The Riches of Gods Love

unto the Veſſells of Mercy,

CONSISTENT WITH

His Abſolute Hatred or Reprobation

Of the Veſſells of Wrath.

OR

AN ANSWER

UNTO A BOOK ENTITULED

Gods Love unto Mankind, Manifeſted by Diſproving His Abſolute Decree for their Damnation.

IN TWO BOOKES

The First being a Refutation of the ſaid Booke,

As it was Preſented in Manuſcript by Mr HORD unto Sir *NATH: RICH.*

The Second being an Examination of certain Paſſages inſerted into M. HORDS Diſcourſe, (formerly Anſwered) by an Author that conceales his Name, but was ſuppoſed to be Mr MASON, Rector of *Andrews-Underſhaft* in London.

By that Great and Famous Light of Gods Church,

WILLIAM TWISSE D. D.

And Prolocutor of the late Aſſembly of *DIVINES.*

Whereunto are annexed Two Tractates of the ſame Author in Anſwer unto D. H. The one concerning Gods Decrees Definite or Indefinite. The other about the object of Predeſtination.

TOGETHER WITH

A Vindication of D. *TWISSE* from the exceptions of Mr *JOHN GOODWIN* In his *Redemption Redeemed.*

By HENRY JEANES Miniſter of God's Word In *CHEDZOY.*

Rom. 9. 20. *O Man, who art thou that repliest againſt God, ſhall the thing formed, ſay to him that formed it, why haſt thou made mee thus?*

v. 21. *Hath not the Potter power over the clay, of the ſame Lump to make one veſſell to honour, and another unto diſhonour.*

OXFORD,

Printed by L. L. and H. H. Printers to the Univerſity, for *Tho: Robinſon.*

Anno Salutis M. DC. LIII.

TO THE WORSHIPFULL,
And his Honoured Uncle,

MICHAEL OLDISWORTH Esquire,

And a Member of the PARLIAMENT

Of the Common-wealth of ENGLAND.

SIR,



Have often heard you professe a deep dislike of the unnaturall vanity of the English Nation, in preferring strangers in all callings above such of their own Country men, as farre surpassed them. And of this unjust partiality, no profession hath tasted in a greater measure, than that of Divinity; for of our Ministers, such whom God hath best fitted with parts and Learning for the discussing of controversies, have been so undervalued in comparison of some Forraine Divines, whose Learning was little better than systematicall; as that they languished in their private studies, and had dyed in obscurity, unlesse the fame of their great abilities had been eccho'd over unto us by the generall applause of all Christendome. Nay this sometimes hath not awakened us unto a due estimation of them. D^r *Ames* was looked upon abroad, as one that amongst Protestant writers had few, either superiors, or equalls, for subtilty in Logick, and Scholasticall Divinity; and yet he dyed an exile from his Native Soyle, so that his Tombe might have had that inscription upon it, which *Scipio* by his will appoynted to be on his; *Ingrata Patria ne ossa mea quidem habes*, Unthankfull Country, thou hast not so much as my Bones. Of how great reputation this our Author was beyond the Seas, I had rather you should heare from the able and judicious *Rivet*, than by mee, who am censured by some (who I am sure much overvalue their own judgements) to have too high and admiring thoughts of him. *Rivet* (in his Epistle prefixed unto a late Book of D. *Twisses* against *Arminius* and *Corvinus* &c.) will assure you that [a] *The most Learned men in the whole Christian World, even those who are of the adverse party, doe confesse that there was nothing yet extant more accurate, exact, and full, touching the Arminian Controversies, than what was written by D. Twisse.* [b] As also *That he (if any one) hath so cleared and vindicated the Orthodoxe cause from objected absurdities, and the calumnies of adversaries, as that out of his labours, not only the Learned, but also those who are least versed in controversies, may find enough whereby to disentangle themselves from the snares of Opposites.* Indeed there is none almost that hath Written against *Arminianisme* since the Publishing of any thing of D^r *Twisses* on that Subject, but have made very honourable mention of him, and have acknowledged him to be the mightiest man in these Controversies, that this Age hath afforded.

a De auctore, ejus Methodo, Scholasticâ dispurandi formâ, acumine & accuratione, judicium lectoribus relinquo; quibus præiverunt Doctissimi ex toto orbe Christiano viri, etiam ex iis qui in contraria sunt parte, fatentes, nihil acuratius, nihil exactius & plenius in hoc argumento hactenus proditum fuisse.

b Hoc saltem omnibus piis placere debet, quod usq; & ubiq; in bonam causam fuerit intentus; eamque, si quisquam alius, ab absurdis objectis, & adversariorum calumniis, ita vindicavit, ut ex illius labore habeant non docti tantum, sed etiam minus exercitati, quo se possint extricare laqueis adversantium. *ibid.*

And yet this Worthy and able Combatant for the Truth and Cauſe of God, was here at home deſigned unto Ruine, as I have found in a Manuſcript under his owne Hand. This I grant was by the *Canterburian Faction*, but withall I could tell ſtrange Stories of the neglects that were heaped upon him by ſome, who were (I believe) Zealous (I am ſure forward) Sticklers for a Reformation. Theſe Men (me think) ſhould bluſh at the ingenuous Teſtimony, which Biſhop *Hall* (though diſſenting from him about Church Goverment) gave of his eminent worth in a Letter of his to Mr *W. S.* by way of Approbation of a ſmall piece of Dr *Twiſſes* Entituled, *The doubting Conſcience Reſolved &c.* The *Doctor* ever declined conference by word of Mouth, as out of modeſty, ſo becauſe he thought the more deliberate way of the Pen, to be quieter, and fitter too, for the bolting out of the Truth: And hereupon he ſpake not much in the late *Aſſembly of Divines* at Weſtminſter. This, ſome (who talked their ſhares) interpreted as an Argument of the former weakneſſe, or at leaſt preſent decay of his intellectualls. But as (c) *Sophocles*, when his Sonnes brought him into queſtion for Dotage, is reported to have recited a Tragedy of *Oedipus Coloneus*, which he had laſt written, and had in his Hands, and to have demanded whether that ſeemed the Verſe of a Dotard, or no. So our *Doctor* could have ſtop'd the Mouths of theſe bold cenſurers by Publiſhing very Maſculine and Vigorous pieces that he Penned in even his moſt declining Age. I may wiſh but I doe not expect, to Live ſo long, as to ſee any thing Publiſhed touching this Argument more convincing the adverſary, than this Elaborate and Weighty Diſcourſe; and yet ſome, who are Perk'd up into places, unto which their parts and gifts bare no proportion, have very lately beſpattered it as lame, imperfect, and I know not what. But the beſt of it is, this their detracting from it, is not likely to be any diſadvantage to it; for it was ſo farre from working that miſchievous effect, which it ſeemes they intended, as that it begat in thoſe who heard it, and unto whom it was afterwards reported, only an admiration, and a ſerious indignation at the immodeſt impudence of ſuch raw young men, who are no better ſkill'd in Polemicall Divinity, then the mock (d) Councel of the Great Duke of *Muſcovie* are in State affaires, *which is made up of the graveſt and ſeemlieſt men of all Muſco, and the adjoyning Citties, richly apparrelled out of the Wardrope; which to forrainers, not knowing this fraude, appeare ſo many Princes, and Noble men; but indeed are meane and unqualified perſons, and of no more ability, than ſo many pictures in a faire-wrought hanging, that ſerve only to cover a Wall.* But I appeale from the raſh and unrighteous cenſures of theſe preſumptuous Novices, unto your more knowing and candid judgement, who as you highly reverenced this our Author whileſt living, ſo have you ever ſince his death borne a zeale unto his memory, and therefore I am aſſured that this Book of his will find with you, not only a favourable, but alſo a gratefull acceptation; and the ſame confidence I have concerning all rationall, Learned, and Orthodoxe men, unto whoſe reading I commend it, and that unto the bleſſing of the Almighty; and ſo I reſt,

c *Cicero de Senectute.*

d *Heylins Geography & Torſhells Hypocrite.*

Your deeply Obliged,

And moſt Humbly devoted Nephew,

HENRY JEANES.

TO THE READER.

IN the days of our Henry the 8th the whole Convocation offered unto Sr Thomas Moore the ſum of foure thouſand pounds at the leaſt, thereby to recompence, in part, the paines, and travailes he had taken, in writing for the defence of the Romiſh faith; which my Author miſcalls the true Catholicke Faith. Now the undertakings of Sr Thomas Moore for the Popiſh cauſe, are not worthy to be named the ſame day with the performances of Doctor Twiſſe againſt the enemies of God's grace, both Jeſuites, and Arminians; I was therefore (I confeſſe) tranſported with a juſt both ſorrow and indignation, when I could not prevaile with any (though I ſolicited diverſe) to adventure upon the Printing of this following Worke of his, without a large ſupply towards the the charge thereof. [a] His Latine Workes have rendred him ſo renowned in forraine Churches, as that they have looked upon him as the Bradwardine of the Age. The States of Weſt-Friezland, unto whom he was no otherwiſe known, than by his Anſwer to Arminius his Book againſt Perkins, offered him the greateſt preferment that a Miniſter in that Country is capable of, viz. the place of a Profeſſor of Divinity in the Univerſity of Franeker, and took order for defraying the charges of his journey, and tranſportation of his family; and were this Book, that I now preſent unto thy view (unto which there is not in the Engliſh Tongue any peere for ſolidity, and accurateneſſe in Scholaſticall Divinity) tranſlated into Latine, I am perſwaded that Outlandiſh Divines would have ſuch an eſtimate of it, as St Jerome had of certaine Bookes of the Martyr Lucian written with his own hand, which he valued as a precious jewell; or as [b] Beza had of a Commentary of Mr Rollocke upon the Romans and Epheſians; concerning which he wrote unto a friend, that he had gotten a treaſure of incomparable value. It was therefore very ſtrange unto me, that there ſhould be any knowing and ſober perſons who ſhould either deſpaire or doubt of the acceptation thereof; But my wonder would have been ſwallowed up of a greater amazement, if I had known that, of which I was ſince by a good hand informed, that this active, unwearied, and victorious Champion of Gods grace, lived in great want even whileſt he was Prolocutor of the late Aſſembly of Divines. Nay which is ſtranger

[a] *Rivet.* Inde factum eſt ut *Guilielmus Twiſſus*, vir doctiſſimus, & in controverſiis illis exercitatiſſimus, *cauſam illam Dei*, contra renaſcentem Pelagianiſmum, tanquam alter *Bradwardinus*, iterum defendendum ſumpſerit, & Librum illum Arminii tam decantatum non eſſe invincibilem, accurato & luculento ſcripto probaverit, nihil omittendo quod non excuſſerit, uſq; ad minutiſſima. Quod opus quam fuerit acceptum, ex eo colligi poteſt, quod, quamvis ſit magnæ molis, duabus editionibus diſtractis tertia nuper prodiit apud eundem Typographum, qui primam curaverat. Hoc labore notus & celebris factus Author in tranſmarinis regionibus, &c.

[b] Clarkes Lives.

ſtranger yet, that he was ſlighted by ſome of his owne calling; who, if they had not much forgotten themſelves, would (ſeeing they ſwam in all plenty) have imitated (in ſome degree at leaſt) that forementioned example of the gratefull munificence of a Popiſh Convocation unto S^r Thomas Moore. *D^r* Ames, *in his Preface to the* Dioceſans *Tryall of that Worthy Divine M^r* Paul Baine, *tells us, that the ſaid M^r* Baine, *was all his life after his ſilencing preſſed with want, not having, as he often complained unto his Friends, a place to reſt his Head in, which me thought (ſaith D^r* Ames) *was an upbraiding of the Age and place where he lived with baſe Regardleſneſſe of piety and learning. If I ſhould apply the like cenſure unto thoſe that neglected this our Author (the Glory of his Age, and Ornament of his Nation) I ſhould not be over bitter. He is now above any recompence to be made unto him in his owne Perſon by us; but we may expreſſe a gratefull Memory of him, as unto his* Children, *ſo unto the Iſſue of his minde,* His Bookes. *I ſpeake not only for the entertainment of thoſe that are Extant; but for bringing into the light thoſe Pieces, that lye in the Hands of his* Children; *which are likely to be Buried in Duſt, and Perpetuall Oblivion. If I had but halfe that Intereſt in great* Perſonages, *which diverſe of my* Brethren *in both the* Univerſities, *& in the* City of London *have, I ſhould apply my ſelfe with an undeniable importunity, to perſwade them unto ſo good, and great a Worke, which will Purchaſe them a precious Memory with the Godly and Learned in all future Ages of the Church. I have but one thing more to ſay of the* Booke, *before I take my leave of Thee: If any* Arminian *whatſoever will give a Juſt, Full, and Scholaſticall Anſwer unto It, I ſhall by God's helpe returne him a Reply; For 'tis* De Cauſa Dei (*as* Bradwardine *Entitles his Booke*) *And in defence of Goa's Cauſe I ſhall feare no Colours. But if the Ignorant Paper-blurrers of the Time ſhall Snarle, and Snap only at ſome few Paſſages, they are not to expect, that ſo much as any ſerious notice ſhould be taken of them.*

Thine,

In all the obligations of Charity and Truth

HENRY JEANES.

THE FIRST BOOK
IN TWO PARTS:

WHEREOF,

THE FIRST

Containeth a Conſideration of thoſe Reaſons for Which Mr HORD (as he pretended) Firſt queſtioned the truth of Abſolute Reprobation.

THE SECOND

Examineth thoſe Arguments againſt the Abſoluteneſſe of Divine Reprobation, which M. *HORD* took to be of a Convincing Nature.



OXFORD,

Printed by *LEON: LICHFIELD*, for *THO: ROBINSON.*

Anno Salutis M. DC. LIII.

A Table of the Principall Matters contained in this Treatiſe, wherein the Anſwer unto Mr *Maſon's* Additions is referred in ſuch order, as that it is made aptly to *cohere with the refutation of* M. HORDS *DISCOURSE.*

AN examination of the Epiſtle to the Reader. lib. 2. p. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

The maine ζητούμενον or Queſtion in theſe Controverſies propounded and ſtated, together with the different opinions of Remonſtrants and Contra-Remonſtrants, both Supralapſarians, and Sublapſarians concerning it, examined. lib. 1. pag. 1, 2, 3. &c. uſq; ad p. 14. and p. 32, 33. uſq; ad p. 40. l. 2. p. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.

The abſolute decree cleared from Mr *Hord's* reaſons both inducing, and convincing.

1. And firſt to begin with thoſe, for which (as he pretended) he firſt queſtioned the truth of abſolute Reprobation, where the abſolute decree is vindicated from the charge.
   1. Of Novelty. lib. 1. p. 40. &c. *uſq;* ad p. 60. l. 2. p. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19.
   2. Of Unwillingneſſe to abide the tryall lib. 1. a p. 59. ad 84. l. 2. p. 19. 20. 21. 22.
   3. Of Infamie. lib. 1. a p. 83. ad p. 91. l. 2. p. 22. 23, 24.
   4. Of Affinity with the old and exploded errors of the Stoicks, and Manichees lib. 1. p. 92, 93. &c. uſq; ad p. 102.
2. Thoſe arguments againſt the abſolutenes of Divine Reprobation according to both the upper and lower way, which Mr *Hord* tooke to be of a convincing nature, are examined.
   1. Mr *Hord's* or Mr *Maſon's* arguments againſt the upper or Supralapſarian way are anſwered. lib. 2. p. 25. &c.

      Where,
      1. The upper or Supralapſarian way is vindicated from the diſhonouring of God in two particulars.
         1. It doth not charge him with mans deſtruction. lib. 2. a p. 25. ad p. 51.
         2. It doth not charge him with mens ſinnes. lib. 1. a p. 14. ad 28 l. 2. a p. 51. ad 116.
      2. The upper or Supralapſarian way is cleared from the overthrow of Religion, and holy Life, and that in foure particulars.
         1. It maketh not ſinne to be no ſinne. lib. 1. p. 10, 28, 29. l. 2. a p 116. ad 121.
         2. It taketh not away the conſcience of ſinne. lib. 1. p. 29, 30. l. 2. p. 117, 121, 122.
         3. It taketh not away the deſert and guilt of ſinne. lib. 1. p. 10, 30, 31, 32. l. 2. p. 122. 123 &c. uſq; ad p. 131.
         4. It maketh not the whole circle of mans Life a meere deſtiny. lib. 2. p. 127, 128, 130, 131, 132, 133.
   2. Thoſe pretended convictive arguments againſt abſolute Reprobation which proceed as it is ſtated according to the Sublapſarian or lower way. lib. 1. p. 103. &c.

And it is fully and clearly evinced that the Sublapſarian Doctrine is not repugnant unto. 1. Teſtimonies of Scripture. 2. Attributes of God. 3. End of the Word, and Sacrament, with other excellent gifts of God to men. 4. Holy and Pious endeavors. 5. The Grounds of comfort, whereby diſtreſſed conſciences are to be relieved.

1. The Sublapſarian Doctrine concerning abſolute reprobation is not repugnant to Scripture. lib. 1. p. 103, 104. &c.

Particularly, not to *Ezek.* 33. 11. As I live ſaith the Lord God, I have no pleaſure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turne from his way & live: turne ye, turne ye from your evill wayes; for why will ye dye o Houſe of Iſrael. lib. 1. p. 103 &c.

Nor to *Ezek.* 18. 32. I have no pleaſure in the death of him that dyeth, ſaith the Lord God; wherefore turne your ſelves and live ye. lib. 1. p. 103, 104, 105, 106.

Not to *Rom.* 11. 32. For God hath concluded them all in unbeliefe, that he might have mercy upon all. lib. 1. p. 107, 108.

Not to *Iohn.* 3. 16. God ſo loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son &c. lib. 1. p. 108, 109, 110.

Not to 1. *Tim.* 2. 4. Who will have all men to be ſaved, and to come unto the knowledge of the Truth. lib. p. 111, 112, 113, 114, 115.

Not to 2 *Peter* 3. 9. --- not willing that any ſhould periſh but that all ſhould come to Repentance. lib. 1. p. 115, 116, 117.

Not to thoſe conditionall ſpeeches which are in 1 *Cron.* 28. 9. And 2 *Cron.* 15. 2. And *Gen.* 4. 7. And *Heb.* 10. 38. lib. 1. p. 117, 118, 119, 120.

2. The Sublapſarian Doctrine &c. is not contrary unto Gods Attributes; to the clearing of which, a diſcourſe premiſed concerning Gods Atributes in generall is refuted. lib. 1. p. 121, 122, &c. unto p. 128.

This done, our Author comes to ſhew in ſpeciall, how that the Sublapſarian Doctrine doth not oppugne,

1. God's Holineſſe. lib. 2. p. 133, 134, &c. unto p. 147.
2. God's Mercy. lib. 1. p. 128, &c. unto p. 145. l. 2. p. 147, 148.
3. God's Juſtice. lib. 1. a p. 145. ad 171. l. 2. a p. 149. ad 156.
4. God's truth or ſincerity. lib. 1. a p. 171. ad 187. l. 2. a p. 156. ad p. 167.

3. The Sublapſarian doctrine not contrary to the uſe and end of God's gifts to men. lib. a p. 187. ad 222. l. 2. p. 166. 167.

4. The Sublapſarian Doctrine not prejudiciall to piety and a Godly life. lib. 1. a p. 221. ad 255. l. 2. p. 167, 168, 169 170.

5. The Sublapſarian Doctrine no enemy to true comfort. lib. 1. p. 255, 256 &c. uſq; ad finem.

By this Table (Reader) thou maiſt correct the miſtitleing of pages, as lib. 1. p. 86, 87, 88, 89. 90. & lib. 2°. p. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27. & p. 52, 53, 58, 59. & a p. 133 ad p. 147.

READER

I would adviſe thee to begin with the examination of thoſe Arguments againſt the abſoluteneſſe of Divine Reprobation (which Mr *Maſon* and Mr *Hord* tooke to be of a convincing nature) by which Method in Reading thou wilt the ſooner meet with that abundant ſatisfaction, which this worke will yeeld, as touching this controverſy, unto all that are capable or deſirous thereof.

THE

THE FIRST PART.

CONTAINING

A CONSIDERATION

of those Reasons, for which

MR HORD

(as he pretended) first Questioned

THE TRUTH OF

ABSOLVTE REPROBATION.



OXFORD,

Printed by L. L. Printer to the University,
for T. R. *Anno* 1653.



THIS TREATISE DIVIDES IT SELFE INTO TWO PARTS,

Viz. { 1. *An Introduction.* 2. *A Diſcourſe.*

I. The Introduction.

SECTION I.

SIR,

I Have ſent you here the Reaſons, which have moved me to change my Opinion in ſome Controverſies, of late debated between the Remonſtrants and their Oppoſites. I doe the rather preſent them unto you,

1. That I may ſhew the due reſpect, which I beare your Worſhip, with my forwardnes to anſwer your deſires, as I can, with regard to Conſcience.
2. That you may ſee, I diſſent not without cauſe, but have Reaſon on my ſide.
3. That if I can be convinced, that my Grounds are weake and inſufficient, I may think better of my Opinion, which I have forſaken, then I can for the preſent.

In the delivery of my Motives, I ſhall proceed in this Order,

1 I will ſtate the Opinion which I diſlike.
2 I will lay down my reaſons againſt it.

Touching the firſt your Worſhip knowes theſe two things very well;

1 That the main ζητούμενον, and Queſtion in theſe Controverſies, and that on which all the reſt hang, is, What the decrees of God are, touching the everlaſting condition of men, and how they are Ordered.

2. That the Men which have diſputed theſe things may be reduced to two ſorts or ſides.

The firſt ſide affirmes, that there is ſuch an abſolute decree, proceeding from the good pleaſure of God alone, without the conſideration of mens finall Unbeliefe and Impenitency, as, by which he caſteth men off from Grace and Glory, and ſhuts up the farr greater part of men (even of thoſe that are called by the Preaching of the Goſpel to Repentance and Salvation) under invincible and unavoydable ſin and damnation.

The other ſide, diſavowing any ſuch decree, ſay, that the Decree of God to caſt off men for ever, is grounded upon the foreſight of their continuance in ſin and unbeliefe, both avoydable by Grace, and conſequently inferring no mans damnation neceſſary.

TWISSE.

Consideration.

WOrthy Sir, according to your desire to take into Consideration this writing directed unto you, at length I have gotten some leasure from other imployments, to addresse my selfe to give you satisfaction in this particular.

1 That I may shew my selfe answerable to that respect which you have deserved at my hands; and not so only, but to my zeale of Gods truth, which hath deserved much more at the hands of us both.

2 That you may the better discern which of us two, whom you put to conferre, doth maintain the cause of Gods truth, and hath the best reasons on his side.

As for the change of Opinion here mentioned, such Professions are nothing strange. But whether such a Profession be in truth, or in pretence, and rather liberty taken to manifest that Opinion, which formerly hath been cherished: as also with what conscience voyd of all carnall respects, such a change or manifestation is made, it belongs not unto us to judge, but to leave that unto God, who tryeth the hearts and reynes. Sure we are, the heart of man is full of deceitfulnesse, both to deceive others, yea and to deceive our selves, the more need there is to be jealous over our selves, and to carry a watchfull eye over our own soules, and whether we have chang'd a former way,
2 Cor. 13. 5. or at the first chose one or other way, and continue to imbrace that, whereof we have been at first informed; not to despise, but in the feare of God, to practice that holy counsell of the Apostle given to the Corinthians, a famous Church, and such as were destitute of no spirituall gift. Prove your selves, whether you are in the Faith, examine your selves: know ye not your own selves, that Jesus Christ is in you, except ye be Reprobates? as also to consider how indifferently we carry our selves, in
1 Cor. 11. 19. using means to inform our selves in the way of truth, and whether they be not such
2 Thes. 2. 10, 11. as doe discover our chiefe care hath been to bring our judgements about, to the imbracing of that way (whether Truth or Errour) which formerly we did effect. Certaine it is, that Heresies must be, and that to this end, that they that are approved may be made manifest. And Illusions shall have their course, when the truth of God is not imbraced with love, whatsoever be the pretence of our disaffecting it, whether harsh-
Matth. 24. 24. nes to affections, or discrepancy to carnall reason. And when such judgements have their course, Who are priviledged from being seduced? Let our Saviour speake in this, So that if it were possible men should deceive the very elect. Upon what may we be
2 Thes. 2. 13. assured to stand firme in time of such temptation? Let the Apostle answer us in this, when after the effectuall working of Satan in them that perish, he comes neere to them to whom he writes in the way of comfort thus, But we ought to give thankes alway to God, for you Brethren beloved of the Lord, because that God hath from the beginning chosen you unto salvation through sanctification of the spirit and faith of the truth. Like as before he did conclude unto himselfe their election, from observation of the work of their Faith, the labour of their Love, and the patience of their Hope. And the greater is the comfort which hereby is ministred unto us, the greater should be our care, to informe our selves aright, in the doctrine thereof, and especially to have an eye unto it, that we doe not shape it in such a manner, that like as it is impossible we should have any assurance thereof, so it will prove equally impossible we should draw any comfort from thence.

1. But is it so, as here it is put upon you, that you knew very well indeed, *that the main ζητούμενον, and Question in these Controversies, and that on which all the rest hang, is, What the decrees of God are, touching the everlasting condition of men, and how they are ordered?*

I assure you, if you knew this, you know more then I doe. I had thought rather that the resolution of the Point concerning Predestination, had depended upon the resolution of the Point touching Grace efficacious, then the contrary. As namely, if Faith be confessed to be the gift of God, and that not with respect to any thing in man, it followeth herehence, that Predestination unto faith, and reprobation from faith,

faith, muſt proceed meerely upon the good pleaſure of God, and not upon foreſight of ought in man.

There was a time when *Auſtin* thought, *that God elected ſome to beſtow the Holy Ghoſt upon them, that by working that which is good, they might obtain everlaſting life*: and who were thoſe whom he thus elected? namely ſuch as whom he foreſaw would believe: and what was his reaſon for it? ſurely this; *Quod ergo credimus noſtrum eſt, quod autem bona operamur, Illius eſt, qui Credentibus dat Spiritum Sanctum; quod profectò non dicerem, ſi jam ſcirem, etiam ipſam fidem inter dei munera reperiri quæ dantur in eodem ſpiritu.* Marke I pray the manner of his Retractation, I would not have ſaid (ſo) if at that time I had known Faith to have been amongſt the gifts of God, which are given in the ſame ſpirit. So then as ſoon as *Auſtin* came to acknowledg, that Faith it ſelfe was the gift of God; he therewithall came off from affirming, that *Quem ſibi creditурum eſſe præſcivit, ipſum elegit, cui Spiritum Sanctum daret ut bona operando etiam vitam æternam conſequeretur.* And like as before he maintained, that God elected ſome (to wit, Believers) to beſtow the Holy ſpirit upon them, that by working good workes, they might obtain alſo everlaſting life; ſo now having found that Faith alſo, is the gift of God, he was accordingly to maintain, that God elected ſome to beſtow the Holy ſpirit upon them, that both by believing, and working good workes, they might obtain everlaſting life: ſo that no longer was the foreſight of Faith, to precede election in *Auſtins* opinion, to wit, after once he knew Faith to be the gift of God. And accordingly in his Book *De Prædeſtin. Sanctorum*, addreſſing himſelfe to the rectifying of the *Maſſilienſes* in the poynt of Predeſtination, wherein they did not as yet diſcerne the truth of God: *Adhuc in quæſtione caligant de Prædeſtinatione ſanctorum.* Cap. 1. And againe, *Si quid de Prædeſtinatione Sanctorum aliter ſapiunt (Deus) illis hoc quoq; revelabit. Ibid.* Marke I pray you what courſe he takes to rectify them herein. *cap. 2. Priùs itaq; fidem quâ Chriſtiani ſumus donum dei eſſe debemus oſtendere*: and whereas he had performed this task very ſufficiently before, manifeſting by divers pregnant paſſages of holy Scripture, that Faith was the gift of God, and the *Maſſilienſes* did elude them by ſuch a diſtinction as this, Faith may be conſidered two waies, either as touching *Initium*, the firſt beginning of it; or as touching *Incrementum* the augmentation thereof; and accommodating this diſtinction ſaid, The paſſages of Scripture alleadged by *Auſtin* proceeded as touching the Augmentation of it, which they willingly granted to be the work of God; but not as touching the initiation of it, which they ſtill maintained to be the work of man. Therefore *Auſtin* addreſſeth himſelfe in that diſcourſe of his, to prove that the very Initiation of Faith, is the work of God, and not the Augmentation only. His words are theſe, *Sed nunc iis reſpondendum eſſe video, qui divina teſtimonia, quæ de hâc re adhibuimus, ad hoc dicunt valere, ut noverimus ex nobis quidem nos habere ipſam fidem, ſed incrementum ejus ex Deo: tanquam fides non ab ipſo donetur nobis, ſed ab ipſo tantum augeatur in nobis ex merito quo cœpit à nobis.* And likewiſe in the 19. cap. of the ſame Book, having propounded the opinion of the Pelagians, namely that becauſe *God foreſaw that we would be holy and unblameable before him in love, therefore he elected and predeſtinated us in Chriſt, before the foundation of the World*; and ſhew'd how this opinion, contradicts that of the Apoſtle *Epheſ.* 1. 4, 5. where it is ſaid, that, *God elected us in Chriſt, and predeſtinated us before the foundation of the World, that we ſhould be holy and unblameable before him in love*: and perceiving withall how the *Maſſilians* did avoid this as nothing contrary to their Tenent (though contrary to the Pelagian Tenent) foraſmuch as they maintained not, that God foreſaw any thing but our Faith, and therefore God elected us before the foundation of the World, that we ſhould be holy and unblameable before him in love, (for theſe were their words) *Nos autem dicimus noſtram Deum non præſciſſe niſi fidem & ideò nos elegiſſe -- ut etiam ſancti & immaculati gratia atque opere ejus eſſemus*; what courſe doth *Auſtin* take to beat them off but this, namely to prove, that, Like as Holines ſo Faith alſo, and that as touching the Initiation thereof, is the work of God. thus: *Sed audiant ipſi in hoc teſtimonio, ubi dicit, ſortem conſecuti ſimus, prædeſtinati ſecundum propoſitum qui univerſa operatur. Ipſe ergo ut credere incipiamus operatur qui univerſa operatur.* So that it is cleer in the opinion of *Auſtin*, that to take both himſelfe and others off from premiſing the foreſight of Faith unto Gods election, it is ſufficient to prove that Faith is the gift of God, the work of God both touching the augmentation, and touching the firſt introduction thereof. And thus evincing the condition of Predeſtination, as excluding all foreſight of Faith, from the condition of Predeſtination, as being throughout the work of God in man, rather then taking a contrary courſe, as if the main ζητούμενον were, what

Auguſt. de Præd. Sanct. c. 3. Fidem elegit Deus in præſcientia ut quem creditурum eſſe præſcivit, ipſum eligeret cui Sp. ſanctum daret ut bona operando vitam æternam conſequeretur. Retract. lib. 1. cap. 23.

what is the condition of Gods decree of Predeſtination, as here it is pretended and ſuppoſed. And albeit it is commonly received of all ſides (as if it were without queſtion) that Faith is the gift of God: yet we find practiſes on foot, for the working of a manifeſt innovation herein. For not to ſpeak of their interpretations of their own meanings, as, in what ſence they ſay God workes Faith in us; it is apparent the Remonſtrants now a daies, doe as good as profeſſe, that Faith is not beſtowed upon us for Chriſts ſake, in as much as they deny that Chriſt merited Faith for us. For when the Author of the Cenſure paſſed upon the Remonſtrants Confeſſion, diſputeth thus, *At ſi hoc tantum meritus eſt Chriſtus tum Chriſtus nobis non eſt meritus fidem nec regenerationem:* the Remonſtrants in the Anſwer hereunto, forthwith confeſſe it in theſe words, *Sanè ita eſt. Nihil ineptius, nihil vanius eſt quàm hoc Chriſti merito tribuere. Si enim Chriſtus nobis meritis dicatur fidem & regenerationem, tum fides conditio eſſe non poterit, quam a peccatoribus Deus ſub comminatione mortis æternæ exigeret.* And by the way marke, I pray, that not any difference is put *between Faith and Regeneration*; manifeſtly ſignifying thereby, that as they grant it to be the work of man to believe, ſo we are commanded *to make our ſelves a new heart.*

Apol. pro Confeſ. Remonſt. Fol. 95. p. 1.

Ezech. 18. 31

And as for ordering of the decrees, which here is added to compleat the main ζητούμενον, as here is pretended; that in my opinion, is ſo farr off from being the main ζητούμενον, as that it is not to be accounted any ζητούμενον at all Theologicall, but meerly Logicall. Let the condition of the decrees be rightly explicated according to Divinity, and we ſhall have no need at all of Divinity for the right ordering of them. A meer Logicall faculty by light of nature, will ſerve for this. For the decrees whereof we treat, are meerely *Intentiones rerum gerendarum.* Now for the ordering of theſe in what kind ſoever, we have received Rules of the Schooles, never yet that I know contradicted by any; namely, that they are to be ordered according to the condition of the things intended, which are but two, to wit, the end and the means; and all doe attribute priority to the intention of the end, and poſteriority to the intention of the means. It is true, men may erre, in deſigning the right end, as alſo, in deſigning the right means, and theſe errours are to be diſcovered, and the truth cleered by that ſcience, whereunto the conſideration of the end and means belong, and not by Logick. But agreement being made concerning the end and means, there is no doubt to be made, but that according to the moſt received Rules of Schooles, the end muſt be acknowledged both firſt in intention, and laſt in execution, and contrarily the means laſt in intention and firſt in execution.

2. But come we to the Decrees themſelves, & the different opinions thereabouts, which follow in the next place. Now here I looked for different opinions about decrees, in the plural number, but I find the relation extends no farther then to one decree, and that of Reprobation. So at the firſt entrance reaſons are promiſed, even in this writing, to be exhibited *of chang of opinion in certain controverſies* in the plurall number, when in the iſſue, all comes but to one controverſy, and that about Reprobation. Yet the Scripture ſpeaketh fully of Election, ſparingly of Reprobation in moſt places, leaving us to judge thereof, by conſequence from the doctrine of Election Yet ſome paſſages we have (I confeſſe) that give light and evidence to both alike. For like as it is ſaid *Actis* 2. laſt. that *God added daily to the Church ſuch as ſhould be ſaved.* ſo 2 *Cor.* 4. 3. it is ſaid, *If our Goſpell be hid, it is hid to them that are loſt*, and as it is ſignified *Math.* 24 24. that Tis impoſſible ſeducers ſhould prevaile over the elect. ſo 2 *Theſ.* 2. both as much is ſignified ver. 13. and alſo expreſſed ver. 10. 11. that they ſhall prevaile among them that periſh: and the 1 *Cor.* 1. 18. we are given to underſtand joyntly, *that the preaching of the Croſſe is to them that periſh fooliſhneſſe: but unto us which are ſaved it is the power of God.* and *Rom.* 9. 18. that *as God hath mercy on whom he will, ſo alſo he hardneth whom he will.* And like as *Actis* 13. 48. we read that, *as many believed as were ordained to eternall life*; which phraſe of ordaining to eternall life, I conceive (under correction) to be all one with the phraſe of *Writing our names in Heaven. Luke* 10. 20. *and writing us in heaven. Hebr.* 12. 23. and this phraſe I take to be all one with the *writing of us in the Book of life.* So on the other ſide we read, *that Whoſe names were not written in the Book of Life from the foundation of the World ſhould wonder when they beheld the Beaſt, and not ſo only but worſhip him alſo.* But give we every veſſel leave to vent that liquor whereof it is full.

Revel. 17. 8.
Revel. 13. 8.

I come to the conſideration of the different opinions here propoſed, concerning the decree of Reprobation; and herein, I will endeavour to open a clear way to the right

right understanding of the truth, that your judgement may have the more free course in discerning it, and withall, to represent unto you, the unreasonable carriage of our Adversaries in the setting downe of our Tenent, whereby you may guesse, what you are to expect from them prosecuting against it. And herein I will insist upon these particulars. The first shall be the Things Decreed. The second the Cause of this decree. The third, the Persons on whom this Decree doth passe. The fourth shall be that claw of Unavoydable Sin, and Damnation.

1. The Things Decreed are here said to be, *The casting off from grace and glory, and the shutting of men up under Damnation.*

Now I pray observe here in the first place, that, *by casting off from grace and glory*, we mean no other thing, then the not giving of grace and glory; and by grace, we mean the grace of Faith and Repentance, the grace of Regeneration. For like as in Election God purposeth (we say) to give this grace unto some, which is the same with shewing mercy on them. *Rom.* 9. 18. as we suppose; so on the other side, God purposeth to deny this grace unto others, which in Scripture phrase is to harden them, that being made opposite to Gods shewing mercy. *Rom.* 9. 18. And for the farther clearing of the termes we say, that God by giving Faith and Repentance, doth cure that infidelity and impenitency, which is naturall unto all, as being borne in sin: and by not giving this grace of Faith and Repentance unto others, God leaves their naturall infidelity and impenitency uncured. And if this Author means ought else *by shutting up under sin*, then the not curing of their naturall infidelity and impenitency, he doth us wrong, and what he means thereby I know not. As for shutting up under damnation, that is not our phrase, but we love to speak in plain tearmes, and say, that God doth purpose to inflict damnation on them whom he Reprobates.

Thus much for the cleering of the tearmes, as touching the things Decreed.

Secondly, observe I pray, which is of principall consideration, that here we have no cause at all specified, why he refuseth to give them grace; cunningly leaving it to an improvident Reader to conceive, that the cause of the decree, which is here specified, to be the meer pleasure of Gods will, is indifferently applyable *to the not giving of grace and glory, and to the shutting up under damnation* as the cause thereof, which is a notorious impostur, yet I doe not think this Author guilty of it, but others rather, who abuse their witts by cunning courses, to deceive the hearts of the simple. Amongst the Fallacies observed by Aristotle, there is one called *Fallacia plurium interrogationum*, as when many things are put together, and an answer is required to be made, either affirmatively or negatively to them all, as if they were but one; when indeed the answer cannot be made aright, without distinction of the things demanded, the one whereof perhaps requires an answer affirmative, the other negative. As for example, to instance as touching one of the Controversies here declined: We are often demanded, whether every one that heareth the Gospell, be not bound to believe that Christ died for him? Now I say this phrase *Christ died for me* includes many things, as the benefits which arise unto me by the death of Christ, may be conceived to be many. But let these benefits be distinguished, and we shall readily answer to the question made, and that perhaps differently, as namely, affirmatively to some, negatively to others; as thus. Doe you speak of Christs dying for me, that is, for the pardon of my sins, and for the salvation of my soule: I answer affirmatively and say, I am bound to believe that Christ died for the procuring of these benefits unto me in such manner, as God hath ordained, to wit, not absolutely but conditionally, to wit, in case I doe believe and repent. For God hath not otherwise ordained, that I should reap the benefit of pardon and salvation, by vertue of Christs Death and Passion, unlesse I believe in him and repent. But if question be made, whether I am bound to believe that Christ died for me, to procure faith and repentance unto me; I doe not say, that I am bound, or that every one who hears the Gospel, is bound to believe this.

Nay the Remonstrants now a daies, deny in expresse tearmes, that Christ merited this for any at all. I am not of their opinion in this; but I see clearly a reason manifesting, that Christ merited not this for all, no not for all and every one, that hears the Gospel. For if he had, then either he hath merited it for them absolutely or conditionally. Not absolutely, for then all and every one of them should believe *de facto*, which is untrue; for the Apostle saith, *Fides non est Omnium*: Nor conditionally, for what condition I pray can be devised, upon the performance whereof, God for Christs sake should give us faith, and repentance? In like sort, if I am demanded whether

Censura Censura.

2 Thes. 3.

whether God did decree, of the meer pleaſure of his will, to refuſe to give grace and glory unto ſome, and to inflict upon them damnation. To this I cannot anſwer at once, there being a Fallacy in the demand. But diſtinguiſh them, I anſwer and ſay, that, as touching the poynt of denying grace, God doth that of his meer pleaſure; but as touching the denyall of glory, and the inflicting of damnation, he doth not decree to doe theſe of meer pleaſure, but rather meerly for ſin, to wit, for their infidelity and impenitency, and all the bitter fruits that ſhall proceed from them. So that Reprobation according to our Tenent rightly ſtated, is the decree of God partly to deny unto ſome, and that of his meer pleaſure, the grace of Faith and Repentance, for the curing of that infidelity and hardnes of heart, which is naturall unto all, and partly to deprive them of glory, and to inflict damnation upon them, not of his meer pleaſure, but meerly for their finall continuance in ſin, to wit; in infidelity and impenitency, and all the fruits that proceed therehence.

2. Now as for the cauſe of this decree, as likewiſe of all the decrees of God, when any of our Divines ſay, that it is the meer pleaſure of God, as in ſome places it is expreſſed of ſome decrees, let them be underſtood aright; not as if they diſtinguiſhed between the decree of God, and the good pleaſure of his will; for we know full well, that the decree of God is the good pleaſure of his Will, what decree ſoever it be: but hereby we only exclude, all cauſes from without, moving God to make any ſuch decree; like as when it is ſaid, *Deuteron.7.7. The Lord did not ſet his love upon you, nor chuſe you, becauſe ye were more in number then any people, but becauſe the Lord loved you*, as much as to ſay, The Lord loved you, becauſe he loved you. Where we cannot ſoberly deviſe any diſtinction between love and love, as between the cauſe and the effect; only hereby is excluded all cauſe from without. Now we are ready with open face to profeſſe, that of the Will and decree of God, there neither is, nor can be any cauſe from without: all things from without being temporall, and the Will of God being eternall, and the Will of God *quoad actum Volentis*, being the very Eſſence of God; For God is a pure Act and that indivisibly One, whereby he is ſaid to Bee whatſoever he is, as wee doe conceive variety of perfections in God, yet all theſe are but one indiviſible Act in God; and by this one indiviſible Act, he both knowes all that he knowes, and willeth and decreeth all that he willeth and decreeth. Man when he willeth any thing, as likewiſe an Angel when he willeth ought, they produce an act of willing paſſing upon this or that object: but it is not ſo with God, in whom there is no accident. And therefore *Aquinas* was bold to profeſſe, that never any man was ſo mad, as to profeſſe that merits were the cauſe of Predeſtination, as touching the act of God predeſtinating: and why ſo? why ſurely upon this ground, becauſe predeſtination is the will of God; and like as nothing can be the cauſe of the will of God, as touching the act of willing, ſo nothing can be the cauſe of divine predeſtination, as touching the act of God predeſtinating. His words are theſe in the ſame place; *Sic inquirenda eſt ratio prædeſtinationis, ſicut inquiritur ratio divinæ voluntatis. dictum eſt autem ſuprà, quod non eſt aſſignare cauſam divinæ voluntatis ex parte actus volendi.* But becauſe like as the love of God is ſometime taken for the good thing which God beſtowes, like as *Janſenius* interprets that place *Iohn.* 14.21. *He that loveth me ſhall be beloved of my Father*, to wit, of the effect of the Fathers love; and we commonly ſay, that Paſſions are attributed unto God not *quoad Affectum*, but *quoad Effectum*: in like ſort the Will of God is taken for the thing willed, as 1 *Theſ.*4.3. *This is the will of God, even your ſanctification*, that is, this is willed by him. Therefore *Aquinas* diſtinguiſheth a double conſideration in the will of God, one *quoad actum volentis*, and ſo it hath no cauſe from without; another *quoad res volitas*, and ſo it may have a cauſe. So likewiſe in predeſtination as conſidering it either *quoad actum Prædeſtinantis*, and ſo it hath no cauſe, or *quoad effectum Prædeſtinationis*, and ſo it may have a cauſe, as there he profeſſeth, both touching the will of God in generall, and touching Predeſtination in ſpeciall. Of the will of God in generall, thus; *Non eſt aſſignare cauſam voluntatis divinæ ex parte actus volendi, ſed poteſt aſſignari ratio ex parte volitorum, in quantum ſcilicet Deus vult eſſe aliquid propter aliud.* And of predeſtination in ſpeciall, thus; *Sed hoc ſub quæſtione vertitur, utrum ex parte effectus prædeſtinatio habeat aliquam cauſam; & hoc eſt quærere utrùm Deus præordinaverit ſe daturum effectum prædeſtinationis alicui propter aliqua merita.* Now thus we acknowledge of predeſtination, both in the way of a meritorious cauſe on Chriſts part, and in the way of a diſpoſing cauſe on our part. For God we ſay, hath predeſtinated to beſtow upon us, both grace and glory for Chriſts ſake; where Chriſt is made a meritorious cauſe of grace and glory,

Aquin. 1.q. 23. art. 5. *Nullus fuit ita inſanæ mentis ut diceret merita eſſe cauſam Divinæ* Prædeſtinationis ex parte actus Prædeſtinantis.

but

but not of the act of predestination. And farther we say, that God hath predestinated to bestow glory upon us, as a reward of grace, as a reward of faith, repentance, and good workes: and to this purpose it is said that God by his grace, *doth make us meet partakers of the inheritance of the Saints in light*, Coloss. 1.12. But as for the bestowing of grace on any, we say there is no cause thereof on mans part, For *he hath mercy on whom he will*. Rom. 9. 18. and *he hath called us with an holy calling not according to our workes, but according to his own purpose and grace*. 2 Timoth. 1.9.

Now let us apply this to reprobation, which is the will of God, as well as predestination, and if there can be no cause of predestination *quoad actum Prædestinantis*, because there can be no cause of the will of God *quoad actum volentis*; Who seeth not, that by the same reason, there can be no cause of reprobation *quoad actum reprobantis*? And if it be a mad thing to maintain that merits are the cause of predestination *quoad actum prædestinantis*; it must be as mad a thing to maintain, that any merits of the creature, can be the cause of reprobation *quoad actum reprobantis*. And this doctrine *Aquinas* applies expressly to Reprobation it selfe, upon the 9. Rom. Lect. 2da, at the end of these words *Præscientia peccatorum potest esse aliqua ratio reprobationis*: but how? *ex parte actus reprobantis*? nothing lesse, but rather *ex parte effectus*; and what effect? not the denying of grace, but only as touching the inflicting of punishment: thus, *Præscientia peccatorum potest esse aliqua ratio reprobationis, ex parte pœnæ quæ præparatur reprobatis, in quantum scilicet Deus proponit se puniturum malos propter peccata quæ à seipsis habent non à Deo.*

And farther we prove this, both by cleare evidence of Scripture, and cleare evidence of reason, and thirdly by as cleare a representation of their infatuation that oppose this doctrine, and particularly of the Author of this discourse.

First by cleare evidence of Scripture. *Rom.* 9. 11. Where the Apostle proves, that Election stands not of good works, by an argument drawn from the circumstance of the time, when that Oracle, *The elder shall serve the younger*, was delivered; together with the present condition of *Jacob* and *Esau*, answerable to that time; thus, *Before the children were borne, or had done good or evill, it was said to Rebecca, The Elder shall serve the Younger, Therefore the purpose of God according to Election stands not of good workes*. Now look by what strength of reason the Apostle concludes this of Election, by the same strength of argumentation may I conclude of reprobation, in proportion, thus, Before the Children were borne, or had done Good or Evill, it was said to *Rebecca* The Elder shall serve the Younger; therefore the purpose of God according to reprobation, stands not of evill workes: that is, like as good workes are not the cause of Election, so evill workes are not the cause of Reprobation, to wit, *quoad actum reprobantis*, as touching the very act and eternall decree of God it selfe.

Secondly, observe, I pray, whether my reason be not as cleare; If God upon the foresight of sin, doth ordain a man unto damnation; (thus I am content to propose it in the most rigorous manner) then this is done either by necessity of nature, or by the constitution of God: Not by necessity of nature, as it is confessed; and the cause is evident, for undoubtedly he could annihilate them, and so he can the holiest creature that lives, as all sides confesse. Therefore it must be by the constitution of God: but neither can this hold. For if so, then God did constitute, that is ordaine, that upon the foresight of sin, he would ordaine men unto damnation. Where observe that the act of divine ordination, is made the object of divine ordination: as much as to say, he did ordaine to ordaine, or he did decree to decree: Whereas the objects of Gods decrees are alwaies things temporall; as for example, We say well, God did decree to create the world, to make man out of the earth, to send Christ into the World, to preserve us, to redeeme us, sanctify us, save us. But Gods ordination or decree is an act eternall, and cannot be the object of his decree or ordination. I challenge all the Powers of darknes to answer this, and to vindicate the Tenent, which I impugne, from that absurdity, which I charge upon it, if they can.

O but some will say, it's very harsh to say, that God of his meer pleasure doth ordain men unto damnation.

I am content to doe my endeavour, to remove this ſcandall out of the way of honeſt hearts, yea and out of the way of others alſo.

Firſt therefore conſider, is it fit to reſiſt the evidence of divine truth, becauſe it is harſh to mens affections?

Secondly, Wherein conſiſts this harſhneſſe? Is it in this, that nothing is the cauſe of Gods decree? and will nothing temper the harſhnes of it, unles a thing temporall as ſinne, be made the cauſe of Gods will, which is eternall and even God himſelfe? But let us deale plainly, and tell me in truth, whether the harſhnes doth not conſiſt in this, That the meer pleaſure of Gods will, ſeems to be made the cauſe, not of Gods decree only, but of damnation alſo; as if God did damne men, not for ſin, but of his meer pleaſure. And this I confeſſe is wondrous harſh, and yet no more harſh then it is untrue, though in this jugling world, things are ſo carried by ſome, who will both ſhuffle, and cutt, and deale themſelves, as if we made God of meer pleaſure to damne men, and not for ſin, which is a thing utterly impoſſible: damnation being ſuch a notion, as hath eſſentiall reference unto ſin. But if God damne no man but for ſinne, and decreed to damne no man but for ſinne, what if the meer pleaſure of God be the cauſe of this decree; what harſhnes I ſay is this? As for example, *Zimri* or *Cosby* periſhed in their inceſtuous act, and gave up both luſt and ghoſt together, ſo going as it were quick to Hell, never fearing the judgements of God, untill they felt them. If we ſay, God decreed they ſhould be cut off in this ſin of theirs, and be damned for it, What harſhnes I pray in this, though God made this decree of meer pleaſure? For is it not manifeſt he did? For could he not if it had pleaſed him, have cauſed them to outlive this ſin of theirs, and given them ſpace for repentance, and not ſpace only, but grace alſo for repentance, ſeeing as *Auſtin* ſaith, *Quantumlibet præbuerit Patientiam, niſi Deus dederit, quis aget Pœnitentiam.*

Mark well that Gods pleaſure is the cauſe of this decree, but not of the damnation decreed.

Contr. Iulian. Pelag. lib. 5. cap. 4.

Now I pray, what is become of the harſhnes of this our Tenent as is pretended? And the truth is, the harſhnes lyeth not here, though our Adverſaries would faine draw it hither, but rather on the other part of reprobation, as it denotes Gods purpoſe for the denying of grace, to wit, the grace of Regeneration, the grace of faith and repentance: but on this part, they are not very forward to cry out upon our Tenent, as ſavouring of harſhnes, but themſelves rather driven to ſuch ſtraites, as either to deny faith and repentaince to be the gift of God (wherein the Remonſtrants now a daies, are come ſo far as cleerely to profeſſe, that Chriſt merited not faith and Regeneration for any; whence it followeth, that if God doth give faith and repentance unto any, yet it is not for Chriſts ſake that he gives it,) Or being demanded how it comes to paſſe, that God gives it not to all, if his meer pleaſure be not the cauſe of this difference, as namely in ſhewing mercy unto ſome, when he hardens others, they are put upon this ſhift to ſay, that if they would believe, God would give them faith, if they would repent God would give them repentance; and one that I have had to deale with, on this very argument, ſpares not to profeſſe that God doth work in man *to Velle, credere, & reſipiſcere, modo Velit.*

One thing I had almoſt pretermitted, and that was, to repreſent the infatuate condition of this declaration, to wit, as touching the Authors Tenent in oppoſition to ours, as in ſaying, *that Gods decree to caſt off men for ever, is grounded upon the foreſight of their continuance in ſin and unbeliefe;* For this continuance muſt be underſtood of finall continuance therein, leaſt otherwiſe the contradiction to our Tenent be not duely expreſſed. Now the foreſight hereof is made to precede Gods caſting men off for ever: but from what? ſurely from grace and glory, in contradiction to our Tenent as here it is ſhaped; and conſequently in election, the foreſight of finall perſeverance in faith and repentance, muſt be ſhaped to precede Gods giving grace, to wit, in another world, as if the other world were appoynted for the giving of grace to ſome, and denying it another; and that the giving of the grace of faith and repentance, and denying it unto others, was after the one hath perſevered in faith and repentance, and the other in infidelity and impenitency unto the end in this World. For this is it we meane by grace, when we ſay, God in Election deſtinates it to one, and in Reprobation decrees to deny it unto the other; and in contradicting us it is fit they ſhould uſe our termes in our meaning, unles they expreſſe the contrary, and give a reaſon of it.

3. As for the Perſons on whom this decree paſſeth, and the aggravation there mentioned, namely of *ſhutting up the greater part of men, even of thoſe that are called,*

under

under ſinne and damnation, This is confeſſed on all hands, That the greateſt part of men are reprobated, even of thoſe that are called; and our Saviour hath expreſly given us to underſtand, *That many are called but few are choſen.* And it is without queſtion, that if it be lawfull for God to deale thus with one, it is as lawfull to deale ſo with the greateſt part, yea with all. And experience juſtifieth that the greateſt part of them that are called doe not performe true faith and repentance: and if they did and dye therein, then the greateſt part of them that are called, ſhould be choſen. Whereby it is manifeſt, that God doth not give Faith and Repentance unto the greateſt part of them that are called; and conſequently, it is nothing ſtrange, that he ſhuts up the greateſt part of them that are called under Damnation. So that in true account there is no weight at all of aggravation in this. Like as you have read in *Newes from Parnaſſus*, that when the French and the Spaniard weighed their powers in the ballance, and the French being found to weigh 25 Millions, and the Spaniard but 20: He thinking to help the matter, and to make himſelfe as weighty as the French, clapped into the ſcale the Kingdome of Naples and the Dukedome of Millan; but beyond his expectation, the ſcale proved never a whit the more weighty then before, but lighter rather.

4. As for the laſt claw, to help the matter with a couple of Epethetes of *invincible ſin and unavoidable damnation*; one of theſe might have ſufficed to be expreſſed, ſeeing undoubtedly Damnation is no otherwiſe avoidable by man, then by avoiding ſin the cauſe thereof. For it is undenyable that man dying in ſin, his damnation is unavoydable by the whole power of nature.

But as for the avoydablenes of ſin, the Author of this Diſcourſe acknowledgeth it no otherwiſe then by grace; and we willingly profeſſe, that all ſin is avoydable by grace. But by the way it is implied, that ſuch a grace is afforded unto all reprobates, whereby they may avoyd that infidelity and impenitency for which they are damned. But this we deny. For if this were true then all Reprobates were enabled to believe, to repent, to pleaſe God, to diſcerne the things of God, to be ſubject to the Law of God; but to ſay this, is directly to contradict the Word of God, which profeſſeth of ſome, that *They could not believe Ioh.*12.39. of others that *They cannot repent, Rom.*2.5. Of all naturall men, that *They cannot diſcern the things of God*, as which *ſeem fooliſhneſſe unto them*, 1 *Cor.*2.14. of them that are in the fleſh, that *They cannot pleaſe God, Rom.*8.8. of φρόνημα σαρκὸς *the affection of the fleſh*, that *'tis enmity againſt God, and it is not ſubject to the Law of God, nor can be, Rom.*8.7. And of the Iſraelites in the Wilderneſſe for forty years together, *God had not given them eyes to ſee, nor eares to heare, nor an heart to perceive, Deutron.* 29. 4.

INTRODUCTION.

SECT. II.

THE firſt ſide is divided; for

1. Some of them preſent man to God, in the decree of Reprobation, conſidered and looked upon out of, or above the Fall, and make the Will of God, without any conſideration of ſin in man Originall or Actuall, to be the cauſe of his eternall Rejection, that ſo he might ſhew his abſolute and unlimited power and dominion over him, in appointing to heaven or hell, whom he pleaſed: and this way goe *Calvin, Beza, Zanchius, Piſcator, Gomarus.*

That way ſeems to charge God very deepely, and to make him the prime and principall cauſe of mens everlaſting ruine, and the author alſo, not only of the firſt ſin that entred into the world, but of all other ſins likewiſe, that are ſucceſſively committed therein, as meanes

to bring men by a course and colour of justice, to those lamentable ends to which he had from eternity appointed them: and so by good consequence, it makes the pure and holy God, to be unholy, and ascribes unto him, farre greater cruelty, then can be found in the most bloudy and barbarous Tyrant in the World. *Suetonius* in the life of *Tiberius* (one of the veryest Butchers of all the Roman Emperours) reports of him, that having a mind to put the two sonnes of *Germanicus* (*Drusus* and *Nero*) to death, *Variâ fraude induxit ut concitarentur ad convitia, & concitati perderentur*; He used cunning contrivances to draw them to reproach him, that so he might cover his cruelty in their death, under a pretext of justice. And a little after he saith of the same Emperour, that (because it was not lawfull among the Romans to strangle Virgins) he caused certain little maides to be deflowred by the Hangman, that so they might afterwards be strangled. This cruelty of *Tiberius*, exceeded the bounds of humanity, and yet it comes as short of that, which this way laies to the charge of God, as a temporall death comes short of an eternall, and the power of man in drawing men to offend, comes short of that irresistable power, which the Almighty is able to use, in the producing of sin.

Sueton. Edit. Lugd. 1532. pag. 171.

Ibid. p. 175.

Besides, it takes from men all conscience of sin, and makes sin to be no sin. We use to say, *Necessitas non habet legem*, Necessity hath no law. Actions in themselves evill, if an absolute necessity bear sway in them, are transgressions of no law, and consequently are no sin (for sin is a transgression of the law) and men when they doe them, they have no reason to be sorry for them. The Tragœdian could see this, where he saith, *Fati ista culpa est, Nemo fit fato nocens*, when one evill action is done, the doer is not in fault, but the decree that necessitates him to doe it.

It takes away likewise from good and evill actions, that defect which they naturally carry with them of Rewards and Punishments, as Saint *Hierome* tells us, *Liberi arbitrii nos condidit Deus, nec ad virtutes nec ad vitia necessitate trahimur, alioqui ubi necessitas est nec damnatio nec corona est.* Where necessity domineers, there is no place for retribution; and therefore none are drawn by the adamantine chains of necessity to virtues or vices, but left free to the choyce of their own wills. When *Zeno* his servant was punished by him for a fault that he had done, he told his Master out of his own grounds that he was unjustly beaten, because he was *Fato coactus peccare*, constrained so to doe by his undeclinable destiny; and certainly, if malefactors could not chuse but play their rude prankes, they could not be justly punished for them. For all just punishments suppose a possibility of avoyding those offences, of which they are the punishments.

L. 2. contra Iovin.

TWISSE.

Consideration.

THis Authors pretence being only to oppose that Tenent, which maintaines that the decree of denying grace and glory, and of inflicting damnation doth not presuppose the foresight of final perseverance in sin, you may well marvaile to what purpose this comes in about the different condition of man, considered by God either as before the Fall, or after the Fall in *Adam*, it being a question of another nature and meerly Logicall, to wit, about the ordering of Gods decrees of Creation, Permission of the fall of *Adam*, giving or denying Grace, Salvation or Damnation. The resolution whereof, depends upon the right distinction of these decrees, in reference to the end, and to the means tending to that end. For this being Resolved according to the rules of Divinity, the order between them, must consequently be determined, according to the rules generally received in the Schooles, namely thus, The intention of the end is first, then the intention of the means: so that if Salvation be the end, and Creation and Permission of Adams Fall and Raising therehence by Faith and Repentance to be the means, it must be confessed, that the decree of Salvation must be first, then the decree of Creation, permission of sin, and of raising out of sin. So if the damnation of any be the end that God intends, and creation and permission of sin, and of finall perseverance therein be the means; it must be acknowledged, that the decree of damnation, was before the decree of creation, &c. But if salvation and damnation be no ends intended by God, but means rather, as well as creation, and permission of all to sin in *Adam*, together with the raising of some therehence, and leaving some therein, tending to some farther end, namely, the Manifestation of Gods glory in a certain kind, as the Scripture together with manifest reason doth justify. For God being the supreame efficient, must necessarily be the last end. And even there where the word of God doth testify, that God created the wicked against the day of evill, it doth therewithall give to understand, that what is signified by, *To the day of evill*, doth not denote the end of Gods actions (that before being expressed to be God himselfe, *God made all things for himselfe*, not for acquiring ought unto himselfe, for he is so perfect, that nothing can be added unto him) but

for

for the manifesting of his own most glorious nature: so that if God be pleased to manifest his glorious beneficence on man in the highest degree, and that in the way of mercy mixt with justice; this end requires and bespeaks both creation (no glory at all being manifestable without this) and permission of sin (otherwise it could not be manifested in the way of mercy) and satisfaction for sin (otherwise this mercy could not be mixed with justice exactly) and faith and repentance (otherwise the good which God intends could not be bestowed by way of reward) and last of all Salvation, under which we comprehend, the highest and most blessed condition that the nature of man, continuing a meere man, is capable of. And herehence we conclude, that in case the end is such as hath been specified, and all these actions following, congruous means tending to that end, therefore the decree of manifesting Gods glory, as above specified, is first with God, and secondly the decree of the means; which means although they are many materially, yet they come all under one formall notion of means tending to a certain end, which according to the severall parts thereof bespeaks them all; and consequently they are all to be considered, as making up the object of one formall decree, called the decree of the means: and the intention of none of them is before another, but all intended at once, as means tending to that end which is first intended. In like manner if God shall be pleased to intend the manifestation of his glory in Man or Angell, in the way of justice vindicative, the means necessarily required hereunto are, Creation, Permission of sin, and Damnation unto punishment, and all three makes up the object of one formall decree, which is to be called the decree of the means. So that like as God doth not intend the creatures creation, before he intends his damnation, in the same respect he cannot be said to intend his damnation, before he intends his creation, or the permission of his sinne.

And this rightly considered, sets an end unto all quarrell about the different consideration of Man in election and reprobation, which yet is about a Schoole point only, touching the right stateing of the end and the means, and the right ordering of Gods decrees concerning them. And doth it not set an end also, to all aspersions of cruelty cast upon the holy providence of God, from the guilt of which kind of blasphemies, nothing can free them, but confidence in their own way, as if it were the way of truth, and that by convincing evidence of holy Scripture? Whereas it appears how little direction they take from the Word of God throughout, for the shaping of their Tenent in this. Yet neither is any such confidence, able to free them from the guilt of such blasphemies which they utter: well it may free them from the conscience of it, yet if it doe, that is more then I know. And only to these two ends doth this aliene discourse of our different opinions thereabouts tend, as I conceive; namely, to shew the difference of our Divines, and to give vent to those aspersions of blasphemy on the first way, as also to make way for a third in part, which comes to be considered in the next Section, in the manner how they fall upon the relation of the second way.

Yet *Arminius* in his Conference with *Junius*, might have informed him of three opinions concerning the object of Predestination, dividing the fruit of these into two. The condition of man before the Fall, being considerable two waies, either as before the Fall, but after Creation, which they call *the Masse created, but not yet corrupted*; or as not before the Fall only, but before the creation also, which we commonly call the Masse not yet created, or Mankind not yet created. As touching the most harsh way of these three, upon examination of *Arminius* his twenty arguments against it, I find nothing worth the speaking of, but meere suggestion of flesh and bloud, which yet being duely pondered, doe discover most shamefull nakednes.

Note

His arguments against the making of Mankind not yet created, the object of predestination, I have proposed and answered in my *Vindiciæ gratiæ Dei, lib.* 1. *De Prædestin. digress.* 5. if this Author hath any mind to be doing with them, I shall be ready to consider what he saith, as God shall give opportunity.

And in *Junius* you shall finde, how he laboureth to reconcile them, but very obscurely. *Piscator* also sets hand to the same work, and carryeth himselfe therein (as his manner is) very clearely, by distinguishing three acts in Predestination. The first whereof he will have to presuppose Mankind not created; for it is the decree of creating man to different ends. The second, he will have to presuppose Mankind created, but not corrupted: for it is the decree of permitting *Adam* to fall, and all Mankind

Piscator's manner of ordering Gods decrees

kind in him. The third and laſt he will have to preſuppoſe Mankind both created and corrupted; for it is the decree of raiſing ſome out of ſin, wherein they are conceived and borne, and leaving ſome therein. As for the Angells it is without queſtion, that election and reprobation divine had courſe concerning them, as well as concerning mankind, and as certain it is, that no corrupt Maſſe could be the object of divine Predeſtination in their election and reprobation.

As for *Arminius* his ordering of Gods decrees in oppoſition to theſe waies taken by our Divines, that he hath communicated unto us, in the Declaration of his opinion before the States, *pag.* 47. where leaving out the decree of creating mankind in *Adam*, and the decree of permitting all mankind to fall in *Adam*, he takes into conſideration only, the divine decrees of ſaving ſinfull man.

1. The firſt whereof is, *Whereby he decreed to make his Sonne Chriſt a Mediator, Redeemer, Saviour, Prieſt and King, by his death to aboliſh ſin, by his obedience to obtain Salvation (formerly loſt) and by his power to communicate it.* And this decree he ſaith is abſolute.

2. The ſecond is, *Whereby he decreed to receive into grace ſuch as believe and repent, and thoſe perſevering unto the end, to ſave in Chriſt, for and by Chriſt: but ſuch as believe and repent not, to leave under ſin and wrath, and to damne as aliene from Chriſt.* Where obſerve, 1. This decree of ſaving ſuch as believe and repent, he calleth a decree abſolute, yet this decree paſſeth upon no particular perſons: ſuch a decree is reſerved for the laſt place. 2. God (with him) receives none into grace and favour, unles they believe and repent: Whereby it is manifeſt, that with him faith and repentance are no fruits of Gods grace and favour: for they muſt be performed before they are received into Gods grace and favour.

3. The third is, *Where by he decreed ſufficiently and efficaciouſly to adminiſter the means which are neceſſary to faith and repentance.* This decree whether he conceives it to be abſolute or no, he doth not ſpecify; nor whether he decreed to adminiſter them unto all, nor by whom, whether by men only, or by men or Angells, nor whether by means he underſtands the Goſpel only, and we have cauſe to doubt thereof. And laſtly, which is moſt obſcure, he doth not explicate what he means, by ſufficient and efficacious adminiſtration. Only he adds, that in this adminiſtration, he carries himſelfe according, 1. *To his Wiſdome, which ſhewes what becomes his mercy and ſeverity*, and 2ly *to his Juſtice, whereby he is ready to follow the preſcript of his Wiſdome.*

4. The fourth and laſt is, *Whereby he decreed to ſave and damne certain particular perſons.* Now whereas our Divines generally, what way ſoever they took, had a care out of their Logick and Philoſophy which they had by light of nature, to order the decrees divine, according to the common Rules of Art concerning intentions, as they are found to be either of ſome end, or of ſome means tending to an end, this ſeems to have been no part of *Arminius* his care. This order of his, I have ranſaked in my *Vindiciæ. lib.* 3. *digreſſ.* 2. And if this Author think good, he may anſwer thereunto, and doe his beſt to qualify the abſurdities wherewith I charge that order of his.

But as touching the embracers of this firſt way, whoſe names he expreſſeth, he had need to prove it. For divers think otherwiſe of *Calvin*, and they repreſent their reaſons for it, out of his own words ſuch as theſe, *De æternâ Dei Prædeſtinatione.* pag. 970. ſpeaking of *Pighius*. *Auguſtinum ridet* (ſaith he) *ejuſq; ſimiles hoc eſt pios omnes, qui deum imaginantur poſtquam univerſalem Generis humani Ruinam in perſonâ Adæ præſciverit, alios ad vitam, alios ad interitum deſtinaſſe*, & pag. 710. *Cùm de prædeſtinatione ſermo habetur, inde exordiendum eſſe conſtantèr ſemper docui atquè hodiè doceo, jure in morte relinqui omnes reprobos, qui in Adam mortui ſunt atquè damnati.*

As for *Beza*, I know full well he maintained, that man not created is the object of Predeſtination, but can this Author repreſent unto us, any place out of *Beza*, wherein he ſhould affirme, that God doth decree to damne any man but for ſin; or that damnation is the end that God intends in the decree of Predeſtination to death? In his Queſtions and Anſwers he profeſſeth the contrary. pag. 111. *Poſtremò non dixi exitium iſtorum* (he ſpeaks of Reprobates) *eſſe finem deo decernenti propoſitum, ſed gloriam ipſius. Nequè etiam ſimpliciter dixi iſtos eſſe exitio deſtinatos, ſed juſto exitio deſtinatos dixi.* And in his Book *De æternâ Dei Prædeſtinatione contrà Sebaſtian. Caſtell: ad argument. Caſtell.* 2. pag. 346. *Quamobrem etiam illud quoquè probavimus, nos ita loqui non ſolere, & quanquam à Deo ſimpliciter conditum dicamus ad perditionem, ſed idcircò ut ipſius juſta condemnatione Dominus juſtitiam ſuam patefaciat.*

As for *Zanchy*; *Peter Baro*, that cauſed ſuch perturbation in *Cambridge* about this very

ry argument, he denyes this to have been the opinion of *Zanchy*, *In ſumma trium de Prædeſtinatione ſententiarum*; his words are theſe, *Altera ſententia eſt Auguſtini, poſterior etiam Sohnii Heydelbergenſis Theologiæ Profeſſoris, & aliorum quorundam Proteſtantium, ut Zanchii, atquè etiam Bellarmini, qui omnes priorem illam improbant, in hoc inter ſe conſentientes, ut ſit prædeſtinatio ab Adami tantum lapſu accipienda.*

And as touching *Piſcator*, he handles the queſtion about the object of Predeſtination in a ſmall Treatiſe, annexed to an anſwer of his to *Hemingius*, *De Univerſali Gratiâ*; and inquires whether the object thereof be *Humanum genus nondum conditum*, or *conditum*, but *nondum corruptum*, or both *conditum* and *corruptum*; and his reſolution is, that in the decree of Predeſtination, there is place for all theſe conſiderations, according to three ſeverall acts compriſed therein, which I have formerly mentioned, and ſo drawes into one all three opinions.

As touching *Gomarus* in the laſt place, I have ſeen little or nothing of his; but when *Lubbertus* in his Book *Ad 99 Errores Conradi Vorſtii* pag. 807. had profeſſed, *Maſſam conſideratam eſſe a Deo, non ut integram, ſed ut corruptam*; and was charged by *Voſtius* as deliver-ing that which was contrary to the doctrine of *Calvin*, *Beza*, and *Gomarus*, he replies that herein he doth not contradict them, but ſaith he, *Illorum dicta quæ quibuſdam aſperiuſcula videntur, lenio, & in commodiſſimum ſenſum interpreter.*

But be it ſo, that all of them made *Humanum genus*, not *corruptum*, no nor *integrum*, but *nondum conditum* the object of reprobation. I am of their mind that doe ſo; and was not Dr *Whitaker* alſo, whom very wiſely this Author conceales? This renowned Profeſſor in the Univerſity of *Cambridge*, in a Publique exerciſe, his *Concio ad Clerum*, profeſſeth, what *Paul* ſpeaks *De luto & figulo non poſſe melius exponi quàm de Maſſâ incorruptâ*: and that *Bucer* underſtands it thus, *Bucerus per Maſſam intelligit primam humani gĕneris originem ex quâ homo conditus à Deo & fabricatus eſt.* And he diſputes at large, that there is no cauſe of reprobation, and that neither ſin actuall, nor ſin originall is the cauſe thereof, and profeſſeth this to be the Opinion of the Church of England. And though now a daies we be upbraided, as if we had learned it of Papiſts and Schoole Divines, this great light of Cambridge, ſpares not to make honourable mention of Schoolemens ſollid diſcourſe on this point, ſaying, *Hanc ſententiam Scholaſtici ſi ullam egregiè ſolideq́ pertractarunt præſertim qui inſigniores ſanioreſq́ habiti ſunt. Lombardus ait, ut prædeſtinationis nulla merita ſunt, ità nec reprobationis.* Now the doctrine which he ſaith the Schoolemen handle ſo ſolidly as none more, is the very doctrine which this Author ſeems here to impugne, as when he ſaith, *ſome make the will of God without any conſideration of ſin in men, originall, or actuall, to be the cauſe of their eternall Rejection*; for Dr *Whitaker* expreſſeth it thus, *His igitur iſto modo explicatis, ſequitur tertiam opinionem ſolummodò & neceſſario veram eſſe, æquè reprobationis ac prædeſtinationis cauſam eſſe dei voluntatem, quandoquidem providentiæ divinæ munus eſt omnia ad fines iſtos certa ratione certiſq́ mediis ordinare.* Only as touching the end here mentioned, *That ſo he might ſhew his abſolute and unlimited power and dominion over them, in appointing to heaven or hell whom he pleaſeth*, that I find not in Dr *Whitaker*. He ſaith plainly that *God predeſtinated unto death, whom he would, and becauſe he would: Deus igitur ad mortem prædeſtinavit quos voluit, & quia voluit:* (which phraſe I willingly confeſſe I like not ſo well) but that the end thereof is to manifeſt *his abſolute and unlimited dominion and power*, he ſaith not; and *Beza* in the places before mentioned, referres it to the manifeſtation of Gods juſtice, as the end thereof. And like as he ſaith, *certiſſimum eſt damnationem nunquam niſi propter Peccatum infligi*; ſo I ſhould think it nothing leſſe certain, that God doth not ordaine any man to be damned, but for ſin, eſpecially conſidering that damnation in the notion thereof, hath an eſſentiall reference to ſin.

Now ſince I have found ſuch a Champion as Dr *Whitaker* for the maintenance of this Tenent, have I cauſe to feare the ſharp cenſures of any profeſſors in the Country? Were he alive, I preſume he would be nothing skarred with the imputation of *making God, the Prime and Principall cauſe of mens everlaſting ruine*; he would I think require a little more learning in the Criminator, then to expreſſe himſelfe ſo crudely. For without all queſtion, *God is the prime and principall cauſe*, nay the ſole cauſe of mans everlaſting ruine *in genere cauſæ efficientis*, though this excludes not a meritorious cauſe of his own damnation on the creatures part, as Dr *Whitaker* profeſſeth in the words formerly alleadging, acknowledged. *Damnationem infligi propter Peccatum.*

And farther I am apt to conceive, and have undertaken to juſtify, and that to the view of the World, that albeit mankind not created, be the only object of predeſtination and reprobation, yet no mans reprobation is made by God, *citra conſiderationem Peccati*

Peccati, in as much as I hold that the decrees of creation, permission of sin, and of finall perseverance therein, and lastly of damnation for sin, are not decrees subordinate, but coordinate and simultaneous, as being decrees concerning means tending to the same end, which is the manifestation of Gods glory, in the way of vindicative justice.

And whereas it is farther urged, that hereby God is made the author of the first sin and of all sins; As I find by Dr *Whitakers* discourse in his *Cygnæa Concio*, that were he alive he would answer hereunto, That this Author takes his aime much amisse, considering, that the effect of Reprobation is not sin, but the permission of sin, and Gods means to the end intended by him, to witt, the manifestation of his glory in the way of vindicative justice, is not sin, but the Permission of sin; according to that of *Aquinas*, alleadged by the foresaid Doctor thus, *Sicut Prædestinatio includit voluntatem conferendi gratiam & gloriam, ita Reprobatio includit voluntatem permittendi cadere in culpam & inferendi damnationis pœnam pro culpâ.* And as I discern no unholinesse in Gods permitting of sin, so neither doe I discerne any cruelty therein. But Dr *Whitaker* well perceived that this course of Gods counsells, would seem injurious; and therefore after he had proposed his last argument drawn from that of the Apostle, *Rom.* 11. *ô altitudo!* thus, *Vltimò illa Apostoli exclamatio, ô altitudo, hanc sententiam confirmat. Neq; enim tantæ altitudinis est ut penetrari nequeat, Deum odisse homines propter peccatum, etiam antequàm nati sunt; immo rationi convenientissimum est ut Deus ferre nequeat, quod est naturæ suæ contrarium.* But marke wherein the depth the Apostle speaks of, consists in his judgement; *Ibi demùm infinitum βάθος & Abyssus est divinæ discretionis, quando sine peccati ratione quidam reprobantur & alii qui nihilo erant amore digniores ad vitam & fælicitatem prædestinantur, ut omnis ratio discretionis ad solam dei voluntatem referatur.* And because he knew full well that this mysterious depth of Gods counsell, would seem very harsh to carnall affections, as savouring of cruell and injurious proceedings, therefore he takes expresse notice of it, and that in *Austins* language, saying, *Iniquum videtur* (Augustinus ait) *ut sine ullis bonorum malorumq; operum meritis unum Deus diligat, odiatq; alterum*; whence he concludes according to *Austin* thus, *Deus igitur hunc diligit, illumquè odit sine meritis ullis operum aut bonorum aut malorum. Hoc videri possit alicui iniquum, sed est æquissimum, quia sic Deo visum est. Neq; Augustinus affirmare veritus est, eos Apostoli verbum evacuare qui judicium divinæ discretionis ad opera reducunt prævisa aut præterita*; and so concludes the main point he insists on, thus, *Non est igitur peccatum originale causa æternæ reprobationis, nedum actuale.* So that both *Austin* and Dr *Whitaker*, and all our Divines, knew full well in how harsh an accent this truth sounds in the eares of men; yet because the word of God doth testify this truth unto us, it becomes all Christian hearts to submit, and to acknowledge the equity of it, though we are not able to comprehend the reason of it: Though I know full well, some are so violently carried with the zeale of their own way, that they spare not to professe, that they will sooner deny that there is a God, then yeeld to that which the Contra-Remonstrants teach; which for ought I know, is no other then this which Dr *Whitaker* taught and Preached publiquely in the University of Cambridge, being at that time *Professor Regius*. And seeing we acknowledge the seeming harshnes of it, as well as our Adversaries, yet because we find it revealed in Gods word, we hold it our duty to embrace it, and therehence conclude that it is *æquissimum*. Doth it become any one to take the course this Author takes, and by a Parallel between this course of God, and the courses of *Tiberius*, as also by a saying of *Zeno's* servant, to cry it down as *iniquissimum*, and thence to conclude hand over head, that the word of God doth not teach it? Is this a Christian course? is this Theologicall? is this Scholasticall? Yet in my judgement the harshnes lyeth not here, to wit, in the point of Gods purpose to inflict damnation; considering that not one of our divines, that I know, doth maintaine that God did ever purpose to inflict damnation, but for sin. Or if there be any harshnes therein, that is to be found in the kind and degree of punishment and everlastingnesse thereof, God holding them everlastingly as it were upon the rack and in quick sence of torment. And yet we maintaine without contradiction amongst Christians, that it is just with God to doe so for one act of drunkennes or adultery, or the like unrepented of; which kind of punishment, never any Tyrant in the world was known to take, or could take. But the harshnes in my opinion, is most pregnant to bring forth distast on the other part of reprobation, which is the purpose of God to deny grace, this being denied to whom he will, and that of meer pleasure; for like as he shewes mercy on whom he will, so the Scripture testifies, that he hardens whom he will. And not only *Austin* and Dr *Whitaker* and our Divines generally doe take

take notice, how unſavoury this doctrine is in the judgement of fleſh and bloud, eſpecially in comparing it with Gods ordinary courſe of complaining of men for their diſobedience, even of thoſe whom himſelfe hath hardned, but the holy Apoſtle alſo *Rom.9.19. Thou wilt ſay then*, and is it ſo, doth God harden whom he will? *Why then doth he yet complaine? For who hath reſiſted his will?* Now in this caſe, how doth the Apoſtle ſtop the mouthes of ſuch, but thus; O man, *who art thou that diſputeſt with God? ſhall the thing formed, ſay to him that formed it, Why haſt thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over the clay, of the ſame lump to make one veſſell unto honour and another unto diſhonour?*

But let us come to the conſideration of the Parallel here made between the counſells of *Tiberius* and the counſells of God. This conſiſts of two parts, according to a double ſtory of *Tiberius* taken out of *Suetonius*.

The firſt is his dealing with *Druſus* and *Nero*, the two ſonnes of *Germanicus*, theſe *varia fraude induxit ut concitarentur ad convitia & concitati perderentur*, he uſed cunning contrivances to draw them to reproach him, that ſo he might cover his cruelty in their death, under a pretext of juſtice. What theſe cunning contrivances are, it is ſpecified by *Suetonius*; but I hope this Author will acknowledge, that it ſtands him upon, to repreſent what thoſe cunning contrivances are, which our doctrine imputes unto God, to draw them to ſinne againſt God. Our Divines commonly teach, that God as he is able to keep any man from ſinne (as he did the Angells that ſtood, when their fellowes became Apoſtates, the cauſe whereof *Auſtin* reſolves into *amplius Adjutorium* given by God, either in their creation or after: De Civit. Dei. lib. 12.cap. 9. *Iſti aut minorem acceperunt amoris divini gratiam quam illi qui in eadem perſtiterunt, aut ſi utriquè boni æqualiter creati ſunt, iſtis mala voluntate cadentibus, illi amplius adjuti ad eam beatitudinis plenitudinem, unde ſe nunquàm caſuros certiſſimi fierent, pervenerunt,*) ſo likewiſe that Gods permiſſion is enough to proſtitute any man unto ſinne. And not our Divines only, but Arminius alſo and others. Arminius Exam. pag. 152. *Quoties voluntas permittitur a Deo ut faciat aliquid, neceſſe eſt ut nullo argumentorum genere perſuadeatur ad nolendum, ſecùs permiſſio non fieret.* And Pag. 157. thus he defines the permiſſion of ſinne, *Permiſſio peccati eſt ſuſpenſio omnium impedimentorum quibus poſitis peccatum non fieret.* Now let any ſober man judge, whether herehence it it followeth not neceſſarily *neceſſitate conſequentiæ & ſuppoſitionis*, that ſinne ſhall be, to wit, upon the removing of all thoſe impediments upon the poſition whereof ſinne could not be; conſidering that an impediment of ſinne in this caſe and in Arminius his phraſe is every thing *quo poſito peccatum non fuerit. Voſſius* in like manner, in Amicitia duplicatione Pag. 213. *Fateor quidem permiſſione jam poſitâ in actu neceſſariò etiam poni rem aliquam permittendam, idq; ob neceſſariam talium relatorum ad ſe invicem habitudinem, atq; in arguendo mutuam quandam χάσιν quæ ferre non poteſt ut unum ſine altero reipſâ ſit, nedum ut alterum extra ſe quidquam verè agat, altero ne quidem adhuc exiſtente, nedum verè patiente, aut contra.* Navarettus in 1. Queſt. 19. Art. 9. §. 2. maintaines, *Poſita permiſſione infallibilitèr ſequi quod permittitur.* *Auſtin* himſelfe ſuppoſeth as much where he ſaith, *Ad omnipotentiſſimam ſuam bonitatem pertinere, potiùs bona ex malis elicere, quam mala eſſe non ſinere.* For hereby he gives to underſtand, that God permits ſinne with a purpoſe to work good out of evill. Now this manifeſtly implies, that upon Gods permiſſion of ſinne, ſinne ſhall exiſt. Nay how can this be avoided, unleſſe we deny that God alone, is he that keepes us from running into ſinne, and maintaine that man can doe this of himſelfe, without that ſpeciall grace of God, whereby he keepes us from ſinne: yet in the Councel of Paleſtine, it was concluded, that Gods grace was required to every act, and Pelagius himſelfe was driven to ſubſcribe thereunto, and to anathematize thoſe that denied. Now let us examine what this grace of God is, which is neceſſarily required to every good act, whether God doth not work the will thereunto, according to that, *I will cauſe them to walk in my ſtatutes, and keep my judgements and doe them*: Ezech. 36.28. or whether it be only ſuch a Cooperate grace, as ſome now a daies bluſh not to profeſſe as whereby God workes in us, τὸ *Velle bonum modò Velimus*, this I can ſhew under the hand of a zealous Partizan for Arminius. Now I hope there is no ſuch cunning contrivance in the permiſſion of ſinne.

Farther, there are certain occaſions & opportunities offered for the cõmitting of ſin in the courſe of the World: We willingly aſcribe unto God the adminiſtratiõ of theſe,

and ſo doth *Arminius*; and that not of Occaſions only, but of Arguments alſo inciting unto ſin, *Diſput. Pub. Theſ. 9. De Iuſtitiâ & Efficaciâ providentiæ Dei in malo. Num. 6. Efficientia Dei circa peccatum concernit tum actum ipſum tum vitioſitatem ejus. Efficientia quæ circa initium conſideratur vel impeditio vel permiſſio eſt; cui addimus adminiſtrationem argumentorum & occaſionum ad peccatum incitantium.*

Yet there is a greater power of provocation unto ſin then all theſe, & that is by the practiſes of Satan, who *goeth about like a roaring Lyon ſeeking whō he may devoure.* How coms he to have ſuch liberty? Hath not God power to bind Satan for a thouſand years and more if it pleaſe him? The Devills ſometime beſought our Saviour, that he would not ſend them into the deep; ſurely they acknowledged thereby his power to ſend them thither; yet he did not, though he was not ignorant, that their going about was like ſo many roaring lyons, to devoure the ſoules of men by provoking unto ſin. As for thoſe that *Tiberius* ſet about *Druſus* and *Nero* to provoke them, what were they comparable to the Devill and his Angells for the practiſing of provoking courſes? But *Tiberius* bid his ſervants to provoke *Druſus* and *Nero* and not to ſpare: but can any ſay truely that we maintaine that God bids the Devill to provoke this Author, or any ſuch *Arminian* ſpirit to make ſuch parallels as theſe? Yet 1 *Kings* 22. we read when a wicked ſpirit offers his ſervice to God to intice *Ahab that he might goe and fall at Ramoth-Gilead*, & that by becoming a lying ſpirit in the mouth of all his Prophets, the Lord not only accepts it, ſaying, Goe forth and doe ſo; but alſo tells him, *thou ſhalt entice him, and ſhalt alſo prevaile.* That was a great deale more then was in the power of *Tiberius*, or his inſtigators, or the Devills themſelves. And did not *Ahab* deſerve as much at the hands of God? And why might not this Author and his fellowes, have deſerved ſo much at the hands of God, as to have a lying ſpirit put in the mouthes of them, on whom they depend for reſolution in poynts of Divinity, and that they prevaile with them alſo? And why may not he alſo be thus given over to illuſions to believe lies? Nay, what doe we talk of deſert in this? Did not the Devill provoke *Eve* and *Adam* to ſin againſt God in Paradiſe? Could not God have kept the Devill off? Why did he not? *Cur non interceſſit & circumſcriptorem colubrum cohibuit?* to ſpeak in *Tertullians* phraſe. Doth it not manifeſtly appeare, that it was Gods will to have them tempted, to have them provoked unto ſin? & why not? Is it lawfull for a man to lay a bait of gold and ſilver in his ſervants way to try his fidelity, and whether ſuch a provocation will make a breach upon his honeſty; and ſhall not ſuch a courſe be lawfull unto God? for this nothing hinders their liberty of tranſgreſſing. And to ſerve God while we are not tempted to ſin againſt him, is a poor commendation. *If thou faint in the day of adverſity thy ſtrength is ſmall*, ſaith *Solomon*. *Iob.* 1. 11. *Stretch out now thine hand and touch all that he hath, and ſee if he will not blaſpheme thee to thy face*; as much as to ſay, Let but *Iob* be in this manner provoked, and ſee whether he will not blaſpheame. What is the Lords anſwere? *Lo, all that he hath is in thine hand, only upon himſelfe ſhalt thou not ſtretch out thine hand.* Hereupon Satan goes to his work. One meſſenger comes and brings tydings, ſaying, *The Oxen were plowing, and the Aſſes feeding in their places, and the Sabeans came violently and took them, yea, they have ſlaine thy ſervants with the edge of the ſword, and I only am eſcaped alone to tell thee*: Upon the neck of him comes another, ſaying, *The fire of God is fallen from heaven, & hath burnt up thy ſheep and thy ſervants, and devoured them, and I only am eſcaped alone to tell thee.* Upon the back of him comes a third ſaying, *The Caldeans ſet out three bands, and fell upon the Camells and have taken them and ſlain thy ſervants with the edge of the ſword, & I only am eſcaped alone to tell thee.* After all theſe coms a fourth, ſaying, *Thy ſonnes and thy daughters were eating and drinking wine in their eldeſt brothers houſe, and behold there came a great wind from beyond the wilderneſſe, and ſmote the fowre corners of the houſe which fell upon thy children & they are dead, and I only am eſcaped alone to tell thee.* Here are provocations enough, and can it be denied, but that God would have *Iob's* uprightneſſe thus to be tried? And hath not God power thus to try any other nothing ſo upright as *Iob* (whatſoever be the conſequents thereof) unto tranſgreſſion, though it be even to the curſing of their King and their God? as *Iſ.* 8. 21. *He that is afflicted and famiſhed, ſhall goe to and fro in it, and when he ſhall be hungry he ſhall even fret himſelfe and curſe his King and his gods and ſhall look upward*: and Revelations 16. 21. *There fell a great haile like talents out of heaven upon the men, and men blaſpheamed God becauſe of the Plague of the haile, for the plague thereof was exceeding great.* Yet *Iob* continued in his uprightneſſe, his wicked Wife perceived it, though ſhee her ſelfe was enraged, and betrayed the corruption of her heart within, but he was no more effectually brought thereby to ſin againſt God, then *Joſeph* was by the temptation

Prov. 24. 10.

tation of his wanton Miſtris: though *David* fell fowlly and ſhamefully, provoked thereunto by the ſight of *Bathſheba*, and did not God by his providence bring him to the ſight of *Bathſheba*, as he brought *Shimei* and *David* after this together, as *Arminius* and his complices confeſſe, when *Shimei* railed on him? A great provocation to ſo great a Perſon as *David*, if not to bid, yet at leaſt to ſuffer *Abiſhai* to cut off that doggs head, as he called him; yet *David* would not ſuffer him, and why? Let *David* himſelfe anſwer; *The Lord*, ſaith he, *hath bidden him to curſe David. It may be the Lord will render unto me good, for his curſing this day.* He fell not foule upon God, though acknowledging his juſt providence herein. And to make a Parallele between the courſes of God, and the courſes of *Tiberius* that monſter of men, in taking a courſe with *Druſus* and *Nero* to provoke them to the reproaching of him, that he might deſtroy them: Thus *David* was not corrupted with the provocations of his Subject, as *Druſus* and *Nero* were by a fellow Subject to convitiate their Prince. Neither did he fare the worſe for this, but no doubt found cauſe to bleſſe God for his grace, in reſtraining him from breaking forth into any intemperancy of tongue or ſpirit, like as formerly he bleſſed God for the good counſel of *Abigal*, whereby he was reſtrained from ſhedding bloud, and that his own hand did not ſave him. And if it be not lawfull for us to provoke another unto ſin, will it follow forthwith, that it is not lawfull for God to provoke? One is provoked by proſperity to corrupt his waies, another by adverſity is provoked to break forth into impatience and blaſphemy? What then? ſhall not God be acknowledged to be the Author both of proſperity and adverſity? Nay, what doth the Lord long before profeſſe what ſhould be his providence towards the Jewes? and that in this very kind of provoking them. *Deutron.* 32.21. *They have moved me to jealouſy with that which is not good, they have provoked me to anger with their vanities: and I will move them to jealouſy with thoſe that are no people, I will provoke them to anger with a fooliſh Nation.*

But let us conſider more diſtinctly, what this act of provocation is, and wherein it conſiſts, that we may be the better able to judge in what caſe we may ſafely attribute it unto God, and in what caſe not; that ſo we may neither aſcribe that unto him which doth not become him, nor deny that unto him which doth become him, both theſe courſes being equally blaſphemous, and ſo reputed among Schoole Divines.

Now Provocation in the moſt uſuall phraſe of Scripture is by way of exaſperation, and it is an incitation unto wrath; and never otherwiſe taken when man is ſaid to provoke God. And in the ſame ſenſe it is delivered in the particular fact of *Tiberius* here mentioned. But when a reſemblance is here made between the particular courſe of *Tiberius* and the courſes of God, Gods provocation of man is not to wrath only, but meant of incitation to any kind of ſin, whether it be by way of exaſperation, or by way of alluring and enticing, according to the ſeverall paſſions and affections of man, which are apt to be moved ſeverall waies to ſin, amongſt which the paſſion anger is but one. And as it is ſaid of the wrath of man, that it workes not the righteouſneſſe of God; ſo it is verified of every other inordinate affection. In the 1 *Chron.* 24.1. it is ſaid that Satan *provoked David to number Iſrael.* That was not by way of exaſperation and moving in him the paſſion of anger, by the working upon ſome other paſſion, whether pride or curioſity: and therefore though it be rendred by the word, Provoked, yet in the Originall the word uſed ſignifieth properly to tempt. But conſider we provocation according to the propriety thereof in the firſt place, by way of exaſperation.

Now conſider, I pray, whether the Miniſters of *Tiberius* did more exaſperate *Druſus* and *Nero*, then God exaſperated *Ionah*. *Ionah.* 4.7. For having prepared a *Gourd and made it to come up over Ionah, that it might be a ſhaddow over his head, and deliver him from his griefe; & Ionah being exceeding glad of the Gourd, God prepared a worme when the morning roſe the next day and it ſmote the Gourd that it withered.* And God proceeded farther then this. *For when the Sun did ariſe, God prepared alſo a fervent eaſt wind, and the Sun beat upon the head of Ionah, that he fainted and wiſhed in his heart to dye, and ſaid it is better for me to dye then to live.* And not only ſo, but juſtified himſelfe in this his impatience. For when the Lord ſaid unto him, *doeſt thou well to be angry for the Gourd? Ionah* ſtoutly anſwered, *I doe well to be angry to the death.* It's true, *Ionah* brake not forth into blaſphemies againſt God, as it ſeems *Druſus* and *Nero* did againſt *Tiberius*. *Ionah* was better brought up under the wings of God then ſo. Gods grace preſerved him from ſuch exceſſe, but that the Miniſters *Tiberius* ſet about them, did more provoke them by exaſperating courſes, then God did in like manner provoke *Ionah*, it doth not appeare: but had *Ionah* hereupon broken forth into blaſphemies, had *Ionah's* ſinne been excuſable or Gods courſe blameable?

Revel. 16. 21. we read of *a great hayle that fell upon the men like Talents out of heaven, and men blaſpheamed God becauſe of the plague of the hayle, for the plague thereof was exceeding great.* And *Iſai* 8.21. The Lord prophecyeth, that, *He that is afflicted and famiſhed, ſhall goe to and fro, and when he ſhall be hungry, he ſhall even fret himſelfe, and curſe his King and his Gods and look upward.* ſuch plagues are the work of God, for *there is no evill in the citty but the Lord hath done it.* Amos 3. But let them look unto it, that thereupon take occaſion to blaſpheme. And *Tentatio probationis* was never yet that I know denyed unto God, to try whether they will blaſpheme God or no. To this end Satan deſired to have an hand on *Job*, yet not ſo much to try whether he would blaſpheme or no, but being confident he ſhould bring him to blaſpheme. *Job.* 1. 11. *ſtretch out now thine hand and touch all that he hath, and he will curſe thee to thy face.* The Lord gave him leave, and *Job* acknowledgeth the Lords hand in all that Satan did, ſaying, *The Lord gave and the Lord takes away, yet in all this Job ſinned not nor charged God fooliſhly.* Satan deſires yet farther liberty, ſaying *skin for skin, yea all that a man hath will he give for his life. But put forth thy hand now and touch his bone, and his fleſh, and he will curſe thee to thy face. And the Lord ſaid unto Satan, Behold he is in thy hand, but ſave his life. So went Satan forth from the preſence of the Lord, and ſmote Job with ſore boyles from the ſole of his foot unto his crowne, and he took him a pot-ſhard to ſcrape himſelfe withall, and he ſate down among the aſhes, Then ſaid his Wife unto him, Doeſt thou yet continue in thy integrity? Curſe God and dye.* She manifeſted the inward corruption of her irreligious heart. *Job* might have brought her to a forme of godlines by his pious courſes in his family, but litle power of godlineſſe doth appeare upon her. For as *Solomon* ſaith, *If thou faint in the day of adverſity thy ſtrength is ſmall.* It ſeems her heart was ſowred with Atheiſme, thinking the world was governed by chance, rather then by divine providence, and conſequently it was all one, whether a man did bleſſe God, or curſe God, and a madneſſe to make a conſcience of walking in integrity, and that in *Iobs* caſe at this time, whether he did bleſſe God he muſt dye, or whether he did curſe God he could but dye, and better it was for him thus impoveriſhed, thus afflicted, to dye then to live; as for the powers of the world to come, it ſeems ſhe never had but a taſt of them, and that taſt never produced any true faith in her concerning them. Here was a ſore temptation, the very gates of hell playing upon him with their greateſt Ordinance to batter (if it were poſſible) his ſhield of faith. But what is *Iobs* anſwer. *Thou ſpeakeſt as one of the fooliſh women ſpeaketh. What ſhall we receive good at the hand of God and ſhall we not receive evill? In all this did not Iob ſin with his lips.* The worke of Satan in the impoveriſhing of *Iobs* eſtate, and afflicting his perſon, cannot be denied to be Gods work. As for the work of his wife, why might not that be the work of God, as well as the work of Satan? For did not Satan ſin in all this? As our Saviour ſaith that he was a murtherer from the beginning, and as S[t] *Peter* ſaith, *The devill goes about like a roring Lyon ſeeking whom he may devoure*; ſo who can make doubt but theſe courſes practiſed againſt *Iob*, were fruits of his murthering and devouring diſpoſition? And all ſides now a daies confeſſe, that the act of the moſt flagitious ſin committed by man or Angell, is the work of God in the way of a principall efficient cauſe, as well as it is the work of the creature. And as for the ſinfulneſſe of the act, either of the Devill or his Wife, that was not it which did or could hurt *Iob:* but the works wrought by Satan, the temptation atheiſticall propoſed by his Wife, this was the greateſt danger in the conſideration thereof to corrupt his ſoule, for that is it alone that workes upon the will to incline it. And as for their ſinning herein, that proceeded from the want of Gods feare, according to that of *Abraham. Geneſ.* 20. 10. *I ſaid ſurely the feare of God is not in this place, therefore they will ſlay me for my Wives ſake.* And albeit God engageth himſelfe towards ſome, for the putting of his feare in their hearts, that they ſhall never depart away from him. *Ierim.* 36. 40. yet he hath not engaged himſelfe thus farre towards all. For the Apoſtle plainly profeſſeth, that, *He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth Rom.* 9. 18. and hardning we know is denying the feare of God, either as touching the habituall infuſion thereof, or as touching the actuall excitation thereof after it is infuſed. Yet I deny not bnt obduration and excæcation are ſometimes promiſcuouſly uſed, the one for the other, becauſe of the ſtrict conjunction that is betwixt them. And as touching the particular act of Convitiation, *Auſtin* ſpares not to profeſſe, that even when it is committed by man, it is brought forth by God out of his ſecret providence lib. 9. Confeſſ. cap. 8. *Quid egiſti Deus meus? unde curaſti? unde ſanaſti? nonne protuliſti durum & acutum ex alterâ animâ convitium tanquam medicinale ferrum ex occultis proviſionibus tuis & uno ictu putredinem illam*

lam præcidiſti? And whereas *Bellarmine* endeavoureth to blaſt the evidence of this place giving teſtimony unto Gods ſecret providence in evill, I have endeavoured to ſhew the vanity of his diſcourſe in my *Vind. Grat. Dei lib.* 2. *Crim.* 3. *digreſſ.* 2. *cap.* 13. And in what congruity can it be ſaid, that God bid *Shimei* to curſe *David*, but that in the ſame analogy of faith, it may be ſaid, that God bid *Iobes* Wife in this manner to tempt him? And which of the two was the greateſt provocation, *Tiberius* his Miniſters Provocation of *Druſus* and *Nero*; or *Shimei's* provocation of *David* rayling on him to his face, the Subject blaſpheaming his Prince? undoubtedly the provocation was nothing inferior, only here was the difference; *Tiberius* gave ſuch commandment to his Miniſters ſo to provoke *Druſus* and *Nero*, God gave no ſuch commandement (in proper ſpeech) unto *Shimei*, but rather commanded the contrary in his law, *Thou ſhalt not ſpeak evill of the ruler of thy people.* But Gods ſecret providence, whereby he makes uſe of all his creatures in what condition ſoever he finds them, even of Devills and wicked men, to ſerve his turne by them, either in the way of judgement, or in the way of mercy, and ſometimes for triall of the faith and patience of his children, is in Scripture phraſe called Gods bidding or commanding. And indeed it is farre more effectuall then his commandment. And *Auſtin* by pregnant paſſages of holy Scripture convicted of this truth, ſpareth not to profeſſe as much in theſe words, *His & talibus teſtimoniis divinorum eloquiorum quæ omnia commemorare nimis longum eſt, ſatis quantum exiſtimo manifeſtatur operari Deum in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum voluntates quocunquè voluerit ſive ad bona pro ſuâ miſericordiâ, ſive ad mala pro meritis eorum, judicio utiq; ſuo aliquando aperto, aliquando occulto, ſemper autem juſto. De Grat. & lib. Arbitr. cap.* 21. And touching this particular caſe of *Shimei*, inquiring about the interpretation of it, ſee I pray, how he reſolves concerning it. *Quomodo dixerit dominus huic homini maledicere David, Quis ſapiens & intelliget. Non enim jubendo dixit, ubi obedientia laudaretur, ſed quod ejus voluntatem proprio vitio ſuo malam in hoc peccatum judicio ſuo juſto & occulto inclinavit. Ideò dictum eſt, dixit ei dominus. Nam ſi jubenti obtemperaſſet Deo, laudandus potius quam puniendus eſſet, ſicut ex hoc peccato poſteà novimus eſſe punitum.* And he proceeds farther to ſhew the reaſon of this divine providence. *Nec cauſa tacita eſt, cur ei Deus juſto modo dixerit maledicere David, hoc eſt, Cor ejus malum in hoc peccatum miſerit vel dimiſerit ut videat (inquit) dominus humilitatem meam & retribuat mihi bona pro maledictio ejus in die iſto.* And hereupon concludes. *Ecce quomodo probatur Deum uti cordibus etiam malorum ad laudem atq; adjumentum bonorum. Sic uſus eſt Iuda tradente Chriſtum. Sic uſus eſt Iudæis crucifigentibus Chriſtum, & quanta inde bona præſtitit populis crediturís? Qui & ipſo utitur diabolo peſſimo, ſed optimè ad excercendam & probandam fidem & pietatem bonorum non ſibi, quia omnia ſcit antequam fiant, ſed nobis quibus erat neceſſarium, ut eo modo ageretur nobiſcum.* *De Grat. & lib. arbit. cap.* 20.

But let us proceed to provocations unto other ſins, not in the way of exaſperation, but in the way of allurements. *Achan* was a covetous perſon, at the ſacking of Jericho, it was his hap to light among the ſpoyle, upon a goodly Babyloniſh garment, and two hundred ſhekells of ſilver, and a wedge of gold of fifty ſhekells waight. Was not ſo faire a prey, a ſore temptation to a covetous perſon? How was *Demoſthenes* taken with a rich bowle that was ſhewed him by *Harpalus*, but there was great danger in it, I confeſſe, yet *if deſire of prey doth ſometimes overrun the ſent*, may it not as well overcome the feare of danger, eſpecially conſidering the opportunity of ſecrecy to convey it cloſely into his Tent and hide it there? I ſaw, ſaith he, and I coveted them and took them, and behold they lye hid in the earth in the midſt of my Tent, and the ſilver under it. Now can it be denied, but that God by his providence brought him into this temptation, and conſequently into this provocation, for to tempt is to provoke 1 *Chron.* 21. 1. And is it not juſt with God, to bring any man into ſuch temptations of what kind, or in what degree ſoever (ſeeing no temptation or provocation in this kind or degree, bereaves a man of the liberty of his will) If not, what meant our Saviour to teach his Diſciples, and in them us, to pray unto God that *He will not lead us into temptation?* And what cauſe hath *Achan* to complaine of this temptation? We do not read he did; was it not the condition of many others as well as himſelfe? Was this prey that he ceazed on, the only ſpoyle of that great Citty? Were there no Babyloniſh garments but that one, no more ſilver or wedges of gold, but that *Achan* lighted on? Yet they refrained, ſome out of the feare of God, that reſtrained them in a gracious manner, and kept them from ſinning againſt him: others though not out out of a feare of God, yet out of the feare of puniſhment, were moved to beware how they tranſgreſſed. For albeit, *Libertas ſine gratia non eſt libertas, ſed contumacia*, as * *Auſtin* writes, *Epiſt.* 28.

writes, yet feare of punishment oftimes restraines from committing capitall crimes, though this restraint be not gracious; and considerations of lesse force then these doe prevaile many times with carnall men, both to abstain from evill, and to doe that which is good, though not in a gracious manner. As we read in the Gospell of a wicked Judge, that neither feared God nor reverenced man, yet he would doe the Widdow justice to ease himselfe of her importunate sollicitations where with she molested him.

Come we to provocations unto sinne of another nature, in satisfying the concupiscence of the flesh. *David* arising out of his bed at eventide, and walking upon the roof of the Kings Pallace, *from the roofe he saw a Woman washing her selfe: and the Woman was very beautifull to look upon*: we know what followed hereupon. Now was it not God that lead him into this temptation, into this provocation? Surely if this were not just with God, it were in vaine for us to pray, that God will not lead us into temptation; for we need not feare any such temptation, which cannot befall us without violation of Gods justice in the course of his providence. *Paul* the Apostle, *least he should be exalted out of measure, through the abundance of revelations* (made unto him, which were very dangerous to puff a man up, and make him swell in the conceit of his own worthinesse being admitted into the secrets of God) was sometimes exercised *with a thorne in the flesh, the messenger of Satan sent to buffet him*. But the feare of God was alive in him, and stirred up his faith to pray unto God three times *that it might depart from him*: and the Lord made him a gracious answer, not as yet to deliver him, but to support him in this conflict, and give him the victory over it. For the Lord said unto him, *my grace is sufficient for thee, for my power is made perfect in thy weaknesse*. This answer put heart into *Paul*; *Therefore*, saith he, *will I very gladly rejoyce rather in mine infirmities that the power of Christ may dwell in me*. Mark I pray, *Rather*, in mine infirmities. He would not blame God for thus exercising him, but rather rejoyce to be thus exercised, for as much as this same should doe him no harme; for by vertue of Christs power dwelling in him he should have the victory. Secondly, it should doe him good in preserving him *from being exalted out of measure through the abundance of revelations*. *Therefore*, saith he, *I take pleasure in infirmities, in reproaches, in necessities, in persecutions, in anguishes for Christs sake; for when I am weak then am I strong*. And had not *Joseph* as good cause to conceive that it was the will of God, that he by the unchast motions of his wanton Mistris, should be provoked unto unclean courses, as *David* had to perswade himselfe, that it was Gods will by the rayling of *Shimei* he should be provoked unto revenge; that so by the power of his grace, strengthning them against such provocations, they might come forth of their severall temptations, as gold out of fire, more bright more resplendent then before? *Ioseph* was a faire person and wellfavoured *Genes.* 39. 6. Now this was a sore provocation to a lustfull eye. Beauty is said to be of a dangerous nature, as that which makes a man either *Prædonem alienæ castitatis* or *Prædam suæ*. But Joseph had a gracious and a chast heart, his beauty gave him no encouragement to prey upon others chastity, but being a congruous baite to the lustfull appetite of his Mistris, it was in danger to expose his own chastity to be preyed upon. And as *Austin* said of Gods providence concerning *Shimei*, *ejus voluntatem proprio vitio suo malam in hoc peccatum judicio suo justo & occulto inclinavit*. Who seeth not, that the like may be said of Gods dealing with *Ioseph's* Mistris? and that without all aspersion of unholinesse unto God. For if he gives Men or Women over unto their lusts, what will be the issue but uncleannesse: *Rom.* 1. 24, 26. When God gave them up to vile affections, what followed but this? *even their Women did change their naturall use into that which was against nature*, vers. 27. *and likewise also the Men left their naturall use of the Women, and burned in their lust one toward another; and Man with Man wrought filthinesse, and received in themselves such recompence of their errour as was meet*. Here we have a strange course of Gods providence in punishing sin with sin. For these Gentiles in defiling themselves one with another, in a most unnaturall and abominable manner, are said to receive *such recompence for their errour as was meet*. In few words, what is meant by provocation unto any sin? Is it to doe that whereupon man may take just cause or occasion to doe that which he doth without blame? like as the Corinthians provoked *Paul*, *as a foole to boast himselfe*, as himselfe expresseth it, for he adds, *ye have compelled me*. But this cannot be affirmed of *Tiberius* his ministers in provoking *Drusus* and *Nero*. For no provocation could be sufficient to make them unblameable in convitiating their Prince, much lesse can it be said, that God provokes any man in this manner: neither doe I think that any of our adversa-

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ries (as malevolent as they are) dares impute any ſuch crimination unto us, as if wee attributed any ſuch diſcourſe unto providence divine. What then is it to provoke unto ſin? Is it to doe ſomewhat upon the conſideration whereof, mens paſſions being moved, they cannot but ſin. But this in like ſort is equally as untrue, as the former, even of thoſe provocations which were made upon *Druſus* and *Nero* by the practiſes of *Tiberius*. Or is it the doing of ſomewhat, whereupon occaſion is taken to ſinne, to blaſpheme? this hath no colour of truth in it. For even man without all tranſgreſſion may doe many things, whereupon occaſion is taken of doing evill, and therefore we diſtinguiſh of *Scandalum datum & Acceptum*. Nay, though man knowes offence will be taken upon the doing of ſome things. yet if the doing thereof be commanded by God, he muſt doe them, what occaſion ſoever is thereby taken to offend. Indeed if they are things indifferent, I muſt abſtaine from the doing of them, in caſe I know offence will be taken thereat, and that thereby I ſhall lay a ſtumbling block in the way of my Brother. For *Paul* profeſſeth that if meat would offend his Brother, he would never eat meat rather then offend his Brother. But no ſuch obligation lies upon God. For he knoweth full well how ſome will abuſe his mercies, others grow worſe and worſe by his judgements, breaking forth into blaſphemy thereupon: yet no wiſe man will ſay that God is the more unholy in the ſhewing of mercy, and in the execution of judgement. He profeſſeth in plain termes, that to them who feare him *he will be a ſanctuary, but as a ſtumbling block, and as a rock to fall upon to both the houſes of Iſrael, and as a ſnare, and as a net, to both the Inhabitants of Ieruſalem*, Iſai. 8. 14.

As for the laſt clauſe of this odious Parallel, concerning the end of *Tiberius* his courſe in this, namely *that ſo he might cover his cruelty in their death under pretext of juſtice*. Undoubtedly I ſhould think the putting of them to death was juſt in caſe they did convitiate their Prince whatſoever their provocations were. For hereby they deſerved death, yea everlaſting death and damnation. His ſin was in cauſing them to be provoked hereunto, and ſo alſo it might be in the manner of their execution. For it is written of him that *fame necavit*, he famiſhed them. I know *Tiberius* was cruell enough, but by the ſtory it ſeems, that policy, wicked policy moved him unto this; firſt to intend their deaths becauſe he ſaw the affections of the people towards them, belike for *Germanicus* his ſake, a worthy man according to thoſe times. For when he found that in the beginning of the yeare, vowes were made on their behalfe, to wit, for their preſervation he dealt with the Senate, that *ſuch rewards ought not to be tendred, but towards ſuch who were of experience and of ripeneſſe of age*: and that hereupon the inward character of his affection towards them being diſcovered, he laid them open to every mans criminations, *variaq; fraude inductos ut & concitarentur ad convitia & concitati perderentur, accuſavit per literas, amariſſimè congeſtis etiam probris, & judicatos hoſtes fame necavit*. And anon after, the ſame Author diſcovers the reaſon of all this, to wit, that ſeeing *Germanicus* was but his adopted Sonne, and one *Druſus* by name was his naturall ſonne, and his own ſonne *Druſus* being dead, leaving a ſonne *Tiberius* behind him, he deſired to make him as his naturall ſonne his ſucceſſor in the Empire. *Ælium Sejanum ad ſummam potentiam non tàm benevolentia provexerat quàm ut eſſet cujus miniſterio ac fraudibus liberos Germanici circumveniret: Nepotemq; ſuum ex Druſo filium naturalem ad ſucceſſionem Imperii confirmaret*. Sure we are God hath no need of any ſuch politique courſes; neither hath he need of any pretext of juſtice to take a mans life from him. It is confeſſed now of all hands, that God can annihilate the holieſt Angel by power abſolute. And if it be in the power of God to keep any man from ſin, as I think no wiſe man will deny, ſurely it is in his power to refuſe to keep any reaſonable creature from ſin. For certainly though *Adam* were created in innocence, yet he preſerv'd him not in innocency, but left him to himſelfe, having expoſed him to Satans temptations. The Angells had no Satan to tempt them; God preſerved the elect Angells from ſinning, and how? let *Auſtin* ſpeak in this particular; either by giving them *majorem amoris divini menſuram* in their creation then their fellowes; or by giving them *amplius adjutorium* after their creation. And in particular concerning *Adam*, the ſame Author profeſſeth that God gave him, *Poſſe ſi voluit*, but he gave him not, *Velle quod potuit*. And dares any man deny that it is in the power of God by the deniall of his efficacious grace, to make way for the entring of ſin into the World, and that wonderfull work of the incarnation of the ſonne of God, and the redemption of the World by him; as alſo for the manifeſtation of his own glory, both in the way mercy by the pardoning of ſin, and in the way of juſtice by the puniſhing of ſin. Let *Arminius* be heard in this, Who confeſſeth

that

that God in the ſtorehouſe of his wiſdome and power, hath not only ſufficient impediments of ſin, but efficacious alſo, by the uſe whereof, ſinne would certainly and infallibly be hindered: His words are theſe, *Præter illa ſufficientia, impedimenta etiam efficacia habet in ſuo ſapientiæ & potentiæ theſauro, quibus productis certò & infallibiliter peccatum impediretur.* Which if it be true, certainly it was as true, as touching the hindering of the ſinne of *Adam*, as of hindering any mans ſinne elſe from the time of *Adams* fall. And as certain it is that God would not make uſe of any of theſe impediments, though it is apparent theſe impediments *Arminius* ſpeakes of, are of ſuch a nature as whereby ſinne would be hindered without any prejudice to the freedome of mans will, as appears by all his inſtances following of this kind, ſhewing how God did efficaciouſly hinder the ſinnes of many. And indeed it is evident in reaſon and ſuch as cannot be denied, unleſſe a man will ſay, that whatſoever courſe had been taken by God to preſerve him from ſinne, without prejudice to the freedome of his will, yet nevertheleſſe he would have ſinned: which is in ſo high a degree abſurd, as manifeſtly to contradict the very light of nature. For ſeeing *Adam* in the ſtate of innocency was naturally indifferent, as well to ſtand, as to fall; and morally more inclined to ſtand then to fall; (for as much as God had made him good) even in reſpect of this indifferency it cannot be ſaid, that upon every occaſion or temptation unto ſin, he would have yeelded thereunto. For ſuch a condition is not an indifferent condition. Nay Philoſophers ackowledge that of three ſorts of contingents, one ſort is of ſuch which they call, *Contingentia æqualitèr*, that is, ſuch as fall out as often one way as another. And what are theſe? ſurely all ſuch and none but ſuch as are ſubject to a mans free will. And even of *Eſau* borne in ſin (ſo was not *Adam*) *Auſtin* thinks it ſtrange, that any man ſhould deny, but that there was a courſe to have called him as effectually, as he called *Jacob*, had he been pleaſed to have uſed it. Now hereby it manifeſtly appears, that God hath no need of any provoking courſes, exaſperating courſes to draw them unto ſinne, let him but withold thoſe efficacious impediments of ſin, which are in the ſtorehouſe of his wiſdome and power, as *Arminius* acknowledgeth, and ſinne hereupon ſhall enter. For the permiſſion of ſinne (by *Arminius* his diſtinction of it) is the ſuſpenſion of that efficiency whereupon it would be avoided. And if it were a ſafe courſe to judge of what becometh God by that which becometh man, we ſhould conclude even of permiſſion of ſin, that like as it becometh not us to permit ſinne if it lieth in our power to hinder it, in the ſame manner it becometh not God to permit any ſinne, ſeeing it lyeth in his power to hinder it. *Sed judicia ejus* (ſaith *Auſtin*) *multa abyſſus. Nos certè, ſi eos in quos nobis poteſtas eſt ante oculos noſtros perpetrare ſcelera permittamus, rei cum ipſis erimus: quàm verò innumerabilia ille permittit fieri ante oculos ſuos, quæ utiq; ſi voluiſſet nulla ratione permitteret.* In the 2 *Kings* 2. 26, 27. we read of a deſperate courſe of the King of *Moab*, that finding the battail to be ſore againſt him, firſt tryed with 700 men to break through to the King of Edom, but when he could not, he took his eldeſt ſonne that ſhould have raigned in his ſteed, and offered him for a burnt offering upon the wall; the ſight of which barbarous part of his ſtrook griefe into the hearts of the children of Iſrael, ſo that they departed from him, and returned into their country. What, therefore ſhall we condemne God, for ſending *Abraham* to ſacrifice his ſonne, his only ſonne, his ſonne *Iſaac*? In the 16 *Judg.* we read a ſtrange ſtory of *Sampſon* whoſe faith is commended *Hebr.* 11. For there we read how he dyes, his heart flaming with deſire of revenge, and yet with great devotion prayes unto God to aſſiſt him, that he might be avenged of the Philiſtins for his two eyes. *O Lord God I pray thee think upon mee, O God I beſeech thee ſtrengthen me at this time only, that I may be at once avenged of the Philiſtins for my two eyes.* And again, *Let me looſe my life with the Philiſtins: & he bowed himſelfe with all his might, and the houſe fell upon the Princes, and upon the people that were therein; ſo that the men that he ſlew at his death, were more then they which he had ſlaine in his life.* For both the houſe it ſelfe was full, and upon the roofe of it there were about 3000 men and women. Here is a ſtrange maſſacre wrought by *Sampſon* an Iſraelite upon the Philiſtins, at that time when the Iſraelites were in ſubjection to the Philiſtins who were their Lords, as ſometimes *Pharaoh* was. For the men of *Judah* admoniſhed him when they came up to the rock Etam to bind *Sampſon*. *Knoweſt thou not* (ſay they) *that the Philiſtins are rulers over us? Wherefore then haſt thou done thus unto us?* to wit, in taking ſuch courſes as might well provoke the Philiſtins to root out the Iſraelites. Yet nevertheleſſe he comes ſparkling with zeale to deſtroy many thouſands of them, yea the Princes with the reſt, and well pleas'd to deſtroy himſelfe with them, to be avenged of them

Exam p. 157.

Zabarel. lib. 1. Poſt. Analyt. 182.

Lib. 1. ad Simpli. queſt. 2.

Exam. p. 157, & 166.

Contr. Iulian. Pelag. l. 5. cap. 4.

them for his two eyes. And how could this be done by him without ſome ſpeciall & propheticall inſtigation & animation received from the ſpirit of God, we know not. And who doubts, but that God animating him hereunto, all this was lawfull? which without Gods warrant, could be no leſſe then abominable & moſt damnable ſins. Yet undoubtedly God did not animate *Herod*, & *Pontius Pilate*, together with the Gentiles, and people of Iſrael to do what they did againſt our Saviour, but rather left them to be ordered by his Law, wherein ſuch things are prohibited. And nevertheleſſe the Apoſtles in their pious meditation with one voyce profeſſe, that, *All theſe were gathered together againſt the holy Son of God, to doe thoſe things which Gods hand, and Gods councell had predeſtinated to be done*: and why the like is not to be acknowledged of the moſt barbarous facts committed by *Tiberius*, or any other monſter of nature, I know no reaſon. And as touching ſhamefull courſes, no leſſe abominable in the kind of acts flagitious, as theſe here mentioned of *Tiberius* were, in the kind of acts facinorous; The Apoſtle profeſſeth both that God gave them up to vile affections, and to the luſts of their own hearts, to the committing of ſuch abominations, and alſo that herein they received ſuch recompence of their errour as was meet; and the errour which God avenged in this manner what was it, but ſuch wherein *Tiberius* was as deep, as thoſe whom the Apoſtle ſpeaks of, namely, in changing the glory of the incorruptible God, to the ſimilitude of the image of a corruptible man, and of birds, and of four footed beaſts, and of creeping things. And they were but πάθη ἀτιμίας into which God delivered up *Tiberius*, and to ſuch God delivered up them of whom the Apoſtle ſpeaks; and his actions as well as theirs, were equally the fruits of ἀδόκιμος νόος, into which God gave them up, that ſo they might receive that recompence of their errour as was meet.

I come to the ſecond inſtance here made of *Tiberius* his cruelty, which he compares to thoſe courſes, which we out of holy Scripture have learned, to be attributed unto God himſelfe. Now this hath long agoe been objected by *Bertius*, in his Preface to the Conference of *Arminius* with *Iunius*; I ſay objected by him unto *Piſcator*, & thereunto *Piſcator* alſo hath anſwered long agoe. And whereas *Bertius* hath replyed and allowed *Piſcator* a year for putting in his anſwer thereunto, whereof had he failed, he would interpret it as a confeſſion of his inſufficiency, to make good the cauſe maintained by him. *Piſcator* anſwers, that he had no need of ſo long a time as he preſcribed him, for after he had read over his book, in the ſpace of two or three daies he addreſſed himſelfe to an anſwer thereunto, and within a month finiſhed it. Now if the Author of this diſcourſe were ignorant hereof, his ignorance might excuſe him, if otherwiſe he might have, with more credit, occupied himſelfe in the anſwering, at the leaſt, of ſome chief particulars, whereupon *Piſcator* ſtands, for the juſtifying of his doctrine delivered by him, not of his own brain, but according to the word of God, then hand over head, to hold up the crimination without taking notice of the dilution thereof, many years a goe propoſed and ſet forth to the judgement of the world. But I am content to take into conſideration, how Scholaſtically and judiciouſly he carrieth himſelfe in this crimination, as well as in the former: and the rather, becauſe it may be that this odious cõpariſon he makes more account of (for the preparation of his Auditors to entertain that which followes with the more propitious affectiõ) then he doth of the ſtrength of ought that follows, whatſoever he doth or may pretẽd to the cõtrary. to the point thẽ.

Tiberius commanded the Virgins to be defloured, that they might be ſtrangled. Now is there any carriage of God taught by us like unto this? If God were diſpoſed to ſtrangle any, certainly he hath no need to have thẽ defloured firſt. For it is now a daies confeſſed even by Arminius himſelfe, that God can lawfully annihilate the holieſt creature that lives, and that without all reſpect to ſin, or the vitiation of them. And annihilation I think is much more then ſtrangulation; this cauſing only a diſſolution between the body and ſoule, but annihilation, ſetting an utter end to body & ſoule by turning them both into nothing. And farther, had *Tiberius* only permitted the deflouring of them, whẽ he might have hindered it, though this were a foule part in him, yet I hope no Chriſtian will ſay, it is a foule part in God, to permit any act never ſo flagitious, or facinorous when he is able to hinder it; eſpecially when he may hinder it without any prejudice to the liberty of mans will: and that this is in Gods power *Arminius* acknowledgeth and ſuppoſeth at large in his *Examen* and Treatiſe there *De Permiſſione*. But *Tiberius* commanded the Hangman to defloure them. But is this our doctrine, that God commanded the raviſhing of any, the murthering of any, or any other ſin whatſoever? Do we not all teach rather, that God forbids it, and that under

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penalty of everlasting death? yet it is true, the word of God expressely professeth out of the mouth of *David*, that *God bad Shimei to curse David*, and that he bid the evill spirit to seduce *Ahab*, that he might goe up to Ramoth-Gilead, and that not to be strangled I confesse, but, which was nothing better to him, that he might fall, and be slain there. But this is a figurative speech, and signifies not properly any command of God, but rather denotes the secret operation of Gods providence in the hearts of men, even of wicked men; for those as well as Devills, God knows how to make use of, to serve his own turne. And *Austin* professeth, *Deum operari in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum voluntates quocunq; voluerit, sive ad bona, pro suâ misericordiâ, sive ad mala pro meritis eorum judicio utiq; suo, aliquando aperto, aliquando occulto, semper autem justo*: And, touching the particular of *Shimei*, writes thus, *ejus voluntatem proprio suo vitio malam, in hoc peccatum judicio suo justo, & occulto inclinavit*. As for *Tiberius* his causing the little maides to be defloured, that might be done without their sinne, they might be ravished, and in that case, that might be their sorrow but not their sin. And as for the hangmans fault, in this, he was not excusable by *Tiberius* his causing him to defloure them; For *Tiberius* his causation herein extended no farther then to command them. And I hope it was no just excuse for the people of Israel in their Idolatrous courses, that therein they did but keep the statutes of *Omri*, and all the manner of the house of *Ahab*, *Mic.6*. Yet neither doth God command any man to doe that which his Law forbids, or to sin against him. And farther we acknowledge with *Austin*, that sin hath no efficient cause, but deficient. And it is enough with God to expose any man to sin, by not working him to that which is good; it being his office to work us to every thing that is pleasing in his sight. *Heb.*13. 20. to cause us to walk in his statutes, and judgements, and to doe them, *Ezech.* 36.28. yea, to keep us from presumptious sins, and that they get not the dominion over us. *Psal.*19.14. yea, to deliver us from every evill work, 2 *Timoth.*4.18.

De Grat. & lib. Arbitr. c.21.

But perhaps some may say; Our doctrine is that God willeth sin to be committed for which men may and shall be punished; like as *Tiberius* would the Virgins should be defloured, that they might be strangled.

And I answer, that *Arminius* himselfe professeth that, *Deus voluit Achabum mensuram scelerum suorum implere*, God would have *Ahab* fill up the measure of his sinne, that he might be condignely punished. And why may we not say as well, that God would have Tiberius to fill up the measure of his sinnes? And yet like as Tiberius would have the Virgins to be defloured that they might be strangled; so Ahab would have Naboth accused of blasphemy, that he might be condemned for it, and so put to death and stoned; and all these things were done under colour of Religion. Yet Arminius in reference to these very courses, spares not to professe, that God would have Ahab to fill up the measure of his sinnes, yet doth not *Bertius* upbraid him for defaming God, with imputing cruelty unto him. Againe, the same Arminius professeth that in their ignominious handling of Christ, God would have the Jewes, *progredi quousq; progressi sunt*, proceed so farre as they did proceed. And was it not Gods will in like manner, that the Gentiles should proceed as farre as they did in the same businesse? Now we know full well by the story Evangelical, how farre they went in their mischievous courses against the Son of God. For Judas betrayed him, and the high Priests both hired Judas hereunto, and suborned false witnesses against him; and both the Herodians and Souldiers mocked him, and the people urged Pilate to crucify him, and to dismisse Barnabas, and Pilate yeelded to the peoples desire, took order to have him first scourged, then crucified. And if it may be truely and piously said, that in these ignominious usages of the Son of God, they went as farre as God would have them to goe; why may it not, with as great truth and piety be avouched, that Tiberius also in these his barbarous courses, went as farre as God would have him? Neither doth Arminius give himselfe to qualify the harshnesse of these his affirmations. We say that whatsoever comes to passe, it is Gods will it should come to passe, as *Austin* expresly professeth, *Enchir. cap. 95. Nec aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit*, and the Articles of Ireland, Artic. 11. professe the same. But withall we explicate it as *Austin* dothin the words following, by adding the different manner, how they shall come to passe by the will of God, according to the different condition of things that come to passe, namely good or evill; thus, *Vult fieri*, but how? *vel sinendo ut fiat* (to wit in case they are evill) *vel ipse faciendo* (to wit, in case they are good. So then good things God will have come to passe by his effection, evill things only by his permission. And *Bellarmine* opposing our Divines to the uttermost

uttermoſt of his power in this particular, being convicted in conſcience by the evidence of truth is driven to confeſſe; *Bonum eſſe ut malum fiat Deo permittente*, It is good that evill ſhould come to paſſe by Gods permiſſion, or Gods permitting it. Tiberius willed that the Virgins ſhould be defloured and impiouſly he willed it. God willed that Davids Concubines ſhould be defloured, and holily he willed it; neither is he delighted with impurity. For the Scripture attributes this unto God, *I will give thy Wives unto thy Neighbour, and he ſhall lye with them in the ſight of all Iſrael and before the ſunne.* And this conſtupration of Davids Concubines ſerved for the chaſtiſing of David, as Arminius profeſſeth, *Inſerviit caſtigando Davidi; & omnes pœnæ habent Deum authorem*, All puniſhments have God for their author; they are the words of the ſame Arminius. It was impiety and cruelty in Tiberius to cauſe the Virgins to be defloured and ſtrangled But what Chriſtian dares to impute impiety or cruelty unto God for cauſing the Children of the Sodomites, ſome in their Mothers wombe, ſome hanging upon their Mothers breaſts, to be conſumed with fire and brimſtone. It was impiety and cruelty in Tiberius, to will the deflouring of thoſe Virgins, that they might be ſtrangled. But Arminius thought it neither impiety nor cruelty for God to will, that Ahab ſhould fill up the meaſure of his ſinne, that ſo he might accumulate unto himſelfe wrath in the day of wrath; for if he had I preſume, he would not have aſcribed any ſuch will unto God, as he doth in expreſſe termes. Although he well knew the vaſt difference between the power of man, and the power of God in executing vengeance; the ones power extending only to the execution of vengeance temporall, but Gods power extends to the execution of vengeance eternall. Now I find a ſtory immediatly following this very ſtory alleadged by this Author out of *Suetonius* expreſſing the cruelty of Tiberius in a farther degree, as not contented with the death of them whom he would deſtroy, and therefore he would keep them alive to torment them: *Mori volentibus vis adhibita vivendi*, when they deſired to dye, he cauſed them to live by force; *Nam mortem adeò leve ſupplicium putabat ut cum audiſſet unum è reis anticipaſſe eam, exclamaverit Carnutius me evaſit*, For he accounted death ſo light a puniſhment that when he heard one of the condemned perſons to have anticipated it, he cryed out *Carnutius* hath eſcaped me; for that was the condemned perſons name. *And when he took notice of them that were inward, when one deſired to ſuffer betimes, he anſwered him, Nondum tecum in gratiam redii.* I doe not as yet beare theſe ſo much good will. Now, why may not ſome Atheiſticall perſon track the ſteps of this Author, and in this particular exaggerate the hainouſneſſe of Gods holy courſes as ſavouring of cruelty beyond all example, beyond the cruelty of Tiberius, becauſe he holds delinquent creatures upon the rack of eternall torment in hell fire? For certain vindicative courſes in Tiberius inferior unto theſe are accounted abominable, cruell, and impious; how much more (if this Authors argumentation be of force) thoſe courſes which the word of God hath informed us to be the courſes divine, infinitely beyond the courſes of Tiberius in the way of ſeverity and rigour? As for the power of God in producing ſinne, we acknowledge none. Above 1200 years agoe it was delivered by *Auſtin*, that *ſinne hath no efficient cauſe, but deficient only.* But when the creature ſinneth, he ſinneth in doing that he ought not to doe; or in doing what he doth, not in that manner he ought to doe; or in not doing what he ought to doe, or not in what manner he ought to doe it; not one of all which is incident unto God. All efficiency both divine and humane is found only about the act ſubſtrate unto ſinne; and all ſides now a daies acknowledge, that God is the author thereof as well as man by an effective concourſe, though difference there is about the manner of the concourſe: and particularly theſe; Arminius will have Gods concourſe to an evill act, to be every way as much as his concourſe to a good, and that he concurres to the working of a good act, no more then to the working of an evill act. Which we utterly deny, requiring a double concourſe to every good act that is not ſupernaturall, as touching the ſubſtance of the act; One to the producing of the ſubſtance of the act, another to the producing the goodneſſe thereof, that is, the gracious manner of performing it: For even a naturall man may abſtaine from lying, ſtealing, whoring, blaſpheaming; but no naturall man can abſtaine from theſe in a gracious manner, that is, out of the love of God, and that ſuch a love as is, *Amor Dei uſq; ad contemptum ſui*, the love of God to the contempt of himſelfe: For this manner of performing it is ſupernaturall.

Secondly, as touching the matter of divine concourſe, to the ſubſtance of any naturall act. We ſay God moves the will to the doing of it, as it becomes the firſt cauſe to move the ſecond, but how? agreeable to the nature of it, that is, like as he moves naturall agents to doe that which they doe, neceſſarily; ſo he moves all rationall agents to doe that which they doe, contingently and freely. What is the Arminian tenent to the contrary, namely this, that God workes in man τὸ *Velle modo velit*, as abſurd an aſſertion as ever any man breathed. It is true, many times our Divines in ſpeaking of the ſecret providence of God in evill, doe expreſſe themſelves in phraſes of a very harſh accent in the judgement of fleſh and blood, but herein they doe nothing exceed ſobriety, forasmuch as uſually they contemper themſelves to Scripture phraſe rather within the compaſſe thereof, then beyond it. Yet Blaſphemy is uſually imputed unto them without all feare or wit; not conſidering, that herein they impute blaſphemy to the language of the Holy Ghoſt. As for example.

What an horrible ſinne is it for Kings and Princes to imploy their power and authority, not for the ſupporting of the Kingdome of Chriſt, *by whom Kings reigne*, but for the ſupporting and eſtabliſhing of the kingdome of Antichriſt, as in the Martyrdome of Gods Saints, delivered over to the ſecular power, to that end, and that by cenſures Eccleſiaſticall? Now if we ſhould ſay that it is God that works thus in the hearts of Kings, thus to imploy their power for the ſupporting of Antichriſt, we ſhould be cenſured for blaſphemers. Yet the Holy Ghoſt ſpares not to profeſſe, that *God hath put into their hearts to fulfill his will, and to agree and give their Kingdome to the Beaſt, untill the words of God be fulfilled.*

In like ſort, from the firſt Preaching of the Goſpell unto this day, many there have been, and at this day are, who are diſobedient unto it, and ſtumble at it either in the whole or in part. If we ſhould ſay that they who thus diſobey, and ſtumble at the word of God, are ordained thereunto, ſuch as this Author and his Complices, are ready to cry out upon us as Blaſpheamers, and to profeſſe that they will rather deny
1 Pet. 2.8. that there is a God, then hold with the *Contra-Remonſtrants.* Yet S. *Peter* budgeth not to profeſſe, that *Chriſt is a ſtone of ſtumbling and a rock of offence, even to them which ſtumble at the word of God, being diſobedient, whereunto alſo they were ordained.*

When we profeſſe that not any thing in the world comes to paſſe but *Deo volente*, God willing it, We are cenſured as Blaſphemers, in profeſſing that God doth will that which is evill, and ſinne; yet not only the Articles of Ireland, Artic. 11. profeſſe as much, and *Auſtin Enchir.* 95. *Non aliquid fit niſi Omnipotens fieri velit*: but the Apoſtles with one voyce (as touching the contumelious uſages of the Sonne of God, both by Jewes and Gentiles, Herod and Pilate) in their pious meditation poured forth before the face of God, profeſſe, that, *Both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and People of Iſrael, were gathered together againſt the holy Sonne of God, to doe that which Gods hand and Gods councell had before determined to be done.*

In like ſort, when we ſpeak of Gods giving men over to illuſions to believe lies, others to vile affections, and *to uncleanneſſe through the luſts of their own hearts, to diſhonour their own bodies between themſelves*, which conſiſted in this, that, *The Women did change their naturall uſe into that which is againſt nature; and likewiſe the men, leaving the naturall uſe of the Women, burned in their luſts one towards another, men with men working that which is unſeemely, and receiving in themſelves the recompence of their errour which was meet*: and obſerve herehence, that it is juſt with God to puniſh ſinne with ſinne. And as it hath been obſerved before us, from the daies of *Auſtin*, who when *Iulian* the Pelagian ſaid, this was done, *deſerendo*, replies, taking him at his word, who could not but profeſſe that God doth thus, the Scripture expreſly teſtifying as much; and touching the manner mentioned by him, addeth, whether God doth this, *deſerendo*, or *alio modo ſive explicabili, ſive inexplicabili*, it matters not. An Arminian ſpirit ſpares not to joyne himſelfe with *Iulian* the Pelagian in affronting *Auſtin* thus diſcourſing out of the word of God, and to profeſſe, that that doctrine of Gods puniſhing ſinne with ſinne is a common errour; whereas the Apoſtle profeſſeth in expreſſe termes, that, *Herein they received ſuch recompence of their errour as was meet*: and what is recompence here but puniſhment? and wherein conſiſted it, but in defiling themſelves contrary to nature, as the Scripture plainly teſtifies, ſaying, *Men with men working that which is unſeemely, and receiving in themſelves ſuch recompence of their errour, as was meet.* And Arminius ſpares not to profeſſe, that, *Omnis pœna Deum authorem habet.* Wherein yet we concurre not with Arminius. Wee deny that *Omnis pœna habet Deum authorem.* It is true that *Pœna poſitiva*, not of all puniſhment

niſhment that conſiſts in privation, ſuch as ſinne is; For *Malum*, as *Auſtin* long agoe pronounced, *non habet cauſam efficientem* but *deficientem*. Yet we confeſſe that God could keep any man from any ſinne, but if he will not, this is not ſufficient to make him the author of it. It is only a culpable defect that makes one the author of ſinne; that is, when he failes of doing that which he ought to doe. But God is bound to none to preſerve him from ſinne, any otherwiſe then his own free will doth bind him; for he hath mercy on whom he will: and ſo alſo on the other ſide, He hardneth whom he will.

Yet I have given no inſtances in any paſſages of the Old Teſtament, which give plentifull teſtimony of Gods ſecret providence of evill; the evidence whereof did wring from *Auſtin* this confeſſion. *Contra Iulian. Pelag. lib. 5. cap. 3. Et multa alia commemorare poſſemus, in quibus aliquando appareat occulto judicio Dei fieri perverſitatem cordis ut non audiatur quod verum dicitur, & inde peccetur, & ſit ipſum peccatum præcedentis pœna peccati. Nam credere mendacio & non credere veritati utiq; peccatum eſt. Venit tamen ab eâ cæcitate cordis, quæ occulto judicio Dei, ſed tamen juſto, etiam pœna peccati monſtratur.* And in his Book *De Grat. & lib. arbitr. cap. 20.* inquiring how it is ſaid that the Lord bid *Shimei* to curſe *David*; *Quomodo dixit Dominus huic homini maledicere David? Quis ſapiens & intelligit? How did God bid this man curſe David? Who is wiſe and he ſhall underſtand?* *Non enim jubendo dixit, ubi obedientia laudaretur, ſed quod ejus voluntatem proprio vitio ſuo malum in hoc peccatum judicio ſuo juſto & occulto inclinavit. Ideo dictum eſt, dixit ei dominus. Nam ſi jubenti obtemperaſſet Deo, laudandus potius quàm puniendus eſſet, ſicut ex hoc peccato poſtea novimus eſſe puritum.* Neither ſaith he, is the cauſe concealed, why God thus dealt with *Shimei*, *Hoc eſt cor ejus malum in hoc peccatum miſerit vel dimiſerit* (I expreſſe it rather in *Auſtins* words then mine own, becauſe the adverſaries of Gods truth, think it enough to paſſe the cenſure of blaſphemy upon ought that we deliver herein.) Now the cauſe was, *Ut videat Dominus, inquit, humilitatem meam & retribuat mihi bona pro delicto ejus in die iſto*, That God may ſee my humility ſaith *David*, and recompence me good for his curſing this day. *Ecce quomodo probatur* (thus *Auſtin* goes on) *Deum uti cordibus etiam malorum ad laudem atq; adjumentum bonorum.* Thus, (ſaith he) *he uſed Iudas betraying Chriſt, thus he uſed the Iewes crucifying Chriſt: and how great good things did he thereby procure to all that ſhould at any time believe? Who alſo uſeth the Devill himſelfe, though moſt wicked, yet he uſeth him optimè moſt holily, for the exerciſing and proving of the faith and Piety of the righteous, not to himſelfe who knowes all things before they come to paſſe, but to us, who had need that after ſuch manner God ſhould proceed with us.* The adding hereunto, how God wrought in the heart of *Abſalom* to confound the counſell of *Achitophel*, he breaks forth into this exclamation in the beginning of the next chapter. *Who would not tremble at the conſideration of theſe judgements divine, whereby God workes even in the hearts of wicked men what he will, yet rendring unto them according to their deſerts.* Then making mention of *Rehoboam* his deſpiſing the counſell of the Antients, as alſo that 2 *Chron.* 1. how God ſtirred up the ſpirit of the Philiſtins and Arabians againſt *Ioram*, and they came up upon the land of Judah and laid it waſt. Here, ſaith *Auſtin*, *it is manifeſt that God doth raiſe up enemies to lay ſuch countries waſt, whom he judgeth worthy of ſuch puniſhments. But yet*, ſaith he, *will you ſay they came not up by their own will, or did they ſo come up by their own will, as to make that untrue which the Scripture ſaith, namely, that God ſtirred them up? Nay rather both are true, for both they came up by their own will, and yet God ſtirred up their ſpirits to come; which alſo*, ſaith he, *may be delivered in this manner, namely, that both God ſtirred up their ſpirit, and alſo they came up by their own will. Agit enim Omnipotens in cordibus hominum etiam motum voluntatis eorum: For the Almighty doth worke in the hearts of men, the very motion of their will, that he may work by them that which he thinks good to work by them, even he who knoweth not how to work any thing unjuſtly.* Unto theſe he addeth variety of other teſtimonies all drawn out of the Word, and concludes, *His & talibus teſtimoniis divinorum eloquiorum quæ omnia commemorare nimis longum eſt, quantum exiſtimo minifeſtetur, Operari Deum in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum voluntates quocunq; voluerit ſive ad bona pro ſuâ miſericordiâ, ſive ad mala pro meritis eorum, judicio utiq; ſuo aliquando aperto, aliquando occulto, ſemper autem juſto.*

INTRODUCTION.

SECT. III.

BEsides it takes from men all conscience of sinne, and makes sinne to be no sinne; we use to say, *Necessitas non habet legem*, Necessity hath no law, &c. *ut est in superiori Sectione, usq; ad finem Sectionis.*

TWISSE

Consideration.

THis Motive, as this Author calleth it, hath the first place in the 16th reason of Arminius; whereby he laboureth to disprove their opinion, who conceive the object of Predestination to be the Masse of mankind not created; as appears, in the declaration of his opinion made before the States of Holland, &c. and it is the first particular of six, mentioned in that sixteenth reason of his. And why should he divide it from the rest, and not clap them together, into this ranke of motives, to prepare him to the renouncing of that Tenent, which here he impugneth, and adde Arminius his other ninteen reasons hereunto to the same purpose; if himselfe be privy to the cause thereof, I am not? But as it lieth I will consider it. Now it proceedeth upon suppositon, that such a necessity of sinning is brought upon man by this decree, as stands in opposition unto liberty. Whereunto I answere.

1. That this decree in reference to the act of denying grace, brings no necessity at all of sinning upon man; it being only the divine decree of not cureing by the grace of regeneration (that is by the grace of faith and repentance) that naturall infidelity and impenitency wherein every man is borne; all men being *conjecti in necessitatem peccandi*, through the sinne of *Adam*, as *Corvinus* confesseth, they being his own words. Now let every sober man judge, whether to leave that infidelity and impenitency which God findes in a man uncured, be to bring a necessity of sinning upon him.

2. Secondly, we answer, that notwithstanding *that necessity of sinning* whereupon all are cast, as *Corvinus* speaketh, yet there is no sinne committed by a naturall and carnall man, which is not committed by him freely: The act of lying, the act of blaspheaming, the act of whoring, the act of drunkennesse, gluttony, rayling, and in generall, every sinfull act being freely committed, by every one by whom it is commited, as is apparent by this, that there is not one of these sinfull acts, but is forborne by divers naturall and carnall men, and therein they doe abstaine from the committing of it freely. And yet we say, that even in abstaining from these acts, they doe not abstaine from sinne, for as much as they doe not abstaine from them in a gracious manner, and all by reason of that originall corruption which remaines uncured in them, untill such time as God, who hath mercy on whom he will, is pleased to cure it by the grace of regeneration.

3. But because I imagine this Author lets fly at randome, and keeps not himselfe to the precise genius of the Tenent by him impugned, but rather aimeth at our doctrine concerning providence divine, and the decree of God; according whereunto we willing professe with *Austin* that, *Non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, Enchir.* 95. Therefore I answere in the third Place, That the necessity following upon this will of God, is nothing prejudiciall to the liberty or contingency of second agents in their severall operations. Although I am not ignorant, that now a daies it is the common and glorious course of our Adversaries, very confidently to presume and presuppose, that upon the will of God, passing upon the action of the creature, there followeth a necessity, standing in flat opposition to the liberty of rationall agents; and no marvail, for *sic facitavit Hercules*, Arminius the great Champion of their cause, his learning

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ſerved him to doe ſo before them. As if the contumelious uſages of our Saviour by Herod and Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles and people of Iſrael, were not performed freely, but by meer neceſſity oppoſite to liberty. For it cannot be denied, but that all theſe were gathered together againſt the holy ſonne of God, to doe what Gods hand and Gods counſel had predeſtinated to be done. *Acts* 4. 28. And in like ſort, they that through diſobedience ſtumbled at the word of God, did not freely diſobey the Word, becauſe *Peter* profeſſeth of them in expreſſe termes, that Hereunto they were ordained. And after the ſame manner it is to be conceived of the Kings, that gave their Kingdomes to the Beaſt, namely that they did it not freely in as much as the Holy Ghoſt ſaith, that God *put into their hearts to fulfill his will, and to conſent and give their Kingdome to the Beaſt.*

Yet the Church of Ireland in their Articles ſet forth by as good Authority, as the Articles of the Church of England, Art. 11. having profeſſed that, *God from all eternity, did by his unchangeable counſel ordaine whatſoever in time ſhould come to paſſe*; to prevent ſuch like objections as this Author faſhioneth, forthwith adde, *Yet ſo as thereby no violence is offered to the willes of reaſonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor the contingency of ſecond cauſes is taken away, but eſtabliſhed rather.* And *Auſtin* in his Book *De Grat. & Liber. Arbitr.* where he ſpeaks as freely of Gods effectuall Providence working in evill, as no where more, in ſo much as our Adverſaries take great exceptions againſt his ſpeeches (ſuch as formerly delivered) and that in expreſſe termes: His main drift notwithſtanding, and ſcope in that Book is to prove, that notwithſtanding the divine operation, in working the motion of the creature as he thinks good, yet is the creature never a whit the leſſe free in its own operation. And indeed where grace is wanting, there is too much will rather then too little, unto that which is evill; according to that he writes alſo elſewhere, *Libertas ſine gratia non eſt libertas ſed contumacia.* And if Gods operation prejudiceth not the liberty of the creature, much leſſe the will of God. For though not any thing comes to paſſe unleſſe God willeth it, whether it be good or evill, yet with this difference as *Auſtin* in the ſame place profeſſeth, *He will have that which is good come to paſſe by the effecting of it, but evill only by his permitting of it. Non aliquid fit niſi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel ſinendo ut fiat vel ipſe faciendo.* Epiſt. 28. Enchirid. cap. 95.

But though *Auſtin* and the Church of Ireland, yea and the Word of God teacheth this; yet the Tragædian, as this Author ſaith, could ſee the contrary, that is, perceive the evidence of the contrary, which none of theſe ſaw. And is not this a pretty Comædy, that a Tragædian and *Zeno's* ſervant muſt be brought in, and that in a confidentiary ſuppoſition to out face, not Divines only both antient and late, but the very word of God? For it is as clear forſooth, that what comes to paſſe by the will of God, and by the effectuall operation of God, doth not come to paſſe freely; and conſequently, that the doctrine (which maintaines that evill comes to paſſe by the will of God, as the crucifying of Chriſt by the predeſtination of God, or by the operation of God; as the Rent of the ten Tribes from the two, and the hardning of *Pharaoh's* heart, ſo as not to let Iſrael goe, God profeſſeth to be his work) takes away all conſcience of ſinne? All this I ſay is as cleare (if we believe this Author) as that *Seneca's* Tragædies are the Oracles of God. And I pray conſider, muſt it not take away as well all conſcience of righteouſneſſe, whether of faith, or of repentance, or of obedience; unleſſe we deny faith to be the gift of God, repentance to be the gift of God; unles we deny that God is he, *Who makes us perfect to every good work, working in us that which is pleaſing in his ſight*, that God is he that putteth his own ſpirit in us, and *cauſeth us to walke in his ſtatutes, and to keep his judgements and doe them?* Ephes. 5. 8. 2 Timoth. 2. Acts 11. 18. Heb. 13. 20. Ezech. 30. 28

Yet what doth *Seneca* ſpeak of the divine will, or divine operation? Did the Tragædian under the terme of Fate, denote the divine decree, or the divine adminiſtration of things, which is plentifully revealed to us in the word of God? *Auſtin* I am ſure thought otherwiſe in more places then one, in Pſalm. 31. on theſe words, *Pronunciabo adverſum me*, He blames thoſe who when they are found in their ſinnes ſay, *Fatum mihi fecit, ſtellæ meæ fecerunt*, But ſaith he, *Quid eſt fatum? Quæ ſunt ſtellæ? certè iſtæ quas in Cælo conſpicimus; & Qui eas fecit? Deus. Quis eas ordinavit? Deus, ergo vides quod voluiſti dicere, Deus fecit ut peccarem*: Then he tells of others, who ſaid that *Mars facit Homicidam, Venus Adulterum*. So that *Fatum* with them were ſecond cauſes, which we all know in their operations, doe both work by neceſſity of nature, and have no power to maintain the free will of man; and in Pſalm. 91. *Quæris ab illo quid ſit Fatum, & dicit ſtellæ malæ. Quæris ab illo, quis fecit ſtellas, quis ordinavit ſtellas; non habet quid tibi reſpondeat niſi Deus.*

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It's true indeed, the Pelagians did object the Stoicall Fate unto *Auſtin*, as if his doctrine ſavoured of it; and what doth he anſwer thereunto? *Nec ſub nomine gratiæ Fatum aſſerimus, quia nullis hominum meritis dicimus Dei gratiam antecedi. Si autem quibuſdam omnipotentis Dei voluntatem placet Fati nomine nuncupari, profanas quidem verborum novitates evitamus, ſed de verbis contendere non amamus.*

Yet becauſe we are to give the Devill his right; With what conſcience could this Author profeſſe of this *Fatum* of the Heathens, that their faith thereof did take away all conſcience of ſinne, ſeeing it did not take away the conſcience of ſinne in her, who is made by the Poet to utter this; as appears in the ſame Author within a few lines after. For there ſhe profeſſeth, that if God the creator of all, ſhould make his wrath break forth againſt her, and ſtrike her with a thunderbolt from heaven, yet this were no ſufficient puniſhment for her ſinnes. Queen *Iocaſtas* word are theſe.

Non ſi ipſe mundum concitans divum ſator
Coruſca ſæva tela jaculetur manu
Unquam rependam ſceleribus pœnas pares.

Shee juſtifies God and condemnes her ſelfe, notwithſtanding her former words uſed only as it ſeems, to pacify the furious moode of her Sonne and Husband *Oædipus*. Will not ſuch one day, riſe up in judgement againſt many Chriſtians, who unleſſe themſelves may be exempted from that providence divine, whereby he moves all things agreeable to their natures, are ſo apt to condemne God of injuſtice, and juſtify themſelves, as needing not to have any conſcience of ſinne? And which is moſt ſtrange, they acknowledge Fate in this caſe to be ſuch, as that it neceſſitated even God himſelfe; as appears by the laſt Chorus.

Fatis agimur, cedite Fatis,
Non ſollicitæ poſſunt curæ
Mutare rati ſtamina fuſi.
Quicquid patimur mortale Genus,
Quicquid facimus venit ex alto:
Serváq; ſua decreta colus
Lacheſis durâ revoluta manu.
Omnia certo tramite vadunt;
Primúſq; dies dedit extremum
Non illa Deo vertiſſe licet,
Quæ nexa ſuis currunt cauſis.
It cuiq; ratus prece non ullâ
Mobilis ordo, multis ipſum
Timuiſſe nocet, multi ad fatum
Venere ſuum dum fata timent.

But as I ſaid before, whatſoever they conceived of Fate, and howſoever they faſhioned it, their opinion thereof did not expectorate all conſcience of ſinne in them, or urge them to juſtify or excuſe themſelves in their courſes. For it appears both of *Oædipus* and *Iocaſta*, that they not only condemned themſelves, but became ſelfe executioners of puniſhment upon themſelves for their foule crimes: the one pulling out his own eyes, judging himſelfe unworthy to ſee the light; and the other deſtroying herſelfe. Though whatſoever they or the Poets that ſet them forth conceived of Fate, in this caſe of theirs, it was only the Oracles of the Devills, and his illuſions that abuſed them; God giving them over thereunto, and that no doubt moſt juſtly; when in a wicked curioſity they deſire to know, what ſhall become of them and their children: the Devill gives forth his Oracles as he thinks good, afterwards ſets his witts on work to accompliſh them thereby, to gain the greater credit and reputation to himſelfe, and ſo much the more forcibly holds them in his ſnares.

But to proceed. This argument or motive is not yet at an end, but like as this doctrine, is pretended to take away all conſcience of ſinne, which is as much as to ſay, all deſert of ſinne on the one ſide; ſo it may be extended to ſhew, how it takes away all conſcience of obedience, and all deſert thereupon, on the other ſide; to wit, in good actions. And indeed were it true, that the doctrine did bereave a man of all free will, it were true, as *Hierome* ſaith, that where ſuch neceſſity is, *nec damnatio, nec Corona eſt*. But *Auſtin* hath ſpent an whole Book in proofe of this, namely; that grace conſiſts with freedome of will, unto that which is good; and want of grace together with God's efficacious operation, even in the worſt of things, doth conſiſt alſo with free-

dome

dome of will unto that which is evill. But that in the ſtate of nature man hath no free will to that which is good, but is a ſervant unto ſin, I know no man that doth or can deny, unleſſe withall he deny Originall ſinne with the Pelagians; like as indeed it is written of *Grevincovius* that great Arminian, *that, Grevincovius negavit peccatum Originale, quod & teſtibus convinci poteſt.* And indeed this Authors diſcourſe bears ſtrongly this way, whatſoever Proteſtation in ſhew of words he makes hereafter to the contrary. For it is apparent, that in this place, the face of his diſcourſe ſtands for freedome of will in all, as well unto that which is good, as unto that which is evill. And albeit there is ſo little difference between this and his former motive (touching the conſcience of ſinne) that it ſeems to be added only to make way for this ſentence of Hierome, which yet is nothing to the purpoſe, unleſſe he can prove, that Gods decrees doe bereave men of liberty of their wills: yet very unhappily doth he carry himſelf herein and in farre different manner from Hierom's expreſſion, though he placeth *Corona* in oppoſition to *damnation*; one whereof, to wit, damnation, implies the merit of ſinne preceding: but the other, to wit, *Corona*, no way implies any meritorious nature of obedience precedanious thereunto. But this Author ſticks not to apply a meritorious condition to good actions on the one ſide, as well as to evill actions on the other. And if good actions were as meritorious, and that naturally too, of the crown of righteouſneſſe, as evill actions are of damnation. And withall he will have no more to decree, or work the faith, and repentance, and obedience of one, then he doth the infidelity, and impenitency, and diſobedience of another, leaſt this his will & operation, prove an adamantine chaine, of neceſſity to draw them to faith, and repentance, and obedience, whereas his wiſdome thinks it fit, they ſhould be left to their own choyce, whether they will believe and repent, yea or no. For he doth very confidently preſume, that every man hath power to believe and repent, and doe any good work; which is as good, as in expreſſe termes to profeſſe, that there is no originall ſinne at all; Notwithſtanding ſo many expreſſe teſtimonies of holy writ to the contrary, namely, *Iohn* 12. of ſome that, *They could not believe.* Rom. 2. of others that, *They could not repent.* Rom. 8. of all that are in the fleſh, that, *They cannot pleaſe God.* 1 Cor. 2. of the natural man that, *He neither perceives the things of God nor can know them*; of the Iſraelites in the Wilderneſſe, that, God *had not given them an heart to perceive, nor eyes to ſee, nor eares to heare unto that day.* Deutr. 29. 4. But theſe paſſages of holy Scripture, ſeem to have no place in this Authors conſideration, if ſo be they have in his Creed. This bed is ſomething too ſhort for him to ſtretch himſelfe thereon; and therefore he deſires to change his lodging, and to paſſe from the deſert of good actions, to the deſert of evill actions, which he formerly inſiſted upon, and he tells a ſtory of *Zeno's* ſervant moſt ſuitable to his lambick taken out of *Seneca*, though he quotes the place of neither.

Well, *Zeno's ſervant*, he ſaith, *when he was puniſhed by his Maſter for a fault that he had done, told his Maſter out of his own grounds, that he was unjuſtly beaten, becauſe he was, Fato coactus peccare*: and hereupon making his reckoning without his hoſte, concludes that, *Certainly if Malefactors could not chuſe but play their rude prankes, they could not be juſtly puniſhed for them:* Wherein he tells us what the ſervant ſaid; but what the Maſter anſwered, thereof he ſaith juſt nothing. Nay doth he truly relate what the Servant ſaid? Nothing leſſe, but ſhapes it, as he thinks good, that making his own bed, he may lye thereon more ſoftly. If we may believe *Diogenes Laertius* who reports the ſtory, the Servants anſwer was not *Fato coactus ſum peccare*, but *Fatale mihi erat furari.* For he took his ſervant playing the theefe, & though the ſervant took advantage from his Maſters doctrine of Fate, to frame an Apology for himſelfe, yet would not *Zeno* permit him to enjoy thereby any priviledge from ſtripes. For, *ſervum in furto deprehenſum verberavit.* A manifeſt evidence that even in his opinion, the deſtiny he maintained was no juſt excuſe for ſinne. And to meet him in his own plea, when he ſaid, *Fatale mihi erat furari, & cædi inquit*: this was the anſwer he made to his ſervant, which anſwer of his this Author either conceales, or was not privy to his own ignorance. And indeed *Chryſippus* the Stoick, though an eager maintainer of Fate Stoicall, yet denyed not the liberty of mens wills, as appears in *Cicero de Fato*, though in his opinion this doctrine of theirs did cohere. And *Plutarch* likewiſe in his book *De Fato* profeſſeth as much. *Fatum omnia continet, ſicut etiam videtur, neq; tamen propterea omnia neceſſariò eveniunt, ſed unumquodq; ſuo naturæ modo.* Neither did *Zeno* conceive hereby all place to be taken away for perſwaſion, as appears by his anſwer to *Crates*, when he took him by the cloake to draw him away from *Stilpo*, ſaying, *O Crates, commodiſſimè auribus Philoſophum teneas. Cum igi-*

tur perſuaſeris, tum illum trahe. Nam ſi per vim egeris, corpus quidem apud te, ſed animus apud Stilponem erit. Neither were any Philoſophers more ſtudious of Morality then the Stoicks, They wrote *De Bonis & Malis, de Affectibus, de Virtute, de Fine, deq; primâ æſtimatione, & de Actibus ac de Officiis, de Adhortationibus & dehortationibus*, as *Diogenes* writes in the life of *Zeno*. And *Auſtin de Civit. Dei cap.9.* profeſſeth of the Stoicks, that, though *Omnia Fato fieri contenderent*, yet, *Non omnia neceſſitate fieri dicerent*. And more then this, whereas the Stoicks were ſo jealous of maintaining the liberty of mens wills, that they denyed them of all other things to be ſubject to neceſſity. *Auſtin* profeſſeth that their feare, of ſubjecting the wills of men unto neceſſity, in this reſpect was a cauſeleſſe feare. *Ibid.* cap.10. *Unde nec illa neceſſitas formidanda eſt, quam formidando Stoici laboraverunt, cauſas rerum ita diſtinguere ut quaſdam ſubtraherent neceſſitati, quaſdam ſubderent; atq; in his quas eſſe ſub neceſſitate noluerunt, poſuerunt etiam noſtras voluntates, ne videlicet non eſſent liberæ, ſi ſubderentur neceſſitati.* And then proceeds to ſhew, that there is a certain neceſſity nothing prejudiciall to the will, albeit the will be acknowledged in ſubjection thereunto. And that neceſſity he deſcribes to be this, as when we ſay, that, *Neceſſe eſt ut ita ſit aliquid vel ita fiat*; his words are theſe; *Si autem illa definitur eſſe neceſſitas, ſecundum quam dicimus neceſſe eſt, ut ita ſit aliquid, vel ita fiat, neſcio cur eam timemus ne nobis libertatem auferat voluntatis.* Herein *Auſtin* profeſſeth to goe beyond the Stoicks, in acknowledging a neceſſity whereunto the will of man is ſubject, and that without detriment to the liberty thereof. Yet in my judgement, it would better become a Chriſtian Divine, to informe both himſelfe and others out of the Word of God, and reſt thereon for the diſcovery of the nature of Providence and Predeſtination divine, then to goe a forraging among Poets and Stoicks, for the juſtification of his own, in point of Chriſtian faith, and for the redargution of the way of his Oppoſites.

INTRODUCTION.

SECT. IV.

THeſe abſurdities following too evidently from the upper Way, Others of the ſame ſide willing to decline them as rocks and precipices, doe leave that Way, and preſent man to God in his decree of reprobation, lying in the fault and under the guilt of Originall ſinne; and ſay, That God looking upon miſerable mankind lying in Adams ſinne, did decree the greateſt part of them to eternall torments in hell without remedy, for the manifeſtation of his ſevere Juſtice.

But notwithſtanding this difference among themſelves, they agree well enough together. For this little jarre is not (in their judgements) enough to make a breach between them, as we may ſee in the Conference at the Hague, and in the Synod at Dort. In the Conference at the Hague the Contra-Remonſtrants have theſe words. *Quoad ſententiarum diverſitatem in hoc argumento, quod Deus hominem reſpexit in hoc decreto nondum creätum, vel creätum & lapſum, quia hoc ad fundamentum hujus doctrinæ non pertinet libenter alii alios æquitate Chriſtiana toleramus.* After this in the Synod of Dort, they permitted *Gomarus* to goe the Supralapſarian way; and the Delegates of South Holland were very indifferent which way they took. For theſe are their words, *An Deus in eligendo conſideravit homines ut lapſos, an etiam ut nondum lapſos, exiſtimant (viz.* the Delegates aforeſaid) *non eſſe neceſſarium ut definiatur, modo ſtatuatur Deum in eligendo conſideraſſe omnes homines in pari ſtatu.* And to ſay the truth there is no reaſon why they ſhould quarrell about circumſtances, ſeeing they agree in the ſubſtance. For they both ſay.

Collat. Hag. Brand.p.37.

Act. Synodal. pag.3.& 48.

1. That the moving cauſe of reprobation is the alone will of God, and not the ſinne of man originall, or actuall.
2. That the finall impenitency and damnation of reprobates, are neceſſary and unavoidable by Gods abſolute decree.

Theſe two things are the *maxima gravamina* that the other ſide ſtick at. So that theſe two paths meet at laſt in the ſame way. But becauſe this laſt is choſen by the moſt, and lateſt maintainers of the abſolute decree, as the more moderate of the two, and the eaſyer to be defended, I will ſet down the concluſion which I diſlike in their way and words.

God hath abſolutely purpoſed from eternity, of his meer will and pleaſure without any conſideration of actuall continuance in ſinne and unbeliefe, utterly to caſt off from grace and glory, Millions of men conſidered in the fall (even thoſe whom he calls to repentance and ſolvation by the Preaching of the Goſpell) for the manifeſtation of his ſeverity and Juſtice.

That all mankind is involved in the firſt ſinne and the fruits thereof, which are corruption of nature, and the guilt of eternall death, I confidently believe. But that God did abſolutely intend to leave men in that woefull ſtate for ever, and upon this only ſinne, to build a peremptory decree of the unavoidable damnation of the farre greater part of mankind, I cannot yet be perſwaded.

Having thus plainly laid down the poſition, which I deem to be falſe, I come now in the next place to deliver my reaſons againſt it, which are of two ſorts:

1. Such as firſt made me to queſtion the truth of it.
2. Such as doe for the preſent convince me that it cannot be a truth.

TWISSE

Conſideration.

HEre breaks out the main reaſon, that moved this Author to repreſent the different opinions of our Divines about the object of Predeſtination, that ſo a way might be opened unto him at pleaſure, to charge the former opinion with what he thought good; and as for the proofe of his criminations, he might the better eaſe himſelfe of the burthen thereof, by ſhewing the diſſent of other Devines of the ſame profeſſion from the former in this particular, making choyce rather to ſhape the object of Predeſtination and reprobation, under the notion of mankind, lying in the maſſe corrupt by the fall of Adam. For ſurely it is to be preſuppoſed, that they did not diſſent from their former friends without ſome reaſon, and this Author makes bold to inſinuate, that theſe abſurdities mentioned by him were the reaſons: As when he ſaith, *Theſe abſurdities following too evidently from the upper way; Others of the ſame ſide willing to decline them, as rocks and precipices doe leave that way.* But that theſe were the motives whereby they were induced to decline the former opinion, and to embrace the latter, he proves not, nor ſo much as adventureth upon the proofe thereof, but leaves unto his credulous reader to ſupply that by his forwardneſſe, to take it upon truſt; as if this diſcourſer by his morall carriage, might winne the opinion of ſo much worthineſſe, as to be a man with whom you may well play at Put-finger in the darke, *quicum in tenebris mices.* And yet Arminius might have taught him, that there is a middle opinion between theſe; namely, of thoſe who make the object of predeſtination the maſſe of mankind created, but not yet corrupted. And he puts this opinion upon *Junius*, and appeals to his *Theſes*, as giving evident teſtimony thereunto. Now there is no ſhew or colour of reaſon, why, to avoyd the abſurdities premiſed by this Author, any man ſhould decline the firſt way, and embrace the ſecond, which is the way of *Junius*. And this I conceive to be the main reaſon, why this ſecond way is altogether diſſembled by this Author, or by the ſpirit that guided him. For albeit it was for this advantage (who hankes after every ſorry conſideration to ſerve his turne in the way of motive, learning to repreſent the multiplicity of opinions hereabouts amongſt our Divines:) yet it being a matter of greater moment, to gain the juſtification of his abſurdities charged upon the firſt way, from the mouthes or practice of our Divines, at leaſt in appearance: and ſome colour hereof he findes by declining the firſt way and falling upon the third; but no colour at all by declining the firſt way and falling upon the ſecond. Therefore he thought it a part of his wiſdome altogether to diſſemble the ſecond, and to repreſent the opinion of thoſe Divines who decline the firſt (yea and ſecond too) and fall upon the third. But ſuppoſe *Iunius* had preferred the third way and not the ſecond, Had he done it out of a deſire to decline the abſurdities here mentioned? It is apparent by that his conference with Arminius (which yet he ſet not forth, but the Arminian party after his death) that he maintaines all theſe conſiderations to have their place in Predeſtination, and therefore makes *Hominem communiter conſideratum* the object of predeſtination, which as it is a notion abſtract from all the three ſpeciall notions of *nondum conditum*, or *conditum*, but *nondum corruptum*, or *deniq; corruptum*, ſo it is indifferently applyable unto them all. And indeed *Piſcator* reſolves the queſtion about the object of Predeſtination, namely, that as Predeſtination includes the decree of creating men unto different ends, ſo the object muſt neceſſarily be mankind *not yet created*; as it includes the decree of permitting all to fall in *Adam*, ſo the object (as he thinkes) muſt be mankind *created, but not yet corrupted*; and laſtly as it includes the decree of chuſing ſome out of that corrupt maſſe, and refuſing others or leaving them in it. ſo the object of his judgement muſt be mankind *both created and corrupted*. And Arminius himſelfe profeſſeth, that the twenty reaſons wherewith he diſputeth againſt the firſt way, may alſo be accommodated againſt the other waies. And albeit the followers of the ſecond and third way doe think that they can better maintain their Tenent, and free it from the

absurdities wherewith the other waies are charged; yet it followeth not herehence, that therefore they did justify them, the contrary whereunto appears in the particular of *Iunius*, as before I mentioned. *Moulin* indeed disputes against the first, but doth he, to decline that, subsist in the third, as touching the making of the corrupt Masse the object of reprobation? it is apparent he doth not. But as reprobation denotes Gods decree of damnation, he premiseth thereunto, the foresight of finall impenitency. Of this opinion of his, this Author takes no notice. Yet is *Moulin* sound throughout in the doctrine of election; wherein if this Author did concurre with him, we should nothing trouble our selves to take him off from his concurrence with *Moulin* in that particular of reprobation. And wee of the first way are willing to professe, that God neither damnes nor decrees to damne any man, but for sinne and finall perseverance therein; nor so only, but in plain termes to pronounce, that in no moment of nature doth Gods intention of damnation precede the consideration of sinne, and final impenitency; though we doe not make the consideration of sinne to precede the intention of damnation, as *Moulin* doth. And to my understanding, other reasons there are, which cast Divines upon the third way, then the declining of these absurdities mentioned by this Author; as namely, that the very notions of election and reprobation, the one being conceived to be an act of mercy, the other an act of justice, doe presuppose sinne. And whereas *Arminius* in his conference with *Iunius*, produceth five reasons against the first way, no lesse then foure of them proceed on this manner; The first thus, *Prædestinatio est voluntas Dei de illustrandâ suâ gloriâ per misericordiã & justitiã: At illa voluntas locum non habet in nondum condito ceu condendo.* The third thus, *Prædestinatio est pars providentiæ administrantis & gubernãtis humanũ genus; ergò posterior naturâ actu creationis vel proposito creandi. Si posterior actu creationis vel propositio creandi hominẽ, jam homo prædestinationis objectum non est consideratus, ut nondũ conditus.* His 4th argument is this, *Predestinatio est præparatio supernaturalium bonorũ: ergo præcedit communicatio naturaliũ, & propterea creatio in naturâ sive actu, sive in decreto Dei.* His last reason is of the same nature thus, *Illustratio sapientiæ Dei per creationẽ prior est illustratione sapientiæ Dei quæ est administratio prædestinationis*, 1 Cor. 1. 21. *Ergo creatio prior est prædestinatione.* To all which reasons of his, I have answered in my *Vindic. Grat. Dei. lib.* 1. *part.* 1. *De Prædestin. digress.* 5. in severall chapters. Only the second argument of *Arminius* insisteth upon Gods ordination of mans fall. And to be freed from the trouble of answering this argument, is the only thing that I know we gain, by leaving the first and second way, and embarking our selves in the third. But how freed? surely only so farre, as that the doctrine of election and reprobation, supposing *Adams* fall, doth not engage us to inquire into divine providence concerning *Adams* fall. But nevertheless it cannot be denied, but that had not God permitted *Adam* to fall, he had never fallen. And we that take the first way, acknowledge no other Providence divine concerning the ingresse of sinne, as sinne, into the world, but in the way of permission. Sinne as sinne admitting no cause efficient, but deficient only. And it is utterly impossible, that God, either in doing what he doth, or in forbearing to doe what he doth not, should in any culpable, or justly blameable manner be deficient. And if it be farther demanded, whether upon Gods permission it followeth, that sinne shall be committed by the creature; We readily professe it doth. This *Vorstius* acknowledgeth a favorite of the Arminians. Nay doth not Arminius himself deliver it expressly, where he saith, That when God permitteth the willing of ought, *Necesse est ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum*? This he delivers without all qualification of the necessity mentioned, which we doe not. And this also *Navarettus* a Papist professeth, and though he be a Dominican, yet I know no Jesuite that opposeth him in this. And if any man inferre herehence, that then God determining to permit sinne, did determine that sinne should enter into the World. We willingly grant that God did so ordaine, namely, that sinne should come to passe by his permission. *Non aliquid fit* (saith *Austin*) *nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo.* And *Bellarmine* professeth, that, *Bonum est mala fieri Deo permittente*: so that herein God doth not will evill, but that which is good in the acknowledgement of *Bellarmine*; and that in the heat of his opposition against our Divines in this particular. And Arminius is expresse in saying, *Voluit Deus Achabum mensuram celerum implere.* And what is this but, *Peccata peccatis cumulare*? And though the Jesuits and Arminians doe with all their force resist, yet it evidently followes from the notion of efficacious grace embraced by the one, and by the notion of an efficacious impediment of sinne, dictated by Arminius himselfe. For efficacious grace with the Jesuites, consists in the congruity

Auguſt. de Civit. Dei. l. 12. *c.* 7.

Lib. 2. *de Amiſſ. grat. & ſtatu peccati. c.* 14.

Exam. p. 162.

congruity thereof, and the congruity thereof conſiſts in this, that God foreſeeth that upon the confeſſion thereof ſinne will be avoided. Now what is the reaſon why God grants ſuch a grace, whereupon he ſeeth ſin will not be avoided; and denies ſuch a grace, upon the granting whereof, he knowes full well that ſinne would be avoided; but becauſe his pleaſure is, that ſinne ſhall be committed by his permiſſion, and not be avoyded, although he hath given them grace ſufficient to avoid it, as they ſay, and it was moſt true of *Adam* in the ſtate of innocency. In like ſort doth Arminius diſtinguiſh of, *Peccati impedimentum ſufficiens & efficax*, Efficacious hinderance of ſinne, is that whereby God ſeeth ſinne will be avoided; ſufficient is only that whereby a man may avoid it if he will. But withall he confeſſeth, that God in the Promptuary of his wiſdome, hath not only ſuch impediments as are ſufficient to the avoiding of any ſinne, but ſuch alſo, as whereby any ſinne would indeed be avoided, were he pleaſed to grant them. But yet as often as he thinks good to permit ſinne, he doth not grant ſuch impediments. And is not this a manifeſt evidence, that it is Gods will, that ſinne ſhall come to paſſe (to wit, as often as it doth come to paſſe) by his permiſſion? But ſuppoſe all our Divines that embrace the third way, doe imagine the abſurdities here ſpoken of, to be juſtly chargeable upon the firſt way. Yet as he thinks them in an errour, while they conceive they can with eaſe avoid theſe abſurdities by their third way, let him be pleaſed to conceive, they may as well be in an errour, in thinking them juſtly chargeable upon the firſt way; and conſequently their opinion is nothing ſufficient to juſtify, that they are unremoveable by them that embrace the firſt way.

Armin. Examp. 157.

It is true there is no cauſe of breach either of Unity or Amity between our Divines upon this difference, as I ſhewed in my digreſſions *De Prædeſtinatione Digreſſ.* 1. ſeeing neither of them derogate either from the prerogative of Gods grace, or of his ſoveraignty over his creatures, to give grace to whom he will, and to deny it to whom he will, and conſequently, to make whom he will veſſells of mercy, and whom he will veſſells of wrath; but equally they ſtand for the divine prerogative in each. And as for the ordering of Gods decrees of creation, permiſſion of the fall of *Adam*, giving grace of faith and repentance unto ſome, and denying it to others, and finally ſaving ſome and damning others, whereupon only ariſe the different opinions, as touching the object of predeſtination and reprobation, it is meerly *Apex Logicus*, a poynt of Logick. And were it not a meer madneſſe, to make a breach of unity or charity in the Church of God, meerely upon a poynt of Logick? Thus have I juſtified the improbability and utter unlikelihood, that ever any ſchiſme will be made in the Church of God, upon theſe nice and meer Logicall differences, in my *Vindic. Grat. Dei*, which this Author is acquainted with as appears by a paſſage that hereafter he repreſenteth therehence, and that farther into the Book then theſe my digreſſions are upon the point of predeſtination, but is content to take no notice thereof, leaſt it might hinder the courſe of his Scene, whereunto it is fit he ſhould be ſerviceable. And as for the two Articles here mentioned, wherein they are ſaid unanimouſly to agree, and which he calls *maxima gravamina*. It is true they doe agree herein, but it may be in a farre other ſenſe, then he is willing ſhould be taken notice of. For as for the firſt,

1. *That the moving cauſe of reprobation, is the alone will of God, and not the ſinne of man originall or actuall.*

1. This is true in proportion to election, that like as no good work of man is the moving cauſe of election, but only the will of God; ſo no ſinne or evill work of man is the cauſe of reprobation, but only the will of God.

1. That ſo it is of election, the Apoſtle both
   1. Saith, *Election is not of Workes but of him that calleth.*
   2. And proveth thus, *Before Eſau and Iacob were borne, or had done good or evill, it was ſaid, The Elder ſhall ſerve the Younger; therefore Election is not of Workes (that is of good workes) but of him that calleth.*

2. That ſo it is of reprobation, I prove by the ſame argument of the Apoſtle, thus, *Before Eſau and Iacob were borne, or had done good or evill, it was ſaid the Elder ſhall ſerve the Younger; therefore reprobation ſtands not of workes* (that is of evill workes) *but of the meer pleaſure of God.*

   1. And like as this is farther evident by Gods courſe of calling in the point of Election, as the Apoſtle intimateth, for as much as God calleth effectually whom he will in beſtowing faith and repentance upon them.

them. For as the Apoſtle afterwards profeſſeth, *He hath mercy on whom he will.*

2. So it is as evident in the point of reprobation, in as much as God refuſeth to call whom he will, by denying faith and repentance unto them, as afterwards the ſame Apoſtle profeſſeth, ſaying, that God hardneth whom he will.

2. And this doctrine we doe explicate by diſtinguiſhing that which our Adverſaries deſire to confound, leaſt their cheating carriage ſhould be diſcovered, as formerly I have ſhewed.

For Predeſtination and Reprobation, may be conſidered either *quoad Prædeſtinantis & Reprobantis actum*; or *quoad Prædeſtinationis & Reprobationis terminum*, as much as to ſay, *quoad res prædeſtinatione & reprobatione præparatas*, that is, either as touching the act of Predeſtination and Reprobation, or as touching *the things decreed by Predeſtination or Reprobation.* Now as touching the act of Predeſtination never any man (ſaith *Aquinas*) *was ſo mad as to ſay that the merits of man are the cauſe of predeſtination.* And why ſo? Becauſe the act of predeſtination is the act of Gods will, and formerly (ſaith he) I have ſhewed, *that there can be no cauſe of the will of God, as touching the act of God willing, but only as touching the things willed by God.* Now apply this to reprobation. For is not reprobation as touching the act of God reprobating, the very act alſo of Gods will? This cannot be denied: and herehence it followes, that like as there can be no cauſe of Gods will, as touching the act of God willing, ſo there can be no cauſe of reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating. And like as it was a mad thing in *Aquinas* his judgement to ſay, that merits were the cauſe of predeſtination, as touching the act of God predeſtinating; ſo it is no leſſe madneſſe in his judgement, to maintain that either ſinne originall or actuall, can be the meritorious cauſe of reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating.

And what are the reaſons hereof in School-divinity? Why ſurely theſe. 1. Predeſtination and Reprobation are eternall, but good workes and evill workes of the creature are temporall; but impoſſible it is, that a thing temporall, can be the cauſe of that which is eternall. 2. The act of Predeſtination and Reprobation is the act of Gods will, and the act of Gods will, like as the act of his knowledge, is the very eſſence of God even God himſelfe; and therefore to introduce a cauſe of Gods will, is to bring in a cauſe of God himſelfe. 3. If works or faith foreſeen be any moving cauſe of Divine election, then either they are ſo of their own nature, or by the meer conſtitution of God. Not of their own nature, as it is apparent; therefore by the conſtitution of God: but this cannot ſtand neither. For if by the conſtitution of God, then it would follow, that God did conſtitute, that upon foreſight of mans faith he would elect him, that is, ordaine him to ſalvation. And what I pray is to conſtitute? Is it any other then to ordaine? And herehence it followeth, God did ordaine that upon foreſight of mans faith, he would ordaine him unto ſalvation: Whereby the eternall ordination of God, is made the object of his eternall ordination; whereas it is well known, and generally received, that nothing, but that which is temporall, can be the object of divine ordination which is eternall. In like ſort I diſpute of reprobation: if ſinne be the cauſe thereof, then either of its own nature it is the cauſe thereof, or by the ordinance of God: Not of its own nature as all are ready to confeſſe: if you ſay by the ordinance of God, then it follows God did ordaine, that upon the foreſight of mans ſinne, he would ordaine him unto damnation. For reprobation is Gods ordaining a man unto damnation, as touching one part of the things decreed thereby; which we come to conſider in the next place, and that both in election and in reprobation, having hitherto conſidered them as touching the act of God electing or reprobating, and ſhewed that thus they can have no cauſe.

But as touching the things decreed, thereby they may have a cauſe as *Aquinas* profeſſeth and we profeſſe with him. As for example to begin with election.

The things decreed or deſtinated to a man in election are two, Grace and Glory. Now both theſe may have a cauſe: For both Grace is the cauſe of glory; and Chriſts merits are the cauſe both of grace and glory. But let grace be rightly underſtood. For in the confuſe notion of grace many are apt to lurke, thereby to ſhut their eyes againſt the evidence of truth. For no marvail if men be in love with their own errours; and in proportion to the love of errour, ſuch is their hatred of Divine truth oppoſite thereunto. Now by grace, we underſtand the grace of regeneration, whereby

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that naturall corruption of mind and will (commonly called blindneſſe of mind and hardneſſe of heart) which we all bring into the world with us through originall ſin, is in part cured. More diſtinctly we call this grace, the grace of faith and repentance, whereby our naturall infidelity and impenitency is cured. Now this grace we ſay God beſtowes on whom he will, finding all equall in infidelity and impenitency. For ſo the Apoſtle tells us, that, *God hath mercy on whom he will.* And as God beſtowes it on whom he will, not finding any cauſe in man any way moving him, either in its own nature, or by divine conſtitution, moving him to beſtow this grace on any. So the Apoſtle 2 *Timoth.* 1.9. *God hath ſaved us, and called us with an holy calling, not according to our workes, but according to his own purpoſe and grace.* And indeed we being all found dead in ſinne, what could be found in one to move God to beſtow the life of faith and repentance upon him, more then upon another? And if any ſuch thing were found in man moving God hereunto, then ſhould grace be beſtowed according unto works, that is in the Fathers phraiſe (as *Bellarmine* acknowledgeth) according unto merits; which was condemned 1200 years agoe, in the Synod of Paleſtine: and *Pelagius* himſelfe was driven to ſubſcribe unto it, otherwiſe they had condemned him alſo. Rom. 9. 18.

But as touching the conferring of glory, God doth not beſtow this on whom he will, finding men equall without any moving cauſe thereunto, even in man; For though there be no moving cauſe hereunto in man of its own nature, yet there is to be found, a moving cauſe in man by conſtitution divine, whereby God is as it were moved to beſtow ſolvation on ſome, and not on others. For God hath made a gracious promiſe, that whoſoever beleeveth and repenteth, and continueth in faith and repentance unto death ſhall be ſaved, and whoſoever beleeveth not and repenteth not ſhall be damned. So then though men are equall in originall ſinne, and in naturall corruption, and God beſtowes faith and repentance on whom of them he will, curing their corruption in whom he will: yet when he comes to the conferring of glory, men are not found equall in morall condition; and accordingly God cannot be ſaid on like manner, to beſtow glory & ſolvation on whō he will; For he hath tyed himſelfe by his own conſtitution to beſtow ſolvation on none, but ſuch as dye in the ſtate of grace. Yet, I confes, ſome ſay that God beſtows ſolvation on whom he will, in as much as he is the author of their faith & repentance, & beſtows theſe graces on whō he will, yet certainly there is a different manner in the uſe of this phraiſe of beſtowing this or that on whom he will. For when God beſtowes faith and repentance, he findes them on whom he will beſtow it, no better then others: But when he comes to the beſtowing of glory he findes them, on whom he beſtowes that, farre better them others.

Now we come to the things decreed in reprobation, and theſe are two.

1. The denyall of the grace of regeneration, that is, of the grace of faith and repentance, whereby mans naturall infidelity and impenitency is cured.

2. The denyall of glory, and the inflicting of damnation. The firſt of theſe, to wit, the denyall of grace mentioned, is made to whom he will. And it muſt needs be ſo, in caſe God gives this grace to whom he will. And the Apoſtle profeſſeth, that as *God hath mercy on whom he will, ſo he hardneth whom he will.* And as God denies this grace to whom he will, ſo did he decree to deny it to whom he will: Yet there is a difference conſiderable: For albeit God hardneth whom he will, by denying unto them the grace of faith and repentance; yet notwithſtanding, like as it is juſt with God to inflict damnation upon them, for that ſinne whether originall or actuall, wherein he findes them, when the miniſtry of the word is afforded them: ſo likewiſe it cannot be denied to be juſt with God, to leave their infidelity and impenitency wherein he finds them uncured. But yet becauſe God hath not made any ſuch conſtitution, namely, that whoſoever is found in infidelity and impenitency, ſhall be ſo left and abandoned by him: therefore he is properly ſaid, as to cure it in whom he will, ſo to leave it uncured in whom he will, finding them all equall in originall ſinne, and conſequently lying equally in this their naturall infidelity and impenitency. So wee may juſtly ſay, there is no cauſe at all in man of this difference, to wit, why God cures infidelity & impenitency in one and not in another, but it is the meer pleaſure of God that is the cauſe of this difference. And if any liſt to contend hereabouts, we ſhall be willing to entertaine him, and conferre our ſtrength of argumentation on this point.

2. But as touching the denyall of glory and inflicting of damnation, which is the ſecond thing decreed in reprobation, there is alwaies found a cauſe motive, yea and meritorious hereof, to wit, both of the denyall of the one & inflicting of the other: And God doth not proceed herein according to the meer pleaſure of his will; & that

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by reaſon of his own conſtitution, having ordained that whoſoever continueth finally in infidelity, in profane courſes, and impenitency ſhall be damned. And albeit on the other ſide it may be ſaid in ſome ſence (as formerly I have ſhewed) that God ſaves whom he will, in as much as he is the author of faith, which he beſtowes on whom he will; yet in no congruous ſence can he be ſaid to damne whom he will, for as much as he is not the author of ſinne, as he is the author of faith. For every good thing he workes, but ſinne and the evill thereof he only permits, not cauſeth it. And laſtly, as God doth not damne whom he will, but thoſe only whom he finds finally to have perſevered in ſinne without repentance: ſo neither did he decree to damne, or reprobate to damnation whom he will, but only thoſe who ſhould be found finally to perſevere in ſinne without repentance.

Now let us apply this to the Article we have in hand, which is this; *The moving cauſe of reprobation is the only will of God, and not the ſinne of man originall or actuall*: and for the explication hereof, according to that which hath been formerly delivered, We ſay that reprobation doth ſignify, either a purpoſe of denying grace, as above mentioned, or a purpoſe of inflicting damnation. And each may be conſidered, either as touching the act of Gods decree, or as touching the things decreed. We ſhew how the Article holds or holds not, being differently accommodated.

1. As touching the things decreed,

1. As touching the deniall of grace, We ſay, That God decreed of his meere good pleaſure to deny unto ſome the grace of faith and repentance, for the curing of that naturall infidelity and impenitency which is found in all, without any motive cauſe hereunto found in one more then in another.

2. As touching the inflicting of Damnation, We ſay, That God decreed to inflict damnation on ſome, not of his meer pleaſure, but meerly for their finall perſeverance in ſinne without repentance.

2. As touching the very act of Gods decree, We ſay, Nothing in man could be the cauſe hereof, but the meer pleaſure of God, as *Aquinas* profeſſeth it a mad thing to deviſe in man a cauſe of divine predeſtination, as touching the act of God predeſtinating, & as I have ſhewed, becauſe both are eternall and the act of Gods will, which is God himſelfe: and withall to deviſe a cauſe hereof, is to caſt our ſelves upon an unavoydable abſurdity, as namely to ſay, That God did ordaine that upon the foreſight of this or that in men, he would ordaine ſome of them to ſolvation, and others unto damnation. And indeed the harſhneſſe of the Tenent, conſiſts chiefly in confounding theſe different conſiderations, whereby a colour is caſt, as if we maintained that God did decree to damne men of his meere pleaſure and not for ſin.

2. As touching the ſecond which is this, *That the finall impenitency and damnation of reprobates are neceſſary, and unavoydable by Gods abſolute decree.* Here as it were to make weight, impenitency and damnation are clapt together, as unavoydable by Gods abſolute decree; whereas it is without all queſtion, that ſuppoſing impenitency to be finall, damnation is unavoydable by the Law of God, as who hath ordained, that whoſoever dies in impenitency ſhall be damned. And as for impenitency, doth this Author, or any Arminian deny it to be a fruit of that originall corruption wherein all are borne? I perſwade my ſelfe they doe not. *Corvinus* profeſſeth of all, That by the ſinne of Adam, they are, *conjecti in neceſſitatem peccandi*. Then againe doth he maintaine that any is able to cure this but God. It ſeems he doth not by that which followeth, where he ſignifieth that God (in his opinion) did not abſolutely intend to leave men to that woefull eſtate wherein they were borne. What then? Will he have God bound to cure it in all? If ſo, then certainly he doth cure it in all. For it were impoſſible God ſhould not doe that, whereunto he is obliged in the way of juſtice. But nothing more manifeſt, then that God doth not cure it in all: therefore certainly he is not bound to cure it in all. But I imagine he conceives that God is ready to cure it in all, and it is mans fault that he doth not cure it in any. As much as to ſay, if man would doe ſomewhat which he may doe, then God would give him repentance. Here is good ſtuffe towards; and undoubtedly, this is the criticall point as touching the nature of efficacious grace. Yet this I know full well, how carefull the greateſt Rabbies amongſt the Arminians are to decline. And will it not manifeſtly follow herehence, that the grace of repentance is given *ſecundum merita*, according to ſome good work of man that went before? Which was condemned in the Synode of Paleſtine above 1200 years agoe; Nay what will you ſay, if their doctrine hereabouts

Defenſ. Armin. pag. 394.

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in the iſſue thereof comes to this, namely that God doth work in man, τὸ *Velle credere, modo Velit*, τὸ *Velle reſipiſcere, modo Velit*, as I can ſhew it under the hand of one? and I have cauſe to ſuſpect that it comes alſo from another manner of hand, then his, with whom I have had to deale with. And in this caſe it ſhall not be true that God ſhews mercy on whom he will, in giving faith and repentance, but rather he ſhall ſhew mercy on whom man will. And like as when a queſtion is made, why ſuch a man is rewarded by the Magiſtrate, no wiſe man will anſwer becauſe it is the pleaſure of the Magiſtrate ſo to reward him, but rather repreſent the cauſe on mans part, why he was reward: ſo if God ſhews mercy in giving repentance according to ſome preparation found in one man, rather then in another, it ſhall not be ſaid, that God hath mercy on whom he will, but rather the reaſon on mans part is to be repreſented, why God doth give him repentance. Yet theſe Petitions he calls *maxima gravamina* on the part of Reprobation.

And will he not give us leave to propoſe in proportion hereunto, our *maxima gravamina*, as touching their opinion in point of election? namely. 1. That it is not the meer pleaſure of God, but the faith and repentance of a man foreſeen, that is the moving cauſe of divine election. 2. And that every man hath power to believe and repent, and no man hath more cauſe to be thankfull unto God, for giving him any more grace to believe and repent (in the way of grace preventing) then he gives to reprobates. I ſpeak of reprobate men, but for ought I yet know to the contrary, I may as well deliver it of the reprobate Angells. And as touching that which they call grace ſubſequent, which is only Gods concurrence, ſeeing God affords that to any ſinfull act, they may thank themſelves, rather then God for that, like as for Gods concurrence unto any act of ſinne. Theſe doctrines are no *gravamina* to the tender conſciences of our Adverſaries.

The doctrine oppoſite to this which here he diſlikes muſt needs be this, *God hath not abſolutely purpoſed from eternity of his meer will and pleaſure, but upon conſideration of actuall continuance in ſinne and unbeliefe, to caſt off men from grace and glory.* Now this actuall continuance in unbeliefe I preſume muſt be finall; and upon the conſideration hereof, God caſts them off from grace: but I pray from what grace? ſurely from the grace of faith; otherwiſe it ſtands not in any contradiction to our Tenent. So that their doctrine in the iſſue comes to this, Whom God foreſees that they will not believe unto death, he decrees that they ſhall not believe unto death: and applied unto repentance, thus; Whom God foreſees that they will not repent unto death, he decreeth that they ſhall not repent unto death. This is the ſober and ſavoury doctrine of theſe impugners of the grace of God: and yet they perceive not what a ſpirit of giddineſſe poſſeſſeth them in this.

It is without queſtion (I think) that God leaves many in that woefull eſtate which here is called corruption of nature (no more, without any ſpecification wherein it conſiſts) the guilt whereof is eternall death; and ſeeing that if he ſo leaves them, it cannot be denied, but that God intended ſo to leave them. All the queſtion is, Whether God did abſolutely intend to leave them. Now had this Author, as he profeſſeth his diſlike of Gods abſolue intention hereof, ſo dealt clearly, and ſhewed how he did intend ſo to leave ſome, as namely upon what condition, or upon foreſight whereof, and withall given ſome proofe of his aſſertion, his ingenuity had been commendable. Yet we ſay, that God did not at all intend to leave men in this ſtate. For the terme, men in this place being indefinite, it is capable of truth either way. And this Author defines not whether he ſpeaks of ſome or of all. We willingly grant, he doth not leave his elect in that woefull ſtate, but brings them out of it by faith and repentance; which are expreſſely called the gifts of God, in holy Scripture. But as for Reprobates, I doe not find he gives either faith or repentance unto them. And *Auſtin lib.* 5. *contra Julian. Pelag.* cap. 4. ſpeaking of the *Non prædeſtinati*: *Illorum neminem* (ſaith he) *adducit Deus ad ſalubrem ſpiritualemq; pœnitentiam, quâ homo reconciliatur Deo in Chriſto, ſive illis ampliorem patientiam, ſive non imparem præbeat*: and if not unto repentance, then certainly neither doth he bring any of them unto faith. Then againe, it were worth the knowing of this Author, whether any Infants of Turkes and Saracens departing this life in their infancy, are left in this woefull eſtate. If none are left but all are ſaved, is it not a pretty guilt of eternall death, for which not any ſuffers? And you may gueſſe by this whether this Authors Pretence of acknowledgement of naturall corruption be not only from the teeth outward:

If any heathen Infants dying in their infancy, are left in this wofull estate, and suffer eternall death for that naturall corruption, let this Author answer, whether God intended to leave them in this woefull estate absolutely or no. For I professe willingly, I cannot imagine how God should intend this concerning such Infants and not absolutely, seeing before they come to the use of reason, there is no place for Divine foresight of any thing in them, to put a difference between some and others.

II. The Discourse it selfe, consisting of

1. *Motives inducing,*
2. *Arguments convincing.*

I. Motives inducing.

DISCOURSE.

SECT. I.

The first Motive.

THe Reasons of the first sort are these foure which follow.

1. The Novelty of it. I cannot find absolute and inevitable reprobation to have any footing in Antiquity. The upper way was never taught or approved by any of the Fathers (even the stoutest defenders of grace among them against the Pelagians) for the space of 600 years after Christ: nor the Lower way till the time of S. Austin, which was above 400 years after him.

They did all generally agree upon the contrary Conclusion, and taught men in their times, That it was possible for them to be saved, which in the event were not saved, and to have repented which repented not, and that there was no decree of God, which did lay a necessity of perishing upon any sonne of Adam.

Lib. 3. Instit. c. 22. sect. 1. This that I say M. *Calvin* himselfe doth ingeniously acknowledge, speaking of election, and reprobation, according to Gods foreknowledge, *Neq; hæc vulgo recepta opinio solius vulgi est, habuit enim sæculis omnibus magnes Authores*; The Opinion of a conditionall decree hath had great Authors in all ages.

Beza in Rom. 11. v. 37. Reverend *Beza* speaking likewise of the same opinion, speaks to the same effect in these words; *In quem errorem sanè turpissimum Origenes Veteres plerosq; tum Græcos, tum Latinos adegit*, Into which most foule errour *Origen* drew many of the Ancients both Greeks and Latines. But *Prosper* amongst the rest S. *Austins* Scholler doth very cleerly witnesse it, *Penè omnium* (saith he) *parem inveniri & unam* *Prosper in epist. ad August.* *sententiam qua propositum est, Prædestinationem Dei secundum præscientiam receperunt, ut ob hoc Deus alia vasa contumeliæ, alios honoris vasa fecerit, quia finem uniuscujusq; præviderit, & sub ipso gratiæ adjutorio in qua futurus esset voluntate & actione præscierit.* All did grant with one consent, that God decreed mens ends according to his foresight of their actions, not otherwise.

To these Testimonies let me adde two or three particular instances for the farther clearing of the newnesse of it.

Minutius Fælix brings in the Pagans objecting to the Christians, that they hold an inevitable event of things, and did feigne and frame to themselves an unjust God, who did punish in men their unavoidable destinies, and not their ill choyces in these words. *Quicquid agitis ut alii Fato, ita vos Deo additis: Iniquum igitur Deum fingitis, qui sortem in hominibus puniat, non voluntatem.* The objection he thus answers. *Illud Fatum est quod de unoquoq; Deus fatus est.* Christians hold no other Fates then Gods decrees, *Qui cum universam præscit materiam pro meritis & qualitatibus singulorum etiam fata determinat; & ita in nobis non genitura plectitur, sed ingenii natura punitur.* God that foreknew all men and their actions did accordingly determine their retributions.

Hier. ad Gal. cap. 1. 15. S. *Hierome* an eager opposer of the Pelagians in many places of his writings hath the same thing: *Ex præscientiâ dei evenit ut quem justum futurum scit prius diligat quam oriatur ex utero & quem peccatorem aderit antequam peccet.* To the same purpose he speaks in another place, *Dilectio & Odium Dei vel ex* *Idem ad cap. 1 Mal.* *præscientiâ nascitur futurorum, vel ex operibus, alioqui novimus quòd omnia Deus diligat, nec quicquam eorum oderit, quæ creavit.* And in his Book against Pelagius he saith, *Elegit Deus quem bonum cernit.* *Id. lib. 3. contr. Pelag.* The summe of all which speaks is but this, that there is no decree of damning or of saving men, but what is built upon Gods foreknowledge of the evill and good actions of men.

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I will ſhut up my inſtances with the judgement of the Councell of Arles againſt the Pelagians in the yeare 490. or thereabout. This Councell ſubſcribed to the Letter which was written by Fauſtus againſt Lucidus the Prædeſtinarian, and made the Anathema's and curſes which he therein denounceth againſt him and ſuch like, to be their own; ſome of which were theſe, *Anathema illi qui dixerit, illum qui periit non accepiſſe ut ſalvus eſſe poſſit*, and againe, *Anathema illi qui dixerit, quòd vas contumeliæ non poſſit aſſurgere ut ſit vas in honorem.* *Synod. Arelat. 3a. contra Lucedum. Bin. Tom. 2. part. 2. fol. 639.*

By this and the like ſpeeches which I have met with in the Ancients being convinced, that the doctrine of abſolute reprobation (and election too) was unknown unto them, I begin to call it into queſtion. For albeit I make not the deciſions and determinations of the Fathers or Councells the rules of my Faith (becauſe they are but men and therefore ſubject unto errour) yet I honour their gray haires, and their grave aſſemblies, and doe vehemently miſtruſt thoſe doctrines which they never approved or taught, but diſliked and condemned.

TWISSE

Conſideration.

AS touching the pretence of Antiquity; I find many are very apt to make plauſible uſe of this, when either indeed, or at leaſt in their imagination, it ſeems to ſerve their turnes. And becauſe I am put upon it, I will ſpeak ſomewhat of it in generall, and then proceed to conſider it as it is appyable to the preſent occaſion.

As concerning the firſt, I find no ſmall equivocation in the word Ancient: For if we compare an ancient man with a younger, in all probability the ancient is likely to be more wiſe then the other; becauſe he hath more experience, by reaſon of the length of his daies, according to that of *Job.* 12.12. Amongſt the ancient is wiſdome, and in length of daies is underſtanding. But this holds not of that which is ancient, as it ſignifies that which goes before another. For it is well known, that youth goeth before old age; yet no man will ſay, that the opinions of men in their youth, are more likely to be ſound, then the opinions of riper age. Neither doth any man call or account youth Antiquity. Yet our Fathers we call our Ancients, becauſe they have gone before us, but little reaſon there is in my judgement, to count their faith the more ſound by reaſon of ſuch Antiquity; no more then why the opinions of man in his youth, ſhould be reputed more ſound, then the opinions of his age. For as there is a youth in man; ſo there is to be acknowledged a youth of the world; and ſo likewiſe of the Chriſtian World, even of the Church of God. The Holy Ghoſt ſpeaks in this language. For even they who were the great Anceſtors of the Jews in the daies of Jeremy, are called the youth of Iſraell, as the youth of Gods Church. Jerem. 2.2. *I remember thee with the kindneſſe of thy youth, and the love of thy marriage, when thou wentſt after me in the wilderneſſe, in a land that was not ſowen. Iſrael was as a thing hallowed unto the Lord, &c.* Ezech. 16.60. *I will remember my Covenant made with thee in the daies of thy youth.* In like ſort the Ancients counting them immediately from the Apoſtles daies, are the very youth of the Church Chriſtian. Now like as it is not to be exſpected that a man ſhould have as great perfection of knowledge in his youth, as in his age; ſo neither is it to be ſuppoſed, that the Church of Chriſt ſhould have as great perfection of knowledge in her youth as in her age. This is to be underſtood *cæteris paribus*; otherwiſe there lies a double exception againſt it: the One in the way of Gods extraordinary mercy, the Other in the way of Gods extraordinary judgement. For God may extraordinarily inſpire a young man with the ſpirit of Prophecy, and ſo make him wiſer then the aged. Such was the condition of Gods exuberant grace in the daies of the Apoſtles, enduing them with power from on high, not only to inſtruct them with all ſpirituall wiſdome and underſtanding in the myſteries of the Goſpell, but enabling them alſo to expreſſe it in diverſe languages, that ſo they might be able Miniſters of Chriſt, to carry the glad tidings of ſalvation over all the World. On the other ſide, the ſinnes of the Chriſtian world not embracing Gods Truth with

love, may deſerve at the hands of God, that he ſhould give them over to illuſions to believe lies. Then no marvaile if our former light ſet in obſcure darkneſſe, and degenerate daies come in place of better and more noble times; which may more eaſily come to paſſe, conſidering that the light of the Goſpell is a ſpirituall light of faith, no naturall light of reaſon; though even this naturall light of reaſon comes to be amended and perfected by that light of grace.

But it may be ſaid, that They who lived neer the Apoſtles daies, are like to be better acquainted with the truth of God then wee. I have found ſome to pleaſe themſelves in this conceit, and it runns ſmooth and glibb, and it ſeems very plauſible to winne approbation. But as *Auſtin* ſaith of ſome things, that *acutule ſonant*, but *diſcuſſa reperiuntur obtuſa*: ſo many times it falls out, that reaſons plauſible at firſt, when exploration comes, prove very unſound; like the fruit *Solinus* writes of, which grew about Sodome, Faire to the eye, but being cruſhed *in cineres abeunt & vanam fuliginem*. And for the diſcovering of the emptineſſe of this reaſon, I proceed thus.

When you ſay of thoſe Ancients, that they were neer to the Apoſtles. I demand whether the meaning be, they were neer to the times of the Apoſtles, or neer to the Perſons of the Apoſtles, or neer to the word of the Apoſtles. The former two, doe nothing at all conduce to the perfection of Chriſtian knowledge, or ſoundneſſe of faith. For certainly both Jews and Heathens profeſſed enemies to the croſſe of Chriſt were as neer to their Times and Perſons as believing Chriſtians, but they were not ſo familiarly acquainted with their word. But as touching familiar acquaintance with the word of the Apoſtles; as alſo the embracing of it by faith: Nothing I truſt hindereth us from being as neer to the Apoſtles, as the Ancients were. Nay it is well known, that as touching divers peeces of the books of the New Teſtament, we receive them for Canonicall, which many of the Ancients doubted of. And as touching divers books concerning the times of the Old Teſtament, they are diſcovered unto us to be Apocryphall, which to many of the Ancients were not.

But it may be ſaid, that theſe Ancients to whom they pretend ſo much reverence (which indeed is but reverence to themſelves, and to ſerve their own turnes) were ſo neer to the Apoſtles, that they not only were partakers of their writings, but of their Preaching alſo by word of mouth? To this I anſwer.

1. That it is a very rare thing to meet with any ſuch now adaies, unleſſe it be ſome counterfeit Author: neither doe I find any ſuch alleadged by any, leaſt of all by any Arminian, who yet upon my knowledge doe diſcourſe after this manner, as touching their neerneſſe to the Apoſtles.

2. But ſuppoſe there were any ſuch, and they ſhould tell us what they heard preached by the Apoſtles, ſhall we take their relations for Oracles, and make the word of God to conſiſt, partly of that which is written by them, and partly of that which is not written, but delivered by word of mouth, and commended unto us by tradition? Then farewell the doctrine of Proteſtants concerning the rule of faith, that it is only the written-word; and let us with the Papiſts, joyne thereunto traditions to make up a compleat Rule of Faith.

It may be farther ſaid, that by reaſon of their neerneſſe to the Apoſtles, they may be better acquainted with the meaning of the word written.

To which I anſwer; if ſo, then either from the Apoſtles own mouthes, or by relation from others. Of any that report what they heard from the Apoſtles own mouths, they alleadge none. If they did, what were this other then to bring in Tradition to be a Rule, if not of faith, yet of interpretation of Gods word, which is as foule every way as the former, conſidering that ſoundneſſe of faith, is grounded upon the ſoundneſſe of interpretation of Gods word. If only by relation from others, the ſame exceptions lye againſt this and over and above, this muſt be of ſomewhat farre leſſe authority then the former: it being ſo difficult a matter to report from another without adding ſomewhat of his own, whether it be much or little, as *Chaucer* ſpeaketh.

Laſtly, let the Commentaries of theſe daies, be compared with the Commentaries of the Ancients, and let the indifferent reader judge, which of them are moſt true, moſt learned, moſt ſubſtantiall. So that I ſuppoſe, I may be bold to conclude, that this reaſon drawn from the neerneſſe of the Ancients to the Apoſtles, how plauſible ſoever it ſeems at firſt ſight, yet indeed is of no force.

Now to the contrary we have theſe reaſons.

1. Like

1. Like as it is fit every man ſhould profit in the knowledge of God more and more, as long as he lives: ſo in all likelihood, the Chriſtian world doth profit more and more, as they draw neerer to the end of the world, excepting thoſe times of Gods judgements in giving the world over to illuſions to believe lies. *Auſtin* did profit, as in other points of Chriſtian knowledge, ſo in this as concerning Predeſtination, and blames the Maſſilienſes for not profiting with him. *De Prædeſtin.* lib. 1. cap. 4. *Videtis quid nunc de fidei & operibus ſentiebam, quamvis de commendandâ dei gratiâ laborarem; In qua ſententia iſtos fratres noſtros eſſe nunc video: quia non ſicut legere libros meos, ita curaverunt proficere mecum.*

2. We have more means and helps for our furtherance in Chriſtian knowledge, then they had, and that in divers reſpects. Firſt, becauſe we enjoy their labours, they enjoyed not ours, nor the like before them. So that by the reading of their writings we ſoon attain to that knowledge which they had, they communicating it unto us; and it were very ſtrange we ſhould adde nothing thereunto; eſpecially conſidering that *Veritas* was wont to be accounted *temporis filia*: and *Ariſtotle* accounts it an eaſy thing to adde; Any man ſaith he may doe that, τὸ ἐπιθεῖναι τῷ τυχόντι, and thus, ſaith he, Arts come to their perfection ὅπως γεγόνασιν αἱ τέχναι ἐπιδόσεις. A tall man is able to diſcover much farther then a Dwarfe, but let a Dwarfe be advanced upon the ſhoulders of that tall man, and he will diſcover much farther then he. Let then thoſe Antients goe for tall fellowes in the diſcovery of Chriſtian truth, let the Divines of moderne ages be but Dwarfes, as the Children of Iſrael ſeemed to be, but Grashoppers in compariſon of the Canaanites, eſpecially to the ſonnes of *Anack*; yet if by their pious labours and induſtries, which they have with much ingenuity communicated unto us, they ſuffer us to get upon their ſhoulders, ſhall not we though Dwarfes, be enabled hereby to diſcover ſomewhat more then they? The Eagle is a fowle of great ſtrength and ſoareth high, the higheſt of all Kites and Haukes, yet let her carry a Wren along with her on her ſhoulders in her aëriall aſcentions, when ſhe is weary and can fly no higher, can it ſeem ſtrange, if the Wren carried thus high by this Anakim of fowles, preſumes of her own ſtrengh to fly a little higher then ſhe? or is this any glory to the Wren, or diſparagement to the Eagle?

2. Secondly Have not we better helpes of Art then they, eſpecially as touching the knowledge of the Tongues, and Logicall reſolutions of the Text. The Latine Fathers moſt of them were little acquainted with the Greek; neither Latine nor Greek Fathers were uſually much acquainted with the Hebrew: *Origen* amongſt the Greek, and Hierom amongſt the Latine, had not their fellows for this.

3. Laſtly, the Ancients in their daies were not ſo put unto it as the latter; Nothing did more quicken them, or doth us, then contentions with Heretiques. And therefore look how they were exerciſed with Hereſies, ſo it is to be expected they were beſt ſeen in thoſe Articles of Faith, which were moſt ſhaken by Heretiques. This both Auſtin and Gregory take notice of; and Auſtin is moſt frequent herein, ſome paſſages to this purpoſe I ſhall relate hereafter. Now before Pelagius his daies, the Fathers were much exerciſed in oppoſing the Manichees, and accordingly gave themſelves to the maintenance of Free-will, as Aniarius obſerves by the relation of Sixtus Senenſis. But Pelagius was the firſt that oppoſed Gods grace; and therefore thoſe Fathers that contended with him, gave themſelves chiefely to the maintenance of Gods grace. *Bibl. l. 5. annot. 101.*

And now am I come to the treating of Ancients no longer in generall, but in a ſpeciall reference to the doctrine of predeſtination. Now herein the Papiſts themſelves (who in other points labour to beat us down with nothing ſo much as with the noiſe of Antiquity) are willing to confeſſe that in the point of grace and predeſtination we need not trouble our ſelves, with inquiry after the doctrine of the Ancients before Pelagius roſe, and that upon the ground before mentioned, to wit, becauſe they were nothing exerciſed hereabouts. As for example *Bellarmine*, *De Grat. & lib. Arbitr. lib.* 1. c. 14. having propoſed diverſe paſſages of the Fathers favouring, as it ſeemed, the doctrine wherewith Pelagius troubled the peace of Gods Church, makes Auſtin to anſwer for him, *Veteres Patres qui ante Pelagium floruerunt, quæſtionem iſtam nunquam accuratè tractaſſe, ſed incidenter ſolum, & quaſi per tranſitum illam attigiſſe. Addit verò* (ſaith *Bellarmine*) *in fundamento hujus ſententiæ, quod eſt, Gratiam Dei non prævenire ab ullo opere noſtro, ſed contrà ab illâ omnia opera noſtra præveniri, ita ut nihil omnino boni quod attinet ad ſalutem ſit in nobis, quod non ſit nobis ex Deo, convenire Catholicos omnes & ibidem citat Cyprianum, Ambroſium*

ſium & Nazianzenum: yet he takes a courſe to reconcile them to the truth; ſo doth Sixtus Senenſis Bibl. Sanct. lib. 6. Annota. 251. ſo doth Alvarez. de Auxil. lib. 5. diſp. 37.

Again conſider. The decrees of predeſtination and reprobation are ſecret, neither doe they appeare of what condition they are, but by the manner of their executions. Now their executions doe conſiſt partly in beſtowing ſalvation on ſome, and inflicting damnation on others; partly in beſtowing the grace of faith and repentance on ſome, and denying it unto others. As touching ſalvation and damnation we willingly profeſſe, that the ſalvation of men of ripe years, doth alwaies preſuppoſe Faith and perſeverance therein; and the damnation of others doth alwaies preſuppoſe finall perſeverance in ſinne unrepented of. But we deny that herehence it followeth, that either faith precedes the decree of ſalvation, or ſinne precedes the decree of damnation, or the preſcience of either. That faith cannot precede election, nor ſinne reprobation, is evident; For as much as election and reprobation are eternall, but faith and ſinne are things temporall: but that wich is temporall cannot precede that which is eternall. Neither doth it follow, that becauſe faith precedes ſalvation, therefore faith precedes the decree of ſalvation. For it is faith exiſtent in time that precedes ſalvation; but no Divine will ſay that faith exiſtent in time, precedes Gods decree of ſalvation, unleſſe it be ſome ſuch as maintaine with Vorſtius, that Gods decrees are not eternall. In like ſort, it is ſinne exiſtent in time, that precedes damnation; but no wiſe Divine will ſay, that ſinne exiſtent in time precedes Gods decree of damnation; the former being a thing temporall but this decree eternall. Laſtly, neither will it follow that becauſe faith precedes ſalvation and ſinne damnation, therefore the foreſight of faith, is antecedanious to the decree of ſalvation, and the foreſight of ſinne is antecedent to the decree of damnation. For no Enthymeme of this nature is found, but ſo farre forth as it is reducible into a good Categorical Syllogiſme, whereof theſe Enthymems are uncapable. For Enthymems reducible unto good Syllogiſmes muſt agree, either in their Subjects or in their Predicates, but theſe doe not. Again all the termes in a good Enthymeme muſt be expreſſed in that Syllogiſme whereunto it is reduced But each of theſe Enthymemes conſiſteth manifeſtly of four termes; as in the firſt, there, Faith, and the Foreſight of faith, Salvation and the Decree of ſalvation; Of the ſecond, theſe, Sinne, and Foreſight of ſinne, Damnation and the Decree of damnation; and conſequently that Syllogiſme whereunto either of theſe quaternary of termes is clap'd, cannot be good; For no Categoricall Syllogiſme is good that conſiſteth of foure termes. As for the reducing of them into a Syllogiſme Hypotheticall, ſuch Reductions were never heard of in the Schooles of the learned: and that for juſt reaſon; becauſe that is no courſe to juſtify the ſoundneſſe of the Enthymemes, but a meer begging of that which is in queſtion. As in caſe a man ſhould reduce it thus; If faith be precedanious to ſalvation, then the foreſight of faith is precedanious to the decree of ſalvation; But faith is precedanious to ſalvation, Therefore it is precedanious to the decree of ſalvation. In this Hypotheticall Syllogiſme, the conſequence of the Major is the very Enthymeme which is in queſtion, for the ſubſtance of it and conſequently no proving of it, but a meere begging of it. Yet notwithſtanding we doe not deny, but that God did decree that no man ſhould be ſaved, but ſuch as being of ripe years, ſhould be found to perſevere in faith unto death: none ſhould be damned, but ſuch as ſhould be found finally to perſevere in ſinne. The other execution of theſe decrees conſiſts (as I ſaid) in the beſtowing of the grace of faith and repentance on ſome, and denying it unto others. Now the queſtion is, Whether God be indeed the author of faith and repentance, yea, or no; and becauſe the Arminians dare not profeſſedly deny this. (though lately they are come ſo farre as profeſſedly to deny that Chriſt merited it) therefore let the queſtion proceede about the manner how God beſtowes it, as namely, whether he beſtowes it of his meer pleaſure on ſome, denying it to others, or, Whether the reaſon why God beſtowes it on ſome and not on others, be, becauſe God findes ſome good work in one, which he findes not in another. This queſtion being decided, it will clearly appeare, whether predeſtination proceeds upon the foreſight of ought in man, yea or no. For if God of his meer pleaſure doth beſtow faith on one, and not on another, it followes undeniably, that God predeſtinated him hereunto abſolutely, and of his meer pleaſure, without conſideration of any future work of man. But if God beſtowes faith on man upon conſideration of ſome precedent work of his, which was

not

not the work of God, then (and not otherwiſe neither) it will follow, that upon the conſideration of that future work of man, God did elect him unto faith, or predeſtinate faith unto him. So that if we deſire ſincerely and ingeniouſly to inquire what was the opinion of the Ancients about the abſoluteneſſe of predeſtination, we ſhould ſtate the queſtion as touching Predeſtination unto faith, and not as touching Predeſtination unto ſalvation. For we all confeſſe that God predeſtinated no man unto ſalvation, but ſuch as he foreſaw, coming unto ripe years, would believe ſooner or later. And therefore the main queſtion between the Remonſtrants and Contraremonſtrants was, whether this decree were the whole decree of Predeſtination, and whether there were not another decree of Predeſtination beſides, as namely, whether God did not decree to beſtow faith on ſome, and deny it unto others. And ſecondly to inquire, Whether this decree of beſtowing faith on ſome, did not proceed according to Gods good pleaſure, without conſideration of any different work in man. And the moſt compendious reſolution hereof, is to inquire of the manner how God carrieth himſelfe in the beſtowing of faith and repentance on ſome, and denying it unto others; as namely, Whether on his meer pleaſure he hath not mercy on ſome, giving them faith and repentance, and of his meer pleaſure, denyes the gift of faith and repentance unto others. Now let the Fathers, (whoſoever thinks good) be admitted to bring in their ſuffrages on this Article, and remember what was decreed in the firſt Synode that was gathered, to make peace in the Church after Pelagius had diſturbed it, namely, *Gratiam non dari ſecundum merita*, that is, as Bellarmine acknowledgeth, *Gratiam non dari ſecundum opera*. Laſtly, all of us now a daies conſent, as touching Gods concourſe to the ſubſtance of every act of the creature whether good or evill. Now let this Author or any other, repreſent unto us, what footing he finds in Antiquity concerning this. But I come to anſwer particularly, according to this Authors text.

De Grat. & lib. Arbitr. l. 6. c. 5.

He cannot find abſolute and inevitable reprobation to have any footing in Antiquity. Belike he can find reprobation evitable; a ſtrange phraiſe either way. Theſe attributes applied to damnation doe carry a faire ſenſe with them, damnation being a work of God wrought in time, and undoubtedly may be avoided, may be incurred for the time to come. But reprobation is eternall as God himſelfe, and how that ſhould be fancied to be of an avoidable condition for the time to come, I cannot comprehend, unleſſe this Author be of their opinion, who deſire to ſhape Gods decrees of a revocable nature, as being both to impute unto him an impotent immutability, as ſome are pleaſed to phraiſe it.

But leave we reprobation unavoidable, take we the abſolute nature of it into conſideration: this he cannot find in all Antiquity. But conſider I pray, he pretends theſe motives, as inducements to change his former opinion: ſo then belike, he ſtood ſometimes for reprobation abſolute; but did he find any footing in Antiquity for it, what time he embraced it? if he did formerly embrace it, notwithſtanding he found no footing in Antiquity for it, why ſhould he now relinquiſh it, for finding no footing in Antiquity for it? Belike the older he waxeth, the more he groweth in love with Antiquity. Again when formerly he did embrace the doctrine of abſolute reprobation, upon what grounds did he embrace it? was it becauſe he was in hope he ſhould hereafter find Antiquity for it? or was it only for the authority of them who brought him up in this opinion? What ſorry grounds are theſe to build a mans faith upon? Yet this is not our courſe to impoſe Articles of faith on any, but rather to endoctrinate them out of the word of God. If then a mans Chriſtian faith be built upon the Word of God, is it a Chriſtian courſe to renounce it, or to queſtion the integrity of it, becauſe he finds no footing in Antiquity for it? What then ſhall become of the faith of Laicks, and ſuch as are unlearned? Muſt the writings of the Fathers be tranſlated into all vulgar Languages, and the unlearned addict themſelves to the ſtudy of them, leaſt otherwiſe their faith prove a wavering faith, for want of finding Antiquity to favour it? Belike the writings of the Prophets and Apoſtles, are no part of Antiquity, in this Authors more mature judgement. But if formerly the doctrine of abſolute reprobation were received upon the evidence of Gods word, as it is fit the faith of every Chriſtian ſhould be grounded thereupon, eſpecially the faith of a Divine called to be a Teacher of others; I ſhould think there were no juſt cauſe of alteration, but upon diſcovery of the errour of thoſe grounds, whereupon formerly it was builded; and the diſcovery hereof alone, were chiefly to the preſent purpoſe, namely,

namely to ſhew juſt cauſe of change of mind, & alteration of judgement, but no ſuch courſe doe I find taken here. Theſe motives and reaſons here propoſed, may carry a ſhew of reaſon, why a man being yet to chuſe his faith in theſe particulars, poſſeſſed with neither way, but indifferent, might preferre one way before another, one opinion before another, but nothing ſufficient to juſtify a change, unleſſe the weakneſſe of former grounds be laid open. For it may be that the former grounds might be ſuch as upon due compariſon would be found to overweigh theſe pretences. For upon view that I have taken of the diſcourſe following, I find not one argument drawn from thoſe places of Scripture that treat of election and reprobation; theſe I find are purpoſely declined as ſo many rocks, as if the Author feared to make ſhipwrack of his errours (pardon my boldneſſe in ſo naming them, *Auſtin* is my precedent in this ſaying, *Hoc ſcio contra iſtam prædeſtinationem quam ſecundum ſcripturas defendimus, neminem niſi errando diſputare poſſe*) but in the mean time while he fears to make ſhipwrack of his errours, let him take heed leaſt he make ſhipwrack of a good conſcience.

Aug. de don. Perſev. c. 19. But proceed we with him about the inquiry what footing this doctrine finds in Antiquity. He ſaith he cannot find it; but it is more then I find that ever he made any convenient ſearch after it, his whole diſcourſe hereupon is of ſo hungry a nature. The abſoluteneſſe of election and reprobation, we conclude in Chriſtian reaſon from Gods abſolute carriage in giving and denying grace, underſtanding thereby the grace of regeneration. Now the abſoluteneſſe herein, as we ſuppoſe, conſiſts in beſtowing this grace on ſome, and denying it to others, according to the meer pleaſure of the Lords will. Now hath not the Apoſtle (more ancient then all the Antiquity he ſpeaketh of) profeſſed in expreſſe termes, that *God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth?* What need we ſeek farther amongſt the Ancients for the juſtification of this? And that mercy here is meant, ſuch a mercy in beſtowing faith on ſome, which is denied to others, in converting the wills of ſome unto good, when others are not converted, I could prove by variety of places out of *Auſtin*, whoſe authority in this caſe is farre more worthy, then all the authority this Author produceth. Neither is this the voyce of *Auſtin* only, but of *Ambroſe* alſo in that famous ſaying of his *Quem vult religioſum, facit*, ſo much magnified by *Auſtin*. And not *Ambroſe* alone, but *Nazianzen* alſo, and *Cyprian* are alleaged by him, as concurring with him in the foundation of the doctrine of predeſtination, which he makes to be the freedome of Gods grace in converting whom he will. And which is farre more then this, yea farre more then all that can be produced to the contrary, by the very Prayers of the Church every where in uſe, he juſtifies the generall concurrence in that which he accounts the foundation of predeſtination. As when their common courſe was to pray unto God, that he would be pleaſed to convert unto the faith of Chriſt the hearts of Heathens; and wherein did this converſion conſiſt, but in giving them faith and repentance: manifeſtly giving us to underſtand thereby, that the whole Catholique Church did concurre in this Article of Faith, that it was in the power of God according to his free grace, to convert whom he would unto the faith of Chriſt, and conſequently not to convert whom he would. For if there were any cauſe on mans part, why he doth not convert ſome converting others, then there were alſo on mans part, a cauſe why God doth convert ſome not converting others, and conſequently grace ſhould be given according unto works, that is in the phraſe of the Ancients, *Gratiam dari ſecundum merita* (as *Bellarmine* acknowledgeth) which was ever accounted expreſſe Pelagianiſme, and was as expreſſely condemned in the Councel of Paleſtina above 1200 years agoe, and Pelagius himſelfe was driven to ſubſcribe unto it, by ſhamefull diſſimulation ſo to prevent Anathematization of his own perſon.

De dono Perſev. 19.

Bellar. de grat. & lib. arbit. l. 6. c. 5.

But the upper way (ſaith this Author) *was never taught or approved by any of the Fathers for 600 years.* Here breaks forth another reaſon of this Authors (or his that directed him) cunning carriage in diſtinguiſhing the two waies of our Divines in maintaining the abſoluteneſſe of election and reprobation, to wit, that in the courſe of his diſcourſe he might ſerve his turne with both, and where Antiquity ſerved not his turne againſt the one, yet might it ſerve his turne, as he thought againſt the other. But the truth is, there was no ſuch queſtion at all ventilated in thoſe daies, as touching the object of predeſtination, no nor in Auſtins neither, nor many hundred years after, that I know. And no marvell; For it concernes the ordering of Gods decree aright, which is meerly Logicall, as I have ſhewed in my *Vind. Grat. Dei.* Its true that S^t *Auſtin* doth uſually accommodate that of S^t *Paul, Rom.* 9. 21. concerning the Maſſe, unto mankind

mankind conſidered *in Maſſa damnata* as he commonly calls it, that is, in the corrupt Maſſe; but not alwaies, but ſometimes he ſpeaks of it, and accommodates it cleerely unto the Maſſe of mankind uncorrupt, yea, as yet not created, as there I have ſhewed. And as for the right ordering of Gods decrees, and the right ſtating of the object of predeſtination and reprobation, We deſire no better, nor other ground then that of the Apoſtle, *God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth*, that is, he cures infidelity and hardnes of heart in whom he will, by beſtowing faith and repentance upon them, and leaves it uncured in whom he will by denying faith and repentance unto them. And as for the rigour of this Tenent (as it is commonly accounted) of making the Maſſe of mankind not created the object of predeſtination, I have already ſhewed the vanity of that conceit and denomination; for as much as hereby neither is the decree of damnation made to precede the conſideration of ſinne, no nor of finall impenitency in any moment of nature, nor in any moment of nature is the decree of ſalvation made by mee, to precede the conſideration of finall perſeverance in faith and repentance. But whereas ſome, who are moſt rigid indeed in their diſcourſe, make the decree of ſaving ſome and damning others to precede the decree of creating and permitting of ſinne both originall and actuall; others who are moſt diſſolute, make the decree of creating and permitting of ſinne, to precede the decree of ſaving ſome and damning others, My Opinion is equally removed from theſe extreames, and conceives none of theſe decrees to be either way ſubordinate, but all coördinate and ſimultaneous, as being decrees only of various means, tending to one and the ſame end; thus God doth decree both to create ſome, and to permit to ſinne, and finally to perſevere therein, and to damne them for their ſinne, to the manifeſtation of his glory in the way of juſtice vindicative. On the other ſide, God doth decree to create others, and permit them to ſinne, and raiſe them out of ſinne by faith and repentance, and reward them with everlaſting life, to the manifeſtation of his glory, in the way of mercy mixed with juſtice.

Farther conſider that as touching predeſtination it ſelfe, there was no queſtion moved thereabouts in the Church of God, before the daies of Pelagius; and what credit can they get, who conſult with them in ſuch points, wherein they were not exerciſed. For we find by experience, that to contend with Heretiques hath been an ordinary means in the courſe of Gods providence, for the more diligent inquiſition after the truth of God and happy diſcovery thereof. *Sancta Eccleſia* (ſaith Gregory) *juâ ſemper eruditione inſtruitur, dum Hæreticorum quæſtionibus impugnatur.* *in Epiſt. lib. 7. epiſt. 3.* And Auſtin in like manner, *Didiſcimus*, ſaith he, *ſingulas quaſq; Hæreſes intuliſſe Eccleſiæ proprias quæſtiones, contra quas diligentius defenderetur ſcriptura divina, quam ſi nulla talis neceſſitas cogeret.* *De don. Perſ. cap. 20.* And on the other ſide, before queſtion hath been moved on a poynt, the Fathers have delivered themſelves ſomewhat improvidently, whereupon Heretiques have taken advantage to countenance their errours by the writings of the Ancient. This Hierome obſerves in the poynt of Arrianiſme, proving thereby, that the Ancient Writers before the Arrian Hereſy aroſe, were no competent judges in that poynt. *Si me cauſas vitiorum* (ſaith he) *in Patrum Scriptis neſcire reſpondero non ſtatim illos Hæreticos judicabo. Fieri enim poteſt ut vel ſimpliciter erraverint, vel alio ſenſu ſcripſerint, vel a Librariis imperitis eorum paulatim ſcripta corrupta ſunt, vel certè antequam in Alexandriâ quaſi dæmonium Meridianum Arrius naſceretur. Innocenter quædam & minus cautè locuti ſunt & quæ non poſſunt perverſorum hominum calumniam declinare.* *Apoleg. 2. adv. Ruffin.* Marke it well, Before Arrius like a Devill from the South roſe up, the Fathers delivered ſome things innocently, yet leſſe warily, and ſuch as cannot avoid the calumny of perverſe perſons. Upon the ſame ground it is, that Auſtin excuſeth Ticonius, and that in the ſame particular wherein he approached neere to Pelagianiſme, to wit, before the Church of God was acquainted with that Hereſy; his words are theſe, *Sed non erat expertus hanc Hæreſin Ticonius quæ noſtro tempore exorta multum nos, ut gratia Dei quæ per Dominum noſtrum Jeſum Chriſtum eſt adverſus eos defenderemus, exercuit; & ſecundum id quod ait Apoſtolus, Oportet Hæreſes eſſe ut probati manifeſti fiant in vobis, multò vigilantiores diligentioreſq; reddidit: ut adverteremus in ſcripturis Sanctis, quod iſtum Ticonium minùs attentum, minuſq; ſine hoſte ſollicitum, fugit, etiam ipſam ſcilicet fidem donum illius eſſe, qui ejus menſuram unicuiq; partitur.* *Aug. de doctr. Chriſt. l. 3. c. 33.* Ticonius conſidered not that faith it ſelfe is the gift of God, neither was he ſo carefull to look into the truth of this; and why? ſurely becauſe he had no enemy to put him to it, as being not

acquainted with the errour of Pelagius. But this Heresy, saith he, arising in our daies, hath put us upon the defence of the grace of God, which is given us through our Lord Jesus Christ, and hath made us more watchfull and diligent to observe, that even faith it selfe is his gift, who distributes to every one a measure thereof. Hence it is that the same Austin, when Prosper signified that those of Marseiles would rest contented if he could make good the opinion which he maintained in the point of predestination, out of the Writings of the former, and more ancient Divines, returnes for answer, that there was no need hereof, considering that They living before this Heresy was known, (to wit, of Pelagius) were not at all put upon the discussing of this question, which surely they would have done, had they been constrained to make answer to any such as the Pelagians were. See his own words, *Si hujus sententiæ defensionem ex divinorum eloquiorum nos præcedentibus Catholicis tractatoribus promerem, profectò hi Fratres quibuscum nos agimus, acquiescerent. Hoc enim significastis Literis vestris.* This was Prosper's motion; now mark Austin's answer. *Quid igitur opus est ut eorum scrutemur opuscula, qui priusquam ista Hæresis oriretur, non habuerunt necessitatem in hac difficili ad solvendum quæstione versari, quod proculdubio facerent, si respondere talibus cogerentur.* Charity did suggest unto him, this would have been their course, had they been exercised with Pelagius, as he was. For it was his own case. For there was a time when himselfe thought that albeit holinesse and good works consequent to faith together with salvation, were the work of God, yet faith it selfe he conceived to be the work of man; to wit, before he was exercised with Pelagius as appears, Liber Propositionum ex Epistolâ ad Romanos. *Non ergo elegit Deus opera cujusq; in præscientiâ, sed fidem elegit in præscientiâ, vel quem sibi creditурum esse præscivit, ipsum elegit cui Spiritum Sanctum daret, ut bona operando etiam vitam æternam consequeretur.* For he professeth in the words following that he then conceived, *Nostrum esse credere*, to believe was a work of our own. Afterwards he retracteth this, Retract. lib. 1. cap. 25. professing, I had never said this, had I known faith it selfe to be the gift of God, *Si scivissem fidem ipsam inter Dei munera quæ dantur per Spiritum Sanctum reperiri. Nam quamvis credere & operari utrumq; nostrum sit propter liberum voluntatis arbitrium & quæ non nisi volentibus nobis fiunt, utrumq; Dei donum est qui & credere, & velle, & perficere subministrat.* The Papists themselves, notwithstanding the great devotion they pretend towards the Ancients, yet are driven to devise what may be said to excuse them; as in the very point of Free-will they desire to excuse Chrysostome. Sixtus Senensis, Bibliothec. lib. 5. annotat. 101. *Vel dicendum est sicut etiam Annianus in Præfatione Commentariorum Chrysostomi in Math. annotavit Chrysostomum interdum naturæ nostræ vires plus æquo extulisse ex contentione disceptandi cum Manichæis & Gentilibus, qui hominem asserebant vel naturâ malum vel fati violentia ad peccandum compelli.* Nay what think we of Vossius himselfe, from whose labours it is, and nothing of their own, that our Arminians would seem to breath so much Antiquity. This Vossius professeth, they mistake him that taketh him to be of any other opinion in the poynt of predestination, then Austin was of. De Historicis Lat. lib. 2. cap. 17. Yet doth he acknowledge that Austin did reject the opinion of the Ancients both Greeks and Latines who went before him, in the point of predestination. Histor. Pelag. pag. 655. *Patres Græci & Latinorum illi qui ante Augustinum vixerunt, ipseq; aliquandiu Augustinus, verba Apostoli interpretari solent de electione quorundam ad salutem secundum fidem & pietatem præviſam; & aliorum reprobatione æterna ob præscientiam malorum operum quæ in vita acturi essent. Sed Augustinus* (here comes in the Adversative) *rejectâ hâc opinione existimabat Apostolorum loqui de quorundam electione ad vitam, aliorum item præteritione, non habitâ vel in his vel in illis ratione, sive bonorum, sive etiam malorum quæ personalia forent.* And which is more then this, Pag. 653. professeth a third interpretation of that passage Rom. 9. 11, 12, 13. differing both from Austins interpretation, and from that of the Fathers Greeke and Latine that went before him, and makes it disputable, which is truest, though this third opinion hath no footstep amongst the Ancients, and thus he carrieth himselfe, notwithstanding all the pretence of his reverence of Antiquity. And to vindicate Austins interpretation, as well as the rest, from countenancing absolute reprobation, he calls in to help at a dead lift, the doctrine of the Jesuits, concerning Scientia Media. And I desire upon no better termes to contend then this in Scholasticall Divinity, whether this doctrine be not a most unsober invention without all ground. And

Aug. de Præd. Sanct. l. 1. cap. 14.

whereas

whereas Voſſius acknowledgeth Auſtins opinion to be for the abſoluteneſſe of election (and he profeſſeth himſelfe to be of Auſtins opinion.) I dare appeale to any learned Divines ſober judgement, whether this doctrine of *Scientia Media* doth not equally juſtify the abſoluteneſſe of reprobation, as the abſoluteneſſe of election. Yet after all this, I would not have any think, that I reject any of theſe ancient Fathers, that ſeem to be moſt oppoſite to Auſtins opinion in the point of predeſtination. I think they may be fairely and Scholaſtically reconciled without acknowledging ſo much difference between them, as Voſſius maketh, and that by ſuch an interpretation as ſometimes is admitted by Voſſius himſelfe, of his own phraiſe of his own diſtinction, though he dreames not of the applyable nature of the ſame to the will of God in predeſtination. His diſtinction is of *Voluntas Dei antecedens, & voluntas conſequens*; and this he makes equivalent to that other diſtinction of the will of God, to wit, *Abſoluta & Conditionalis*. Now this Conditionall will of God he interprets not *quoad actum volentis*, but *quoad Res volitas*: Like as Doctor Jackſon profeſſeth in expreſſe termes, that the former diſtinction of *voluntas antecedens & conſequens*, is to be interpreted, namely, *quoad res volitas*, and not *quoad actum volentis*. Now according to this conſtruction, there is no difference between them and Auſtin, nor the leaſt impediment to the making of the will of God, both in predeſtination and reprobation to be moſt abſolute. For though ſinne be acknowledged to be the cauſe of the will of God in reprobation *quoad res volitas*, that is, in reſpect of the puniſhment willed thereby, this hinders not the abſoluteneſſe of reprobation *quoad actum reprobantis*. And unleſſe we underſtand the Fathers thus, we muſt neceſſarily charge them with ſuch an opinion, whereof Aquinas is bold to profeſſe, That never any man was ſo madde as to affirme, to wit, that any merits ſhould be the cauſe of Predeſtination *quoad actum prædeſtinantis*. And why ſo? to wit, becauſe predeſtination is the act of Gods will, and there can be no cauſe of Gods will *quoad actum volentis*. Now who ſeeth not that by the ſame reaſon there can be no cauſe of divine reprobation *quoad actum reprobantis*; for even reprobation is the act of Gods will, as well as predeſtination, and every way it muſt be as madde a thing to deviſe a cauſe of reprobation *quoad actum reprobantis*.

Hiſt. Pelag. lib. 7.

Of Providence

They did all generally agree, ſaith this Author, *upon the contrary concluſion*. Now the contrary Concluſion to *abſolute and unavoidable reprobation* is to maintain conditionall and avoidable reprobation; but this is not the contrary concluſion here ſpecified by this Author, but rather that damnation was avoydable, ſuch is his looſe diſcourſe; whereas there is no queſtion at all concerning damnation, whether it be conditionall or abſolute. We all confeſſing, that like as ſalvation is not ordained to befall any man of ripe years, but upon the performance of faith and repentance and finall perſeverance therein; ſo damnation is not ordained to be the portion of any, but upon their finall perſeverance in ſinne. In like ſort as touching the poſſibility of ſalvation, not one Divine of ours, that I know, denyes the poſſibility of any mans ſalvation while he lives in this World. Doctor Jackſon indeed hath an opinion, that a man may proceed ſo farre in ſinne in this life, that the doore of repentance may be ſhut upon him. Wee have no ſuch opinion; We acknowledge, that as God calls ſome at the firſt houre, ſo may ſome be called at the laſt houre of the day, yea the Thiefe upon the Croſſe, yea, *inter Pontem & Fontem*. In a word, We ſay plainly, that it is poſſible for any man at any time to be ſaved by grace giving repentance: without repentance none can be ſaved; which is, I preſume, without queſtion between us. In like ſort it is poſſible for any man to repent, provided that God be pleaſed to give him repentance, and whether God will give him repentance or no we know not. Therefore the Apoſtle inſtructs Timothy after this manner, *The ſervant of the Lord muſt not ſtrive, but muſt be gentle towards all men, apt to teach, ſuffering the evill, inſtructing them with meekneſſe that be contrary minded, εἰ ποτέ, if at any time God may give them repentance, that they may acknowledge the truth and come to amendment out of the ſnare of the Devill, of whom they are taken Priſoners to doe his Will.* Here is clearely an acknowledgement of a poſſibility of repentance, ſooner or later, but upon the gift of God, not otherwiſe. The contrary opinion whereunto, this Author ſeemeth in this paſſage very ſtrongly to favour of, but alleageth not one Father for the proofe of it, to give us ſome document of his judicious

carriage in the ſurvey of the Fathers which here he pretends to have been made by him, and that with very great oſtentation; Yet I ſeem to be very well acquainted with the ſpirit that breatheth here; and I wonder the paſſages of the Ancients to this purpoſe (which yet I am perſwaded are nothing to the purpoſe) are not collected out of Doctor *Uſher's* diſcourſe *In cauſa Godæſchalci* inſcribed to *Gerardus Voſſius*; and I doubt not but the iſſue will be this, that God is ready to give all men repentance in caſe they performe ſomewhat; and ſo the grace of repentance ſhall be given according to mens works, which was condemned 1200 years agoe in the Synod of Paleſtine, and ever ſince accounted no better then flat Pelagianiſme. And which is worſe then this, as that which ſtands in oppoſition to common ſenſe, they wil be driven to profeſſe, that God is ready to give a reprobate repentance, in caſe he will repent, yea the very will to repent, in caſe he will repent. This deſperate reſolution I have already found by experience, and if I be not deceived, breathed by the very ſame ſpirit that breatheth heere.

At length we are like to receive an account of this Authors judicious ſurvey of the Ancients out of *Calvin* and *Beza*. *Neq; hæc vulgò recepta opinio ſolius vulgi eſt*; (ſaith *Calvin*) *habuit enim ſæculis omnibus magnos authores*. To this I anſwer,

1. That this is farre from juſtifying, that abſolute reprobation, and abſolute election had no footing in Antiquity, that the Upper way was never taught for the ſpace of 600 years, nor the Lower way till the time of S^t *Auſtin*. Though in all ages it had great Authors to impugne it, yet it might alſo have in all ages as great Authors to maintain it, and more too, for ought theſe words of Calvin in his opinion doe manifeſt to the contrary.

2. Albeit not ſome but all had maintained election and reprobation to proceed according to foreknowledge of mens works, yet this nothing hinders the abſoluteneſſe either of election or reprobation. For conſider, it is one thing to ſpeak of election unto grace, another to ſpeak of election unto glory; one thing to ſpeak of reprobation, as it ſignifies a purpoſe to deny grace, another thing to ſpeak of it, as it ſignifies a purpoſe to inflict damnation. It was never known I think, that any maintained, that God upon the foreſight of mens faith, did elect them unto faith, or purpoſe to give them faith; or that God foreſeeing men would not believe, nor repent, did decree that they ſhould neither believe nor repent. Upon which brainſick conceit our Arminians are caſt now a daies, and all the embracers of *Scientia Media*: But many of them profeſſed indeed that God did decree to beſtow ſalvation upon them whom he foreſaw would finally perſevere in faith and repentance; and to damne thoſe whom he foreſaw would finally perſevere in infidelity or impenitency. We acknowledge as much as they, but ſtill the way is open to enquire of the order of theſe, namely, Whether the foreſight of faith and repentance were before the decree of ſalvation, or after it, or ſimultaneous with it: Whether the foreſight of infidelity and impenitency were before the decree of damnation, or after it, or ſimultaneous with it; but where is any ſuch queſtion to be found amongſt the Ancients? We willingly profeſſe that God did not purpoſe to beſtow eternall life on any of ripe years, but as a reward of their faith and repentance and good workes; that God did not purpoſe to inflict damnation on any of ripe years, but as a condigne puniſhment of their finall infidelity and impenitency; and the Ancients who maintained that God decreed to ſave ſome and damne others, according to his preſcience of the piety of the one, and impiety of the other, had no other meaning that I know, or this Author is able to make good, or any other, as I am perſwaded.

3. But let us farther enquire what thoſe Ancients thought concerning faith and repentance; as whether they thought them to be the gifts of God, or no; dares this Author or any Arminian deny, they maintained them to be the gifts of God, the Scripture being ſo full and expreſſe for this? Secondly, enquire what their opinion was concerning the manner how God gave faith to one, and not to another, as 'tis manifeſt he did not, he doth not give it to all; as namely, whether it was of the meer pleaſure of God, that he converted ſome, and not others; or whether he beſtowed faith on ſome, and not on others, becauſe he found thoſe ſome to have prepared themſelves for the receiving of faith, not ſo others. If it was of the meer pleaſure of God, it manifeſtly followeth, that election unto grace and reprobation from grace, was abſolute: which is the main thing in queſtion in theſe our daies. For we who are accounted moſt rigid herein, doe not affect to ſay, That God decreed to ſave whom

whom he will, or to damne whom he will; but to the contrary we ſay, God decreed to ſave none, but ſuch as believe and repent, and to damne none, but ſuch as dye in infidelity or impenitency: but we profeſſe willingly, that God decreed to beſtow faith and repentance on whom he would, and deny it to whom he would, the Scripture being expreſſe, that God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth. And *Auſtin* is moſt frequent in this profeſſion, and this is that Grace which he acknowledgeth to be the foundation of predeſtination, and wherein both *Cyprian*, and *Nazianzene*, and *Ambroſe* did agree with him. And *Ambroſe* in ſpeciall ſort he magnifies for this profeſſion. And *Calvin* hereupon obſerves, that whereas the Pelagians charged him, with differing from the ancients herein. *Valet Auguſtini teſtimonium*, ſaith he, *apud eos, qui libenter in Patrum authoritate acquieſcunt. Quanquam non patitur Auguſtinus ſe a reliquis diſſjungi, ſed claris teſtimoniis divortium hoc cujus invidia gravabant eum Pelagiani, oſtendit falſum eſſe. Citat enim ex Ambroſio (lib. de Prædeſtin. ſanct. cap. 19.) Chriſtus quem dignatur vocat* (here is the criticall point of this queſtion concerning the abſoluteneſſe of election and reprobation) *Item ſi voluiſſet ex indevotis feciſſet devotos. Sed Deus quos dignatur vocat, & quem vult religioſum facit. Si ex Auguſtino integrum volumen contexere libeat, lectoribus oſtendere promptum eſſet mihi non niſi ejus verbis opus eſſe: ſed eos prolixitate onerare nolo.* This was *Calvins* judgement, as touching the judgement of Antiquity in this.

4. Yet I confeſſe there was a time when *Auſtin* did not conceive faith to be amongſt the gifts of Gods ſpirit, but being exerciſed with the Pelagians, he came to acknowledge the ſpeciall grace of God in this; and hereupon made faith an effect of predeſtination, and not any precedent thereunto, and doubts not, but the Fathers would have expreſſed as much, had they been exerciſed with the Pelagians as he was; for ſo much he ſignifies unto *Proſper* as before I ſhewed, and withall ſhewes how in the foundation of predeſtination they agreed with him, in as much as they agreed in the nature of grace, acknowledging the converſion of the heart to be the gift of God; And not they only, but the whole Catholique Church, as appeared by their common prayers, that God would convert the hearts of Infidells; and to ſay, that God doth not convert the hearts of men according to the meer pleaſure of his will, but according to mens preparations, is clearly to maintaine that God gave grace according unto works, which doctrine was generally exploded as meer Pelagianiſme.

5. Suppoſe they did all acknowledge the decree of election and reprobation, to be conditionall, yet if they interpreted this conditionally, not *quoad actum Volentis*, but *quoad Res volitas*, this is nothing oppoſite to the abſoluteneſſe of election and reprobation *quoad actum elegentis* and *reprobantis*, but only *quoad res volitas*, to wit, ſalvation on the one ſide, and damnation on the other ſide. And we willingly acknowledge that God hath not ordained that ſalvation or damnation ſhall befall any man but in caſe they believe and repent, or refuſe to believe, or repent. Now that the Ancients did in this manner underſtand *voluntas conditionata* in God, *Voſſius* himſelfe (upon whom our Arminians doe moſt depend as touching the authority of the Ancients) doth improvidently, and ere he is a ware, confeſſe. *Hiſt. Pelag.* pag. 638. his words are theſe. *Aliqua abſolutè vult & ſimpliciter: quomodo creare mundum voluit & extremo die volet reſurrectionem carnis. De qua voluntate intelligi debet illud*, Pſal. 115. 3. *Deus noſter in cœlo, quæcunq; voluit facit. & Apoſt. ad Rom. 9. 19. Voluntati ejus quis reſiſtit? Aliqua item vult cum conditione quæ idcirco in effectum non prodeunt niſi conditione impletâ: quomodo omnes homines ſalvari vult, ſed per & propter Chriſtum fide apprehenſum. Atqui non omnes fide aphrehendunt Chriſtum, ſed abſq; pœnitentiâ ac fide plurimi de hoc mundo decedunt. Quo reſpectu tales in æternum ſtatuit damnare. De conditionatâ illâ voluntate extant longè plurima apud Veteres Scriptores. Aliqua hoc loco aſcribemus.*

Such indeed are *Beza's* words upon that of the Apoſtle, *Who hath given firſt unto God?* Rom. 11. 35. *Eſt autem etiam hic locus* (ſaith he) *diligenter obſervandus adverſus eos qui fidei, vel operum præviſionem faciunt electionis cauſam. In quem errorem ſanè turpiſſimum. Origenes veteres pleroſq; tum Græcos tum Latinos adegit donec; tandem Dominus Auguſtinum per Pelagianos ad hunc agnoſcendum & corrigendum errorem excitaret.* The firſt part this Author conceales, it being by *Beza* delivered as touching election; and this Author deales purpoſely on reprobation only. The latter part likewiſe he paſſeth by; for *Beza* confines this which he ſaith of the Ancients to a certain time, namely, the time preceding the troubles raiſed by *Pelagius*. But this Author had rather it ſhould runne at randome without any determination; and then againe, the mentioning of Auſtin raiſed by God upon

upon occasion of Pelagius his doctrine, to take notice of this errour, and correct it, he well saw was like enough to blast all the shew he makes of the Ancients, especially considering how that Pelagian faction was not by Austin only, but by the Catholique Church of those daies beaten down. And it is well known how the writings of Austin were countenanced, and how many Councells of those daies, made decrees against the Pelagian Heresy. And for both these passages, it seems he was beholding to Vossius in his Pelagian History, *Lib.6. Thes.*8. which is this, *Græci Patres semper, Patrum verò Latinorum illi qui ante Augustinum vixerunt, dicere solent, eos esse prædestinatos ad vitam, quos Deus pie rectèq; victuros prævidit, sive ut alii loquuntur quos prævidit credituros, & perseveraturos, &c. Quod ita interpretatur ut prædestinatio ad gloriam facta dicitur, secundum præscientiam fidei & perseverantiæ.* And next unto some passages alleadged out of Origen he brings in these two passages of Beza and Calvin. Now it liked not this Author to take his course to begin with Clemens Alexandrinus, and his Scholler Origen, as Vossius doth: For albeit Origen was a man for his learning of great authority in the Church of God, in such sort that it was wont to be said, that *Origenis ingenium Ecclesiæ Sacramentum*, and no marvail if many followed him, and 'tis usuall even with Hierome in his Commentaries to follow him. Yet after his death, his Writings were found at length to have a very ill savour in the Catholique Church. And amongst other foul opinions found in him, one nearly concerning this very particular we have in hand, was that which Vossius there delivers in this manner, *Veterum multorum opinio est, putâsse eum animas corporibus vel prædestinatorum, vel reproborum uniri pro iis quæ bene vel male egissent ante conditum corporeum hunc mundum.* Judge I pray whether here be not a sweet nosegay for the Divill, as touching the foresight of works, not to come, but of works past before they were borne, and thereupon their soules united either to bodies predestinated unto life, or reprobated unto death. Yet Vossius would not have us think either Origen deceived by Clement (which no man ever said that I know, neither doth Vossius pretend any such thing) or that Chrysostome was deceived by them, or those that followed, by him, all this seems to be delivered only to crosse Beza, who professed the Greek and Latine Fathers were deceived by Origen. Yet it is well known of what estimation Origen was in the Church, none of the others like him; but what is his reason? because forsooth Irenæus lib. 4. cap. 76. professeth that God did destinate heaven to them that should believe; and to them which should not believe, hell. But could he be ignorant that Fulgentius professeth the selfe same, lib. 1. *ad Monimum*; namely, *Deum prædestinasse ad regnum quos ad se præscivit misericordiæ prævenientis auxilio redituros, & in se misericordiæ subsequentis auxilio esse mansuros.* Yet this very Author in his Preface professeth that Fulgentius amongst others, albeit they maintained that God did destinate no others to salvation, then such as whom he foresaw by the pure gift of his grace, would have the beginnings of faith, and a good will, and persevere in good, yet notwithstanding they withall maintained, that this prescience divine of their faith and perseverance, did flow from Gods absolute decree to save them. Nay Austin himselfe in Joan. Tract. 42. (as Hunnius and others alleage him, and I find it true) hath these words of those of whom our Saviour saith, *Therefore you heare not, because ye are not of God; Prægniti erant quòd non fuerant credituri eâ fide quâ solâ possint a peccatorum obligatione liberari*; and afterwards saith, *secundum hanc prædestinationem loquutus est Dominus.* But will it herehence follow that Austin did deny absolute predestination? Vossius himselfe acknowledgeth the contrary of him, as well as of Fulgentius, namely, that Gods foreknowledge of perseverance in good, proceeded from Gods absolute decree of saving them. And let every sober reader judge whether upon the same grounds it doth not follow, that Gods foreknowledge of mans perseverance in infidelity, doth not likewise follow from Gods absolute decree of reprobating him. For what is the ground of the former, but this, that God had absolutely decreed to give faith unto some? Now doth it not herehence follow, that God absolutely decreed to deny faith unto others? For as Ambrose saith, and as Austin alleageth out of him, *si voluisset ex indevotis fecisset devotos.* Yet am not I of Vossius his opinion in this. I say rather, Gods foreknowledge of one mans faith, proceeds from his decree not of saving him, but of giving him faith; and Gods foreknowledge of another mans finall perseverance in infidelity, proceeds from Gods decree, not of damning him, but of denying him grace to cure his infidelity. And as for the decree of salvation, I deny it to be in any moment of nature, before the decree of giving grace; in like sort, I deny the decree of damnation to be in any moment

Præf. in Hist. Pelag.

ment of nature before the decree of permitting mans infidelity to continue uncured unto the end. And the criticall queſtion in this point conſiſts in this, Whether the granting of grace, or deniall of grace, be not meerely of the pleaſure of God, and not according to any different diſpoſitions in man; by grace underſtanding grace effectuall to the working of faith and true repentance. And unleſſe the Ancients be ſhewed to have maintained, either that faith, and repentance, are not the gifts of God; or, that if they be the gifts of God, that God diſpenſeth his effectuall grace for the working of them, not according to the meer pleaſure of God, but according to the different diſpoſitions of men; all that they talke of the Ancients in this point, is meerly vaine and to no purpoſe.

But I come to *Proſper*, whoſe relation, I doubt not, this Author takes to be of greateſt moment. Now to this I anſwer.

1. To ſay that, *Penè omnium par invenitur & una ſententia, qua propoſitum & prædeſtinationem Dei ſecundum præſcientiam receperunt*, doth not prove that there is no footing amongſt the Ancients for abſolute predeſtination. Neither doth Voſſius alleage halfe ſo many Fathers for this opinion, as were thoſe Biſhops who joyned with *Cyprian* in decreeing the Rebaptization of Hereticks.

2. This ſeems to be related by *Proſper*, not ſo much out of his own opinion, as by way of an objection propoſed by the Maſſilienſes, deſiring Auſtin to ſhew how it is to be anſwered. *Illud etiam* (ſaith he) *qualiter dilucitur quæſumus demonſtres quod retractatis Priorum hac de re opinionibus, penè omnium invenitur par & una ſententia, &c.* And this is farther evidenced by theſe words of Proſper. *Obſtinationem ſuam vetuſtate defendunt ut ea quæ de Epiſtolâ Pauli Romanis ſcribentis, ad manifeſtationem divinæ gratiæ prævenientis Electorum merita proferuntur, a nullo unquam Eccleſiaſticorum ita eſſe intellecta ut nunc ſentiuntur, affirment.*

3. Obſerve, When Proſper urged them to expound thoſe paſſages in S^t *Paul*, after what meaning they thought beſt, they forthwith profeſſed ingeniouſly that they found nothing in the Fathers that gave them content: their words related by Proſper are theſe, *Nihil ſe inveniſſe quod placeret.*

4. Bellarmine, *De Grat. & liber. Arbit. lib. 2. cap. 14.* takes notice of this objection drawn out of Proſper and anſwereth it, according unto Auſtin in this manner, *Auguſtinus ipſe in libr. de Bono Perſev. cap. 20. dicit Veteres Patres, qui ante Pelagium floruerunt, quæſtionem iſtam nunquam acuratè tractaſſe ſed incidenter ſolùm & quaſi per tranſitum illam attigiſſe. Addit verò in fundamento hujus ſententiæ quod eſt, Gratiam Dei non præveniri ab ullo opere noſtro; ſed contrà, ab illo omnia opera noſtra præveniri, ita ut nihil omninò boni quod attinet ad ſalutem, ſit in nobis quod non ſit nobis ex Deo, convenire Catholicos omnes; & ibidem citat Cyprianum, Ambroſium, Nazianzenum.* So that it appears hereby, that Auſtin did not acknowledge the former Writers to have embraced this opinion, though the Maſſilienſes pretended ſo much. And herewithall he openeth unto us, a way how to conceive aright of their opinion in predeſtination; namely, that as many as acknowledge Gods grace preventing us in every good work, they all are to be accounted to agree with him in the doctrine of predeſtination. For it is apparent, that in the contrary doctrine Pelagius grounded his opinion concerning predeſtination. And Auſtin himſelfe ſometime thought that God, *quem ſibi creditурum eſſe præſcivit, ipſum elegit, cui ſpiritum ſanctum daret, ut bona operando vitam æternam conſequeretur*: and why ſo? becauſe forſooth he at that time conceived it to be mans work to believe, which ſaith he, I had never ſaid, had I known faith it ſelfe to have been amongſt the gifts of the holy Ghoſt. *Retract. lib. 1. cap. 25.* and therefore *De Prædeſti. Sanct. cap. 1.* in his anſwer to the Letter of Hilarius, mark what courſe Auſtin takes for the juſtifying of his own doctrine concerning predeſtination. *Prius fidem quâ Chriſtiani ſumus donum Dei eſſe debemus oſtendere.* And Bellarmine in the place above cited profeſſeth, that Auſtin did herehence rightly collect out of the Fathers, *Gratuitæ prædeſtinationis ſententiam & fidem in Eccleſiâ Catholicâ ſemper fuiſſe. Nec, olim* (ſaith he) *defendi poteſt prædeſtinatio ex operibus præviſis, niſi aliquid boni ponatur in homine juſto, quo diſcernatur ab impio quod non ſit illi à Deo; quod ſanè* (ſaith he) *Patres omnes cum ſummâ conſenſione rejiciunt.* In like ſort, Junius in his anſwer to Baro for the juſtifying of gratuitous predeſtination, counts it ſufficient to prove, *Fidem eſſe donum prædeſtinantis & miſerentis Dei ex prædeſtinatione ipſius.* And adds ſaying, *Hoc omnes Patres uno conſenſu ex Chriſto & Paulo agnoverunt. Ipſe Juſtinus Martyr Apolog. 2. & alii. Graviſſimè verò Clemens Alexandrinus* (*in hac alioqui paleſtrâ non ita exercitatus*) *ut ſequentia ſæcula. Stromat. lib. 2. Baſilidis & Valentini dogma eſſe dicit, quod fides*

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à naturâ sit. In my poor judgement, the Fathers, as many as stated predestination according to the prescience of mens works, had no other meaning but this, that God did predestinate no man to eternall life, but such as coming to ripe years should believe in Christ and repent; no man unto eternall death, but such as should finally persevere in infidelity and impenitency; so making works foreseen the cause of salvation, but not of Gods decree. And Aquinas was bold to professe that, *Nemo fuit ita insanæ mentis qui diceret merita esse causam prædestinationis divinæ quoad actum prædestinantis.* And 'tis a good rule that *Gerson* gives, that holy mens Writings are not to be urged precisely according to the letter, *De Vitâ Spirituali animæ Sect. 1. co. 11. Notet his quòd Doctores etiam sancti sunt magis reverenter glossandi in multis, quàm ampliandi: quoniam non omnes semper adverterunt, aut advertere cogitaverunt ad proprietatem locutionis. Improprietas autem non ampliari debet, sed ad proprietatem reduci, alioquin quid mirum si augetur deceptio.*

5. We know what answer Austin himselfe makes unto this, De Prædestin. Sanct. cap. 14. *Quid igitur opus est ut eorum scrutemur opuscula, qui priusquam ista Hæresis oriretur, non habuerunt necessitatem in hac difficili ad solvendum quæstione versari, quod proculdubio facerent si respondere talibus cogerentur.*

6. As before I shewed, Fulgentius himselfe maintaines predestination to be *secundum præscientiam*; yet *Vossius* acknowledgeth him as well as Austin, to have maintained the absoluteness of predestination.

7. Lastly, this passage concerneth predestination alone, as it signifies the divine decree of conferring glory; but who ever was known to maintaine the divine decree of conferring grace to have been *secundum præscientiam*, according to foresight of any work in man? For this is plainly to maintain, that grace is given according unto works, which in the Ancients phraise is all one, as to acknowledge, that grace is given according unto merits, which is direct Pelagianisme, and condemned 1200 years agoe in the Synod of Palestine.

As for that of Minutius Fœlix, We deny that God doth, *sortem in hominibus punire, non voluntatem.* We doe not say, *Genitura plectitur*; we say that in every one who is punished by God, *ingenii natura punitur*; Wee confesse that *Fatum illud est quod de unoquoq; Deus fatus est*; and that *pro meritis & singulorum qualitatibus, etiam fata determinat.* Yet the holy Ghost professeth in the mouthes of all his Apostles, that both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles, and People of Israel, were gathered together against the holy sonne of God, to doe that which Gods hand, and Gods councell predetermined to be done; and yet this predetermination divine, I should think, was nothing prejudiciall to the liberty of their wills.

As for Hierome, this Author saith that he was an eager opposer of the Pelagians, but no where doth it appeare, that the point of predestination comes in question between them. These very passages out of Hierome are proposed by Grotius in his *Pietas Ordinum Hollandiæ*, and answered by Gratianus Civilis punctually, and long before by Bellarmine *Lib. 2. de Grat. & lib. arb. cap. 14.*

I answer, what is this any other, but that which the Fathers many of them have professed in saying, that predestination is *secundum præscientiam*; And doth not Fulgentius affirm the same? Yet is he acknowledged by Vossius, a maintainer of the absoluteness of predestination as well as Austin. Did Hierome deny faith to be the gift of God? or granting it to be the gift of God, did he maintaine, that God gave it according unto works? If not, but according to the meer pleasure of his will, having mercy on some, while he hardned others; the case is cleare, that he maintained absolute election unto faith. As for Gods decree of salvation and damnation, we willingly professe, that God decreed to save no man but upon his finall perseverance in faith and piety; to damne none, but such as finally persevere in infidelity and impenitency. Now compare we these decrees together, the decree of giving faith, and the decree of saving; which of these are most likely to be the foremost; it is apparent that salvation is more likely to be the end in respect of faith, and faith the means in respect of salvation, then the contrary. And the generall and most received rule of Schooles is, that the intention of the end is before the intention of the means. I think the glory of God in the way of mercy, mixed with justice is the end of both; and that the decrees of giving faith and salvation are simultaneous, as decrees of means tending to the same end, and so neither before the other. But Hierome saith, that, *ex Præscientia futurorum nascitur dilectio vel odium.* I confesse he doth in a disjunctive manner thus, *vel ex præscientia vel ex operibus.* And we know that passions such as Love and Hatred, are commonly

commonly ſaid to be attributed to God, not *quoad affectum* but *quoad effectum*, and ſo they may fairely ſtand for ſalvation and damnation, which proceed *ex operibus* in Hieroms phraiſe. But admit he means hereby, *decretum ſalvandi* which riſing *ex præſcientia fidei*, muſt preſuppoſe the decree of giving faith to precede. I anſwer then, there is to be acknowledged an impropriety of ſpeech, and here is place for Gerſons rule, *Sancti non ſemper adverterunt ad proprietatem locutionis*. And the rather becauſe Hierome we never find exerciſed in this Controverſy. And it is againſt common reaſon, that faith ſhould be intended before ſalvation. And laſtly, this were to impute unto him to acknowledge a motive cauſe of Predeſtination *quoad actum prædeſtinantis*: which Aquinas profeſſeth againſt, as a thing impoſſible; namely, that there ſhould be a cauſe of Gods will *quoad actum volentis*; Nay he is bold to ſay that, *No man was ſo mad to ſay that merits are the cauſe of Predeſtination quoad actum prædeſtinantis*.

The laſt part of this Authors performance in the poynt of Antiquity is the Councell of Arles, ſubſcribing as he ſaith, the letter which was written by Fauſtus againſt Lucidus the Predeſtinarian (for ſo he ſtyles him) and in his Epiſtle he inſiſts upon two Anathema's, the one this, *Anathema illi qui dixerit illum qui periit non accepiſſe ut ſalvus eſſe poſſit*. The other this, *Anathema illi qui dixerit quod vas contumeliæ non poſſit aſſurgere, ut ſit vas in honorem*.

Firſt, I will anſwer as touching the Anathema's themſelves, then as touching the credit and authority of this ſtory.

1. As touching the Anathema's. The firſt proceeds as well of him that is baptized and afterwards periſheth, as of him that is a Pagan and never was baptized, and periſheth in his Paganiſme, as the Anathema it ſelfe witneſſeth, if it be repeated at full, thus, *Anathema illi qui dixerit illum qui periit non accepiſſe, ut ſalvus eſſe poſſit, id eſt, vel de baptizato, vel de illius ætatis Pagano, qui credere potuit & noluit*. By which latter clauſe it appears, that *accipere ut ſalvus eſſe poſſit*, is no other then to receive *Poſſibilitatem credendi* (I ſay *Poſſibilitatem* not *Potentiam*, becauſe I find this is *Fauſtus* his uſuall phraiſe, as it was the phraiſe of *Pelagius* before him) and this is as much as to ſay, that every man hath power to believe if he will. Now obſerve I pray, This kind of power is meerely nature, not that which we commonly call Grace, whereby we underſtand ſomething diſtinct from nature. And Auſtin acknowledgeth both, De Gen. contr. Manichæ. lib. 1. cap. 3, that all men, *poſſunt credere ſi velint*; and that this is no more then is ſignified by that naturall illumination wherewith God enlightens every man, when he comes into the world, Iohn 1.9. And, De Prædeſt. Sanct. cap. 5. *Poſſe habere fidem, ſicut poſſe habere charitatem, naturæ eſt hominum. Fidem verò habere, ſicut & charitatem habere gratiæ eſt fidelium*. And more then this, the ſtate of the queſtion between *Pelagius* and the Catholiques of thoſe daies is ſo propoſed by Auſtin, as not at all to conſiſt about the poſſibility of believing or doing any good work, but meerly about the willing & doing of it. In ſo much that Auſtin profeſſeth, that if Pelagius would acknowledge the will and doing of good to be from God, as he did the poſſibility hereof to be from God, there ſhould be an end of all controverſy between them, and Pelagius ſhould be received as a good Catholique. This appears in his book, *De Gratiâ Chriſti contra Pelagium & Cæleſtium cap. 6*. Pelagius his words were theſe ſpeaking of God *Qui ipſius voluntatis & operis poſſibilitatem dedit. Hanc autem poſſibilitatem* (ſaith Auſtin) *in naturâ eum ponere de verbis ejus ſuperioribus clarum eſt. Sed, ne nihil de gratiâ dixiſſe videretur, adjunxit, quiq, ipſam voluntatem gratiæ ſuæ adjuvat ſemper auxilio*. Now this *adjutorium poſſibilitatis*, in what ſence he delivered it, Auſtin profeſſeth to be obſcure, both as touching the nature of it, and as touching the manner how he conceived the nature of man to be aided thereby; but in other places, ſaith he, where he ſpeaks more plainly, it appears to conſiſt in giving a law, and affording inſtruction. Now by the way mark Auſtins obſervation upon theſe words of Pelagius, *Quiq, ipſam poſſibilitatem gratiæ ſuæ adjuvat ſemper auxilio; non ait*, ſaith Auſtin, *ipſam voluntatem vel ipſam operationem, quod ſi diceret, non abhorrere à doctrinâ Catholicâ videretur*. Now, *voluntatem adjuvari*, in Auſtins meaning, is, *Voluntatem præparari à Domino ut velit; & operationem adjuvari* is, *voluntatem corroborari ne fruſtrà velit*. The one operation he calls grace prevenient, the other ſubſequent, according to that, *Nolentem prævenit ut velit, volentem ſubſequitur ne fruſtrà velit*. And cap. 25. of the ſame Book, *Non ſolum Deus poſſe noſtrum donavit atq, adjuvat, ſed etiam velle & operari operatur in nobis*, whereby it appears that *Voluntatem atq, operationem noſtram adjuvari à Deo*, is *Deum operari in nobis & velle & operari quod bonum eſt*; which if Pelagius had acknowledged he had been received for a Catholique. So that

he excepted not against him for acknowledging *Possibilitatem volendi, atq; agendi quod bonum est.*

As touching the second Anathema, I say that *Vas contumeliæ* may be taken in a double sense: either to signify a vessel deserving contumely, deserving wrath; or to signify a Vessell ordained to contumely, and to the suffering of eternall wrath. In the first sense, there is no question but a man may change from being a vessell of contumely, or a vessell of wrath, into the condition of a vessell of honour; but in the second sense, it is as impossible there should be any such change, as it is impossible there should be any change in God, whereof I think there is no question: and both *Faustus* and *Lucidus* might take the phraise in the former sense: but if they did take it in this latter sense, dares this Author justify them?

2. Now I come to the credit and authority of this story concerning the Councell of Arles; and

1. I say, suppose it be a truth; yet about the yeare 494. there was a Roman Councell wherein *Gelasius* and 70 Bishops with him justify the writings of *Austin*, and *Prosper*, and condemne the writings of *Cassian* and *Faustus*, by whose procurement it is here pretended the Bishops of Arles subscribed this Epistle of *Faustus* unto *Lucidus*. And the Fathers of this pretended Councell of Arles are not reckoned up above sixteen.

2. The credit of this story lyeth wholly upon Faustus his relation and his honesty therein, a man infamous in the Church for opposing Austin and his doctrine of grace and predestination, as appears by the Writings of *Fulgentius*, *Petrus Diaconus*, *Alchimus Avitus* and others. *Ado Viennensis in Chron. ad ann.* 492. writes of him thus. *Faustus ex Abbate Monasterii Licinensis apud Regem Galliæ Episcopus factus, Pelagianorum dogma destruere conatus* (which yet may be made apparent to have been meerly in pretence) *in errorem unde qui ejus sensus in hac parte Catholicos prædicant, sicut Germadius de Viris illustribus scribens, omninò errant. Ita enim liberum arbitrium tàm Augustinus quam cæteri Catholici in Ecclesia Dei docent ut illuminatio, virtus & salus illi à Christo, per Christum, & in Christo sit. Faustus verò iste ita liberum Christianorum arbitrium docere conatur, ut illuminatio, virtus & salus non à Christo, sed a naturâ sit. Contra hunc scribit beatissimus Avitus Viennensis Episcopus lucidissima fide ejus redarguens errorem; similiter & Joannes vir eruditissimus Antiochenus Presbyter.* *Isidore* in his Book *De Viris illustribus*, testifies that *Fulgentius* wrote seven Books against Faustus, *Qui mirâ calliditate Catholicus videri volebat cum Pelagianus esset. Auctor quoq; Vitæ 5ti Fulgentii testatur à Sancto Fulgentio refutatos libros duos Fausti de Grat. & Liber. Arbitrio.* And *Petrus Diaconus* in his Book *De Incarnatione & Gratiâ Christi cap. ultim. Anathema dicit Libris Fausti*, And this Bellarmine, de Script. Eccles. writes to admonish them, who in these Letters contend, that *Faustus* was a Catholique.

Farther observe the Bishops who are pretended to have subscribed *Faustus* his *Epistle* to *Lucidus* are numbred these.

Auxianus.	*Faustus.*	*Patiens.*
Claudius.	*Julianus.*	*Paulus.*
Euphronius.	*Leucadius.*	*Pragmatius.*
Eutropius.	*Megetius.*	

But the Bishops that were assembled at the Councell of Arles are These.

Agricii nomine *Cataphronius.*	*Galliani* nomine *Melerius.*
Cælestinus.	*Joannis* nomine *Desiderius.*
Cæsarius.	*Julianus.*
Constantini nomine *Leontius.*	*Maximus.*
Contumeliosius.	*Philagrius.*
Cyprianus.	*Prætextatus.*
Eucherius.	*Proitianus.*
Florentius.	*Severi* nomine *Cataphronius.*

Thus they are reckoned up on both sides by Vossius, amongst whom there is but one name common. To help this, Vossius deviseth a 4th Councel of Arles and that the Bishops mentioned to have subscribed *Faustus* his Epistle, to be the Bishops assembled in the 4th Councel of Arles, and not those whom we read to have been assembled

at

at the Third. But that any ſuch Biſhops were aſſembled at a 4th Councell of Arles he brings no evidence, that I find; but his own conjecture is the beſt ground for this. And all this pains is taken to ſalve *Fauſtus* his reputation in this. And the reaſon that moves *Voſſius* to conceive that this ſubſcription was not a meer fiction of *Fauſtus*, is this; Becauſe forſooth if this had been a meer fiction of *Fauſtus*, ſurely *Maxentius* in oppoſing him, would not have failed to have caſt this in his teeth. *Binius* is eager in the defence of theſe Epiſcopall ſubſcriptions, but withall confeſſeth, that either *Fauſtus* himſelfe, or ſome in his name, practiſed to countenance his Books alſo by the authority of thoſe Biſhops. *In fine* (ſaith he) *hujus Commentarii & Libelli, ipſe Fauſtus, vel alius quis doloſè addiderat hæc verba, In quo quidem opuſculo poſt Arelatenſis Concilii ſubſcriptionem, novis erroribus deprehenſis adjici aliqua Synodus Lugdunenſis exegit, ut ſcilicet* (ſaith *Binnius*) *aliquo fuco venditari poſſet quaſi ſcriptum de gratiâ & libero arbitrio Commentarium duæ Synodi recepiſſent & approbaſſent.* Now if ſuch were the diſhoneſt art of *Fauſtus* in counterfeiting this, why might he not be as diſhoneſt in counterfeiting the former Epiſcopall ſubſcriptions alſo? And if *Voſſius* his reaſon to ſalve *Fauſtus* his credit, were of force in this, why ſhould it not be in force in the other alſo? For *Maxentius* we doe not find to have excepted againſt his fidelity, more in the one then in the other? And why might not *Maxentius* be ignorant of them both? And in *Biblioth. Sanct. Patrum.* there is an admonition added to *Fauſtus* his Epiſtle to *Loentius*, *ex Indice Expurgat. M. Script. Pelatii*, wherein though *Fauſtus* his epiſtle to *Lucidus*, is acknowledged to have been approved by the Epiſcopall ſubſcriptions in the Councell of Arles, yet as touching *Fauſtus* his mendicating authority from thoſe Fathers to his books, De Grat. & Lib. Arbit. The Author thereof ſpares not in plain termes to give *Fauſtus* the lye in theſe words. *Neutiquam tamen ullus ob id exiſtimet ab utroq; Concilio approbatos tres libros Fauſti de Gratiâ, ut ipſe mendaciter innuere videtur in ea quæ his ſubjicitur, præfatoriâ Epiſtolâ ad Epiſcopum Leontinum &c.* But can *Voſſius* ſhew that *Maxentius* did caſt this jugling courſe of *Fauſtus* in his teeth?

But it ſeems that Voſſius had no great need to trouble himſelfe in the vindicating of Fauſtus his reputation in pretending the ſubſcription of Biſhops to his Epiſtle written to Lucidus. For how doth it appeare that Fauſtus is the author of any ſuch pretence? It is true, in the Epiſtle it ſelfe that he wrote to Lucidus, he profeſſeth that he kept a copy of it, to ſhew to that aſſembly of Biſhops, *Hujus Epiſtolæ exemplar mecum retineo in conventu Sanctorum Antiſtitum, ſi ita neceſſe fuerit, proferendum:* by the way obſerve that this reſolution of his, was not abſolute, but *ſi ita neceſſe fuerit*, and this neceſſity he ſignifies wherein it did conſiſt, namely in caſe Lucidus by his ſilence, did give teſtimony of his continuance in his errour, as he calls it, His words are theſe, *Quod ſi eam ſubſcriptam tranſmittere nolueris, aperte adhuc te in errore perſiſtere ipſo ſilentio comprobabis, ac perinde jam neceſſitatem mihi facies ad perſonam tuam publicis conventibus exponendam.* Now as for that which followes after the end of the Epiſtle, *Et ſubſcripſerunt Epiſcopi, qui ordine ſubſequuntur qui in eâ quoq; Synodo adfuerunt.*

Auxanius in Chriſti nomine Epiſcopus, Relegi & ſubſcripſi
Fauſtus exemplar Epiſtolæ meæ Relegi & ſubſcrip.
Paulus Epiſcopus in Chriſti nomine, Rel. & ſubſcrip.
Eutropius &c.

Obſerve the admonition ſubjoyned by *Henricus Caniſius*. Theſe ſubſcriptions, ſaith he, are not in the Manuſcript. *Hæ ſubſcriptiones non ſunt in Manuſcripto Codice.* Conſider I pray the fair iſſue of this Authors learned pretence of Antiquity, he honoureth the gray haires of Fauſtus, and thoſe grave aſſemblies mentioned by him whereof we have no certainty; but how honoureth he the graver haires of *Auſtin*, & of all the Aſſemblies againſt the Pelagians, that you may gueſſe, though he concealeth it. And herein his devotion to this kind of Antiquity, where he thinketh it will ſerve his turne, he is content you ſhould conceive it doth exceed the devotion of *Calvin* and *Beza*, yea and of Auſtin alſo; whoſe anſwer to Proſper he is content to paſſe by as not favouring ſo much of piety in his judgement, but the Maſſilienſes zeale of the Ancients repreſented by Proſper unto Auſtin, that is ſuitable to his humour, he reliſheth that well, and ſo well that he thinks it fit vehemently to *miſtruſt thoſe doctrines which they never approved, but diſliked and condemned.* Yet of any condemnation other then what is implied by Fauſtus, a man infamous, and whoſe

Writings were condemned by 70 Biſhops, he makes no mention. And before Auſtins daies, and the daies of Pelagius, the Ancients were not exerciſed with any controverſy hereabouts. And was their non-approbation of his doctrine, concerning abſolute predeſtination, any motive to Auſtin vehemently to miſtruſt the truth thereof? I think he will not ſay it was; and therefore I hope he will give *Calvin* and *Beza* leave, never a whit the more for that cauſe, to miſtruſt the ſame doctrine, in granting the Ancients to have conceived predeſtination to proceed *ſecundum præſcientiam* according unto foreknowledge, he is content to conform himſelfe to their judgement; but in miſtruſting the contrary doctrine, hereupon you muſt give him leave to follow his own, or any, rather then not *Calvins* or *Beza's*, but even Auſtins alſo, though never ſo much magnified by the Church of God, and his writings countenanced eſpecially againſt the Pelagians, and the contrary condemned, by other manner of Councells then Arelatenſe 3^d^, and Lugdunenſe. I remember when Epicurus was demanded why, ſeeing he followed Leucippus ſo much, he did not follow him throughout, made this anſwer ſaying, I doe as a man that is a thirſt when he takes the cup to drink, for he drinks what will ſerve his turne, and ſets the reſt by: ſo you muſt give this Author leave to repreſent his devotion to gray haires, ſo farre as they ſerve his turne, and no farther. Yet I have ſhewed how Auſtin maintaines, as touching the Ancients that went before him, that they concurred with him *in fundamento prædeſtinationis*, which he accounted the the doctrine of Free grace, and cites to this purpoſe *Cyprian*, *Ambroſe*, and *Nazianzen*, and by the common prayers of the Church, that God would convert the unbelievers unto the faith of Chriſt; that the ſame doctrine, which was in his judgement the foundation of predeſtination, as he maintained it according to the Word of God, was generally received in the Church of God.

Before I part from this, I think fit to adde ſomething concerning the ſtile here given to *Lucidus*, before the revocation of his pretended error; for here I find him ſtiled the Predeſtinarian. Now I preſume this Author, that pretends ſo great reverence to gray haires, and ſo much preferres Antiquity before Novelty, hath good ground for this his denomination of him, and that out of Antiquity. Now I deſire he would be pleaſed to communicate unto us, his learned reading in Antiquity for this; and the rather, becauſe in the whole ſtory of the buſineſſe between *Fauſtus* and *Lucidus*, I find no mention of any ſuch attribute given to his perſon, or to the doctrine (reputed by *Fauſtus* erroneous) maintained by him. The terme *Prædeſtinatus* qualifying a perſon, I find firſt in *Arnobius* junior, and from that time I find not the Prædeſtinati, or Prædeſtinatians mentioned till the daies of *Hincmarus*, about the year of our Lord God 850. And as for the ſtory of the Predeſtinarian Hereſy, which this Author licks his lipps at, the originall whereof is referred to the yeare 415 by *Sigibertus*; it is very ſtrange, that in *Auſtins* daies it was not known unto him, or being known, not taken notice of by him, nor by *Proſper* neither after him. And *Alphonſus à Caſtro* in his Book *contra Hæreſes*, profeſſeth that the Author of this Hereſy he found not, neither in *Sigibert*, nor in any other; becauſe indeed not one of thoſe who wrote of Hereſies makes mention of this Hereſy, beſides *Bernard* of *Lutzenburg* in his Catalogue of Heretiques; and he ſaith no more of it, then what *Sigibert* mentioneth in his Chronicle. And withall he addes, that after this errour was buried, by the ſpace of almoſt a thouſand years, it was revived by *John Huſſe* the Bohemian. Whereby it appears, that *Alphonſus* was not of this Authors opinion in cenſuring this *Lucidus* for a Predeſtinarian. And the firſt that I find to intimate ſo much is *Hincmarus* about the yeare 850. In like ſort *Prateolus* acknowledgeth that, *Quis eorum Dux & inſtitutor fuerit, neſcitur.* But *Gerardus Voſſius* hath herein helped us with this conjecture, referring the originall of this Hereſy to the Monks of Adrumetum; and Biſhop *Uſher* in his *Hiſtoriâ Godeſcalci* ſaith, *Voſſius* was the firſt that charged thoſe Adrumetine Monks to be the author thereof. Yet if I be not deceived, he might be beholding to *Coccius* for helping him to this conceit. But this makes the matter more ſtrange another way, namely that Auſtin ſhould not take notice of this Predeſtinarian Hereſy, ſeeing none was ſo well acquainted with the opinion of thoſe his neighbour Monks, as he, being the man, whom they conſulted about the difference that roſe thereabouts, and wrote two Books thereupon and compoſed all. And yet I ſee no reaſon why *Voſſius* ſhould referre it to the Adrumetine Monks hand over head, when as it is cleer by the relation of them, that came over to *Auſtin* to complaine thereof, and to conferre with him thereupon; that they were but few, who were carried away with that errour, whereof they complained

ned, and that it was but one, that troubled the place of their Monaſtery herein, who was as it were the Ringleader to the reſt; of which *Voſſius* could not be ignorant. And therefore I ſee no cauſe why he ſhould charge them all indifferently, or that party either, who were tainted herewith, as is pretended; ſeeing there was an *Anteſignanus* who led the reſt, of whom *Voſſius* ſpeaks nothing at all; and I ſuppoſe he knew ſome good cauſe why. Beſides, the Predeſtinarian Hereſy is pretended to have riſen *Ab Auguſtini libris malè intellectis*. Now I find no colour of evidence hitherto, that theſe Monks of Adrumetum, whom *Voſſius* makes the founders of this Hereſy, were led awry by the miſunderſtanding of Auſtins writings. Neither doth *Voſſius* any where, that I know, take any pains to cleare this. And I would gladly be beholding to this Author, that pretends ſo much zeale unto, and skill in the knowledge of Antiquity, and ſo boldly ſtileth *Lucidus* a Predeſtinarian, for communicating unto us his rare evidences concerning this point, out of his great obſervations. And ſo much the rather, to take mee off from mine errour, who ſince the firſt time that I travelled in the ſearch after this Predeſtinarian Hereſy in dealing with *Corvinus*, which is now ſome three years agoe. I have been apt to conceive that this Hereſy from the firſt, was but a meer fiction of the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, cunningly to diſgrace thereby the doctrine of S^t *Auſtin*. And ſince the coming forth of D^r *Uſhers* Hiſtory in the cauſe of *Godeſcalcus*, I have been confirmed herein; as wherein he gives to underſtand, that whereas *Tyro Proſper* wrote hereof before *Sigibert*, although the Printer hath made him to ſpeak as *Sigibert* doth, namely, that *Hæc Hæreſis orta eſt ab Auguſtini libris malè intellectis*: yet that is not the language of *Tyro* himſelfe, but plainly this, *Hæc Hæreſis ab Auguſtino orta eſt*, and that learned Biſhop hath ſhewed out of two Manuſcripts of *Tyro*, the one in Bennet Colledge in Cambridge, the other in our Kings Library: and this he farther confirmes by comparing the deſcription which *Gennadius* makes of that, which he calls the Predeſtinatian Hereſy, with the doctrine of *Auguſtin. lib. 5. cont. Julian. Pelag. cap. 4. & de Bono Perſev. cap. 15*. And withall the ſame learned Biſhop makes it appeare, that look what doctrine *Sigebertus* aſcribes to the Predeſtinatians, the ſame doctrine was charged upon Auſtin, and ſuch as concurred with him therein. This I ſay that learned Biſhop proves out of the beginning of the 6 Book Hypemneſticon. *Credere nos vel prædicare ſugillatis quod Deus quoſdam hominum ſic prædeſtinet ad vitam regni cælorum, ut ſi nolint orare, aut jejunare, aut in omni opere divino vigiles eſſe, eos omninò perire non poſſe, nec prorſus ſui debere eſſe ſollicitos quos Deus quia voluit ſemel jam elegendo prædeſtinavit ad vitam: quoſdam verò ſic prædeſtinavit in Gehennæ pœnam ut etiam ſi credere velint, ſi jejuniis & orationibus, omniq; ſe voluntati divinæ ſubjicerent, in his Deum non delectari & vitam illis æternam in totum dari non poſſe, &c.* Now this in effect is the very Hereſy of the Predeſtinatians related by *Sigebert*. Therefore I much deſire this Author would take the paines to prove, that this pretended Predeſtinarian Hereſy was indeed received to be an Hereſy by the Catholique Church, and not rather a fiction of the remnants of the Pelagians, wherewithall to reproach the doctrine of S. *Anſtin* in the poynt of Predeſtination.

Thus have I examined this Authors pretence of the Novelty of our Tenent. I come to the conſideration of that which followes.

DISCOURSE.

The Second Motive.

2dò. IT S unwillingneſſe to abide the Tryall. I find that the Authors and Abettors of it, have been very backward to bring it to the Standard, not only when they have been called upon by their Adverſaries to have been weighed, but alſo when they have been intreated thereto by their chief Magiſtrates who might have commanded them. A ſhrewd argument (mee thinks) that it is too light.

Beza in Col. Mompelg. pag. 375. Vide etiam Oſiander. In the Diſputation at Mompelgard Anno 1586 held between *Beza* and *Jacobus Andreas* with ſome Seconds on both ſides, *Beza* and his company having diſputed with the Lutherans about the perſon of Chriſt, the Lords Supper &c. When they came to this Point, did decline the ſifting of it, and gave this reaſon among others, that it could not then poſſibly be diſputed of, *ſine gravi eorum offendiculo, qui tanti myſterii capaces non ſunt*, without the great ſcandall and hurt of the ignorant, and unacquainted with theſe high myſteries.

Brand. Collog. Hagh. pag. 57. The Contra-Remonſtrants alſo in their Conference with their Adverſaries at the Hague in the year 1611 could not be drawn to diſpute with them about this point, but delivered a Petition to the States of Holland and Weſtfrizland that they might not be urged to it, reſolving rather to break off the Conference, then to meddle with it.

Act. Syn. p. 1. pag. 133. In the Synod likewiſe of Dort, in the year 1618, and 1619. the Remonſtrants were warned by the Preſident of the Synod *ut de Electione potius quàm de odiosâ Reprobationis materiâ agerent*, that they ſhould rather diſpute of the point of Election, then the odious point of Reprobation.

Can this Doctrine be a truth, and yet bluſh at the light, which makes all thing manifeſt? eſpecially conſidering theſe things.

1. That Reprobation is a principall Head of Practicall divinity by the ill, or well ſtating of which, the glory of God, and good of Religion is much promoted, or hindered.

2. That there is ſuch a neceſſary connexion between the points of Election and Reprobation (both being parts of predeſtination) that the one cannot well be handled without the other.

3. That Reprobation was the chief cauſe of all the uproares in the Church at that time.

4. That it was accuſed with open mouth, and challenged of falſhood, and therefore bound in juſtice to purge it ſelfe of the crimination.

5. That it may eaſily be defended, if (as ſome ſay) it be ſuch an apparent truth, for *Nihil eſt ad defendendum puritate tutius, nihil ad dicendum veritate facilius*, ſaith S. Hierom.

The ſtriving to lye cloſe and hide it ſelfe, though perhaps it be not ſo infallible, yet it is a very probable argument of a bad cauſe. Truth covets no corners, but is willing to abide the tryall, whether in men or in doctrines. *David* knowing his heart to be without guile, offers himſelfe ready to the Lords tryall, Search me, ô God, and know my heart, try me and know my thoughts, and ſee if there be any wicked way in me. And our Saviour tells us that, Every one that doth evill, hates the light and comes not to the light, leaſt his deeds ſhould be reproved; but he that doth truth, comes to the light, that his deeds may be made manifeſt, that they are wrought in God. As S. *Paul* ſaith of an Heretick, he is αὐτοκατάκριτος ſelfe condemned, and ſo may we ſay of Hereſy and untruth, it condemnes it ſelfe, and by nothing more then by refuſing the Touch-ſtone. He is to be thought an empty Scholler, who is loath to be oppoſed, and his gold to be light and counterfeit, that will not have it touched and weighed, and theſe Opinions to be but errours, which would ſo willingly walk in a miſt, and dwell in ſilence, when it concernes the peace of the Church ſo much to have them examined.

Pſalm. 139. 23, 24, Ioh. 3. 20, 21.

TWISSE

Conſideration.

WHo are theſe Authors of this Doctrine, who here are ſaid to have been backward to bring it to the ſtandard? Is *Beza* thoſe Authors? whereof was he the Author? Was it the doctrine of predeſtination as proceeding of the meer pleaſure of God, and not upon foreſight of mans faith and works? Is it not apparent that this was the doctrine of Auſtin 1200 years agoe, and that in oppoſition to the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians? Or was it the doctrine of reprobation, as not proceeding upon the foreſight of ſinne, but of the meer pleaſure of God? Is this Author ſo ignorant, as not to know what are the concluſions of *Alvarez* in the queſtion, Whether there be any cauſe of reprobation on mans part. Lib. 10. de Auxil. diſc. 110. pag. 866.

1. His firſt Concluſion is this, *Reprobation whereby God decreed not to give unto ſome everlaſting life, and to permit their ſinne, is not conditionate, but abſolute: neither doth it preſuppoſe in God, foreſight of the deſerts of reprobates, or of their perſeverance in ſinne unto the laſt period of their life.*

2. His next Concluſion is, *In the Angells that fell, there is no cauſe of their reprobation on their part, as touching the whole effect thereof, but before any foreſight of their future ſinne, God, pro ſua Voluntate, of his meer will, did reprobate ſome of them, and ſuffered them to fall into ſinne.*

3. The third, *Infants departing in Originall ſinne alone, there is no cauſe on their part of reprobation,*

reprobation, if they be conſidered in compariſon with others which are not reprobated, and the like is to be ſaid proportionably of men of ripe years.

4. The fourth, *Not only comparatively, but abſolutely there is no cauſe of reprobation. Therefore neither ſinne actuall, nor originall, nor both of them foreſeen by God, was indeed the meritorious and motive cauſe of the reprobation of any, as touching all the effects thereof, and the proofe hereof he proſecutes at large.*

5. *Reprobation as touching the laſt effect thereof, preſuppoſeth in ſigno rationis the foreſight of ſinne originall, or actuall, for which a reprobate is damned.* Marke it well, He does not ſay as the cauſe for which God decrees his damnation, but as the cauſe for which a reprobate is damned. And *Aquinas* (whoſe followers the Dominicans are) expreſſeth this doctrine in this manner, and that more Scholaſtically and accurately then *Alvarez. Præſcientia peccatorum poteſt eſſe aliqua ratio reprobationis ex parte pœnæ quæ præparatur reprobatis, in quantum' ſcilicet Deus proponit ſe puniturum malos propter peccata, &c.* in Ad Rom. 9. Sect. 2. in fine, that is, Preſcience of ſinnes may be ſome reaſon of reprobation on the part of puniſhment, to wit, in as much as God purpoſeth to puniſh wicked men for their ſinnes. Where ſinne is evidently made the cauſe of damnation, and that by vertue of Gods purpoſe, but by no means the cauſe of the decree it ſelfe. And the ſame *Aquinas* elſewhere profeſſeth that, No man was ſo mad as to affirme *that merits are the cauſe of Predeſtination, as touching the act of God Predeſtinating*: and that it cannot be the cauſe thereof, he proves, becauſe nothing can be the cauſe of Gods will, as touching the act of God willing, but as touching the things willed by God, as formerly he had proved. The ſame doctrine in effect is taught by *Durand* in 1. *diſt.* 41. q. 2. Bonaventure applies the ſame diſtinction to reprobation it ſelfe. *Odium æternum*, ſaith he, implies two things, *Principale ſignificatum & connotatum &c. & primum non eſt ex meritis, ſed ſecundum.* This he explicates in the words following, *Quod patet ſi reſolvatur, quia Odium eſt propoſitum puniendi: Propoſitum autem nullus meretur ſed pœnam*, that is, Hatred (or reprobation) is Gods purpoſe to puniſh: Of this divine purpoſe there is no meritorious cauſe, but only of the puniſhment. The ſame was the Opinion of *Gandavenſis, Scotus, Halenſis*, as I have ſhewed in my *Vindiciæ*.

Now judge I pray with how little judgement, or modeſty this Author intimates *Beza* to be the author of the doctrine of abſolute reprobation. Perhaps he will ſay his meaning is, that he was the author of the Upper-way, as touching the making of the object of Predeſtination mankind not yet created. But to this I anſwer, that *Beza* doth ſo indeed, but he was never called to a conference hereabouts, and conſequently he never declined it. And that which was declined, he makes to be declined by the abettors, as well as the authors; which cannot be underſtood of this nice and Logicall poynt, as touching the object of reprobation. The main queſtion is, whether there be any cauſe of reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating: the Negative whereof, was maintained very generally amongſt Schoole-Divines before *Beza* was borne. And was it ever known, that thoſe I have named did ſhrink in their heads or decline the triall thereof? What a ſilly thing is it then to inferre, that becauſe Beza at ſuch a time, did decline the diſputation hereof, and the Contra-Remonſtrants at another time, therefore it is ſuſpectable to be an untruth? Yet let us examine his inſtances.

Beza he ſaith *did decline the ſifting of this doctrine* (to wit, *of predeſtination*) (for on that they were moved to diſpute.) I doubt this Author ſpeaks by rote, and that he is nothing at all acquainted with the ſtory hereof, either in Oſiander or in Beza, but tranſcribes only what another hath prompted unto him. For it is apparent by Oſianders Hiſtory, that they did conferre thereof. It is true he ſtood off at the firſt, and gave reaſons for it, but at length he and his fellowes, condeſcended to the inſtance and importunity of their Adverſaries, and ſo came on to the Conference hereabout, His words are theſe. *Præfat. in 2. part. Reſponſ. ad Acta Colloq. Mompelg. Quamvis quò evaſura eſſent reliqua ſatis proſpiceremus, mane nihilominus mutata ſententia Illuſtriſſ. Principe ſalutato, in reliquam ſequentem Collationem conſenſimus; eâ tantùm conditione additâ, ne propter proximum Paſchæ Feſtum, ea diſceptatio longius protraheretur. Et ita demùm ad audiendas D. Andreæ declamationes rurſum proceſſimus.*

Was it this point alone the ſifting whereof, as this Author phraſeth it, Beza declined? It is apparent they were no leſſe then three Points. This appears by the ſecond part of Beza's anſwer Ad act. Colloq. Mompelg. as alſo by the anſwer of *Jacobus Andreæ*, as if he were the mouth of the Prince, namely, that if they liſt not *De Tribus illis*

conferre,

conferre, yet he thought it fit that Theſes written by them on thoſe three Articles ſhould be rehearſed in the hearing of all, which afterwards Beza and his fellowes might take home with them to addreſſe an anſwer to them afterwards, as they thought good. And theſe three Articles were concerning, *Predeſtination, Baptiſme, and the putting down of Images in Churches.* Concerning all which *Jacobus Andreæ* gives his reaſons, why he thought it fit they ſhould entertaine farther Conference; Whereunto *Beza* makes anſwer in his Præface to that ſecond part of his Anſwer *Ad Act. Colloq. Mompelg.* It is true, this reaſon *Beza* gave why he thought it not fit in that place publiquely to diſpute thereof, to wit, of predeſtination, *Quod hæc graviſſima quæſtio publicè in illo cætu allatis utrinq; contrariis ſententiis diſceptari abſq; nonnullorum offendiculo non poſſe videretur.* For both the myſterious nature of it is ſuch, as few are capable of it; the Maſſilienſes profeſſed as much, as appears in *Proſpers* Epiſtle unto *Auſtin, De his taceri exigunt* (ſaith *Proſper*) *quorum altitudinem nullus attigerit.* And to the ſame purpoſe, even they who durſt not diſlike Auſtins doctrine thereof profeſſed as much, as appears by the Letter of *Hilarius* unto *Auſtin. Conſentientibus etiam his qui hanc definitionem improbare non audent, ut dicant, Quid opus fuit hujuſmodi diſputationis incerto tot minus intelligentium corda turbari?* Then again it was in a Lutheran Aſſembly, and amongſt many brought up in the hatred of the doctrine which *Beza* maintained, who in all likelihood would be the more exaſperated. *Cauſas verum tacendi longum eſt omnes quærere* (ſaith Auſtin) *quarum tamen eſt & hæc una ne priores faciamus eos qui non intelligunt.* No wiſe man, ſaith our Saviour, putteth new wine into old bottells. *Quanto minus ſapit,* ſaith Beza in that Preface of his, *qui de præſtantiſſimo vino prius in utres fœcibus adhuc, & vappa obſitos immittendo quàm de repurgandis illis & apparandis cogitet.* Laſtly, *Beza* perceiveth the practice of *Jacobus Andreas* ſtanding upon a place of advantage, to urge them to conferre upon ſuch a poynt, the truth whereof is moſt harſh to carnall affections, that ſo he might have the better opportunity to make them odious. And truly what *Jacobus Andreas* was, I know not, but *Beza* ſets him forth as a man of a moſt malevolent diſpoſition to the French Proteſtants: and our Saviour hath admoniſhed us, Not to give that which is holy unto doggs, or to caſt pearle before ſwine. Yet *Andreas* to ſerve his turne, and to draw them into a ſnare, pleads that the doctrine of Predeſtination, is not ſo to be put over in the Schooles, *ut non opus ſit eam rudi & imperito populo ponere;* yet *Hunnius* a man of the ſame profeſſion, is ſo farre different from *Iacobus Andreas*, that he thinks it not fit to preach before the rude people of preſcience divine, but very ſparingly; how much leſſe would he think it fit to Preach before them of Predeſtination divine? *De Prædeſt. queſt. & reſponſ. pag.394.* his words are theſe, *Interim hoc repeto quod ſupra monui rudioribus (quibus Apoſtolus vult lac propinari, non cibum ſolidum apponi) non eſſe multum de præſcientiâ Dei diſputandum, hâc ſolummodo de cauſa quia haud perinde capiunt ea quæ alias in Scholis in Diſputationibus contra adverſarios, &, ut Paulus ait, inter perfectos utiliter & ex fundamentis eloquiorum Dei aſtrui ſolent. Coram rudioribus ergo ſimplicior loquendi ratio & ipſorum captui accommodatior eſt ſi dicamus, Deum ad hæreditatem regni cœleſtis elegiſſe & certo ſalvare decreviſſe eos omnes qui reſipiunt, & in vera fide filii Dei ex hâc vitâ decedunt.* Its well known what order King *Iames* took in his time, in the reſtraint of preaching this doctrine in the Pulpits, by any under the degree of a Deane, and counſelled the States likewiſe to forbid the preaching of thoſe controverſall points amongſt them. And if it were wiſdome in them to take this courſe, without any prejudice to the truth of the doctrine, why ſhould *Beza's* with-holding from conference hereupon, be any thing prejudiciall thereto.

Aug. de Don. Perſev. c. 16.

But were there not other cauſes of moment, to move him hereunto, which this Author conceales, and which Beza propoſeth in the firſt place? as namely, that the Prince who invited them hereunto, in his Letters Miſſive, alleaged no other cauſe of that meeting, but *Infælicem de Cœnâ Domini controverſiam*, that unhappy Controverſy about the Supper of the Lord. Secondly, that their Citties ſent them over accordingly to this Conference for no other cauſe, but to conferre thereabouts. This *Iacobus Andreas* acknowledgeth, and giveth a reaſon why in thoſe Letters of the Prince, there was no mention made of thoſe three Articles, whereabout they were afterwards urged to conferre, to wit, *quod illos in iſtis quoq; diſſidere non intellexerat Princeps Illuſtriſſimus.* And thirdly, becauſe the Feaſt of Eaſter approched, and they deſired to be at home in their own Citties by that time.

Laſtly, doth it follow, that becauſe they declined the ſifting the truth of theſe poynts (as this Author phraiſeth it) after ſuch a manner, to wit, by publique diſputation; doth it herehence follow, that they declined the ſifting of it? They made this

this offer to propoſe their opinion herein, and the confirmation of it out of the Word of God, in private before the Prince: and if *Jacobus Andreas* were pleaſed to propoſe any Theſes againſt it, they would take them along with them and upon conſideration to addreſſe a convenient Anſwer thereunto; This Beza ſets down in that Preface: Let D. *Andrews* ſhew if he can, ſaith *Beza*, *hanc Chriſtianæ doctrinæ partem aut à noſtris ſive ſcribendo ſive concionando prætermiſſam, aut a ſuis rectius & accuratius quàm a noſtris pertractatam*. And truly for my part, I no way like ſuch conferences, being privy to mine own imperfections, as having neither ſuch ſtrength of memory as to command a preſent uſe of my knowledge in theſe poynts upon all occaſions, nor ſuch command of my paſſions, as to keep them from breaking forth in ſuch ſort as might be obnoxious to cenſures, not knowing how I might be provoked; but certainly I feare not to come to the examination of any of their Writings, or to offer mine own to be examined by any of them. One thing I had almoſt omitted out of *Beza*, in his Preface to the Firſt Part of his Anſwer to theſe Acts. It was *Beza's* motion that all things paſſing between them on both ſides, might be ſet down in writing, under the hands of Collators; and this courſe I confeſſe I could willingly approve of, and after this manner to conferre with any. But this ſo faire a motion was rejected by *Andreas*; He would conferre rather by word of mouth then by writing. A ſecond motion propoſed by *Beza* was this, that what was ſpoken on both ſides, might be ſet down in writing by Notaries choſen and appoynted thereunto by common conſent. But neither would *Andreas* admit of this. *Petivimus*, ſaith *Beza*, *initio ut utrinq; omnia ſcriptis propria Collocutorum manu ſubſignatis agerentur. Quod cum D. Andreæ non placuiſſet qui verbis agi malebat* (for the Auditory was very propitious to him for the moſt part) *poſtulavi ut utrinq; dicta à probatis & utriuſq; partis conſenſu delectis Notariis exciperentur, quæ deinde cuiq; parti recognoſcere & addita ſubſcriptione confirmare liceret. Hæc enim erat profectò juſta & ſincera colloquendi ratio ut ſic falſationi occurreretur. Quum autem ne hoc quidem admitteret D. Andreas*, &c. Now let any indifferent perſon that is not ſowred with partiall affections, judge whoſe carriage is to be thought in equity more prejudiciall to their cauſe, the carriage of *Andreas*, or the carriage of *Beza*.

I come to the Contra-Remonſtrants unwillingneſſe to conferre upon the poynt of reprobation. What their reaſons were I know not. But this I am ſure of, the Scripture is free in ſpeaking of election, and expreſſe; not ſo of reprobation, leaving us to take notice of the condition of reprobation by its oppoſition to election. And in conformity hereunto, both Auſtin in his time, and Remigius in his time, and Bradwardine in his time, ſpeaks liberally of predeſtination, but very ſparingly of reprobation. And the doctrine of reprobation as it is nothing leſſe myſterious then that of election; ſo it is farre more harſh to carnall affections. And it is well known that at the time of the Hague Conference, *Barnavelt* that ruled the roſt amongſt the States, was too great a friend to the Arminian Party.

But, what boldneſſe doth this Author take in paſſing his ſuſpicious cenſures upon a doctrine, becauſe ſome defenders of it, at ſome time have been loath to come to entertaine a publique Conference thereupon? For what argument call you this, The Contra-Remonſtrants would not be brought to give their reaſons on this point; therefore the doctrine of Auſtin delivered 1200 years (or thereabouts) before, concerning the abſoluteneſſe both of Predeſtination on the one ſide, and of preterition on the other (as *Voſſius* acknowledgeth) is to be ſuſpended of untruth? And if my readineſſe to come to the triall hereon doth nothing credit the cauſe as maintained by others; why ſhould others unwillingneſſe to come to the ſame triall, be any diſparagement to the ſame cauſe, as it is maintained by me or any other? It is well known that *Peter Moulin*, concurring with us in the poynt of abſolute predeſtination, maintaines reprobation to proceed upon the divine foreſight of finall perſeverance in impenitency. If this Author differed from us no more the Mr *Moulin* doth, and acknowledged the meer pleaſure of God, in giving grace to whom he will, and denying it to whom he will, I doe not think any friend of his would think any whit the worſe of him, or charge him with defection from the truth of God in this. Neither can I think, that he ever was of any other opinion, conſidering how many worthy Divines oppoſite to the Arminians, doe either conceive, or at leaſt ſeem to conceive

that the purpoſe of God to damne, doth preſuppoſe in *ſigno rationis* the foreſight of finall impenitency, yet concurring with us in this, that all are fallen in Adam and ſo brought forth into the world in *damnatâ Maſſâ*, as Auſtin calleth it. God of his meer pleaſure cures this naturall corruption (the fruits whereof are infidelity and impenitency) in ſome, by regenerating them and beſtowing the grace of faith and repentance upon them, and leaves it uncured in others by refuſing to regegenerate them, to beſtow faith and repentance upon them; We give the hands of Chriſtian fellowſhip, and brotherly amity one unto another, without all exception notwithſtanding ſome nice differences, which in the iſſue I hope, will prove to be meerly Logicall, and nothing Theologicall.

Laſtly, however this poynt of unwillingneſſe in ſome, to come to conferre in the poynt of reprobation, might caſt ſome colour of ſuſpicion to the prejudicing of their cauſe; yet leaſt of all did it become this Author to take advantage hereof, conſidering that it is his own caſe, as who declineth not one poynt only, but all the reſt in this his diſcourſe, and cleaves only to that of reprobation, nothing anſwerably (I preſume) to * your expectation, who put this task upon him: and whether it be any thing anſwerable to the promiſe he made unto you, your ſelf are beſt acquainted therewith. Yet becauſe the Remonſtrants hereupon (to wit, upon the Contra-Remonſtrants declining this Controverſy) have taken liberty to oppoſe the doctrine of the Contra-Remonſtrants in this poynt, ſo farre forth, as they made conſtruction of their opinion hereupon, by their doctrine concerning election; therefore I will not ſpare even here, to digreſſe ſo farre, as to take notice what they delivered, and to addreſſe an anſwer hereunto, the rather becauſe I find this diſcourſe of theirs inſerted in their Relation of that Conference at Hague.

* The Doctor directs his ſpeech unto S. *Nathaniel Rich.*

Now, whereas firſt, by a long deduction upon conſideration of the Contra-Remonſtrants doctrine in the poynt of election, they doe inferre *Colloq. Hagh. Bertii p.* 120. that like as faith is made by them a fruit of election, ſo infidelity is by them to be made a fruit of reprobation: this conſequence we utterly deny. It only followes herehence, that like as faith, whereby mans naturall infidelity is cured, is by them made the fruit of election, ſo the denyall of faith, that is, the not curing of mans infidelity, or the leaving of it uncured is the fruit of reprobation. And indeed conſidering the means muſt be his work who intends the end, wherehence it followeth, that look what end God doth intend in mans election, the means tending thereunto muſt be Gods work, as namely, faith; in like ſort, whatſoever be the end which God intends in reprobation, the means tending thereunto, muſt be his work, which cannot be infidelity or ſinne, but the permiſſion of ſinne rather and infidelity, or the not curing of that corruption and infidelity which is naturall unto us all. Hereupon they proceed to propoſe two things to be queſtioned, in congruity to the doctrine of the Contra-Remonſtrants. 1. *Utrumne Fides in conſilio & decreto Dei de electione ad ſalutem, eam ipſam electionem ordine præcedat an verò conſequatur?* 2. *Ex alterâ parte; An Infidelitas in eodem Conſilio & Decreto Dei de reprobatione ad exitium, eam ipſam reprobationem ordine præcedat an ſequatur?* The latter of theſe is only pertinent to our preſent purpoſe; yet ſeeing they handle them both, ſo farre as to diſpute againſt the opinion of their oppoſites in both, and carry themſelves herein *Magnificentiſſimè*, I am content to weigh their arguments, in the ballance of Scholaſticall conſideration, leaſt ſome ſuch as this Author, ſhould affect to ſeem judicious in ſuſpecting my declining of them to favour of ſome inability to encounter them.

Thus therefore they beginne.

If faith followes election unto ſalvation, then alſo the decree of ſending Chriſt as a Saviour into the World, muſt neceſſarily follow that election; But this conſequent is abſurd, and pertains notably to the ignominy of Chriſt.

To this I anſwer. Firſt out of mine own opinion, Thus.

Faith is ſuppoſed to follow Election unto ſalvation, upon no other ground then becauſe the intention of giving faith, is ſuppoſed to follow the intention of giving ſalvation. But this I ſhould deny, and that for this reaſon, becauſe this ſubordination is grounded only upon ſuppoſition, that ſalvation is the end which God intends, and faith the means tending unto that end: but this I deny. Firſt, becauſe the end of Gods actions, is not the ſalvation of man,

but

but the manifeſtation of his own glory. *For he made all things for himſelfe*, Pov. 16.4. and reaſon juſtifies it. For God being the ſupream efficient, muſt be the ſupream end; and being *Optimus* as well as *Maximus*, he muſt needs be both moſt lovely and moſt loving, of that which is moſt lovely, that is, of himſelfe. But becauſe ſome may conceive that though Gods glory be the ſupream end, yet mans ſalvation may be the intermediate end: therefore to this I anſwer; Firſt, let ſuch ſhew then what is the glory of God, which ſalvation of the creature ſetteth forth, and I doubt not, but if that glory be ſtated right, it will appeare, that not ſalvation alone, but ſomething elſe is required to be joyned with it; as namely, the miſſion of Chriſt, yea and faith in Chriſt, to compleat that means, which tend to the procurement of ſuch an end, that is, to the ſetting forth of ſuch a glory. Secondly, the end whether ſupream or intermediate is alwaies ſuch as being rightly underſtood, doth break ſuch a means; but ſalvation is not ſo in reſpect of faith; for it doth not beſpeak it, as is apparent in the ſalvation of Angels, of Infants; as alſo in this, that it was abſolutely poſſible for God to ſave even ſinners without Chriſt, as may be demonſtrated and I have demonſtrated in my Vind. Grat. Dei. by variety of evident reaſons.

In a word, if Gods ſupream end, were the manifeſtation of his glory on ſome conſidered, as meerely poſſible in doing them good in the higheſt degree, and that in the way of mercy mixt with juſtice, and that *ex Condigno & ex Congruo*; it is apparent, that the means required hereunto, and beſpoken hereby, is a body conſiſting of divers particulars, all together compleating the inregrall means required hereunto. For herehence it followeth, that they muſt be both created, without which no glory of God at all can be manifeſted upon them and permitted to ſinne, otherwiſe God could not doe them good in the way of mercy, which ſuppoſeth miſery, but alſo that a Saviour muſt be ſent, and he no leſſe then the Sonne of God, to deſerve the pardon of their ſinne and ſalvation, otherwiſe it could not be in the way of mercy mixt with juſtice *de Condigno*: and faith and repentance muſt be beſtowed on them, otherwiſe the good done them, could not be by way of reward: and laſtly, ſalvation, otherwiſe good could not be done them in the higheſt degree. And thus in no moment of nature is the Predeſtination of Chriſt either before or after the Predeſtination of man; as our Brittiſh Divines maintained at the Synod of Dort; but at once God predeſtinated both him to be our Head and us his Members; like as *Aquinas* maintained Chriſts predeſtination, and our predeſtination to be one act in God, and conſequently neither could be the cauſe of another.

Thus have I diſpatched mine anſwer unto them, as touching mine own opinion. But ſuppoſing the method of the Contra-Remonſtrants ſound, in making ſalvation of man, to be intended by God as an end, and both mans faith in Chriſt, and Chriſts Miſſion to be intended as means. We deny this to be abſurd or ignominious unto Chriſt. Lets heare how they prove it, thus; If the decree of ſending Chriſt be poſterior to the electing of ſingular perſons unto ſalvation, then the intention of mans ſalvation was poſterior to Gods intention of ſatisfaction to his juſtice, which ſay they is abſurd and fooliſh, to wit, to decree the ſalvation of ſinners, unleſſe firſt he decree ſatisfaction to his juſtice. But I anſwer according to the forme of the Contra-Remonſtrants doctrine: Firſt, by proving their order to be ſound: Secondly, by ſhewing the invalidity of the Remonſtrants diſcourſe.

Firſt therefore: There was never any other order of intentions acknowledged by the learned, then ſuch as is found between the intention of the end, and the intention of the means tending thereunto. And the Order moſt received is this; That the intention of the end, is before the intention of the means. Now let every man that is is his right Witts conſider, which is more likely to be the end, and which the means of theſe two, Mans ſalvation, and Chriſts Miſſion to ſatisfy for the ſinne of man. Was ever any man known to be ſo brainſick as to affirme, that the ſalvation of man is a means tending to this end, namely, the ſending of Chriſt into the World to ſatisfy for the ſinne of man? On the other ſide, how fair and plauſible is it to affirme, that Chriſt was ſent into the world, to ſatisfy for mans ſinne, to this end, that man might be ſaved? whence it followeth evidently by the moſt approved rules of Schooles, that the intention of mans ſalvation is *in ſigno rationis*, before the

intention of ſending Chriſt into the world, to make ſatisfaction for ſinne. Againe, if Chriſts ſending into the world to make ſatisfaction for ſinne, be firſt in intention, then it ſhould be laſt in execution, by rules undeniable, and ſuch as are manifeſt by the very light of nature; Whence it followeth, that man ſhould be firſt ſaved and after that Chriſt ſent into the World, that, by his ſufferings, Gods juſtice might be ſatisfied.

Now I come to the conſideration of the Remonſtrants argument. The Conſequence of the Major we grant, but the Minor we deny. And it is a vaine thing for them to cry out, that it is abſurd and fooliſh to ſay, that the intention of ſalvation, precedes the intention of ſatisfying Gods juſtice; for words muſt not carry it: and it is well known that the moſt empty veſſells give the greateſt ſound. I have ſhewed how abſurd it is to conceive, that man was ſaved to this end, that Gods juſtice may be ſatisfied, and that 'tis farre more probable to ſay, That by Chriſts ſufferings, Gods juſtice was ſatisfied to this end, that man might be ſaved. For the ſalvation of man we ſay, was not intended by God ſimply, but after a certain manner, to wit, in the way of mercy mixed with juſtice; which end doth not preſuppoſe the permiſſion of ſinne, as theſe Remonſtrants ſhape the matter to varniſh over their conſequence, with ſome colour of probability: but rather it beſpeaks, both the permiſſion of ſinne, and ſatisfaction to be made for ſinne, to the end that ſo man might be ſaved, not ſimply, but after a certain manner, to wit, in the way of mercy mixed with juſtice. But ſuppoſe they were conſidered as ſinners, Why ſhould the Remonſtrants look ſtrangely upon this doctrine, namely, that God ſhould intend the ſalvation of ſinners *in ſigno rationis*, before he intended that his juſtice ſhould be ſatisfied? For doe not they maintaine, that God by power abſolute, can pardon ſinne without all ſatisfaction? But ſuppoſing that God will not pardon ſinne without ſatisfaction, in this caſe they may contend, that God muſt firſt intend to take a courſe, that ſuch ſatisfaction may be made, and then intend to ſave. And let them contend but in the name of reaſon, and not of clamours, and content themſelves, with the infatuation of themſelves, with ſuch ſenſeleſſe conceits, and not ſpread this ſcab unto others alſo. My reaſon to the contrary is ſtill the ſame, namely, that if God be pleaſed to ſave ſinners in deſpight of ſinne, in the way of mercy mixt with juſtice, the caſe is cleare, that ſatisfaction for ſinne, is rather a means of mans ſalvation, then mans ſalvation is a means tending to the procurement of ſatisfaction for ſinne, and conſequently the intention of ſalvation of ſinners, is in reaſon to precede the intention of procuring ſatisfaction, rather then to follow after it; as the intention of the end, is rather to be accounted before, then after the intention of the means. Yet ſay theſe Remonſtrants, if a man will be ſo obſtinate, as (notwithſtanding the felicity of theſe Remonſtranticall witts in fruitfull inventions and ſubtile argumentations) ſtill to deny that there is any abſurdity herein, thus over and above we prove it. For as yet they have runne themſelves out of breath. *If*, ſay they, *the decree of Chriſt a Saviour, be after the election of particular perſons unto ſalvation, it followeth that God did decree ſome particular mens ſalvation, before he ordained Chriſts merits to procure their ſalvation*; but this is fooliſh and abſurd.

I anſwer, No more fooliſh and abſurd then the former: and indeed every one of theſe conſequences for the expreſſing whereof, they affect to ſeem very inventious, doe ſavour of no invention at all; the Conſequents doe ſo evidently, even every one of them appeare as clearely in the Antecedent, as a mans face in a glaſſe, and are to be accounted rather Tautologies, then deductions, much leſſe doe they relliſh of any ſubtilty of wit. So that all this while, they ſeem to be in travell with nothing but wind, or ſick of the diſeaſe called Tenaſmus, ſtriving mightily to doe ſomewhat, when indeed they doe nothing at all. And our former argument ſtill hath place, and here alſo applied, doth manifeſt, that ſeeing the merits of the ſonne of God are the means of mans ſalvation, then mans ſalvation is the end of Chriſts merits; therefore in all probability, the intention of mans ſalvation, as the intention of the end, ſhould precede the intention of ſending Chriſt to merit as the means, rather then to be ſubordinate unto it. And indeed if the ſending of Chriſt into the World to merit, ſhould be firſt in intention, then ſhould it be laſt in execution; that is, All the elect ſhould firſt be ſaved, and then Chriſt ſhould be ſent into the world to merit their ſalvation. Therefore to mend the matter (for who is ſo ſilly as not to perceive, that if the conſideration of Chriſts obedience, as ſatisfactory, will not ſerve their turne, ſurely neither will the conſideration of his obedience as meritorious, ſtand them in a-

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ny ſtead) they put into this Conſequence another clauſe, without all art, and without all honeſty, pretending, that hereby we make ſalvation deſtinated to man, before it is decreed to man: as if we put any difference in this caſe between deſtination and decree, or as if we make ſalvation deſtinated to a man hereby, before it is deſtinated unto him; whereas we only make the end (that is ſalvation) intended before the merits of Chriſt (which are the means of ſalvation) are intended. And would any man that is in his right witts, ſay this is to make ſalvation deſtinated to a man before it is deſtinated to him? Farther, it is to be obſerved, that we may omit nothing, but take notice of the uttermoſt of their ſtrength, and the rather, becauſe it will notably diſcover either their ignorance, or which is moſt likely, (for as much as they doe not directly inſiſt, as they might upon a new argument farre more plauſible with the ignorant) their unconſcionableneſſe. For they ſignify that hereby it will come to paſſe, that the intention of ſalvation, being before the intention of ſending of Chriſt to merit ſalvation ſhall exiſt, being decreed as preſent to God, before Chriſt is conſidered as he that by his Croſſe hath deſerved it. Now had they ſaid *before Chriſt hath deſerved it*, I ſhould readily have granted it. For I hope none of thē would deny, that the ſalvation of many a Prophet and Patriarch, exiſted not only before God, but actually and really before Chriſt was crucified. To prevent this eluſion of their argument, they expreſſe it thus, *Before Chriſt was conſidered as he that hath deſerved it.* Yet here they fall foule upon an indecent expreſſion. For I will be bold to deny, that Chriſt was conſidered by God, as one that had deſerved mans ſalvation, before he had deſerved it. For before he had deſerved it by his Croſſe, to ſay, that God conſidered him as one that had deſerved it, is either to erre or to feigne, neither of which is incident unto God. God conſidered him from everlaſting, as one that in the fulneſſe of time ſhould deſerve it, by ſuffering upon the Croſſe, not as one that had deſerved it. For to conceive him after the former manner, is to conceive aright, but to conceive him after the latter manner, is to conceive amiſſe. But I will take the pains to mend this argument for them thus. If their ſalvation were decreed before Chriſts merits, then their ſalvation did exiſt as preſent with God before Chriſts merits did exiſt, as preſent with God. But this is not to be admitted: Now I come to diſcover their ignorance, which they betray in this. Firſt, neither Gods preſcience, nor Gods decree doth make things to exiſt, otherwiſe then in *Eſſe cognito* & *in eſſe velito*; but this is not to exiſt. Therefore they qualify it by the addition of the manner, *ut præſens Deo*; which indeed is *Terminus diminuens* in this caſe. For it is preſent to God by vertue of his decree intentionally only, and not really, which alone is to exiſt. But let this Peccadillio paſſe. Secondly, Who ſeeth not that this argument tends to the utter deſtruction of all diſtinct intentions of end, and means in God? For if there be any ſuch diſtinct intentions in God, the one muſt be acknowledged to be before the other. As for example, What was the end of creation? Lets goe no farther then the manifeſtation of Gods power and wiſdome as the end thereof. Now hence it will follow by the quaintneſſe of this argumentation, that the manifeſtation of Gods wiſdome and power in creating the world did exiſt, as preſent with God, before the creation. Is not here a proper argumentation. *Spectatum admiſſi riſum teneatis amici.*

Thirdly, to draw neerer to the diſcovery of their ignorance. I grant it ſhall firſt exiſt; but how? Not in duration; We acknowledge no ſuch priority in God, between the intention of the end, and the intention of the means; though ſuch a priority in this caſe is found in man. What then? Ile tell you: They commonly call it a priority of nature. But take heed you doe not apply it to any of the two kindes of priority of nature mentioned by *Ariſtotle*. For try if you pleaſe, and you ſhall find that none of them can poſſibly ſerve the turne; What then is this priority of nature ſo called? I anſwer, it is only *Prioritas rationis*: And ſo I formerly ſaid, that the intention of the end is *in ſigno rationis*, before the intention of the means. You may farther demand, Wherein doth this *Prioritas rationis* conſiſt? I anſwer out of *Durand*, it conſiſts in this, that, *Ratio unius petitur a ratione alterius*, and ſo indeed, *Ratio mediorum petitur a ratione finis*. This generally holds of the intention of end, and means, as well in God, as in the creature. For alwaies the nature of the end duely conſidered, doth beſpeak what ſhall be the condition of the means. So that this makes no priority of exiſtence at all, neither in duration nor in nature properly ſo called, but only ſuch a ſubordination between them, that the reaſon of the one, that is, the nature or condition of the one, depends upon the nature and condition of the other. Now let any

ſober man judge, Whether the ſalvation of man be required to the procuring of Chriſts merits, and not rather, Chriſts merits are required to the procuring of mans ſalvation; which yet is not true of ſalvation conſidered ſimply, but only as to be beſtowed after a certain manner, to wit, in the way of juſtice, and by way of ſatisfaction made for ſinne, that ſo a man may be ſaved by grace in deſpight of ſinne. In the cloſe of all they ſignify that this of theirs in the laſt place ſeriouſly conſidered will make it appeare, that this doctrine of their Adverſaries, tends notably to the diminution of Chriſts honour, and to the annihilation of Chriſts merits, to wit, unleſſe Chriſts merits be acknowledged the end of mans ſalvation, and not mans ſalvation the end of Chriſts merits, Chriſt ſhall be diſhonoured, and his merits annihilated. Here they are quite out of breath, and that which is wanting, they leave to be ſupplied by the ſerious (they ſhould ſay ignorant) conſideration of their Proſelites. They preſume this colour of diſhonour redounding hereby to Chriſt, will be ſufficient to blow up their Adverſaries, though it prove of no more force then a ſquibbe. This carriage of theirs calls to my remembrance, a mad prank plaid by the Engliſh at *Delfe*, while they were billeted there, which was told me merrily, by one of the number. One of the Souldiers was billeted in an old Widdowes houſe, and another being a Goldſmith, told him and another conſort of theirs, he had a deviſe to put mony in all their purſes, for he knew how to make a Rex-dolar of three-pence ſylver, and in that Widdowes houſe they would ply their buſineſſe very ſecurely. To work they went, and caſting plates of Tinne to the quantity of one of thoſe Dolars, and ſtamping them full and faire, this Gold-ſmith, with the quantity of three pence ſilver, ſylvered them over very fairely, and, leaſt they ſhould ſeem too light, hangs them up in the chimny in a bagge, that the ſmoak might bring them to the ſadder hew. Thus having met with a mine of Sylver in their lodging, one is imployed as a Merchant-man to goe to the Staple of Cloth, and he laies out their coyne in cloth, whereof afterwards they made good ſilver indeed: at length one of them paying a debt of his to a Dutchman in *Delfe*, in one of theſe Rex-dolars, he found the Dutch to betray ſome ſuſpicious geſtures and interpretations upon the coyne. That was a faire warning to an intelligent man of armes; and hereupon they get them packing ing away with all ſpeed; and home they come, and make themſelves merry with the relation. In like ſort theſe Remonſtrants ſhew a great deale of Tinne and traſh in theſe argumentations, and they have not ſo much as three pence ſilver to colour it therewithall to cheat the World, if they will be cheated. But they hope the colour of ſome diſhonour by their adverſaries doctrine redounding unto Chriſt, will be taken for a peece at leaſt of good ſilver. I confeſſe, I am ſomewhat the more merrily diſpoſed at this time, For being taken off from the midſt of a ſentence, by the courteous invitation of a Gentleman, to come unto him to his Inne: He was pleaſed to entertaine me with ſuch good diſcourſe, that it did not a little refreſh my ſpirits. His reaches were after new diſcoveries for the advancement of learning; and endoctrinated me more in one halfe hower, then ſeventeen years ſtudy in the Univerſity. For whereas I never learned there, more cauſes then foure, he was pleaſed to acquaint me with nine; which I took ſome pains to learn without book, and they were theſe, Matter, Forme, Workman, Will, Power, Time, Finding out, Accident, End. And moſt courteouſly offered himſelfe to enlarge on every one of them; but having left off at a broken ſentence, I was deſirous to return to my ſtudies Theologicall, and to let thoſe Philoſophicall progreſſes alone. But I proteſted unto him ſeriouſly, that he had informed me more in the number of cauſes in a ſhort ſpace, then *Oxford* had done in many years; he entreated I would conſider of them, and I promiſed I would, and conferre of them too, with all the Schollers I companied with; which he took in very goo part; and ſo I took my leave. And finding my ſpirit not a little elevated with this recreation, I reſolved, forbearing my uſuall time of ſupper, to follow theſe ſtudies cloſe that night, which truly fell out very happily. For one of thoſe cauſes being *found out*, otherwiſe called, Invention (as for Judgement, I doe not remember that it was admitted into the number) I made uſe of it very happily in finding out, or diſcovery of the foppery of theſe Remonſtranticall argumentations.

Now I proceed to the ſecond Queſtion, as more ſeaſonable to the preſent occaſion. And here firſt they begin with their former artifice, making infidelity on the part of reprobation, anſwerable to faith on the part of election, which is moſt untrue, as formerly I ſhewed: Only the not curing of infidelity by the grace of faith, is made by

us ſubordinate to reprobation; as the curing of naturall infidelity by the grace of faith, is made by us ſubordinate to election. But they goe on, as in ſhaping our Tenent at pleaſure, ſo in baſting it with their very liberall cenſures, as *abſurd and execrable*, in ſuch ſort, as *the bare commemoration of it*, they take to be ſufficient to repreſent the horrour of it, and to confute it, *and this they commit to the judgement of all the faithfull of Chriſt*. And indeed their beſt ſtrength lyeth in ſetting forth their Adverſaries doctrine in ſuch colours, as the Devill is painted with. And in this particular, they conceive good hope (no doubt) that propitious Readers will conceive hereby, that the infidelity of man is made by their Adverſaries the work of God, as well as Faith; Whereas it is well known, that there is ſo little need of working men to infidelity, that all being borne in ſinne, and corrupted and eſtranged from the life of God, through the fall of *Adam*, infidelity is as naturall and hereditary to a man, as any other corruption. And it is as well known and undeniable, that none can cure it but God, by faith; but this he cures in whom he will, by giving Faith to whom he will, and if he refuſe to cure it in any, that, and that alone is enough to make him a veſſell of wrath, that ſo Gods glory may be manifeſted upon him, in the way of juſtice vindicative. But come we to their Arguments.

1. The firſt is this. *If Infidelity followeth Reprobation unto deſtruction, then God cannot in juſtice deſtroy Reprobates for their infidelity. For there is no greater injuſtice, then to deſtroy a man for that, that followeth neceſſarily upon reprobation which is the work of God.* To this I anſwer.

1. According to mine ordering the decrees divine. Secondly, according to the Contra-Remonſtrants Tenent in ordering them.

1. According to my ordering of the decrees divine; In no moment of nature or reaſon is the decree of damnation precedent to the decree of permitting infidelity, or leaving the infidelity of ſome men uncured, to wit, by denying them faith, by denying the grace of regeneration. But the decrees of creating all in *Adam*, of permitting all to fall in *Adam*, in bringing all men forth into the World in the ſtate of Originall ſinne, of leaving this originall ſinne uncured in them, and laſt of all, of damning them for their ſinnes; are decrees not ſubordinate, but coördinate, as decrees *de Mediis*, tending joyntly to one ſupream end, which is the manifeſtation of Gods glory upon them in the way of juſtice vindicative; as alſo to ſhew the riches of his glory upon the veſſels of mercy, whom he hath prepared unto glory, to wit, by beholding in others that miſerable condition, which through Gods meer grace and goodneſſe they have eſcaped. Rom. 9. 22.

2. According to the Contra-Remonſtrants Tenent, I anſwer,

1. Many of them doe not maintaine that infidelity is conſequent to the decree of damnation, but in the foreſight of God, precedent rather: as appears by the Brittiſh Divines their *Theſes De Reprobatione*; and *Alvarez* profeſſeth the ſame. The denyall of grace, and ſo the permitting of naturall infidelity to remain uncured, they make conſequent (as it ſeems) to a negative decree of denying glory. And to the decree of permitting infidelity, they make the foreſight of infidelity ſubſequent; and this foreſight of infidelity they make precedent to reprobation, as it ſignifies the decree of damnation. And thus farre I agree with them, That in no moment of nature, or ſigne of reaſon did God ordain any man to damnation, but for ſinne; and conſequently in no moment of nature, or ſigne of reaſon, did the decree of damnation goe before the foreſight of ſinne or infidelity.

2. But ſuppoſe, as theſe Remonſtrants collect and pick out their meaning, They make the decree of reprobation, in all poynts proportionable to the decree of ſalvation, that like as the decree of giving faith, they conceive to be ſubordinate to the decree of ſalvation; ſo the decree of permitting infidelity, or denying faith (for herein conſiſts the juſt proportion, and not as they feigne it, between faith on the one ſide, and infidelity on the other) is with them made ſubordinate to the decree of damnation. Then I anſwer,

1. Their Conſequence ſhould be this, *If the permiſſion of Infidelity followeth the decree of damnation, then God cannot in juſtice damne them for Infidelity.* Now here is no colour of good Conſequence.

2. If they reply, That in caſe infidelity followeth neceſſarily upon Gods permiting of it, the Conſequence is as good as in caſe infidelity followed upon reprobation. For even hereby it appears, that infidelity followeth upon reprobation though not immediatly

immediately, but by the mediation of the divine permiſſion thereof; but whether it followeth mediately or immediately all is one, as touching the force of the Conſequence.

Reſp. Now to this I Reply, Granting that all is one, as touching the force of the Conſequence: but then conſider.

1. All the force of the argument depends not upon the conſequution of infidelity, ſimply unto the decree of damnation, but only upon the neceſſary conſequution thereof. And yet no mention at all was made hereof, in the Conſequence of the Major, but it is brought afterwards over and above moſt illogically.

2. In this caſe all the force of the Conſequence depends upon the neceſſary conſequution of ſinne in generall, or infidelity in ſpeciall, upon Gods permitting of it.

So that whether Gods decree to permit the ſinne of infidelity, be antecedent or conſequent to the decree of damnation all is one. Yet theſe Remonſtrants make the force of their argument, to conſiſt only in the ſubordinating of the decree divine, as touching the permiſſion of infidelity to the decree of damnation, which yet appears by this to be of no force.

3. But if they hereupon take a new courſe of argumentation, and diſpute thus; *If Infidelity followeth neceſſarily upon Gods permitting of it, then God cannot in juſtice damne a man for Infidelity*; pretending no injuſtice to be greater, then to damne a man for that which followeth neceſſarily upon permiſſion, which is Gods work.

Reſp. I anſwer.

1. That thus their former argumentation is caſhierd as unprofitable.

2. We deny this Conſequence; and call in no meaner name then Arminius himſelfe to beare us out in this our deniall. Who expreſſely profeſſeth, That in caſe God permits a man, *Velle peccatum, neceſſe eſt ut nullo argumentorum genere perſuadeatur ad nolendum. Exam. pag.* 153. I could adde *Vorſtius* alſo, herein concurring with *Piſcator*, *Perkins*, and *Navarrettus* the Dominican is as expreſſely in this as any other; as alſo in ſubordinating it to the decree of reprobation. Arminius likewiſe profeſſeth faith and repentance, *Niſi Deo dante haberi non poſſe. Exam.* 57. and that both of them are denied to the reprobates by the decree of reprobation. See his own words, *At Deus ſtatuit decreto reprobationis reprobis fidem & pœnitentiam non dare. Concedo lubens, illam aſſumptionem, ſed rectè intellectam*: He laboureth to charme this inconvenient grant of his, but no charme will ſerve to keep this adder, from ſtinging and wounding their doctrine of reprobation unto death. He ſaith, Faith is given by way of ſuaſion. We ſay, that matters nothing; for ſo it be given by God whereſoever it be found, and ſo it be denied to reprobates by the decree of reprobation, we deſire no more. We our ſelves acknowledge, that faith is not given to the elect, but by way of ſwaſion, the Word working faith, running in this manner; Repent and believe the Goſpel; and whoſoever believeth ſhall be ſaved. For God hath ſet forth his Sonne to be a Propitiation for our ſinnes, through faith in his bloud.

3. At length he proceeds in his charming courſe, but moſt unſucceſſefully, as whereby his former ſaying is nothing charmed. His care rather ſeems to be to eat his own words, as Satan devoured his own children. For diſtinguiſhing ſuaſion into that which is ſufficient, and that which is effectuall: this effectuall ſuaſion, he confeſſeth to be adminiſtred by the decree of election; but as for that ſufficient ſuaſion, though withall he accounts it allwaies ineffectuall, yet he ſaith it is adminiſtred by the decree of providence, not by the decree of reprobation. At length he confeſſeth, that by the decree of reprobation is denied grace effectuall, that is ſuch a grace as whereupon he foreſaw they would believe. Now herein I appeale to the judgement of every ſober man. Take we two men into conſideration, the one elect as *Paul*, the other reprobate as *Eſau*. Of two ſufficient graces, the Lord foreſeeth which of them will prove effectuall with *Paul*, and which ineffectuall; and he makes choice to give him ſuch a grace, as he foreſeeth will prove effectuall. Again he foreſeeth of two ſufficient graces, which of them will prove effectuall with *Eſau* and which ineffectuall, and makes choice to afford him only that which he knowes will prove ineffectuall. Now what can be the reaſon hereof, but becauſe he purpoſeth to ſhew his mercy in the ſalvation of the one, and his juſtice in the damnation of another. Before Arminius came to this reſolution, as expreſſely to profeſſe, That by the decree of reprobation is denyed grace effectuall, he found himſelfe in a ſtreit upon his diſtinction of grace

ſufficient

ſufficient and effectuall, and the deſcription of each; he drew his breath very ſhort; and therefore to get, as it were, more liberty of ayre, he concluded that diſcourſe with, *Hæc ex Auguſtini ſententiâ dicuntur.* pag. 58. and in the next page. *Hiſce autem ita explicatis ex mente Auguſtini & fortè Scripturæ ſenſu.* But, What, a miſchiefe, doth this great Doctor mean to tell us? Firſt, that he willingly grants that, *Deus ſtatuit decreto reprobationis reprobis fidem & pœnitentiam non dare* (provided it be well underſtood) and after all this explication, tells us, that all this explication of his is delivered *ex ſententiâ & mente Auguſtini*, and but perchance, *ex Scripturæ ſenſu*, concealing all the while what is his own Opinion. Is this to give us the right underſtanding of that Aſſertion (*Deus ſtatuit decreto reprobationis reprobis fidem & pœnitentiam non dare*) moſt prejudiciall to his own Tenent at firſt ſight, and much more by the diſtinction following of *Gratia ſufficiens & efficax*; which he ſo well perceived, that he is content to clap it upon *Auſtins* back to beare the burthen of it; and puts it but upon adventure, that it may prove to be the Scripture meaning. And in like ſort, when, pag. 98. having propoſed two things to be neceſſarily unfolded by him. *Primò, de Gratiâ ſufficiente & efficaci. Secundò, de utriuſq; diſpenſatione, diſpenſationiſq; Cauſis*: He leaves off there, giving it over in plain ground. What doth this argue? but that he manifeſtly perceived, he was not able in any tollerable manner, to ſhape this diſtinction in congruity to his own Tenent. Let this Author well conſider this, that talkes ſo much of our Divines unwillingneſſe to come to tryall in the poynt of reprobation; When Arminius durſt not adventure upon the explicating of his own opinion, touching the diſtinction of grace ſufficient and effectuall, and in giving us the definition of each. The like to have been the courſe of other Arminians, I have known, declining the point of effectuall grace, as a precipice and breakneck unto them: And when others have been put upon it, they have placed it in the grace ſubſequent, and have not been aſhamed to make it conſiſt in this, that God by effectuall grace, doth work in man, τὸ *Velle credere, modo velit*, and why not as well, that he workes in man, τὸ *Credere, modo Credat*, τὸ *Reſipiſcere modo Reſipiſcat*. This that I ſpeake, I can ſhew under the hand of one of them, a great ſtickler for the Arminian Cauſe; great I ſay in reſpect of affection, not of judgement. And I have cauſe to conceive, that both this Authors Diſcourſe, and that others I have had to deale withall, is but as a ſmoake, that for a great part, if not for the moſt of it, comes out of the ſame Chimney.

4. Let the argument ſtand as it doth, let infidelity by Gods permiſſion follow upon the decree of damnation, and that neceſſarily. Yet conſider.

1. Gods permitting of it, is no other then the leaving of it uncured: not that hereby infidelity followeth, which was not before; but being in all before, as the fruit of that naturall corruption wherein all were borne, as all confeſſe, as many as concurre againſt the Pelagians, in acknowledging Originall ſinne. By Gods permiſſion of it, it continueth to be uncured; What actuall ſinne is there in the World, or habituall ſinne ariſing thereupon, which God cannot cure if it pleaſe him? If then he will not cure it in ſome, ſhall it not be lawfull for him to puniſh it, where he findes the continuance of it unto the end, without breaking off by repentance?

2. Suppoſe all men had power to doe any good thing; if God will not give them *Velle quod poſſunt* (as *Auſtin* ſaith he dealt with *Adam* in his innocency, and gave the Angels that ſtood, *amplius Adjutorium*, then he gave the others; whereby it came to paſſe, that they ſtood in obedience when the other fell) what ſhall wee ſay in this caſe, is it poſſible that they ſhould *Velle bonum*, if God will not work it in them, of whom the Apoſtle profeſſeth, that he works in us both the Will and the Deed? Or ſhall wee hereupon ſay, they doe not ſinne freely? What ſhift have they to avoyd this, but either by contradicting the Apoſtle, and ſaying God doth not work in us τὸ *Velle*, or by ſaying that God doth work in us τὸ *Velle, modò Velimus*, as plain a contradiction as ever proceeded from the mouth of any, The ſelfe ſame act, being made before and after it ſelf; for the condition is allwaies before the thing conditioned. And is this to work in us the Will according to Gods pleaſure, or according to mans good pleaſure? What is it to ſay, that grace is given according unto works, if this be not?

3. We deny, that any evill act therefore comes not to paſſe freely, becauſe it comes to paſſe neceſſarily, upon ſuppoſition of Gods denyall of grace, to refraine from it. For like as good works, are not therefore not wrought

freely by us, becauſe God by his grace workes us to the performance of them; (For who dares deny that it is in Gods power to make us work this or that freely) in like ſort, and much more, evill works are not done the leſſe freely, becauſe God denies ſpeciall and effectuall grace to abſtain from them. For, want of grace doth not take away willingneſſe unto that which is evill, but leaves too much rather in man of that kind. As *Auſtin* ſaith, that *Libertas ſine gratiâ non eſt libertas ſed contumacia.* Now where there is contumacy, there is rather too much will then too little. For Contumacy is Wilfulneſſe.

4. The Schooles teach, that liberty of will conſiſts only, *in electione mediorum*, in the election of means to certain ends. Now when the Goſpel is preached to a carnall man, whoſe ends are only carnall, as the Apoſtle ſaith, Philip. 3. 20. *They mind earthly things*; ſo farre forth as he ſhall find it ſerviceable to his carnall ends, he may believe it and make profeſſion of it, as many times Hypocrites doe, and ſometimes in ſuch ſort, as it is hard to diſtinguiſh, between a true and an Hypocriticall profeſſour. This moved the Apoſtle to exhort the Corinthians, famous for their faith, to examine themſelves, and prove themſelves, Whether they were in the faith, that is, *in faith unfaigned.* For there is not only a groſſe Hypocriſy, whereunto a mans own heart is privy, but a ſecret Hypocriſy whereof the man himſelfe is nothing conſcious; yet ſuch a faith undoubtedly is performable by a naturall man. Now when a man rejects the Goſpell, the faith and profeſſion whereof he finds nothing ſerviceable to his carnall ends, doth he not judiciouſly and deliberately, yea and wiſely too (according to the wiſdome of fleſh and bloud) reject it?

5. *Auſtin* profeſſeth *Lib.* 1. *De Gen. contr. Manich. cap.* 3. *That all men may believe if they will*, and juſtifies it in his Retractations. But if the will of man be corrupt, and averſe from believing, We juſtly ſay, ſuch a man cannot believe; as our Saviour ſaith, *How can you believe that receive honour one of another, and ſeeke not the honour that cometh of God alone.* Joh. 5. 44. yet this is an impotency Morall only, which is to be diſtinguiſhed from impotency Naturall. For notwithſtanding this, it may be truely ſaid, that, All men may believe if they will, and herein conſiſts the naturall liberty of the will. The Morall liberty conſiſts, rather in a ſanctified inclination unto that which is good, whereby it is freed from the power of ſinne and Sathan; then in a power to doe good if they will, and not otherwiſe. But I never find that Arminians doe diſtinguiſh theſe.

6. It is not ſufficient for Arminians to conclude, that ſuch a thing upon ſuppoſition comes to paſſe neceſſarily, therefore it comes not to paſſe freely.

1. For upon ſuppoſition that God decreed to create the World, the creation of the World came to paſſe neceſſarily; yet ſimply the World was made by God freely.

2. In like ſort, upon Gods foreknowledge that ſuch a man will not believe it followeth neceſſarily, that ſuch a one will not believe; and ſo the like may be ſaid of the moſt free act that is performed. But will it follow herehence, that it is not done freely?

3. In like ſort upon the denyall of an effectuall impediment of ſinne, unto a man it followeth neceſſarily, that ſuch a man will ſinne, according to Arminius his doctrine, and this holds applied to any particular ſinne whatſoever. But will it herehence follow according to Arminius, that ſuch a ſinne is not committed freely? nonothing leſſe.

2. The Remonſtrants ſecond argument is this.

What God cannot performe that God cannot will. But God cannot damne a man for infidelity flowing from ſuch a decree of Reprobation.

Reſp. 1. But who ſaith that infidelity floweth from the decree of reprobation? Not one that I know, but *Piſcator* upon theſe words, Yee therefore heare not my words, becauſe yee are not of God. But underſtand him aright, it is as if he ſhould ſay, Therefore ſuch a man goeth lame, becauſe the Phyſitian will not cure him: yet it is well known the cauſe of his lameneſſe is from within, and perhaps procured by ſome diſtemper of his own: yet in caſe a Surgeon could cure him and will not, he may be ſaid to be the cauſe of lameneſſe; but how? *per modum non removentis.* This is well known by the learned to be a kind of cauſe whereof notice is taken in Naturall Philoſophy. And in this ſenſe and no other,

John 8. 47.

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it is well known that *Piscator* makes God the cause of infidelity, and that according to the expresse Word of God. But in my judgement *Piscator* mistakes the phrase, *To be of God*, which he conceives to denote election. I rather take it to denote regeneration, as much as to say, *yee therefore heare not my words*, because God hath not hitherto by regeneration cured that naturall infidelity which is in you.

2. But take the argument according to the former expression, God cannot damne a man for that infidelity which is consequent to reprobation; And then my Answer to the former argument in every particular thereof, may be accommodated unto this.

3. The Third followeth. *If Infidelity flowes from reprobation, then God can neither require Faith of reprobates, nor seriously offer salvation unto them, but necessarily counterfeit. For it is manifest Hypocrisy, to invite those unto faith and salvation, who are excluded from both by the decree of God.*

Resp. 1. Here again Infidelity is made to flow from reprobation; whereas nothing flowes from reprobation by the doctrine of the Contra-Remonstranes, but the not curing of mans naturall infidelity, like as the curing of it by faith, is that which flows from election.

2. I say, There is no simulation at all of God in this. For that wich he proposeth is but this, that, *Whosoever believeth shall be saved, and Whosoever believeth not shall be damned.* He sends his Ministers to Preach this, and to Beseech them to believe, and to be reconciled unto God, yea, all they meet with. But for whose sake? Not for the reprobates sake, but for the elects sake, Who because they are mixed among reprobates, and God hath not revealed to his Ministers, Who are elect and who are not (as neither was it fit he should, many of the Ministers themselves, even of those that not only prophecyed in his name, but cast out Devills, being reprobates) therefore it was fit their Commission should be generall to Preach to all. Yea, did not the Apostles themselves take notice of this? Doth not *Paul* professe that, He became all things to all that he may save some? And who were those some, but the very elect of God, as the same Apostle elsewhere professeth, saying, *I suffer all things for the elects sake.* And doth not *Austin* professe that if we knew who were reprobate, we would no more pray for them, then for the Devills? De Civit. Dei lib. 21. cap. 24. 2 Corinth. 6. 2 Tim. 2. 10.

4. The Fourth and last. *If Incredulity followes the decree of reprobation, then God considered the reprobates in his counsell of reprobation, either as creatable, or as created in the state of innocency, or as falne into Originall sinne. Sed falsa sunt hæc omnia. All these things are false. And these things, he saith, are delivered, contra absurdam, detestabilem, atq; abominabilem sententiam.*

Resp. Here is froth enough of words, but a very hungry discourse for substance of argumentation throughout.

1. Yet as I said, All this nothing toucheth them, Who albeit they maintaine that God of his meer pleasure, hath mercy on some, giving them faith and repentance (considering all in the corrupt Masse) and of his meer pleasure hardens others (no worse in nature then the former) by denying them faith and repentance, yet as reprobation signifies the decree of damnation, doe permit thereunto the foresight of finall perseverance in sinne.

2. According to my Ordering of Gods decrees, Who conceive mankind not yet created to be the object of all Gods decrees, they being eternall, and but one act in God, and that act his very Essence, and all other things being temporall. I doe not maintain that the decree of damnation, is in any moment of nature or reason, before the consideration of mans finall impenitency. As neither doe I conceive it to be after this, but both simultaneous; for as much as the decree of permitting all to fall in *Adam*, together with the decree of finall leaving some therein, and the decree of damning them for sinne, I take not to be subordinate, but coordinate and simultaneous.

3. Whether we take the First-way for shaping the object of predestination, or the Second, or the Third, I Answer.

1. The difference hereabout is in my judgement meerly Logicall, nothing Theologicall; the resolution whereof according to generall rules, is easily made by light of nature, if once it be agreed upon in Divinity, What is Gods end both on the part of election, and on the part of reprobation, and what are the means that tend unto those ends.

2. Which way ſoever we take of the Three, I never found any reaſon given by Arminians of any force to take us from it, as I have juſtified in my *Vindiciæ*, as touching the Firſt-way; And in my Examination of the Conference between Arminius and Junius, as touching the Second-way; And in my Anſwer to *Corvinus* againſt *Tilenus*, as touching the Third-way, and therein, I truſt, routed and profligated the 20 Reaſons of Arminius, propoſed againſt the Firſt and Laſt-way, but chiefly againſt the Firſt, in the Declaration of his Opinion before the States.

Now I returne to the Author of this diſcourſe, and to the remainder of his ſecond Motive, from whence I have digreſſed.

I was here paſſing over unto the third inſtance, to wit, of the proceedings in the Synod of Dort; but upon my looking into the Hiſtory thereof, to prepare my ſelfe for an anſwer thereunto, ere I was a ware, I lighted upon the reaſons of that the Contra-Remonſtrants motion to be ſpared, preferred unto the State. And they utterly deny what is here caſt upon them, namely, that they deprecated at all, that they might be ſpared from conferring upon the poynt of reprobation. But whereas the Remonſtrants had incumbred the point of election and reprobation with ſeaven Queſtions, which pertained not to the ſtate of the Controverſy concerning the firſt Article, and being alſo imperfect and intricate for the moſt part, and propoſed to this end, to draw their Adverſaries away from the true ſtate of the Queſtion; They deſired to be ſpared from anſwering unto them. And upon this Petition of theirs it pleaſed the States, that leaving thoſe thorny queſtions, they ſhould come to the handling of the Articles. This is ſet down in the Preface to thoſe *Acta Synodalia*, ſet forth by the Authority of the States. Fol. 10. pag. 1. For after the propoſing of theſe two queſtions to the Remonſtrants, as touching the decree of Predeſtination. 1. Whether the intire decree of Predeſtination were contained in this Article, namely, That God did from everlaſting decree to ſave believers, which no man denies. 2. Whether they thought faith & perſeverance therein, did precede election, as the Cauſes or Conditions thereof. After the Remonſtrants had anſwered affirmatively unto them both; hereupon they bring in their ſeaven, for the moſt part, intricate queſtions. *Reponebant deinde ſeptem alias tum de electione tum de reprobatione, queſtiones, ad quas a Paſtoribus à Claſſibus deputatis reſponderi volebant. Quæ cum ad controverſiæ de primo articulo ſtatum non ſpectarent, etiam mutilæ atq; intricatæ pleræq; eſſent, eumq; in finem ab illis proponerentur, ut hoc modo a præcipuo controverſiæ ſtatu rectaq; agendi ratione, in ambages adducerent. Paſtores expoſitâ per Libellum ſupplicem Illuſt. Ordd. iniquâ hâc agendi ratione, non quidem deprecati ſunt, ne de reprobatione ſententiam ſuam manifeſtarent (uti Remonſtrantes improbè ſæpius ipſis objectarunt) ſed diſertè ſententiam ſuam quantum ad Eccleſiarum pacem atq; ædificationem ſufficere exiſtimarent, non tantum vivâ voce ſed & ſcripto declararunt. Se nimirum cum æternum electionis ſingularium perſonarum decretum ponunt, ſimul quoq; ponere æternum de reprobatione & rejectione quarundam ſingularium perſonarum decretum, quum fieri nequeat ut ſit electio, quin ſimul quòq; ſit aliqua reprobatio aut derelictio. Difficiles omnes circa hunc articulum quæſtiones temere excutere, nihil aliud eſſe quam inutilibus diſputationibus & nihil profuturis litibus, Eccleſiam replere, ejusq; pacem perturbare. Declarationem ſuam hanc Libello ſupplice expreſſam, moderatis omnibus, pacem q; amantibus ingeniis, ſufficere debere: Credi videlicet ac doceri ab ipſis, Deum neminem condemnare, imò verò ne ſtatuiſſe quidem condemnare quenquam niſi juſtè propter propria ipſius peccata: Placuit itaq; Illuſt. Ordd. ut miſſis illis ſpinoſis quæſtionibus, ad articulorum pertractationem deveniretur.* And Pag. 136. & 156. I find this objection propoſed by the Remonſtrants in theſe words. *Pag. 156. In Collatione Haghienſi Libello ſupplice Illuſt. Hollandiæ & Weſtfriziæ Ordinibus exhibito, deprecati ſunt Contra-Remonſtrantes ne de reprobatione ageretur:* & more at large *Pag.* 195. Thus, *Ipſi Contra-Remonſtrantes cum in Colloquio Haghienſi juſſi eſſent, ad interrogata quædam noſtra de reprobatione reſpondere Magiſtratui morem gerere gravati fuerint, uſq; adeò ut Collationem cæptam abrumpere ſe malle profiterentur quàm ut ſummarum Poteſtatum imperio ſe conſtringi paterentur, nihil aliud conſcientiæ ſuæ prætexentes quam quod Eccleſiæ ædificationi obfuturam eam agendi rationem judicarent.* Now to this Pag. 157. *Feſtus Hominus*, one preſent in that Conference, ſtands up and anſwers, *Expoſuitq; paucis quàm non bonâ fide hæc de illis dicerentur. Se Libello ſupplice non fuiſſe deprecatos, ne de reprobatione ageretur: cæterùm quia Remonſtrantes ſubdolè in ipſo Collationis initio, ſeptem queſtionibus ſpinoſis ac minime neceſſariis non tantum ad reprobationis, ſed electionis quoque doctrinam ſpectantibus, à recto agendi ordine Contra-Remonſtrantes in ambages adducere conarentur. Contra-Remonſtrantes Libello ſupplice apud Illuſt. Ordd. de tam iniquâ agendi ratione conqueſtos fuiſſe atq; ut Remonſtrantibus mandaretur, ne extra juſtam agendi rationem jam inchoatam evagarentur petiiſſe. De reprobatione autem Contra-Remonſtrantes*

monſtrantes quantum ad ædificationem ſatis erat, ſententiam ſuam clarè ibidem explicaſſe uti ſcriptorum editorum fide probari poteſt. Idem etiam Reverendus & Doctiſſimus vir, D. Joannes Becius qui & ipſe huic interfuerat Collationi, ſuo præſens comprobabat teſtimonio.

Now I come to the Synod of Dort.

4. This Author ſaith the Remonſtronts were there warned by the Preſident of the Synod, *Ut de electione potius quàm de odioſâ reprobationis materiâ tagerent.* And truly at firſt I wondered not a little, that the Preſident of that Synod ſhould account, *the matter of reprobation* (which is as much as to ſay, the doctrine of reprobation) *an odious matter, an odious doctrine.* For we commonly ſignify hereby, ſuch a doctrine as deſerves to be hated; but I thought withall, that they might expreſſe rather, what is the condition of it in the event, namely, that it is entertained with hatred, not of all neither, nor of any of thoſe, that ſubmit their judgements to the word of God; but rather of thoſe, and of thoſe only, who follow the judgement of fleſh and bloud. Yet I thought good to enquire into the truth of the fact here mentioned; and I find it in the page mentioned, and how the Remonſtrants themſelves doe expreſſe this, even as here it is expreſſed, thus, *A Reverendo Præſide moniti ſumus ut à negativis enunciationibus abſtineremus & de electione potius quàm odioſâ reprobationis materiâ ageremus.* Yet I confeſſe this did not ſatisfy me; For why ſhould this Author make choyce to expreſſe it in the Remonſtrants termes, rather then in the words of the Preſident himſelfe. Therefore I turne to the beginning of that Seſſion, being Seſſ. 32. There I find this particular, *Submonuit & Præſes ut potius quæſtionibus illis inhærerent, quæ circa ſuavem de electione doctrinam verſarentur, quàm ut de odioſè doctrinam de reprobatione exagitarent.* Now I find a great deale of difference between profeſſing the matter of reprobation, or the doctrine hereof to be odious, and admoniſhing to ſpare the exagitation thereof after an odious manner. This indeed being their uſuall courſe, to make it as odious as they can, like as Arminius, *Doctrinam de prædeſtinatione odioſam reddere conabatur*, as it is profeſſed in the Preface to thoſe Act. Synod. fol. 7. pag. 2. and fol. 8. pag. 2. They profeſſe in like manner of the Remonſtrants, namely, that in their Remonſtrance they endeavoured, *Illuſt. Ordd. odioſam reddere doctrinam Eccleſiarum Reformatarum*, and that not only, *de divinâ predeſtinatione*, but alſo *de Gratiâ Dei & Sanctorum Perſeverantiâ*, but all this *malâ fide, nec ſine apertis, atrocibuſq; calumniis.* Moreover I find, Seſſ. 39. pag. 151. this decree of the Synode gratifying the Remonſtrants, and yeelding to their motion made, which was, that they might have liberty to treat as well of reprobation as of election, thus, *Quoniam Remonſtrantes aliquoties profeſſi ſunt, ſe per conſcientiam in Synodo ſubſiſtere ulterius non poſſe, niſi prius caveatur ipſis fore, ut de electione & reprobatione, eâ ratione quam in Theſibus & Scriptis ſuis hactenus exhibitis propoſuerunt, in poſterùm agatur. Synodus quò magis ipſis fiat ſatis, publice ac coràm omnibus declarat, ſtatuiſſe ſeſe ac ſtatuere ſententiam ipſorum, non de electione modò, verum etiam de reprobatione expendere atq; examinare. Quantum nempe in conſcientiâ ad Dei gloriam, ædificationem & tranquillitatem Eccleſiæ, omniumq; conſcientiarum poſſe ac debere ſatis eſſe, ipſa judicaret. Ad agendi verò modum, qui hic eſt ſervandus & ordinem quod attinet, ſuum eſſe de eo diſpicere, non autem fratrum Remonſtrantium qui huc ſunt citati, quicquam præſcribere, exiſtimat.* This decree being read to the Remonſtrants, they refuſed to give way unto it. The 40 Seſſion contains the altercation thereabout, between the Synod and them. They forſooth would preſcribe to the Synod *de modo Agendi*, the Synod muſt not preſcribe to them. And they profeſſe againſt it Seſſ. 41. pag. 155. in this manner, *Nec ſatisfit nobis ſi dicatur Synodum permiſſuram, ut noſtram de reprobatione ſententiam tractemus quoad illa ipſa ad gloriam Dei, ædificationem Eccleſiarum, conſcientiarum tranquillitatem fore judicabit. Nam hâc ipſâ reſtrictione, nobis præciditur libertas & plenaria ſententiæ noſtræ defenſio, & contrariæ Impugnatio. Præterquam quòd non levis ſuſpicandi nobis data ſit occaſio, Synodum, ubi nos de electione diſſerentes audiverit, nequaquam permiſſuram ut Contra-Remonſtrantium & eorum quos illi pro Orthodoxis habent, de reprobatione ſententiam prout neceſſarium judicabimus, ad incudem revocari.* Hereupon the Synod entreats the judgement of Forraine Divines; and they all with one conſent profeſſe, *Tantam Remonſtrantibus libertatem ad defenſionem cauſæ ſuæ conceſſam eſſe, quantâ ex ratione & dignitate Synodi Citatis concedi poſſet. Ac proinde nullam eſſe cauſam cur Synodicum decretum mutandum videretur, aut cur Remonſtrantes querelam inſtituerent, vel authoritatem hujus Synodi ſubterfugerent. Nihil illis eſſe imperatum quod ullo modo conſcientias ipſorum gravare poſſet. Ac proinde conſcientiæ velum fruſtra pervicaciæ obtendi. Abundè iis omnibusq; modis ſatisfactum jam eſſe. Abſolutam illam, nulliſq; circumſcriptam limitibus libertatem quam petunt, à Synodo concedi ipſis non poſſe. Æquum eſſe ut certis ſeſe legibus ſubmittant, quibus, ſi exorbitent, coërceantur.* Nay in the next Seſſion, which is Seſſ. 42. there is a repreſenta-

tion made of their unreaſonable demand in theſe words. *Profeſſi ſunt ſibi agendi modum a Synodo præſcriptum, iniquum videri. Sibi permitti velle non tantum primo loco, ſed & circa omnes articulos & Theſes, ſingulaq; argumenta de ſententiâ Contra-Remonſtrantium, & eorum quos illi pro Orthodoxis habent, quoad reprobationem agere, quia in hoc argumento calceus illos maximè urgeat.* Hereupon the Opinions of the forraigne Divines were required, to wit, Whether it were fit to yeeld unto them, as to treat of Reprobation, before they treated of Election, *Qui conſentientibus declarabant ſuffragiis, ab omni ratione & methodo eſſe alienum id quod Remonſtrantes peterent, ut prius de reprobatione quàm de electione agere ſibi liceret.* Their judgements hereupon are here repreſented ſeverally and at large; Firſt of our Britiſh Divines, then of the Palatine Divines, then of the Divines of the Land of Heſſe, then of the Helvetians, then of thoſe who were of the correſpondency of Weteraw, then of thoſe of Geneva, then of thoſe of Breme, and laſtly of thoſe of Emden.

5. Upon the former bald and baſe pretences, as if, *Concluſum eſſet contrà Manichæos*, the Author proceeds crowing *magnificentiſſimè*, and demanding in this manner.

> Can this doctrine be a truth, and yet bluſh at the light which makes all things manifeſt, eſpecially conſidering theſe things?
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> 1. *That Reprobation is a principall Head of practicall Divinity by the well, or ill ſtating, or ordering of which, the glory of God, and good of Religion, is much promoted or hindered.*
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> 2. *That there is ſuch a neceſſary connexion between the points of election and reprobation (both being parts of predeſtination) that the one cannot be well handled without the other.*
>
> 3. *That Reprobation was the chiefe cauſe of all the uproares in the Churches of that time.*
>
> 4. *That it was accuſed with open mouth and challenged of falſhood, and therefore bound in juſtice to purge it ſelfe of the crimination.*
>
> 5. *That it may eaſily be defended, if (as ſome ſay) it be ſuch an apparent truth. For, Nihil eſt ad defendendum puritate facilius,* ſaith S^t *Hierome.*

Now albeit for the diſcovery of the vile vanity of this concluſion, I need take no other pains, then to appeal to your, or any ſober mans due conſideration of the premiſes duely examined according to my former anſwer; yet I think good not to paſſe it over without ſuch particular conſideration as it deſerves. Firſt, I pray conſider, what is that light that makes all things manifeſt? Is it the light of Conference? In the Conference of *Mompelgard* there were diverſe other things diſputed of, beſides this of predeſtination. Now is the truth manifeſted hereby in all thoſe particulars? If it be, I pray, let him ſignify on whoſe ſide, whether on the part of *Jacobus Andreas*, or on the part of *Beza*? To whom is it made manifeſt? To either ſide, or only to that ſide, on whoſe ſide this Author conceives the truth to ſtand? Doe you not manifeſtly perceive the crudity of this conceit? Nay, who ſeeth not, that it is not the condition of conference, but the quality rather and ability of the conferrers, that is apt to manifeſt the truth. And ſuch men are able to manifeſt, as well out of conference in their diſcourſes, either Poſitive, or Controverſiall, as in conference; yea, and farre better; Thoſe diſcourſes being more quietly carried, and more free from altercation, then conferences; eſpecially in caſe they meet with malignant oppoſites. And indeed it is the Word of God alone, which is that ſpirituall light, which giveth manifeſtation to all ſpirituall truth. And conſequently neither are they to be cenſured as bluſhing at the light, that prefer to write quietly of theſe controverſies, then to conferre about them in ſome caſes; or that preferre conference by the penne as *Beza* did, before conference by word of mouth, though this better pleaſed the lipps of *Jacobus Andreas*. Yet neither *Beza* did refuſe to yeeld to *Andreas* his own way, neither did either the Contra-Remonſtrants at the Haghe Conference, or the Divines of Dort, refuſe to treat of reprobation, as well as election, as formerly I have ſhewed by authenticall evidences. But ſuppoſe *Beza* and his fellowes, whether two or three had altogether declined to conferre at all, as in my judgement they had good reaſon to refuſe, muſt this be cenſured their bluſhing at the light? *Auſtin* profeſſeth as I have formerly vouched him, that there may be many cauſes of forbearing to deliver the truth at ſome times. He little dreamed of expoſing the truth thereby to ſuch a cenſure, as if it bluſhed at the light. And if ſome few might be juſtly cenſured as bluſhing at the light, muſt all for their ſakes, by the rules of juſtice, be made obnoxious to the ſame cenſure, and not the Doctors only, but the Doctrine it ſelfe? Is it not apparent that a true and ſound doctrine, may be weakly apprehended by many, though learned, and *Veritas eſt temporis filia*, and the accurate handling and maintaining of the truth

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in plainer points then this of reprobation, comes not to perfection, but by degrees, and after much ventilating of it in a ruder manner. Thus I think I have crackt the crowne of this concluſion; I may proceed with the greater facility to the reſt.

1. That Reprobation is an Head to any part of practicall Divinity, I never read, nor heard till now. But yet in every theoreticall poynt, as touching the nature of God and his attributes, by the true doctrine thereof, the glory of God, and good of Religion is promoted,& by the erronious doctrine thereabouts it is as much impaired. For like as it is blaſphemy, to attribute that unto God, which doth not become him; ſo is it blaſphemy alſo, to deny unto him that which doth become him. As for the entertaining or refuting conference thereabouts, I have already ſpoken ſufficiently; yet two particulars more I have to deliver, which I purpoſe to ſubjoyne to the end of thoſe five conſiderations here diſtinguiſhed, as remarkable ones, if my memory failes me not.

2. A Connexion I grant there is, between election and reprobation, and the clearing of the truth in the one, doth give light unto the other. But which of theſe is to be handled firſt, that the clearing of the truth therein, may give light to the ſtating of the other, I ſhould think no ſober man would make queſtion. Yet the Remonſtrants at the Synod of Dort, were eager to begin with Reprobation, but were therein generally cenſured by the conſent of forraine Divines that aſſiſted there. But that one of them cannot be handled without the other, is a palpable untruth, as appears by the very practice of this Author himſelfe, and his own carriage in this buſineſſe. For he undertakes only the poynt of reprobation.

3. As touching the third particular, in charging the doctrine of reprobation, with being the chiefe cauſe of all the uproares in the Church at that time; this author takes to himſelfe a ſtrange liberty of diſcourſe. We read and heare of no ſmall ſtirres in the Church of Rome, between the Dominicans and the Jeſuits; but I never read that the Jeſuits laid to the Dominicans charge, that their Doctrine as touching the predetermination of the creatures will to every act thereof, was the cauſe of any uproare in the Church of Rome: But to the contrary rather. I read that in the contention between the Dominicans and Jeſuits in Rome it ſelfe, wherein *Valentianus* through ſome heat in diſputation, caught a feaver whereof he dyed within three daies after; of the relation whereof, made by one *Pet* (that had been a Prieſt) in Oxford I was ſometimes an eare witneſſe. The Jeſuits were rather taxed for their heterodoxy in the poynt *de auxiliis*, as *Petrus Mattheus* in his Hiſtory reports it. And from D. *Jacksons* mouth, I have heard what a Spaniard ſhould deliver upon the mention of *Molina* the Jeſuit, namely, that he was the man, *qui tantos tumultus excitavit*, to wit, in Spain. But as for Churches Proteſtant, he doth well to limit his crimination to a certain time. For the ſtirre that was raiſed by *Huberus* in the Lutheran Churches, was neither cauſed nor occaſioned by our doctrine concerning reprobation. *Huberus* his cauſe was, a pertinacious ſtanding for an univerſall Election. It ſeems he hath relation only to the Haghe conference, and the uproares, as he calls them, amongſt the States only, and their particular, or provinciall congregations alone (as it ſeems) he denominates the Churches. Now let us conſider, Who made thoſe uproares, were they the Contra-Remonſtrants, or the Remonſtrants only? If he chargeth this upon the Contra-Remonſtrants, let him prove it, leaſt he be juſtly cenſured for one of thoſe wild beaſts, an Emperour was ſometimes warned to beware of, they were the ſlanderers. If the Remonſtrants were the authors of theſe uproares, how doth he prove that the doctrine of reprobation, was the chiefe cauſe of them, Were not thoſe Arminians voluntary agents in thoſe uproares? If they conceived their oppoſites doctrine to be unſound, could they not oppoſe it without uproares, without violent proceedings? Againe, their oppoſites doctrine, was it never received or preached 'till thoſe daies? Or was there any uproare made thereupon, 'till Arminius his innovating? And is that the chief cauſe of an uproare, which hath no ſuch conſequent enſuing untill it meets with ſome turbulent ſpirits, which begin to ſtirre as innovators in a Church or State. And yet was reprobation that alone, whereupon they ſtirred? Is it not apparent, that about the five Articles commonly ſo called, they conferred alike? But he ſaith it was the chiefe cauſe, and only ſaith it, yet *Molinæus* profeſſing reprobation to proceed, upon foreſight of finall impenitency, as in truth it cannot be denied, but that as the Contra-Remonſtrants profeſſed, as well in that Conference at the Hague, as in the Synod of Dort, that God did never intend to damne any man

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of ripe years, but for finall perſeverance in infidelity and impenitency. Did their contentions hereupon, either totally ceaſe or in part? But ſuch criminations are nothing ſtrange. We know after what manner of greeting wicked *Ahab* ſaluted the holy Prophet *Elijah*. *Art thou he that troubleth Iſrael?* but he ſpared not to anſwer him, *I am not he that troubleth Iſrael, but Thou and thy Fathers houſe.* In the like manner were *Paul* and *Silas* entertained *Act.*16.20. when being caught and brought before the Magiſtrates, heard ſuch an accuſation made againſt them, *Theſe men which are Jewes trouble our city: and preach Ordinances which are not lawfull for us to receive, neither to obſerve, ſeeing we are Romans.* And no marvaile if the Devill roares, when he falls from heaven, like lightning, and his kingdome is ſhaken. But becauſe he putts us to it in this crimination, I think it fit to give a taſt of the violent proceedings in thoſe parts, as I find them ordered in the Preface to the Synod. *Dordrac.* ſet forth by the authority of the States. And becauſe uproares concern inſurrections againſt government in Church or State; The firſt particular I obſerve of this nature is, Fol. 3. pag. 1. where after Arminius had been much ſuſpected, and divers times urged to declare his opinion, upon certain poynts which hitherto he had declined, ſaving in a falſe manner, his proteſtation in the iſſue, proving directly contrary to his practice. The Rectors of particular Churches, ſowred with the leaven of his doctrine, openly refuſe to ſubſcribe the Confeſſion of the Catechiſme, though the Synod of South-Holland commanded them. *Paſtores Arminii ſententiam amplexi paſſim in Claſſibus recuſabant mandato Synodi de ſubſcriptione Confeſſionis, ac Catecheſeos morem gerere.* Here we have the begining of a manifeſt ſchiſme. Now conſider we the progreſſe hereof. Hereupon a reſolution was made (it being high time) by the States, for the calling of a Nationall Synode, in the yeare 1605. about November 26. the execution whereof, was by divers practiſes of the Arminian Faction, delayed, and put off from time to time, for the ſpace of 13 years. Fol.5. pag. 2. Arminius himſelfe acknowledgeth, *de Heterodoxiâ ſuâ varios rumores omnes jam eccleſias pervaſiſſe, incendiumq; à ſe ſuſcitatum ipſa Eccleſiæ tecta ſuperare dici.* Fol. 8. pag. 1. In the mean time, *Anno* 1608. the States declared their purpoſe was, to call a Provinciall Synode in October following, and ſignification hereof being made, the Rectors of particular Congregations, as many as were addicted to Arminius, being admoniſhed to manifeſt their conſiderations in their ſeverall Deanaries, that ſo they might be fairely ſent to the Synod that approached. They put this off alſo. *Illi verò ut antea, ita nunc quoq; ſinguli conſuetis tergiverſationibus pariter hoc detrectarunt.* The like refuſall was afterwards made in the Synod of South-Holland, though they were urged by the Synod to declare themſelves (for as for the Provinciall Synod, that was deferred two months longer.) Whereupon the Synod decreed, that they ſhould give up their conſiderations within a Months ſpace, or be obnoxious to Cenſure Eccleſiaſticall. Hereupon was means made by *Utenbogard*, for letters from the States unto thoſe Paſtors, to ſend up unto them their conſiderations ſealed, that ſo they might reſerve them to the Provinciall Synod ſhortly to be held. In theſe proceedings a man may eaſily ſmell Barnavells hand all along. Hereupon came forth at length *Arminius* his Declaration before the States. In anſwer whereunto *Gomarus* riſeth up, as there we may read, Fol.6. pag.2. And amongſt other courſes of *Arminius*, makes relation of this, as how *Spretis Synodorum Claſſium & Prebyteriorum judiciis ac decretis ad ſupremi Magiſtratus tribunal prima inſtantia proſiluiſſe, ibiq; querelas atq; accuſationes ſuas adverſus Eccleſiarum doctrinam propoſuiſſe, artibuſq; aulicis favorem ſibi Eccleſiis verò odium conſiliare diligenter ſtudiiſſe.* And hereupon beſought the States, that ſeeing *Contentiones gliſcerent, Eccleſiæ turbarentur, Civeſq; in partes diſtraherentur*, the Nationall Synod which they had promiſed might be gathered together with the firſt; which yet by the practice of *Utenbogard* and others was ſtill delayed. Hereupon Arminius his Faction grew ſo bold, as publiquely to Preach againſt the received Doctrine, as *Bertius* ſpared not to declare himſelfe; but wherein? Mark I pray the Article well, becauſe this Author drawes all to reprobation. Now the Articles whereupon *Bertius* declared himſelfe, to differ from the Doctrine received, were, *De juſtificatione hominis coram Deo, De Prædeſtinatione, De Gratiâ Dei, & libero arbitrio, De Perſeverantiâ fidelium*; and upon theſe very points afterwards, proceeded the Conference between *Arminus* and *Gomarus* before the States. And one *Venator* ſpared not publiquely to broach *Pelagian* and *Socinian* errours. Whereupon he was ſuſpended by the Churches of North-Holland. In ſpite of whom notwithſtanding, he continued his courſes of Preaching. Now whereas the Orthodox Paſtors in the Deanary of *Alomar* conſidering he was lawfully ſuſpended, and withall

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a man of impure life, refuſed to admit him into their company. Hereof complaint was made to the States, and by *Utenbogards* practice a Mandate obtained from them, that they ſhould admit him. Now when the States conſidering the preſent exigent, were eaſily like to condeſcend to a Provinciall Synode, the Arminians moved, thar the Deputies to be ſent thither, ſhould not be appointed thereunto by the Churches, according to the uſuall courſe, but only by the States, preſuming hereby, that either none, but ſuch as favoured their cauſe ſhould be ſent, or at leaſt ſuch as were leſſe alienated from their Opinion. fol. 8. p. But though they could not effect this, yet by their practice it came to paſſe, that the calling, not only of a Provinciall Synode, but of the yearely Synods were hindered. Shortly after this, finding what liberty they had, they met together of their own accord privily, *Sine Magiſtratus Supremi authoritate magno numero. Atq; ibi inter ſe initâ per ſubſcriptionem nominum confœderatione ſeu conſpiratione, manifeſtum in Eccleſiis Reformatis Schiſma inſtituunt.* That year came forth the Remonſtrance. Upon this by the practice of the Remonſtrants, *Vorſtius* is brought in to be a Profeſſor in the place of *Arminius*. For as touching the exceptions taken againſt him, the Remonſtrants profeſſed before the States, he had given them good ſatisfaction, Fol. 10. pag. 2. Then follow their practiſes for the removing of ſuch Rectors from their Churches, as were their oppoſites, and obtruding upon the people ſuch as were of their own Party. At *Alcmar*, *Adolphus Venator*, a man of impure life and faith, moved the people to Armes againſt the Magiſtrate, whereby he was driven to relinquiſh his place, and others brought in of *Venator* his Faction. Fol. 12. pag. 1. Hereupon the Elders and Deacons of that place were removed, and two Paſtors, the one having formerly executed his Miniſtry amongſt them for fifty years continuance. *Grevincovius* in like ſort, with the Magiſtracy of Rotterdam, to deprive his Colleague there *Cornelius Geſelius* of his Miniſtry firſt, and then by their Sergeants to caſt him out of the Citty. *Utenbogard* ſends Remonſtrants into Utrecht, and amongſt others, *Jacobum quendam Taurinum hominem turbulentum & ſævum.* Fol. 12. pag. 2. In Gelderland alſo the ordinary and annuall Synodicall Aſſemblies were hindred by the practice of *Utenbogard*, like as ſtill they continued withall their art to hinder the calling of a Nationall Synod, ſo often promiſed by the States, and ſo many years deferred. *William* of *Naſſau* moved both *Utenbogard* on the one ſide, and *Feſtus Hommius* on the other ſide, to conſider of a courſe how theſe ſtirres might be pacified. To which motion *Feſtus Hommius* makes anſwer, that in caſe the Remonſtrants differed from the Churches only in five Articles, he could think of a courſe whereby ſome peace might be made in the interim, untill a Nationall Synod were gathered. This is the more obſerveable, becauſe this Author layeth all the cauſe of thoſe uproares (as he calls them) upon Reprobation. But he profeſſeth they had great cauſe to ſuſpect the Remonſtrants differed from them in greater points of moment. And theſe are afterwards declared to be theſe, Fol. 14. pag. 1. *De perfectâ Chriſti pro peccatis Satisfactione, de Juſtificatione hominis coràm Deo, de Fide Salvificâ, de Peccato Originali, de Certitudine ſalutis, & de Perfectione hominis in hâc vitâ.* And whereas, they deſired the Remonſtrants would deale clearly and make known what their opinion was in thoſe poynts: *Utenbogard* having laboured to have a hearing before the States alone, There traduceth the actions of his Brethren in demanding the Declaration of their minds hereupon, as if this were to bring in a new kind of Inquiſition amongſt them, not to be endured. And hereupon obtaines of the States, that no ſuch Declaration ſhould be required at their hands. And more then that, finding the Deputies of the Synode by their continuall ſollicitations with the States (as it well became them in their places) to be moſt prejudiciall to their proceedings, they brought it ſo to paſſe, that like as formerly their Annuall Synods were hindered, ſo now it was forbidden to the Deputies themſelves, thenceforth to take any ſuch ſtile unto them, or performe any ſuch office as whereabout they were then imployed. And ſo the Relator proceeds in ſetting downe their inſolent courſes untill at length perceiving, that by the mediation of the King of Great Brittaine, all for the moſt part, inclined to the convocation of a Nationall Synod, they fell plainly on, upon theſe deſperate Counſells openly profeſſing that the calling of a Nationall Councell, would prove prejudiciall to the Majeſty

and Liberty of the Provinces, manifeſting themſelves hereby utterly averſe from ſuch a courſe; which yet hath been moſt in uſe in the Church of God, and that of ancient times, for the pacifying of contentions ariſing in matter of Religion. I profeſſe, I nothing affect to ſpend time in ſuch ſearches and relations, I had rather imploy it another way, but you ſee I am driven unto it, to repreſent the unſhamefaſed condition of this Narration.

4. And whereas he ſaith, *It was accuſed with open mouth, and challenged of falſhood*, it is apparent that the Remonſtrants would very well have reſted contented with a mutuall toleration of one another in their ſeverall waies. For when *Utenbogard* and *Feſtus Hommius* were to meet together, and treat upon ſome faire courſe of compoſition, *Utenbogard*, together with thoſe of his ſide, profeſſed they knew no other courſe for ſetling peace, but my mutually tolerating one the other; *Feſtus Hommius* and others with him on the other ſide, profeſſed they knew no better courſe then convocation of a Nationall Synode, and in the interim to tolerate one another, provided they would declare themſelves to differ from the received doctrine in the Church, in no other points then in the five Articles. But how they carried themſelves herein refuſing to declare themſelves, I have formerly ſhewed. And farther, in the purſuit of this their practice to enjoy toleration, it is farther ſtoried, by what means they procured a Letter from King James to farther them therein, and after that an Edict to that purpoſe from ſome of the States. And conſider farther, If any amongſt us ſhould riſe up, and confederate themſelves and impugne any five Articles of the Church of England, and accuſe us for maintaining erronious doctrine therein, and challenge us for falſhood, if they doe it with never ſo open mouth, ſhall this be ſufficient to juſtify them and condemne us, if wee doe not come to a tryall with them to diſpute the caſe, though Wee are the Poſſeſſours, They the Intruders and Innovators? Wee maintaining no other Doctrine then that which is by Authority eſtabliſhed amongſt us, and They which impugne the doctrine received, are they not uſually judged amongſt us, as ſuch who are rather to be cenſured then diſputed with? And withall conſider, that this *mutua tolerantia*, which the Remonſtrants ſo much preſſed and were ſo glad to enjoy, was with greateſt inſtance ſtood for long after the Conference at the Hague. Laſtly, how often was Arminius himſelfe queſtioned and called upon to give ſatisfaction for his Heterodoxies, and how often did he decline it? When at the firſt, Motion was made for his ſurrogation into the place of *Junius* beind deceaſed, then the ſuſpicions of his Heterodox breaking forth, and they of Amſterdam not well likeing to let him goe from them, amongſt whom at that time, he exerciſed his Miniſtry; and that becauſe they obſerved his luxuriant and novelizing Wit, which was like to breed dangerous effects in an Univerſity: at length upon the great inſtance both of *Utenbogard* and *Arminius* himſelfe, way was made for him unto the Chayre, upon condition he ſhould conferre with *Gomarus* upon ſome chief heads of Doctrine, and by a round declaration of his mind thereon, remove all ſuſpicion of Heterodoxy, having formerly by a ſolemne Proteſtation given his word, that in caſe he had any ſingular opinion of his own, he would not ſpread it. Hereupon he made open profeſſion, that he condemned the chiefe Pelagian opinions concerning grace naturall, the ſtrength of Free-will, Originall ſinne, the perfection of man in this life, and Predeſtination, and that he approved all thoſe diſputes, which *Auſtin* and other Fathers had written againſt them; and that in his judgement the Pelagian errours were rightly refuted by thoſe Fathers, and withall promiſed, that he would teach nothing that differed from the received Doctrine of the Churches; and hereupon he was admitted to a Profeſſors place in the Univerſity. In the beginning whereof he laboured by all means to quench all ſuſpicion of Heterodoxy in himſelfe, and maintained the doctrine of the Reformed Churches, *De ſatisfactione Chriſti, de Fide juſtificante, de juſtificatione per fidem, de Perſeverantiâ verè fidelium, de Certitudine ſalutis, de Perfectione hominis in hac vitâ &c.* all which he afterwards contradicted, as alſo did his Followers. This I ſay, he then at the firſt maintained publiquely, *contrà ſententiam ſuam* (which let every man judge, whether it be not as much as to ſay, againſt his own Conſcience) and *Corvinus* is alleaged as in a certain Writing of his ſet forth in Low-Dutch ingeniouſly profeſſing as much, *Præfat. in Synod. Dordracen, Authoritate Ordinum Fol. 2. p. 1.* But after he had been a yeare or two in the place, he begins to unmaske

himſelfe

himſelfe, and by his Publique Lectures, and chiefly by his dealing with his Schollers in private, his heterodoxy diſcovered it ſelfe. Here upon the deputies from the Churches of South and North Holland are ſent unto him, who acquaint him with the rumours that went of him, praying him that if he diſliked ought in the doctrine received, he would ſincerely declare it unto his Brethren, to the end, either by a friendly Conference, he might receive ſatisfaction, or the whole buſineſſe might lawfully be put over to the conſideration of a Synod. *Arminius* his anſwer was, that he never gave any juſt cauſe, why ſuch rumour ſhould be ſpread of him, neither was it wiſdome for him to treat with them as with Deputies, that ſhould make relation of the whole matter to a Synod, though as private perſons, he refuſed not to conferre with them, provided that in caſe they differed, no relation hereof ſhould be made unto a Synod. The Church of *Leyden* alſo admoniſhed him, that there might be a Conference between him and his Colleagues, before the Presbytery of that Church. To them he anſwered he could not yeeld thereto, without leave from the Curators of the Univerſity, and that he perceived not, that any benefit was like to redound unto the Church by ſuch a Conference. At another time Fol. 4. p. 2. being entreated by the Profeſſors and Paſtors with great earneſtneſſe, that if he had ought to ſay againſt the doctrine received in their Confeſſion and Catechiſme, he would freely and brotherly communicate it unto them, promiſing their endeavours to give him full ſatisfaction, or if not ſo, yet that he and his Colleagues under certain conditions might come to a faire agreement, to live together in peace, and that the reconciliation being made, nothing which paſſed between them ſhould be divulged. The anſwer he made, was this, It was no wiſe part for him to yeeld to their motion, neither was he bound thereto, the preſent meeting being not ordained unto any ſuch purpoſe, fol. 5. p. 2. *Gomarus* openly tells him, how it became him to declare his opinion, *neq; ejuſmodi ſubterfugiis diutius hâc in re uti*, & fol. 6. p. 2. before the States he repreſents his continuall practice thereunto, in concealing his Opinion, His words are theſe, *Quibus inſuper artibus opiniones ſuas diſſeminare; Publicè ſcilicet ab Eccleſiis rogatum obteſtatumq;, ſententiam ſuam occultare, privatim vero Paſtoribus quos in eam pertrahi poſſe ſperaret, ac diſcipulis ſuis diligentèr eam inculcare; argumenta Noſtrorum præcipua quibus aſtrui doctrina Orthodoxa ſoleret enervare, Jeſuitarum verò aliorumq; Adverſariorum, quibus doctrinam Eccleſiarum Reformatarum oppugnant confirmare, Varias de doctrinæ receptæ Veritate dubitationes diſcipulorum animis ingerere, eandemq; cum doctrinâ heterodoxâ prius, quaſi in æquilibrio ſuſpendere, ac deinde prorſus rejicere, nullam hactenus ſinceritatis ac conſenſus in doctrinâ, licet ſæpius ab Eccleſiis amanter fraterneq; rogatum Declarationem edere voluiſſe.* Now let any indifferent perſon compare the carriage of Arminius the Innovator, with the carriage of the Contra-Remonſtrants, ſtanding for the doctrine heretofore received, and judge impartially which of them betrayes the greater diſtruſt of the integrity of their Cauſe.

5. As for the eaſineſſe of defending it, if it be not, or were not ſo in their opinion, who are here pretended to have declined the ſifting of it, What is that to the purpoſe? Then who are they, who ſay it may ſo eaſily be defended? I never read any hitherto, who doe not acknowledge a great myſtery in the divine providence. And from the daies of *Anſelme* unto this preſent day, it hath ever been accounted (in my obſervation) a very difficult poynt to accord predeſtination divine, with the liberty of mens wills. But put the caſe it may eaſily be defended, as of evident truth by the word of God, yet notwithſtanding, if it be found harſh to mens affections, are they likely to admit it with ſuch eaſe? I ſhould think it ought to be put out of queſtion, *that God hath mercy on whom he will*, in beſtowing faith and repentance upon them, and thereby curing their naturall infidelity and hardneſſe of heart, as alſo *that God hardneth whom he will*, leaving their infidelity and hardneſſe of heart uncured; yet when fleſh and bloud riſeth up againſt this doctrine thus, *Why then doth God complaine*; (to wit, of mans diſobedience) *for who hath reſiſted his will?* And the Apoſtle addreſſeth hereunto no other anſwer but this, *O man who art thou who diſputeſt with God? ſhall the thing formed ſay to him that formed it, why haſt thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over the clay of the ſame lump, to make one veſſell unto honour, another unto diſhonour?* Is fleſh and bloud, I pray, apt to reſt ſatisfied with this?

Now as touching the two things I promiſed to adde, they are theſe.

1. I pray conſider whether in all this, this Author doth not very judiciouſly pro-

nounce ſentence againſt himſelfe. For you know, your own motion you made unto him, and the promiſe he made unto you; and I pray conſider how anſwerable hereunto hath been his performance. The certain Controverſies, as touching which he profeſſeth change of Opinion, what are they, but the five Articles ſo much agitated between the Remonſtrants, and the Contra-Remonſtrants? Doe you not perceive how he makes choyce only of reprobation to grate upon? Is he not content to lye cloſe as touching foure of them? What is this, but according to his language, *the coveting of corners?* And what willingneſſe of abideing the tryall doth this manifeſt? Yet he pleaſeth himſelfe in a conceit, of being as free from guile, as *David* was when he offered himſelfe to the Lords tryall, and thereupon advanceth himſelfe to the greater liberty of cenſuring others, ſuch as *Beza*, and *Muſculus*, and their Fellowes, together with the Contra-Remonſtrants, as too full of that guile, whereof himſelfe, by virtue not of his Free-will, but of a grace of God of his ſhapeing, is voyd. This is an uſuall courſe with thoſe of his ſpirit, whereof I have had plentifull experience in this very kind. For if you believe them, all the Arminians Geeſe are Swannes, and all our Swannes are Geeſe in compariſon to them. He hopes you will not think he hates the light, or refuſeth to come to the light, (in his phraſe) this is the cenſure he liberally beſtowes upon his oppoſites. For though ſome of our Divines are willing enough to treat of the five Articles, yet to treat of reprobation, which is a part of one of thoſe, they are not ſo willing, but this young Maſter in Iſrael, out of the plerophorious conceit of his own integrity and ſufficiency, is very willing to treat of this of reprobation, though he leaves all the reſt alone. Yet I pray make the ſcales even, What inſtance can be given, I doe not ſay of *Beza*, *Muſculus*, or any one of the Contra-Remonſtrants, but of any one of the like condition to himſelfe, that being entreated by a friend (as this Author was by you) to ſhew the reaſons, why he hath changed his mind from Arminianiſme, to the oppoſite opinions, hath carried himſelfe, as this Author hath done, to give his reaſons only on the part of one of them, and yet paſſeth his cenſure ſo prodigally on others for refuſing triall, by the way implying, a glorious oſtentation of his own performances to the contrary, as if he had done a notable piece of ſervice, whereas all that he hath performed hereon, by proofe from teſtimonies of Scripture, are little more then two Leaves, and therein alſo as it were purpoſely, declines all thoſe places, wherein the Scripture ſpeaketh directly of election, predeſtination, and of that, which in effect, is all one with reprobation. Such places pregnantly ſpeaking hereof, he purpoſely declines, and yet he calls the places he inſiſts upon, *pregnant teſtimonies*; and indeed ſo they are, but nothing at all to the purpoſe of predeſtination, election, or reprobation. Yet I marvaile not he is ſo well conceited of his atchievements. I remember the Fable of the fly, ſitting on a Cart-wheele, in a dry ſummers day, and ſaying, *See what a duſt I make*. For, becauſe he hath diſcharged himſelf ſo unworthily with you, he may be bold to conceit, that if he had to deale with *Beza*, or with any of the Contra-Remonſtrants, or of the Synod of Dort, he would make it ſoon appeare, *that Hereſy and untruth condemnes it ſelfe* (this is the ſweet accommodation he makes of that the Apoſtles αὐτοκατάκριτος) to wit, by their refuſing the touch-ſtone, and his readineſſe backed with all ſufficiency to come thereto, whereof he hath given ſo plentifull demonſtration in this he hath written unto you; as if he had been with ſome Oracle of late, who had not only revealed unto him, ſome reaſonable motives, and wiſe carriages of the matter, but inſpired him alſo with ſome martiall ſpirit, fit for any encounter, deſpiſing his Adverſaries, as empty Schollers, and as if their parts were but copper, to his gold. Therefore he may take heart to ſpeak boldly, and ſhew himſelfe in the clear day, when ſuch as *Beza* make choyce to walk in miſts, and dwell in ſilence. Beſides his care is very Apoſtolicall for the peace of the Church, whereas *Beza's* was not at Mompelgard, nor the Contra-Remonſtrants, neither at the Hague Conference, or at the Synod of Dort. For none of theſe belike, have been ſo forward to ſhew themſelves unto the World, and upon the ſtage, for the maintenance of their doctrine (at leaſt in the poynt of reprobation) no not *Beza* in his Lectures upon the ninth to the Romans. Yet neither this man nor his Oracle hath done ought that I know, but in corners. And in corners I find theſe ſpirits exceeding buſy; and I have been ſo happy (for ſo I account it, although I confeſſe my time might be farre more profitably beſtowed) as to meet with ſome of their Myſteries, ere I was aware. And I find their Lyons skinnes, doe ſmell farre more of the Fox then of the Lyon.

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2. The ſecond is this, Why ſhould their carriage be any prejudice to others, who are as willing to give an account of their faith in theſe particulars, as any Arminian whatſoever. For my part, I never met with any of them, that I declined, nor I hope never ſhall. I heartily wiſh, time might ſerve me for them all. I have dealt with Arminius his *Examen*, his Conference with *Junius*, *Corvinus* his anſwer unto *Tilenus*, I have entred upon *Voſſius* his Pelagian Hiſtory. I deſire I might have time and opportunity, for their *Synodalia Dordracena*, but moſt of all with the Jeſuits; while I deale with them I learne ſomewhat, but nothing at all while I am occupied with the Arminians.

3. Let mee adde one thing more: In the Articles of our Church, the ſeaventeenth is concerning Predeſtination and Election, not one concerning Reprobation. If any of us, ſhould forbeare to meddle with the doctrine of reprobation in diſpute, may we not juſtly plead, a faire conformity to the wiſdome of the Church whereof we are members? And by the way to touch one thing, Might not this be the reaſon, why this author utterly pretermits the proſecuting his opinion concerning Predeſtination and election, to wit, leaſt thereby he ſhould fall foule upon the doctrine of our Church, ſo evidently ſet downe in that Article concerning the poynt of Predeſtination? The Church of Ireland content themſelves, with the very forme of that 17th Article of ours concerning Predeſtination: Only they premiſe two Theſes; the one whereof is this, *God from all eternity, did by his unchangeable Councell ordaine, whatſoever in time ſhould come to paſſe, yet ſo, as thereby no violence is offered to the Wills of the reaſonable creatures, and neither the liberty, nor the contingency of the ſecond cauſe is taken away, but eſtabliſhed rather*; The other this, *By the ſame eternall Counſell, God hath Predeſtinated ſome unto life, and Reprobated ſome unto death, of both which there is a certain number, known only unto God, which neither can be increaſed nor diminiſhed.*

DISCOURSE.

The Third Motive.

The Infamy of it.

IT is an Opinion (as it is maintained by the Supralapſarians) odious to the Papiſts, and opens their foule mouthes againſt our Church and Religion, and ſo abhorred (maintained either Way) by all the Lutherans, that for this very Tenent, they call us damned Calveniſts, think us unworthy to be above ground, and in their Writings proteſt, that they will rather unite themſelves to the Papiſts, then to us.

Sir *Edwin Sands* ſpeaks of men, whom he commends for ſingular learning and piety, (whoſe opinion he ſo ſets down, as he declares it to be his own) that they think it were no blemiſh for the Reformed Doctors to revive their doctrine, and to abate the rigour of certain ſpeculative opinions, (for ſo he is pleaſed to call them) eſpecially touching the eternall decrees of God, wherein ſome of their chief authors have runne into ſuch an utter oppoſition to all the Romiſh doctrine, as to have exceedingly ſcandalized all other Churches withall, yea, and many of their own to reſt very ill ſatisfied. *Relat. pag.* 194,198.

At the cloſing up of the Conference at *Mompelgard*, when *Frederick* Earle of *Wortenberg* exhorted his Divines to acknowledge *Beza* and his Company for Brethren, and to declare it by giving them their hands, they utterly refuſed it, ſaying, That they would pray to God to open their eyes, and would doe them any office of humanity and charity, but they would not give them the right hand of Brotherhood, becauſe they were proved to be guilty, *errorum teterimorum*, of moſt peſtilent errours, of which they reckoned this for one. *Hemingius* left his own ſide, and joyned with us in the poynt of the Sacrament, but would come no neerer to us, but maintained a diſtance in this. *Oſiand. Hiſt. Eccleſ. pag.* 1040. *Colloq. Mompelg. pag.* 566, 567.

It is a Morſell, which the greateſt part of the Chriſtian Churches cannot ſwallow; and therefore I think it would not down very eaſily with us, and without ſuſpicion.

TWISSE

Conſideration.

HIs third Topick place, is drawn from the Infamy of this doctrine, and that amongſt Papiſts and Lutherans. And this is a grand motive with him to abhorre it. But I pray conſider, was not the doctrine of the Goſpell infamous at the firſt, both amongſt Jewes and Gentiles? What time the Jewes were the only people of God, how doth *Tacitus* out of his worldly wiſdome brand them? Hiſt. l. 5. Doth he not call them *Gentem teterrimam, Genus hominum inviſum Diis?* And as touching their religious Rites, marke what cenſure he paſſeth upon them, *Profana illic omnia,* Annal. *quæ apud nos ſacra, rurſus conceſſa apud illos, quæ apud nos inceſta,* and comparing them with the Rites of Bacchus, ſaith, *Liber feſtos, lætoſq; ritus poſuit, Judæorum Mos abſurdus ſordidusq;.* And ſpeaking of the Chriſtians he calls them, *Genus hominum propter flagitia inviſum.* This cenſure he paſſeth upon them in the daies of holy *Paul*, who forbad them to doe evill that good might come thereof, and commands every ſoule to be ſubject to the Higher Powers, even then, when ſoules were at the beſt, and powers at worſt. And ſee I pray what the King of Aſhurs judgement was, concerning the Religion of Samaria and Jeruſalem, in compariſon to the Religions of their Nations, which were heatheniſh. *Iſa.* 10. 10. *Like as mine hand hath found the Kingdoms of the Idolls, ſeeing their Idolls were above Jeruſalem, and above Samaria.* So that of an heatheniſh Religion, he had a better eſtimation then of the Religion of the Jewes. Now if ſome Rabſhakeh amongſt them ſhould turne heathen (for ſuch a tradition, as I remember is received amongſt the Rabbins, namely, that *Rabſhakeh* was a Jew, but turned heathen) and afterwards endeavoured to entice the Jewes to doe as he did, and that becauſe of the infamous nature of their Religion amongſt heathens, how deſerved ſuch a one to be entertained by them? Was he not by the Law of God to be ſtoned to death? In like manner, if in the primitive daies of the Church, ſome Chriſtian ſhould turne Jew or Infidell, and practice to ſeduce others from the obedience of faith, repreſenting unto them how every where it was contradicted, how Chriſt himſelfe was counted a blaſpheamer, a ſorcerer, how the Goſpell was a ſcandall to the Jewes, fooliſhneſſe to the Gentiles, and that in killing the holy Apoſtles, the world thought they did God very 1 Corinth. 4. good ſervice. Saint Paul himſelfe profeſſing of himſelfe and his fellowes, *That they* 13. *were made as the filth of the world, the offſcouring of all things.* Did this infamy prevaile with *Paul*, or any other holy ſervant of God, to remit any thing, in the maintenance of his Chriſtian faith? Nay, doth he not profeſſe, ſaying, *I paſſe not for theſe things, neither is my life deare unto me, ſo I may fulfill my courſe with joy, and the Miniſtration that I have received to* Act. 20 *teſtify the Goſpell of the grace of God? And that in all things, They approve themſelves as the Mini-* 2 Cor. 6. 4, 8. *ſters of God by honour and diſhonour, by good report and evill report, as deceivers and yet true.*

Againe, Is it to be expected, that any doctrine ſhould be well ſpoken of, by ſuch as are oppoſites and adverſaries thereunto? Suppoſe a rigid Lutheran ſhould by Gods providence, be taken off from their ubiquitary doctrine; and in juſtifying himſelfe for the change of his Opinion, ſhould repreſent unto them, the infamous condition of that doctrine, both in the judgement of Papiſts, and in the judgement of Calviniſts; I pray conſider, How in all likelyhood would this plea be entertained? Could he expect any better recompence hereof, then to be caſt out of their Synagogues? Suppoſe a Papiſt ſhould have his eyes opened, and brought to the truth of God in the poynt of juſtification, and, being demanded the reaſon of this change of mind in him, ſhould anſwer, that the infamy of this doctrine, both amongſt Lutherans and Calviniſts is ſo great, and that ſuch a morſell, which neither Lutherans nor Calviniſts can ſwallow, ſhould therefore (in his judgement) not down very eaſily with Papiſts, and without ſuſpicion. Now let any indifferent Reader conſider, how this plea in all probability would be received amongſt Papiſts. Yet I mean not to quiet my ſelfe, or content my Reader with this parallell. Of that which he here delivers of Papiſts, he gives us no evidence but his bare word in pawne, for the credit of this aſſertion. Neither

ther gives he any teſtimony of Lutherans, their calling us *damned Calveniſts*, and thoughhe had, I pray, what were we the farther off from the kingdome of God for that? And I pray conſider, is it not in our power to recompence them, and call them, damned Lutherans, if we liſt to recompence malice with malice, ſo to ſerve our own turnes? And all this is delivered by him without diſtinction of Papiſts, learned and unlearned, Dominicans and Jeſuits; in like ſort without all diſtinction of Lutherans, whether rigid or moderate. But let us examine his crimination a part.

And firſt, as for Papiſts; not one is here named, nor any reference made to any of of them. S^t *Pauls* prayer was, *that they might be delivered from unreaſonable men.* I think never Sect roſe upmore unreaſonable then this Sect of Arminians. This Writing came unto my hands, before I had diſpatched a large diſcourſe ſent unto me from one of ſame Sect, and therein I have met with pregnant evidences, that more heads then one, were employed thereabouts. And there I am told to my face, that our doctrine of abſolute reprobation, we have learned from the Papiſts. Another with whom I had to doe not long before, profeſſeth in plain manner thus; *The Jeſuits ten of them for one, favour the abſolute irreſpective decree, following herein as they think* S^t *Auſtin, but eſpecially their* S^t *Thomas, and Scotus, with all the rabble of rotten Schoolmen, and the whole Tribe at this day of the Dominicans, who are buzy zelots for the cauſe; of whoſe conſent ſome amongſt us are not aſhamed to bragge.* If our irreſpective decree, be ſo joyntly maintained by both Jeſuits, and Dominicans, and that as they think according to *Auſtin*, how is it poſſible our doctrine herein, can be ſo odious to the Papiſts? Or what Papiſts doth he mean, if neither Jeſuits nor Dominicans, nor any ſuch as concurre with either of them? Or if it be ſo odious unto them, as one Arminian Proſelite profeſſeth, how can it be ſo concordantly maintained by them, as another Arminian proſelite avoucheth? And if we have learned it at the hands of Papiſts, what will theſe Lutherans gaine, by uniting with Papiſts rather then with us, that is, with the Maſters rather then with the Schollars. And if a Lutheran ſhould be converted to the embracing of our Tenent herein, and to juſtify himſelfe ſhould plead; That we Calviniſts are ready to proteſt, that in the doctrine of reprobation and predeſtination, we had rather unite our ſelves with Papiſts then with them, Of what moment think you, would this motive be with them, which this Author moſt inconſiderately propoſeth, as a poynt of very ponderous conſideration?

But as touching Papiſts, their diſlike of us, he confines it only to the Supralapſarian-way. And indeed that diſtinction of the Supralapſarian and Sublapſarian-way. was brought in meerely to get thereby ſome more elbow roome. For if they agree with us in the poynt of Gods abſolute and irreſpective decrees, how improbable is it, that the doctrine of any of our Divines, in ſtating the object of predeſtination to be *humanum genus nondum conditum*, will prove odious unto them; conſidering this is a meer Logicall difference, as I have ſhewed in my *Vindic. Grat. Dei cap.* 1. *pag.* 1. *De Predeſtinatione digreſſ.* 1. Yet as touching the Supralapſarian-way, that opinion is imputed unto *Junius* by *Arminius*, as alſo to *Thomas* and his Followers. *Collat. Armin. cum Juni. pag.* 4. and if ſo, how improbable is it, that ſuch an Opinion ſhould be ſo odious to the Papiſts, as this Author upon his bare word avoucheth. And *Alphonſus Mendoza* ſpares not to profeſſe, that ſupernaturalls were intended by God before naturalls; and his diſcourſe hereupon, was taken with admiration by his Auditors in Spaine, and he was urged as himſelfe profeſſeth, to ſet it forth in Print. And the *Quatuor ſigna Franciſci Mayronis* (mentioned by M^r *Perkins De Prædeſt. Modo & Ordine*) doe manifeſt that he took the ſame way; and theſe *quatuor ſigna*, *Franciſcus Mayro* received from the doctrine of *Scotus*. It is well known that in the Synod of Dort, there met Divines different in this poynt, who yet neither hated one anothers doctrine nor perſons for this difference; like as ſo it is amongſt us, as in the place above mentioned I have ſhewed. Nay it is apparent, that *Junius* took upon him to reconcile all three opinions there abouts, and *Piſcator* after him, who alſo hath diſcharged his part herein, farre more clearely then *Iunius*. And no marvail, *Iunius* having firſt broken the ice. But that the truth may not be carried in the clouds of ambiguities, as they deſire, who are in love with errour: All the queſtion between theſe our Divines conſiſts in this, Whether it were the will of God that *Adam* ſhould fall by his permiſſion, ſo to make way for Gods glorious ends, to wit, the manifeſtation of his glory, in the incarnation of the Sonne of God, as alſo in the way of mercy, in the ſalvation of ſome; and in the way of juſtice, in the condemnation of others. The Supralapſarians maintaine, that ſuch

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was the will of God, least otherwise way should be made for the manifestation of Gods glorious works by accident, rather then by Gods providence. Other Divines that take the Sublapsarian way, had rather decline this nice poynt as difficult, then oppose it as odious. But say I, the doctrine wherein both Jesuits and Arminians doe agree, will abundantly serve us to justify us, in the positive and affirmative part of so nice a poynt as this. For by their doctrine of *Scientia Media*, God did foresee, that upon such an administration of his providence about *Adam* as was used, *Adam* would fall; and more then this, that God could have brought forth other administrations of his providence in very great variety, some whereof were such, that if God had used, *Adam* would not have fallen. Now being pleased to make use of such an administration of providence divine, upon the purpose whereof, he foresaw *Adam* would fall; and not being pleased to use such a providence, upon the purpose whereof, he had foreseen *Adam* would not have fallen; I call here all the indifferent of the World to judge, whether it doth not manifestly follow herehence, that it was the will of God, *Adam* should fall by his permission.

Again, throughout our doctrine, nothing is more harsh then that of Gods determining the will of the creature, to every act of his, as touching the substance thereof. Dares this author betray such ignorance, as hand over head to professe, that this doctrine is odious unto Papists? Whereas the most learned in the Church of Rome, are well known to maintain it in expresse termes, whereas our Divines course is, to keep themselves to the phrase of Scriptures. And as for the Jesuits who oppose it, and in the place thereof bring in *Scientia Media*, and *Gratia Congrua*, shaped after the genius of *Scientia Media*. I can shew an expresse acknowledgement under the hand of a zealot for the Arminian cause, that between the *Gratia prædeterminans* of the Dominicans, and *Gratia congrua* of the Jesuits, there is no such materiall difference at all, but that the absoluteness of predestination and reprobation doth follow, as well upon the one, as upon the other.

To conclude, I would this Author would be so wise, as once more to consult with his Oracle, and enquire, Whether Papists are more ready to joyne with Lutherans, in their doctrine of Christs Ubiquity, as touching his Manhood, then with us in the poynt of Reprobation, or of Gods concourse. For suppose we held as *Suarez* is pleased to state our Tenent, namely, *Quod Deus omnipotenti voluntate nobis necessitatem imponat*; yet the same *Suarez* saith, that in this very poynt, we are not reprehended of them, as if we affirmed ought, *Quod vel in re ipsâ contradictionem involvat, aut Dei omnipotentiam superet*. I presume no Papist is so well conceited in the Lutherans doctrine in the poynt of Ubiquity.

From that which he affirmes of Papists, I come to that which he affirmes of Lutherans. And what one instance hath he given of any Lutheran, speaking against our making the corrupt Masse the object of predestination or reprobation? Surely not one, either out of Sir *Edwin Sands*, nor out of *Osiander*; Nay what cause is there, why either Papist or Lutheran should, in case the object thus stated (or in a more rigid forme of the Masse Uncorrupt) doth no way constraine us to maintaine, that God doth intend the damnation of any man, in any moment of nature, before the consideration of him, as departing out of this World, under the power of sinne; no nor to maintain, that God doth intend the salvation of any man, in any moment of nature, before the consideration of him, in finall perseverance in faith and repentance, provided God suffer him, to live untill the use of reason, as I have shewed, and endeavoured to justify, and make appeare, in my *Vindic. Grat. Dei*, in the digressions concerning Predestination. For indeed not any of our Divines was, I think, ever known to maintain, that God did intend to damne any man but for sinne; Neither doe I maintaine, that God intended to bestow salvation on any man of ripe years, but by way of reward of his faith and repentance. The true and principall, reall (not verball only) difference between us, and the Arminians, is about Gods bestowing of faith and repentance, and his purpose thereof. Now let any learned Lutheran deliver his mind on this, namely, upon the foresight whereof it is, that God gives faith and repentance unto some, and denyes it unto others. When *Tossanus* makes relation of *Hunnius* his exposition of that place Acts 13. 48. *Et crediderunt quotquot ordinati erant ad vitam*, thus, *id est, qui sese ordinarant & disposuerant ad audiendum Dei verbum*; * *Hunnius* in his refutation of *Tossanus* his *Theses*, cites *Tossanus* to appear before the tribunall seat of the Judge both of quick and dead, and to shew in what place of his writings, this is

* *Et illud fide amplectendum.*

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to be found, profeſſing that ſuch doctrine is the very Pelagian Hereſy, and that himſelfe never approved it, but diſproved it rather, and moſt conſtantly impugned it. What Lutheran was ever known ſo abſurd, as to ſay, that God worketh in us, *τὸ Velle credere, modò Velimus*? Yet this doctrine I can ſhew in expreſſe termes delivered by an Arminian. But come to the conſideration of the inſtances propoſed by him.

The firſt is the Relation of Sir *Edwin Sands*. And I remember well to have read in him ſomewhat concerning the *Predeſtinary Peſtilence*, ſo called by ſome. And I might wonder at this Authors wiſdome, in pretermitting that paſſage; but upon ſearch finding it about Fol. 59. though my Book hath no quotation at all of pages, I ceaſed to wonder at his concealing of it. I have rather cauſe to commend his wiſdome therein, although it expreſſeth that whereupon this Author formerly touched, as concerning the Lutherans readineſſe to returne to the Papacy rather then to admit that Predeſtinary Peſtilence. For predeſtinary peſtilence goeth not here alone, but is joyned with the Sacramentary peſtilence, *For theſe two poynts*, ſaith he, *are the ground of the quarrell*; but he addes I confeſſe, that *the Predeſtinary peſtilence was more ſcandalous at that day then the former*. Yet the ſame Author profeſſeth Fol. 73. of the Lutherans, that if he fetch an elle forwards one way, for an elle he looſeth another way, it is only by a kind of boyſterous force and violence againſt the Calviniſts, as in Straſborough of late. And the reaſon hereof he takes to be in part the Abſurdities of the *Vbiquitary Chimæra*. And as for the paſſage here alleaged, I find it about Fol. 86. Wherein I conſider, Firſt that the ſpeculative opinions he ſpeaks of are not about the eternall decrees of God only, or eſpecially above all others, as here by cunning carriage it is pretended. For the words runne thus; *It can be no blemiſh to them to reviſe their Doctrine, and to abate the rigour of certain ſpeculative opinions, eſpecially touching the eternall decrees of God, the quality of mans nature, the uſe of works, wherein ſome of their chiefe Authors have come to ſuch an utter oppoſition, &c* So that the poynts of rigorous doctrine, which were to be qualified in this Gentlemans judgement, are many, but eſpecially three; The firſt whereof is touching the eternall decrees of God, The ſecond concerning the quality of mans nature, The third concerning the uſe of Works: So that the doctrine of Gods eternall decrees is not the poynt alone, the rigour whereof eſpecially is to be qualified in this Authors judgement, but this eſpeciall care of qualification, is by him referred to the three poynts formerly mentioned, and that indifferently. Secondly, Whereas this Author relates, that this is delivered, not as out of the relators judgement only, but as out of *the judgement of men whom he commends for ſingular learning and Piety*. I find no ſuch matter in the Relation that I have, though I have ſearched after it, both by conſidering what went before, and what comes after, as farre as he treats of the ſame matter. Whether this comes in a ſecond Edition I know not: in mine I find no ſuch thing. So that the weight of this motive hitherto, lies wholly upon the authority of this Gentleman. And ſurely I ſhould think it were nothing hard to counterballance this authority to the full. And it may be he ſpeaks herein no other thing then wherein he was endoctrinated by his Tutor, as lately an ingenious and grave divine, differing from us in the poynt of reprobation, moſt ingeniouſly acknowledged, that he was brought into that opinion of his by his Tutor, who was a Lutheran: And I doubt we have too many ſuch amongſt us. Of late I have heard, that one of good place ſpared not openly to profeſſe, ſaying, *Call us as we ought to be called, for we are Lutherans*: I would wee had not too many Popiſh-hearted amongſt us.

Thirdly, whereas this Gentleman adviſeth us to reviſe the Doctrines, and this Author accommodates it only to Gods eternall decrees; I have already performed this, and qualified the rigour of ſome mens opinions thereabouts. For whereas ſome have ſubordinated Gods decree of permitting ſinne, to the decree of damnation, I have taken another courſe, and doe maintain, that in no moment of nature is the decree of damnation, before the decree of permitting finall perſeverance in ſinne. Again, I preſume this Gentlemans meaning is not, that the doctrine of the Church of England is rigorous, as touching Gods eternall decrees. I willingly profeſſe, I deſire no better triall of the truth of the Doctrine I maintain hereabouts, next unto the Word of God, then to be tried by the 17th Article of the Church of England, and by the Articles of the Church of Ireland, ſet forth in the daies of King James

Thirdly, I would it were put unto this Gentleman, if he be living, Whether in his Opinion, God of his free grace doth beſtow faith and repentance on ſome, thereby to cure that naturall infidelity and hardneſſe of heart, which is originally found in all, and of his meer pleaſure, he denies it unto other: Or whether finding ſome morall difference or preparation in one more then in another, is hereupon moved to give faith and repentance unto them, and deny it unto others. If he ſhall acknowledge, that God doth ſhew his mercy to whom he will, that is, of his meer pleaſure, and denies it to whom he will, I am ready to profeſſe, that let him ſtate Gods eternall decrees after what manner he will, I ſhall willingly ſubſcribe thereunto; provided it be ſuitable unto the former ground: and as for the unſuitable nature thereof, if in caſe it ſo fall out, let the proofe and evident demonſtration thereof, lye on mee. But if his opinion be, that God beſtowes faith and repentance on man, moved thereunto by ſome morall preparation, which he finds in one, rather then in another, I appeale to the Lutherans themſelves, whether this be not in plain termes no better then Pelagianiſme.

As for his calling their opinions in this poynt, ſpeculative opinions (as this Author would have us obſerve) I am willing to obſerve it: and withall I think, he doth it with better judgement, then this Author doth in calling them practicall.

And whereas it is pretended, that our Divines have been carried into theſe opinions of theirs, *in oppoſition to Popiſh Doctrine*, This is ſo out of ſeaſon in theſe daies (notwithſtanding the raw judgement of this Author) that our Arminians ſpare not to profeſſe (as formerly mentioned) and charge us to our face, that we have learned this doctrine of ours, out of the Writings of Papiſts. And *Grevinovius*, againſt *Ameſius*, ſpares not to pronounce, that They may with better credit follow the Jeſuits, then Wee the Dominicans, conſidering that the Dominicans are the great Adminiſtrators of the Inquiſition in Spaine. This is delivered as touching the poynt of grace and Free-will: but as touching the poynt of election and reprobation abſolute, I can ſhew under the hand of an Arminian, that herein there is no materiall difference between the Dominicans, and moſt part of the Jeſuits; ſo little difference there is between the *Gratia Prædeterminans* of the one, and the *Gratia Congrua* of the other. So that if this be true, it is not probable, that hereby we ſcandalize the judicious and learned Papiſts; and what thoſe other Churches are which we ſcandalize, excepting Churches Lutheran, either this Author knows not, or is well content to diſſemble it, to wit, the Churches of Socinians and Anabaptiſts. And how doe we more ſcandalize the Churches Lutheran herein, then they ſcandalize us? Was it ever known, that by meer differing in Opinion from other Churches, Chriſtian men were ſaid to ſcandalize them? Or if it were ſo, muſt not the ſcandall in this caſe, be equall on both ſides?

As for the leaving many of our own very ill ſatisfied, why ſhould that ſeem ſtrange? What doth *Carryer* write of many well known to him in this our Church of England, of the ſame mind with himſelfe, ſome Papiſts, ſome Lutherans? And may there not be as many amongſt the Lutherans, as ill ſatisfied with the doctrine commonly received amongſt them, ſave that they are farre more forward, to excommunicate all ſuch, as ſoon as they appeare, then Wee? Beſides all this, The poynt of ſcandall is brought in very unſeaſonably; For if it be a truth that we maintain and profeſſe, if any are ſcandalized by it, it is a ſcandall taken, not given: God forbid we ſhould grow ſo profane, as to account it a ſcandalous thing to make profeſſion of Gods truth; eſpecially this truth we maintain being ſo neere to a cleare oppoſition to Pelagianiſme, a Hereſy condemned by the Church above 1200 years agoe.

When *Frederick* Duke of *Woortenberg* exhorted his Divines to acknowledge *Beza*, and his Company for Brethren, and to declare it by giving them their hands; The anſwer of refuſall was made by *Jacobus Andreas* a moſt bitter enimy, and one whom *Beza* deſcribes, *tanquam virum ſanguinarium*, and his carriage throughout was moſt imperious. And it becomes an Arminian ſpirit well, to make the rancour of his malicious heart, a rule wherebyto cry down the doctrine which he abhorred. With a farre better grace might a Papiſt cry down our faith, oppoſite to the doctrine of the Church of Rome, by the Popes abhorring it, and damning of it to the pit

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of hell. For ſurely it is fit he ſhould be of farre more authority then *Jacobus Andreas*; not to ſpeak of the Anathematization of it in the Councell of Trent, nor of the common argument of Papiſts, in that they deny that we can be ſaved, many amongſt us are of opinion, that a Papiſt can be ſaved, therefore better to be a Papiſt then a Proteſtant; yet ſurely it is in the power of our corruption to requite malice with malice, and as much to ſcorne with our heeles their Brotherhood, as they ours. But if through the grace of God, we doe not give our ſelves leave to requite their malice, if that be no ſcandall to themſelves, there is no cauſe why it ſhould be any ſcandall unto us. In Sir *Edwin Sands* about Fol. 59. there is ſuch a relation as this, Though the Princes and Heads of the weaker ſides in thoſe parts both of Palſgrave and Landſgrave, have with great wiſdome and judgement (to aſſack thoſe flames) impoſed ſilence on that poynt, to the Miniſters of the one Party, hoping that the charity and diſcretion of the other ſort, would have done the like: yet it falleth out otherwiſe, that Lutheran Preachers rage hitherto in their Pulpits. Now let Arminians if they think good, conclude herehence, that ſeeing there was ſo little charity and diſcretion, in the Lutheran Preachers, it becomes them in their writings and Concluſions, to ſhew as little charity and diſcretion as they for their hearts; and that grace of God which they faſhion to themſelves, will bear them out in this, it beeing meerely the power of their own free-wills. But this is not all I have to ſay in anſwer hereunto.

The phraſe in *Oſiander* is not, *errorum teterrimorum*, but *hæreſeon teterrimarum*, of which this Author ſaith, they reckoned this for one. And let him ſpeak out and tell us, what were the others. Was not the denyall of Conſubſtantiation another? As alſo the denyall of the lawfulneſſe of that Baptiſme, which was adminiſtred by Woemen; (the practice whereof King *James* reformed in our Book of Common-Prayer:) As alſo their not concurrence with them in opinion about *the Perſon of Chriſt*, which by their *Ubiquitary Chimæra* (as Sir *Edwin Sands* call it) they doe miſerably deforme. Theſe and other ſuch like were the errours, whereof this Author ſaith, *Beza* and his Fellowes were proved to be guilty of in this Conference, for ſo I take his meaning, pronouncing thereby ſentence *tanquam ex Cathedra Judicis*; or the Lutheran Party throughout in that Conference: which Conference was not of Predeſtination alone, but *de Cænâ Domini, de Perſonâ Chriſti, de Imaginibus, de Baptiſmo*, and laſt of all *de Prædeſtinatione*.

Yet I have not done with this. For I beſeech you conſider, whether this Author, or his Oracle, be not miſerably deceived in all this, and that theſe *teterrimæ Hæreſes* are not ſuch as *Iacobus Andreas* with his Lutheran party, laid to the charge of *Beza* and his Brethren, but rather ſuch as *Beza* and his Brethren, laid to the charge of the Lutherans; and that not in this Conference, but in their Writings, *in Scriptis*, ſo goeth the relation. Whereas this Conference was not by writing, but only by word of mouth; *Iacobus Andreas* not enduring to give way to *Beza's* motion as touching the conſigning of that which they delivered in writing under their hands. For the relation in *Oſiander* runs thus; *Ad hæc D. Iacobus reſpondit, Woortenbergicos Theologos Deum oraturos, ut Bezæ & ipſius Collegis oculos mentis aperiat. Ut autem illis dextram fraternitatis præbeant non ignorare illos quàm horribilium errorum & teterrimarum hæreſeon in ſuis Scriptis coram Eccleſiâ ipſos reos egerint; Ideoq; ſe mirari quomodo eos pro fratribus agnoſcere poſſint aut velint, aut eorum fraternitatem expetant, ſi pro talibus agnoſcant, qui damnatas Hæreſes ab Orco revocent ut Eccleſiæ Dei obtendant.* Now theſe words though at firſt ſight they may ſeem to be referred, either to the Woortenbergers as accuſing *Beza* and his Brethren, of ſuch errours and hereſies; yet the words following, *Ideoq; ſe mirari quamodo eos pro fratribus agnoſcere poſſint aut velint, aut eorum fraternitatem expetant, ſi pro talibus agnoſcant, qui damnatas Hæreſes ex Orco revocent:* theſe words I ſay doe farre more incline to ſignify, that *Beza* and his Brethren, laid theſe horrible errours and hereſies to the charge of the Lutherans; and therefore the Lutherans wondred, how they could deſire their Brotherhood, whom they accounted ſuch horrible Heretiques; rather then the Lutheran party, ſhould wonder how they ſhould affect Brotherhood with *Beza*, ſeeing they neither did affect any ſuch, and if they had it was not fit they ſhould wonder at their own actions. But that which followes puts it out of all queſtion; where comes in manifeſtly, what the Lutheran Party conceived of the Doctrine of *Beza* implying thereby, what *Beza* and his

Fellows conceived of the Lutherans Doctrine, was formerly expreſſed; the words following are theſe, *Contrà verò in quibus & quàm tetris erroribus ipſi verſentur* (that is *Beza* and his company) *hac Collatione iis demonſtratum eſſe: In quibus cum adhuc perſeverent ipſos intelligere quòd eos pro fratribus agnoſcere non poſſint.* In which words *Andreas* gives the reaſon why he and his Fellowes cannot acknowledge *Beza* and his fellowes for brethren, becauſe they maintained, *tetros errores* (as he calls them;) for proofe whereof he appeales to the preſent Conference. And this being delivered on the contrary part to that which is delivered before, as appears by the very firſt word, *Contra verò*, it followeth, that in the former part was ſet down, the reaſon why *Beza* and his fellowes, ſhould not deſire the fraternity of the Lutheran party, to wit, becauſe they laid to the Lutherans charge, that they maintained *horrible errours and moſt peſtilent Hereſies*, for proof whereof, he appeals not to this preſent Conference, which was carried wholly by word of mouth, but to their Writings. This being clearely the meaning of *Andreas*, it is apparent, that the charge laid by *Beza* and his fellowes, upon the Lutherans, was of fouler crimes, by *Andreas* his relation, then was the charge laid by *Andreas* upon *Beza* and his Brethren. For *Andreas* charged *Beza* only with, *errores tetros*; but *Beza* and his are ſaid to have charged the Lutherans with *horribiles errores, & hæreſes teterrimas*. So that this Author doth miſerably miſtake his own evidences, and ſhamefully abuſeth himſelfe firſt, and others after him, if they will be abuſed by him. And whether he hath not taken it from ſome Achates of his upon truſt I know not; and if it be ſo that ſome Achates hath helped him hereunto, certainly he hath not proved *Fidus Achates* in this.

In the cloſe, it will not be amiſſe to ſhew, how Mr *Maſon* of St *Andrews Vnderſhaft* in *London*, alleageth this carriage of *Jacobus Andreas*, as a teſtimony of the Lutheran uncharitableneſſe, in compariſon with the charitable condition of their oppoſites, in a ſmall Treatiſe of Contentment in Gods gifts. pag. 19. And ſhall their uncharitableneſſe plead for the truth of their way, or be any juſt argument, of the untruth of our way, in any ſober and wiſe mans judgement.

Of *Hemingius* his leaving his own ſide, I never heard or read before, unleſſe that of a Papiſt he became a Proteſtant. But the difference is well known between the rigid and moderate Lutherans, and theſe are called by the other *Semi-Calviniani*. And what I pray hath *Hemingius* deſerved, that his authority ſhould be greater then the authority of *Zuinglius, Calvin, Junius; Zanchius, Piſcator*. The Lutherans themſelves (I ſuppoſe) will hardly think him worthy to be remembred the ſame day with *Martin Luther*. And as for *Martin Luthers* doctrine herein, to my judgement, he is farre more expreſſe and reſolute then *Calvin*, and I find that *Beza* in his Conference of *Mompelgard*, doth ſometimes twit his oppoſites with *Luthers* Doctrine, whereunto throughout that Conference, I doe not find they anſwer any thing at all.

When he ſaith, It is a Morſell, which the greateſt part of the Chriſtian Churches cannot ſwallow; What a wild courſe doth he take in theſe his Motives. Muſt we for every doctrine of ours, examine whether the moſt part of Chriſtian Churches doe embrace it yea or no? Why ſhould wee not then runne out in this our ſearch, and enquire, what is the Moſcoviticall and Grecian Faith, what the Æthiopian, and Abyſſine, and ſo proceed in our contemplative perambulations, all the World over, and what we have found preacht unto our people alſo, to their more profound, and ſubſtantiall edification, if they liſt to believe us upon our word. But I ſuppoſe he looked no farther then to this Weſterne World, ſecluding the new diſcoveries within the laſt hundred years or ſomewhat more. And very confidently he muſt exclude all Popiſh Churches, or preſume they are for him in this. Yet as I ſaid, the very laſt Arminian, I have had to deale with, hath told me to my face, that my Doctrine of abſolute Reprobation, I have learned it of the Papiſts; and another to this purpoſe, there is no materiall difference between the *Gratia Congrua* of the Jeſuits, and *Gratia prædeterminans* of the Dominicans. And ſecluding Popiſh Churches, I know not who they are, whom he calls the greateſt part of the Chriſtian Churches. Be it, that the Lutheran Churches are a greater Party, then the Churches of the Calviniſts (which is more then I find in Sir *Edwin Sands* his Relation.) Now ſuppoſe the number of the Calviniſts and their power were greater then that of the Lutherans; ask I pray any Lutheran in the World whether that were any reaſonable motive unto him to change his Religion and turne

Calviniſt?

Calviniſt? If it be of no weight to perſwade them, why ſhould it be of any moment to prevaile with us?

I come now to the Fourth and laſt of theſe Motives.

DISCOURSE.

The Fourth Motive.

Its affinity with the old exploded and condemned Errours of the Stoicks and Manichees.

THe Opinion of the Stoicks was, that all actions and events were inevitable, and determined, either by the revolutions of the Heavens, and the qualities of the Starres, which raigne at mens births, or by the Concatenation of naturall things, and the diſpoſition of the firſt matters of all things, being ſo put together from eternity, that one thing muſt needs follow another as it doth, and the *Materia Prima* being ſo diſpoſed, that all things cannot ſucceſſively come to paſſe otherwiſe then they doe, but muſt of neceſſity be as they are, even *invito Deo*, though God would have ſome things to be otherwiſe then they be.

The Manichees held, that all mens actions, good or evill, were determined too: Good actions by a good God, who was the author of all good things created, and of all good actions that fell out in the World: Evill actions by an Evill God, who was the *primum principium malt*, the firſt and principall author of all evill things that were extant in the world.

The Maintainers of the abſolute decree, doe ſay one of theſe two things; either that all actions naturall and morall, good and evill, and all events likewiſe are abſolutely neceſſary, or that all mens ends (at leaſt) are unalterable and undeterminable by the power of their wills, which is upon the matter all one. For in vain is our freedome in the actions, if the end which they drive at be pitched and determined, ſith, *Omnis actio eſt propter finem*, All actions are done for the ends ſake, that it might be obtained by them, which without them could not.

Now in theſe three Opinions, we may note two things.

1. The ſubſtance and formality of them, which is an unavoidableneſſe of mens actions and ends whatſoever they be; In this all of them agree and holding that in all things, undeclinable fates, and inſuperable neceſſity doe domineere. And therefore *Melanthon* doth not ſlack in many of his common Places, to call this abſolute decree, *Fatum Stoicum*, *Tabulas Parcarum*, and to charge the Church of Geneva (the great defender of it) with a labour to bring in the Stoicks errours, as we may ſee in a certain Epiſtle of *Melanthons* to *Peucer*, where he ſpeaks thus, *Scribit ad me Latius de Stoico Fato uſq; adeo litem Genevæ moveri, ut quidam in carcerem conjectus ſit propterea quod à Zenone differret. O Miſera Tempora! Doctrina ſalutis peregrinis quibuſdam dubitationibus obſcuratur.* And *Beza* too ſpeaking of *Melanthon* ſaies, *Philippus de his rebus ita ſcribere caperat, ut Genevenſes quaſi Stoicorum Fatum invehentes notare quibuſdam videatur.*

2. The Circumſtances or the grounds of their Opinions. The Stoicks derive this neceſſity from the Starres or firſt matter, the Manichees from *duo prima principia æterna & coæterna*, and theſe laſt from the peremptory decree of Almighty God. ſo that in this they differ, but in this difference, the Stoicks and the Manichees in ſome reſpects have the better. For it is better to derive the neceſſity of evill actions, or unhappy events from an evill God, or from the courſe of nature, then from the decree of that God who is infinitely good. The ſubſtance of their Opinions is all one, the ground wherein they differ is but accidentall to their errour.

If it be ſo, for this very reaſon alone may this doctrine of abſolute reprobation be ſuſpected, becauſe theſe dreams of the Stoicks were exploded by the beſt Philoſophers of all ſorts: and this of the Manichees was generally cryed down by the Fathers, not only as fooliſh, but as impious and unworthy of entertainment in a Chriſtian heart, or Chriſtian Commonwealth, not ſo much for any thing circumſtantiall in it, but becauſe it made all things and events neceſſary, and ſo plucked up the roots of virtue, planted vice, and left no place for iuſt rewards or puniſhments.

Theſe are my Reaſons of the firſt ſort.

TWISSE

Consideration.

OUR Doctrine I see is cryed downe, not only as infamous, but also as Stoicall, and Manichaicall. Now I had thought the infamy of it had consisted only in the Stoicality of it, and it is no way fit to coördinate the Genus with the Species, in multiplying criminations. But I remember what the Poet observes to fall out sometimes, namely, that,

Accedit fervor capiti numerusq; lucernis.

It calls to my remembrance a story that Mr *Bastard* sometimes told my good friend D. *Hoskins*, it was of a neighbour that came to him complaining of a friend of his, that had lost all his five Senses; as for example, his sight and his seeing, and so proceeded in his amplification: with whom Mr *Bastard* as it were, condoling, answered, Though he had lost his sight, yet if he had retained his seeing, there had been some comfort. True Sir quoth the plain fellow. In like sort, I might say, that though our Doctrine in this poynt be Stoicall, yet if it were not infamous there were some comfort in it, but the heavy crimination laid to our charge is, that it is not only Stoicall, but infamous also. But let this be our comfort, that nothing herein is laid to our charg, which was not laid to the charg of *Austin*, many hundred years agoe. This *Prosper* testifies after *Austins* death, to have been the practice of the Pelagians. *Prout sibi obnoxias aliquorum aures opportunasq; repererint, scripta ejus quibus error Pelagianorum impugnatur, infamant, dicentes, eum liberum arbitrium penitùs submovere & sub gratiæ nomine necessitatem prædicare fatalem.* Neither was he free from this reproach while he lived, as appears by divers passages; as *Contr. duas Epistol. Pelagiani. lib. 2. cap. 5. Sub nomine, inquiunt, gratiæ ita fatum astruunt, ut dicant, quia nisi Deus invito & reluctanti homini inspiraverit boni & ipsius imperfecti cupiditatem, nec à malo declinare, nec bonum posset arripere.* This is the objection; His Answer followeth in these words. *Nec sub nomine gratiæ Fatum asserimus, quia nullis hominum meritis dicimus Dei gratiam antecedi. Si autem quibusdam omnipotentis Dei voluntatem placet Fati nomine nuncupari, profanas quidem verborum novitates evitamus, sed de verbis contendere non amamus.* And cap. 6. *Fatum qui affirmant de syderum positione ad tempus quo concipitur quisq; vel nascitur, quas Constellationes vocant, non solùm actus & eventa, verum etiam ipsas nostras voluntates pendere contendunt. Dei verò gratia non solùm omnia sydera & omnes cælos, utrum etiam omnes Angelos supergreditur. Deinde Fati assertores & bona & mala hominum Fato tribuunt. Deus autem in malis hominum meritis eorum debita retributione prosequitur; bona verò per indebitam gratiam misericordi voluntate largitur: utrumq; faciens non per stellarum temporale consortium, sed per suæ severitatis & bonitatis æternum altumq; consilium. Neutrum ergò pertinere videmus ad Fatum.* And cap. 8. *Jam de Gratia & Fato quàm inania loquuntur ostendimus. Nunc illud est quod debemus advertere, utrum invito & reluctanti homini Deus inspiret boni cupiditatem, ut jam non sit reluctans, non sit invitus, sed consentiens bono, & volens bonum.* In like sort, the Pelagians charged *Austin* with Manicheisme, *De Nupt. & Concupisc. lib. 2. cap. 3.* to whom he answereth thus, *Quid obtendis ad fallendum communis dogmatis tegmen, ut operias proprium crimen, unde vobis inditum est nomen, atq; ut nefario vocabulo terras imperitos, dicis, ne igitur vocentur Hæretici, fiant Manichæi.* And more at large, *Contr. duas Epist. Pelag. ad Bonifacium, cap. 2. Manichæi dicunt Deum bonum non omnium naturarum esse creatorem: Pelagiani dicunt, Deum non esse omnium ætatum in hominibus mundatorem, salvatorem, liberatorem. Catholica utrosq; redarguit, & contra Manichæos defendens Dei creaturam ne ab illo instituta negetur ulla creatura; & contrà Pelagianos ut in omnibus ætatibus perdita requiratur humana natura.*

Prosp. Epist. ad Ruffin.

2. *Manichæi carnis concupiscentiam non tanquam accidens vitium, sed tanquam naturam ab æternitate malam vituperant: Pelagiani eam tanquam nullum vitium sed naturale sit, bonum insuper laudant. Catholica utrosq; redarguit, Manichæis dicens non natura, sed vitium est; Pelagianis dicens, Non à Patre, sed ex mundo est, ut eam velut malam valetudinem sanari utriq; permittant, desinendo illi tanquam insanabilem credere, isti tanquam laudabilem prædicare.*

3. *Manichæi negant, homini bono ex libro arbitrio fuisse initium mali; Pelagiani dicunt etiam*

etiam hominem malum ſufficienter habere liberum arbitrium ad faciendum præceptum bonum. Catholica utroſq; redarguit, & illis dicens, Fecit Deus hominem rectum; & iſtis dicens, ſi vos Filius liberaverit, verè liberi eritis.

4. *Manichæi dicunt, animam particulam Dei, naturæ malæ commixtione habere peccatum; Pelagiani dicunt, animam juſtam non quidem particulam, ſed creaturam Dei, etiam in iſtâ corruptibili vitâ non habere peccatum. Catholica utroſq; redarguit, Manichæis dicens, Aut facile arborem bonam, & fructum ejus bonum, aut facile arborem malam & fructum ejus malum; Pelagianis dicens, ſi dixerimus quia non habemus peccatum, noſmetipſos ſeducimus. His morbis inter ſe contrariis Manichæi Pelagianiq; confligunt diſſimili voluntate, ſimili vanitate, ſeperati opinione diverſâ, ſed propinqui mente perverſâ. Jam verò gratiam Chriſti ſimul oppugnant, Baptiſmum ejus ſimul evacuant, Carnem ejus ſimul inhonorant, ſed etiam hoc modis cauſiſq; diverſis. Nam Manichæi meritis naturæ bonæ, Pelagiani autem meritis voluntatis bonæ perhibent divinitus ſubveniri. Illi dicunt, debet hoc Deus laboribus membrorum ſuorum: Iſti dicunt, debet hoc virtutibus ſervorum ſuorum. Utriſq; ergò merces non imputatur ſecundum gratiam, ſed ſecundum debitum.*

But come we to the conſideration of the particulars delivered by this Author. 1. As touching the opinion of the Stoicks and Manichees. 2. As touching the Parallell he makes, between their opinion and ours, in the poynt of Predeſtination.

1. The Chaldeans and Aſtrologers, did altogether place Fate, in the influencies of the ſtarres, and becauſe thoſe glorious bodies, did infatuate the World with a ſhew of Divinity (which the Lord Laboured to prevent in the Jewes. *Deutr.* 4.) no marvail if the vulgar ſort did acknowledge no other fate, but that. As *Auſtin* ſaith, *De Civit. Dei lib.* 5. *cap.* 1. *Id (Fatum) homines quando audiunt uſitatâ loquendi conſuetudine non intelligunt, niſi vim poſitionis ſyderum, qualis eſt quando quis naſcitur ſive concipitur.* But I doe not find that the Stoicks did thus diſtinguiſh, but by their *Series Cauſarum*, they comprehended *all cauſes cæleſtiall or ſublunary. Ramus* indeed conceived ſuch a difference between *Poſſidonius* and *Chryſippus* both Stoicks, but *Turnebus* makes bold to tell him, that herein he erred. *Quod autem Poſſidonium dicis ſtudio Aſtrologiæ oblectatum, Fatum ſyderibus attribuiſſe in eo peccas, quod aliam ejus quam Chryſippi ſententiam putas, nec eam totam complecteris. Nam ſi in ſimul ægrotantibus fratribus cauſam eſſe dicebat in ſyderum & cæli conſtitutione & affectione, non tamen idcircò in aliis rebus Fatum non eſſe judicabat.* Nay he profeſſeth that according to all the Stoicks, *Fatum* was God himſelfe and nature; and that by *Fatum* they underſtood, *omnem naturæ contagionem*, which was *Cicero's* phraſe. As indeed the whole frame of nature is knit together *per contactum*, which *Cicero* called *Naturæ contagionem*. And he proves as much of *Poſſidonius* out of *Cicero De Divinatione*. For *Quintus* therein profeſſing according to the opinion of *Poſſidonius*, that all force and courſe of Divination, was derived from God, from deſtiny, and from nature, he concludes therehence, that all kind of artificiall and naturall Divination, were in his opinion comprehended under the notion of Fate. And out of *Cicero's* ſecond Book of Divination ſhewes, that whereas *Poſſidonius* his opinion was, *Vim quandam ſentientem & divinam quæ tota confuſa ſit mundo, ad hoſtiam deligendam ducere.* He concludes thus; *Satis ut opinor, ſignificat Poſſidonium non in ſyderibus tantum Fatum poſuiſſe, ſed per omnem mundi continuationem & naturæ conjunctionem, ordinem ſeriemq; cauſarum permanare credidiſſe. Idem Poſſidonius* (ſaith he) *παλμικὸν ὁτιοῦν ισμα* ſcripſerat, *quod non feciſſet, ſi in ſyderibus tantum Fatum eſſe ſenſiſſet.* And like as *Poſſidonius* did not inſiſt only in the ſtarres, for the confirmation of Fate, ſo neither did *Chryſippus* in inferior cauſes. *Neceſſitatem naturæ acutus interpres* (he taxeth *Ramus*) *ad Chryſippum pertinere aſtrorum ad Poſſidonium credidiſti; errorem errore cumulaſti. Nam nec Poſſidonius in ſolis aſtris Fatum ponebat ſed in totâ naturæ contagione, ut ſuprà docui: & Chryſippus in eâdem naturæ contagione, quâ etiam aſtra continentur, quod non intellexiſti.* And that he proves out of *Cicero* anſwering *Chryſippus* in this manner. *Ut igitur ad quaſdam res natura loci pertinet, ad quaſdam autem nihil: ſic affectio aſtrorum valeat, ſivis ad quaſdam res; ad omnes certè non valebit. Chryſippum enim alloquitur* (ſaith *Turnebus*) *ut vel puero notum eſt, ut me tui pudeat & pigeat, qui Poſſidonium intelligis.* Thus he diſciplines *Ramus*, and proceed farther, ſaying, *Chryſippum autem in aſtrorum conſtitutione, & affectione Fatum poſuiſſe, audi ex Cicerone; ſi quis, verbi cauſâ oriente Caniculâ natus eſt, is in mari non morietur. Vigila Chryſippe &c. Nihil iſtud argumentum* (thus *Turnebus* concludes herehence) *niſi etiam in aſtris Fatum poneret.* So that the foure opinions concerning Fate, related by *Ludovicus Vives* in 4. *lib. Auguſt. De Civit. Dei cap.* 8. and that out of *Picus Mirandula, lib.* 2. *Contra Aſtrologos*; The firſt whereof is ſaid to be *Nature*; The ſecond, a *Series of cauſes*

ſes neceſſary knit together, the Third the *Starres*, the Fourth the *Execution of Divine Decree*. I ſay all theſe make but one Fatum with the Stoicks, yea with all the Stoicks in the judgement of *Turnebus*. And *Auſtin De Civit. Dei lib.* 5. *cap.*8. expreſly includes the will of God within that Series of cauſes, which was accounted *Fatum* in the Opinion of the Stoicks, and upon that ground approves of it. As for neceſſitation by reaſon of diſpoſition of the Matter Prime, whereby things were brought to paſſe in deſpite of God; I find no ſuch thing, neither in *Auſtin*, nor in thoſe that comment upon him, *Ludovicus Vives* and *Coqueus*, nor in *Ramus* or *Turnebus*; but rather to the contrary in *Ludovicus Vives*, who diſtinguiſheth out of the opinion of *Plato*, as touching one God whom he made *Principem Parentemq; cæterorum*; the *Cæteri* belike were ſuch ſpirits as wee call Angells. And that *Maximi Dei leges* were *inevitabiles*, and this was called Neceſſity, and ſuch a Neceſſity, *cui ne Deos quidem* (that is inferior ſpirits) *reſiſtere poſſe. Quæ verò ab Aſtris geruntur, talia interdum eſſe ut evitari ſapientiâ, induſtriâ, labore queant, in quo ſita eſt Fortuna. Quæ verò certis cauſis progrederentur ac permanerent fixa, id dici Fatum quod tamen neceſſitatem non afferat electioni.*

That the Manichees maintained two ſupreme and coëternall cauſes of all things, we read; the one the cauſe of Good, the other of Evill: and that every creature was a ſubſtantiall part of one or both; and that man in his nature was compounded of both, and that his corruption was eſſentiall from the ſupream Author of evill, and not ſuch as acrewed to him of diſobedience, We read. But of their opinion that all things were determined by them, both good, and evill, I no where read, but in this Authors Legend. *Danæus* hath commented upon *Auſtin de Hæreſibus*, and to every Head of Hereſy draws what he hath read thereof in other Authors. But I find no mention at all of this Article amongſt 21 ſhamefull errours of theirs which he reckons up. The 19th is this, *Voluntatem malè agendi, quod vocant liberum arbitrium, nobis à naturâ ipſâ inſitam, non rebellione noſtrâ acceſſitam, vel ex inobedientiâ natam; Quanquam homines propriâ voluntate peccant.* And where *Auſtin* anſwereth the criminations againſt the Catholiques made by the Pelagians, I find no mention at all of this. He ſhould have ſhewed from whom he takes this, that underſtanding their Opinion aright, we might the better judge of the reproachfull compariſon which he makes.

2 To the conſideration of which compariſon of his, I now addreſſe my ſelfe. He propoſeth two things, one whereof he ſaith, muſt needs be maintained.

The Firſt whereof is this; *That all actions naturall and Morall, good and evill, and all events likewiſe, are abſolutely neceſſary.*

Concerning which, I ſay Firſt; I have cauſe to doubt that this Author underſtands not aright, the very notions of abſolute neceſſity, and neceſſity not abſolute. There is no greater neceſſity, then neceſſity of nature. And this neceſſity is twofold; either in *Eſſendo*, in being, or in *Operando*, in working. God alone is neceſſary in being, and his being is abſolutely neceſſary; it being impoſſible he ſhould not be, as not only we believe, but Schoole Divines demonſtrate, and that with great variety, of evident, and curious concluſions. As for the other neceſſity, which is in reſpect of operation: Firſt, this is no way incident unto God, ſpeaking of operation *ad extrà*, and ſecluding the myſterious emanations within the Divine Nature; ſuch as are the Generation of the Sonne by the Father, and the wonderfull Proceſſion of the Holy Ghoſt from the Father and the Sonne. But *ad extra* this neceſſity of operation is only found in the creature, and that only in ſuch creatures, as by neceſſity of nature are determined one way: as fire to burne; heavy things to move downwards, and light things upwards; the Sunne, Moone, and ſtarres to give light; and the heavens to turne round; all naturall Agents in a word diſtinct from rationall are thus determined, to wit, to work that, whereunto they are inclined by neceſſity of nature; but yet ſo that being finite, they are ſubject to ſuperiour powers, and thereby obnoxious to impediment moſt of them, even to powers create; all of them to power increate. Whence it comes paſſe that no work of theirs is abſolutely neceſſary, eſpecially in reſpect of God, who can either ſet an end to all when he will, or reſtraine their operations at his pleaſure. We know the Three Noble Children, when they came forth of the fiery oven, had not ſo much as any ſmell of the fire upon them. And therefore *Durand* profeſſeth that theſe things which are commonly accounted to come to paſſe moſt neceſſarily, doe indeed come to paſſe meerely contingently, in reſpect of the will of God.

Nevertheleſſe we willingly profeſſe, that upon ſuppoſition of the will of God, that this or that ſhall come to paſſe, it followeth neceſſarily that ſuch a thing ſhall come

to

to passe; like as upon supposition, that God knowes such a thing shall come to passe, it followeth necessarily, that such a thing shall come to passe; but how? not necessarily: but either necessarily according as some things are brought to passe by naturall agents, working necessarily after the manner aforesaid; or contingently and freely according as some things are brought to passe, by rationall agents, working contingently and freely. And therefore as touching the Question of the Schooles about the root of contingency, *Aquinas* and *Scotus* concurre in resolving it into the Will of God, but with this difference; *Scotus* relates it into the will of God as a free agent. *Aquinas* resolves it into the Will of God, as an efficacious agent. For the will of God is so efficacious, that he can effectually procure, both that things necessary shall be brought to passe necessarily, and things contingent, contingently; and according he hath provided congruous causes hereof, to wit, both agents naturall for the produceing of necessary things necessarily, and agents rationall for the producing of contingent things, contingently and freely. Thus God preordained that *Josias* should burne the Prophets bones upon the Altar, that *Cyrus* should proclaim liberty to the Jewes, to returne into their Country; yet what sober Divine hath made doubt, whether *Josias* and *Cyrus* did not herein, that which they did freely. And as in doing, so in abstaining from doing. For God ordained that Christs bones should not be broken; as also that when the Jewes, all the Males, came up to the Lord thrice in the year to Jerusalem, None of their neighbours should desire their land. *Exod.*34.24. Yet what sober man should make question, whether the Souldiers did non as freely abstaine from breaking Christs bones, as from ought else, and so likewise the bordering Nations did as freely abstaine, from invading the land of Israel. And how often is this phrase used in Scripture, *Necesse est*, of some things coming to passe, which yet came to passe as contingently and freely, as ought else. And unlesse this be granted, that Gods determination is nothing prejudiciall to the freedome of the creatures will, either we must deny faith and repentance to be the gifts of God, or that they are works produced freely, and so every action pleasing in the sight of God. For the Scripture expressely professeth, that God it is, who worketh in us every thing that is pleasing in his sight. And whatsoever God workes in us, or bestows upon us in time, the same he determined, to work in us, and to bestow upon us from everlasting. For he worketh all things according to the counsell of his will *Ephes.*1.11. and the counsell of his Will was everlasting, it being the same with God himselfe.

Now I come to the second.

2. And that is this. That all mens ends are unalterable and indeterminable by the power of their Wills; and this he saith is upon the matter all one.

1. Now this is most untrue, there being a vast difference between the actions of men, and the ends of men; The ends of men being the works of God. And what a monster shall he be in the Church of God, that with *Vorstius* shall dare to affirme, that all the works of God, were not determined from everlasting; or being determined, they are alterable, and that in such sort, as to be otherwise determinable by the wills of men; especially considering that the very acts of mens wills, being wrought by God, (as all sides now a daies confesse) it consequently followes that they were also determined from everlasting, by the Will and Counsell of God. What should I alleage the 11th Article of Ireland for this? *God from all eternity did by his unchangeable Counsell ordaine, whatsoever in time should come to passe: yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor contingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather.* There is no Arminian that I know dares deny, either that every act of man is wrought by God, or that, look what God doth work in time, the same he did before all time decree, and that from everlasting. I know there is a main, and a most Atheisticall difference between us on one part, but I doe not find them willing to shew their hornes directly therein, but carry the matter so, as if they would obtrude upon us the acknowledgement, either of the temporall (not eternall) condition of decrees divine, or at least of their alterable nature; whereas themselves dare not plainly manifest themselves, to be of any such Atheisticall beliefe. Let us instance in particular: Let the salvation of some, and damnation of others, be the ends this Author meaneth. Now dare any of them with o-

pen face profeſſe, that the ſalvation of the elect, and damnation of the reprobate was not from everlaſting determined by God. Be the ſupream ends of God concerning man, the manifeſtation of his glory in the way of mercy on ſome, in the way of vindicative juſtice on others. Dare any of them profeſſe, that any of theſe ends are not from everlaſting determined by God; or being ſo determined, dare they profeſſe, that theſe divine decrees are alterable, or poſſible to be undetermined by the will of the creature? What a prodigious aſſertion were either of theſe? If they dare not ſay, Gods will is changeable, What an unſhamefac'd courſe is this, to obtrude upon us an alterable, that is, a changeable condition of Gods decrees? But perhaps you may ſay, here is no mention at all made of Gods decrees, but of mans ends. And I willingly confeſſe there is not. And I am perſwaded, this Author dares not in plain termes profeſſe, that Gods decrees are alterable. But hereby you may perceive, and have a manifeſt document of the illuſions of Satan, and how mens carnall affections, which are more in love with errour then truth, doe make them to ſhut their eyes againſt the one, and open them unto the other. It were a very harſh thing to ſay plainly, that Gods decrees are alterable, and that being determined by him, they might be undone, or made undetermined by the wills of men. Therefore the Devill finds a means to draw us, to entertain the ſame blaſphemous opinion, not barefac'd, but hoodwickt as it were, and that is by changing the phraſe. For though it be uncouth to heare of an alterable condition of Gods decrees, yet it ſeems nothing harſh to diſcourſe of the alterable condition of mens ends. But give me leave to unmask the Witch, and make it appeare how the Devill gulls us in this.

Mens ends are either ſo called, as intended by man himſelfe, or as appoynted by God. If this Author ſpeak of mens ends, as intended by man himſelfe, wee willingly grant, that they are alterable at his pleaſure; as for example, Man intends one thing to day, he may intend another thing to morrow, he intends one thing this houre, he may intend another thing the next, and at his pleaſure reverſe his former intentions. And no marvail, conſidering that man partly is of a fickle diſpoſition in reſpect of his affections, ſtudious of change, and ſubject to innovation as the Moone; partly of an improvident diſpoſition, he knows not what a Yeare, what a Month, what a Day, what an houre may bring forth. And therefore though never ſo wiſe and conſtant in his courſes, yet may he have juſt cauſe to change his reſolutions and purpoſes. But of ſuch ends of man, to wit, as intended by man, it is manifeſt this Author ſpeaks not.

But of ends appointed by God, theſe be the ends he will have to be alterable and determinable anew by the wills of men, which cannot be without the alteration and change of Gods purpoſes and intentions, which is as much as to ſay, without the change and revocation of Gods decrees. And an end not yet actually exiſting, but only in intention, can admit of no other alteration then in intention, which this Author conſidering not, though perhaps he abhorres to ſay Gods decrees are changeable and alterable, and ſhuts out ſo uncouth an aſſertion at the fore-doore, yet as it were by a back-doore to receive it in, and in the dark and muffled, or veyled only with a different phraſe, a different expreſſion; Yet forthwith he takes a new courſe; For whereas by the word *unalterable*, he did imply that Gods decrees concerning mens ends, ſhould be of an alterable condition; in the words following he changeth his tone, and will not have the ends of man to be determined by God at all, but left unto man to be determined; as when he ſaith, *In vaine is our freedome in the actions, if the end which they drive at be pitched and determined.* Whereby it is manifeſt, he will not have the end whereunto men drive to be determined. And this end can be no other then ſalvation; for that alone I take to be that whereto men drive, and which they labour to attaine, every one naturally ſeeking after *Summum bonum*, after happineſſe. So that in the iſſue it comes to this, The ſalvation of this Author is not yet determined by God, but left to be determined by his will, and that I take to be in the way of a moving cauſe, and that moving cauſe I gueſſe to be, his finall perſeverance in faith and repentance, whereupon and not till then, ſhall this mans ſalvation be determined by God, as much as to ſay, that Gods decrees are as meerly temporall as are the executions of them. And herein this Author doth exactly agree with Doctor *Jackſon* perhaps being ſo happy as to underſtand him, or perhaps being ſo happy as to light upon an interpreter of him

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ſome one that breaths the ſame ſpirit of oppoſition to Gods truth, and that after the ſame way. For ſometimes the Doctor pleads for a revocable condition of the divine decrees. For the Pope never bindes his hands by any Grant he makes; and why ſhould God bind his hands by any decree he makes? eſpecially conſidering that God hath more wiſdome and goodneſſe to manage ſuch authority then the Pope. But if it be diſhoneſty for a man to take liberty to break his promiſes, I pray what goodneſſe is required to the managing thereof? Yet that Doctor keeps his courſe in diſcourſing of an impotent immutability, and ſaith, it is indecent to attribute any ſuch immutability unto God; whereas immutability is a notion which connotates no power of doing at all, but only a power of ſuffering, and formally denotes the negation thereof. And what madneſſe is it to ſay, that the leſſe power God hath of receiving change, the leſſe power he hath of working? Yet this is not all; He hath another device anſwerable to the latter courſe of this Author, and that is, that Nothing, concerning any mans ſalvation or damnation, is determined by God before he is borne, or before his death: and to that purpoſe he ſaith that God is ſtill decreeing, as if hitherto he had not decreed ought. And would you know of whom he learned this? *Rogers* in his expoſition of the Articles of the Church of England, a Book dedicated to Arch-Biſhop *Bancroft*, & *allowed by the lawfull authority of the Church of England*, writing upon the 17th Article, and delivering his ſecond propoſition, collected therehence, in this forme, Predeſtination hath been from everlaſting; when he comes to ſet forth the Adverſaries of this truth, *Thoſe wrangling Sophiſters*, ſaith he, *are deceived, who becauſe God is not included within the compaſſe of any time, but hath all things to come as preſent before his eyes, doe ſay, that God he did not in the time long agoe paſt only, but ſtill in the time preſent likewiſe doth Predeſtinate.*

2. Conſider we the reaſon he gives for ſo ſhamefull an aſſertion, as touching the alterable condition of Gods decrees, or as touching the ends of men, as yet undetermined by God, In vaine, ſaith he, is freedome in the actions, if the end which they drive at, be determined. Here, Firſt, we have a wild phraſe *Freedome in actions*. For by freedome we underſtand an active power of working after a certain manner, which power is found in the will, not in the actions. Secondly, a bare avouching that unleſſe God as yet hath left the ends of men living undetermined, or in caſe he hath determined them, unleſſe theſe determinations of his be alterable, Freedome of Will is given in vaine; as much as to ſay, unleſſe we admit of ſuch monſtrous aſſertions, the freedome of mans Will is in vaine. But we ſay this conſequence is moſt untrue, and we give our reaſon for it. For whether ſalvation or damnation be the ends he meaneth, no creature is capable of either, but only creatures rationall; and the one being beſtowed by way of reward, and the other inflicted by way of puniſhment, each of theſe preſuppoſeth freedome of Will in the parties thus proceeded with: Or whether the ends are the manifeſtation of Gods vindicative and remunerative juſtice, for the ſame reaſon now ſpecified, each of theſe doth neceſſarily beſpeak freedome of Will in them, who after either way are made uſeleſſe on whom the glory of God is to be manifeſted. When he addes ſaying *Omnis actio* is *propter finem*. This altogether concernes the ends intended, and propoſed by the author of the action, nothing concernes the ends propoſed by another. And the ends of a man propoſed by himſelfe, are either ſupreame or intermediate, ſtill every action deliberate (for ſo alone it holds) tends to one end or other, which man himſelfe intends. The ſupream end of every one is his chief good; but as touching that wherein this conſiſts, all doe not agree. Some place it in wealth, ſome in pleaſure, ſome in honour, ſome in virtuous life. By the light of Grace we are taught, that as we are creatures, our end, which we ſhould propoſe unto our ſelves, is the glorifying of God our Creator, though there were neither reward nor puniſhment. But if there be a glorious reward to be gotten by it, and a dreadfull puniſhment to be ſuffered of them, that ſeek the ſatisfying of their own luſts, and not the glory of God, this is a double hedge unto us, to keep us in the good waies of the Lord, and to move us to make ſtrait ſtepps unto him; but ſurely the end of the creature, ſtill is the glorifying of God that made him. God makes it his care to provide for us, let our care be to glorify him; for ſeeing all things are from him, therefore all things muſt be for him; and ſeeing we are reaſonable creatures, and know this we muſt goe on, in conforming our ſelves hereunto, and ſeeking his glory. And albeit this Author may conceive, that ſalvation is the end he aimes at, yet can I

not beleeve that he makes damnation the end that any man drives at. Nothing being fit to be a mans end, but that which hath *rationem Boni*, which surely damnation hath not.

3. His Annotations as touching the three Opinions proposed by him, come to be considered in the next place; and these are two.

1. The Substance and Formality of them, which, as he saith is an unavoidablenesse of mens actions and ends whatsoever they be. And in this, he saith, all of them agree, all holding that in all things, undeclinable Fates, and insuperable necessity doe domincere. Whereunto I answer, that this is contradictory to his own premises, as touching the third Opinion. For against the Maintainers of Gods absolute decree, he did formerly object only disjunctively, that either all mens actions were absolutely necessary, that is unavoidable, or at least, that mens ends were unavoidable; which is to inferre, that but one of them is avoidable; but here he professeth (as upon that which he had formerly delivered) that by the Third Opinion, both mens actions and their ends were unavoidable. And as for the second Opinion of the Manichees, I find no mention of the unavoidable condition, either of mans actions or ends at all, in the Relation thereof, by those who have most studied their History. And as for the Stoicks, I no where find, that they denied the liberty of mens will, or that it was in mans power, either to forbeare the doing of that he doth, or to doe the things he forbears to doe; but rather the contrary, that they made choyce, some of them at least, (though *Austin* delivers it without any such distinction) to exempt the wills of men from subjection unto Fate: though I deny not, but that many vain discourses might be differently entertained by them, having no better light to guide them, then the light of nature, and wanting that which God hath in great mercy vouchsafed unto us, the light of grace, and that in very plentifull manner. Much lesse doe I find by them, that any thing came to passe, *invito Deo*. Though I willingly confesse, that such a generation hath risen up in these daies, affirming that God willeth and desireth the salvation of all men, and yet the greater part of men are damned. And what is to come to passe, *invito Deo*, if this be not, I willingly professe I know not.

But *Melanchon*, he saith, doth not spare to call this absolute decree, *Fatum Stoicum*, *Tabulas Parcarum*, *and to charge the Church of Geneva, with labouring to bring in the Stoicks errours, as appears by Melanchons Epistle to Peucer, and Beza's confession in the life of Calvin.* To all which I answer.

1. That this Author either was better read in *Melanchon* then in *Luther*, or no so just matter could he find in *Luther*, to cry down the absolute nature of Gods decrees.

2. *Beza* reports what *Melanchon* seems to some, and that Epistle of his to *Peucer* might be their ground. Now therein he delivers his mind meerly upon *Lælius* his relation, which was this, *De Stoico Fato usq; adeò litem Genevæ moveri, ut Quidam in carcerem conjectius sit propterea quod à Leone differret.* This I say is *Lælius* his relation made unto *Melanchon*, whereupon *Melanchon* saith no more then this, *O Misera tempora! doctrina salutis peregrinis quibusdam disputationibus obscuratur.*

3. *Melanchon* died foure years before *Calvin*, the one *Anno* 1560. the other 1564. And therefore if he did passe any censure on the Church of Geneva, it was in *Calvins* daies, many years before his death. Now *Calvin* and he were very great: *Melanchon* so well known and esteemed by *Calvin*, that more then once he appeals to *Melanchons* judgement. Once in the point *De Cænâ Domini*, mentioned by *Ostander*, *Hist. Eccles. Cent.* 16. *Anno* 1558. *pag.* 666. which was but two years before his death. Likewise in the poynt of Free-will and Predestination, as appears by *Calvins* Epistle unto him, prefixed to his Books, *de Libero Arbitrio*, which he sent unto *Melanchon*: Was it ever known that *Melanchon* passeth any censure upon them?

4. When *Grotius* in like manner objected *Melanchon*, see I pray how *Lubbertus* answereth him, *In Respon. ad Pietatem Grotii. Quod ad Melanchthonem attinet, erras si ipsam stare pro Remonstrantibus existimas, &c.* Idem Melanchon in 9. ad Romanos, *Cur inquit nos ad Evangelium vocavit & non vocavit Alexandrum Macedonem, Augustum, Socratem, Pomponium Atticum, qui non minus civiliter vivebant quàm nos. Hic necesse est causam rejicere in voluntatem Dei. Et Jacob electius est, Esau reprobatus priusquam quicquam boni vel mali fecissent: Ergo opera non erant causa, sed voluntas vocantis. Non addam hic, quomodo cavillentur ista nonnulli. Tantum hoc meminerit Lector, si opera secutura in vita erunt causa electionis, non licuit Apostolo dicere,*

Non

Non ex operibus. Ex his constat (saith *Lubbertus*) *Melanchthonem idem cum Calvino & Luthero de prædestinatione sensisse. Fatetur hoc ipse Melanchthon ad Calvinum; suo* (*inquiens*) *hæc cum tuis congruere, sed mea sunt παχύτερα, & ad usum accommodata. Idem in Epistolâ ad Erasmum: Ego integrâ conscientiâ non possum Lutheri dogmata damnare.* He proceeds farther to shew, the different Method used by them in delivering the doctrine of Prædestination. *Calvinus*, saith he, *à Priori docet, illos qui electi sunt, immutabili Dei consilio electos esse, atq; inde infert illos perire non posse. Melanchthon verò a Posteriori docet, nos ex verâ fide & seriâ resipiscentiâ discere quòd sumus electi, Ego credo in Jesum Christum & seriò resipisco, ergo sum electus: atq; ita in ipsâ re consentiunt. Hanc enim Melanchthonis argumentationem approbat Calvinus, & illam Calvini approbat Melanchthon, tantum abest, ut alter alterius doctrinam rejiciat aut contemnat.*

5. When I observed this relation made out of an Epistle of *Melanchthons* unto *Calvin*, I could not rest satisfied untill I had seen the Epistle it selfe: at length I found it amongst *Calvins*, *Epist.* 49. Therein coming to the poynt, *Ad Quæstionem* (saith he) *de prædestinatione habebam amicum Tubingæ doctum hominem Franciscum Stadianum, qui dicere solebat, se utrumq; probare, Evenire omnia ut divina providentia decrevit, & tamen esse contingentia; sed se hæc conciliare non posse.* Here we have gotten one friend more then we looked for, and that a friend of *Melanchthons* also: And to what end doth he make mention hereof, but to give *Calvin* to understand, that with him at *Tubing*, there wanted not such as concurred with him in opinion, and that as touching the eveniency of all things, by the decree of Gods providence, which yet might well consist with Contingency, though we are not able to reconcile these, such is the mysterious nature of Gods providence. And herein *Stadianus* agrees with *Cajetan*, and *Alvarez*. For *Cajetan* having professed that the distinctions devised by the Learned, for the reconciling of Gods predestination with the liberty of mans will, did not, *quietare intellectum*, thereupon he saith, *Ego captivo meum in obsequium fidei; In quo* (saith *Alvarez*) *doctissimè & pissimè loquitur. Melanchthon* goes on to represent his carriage in Teaching, *Ego*, saith he, *cùm Hypothesin hanc teneam, Deum non esse causam peccati nec velle peccatum, posteà contingentiam in hâc nostrâ infirmitate judicii admitto, ut sciant rudes, Davidem suâ voluntate ultrò ruere & eundem sentio, cum haberet spiritum sanctum, potuisse eum retinere; & in eâ lucta aliquam esse voluntatis actionem.* All these things he grants afterwards, to agree with the Doctrine of *Calvin*. But may not a man proceed farther? and to dispute hereof something more accurately then this, He denyes it not: *Hæc etiamsi subtilius disputari possunt, tamen ad regendas mentes hoc modo proposita, accommodata videntur.* In the same manner he goes on, *Accusemus ipsi nostram voluntatem cùm labimur, non quæramus in Dei consilio causam & contra eum nos erigamus; sciamus Deum & velle opitulari & adesse luctantibus* Μόνον θέλησον (*inquit Basilius*) καὶ θεὸς πᾶσι ἄπαντα Yet I presume no Arminian will conceive that *Melanchthon* did not acknowledge this very act of willing to be the work of God, considering the Apostle so expressely professeth, that God worketh in us both the Will and the deed, according to his good pleasure; and *Leo Serm.* 8. *de Epiphan. Dubium non est hominem bona agentem ex Deo habere & effectum operis & initium voluntatis: & Fulgentius Epist.* 4. *Ab ipso* (*Deo*) *est initium bonæ voluntatis.* And if *Melanchthon* had any conceit opposite hereunto, yet let the Opinion of the Affrican Bishops prevaile in authority above *Melanchthon*, who in their Synodicall Epistle write thus (as it is alleaged by our Divines *Act. Synod. Dordrac. pag.* 270) *In vivificandis hominibus Deus nullum initium humanæ voluntatis expectat sed ipsam voluntatem, bonam faciendo, vivificat.* And drawing to an end, I doe not write these things (saith *Melanchthon*) to deliver dictates unto you, who are most learned and most expert in the exercises of Piety. And truly I know (saith he) that these things doe agree with yours, *hæc cum tuis congruere sed sunt παχύτερα*, woven with a thicker thred, *& ad usum accommodata* Thus *Melanchthon* unto *Calvin*, having received his Bookes sent unto him, and written of Free-will and Predestination.

5. Within two years after I find a Letter written by *Calvin* unto *Melanchthon*, wherein he professeth his joy of their agreement, as touching the main poynt, in that whereabout their opinions were asked, albeit with some difference in certain particulars, it is Epist. 63. amongst those of *Calvins*, and the words are these. *Deo autem maximas gratias agere non desino, qui dedit ut in ejus quæstionis summâ de quâ rogati eramus, sententiæ nostræ congruerent. Tametsi enim paululum est discriminis in particulis quibusdam, de re tamen ipsâ optime inter nos convenit.*

The second Annotation of this Author is, the circumstance or the ground of the three opinions mentioned. The Stoicks deriving their necessity from the Starres or first matter; The Manichees from the two supream causes; And the Authors of the

third, from the peremptory decree of Almighty God. And that in this difference, the Stoicks and the Manichees have the better, it being better (as he saith) to derive the necessity of evill actions, or unhappy events, from an evill God, or from the course of nature, then from the decree of that God who is infinitely good. The substance of the opinion is all one, the ground wherein they differ, is but accidentall to the errour.

To this I answer.

1. Is it so indeed, Better to derive the necessity of unhappy events, from an evill God, or from course of nature, then from the decree of God? Is not God then to be accounted the author of evill in the way of punishment? Is there any evill in the Citty, and the Lord hath not done it? Or doth it lesse become him to be the author of affliction then of prosperity? Doth not the Lord in the same place, and in the same manner professe, that he delights in the execution of judgement, as well as of mercy?

Amos 2.
Ier. 9. 24.

2. As touching the necessity he speaks of, whether in good, or in evill actions; consider I pray his carriage, He did not object unto us, that we made all the actions of men absolutely necessary, but either so, or the ends of men unavoidable. Yet here he supposeth the former to serve his own turne in this present crimination, he holds it up, as it were contrary to his own conscience. We acknowledge the actions of men to be free, not one being performed by any, but in such sort, that they had power to forbear it, and still have to forbear the like: But upon supposition of Gods decree, either to work in us any thing, that is pleasing in his sight (which to be his gracious course, the Apostle expressly professeth, *Heb.* 13.20.) or to permit any particular evill, we willingly professe, that as well upon this, as upon Gods foreknowledge, it followeth consequently that *necesse est*, that such a thing come to passe; but how? not necessarily, but agreeable to the condition of our reasonable natures, contingently and freely. And this *Arminius* in plain termes professeth in the poynt of evill, to wit, supposing God permits a man to will this or that evill; *Necesse est ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum, Exam. pag.* 153. But I will farther display the doctrine of these Arminians, and prove, First, that no evill comes to passe, but that God did will it. Secondly, that never was there any greater necessity known to the World, then that which these men bring upon good and evill actions, a necessity that binds the Lord himselfe.

1. As touching the first; These words of *Arminius* are well known, *Deus voluit Achabum mensuram scelerum suorum implere*. But I will prove it by their Doctrine of *scientia Media*: For hereby they maintain, that God foreseeth by what motives sinne will be hindered, or not hindered, without any prejudice to the liberty of the creatures will; As also that God in the storehouse of his wisdome, hath such store of morall impediments, as that he knows thereby, how to hinder any sinne if it pleased him. His words are these, *Præter illa sufficientia impedimenta, etiam efficacia habet in suo sapientiæ & potentiæ promptuario, quibus productis certò & infallibiliter peccatum impediretur*. And this is the difference with him, between a sufficient impediment of sinne, and impediment effectuall. Effectuall is that upon the use whereof, he knows full well, that sinne will be hindered. Sufficient is that upon the use whereof, sinne will not be hindered, and this is known to the Lord from everlasting. Now let them tell me, why would not God make choyce to use such an impediment, which he knew would prove effectuall, but such rather, as he knew would prove ineffectuall. Doth it not manifestly appear hereby, that it is Gods will, that sinne shall come to passe by his permission? Like as the Scripture is expresse to this purpose, as where it is said, that *Herod* and *Pontius Pilate* with the Gentiles, and people of Israel were gathered together against the holy Sonne of God, to doe that which Gods hand, and his counsell, had foredetermined to be done. Now this is well known to have been no lesse then the ignominious handling and crucifying of the Sonne of God. *Acts* 4.28. And *Revel.* 17.17. God put into the hearts of the Kings to doe his will, and to give their Kingdomes to the Beast, as much as to say, to use their Regall power, to the supporting of Antichrist, which we know was in part by Massacring the Saints of God.

2. Now to discover the strange necessity, that these men bring in upon all things: It cannot be denied, but that God knoweth all future things, before they come to passe. Therefore they are presupposed to be future in order of reason before God, knows them to be future; therefore all things future, are either such by necessity of

nature,

nature, or by ſome cauſe; not by any cauſe, for if there were any cauſe hereof, to wit, to make them paſſe out of the condition of things meerly poſſible of their own nature, into the condition of things future, then this cauſe ſhould be found either within God or without God. Not without God can any cauſe hereof be found. For this paſſage of things, out of the condition of things meerly poſſible, into the condition of things future, was from everlaſting, therefore the cauſe hereof muſt have exiſtence from everlaſting. But nothing was everlaſting, *Extra Deum*, out of God; Therefore if any cauſe hereof be to be found, it muſt be within God; otherwiſe it muſt be confeſſed, that all things became future by abſolute neceſſity of nature. If to help this, they will deviſe ſomething within the nature of God, to be the cauſe hereof, let them tell us what that is. Not the Science of God, for all confeſſe, that ſecluding the divine will, Gods knowledge is the cauſe of nothing. If they ſay, the will of God, they concurre with us in embracing the ſame Opinion, which they ſo much abhorre. Nothing remaines to fly unto, but the Eſſence of God; If they plead, that I demand, whether the Eſſence of God working freely, be the cauſe of the futurition of all things, or as working neceſſarily? If as working freely, that is as much as to confeſſe in expreſſe termes, that Gods will is the cauſe thereof: But if they ſay the divine Eſſence is the cauſe hereof, as working neceſſarily, hence it followes, that all things good and evill come from God, as working by neceſſity of nature. See I pray and conſider the abominable, and Atheiſticall opinions, that theſe Arminians doe improvidently caſt themſelves upon, when they ſtretch their witts to overthrow Gods providence, as it is carryed in the 11th Article of Ireland, which is this, *God from all Eternity, did by his unchangeable Counſell ordaine whatſoever in time ſhould come to paſſe; yet ſo as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reaſonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor contingency of ſecond cauſes is taken away, but eſtabliſhed rather.*

In the Concluſion, that which he vaunts of, as touching the Fathers, is meer wind; for he gives you nothing but his word for it; which of what credit it deſerves to be, I leave to the indifferent to judge. And as for the plucking up of the rootes of vertue which he fables of: Conſider I pray, what Sect of Philoſophers were ever known to be more vertuous then the Stoicks; and how was *Zeno* himſelfe honoured by the Athenians, for his grave and vertuous converſation? Hath not *Eraſmus* delivered it, as out of the mouth of *Hierome*, that *Secta Stoicorum* was *Secta ſimillima Chriſtianæ*? Yet I no where find, that they brought in any neceſſity, that was not ſubordinate to the Will of the ſupream God: But theſe Arminians bring in a neceſſity of nature from without God, to make him to doe this, or that, if he doth any thing; or at leaſt, to make God himſelfe a neceſſary Agent, devoyd of all liberty and freedome, contrary to that of *Ambroſe* concerning the manner of Gods working, namely, that it is, *Nullo neceſſitatis obſequio*, but *ſolo libertatis arbitrio*. But according to theſe Divines it muſt be quite contrary, *Nullo libertatis arbitrio, ſolo neceſſitatis obſequio.*

And thus much as touching the firſt ſort of this Authors Reaſons, which he accounts only Inducing; I come to the other ſort, which he eſteemes convincing.

THE SECOND PART OF THE FIRST BOOK,

Wherein are Examined
those Arguments againſt the Abſoluteneſſe of

DIVINE REPROBATION,

WHICH

Mr HORD

Took to be of a

CONVINCING NATURE.



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The Second Part of this Diſcourſe, conſiſting of ARGUMENTS CONVINCING,

whereof there are Five ſorts.

The Firſt ſort of Convincing Reaſons Drawn from Scripture.

DISCOURSE.

SECT. I.

THOSE of the Second ſort, by which for the preſent I ſtand convinced, that abſolute reprobation is no part of Gods truth, are drawn from theſe five following heads,

viz.
1. Pregnant Teſtimonies of Scripture directly oppoſite unto it.
2. Some principall attributes of God not compatible with it.
3. The end of the Word and Sacraments, with other excellent gifts of God to men, quite thwarted by it.
4. Holy and pious endeavours much hindered by it, if not wholly ſubverſed.
5. The grounds of comfort, whereby diſtreſſed conſciences are to be relieved, are all overthrown by it.

It it contrary to pregnant places of Scripture, even *in terminis*, as will appeare by theſe inſtances. Repugnant to Scripture.

1. *Ezech.* 33.11. *As I live ſaith the Lord, I have no pleaſure in the death of a ſinner, but that the wicked turne from his waies and live.* And leaſt men ſhould ſay 'tis true, God wills not the death of a repenting ſinner, the Lord doth in another place of the ſame Prophet, extend the propoſition to them alſo that periſh, *Ezech.* 18.32. *I have no pleaſure in the death of him that dieth.* In this Scripture we may note three things.

1. Gods affection to men ſet forth { 1. Negatively, *I have no pleaſure in his death that dyeth.* 2. Affirmatively, *But that the wicked turne.*

2. The perſons in whoſe deſtruction he delighteth not, wicked men, ſuch as for the rejecting of grace dye and are damned. If God have no pleaſure in their death, much leſſe in the death of men, either altogether innocent, or tainted only with originall ſinne.

3. The truth of this affection. *as I live: cupit ſibi credi* (ſaith *Tertullian*, *Lib. de penit. cap.* 4.) God would faine have us to believe him, when he ſaith I will not the death of him that dyeth, and therefore he bindes his ſpeech with an oath: *O beatos nos quorum cauſa Deus jurat, O miſerrimos ſi nec juranti Domino credimus.* Happy are we for whoſe ſakes the Lord vouchſafeth to ſweare, but moſt unhappy if we believe him not when he ſwears. Now if God delight not in the deſtruction of wicked men, he did never out of his own pleaſure take ſo many millions of men lying in the fall, and ſeale them up by an abſolute decree under invincible damnation: for ſuch a kind of decreeing men to everlaſting death, is quite oppoſite to a delight in mens eternall life.

TWISSE

Conſideration.

TO ſay that this or that opinion is untrue, becauſe it doth *in terminis* contradict places of Scripture, is a very ſuperficiary conſideration: yet it is not the firſt time that I have found it to drop from an Arminians penne: But that it is a very ſuperficiary conſideration, I prove thus; For to deny God the Sonne to be equall to the Father, is *in terminis* to contradict a pregnant place of Scripture, *Phil.* 2. Where it is expreſſely ſaid of God the Sonne, that he thought it no robbery to be equall to the Father: yet notwithſtanding it is agreeable to that of our Saviour, where he ſaith, the Father is greater then I; and ſo *vice verſâ*. In like manner to ſay that God cannot repent, is *in terminis* to contradict pregnant places of Scripture: again to ſay that God can repent, is *in terminis* to contradict other as pregnant places of Scripture; yet neither of theſe is unſound; becauſe each phraſe is agreeable to Scripture in ſome place or other. And the reaſon hereof is, becauſe *in terminis* only to contradict the Scripture, is not to contradict the Scripture; But when we contradict the meaning of Scripture, then and not till then, are we juſtly ſaid to contradict the Scripture; And the reaſon hereof is, becauſe the word of God conſiſts not in the outward barke or bone of the letter, but in the inward pith and marrow of the meaning. And as for contradiction unto Scripture *in terminis*, it may eaſily be proved, that to deny Gods delight in the deſtruction of obſtinate ſinners, is to contradict a very pregnant place of Holy Scripture, as namely *Prov.* 1. 24, 25, 26. *Becauſe I have called and ye refuſed, I have ſtretched out my hand and no man regarded; but ye have ſet at naught all my counſell, and would none of my reproofe: I will alſo laugh at your calamity, I will mock when your feare cometh; when your feare cometh as deſolation, and your deſtruction as a Whirlewind.* And yet never a whit the more, is any contradiction found in Scripture for this: becauſe though they contradict each the other *in terminis*, yet there is no contradiction if we conſider the true meaning: As for example, it is both true that the Father is greater then the Sonne, as touching the Sonnes Manhood; And the Sonne equall to the Father as touching his Godhead. So of repentance, it cannot be attributed to God as it ſignifies change of mind or counſell; but it may be attributed unto God, as it ſignifies change of ſentence; according to that of *Gregory*, *Deus mutat ſententiam, conſilium nunquam*. So as touching Gods pleaſure or delight in the death of a ſinner, as it is the deſtruction of the creature he delighteth not in it; but as it is a juſt puniſhment of the impenitent creature, he delights therein: Thus *Piſcator* reconciles it, on *Ezech.* 18. v. 23, & 32. Surely God delights in the execution of juſtice, as well as in the execution of mercy, as *Jer.* 9. 24. *I am the Lord which exerciſeth loving kindneſſe, judgement, and righteouſneſſe in the earth, for in theſe things I delight ſaith the Lord.*

Nec putemus in verbis Scripturarum Evangelium eſſe, ſed in ſenſu, non in ſuperficie, ſed in medulla, non in ſermonum foliis, ſed in radice rationis. Hieron. in Epiſt. ad Galat. c. 1.

2. Here firſt, the Author declines from the former phraſe, of having no pleaſure in the death of a ſinner, to *not willing* the death of a ſinner; which phraſes have no ſmall difference, as *Piſcator* obſerves upon that in *Ezech.* 33. 11. for ſaith he, *poteſt homo velle id quo non delectatur, ut ægrotus poteſt velle potum amarum, quo non delectatur, poteſt enim eum velle non per ſe, ſed propter aliud, nempe ad recuperandam valetudinem.* And to deny that God willeth the death of as many as dye, is *in terminis* to contradict a pregnant place of Scripture, as where it is ſaid, *that God worketh all things according to the counſell of his will*, *Epheſ.* 1. 11. And therefore ſeeing the inflicting of death is Gods work he muſt will it: But this Author is more happy for invention then his fellowes: For whereas others of his opinion, work upon the place as it is rendred in the vulgar Latine, *Nolo mortem peccatoris*: this Author hath found out an argument from the very phraſe of our laſt Engliſh tranſlation, to advantage his cauſe, as when from Gods having no pleaſure in the death of a ſinner, he quaintly inferres, therefore God doth not of meer pleaſure, will or decree their death; But how ſuperficiary this is alſo, and how fouly it falls in the iſſue, upon the Author himſelfe (as uſually it falleth out with men, that affect new and quaint inventions) I hope to diſcover in due place.

Farther

Farther obſerve; that place, *Ezech.* 33.11. *I have no pleaſure in the death of the wicked*, according to our laſt Engliſh tranſlation, and that, *Ezech.* 18. 23. *Have I any pleaſure at all that the wicked ſhould dye*, doe differently render one and the ſame phraſe in the Hebrew, *in the death of the wicked*, *Ezech.*33.11. which is word for word according to the Hebrew; *that the wicked ſhould dye Ezech.* 18. 23. which being not according to the preciſe termes of the originall, it followeth that hereby, our Tranſlators did expound the ſenſe of the Hebrew, which is word for word, in the death of the wicked, and ſo accordingly, that phraſe, *Ezek.* 18.32. *in the death of him that dieth*, importeth as much as this, *that he who dyeth ſhould dye.*

And as for *Tertullian*, that which he alleadgeth out of him, neither makes for him nor againſt us: we all believe what the Prophet delivereth; but we enquire about the ſenſe of it; But in the ſame place *Tertullian* interprets the place not abſolutely but comparatively, thus, *Vivo inquit Dominus, & pœnitentiam malo quam mortem*, and indeed thus it is accommodated more then once in the Book of Common prayer, as firſt in the generall abſolution; then, in one of the Collects upon Good-Friday: There is a double pleaſure, that God may be ſaid to take in the one, but a ſingle pleaſure only in the other. For in the death of an impenitent ſinner, God delights only in the execution of juſtice: but in the converſion of ſuch a one that he may live, God delights both in the execution of mercy, which is equivalent to his delight taken in the execution of judgement, and over and above he delights in their repentance; For like as of ſuch as fall from God, it is ſaid, *His ſoule hath no pleaſure in them*: ſo of ſuch as turne unto him, it is as true, that *his ſoule hath pleaſure in them.*

3. But give we him leave to enjoy the interpretation he affecteth, yet conſider I pray, whether he doth not enjoy it *tanquam Diis iratis*, and to his bane: for marke I pray his argument, and conſider whether I doe not from the ſame argument, moſt ſtrongly conclude againſt him.

1. His argument runnes thus, *If God delighteth not in the deſtruction of wicked men, he did never out of his own pleaſure, take ſo many millions of men lying in the fall, and ſeale them up by an abſolute decree under invincible damnation.* Now from the rule of contraries, I herehence diſpute thus; If this be a good conſequence which he makes, then on the contrary it followes, that ſeeing God doth take pleaſure and delight in mans eternall life (as this Author expreſſely acknowledgeth) therefore he did out of his own pleaſure, take ſo many million of men lying in the fall, and ſeale them up by an abſolute decree under invincible ſalvation. Now this concluſion is as directly oppoſite unto him in the poynt of election, as his concluſion is oppoſite to ours in the poynt of reprobation. And my argument muſt be of the ſame force and validity with his; becauſe *Contrariorum contraria eſt ratio.* Yet I will not content my ſelfe with this anſwere.

2. Therefore conſider I pray in the next place, the true meaning of this phraſe *I have no pleaſure*: in theſe places of the Prophet, the Author himſelfe though he doth not plainly profeſſe what is the meaning of it, as it became him to doe, and not to depend upon colour of words ſuitable; yet by his drift he manifeſts the meaning of it to be this, that God doth not bring death upon a ſinner, of meere pleaſure, but being provoked thereunto, (and that according to the purport of the firſt place *Ezech.*18.) by the ſinner himſelfe; and alſo, (according to the purport of the ſecond place) only in caſe of impenitency. And I concurre with him in this: And ſo I conceive it to be delivered in the ſame ſenſe with that *Lament.* 3. 32,33. *For though he cauſe griefe* (to wit by reaſon of mens ſinnes v.39.) *yet will he have compaſſion according to the multitude of his mercies*, (to wit, in caſe he repents *Ier.*18.7. *Iudg.*10.16.) For *he doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men.* Mark I pray, *not willingly*; to wit, in as much as he is provoked thereunto by ſinne, and by refuſall to repent. And this is in the former Scripture phraſes, *not to take pleaſure in the afflicting and grieving of men.* For if any work be ſuch, as wherein pleaſure is taken; we need not enquire after a cauſe why it is done, but though no pleaſure be taken in it, yet for ſome benefit redounding thereby, a man may doe it, yea though it be grievous and bitter unto him: As a ſick man is willing to take a bitter potion for the recovery of his health. Now come we to the argument: *God takes no pleaſure in the death of any; therefore he doth not of pleaſure inflict death.* We willingly grant it, in as much as he never inflicts eternall death on any, that doth not dye in ſinne unrepented of: And as he doth not inflict death on any of meere pleaſure, that is, without juſt cauſe on the part of him that dyeth, deſerving it: So we

willingly confesse, that God did never decree to inflict death on any without just cause on the Malefactors part deserving death. And this is the uttermost whereunto this Authors argument can be extended. And all our Divines unanimously confesse, that God neither decreed to damne any man of his meer pleasure, but for his sinne wherein he died without repentance.

3. Observe the cunning of this Disputer, to deceive himselfe first, and then to abuse his readers: For whereas he should have proceeded in his argument by degrees, thus; *God hath no pleasure in the death of a sinner, therefore he doth not of his own pleasure inflict death*; and thence proceed (if he had thought good) to conclude the like of Gods decree, thus; *if God doth not of his own pleasure inflict, then neither doth he of his own pleasure decree to inflict death and damnation*: This author leaping over the inflicting of death, as a block in his way (for the last consequence would have betrayed its own nakednesse) flyeth at first to the application of it, to Gods decree: Now I willingly grant, *that Gods having no pleasure in the death of a sinner, doth signify*, that God inflicts death on no man without a cause, for that were of meer pleasure to inflict: But dares he herehence inferre, *therefore God doth not of meer pleasure decree to inflict death and damnation on man for sinne*, for to this alone comes all the force of this argument. Now to shew the vanity of this consequence, consider I pray.

1. It is as if he should argue thus in plain termes; sinne is alwaies the meritorious cause of damnation; therefore sinne is the meritorious cause of Gods eternall decree of damnation: Now this Enthymeme hath no force any farther, then it may be reduced into a Categoricall Syllogisme; and this Enthymeme is reducible into no other Syllogisme then this; Damnation is the decree of Damnation, sinne is the cause of Damnation, therefore sinne is the cause of the decree of damnation. But in this Syllogisme the proposition containes a notorious untruth: Or thus, Sinne is the cause of damnation; therefore the foresight of sinne is the cause of the decree of damnation: But this Enthymeme is not reducible unto any categoricall Syllogisme at all, for as much as it consists of foure termes; all which must be clapt into the Syllogisme whereunto it is reduced, and consequently make that Syllogisme consist of foure termes, which utterly overthrowes the illative forme thereof.

2. We may as well dispute thus; *Good works as well as faith and repentance are the disposing cause unto salvation*, therefore good works as well as faith and repentance (or the foresight of them) are the disposing cause to Gods election, or to the decree of salvation.

But shall I tell you, the chiefe flourish whereupon this Author (and usually the Arminians) doth insist in this his loose argumentation, I conceive it to be this: they hope their credulous readers, unexpert in distinguishing between Gods eternall decree, and the temporall execution thereof, will be apt hereupon to conceit, that we maintain, that God doth not only of meer pleasure decree whatsoever he decreeth, but also that he doth decree of meer pleasure to damne men: which yet is utterly contrary (if I be not deceived) to the tenet of all our Divines: all concurring in this, that God in the execution of the decree of damnation, proceeds according to a Law, and not in the execution of reprobation only, but also in the execution of election. And the law is this, *Whosoever believes shall be saved, whosoever believes not shall be damned*, And like as he inflicteth not damnation, but by way of punishment, so he conferres not salvation but by way of reward. But in the execution of his decrees of election unto grace, and reprobation from grace; we willingly professe that God proceeds according to no law given unto men, to prepare themselves hereunto, but meerly according to his good pleasure, having mercy on whom he will, and hardning whom he will: And this indeed is the criticall poynt of this controversy: But neither this Author nor his complices (some of them of my knowledge) have any heart to deale on this. I come to his Second pregnant place as he calleth it.

Note

DISCOURSE.

SECT. II.

GOD hath ſhut up all in unbeliefe, that he might have mercy on all. *Rom.*11. 32. in theſe words of the Apoſtle are two [alls] of equall extent; the one ſtanding juſt againſt the other; an [all] of unbelievers, and an [all] of objects of mercy; look how many unbelievers there be, on ſo many hath God a will of ſhewing mercy. And therefore if all men of all ſorts and conditions, and every man in every ſort be an unbeliever, then is every man of every condition under mercy, And if every man be under mercy, then there is no antecedent preciſe will in God of ſhutting up ſome (and thoſe the moſt) from all poſſibility of obtaining mercy; for theſe two are ἀσύστατα they cannot ſtand together.

TWISSE

Conſideration.

I Willingly grant the word [all] in each place is of equall extent, but how? in the Apoſtles meaning in this place; that is, look in what ſenſe the Apoſtle takes the word [all] when he ſaith *God hath concluded all under unbeliefe*: in the ſame ſenſe he takes the word [all] when he ſayeth, *that he might have mercy upon all.* And accordingly in caſe when he ſaith the one he meaneth by the word [all] no more but Jewes & Gentiles: it followes that when he ſaith *God hath mercy on all*, by the word [all] he underſtands no more then both Jewes and Gentile, and that is, certain nations of men only, not all men of all ſorts and conditions; And therefore although it were granted him, that all men of all ſorts are unbelievers, yet unleſſe he can prove, that in this ſenſe the Apoſtle ſpeaketh of [all] in ſaying *God hath concluded all under infidelity*, let any one that is indifferent, judge whether this argument be of any force. Thus our Divines underſtand it, to wit, of Jewes and Gentiles: Thus *Aquinas* and *Sasbutius* Popiſh Divines interpret it. *Aquinas* his words are theſe, *omnia, id eſt, omne hominum genus, tam Judæos quam Gentes in incredulitate concluſit, ut omnium miſereatur, id eſt, ut in omni hominum genere miſericordia locum habeat*; And again; *non eſt extendendum ad omnes homines ſigillatim, ſed ad omnia genera hominum: Fit enim hic diſtributio pro generibus ſingulorum, & non pro ſingulis generum.* So *Cajetan. Concluſit permiſſive omnes tam Judæos quam Gentes in peccatum infidelitatis.* The Text it ſelfe doth cleerely juſtify this, as appears by the two verſes immediatly preceding, wherewith this coheres. v. 30. *For even as the Gentiles in times paſt have not believed God, yet have now obtained mercy, through (the Jewes) unbeliefe.* 31. *Even ſo now have they (the Jewes) not believed, by the mercy ſhewed to you Gentiles, that they alſo, that is, the Jewes, may obtain mercy.* This conſtruction was embraced of old by *Auſtin*, as appears by *Beda* upon the Romans, alleadging *Auguſt. de Civit. Dei lib.* 21. *Concluſit Deus omnes in infidelitate ut omnium miſereatur. Quos omnes? niſi de quibus loquebatur, tanquam dicens & vos & illos. Deus ergo & Gentiles & Judæos, quos præſcivit & prædeſtinavit conformes fieri imagini filii ſui, omnes in infidelitate concluſit, & de amaritudine infidelitatis ſuæ pœnitendo confuſi, & ad dulcedinem miſericordiæ Dei credendo converſi clamaret &c.* And anon after, *Omnium itaq; miſeretur vaſorum miſericordiæ: Quid eſt omnium? & eorum ſcilicet quos ex Gentibus, & eorum quos ex Judæis prædeſtinavit.*

2. Obſerve how he hides himſelfe under an ambiguous phraſe, leaſt he ſhould come with his foule opinion to the light: As when he ſaith *every man of every condition*

is under mercy. The Apostles phrase on Gods part is *misereri*, to shew mercy; on mans part as partaking hereof is *to obtain mercy*. v.30. 31. and *to obtain mercy is to believe*. v.30. as appears by the opposition: *for to obtain mercy and not to believe*, are there made opposite, therefore to obtain mercy and to believe are the same: For *to believe and not to believe are formally opposite*. Now dares this Author avouch, that every man of every condition doth believe? Again the Apostles word *ut misereatur*, that he may shew mercy, is not spoken of the time present; for as much as for the time present, the Lord had mercy only on the Nations of the Gentiles: But the time should come, that God would also have mercy on the Jewes, and consequently on all. But when should this come to passe? Surely not 'till 1600 years after, to wit, when the time cometh which is appoynted for the effectuall and generall calling of the Nation of the Jewes.

So that the foundation being most rotten, no marvail if the edifice he builds hereupon must needs totter. For the Jewes were thus to be shut up under infidelity, for many hundred years, to wit, untill the time came which the Apostle propheſyeth of. And so were the Gentiles also before them, 'till the time came of their calling. And thus *Sasbutius* interpreteth the Apostle in this very place. *Sensus est* (saith he) *sic visum est Deo dispensare utriusq; populi salutem, Iudæorum videlicet & Gentium; ut permitteret utrumq; populum suo vitio concludi, sive constringi, sub incredulitate & damnatione. Concludi, inquam, ne ullâ ratione poscit ex incredulitate suâ vinculo se liberare, ut ipsius misericordia gratuita locum habere agnoscatur in utroq; populo tam Iudæorum quam Gentium.* Thus we see that both his [alls] are not worth a Bodkin; and to give him two [alls] more to encrease his store, we may justly say that all this is nothing at all to the purpose.

DISCOURSE.

SECT. III.

IOhn 3. 16. *God so loved the World that he gave his only begotten Sonne, that whosoever &c.* God loved the World, that is, the whole lump of Man-kind, therefore God did not absolutely hate the greatest part of Man-kind. God loved it fallen into a guilt of sinne and misery, for he so loved them, as to send his Sonne to redeeme them; and a Saviour presupposeth sinne. He did not therefore hate the most of them considered in the fall, for love and hatred are contrary acts, and cannot be exercised about the same Object. Many expositors (I know) doe take *World* here in a restrained sense, and understand by it the company of the Elect, or the *World of believers* only, but they have little reason for it (in my opinion;) for, 1. I think there can be no place of Scripture alleadged wherein this word *World* especially with the condition of *whole*, as in 1 Epist. of Iohn. 2. 2. (which is a place equivalent to this for the matter of it, and a comment upon it) I say (I think) no place can be produced where *World* doth signify only the Elect, or only believers; but it signifies either all men, or at least, the most men, living in some certain place, and at some certain time, but without distinction of good and bad: or if it be used any where more restrainedly, it is applyed only to the wicked and Reprobate men, who are wedded in their affections to the World, and the transitory delights thereof, and therefore doe most properly deserve this name.

2. Suppose it be granted that *World* in some Scriptures is restrained to the Elect, yet it cannot bear this signification here; because,

1. The words then would have a bad and senseleſse construction; for thus would they runne, *God so loved the Elect that whosoever believed in him should not perish &c.* And if they runne thus, then this would follow, there are two sorts of the Elect, some that *doe believe*, and shall *be saved*; others that doe *not believe*, and shall be *damned*, which is a division or distinction unknown in Divinity.

2. *Believers* and *Vnbelievers*, damned and saved comprehend all Man kind, for there is no man but is one of these. Now World in this place includeth *believers and unbelievers*, the *saved and the damned*, (as appears most plainly to him that considers the words;) therefore it signifieth here all Man kind without exception of any. Against this Scripture therefore fights this absolute reprobation and hatred of men.

TWISSE

Conſideration.

BE it the whole lump of man-kind (if that Lettice like his lipps.) I ſhould think by World, is meant *homines in mundo degentes*, men at any time living in the World without any reſtraint: But herehence it followeth not, that God doth not abſolutely hate the greateſt part of man-kind; which this Author ſhould have proved, but he doth not; therefore I will not only deny it, but diſprove it. Firſt therefore conſider, this love is only *ſecundum Quid*, in reference to mens perſons, namely, ſo farre forth as in caſe they believe, they ſhall obtain everlaſting life through the Sonne of God: But if there were no farther love of God towards man, they might be damned, yea every Mothers ſonne for all this. Secondly, if faith it ſelfe be a gift of God, and God gives it not to all, but to ſome only, and thoſe but a few; (for even of them that are called few are choſen:) and withall if God hath abſolutely decreed to beſtow this grace only on a few, and deny it to the greateſt part of the World, will it not manifeſtly follow herehence, that if abſolutely to decree the denyall of faith be to hate, then ſurely God abſolutely hates the greateſt part of men, notwithſtanding this love here mentioned, albeit we extend it to all and every one. Therefore it became this Author to prove, that God is indifferent to give Faith to one as well as to another: and that either abſolutely, whence it would follow, that all and every one, ſhould both believe and be ſaved; or conditionally, and therewithall repreſent unto us, what that condition is, whereupon God beſtowes faith on one, and for the want thereof, he refuſeth to beſtow faith on another. This is the very criticall poynt about the controverſies of Gods decrees. Here therefore he ſhould have ſhewed his ſtrength: For as for Gods purpoſe to damne, we willingly profeſſe, that as God damnes no man but for ſinne, ſo he purpoſeth to damne no man but for ſinne. But as for his purpoſe to give or deny the grace of regeneration, the grace of faith and repentance, we as readily profeſſe, that not the purpoſe only, but the very giving of faith and repentance, for the curing of infidelity and hardneſſe of heart in ſome, and the denying of it unto others, ſo to leave their naturall infidelity and hardneſſe of heart uncured, proceeds meerely according to the good pleaſure of his will, according to that of the Apoſtle, *He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth*; And by a cloud of teſtimonies out of *Auſtin* we can prove, that in this very ſenſe he underſtood the Apoſtle in that place. And indeed no other interpretation of that place, can with any modeſty be deviſed, or obtruded upon us. As for the redeeming of all and every one by Chriſt, diſtinguiſheth that which the haters of Gods truth doe delight to confound. There is a redemption from the guilt of ſinne, and a redemption from the power of ſinne: *For we are redeemed from our vaine converſation.* Chriſt came into the World *to diſſolve the works of the Devill:* No greater works of Satan then *blindneſſe of heart*, 2 *Cor.* 4. 3. and *hardneſſe of heart*, *Epheſ.* 2. 2. and 2 *Tim.* 2. laſt. The pardon of ſinne, and ſalvation, God beſtowes *only on believers*, and upon condition of faith: Now like as God is ready to beſtow theſe benefits on all and every one, and that for Chriſts ſake, in caſe they believe: ſo Chriſt hath merited pardon of ſinne and ſalvation for all and every one, in caſe they believe. Such is the ſufficiency of Chriſts merit, that if every one of *Adams* race ſhould believe, every one ſhould be ſaved: and this preſent Text proceeds upon this, namely, upon the ſufficiency of Chriſts merits. But enquire farther whether Chriſt did not merit for us the grace of faith, and if he did, whether abſolutely of conditionally; if abſolutely then all muſt believe *de facto*, and be ſaved; if conditionally, then faith is a grace, which God beſtowes on man conditionally. Now let this Author ſhew us what that condition is, upon performance whereof by man, God will give him faith, and let

him try whether he can carry himselfe so warily herein, as not to plunge himselfe into plain Pelagianisme. This poynt is a break-neck, or *Crevecœur* unto all Arminians, they generally avoyd the delivering of their minds clearly hereupon, as a man would avoyd a precipice. It is true some Divines doe interpret the word [World] here, of the Elect, as *Piscator*; *Rolloc* doth not, making no mention of the Elect hereupon. And *Piscators* meaning is no more then this, *viz.* that this love of God in respect of every gracious effect (I mean in the way of sanctifying grace) determins only upon the Elect; for in all likelihood, he followed *Calvin* in this, *Universalem notam apposuit* (saith *Calvin*) *tum ut promiscuè omnes ad vitæ participationem invitet, tum ut præcidat excusationem incredulis.* To the same purpose (saith he) pertaines *nomen mundi, quo prius usus est.* And again, *se toti mundo propitium ostendit, quum sine exceptione omnes ad fidem vocat*: But here he subjoynes a caution, thus; *Cæterum meminerimus ita communiter promitti omnibus vitam si in Christo crediderint, ut tamen minime communis omnium sit fides. Patet enim omnibus Christus & expositus est, solis tamen Electis oculos Deus aperit & fidè ipsum quærant.* So that this gracious promise is generall to all and every one, *whosoever believes shall be saved*; But yet notwithstanding if it shall appeare, that God gives the grace of faith, to none but to a certain number, (which are his Elect) it followes, that the effect of this love of God, to wit, Salvation shall in the issue redound to none but Gods Elect.

1. As for the designing a place where the World is taken for the Elect; we need no such place, as I have shewed; yet *Piscator* conceives that so it is taken, *Iohn* 3. 17. *That the World might be saved by him.* But what think you of *Rom.* 11. 15. *Where the casting away of the Jewes is said to be the reconciliation of the World.* And that 2 *Cor.* 5. 19. *God was in Christ reconciling the World unto himselfe.* I say the reconciled World is only Gods Elect, for the reconciled are all saved, as I prove by the Apostles argument *Rom.* 5. *If when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Sonne, how much more being reconciled shall we be saved by his life. Ioh.* 1. 29. *The Lamb of God that taketh away the sinnes of the World.* Are their sinnes taken away that are damned for them? And *Ioh.* 6. 33. *He gives life to the World*; Is life given to any but to the Elect?

2. The second reasons, why in this place it cannot be so taken, are in effect but one, and that a weake one:

1. Because, that they that understand it of the Elect, understand it so in no other sense, but as I have expounded it.

2. If I should say of the twelve Apostles (*Judas* excluded, and *Matthias* substituted in his roome) that God so loved them, that he gave his only begotten Sonne, that whosoever of them believed in him, should not perish but have everlasting life; who can deny, but that this was a truth accommodated unto them? but will it here hence follow, that among those Apostles, some were believers some unbelievers? Suppose all the World were Elect, and it pleased God to give them all Faith, should this Doctrine be the lesse true, whosoever believes shall be saved? yet in this case it would not follow, that amongst the World of men some were believers, and some unbelievers.

But whereas he faines, that some of our Divines should interpret the word [World] here of Believers, that is such a fiction as is incredible. I come to the fourth.

DISCOURSE.

DISCOURSE.

SECT. IV.

1. TImoth. 2. 4. Who would have all to be ſaved and come to the knowledge of his truth. In theſe words the Apoſtle delivers two things. 1. That it is Gods will, that all men ſhould obtain an happy end, *viz.* Salvation. 2. That it is his will alſo, that they ſhould uſe and enjoy the means, which is the knowledge of his truth, that ſo they might obtain the end, the ſalvation of their ſoules; there is no let in God, but that all men may believe and be ſaved, and therefore there is no abſolute will, that many thouſands of men ſhall never believe nor be ſaved.

Two anſwers are uſually returned, which give me little ſatisfaction: The firſt is, that by All we are to underſtand all ſorts, and not every particular man in every ſort and condition. It is true that [all] is ſometimes ſo uſed in Scripture, but (I believe) not here: for the very Text ſhewes that we are to underſtand by it, the Individualls and not the kindes: v. 1. There is a duty enjoyned, *I will that prayers and ſupplications be made for all men*], and in this verſe the motive is annexed, *God will have all to be ſaved*; as if he ſhould have ſaid, our charity muſt reach to all, whom God extends his love to: God will have all to be ſaved, therefore we muſt pray for all: Now in the duty All ſignifies every man, for no man though wicked and prophane, is to be excluded from our prayers; *pray for them* (ſaith our Saviour) *that perſecute you*; And *pray* (ſaith the Apoſtle here) *for Kings, and all that are in Authority*, men in thoſe daies (though the greateſt) yet the worſt, yea very Wolves, and Lyons, and Bears of the Church; pray for them, and if for them, then for any other, thus in the duty it ſignifies every man; and if it doe ſo in the duty, it muſt have the ſame extent in the motive too; or elſe the motive will not reach home, nor have ſtrength enough to enforce the duty. The ſecond anſwer is, that God will have all to be ſaved with his revealed will, have Millions to be damned with his ſecret will. If this anſwer ſtand, then (in my underſtanding) theſe inconveniences will follow.

1. That Gods words (which are his revealed will) are not interpretations of his mind and meaning, and by conſequence are not true; for *Oratio quæ non eſt mentis ſignificatio, ſimulatio eſt.*

2. That there are two contrary willes in God; a ſecret will, that many Sonnes of *Adam* ſhall irrevocably be damned; and a revealed will, that all the Sonnes of *Adam* may be ſaved.

3. That one of Gods wills muſt needs be bad, either the ſecret will, or the revealed; for of contraries if the one be good, the other is bad; and ſo of Gods contrary wills, if the one be good, the other muſt needs be bad, for *malum* is *contrarium bono.*

TWISSE

Conſideration.

THe Concluſion here is very looſe; the Arguments being thus; *It is Gods will that all ſhould be ſaved; therefore there is no abſolute will, that many thouſands of men ſhall never believe nor be ſaved*: and the vanity of this conſequence, I will ſhew more waies then one.

1. The Apoſtle doth not ſay, *It is the abſolute will of God that all men ſhall be ſaved*: nay *Voſſius* interprets this place, and that according to the meaning of the Ancients, of *voluntas conditionata*, a conditionall will in God, not abſolute; and he gives inſtance of it thus; It is the will of God that all ſhall be ſaved, in caſe they believe in Chriſt. Now albeit it be the conditionall will of God that all, and every one ſhall be ſaved in caſe they believe, yet this hinders not, but that it may be the abſolute will of God, that many thouſands of men ſhall never be ſaved; as in caſe his will be to deny the grace of faith and repentance to many thouſands, as it is cleare and undeniable that he doth. Hiſt. Pelag. lib. 6. 7. p. 638.

Nay the Remonstrants themselves, and particularly an Arminian that I had to doe withall lately, spared not to professe, that Election is absolute; if so, then reprobation also is absolute; and I doubt not but that they will all confesse, that howbeit Gods will be, that all should be saved, yet thousands are reprobated.

2. Suppose the Apostle had said, it is the absolute will of God, that all men shall be saved, yet I say it followes not herehence, but that by the absolute will of God many might faile of salvation: for it was the absolute will of God, that every foure footed beast should be represented to *Peter*, let downe unto him in a linnen vessell; yet nevertheless it might be that many thousands were not represented to him, and that by the will of God.

Thus having discovered the vanity of this conclusion; I will now proceed to demonstrate that this place cannot be understood, of Gods will in proper speech, *viz.* willing all and every one to be saved.

1. Like as it is impossible, that a man at the same time should be saved and damned; so it is impossible, that God should at the same time and duration, both will to save and will to damne the same man: But God from everlasting did will to damne many thousands; therefore it was impossible, that from everlasting he should will to save them.

2. If it be Gods will that all and every one shall be saved; then all and every one shall be saved, For *who hath resisted his will. Rom.9.19.* And for confirmation hereof, we find in our selves, that if we will doe ought, we doe it if we can; and if we doe not ought, the reason is, either because we have no will to doe it, or because we have no power to doe it. In like sort, that God doth not save many thousands, the reason must be, either because he will not, or because he cannot; not because he will not, for these professe that it is his will to save all and every one; Therefore the reason why he doth not save all, must needs be, because he cannot save them: this was *Austins* argument 1200 years agoe. *Enchirid.cap.96.* and 97. handling this very place of the Apostle.

3. If God did from everlasting will the salvation of all and every one, then either at this day he doth continue to will the salvation of all and every one, and shall continue for ever to will it, or no; if he doth continue to will it and ever shall, then say that God doth will the salvation of the damned both Men and Divells; albeit it is well known he damnes them. If he doth not continue to will it, then is God of a changeable nature; directly contrary to the word of God, as well as to manifest reason: *With him* (saith *Iames*) *is no variablenesse nor shadow of change. I the Lord am not changed, Mal. 3. 6.* As for that which he thrusts in, to help make weight, saying, *that there is no let in God, but that all men may believe and be saved*, this is a most improper speech; for no man is said (in proper speech) to be let from doing ought, but upon presupposition that he would doe it; now we utterly deny that God hindreth any man from believing and repenting, whose will is disposed to believe and repent. But seeing all men have infidelity and hardnesse of heart naturall unto them, as a fruit of that corruption wherein all are borne; we deny that God cures it in all, but only in whom he will, according to that of Saint *Paul*, *He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth.* And our Saviour upon the same ground, is bold to tell the Jewes, saying, *Ye therefore heare not my words* (that is, believe them not) *because ye are not of God.*

Rom.9.18.
Joh.4.47.

2. The first exposition here mentioned was given by *Austin*, many hundred years agoe. *Enchirid. cap.* 103. and he proves this his interpretation of the word [all] by the congruity of it to Scripture phrase in other places, as where it is said of the Pharises, that they tythe *every herbe*; his words are these, *Isto locutionis modo & Dominus usus est in Evangelio, ubi ait Phariseis, Decimatis mentham, & rutam, & omne olus: neq; enim Pharisei quæcunq; aliena, & omnium per omnes terras alienigenarum omnium olera decimabant. Sicut ergo hic omne olus, omne olerum genus; ita & illic omnes homines, omne hominum genus, intelligere possumus*: yet see the ingenuity of this great light of the Church of God: for forthwith he gives leave to devise any other convenient interpretation; provided that we doe not violate Gods omnipotency, by saying, that any thing that God would have brought to passe, is not brought to passe; his words are these, *Et quocunq; alio modo intelligi potest, dum tamen credere nos cogamur aliquid omnipotentem Deum noluisse fieri, factumq; non esse; qui sine ullis ambagibus sit in cælo & terra (sicut & veritas cantat) omnia quæcunq; voluit*

fecit

fecit: profecto facere noluit, quæcunq; non fecit. This interpretation is generally received by our Divines, becauſe of the congruity thereof to the Text it ſelfe; for as much as the Apoſtle having firſt admoniſhed them in the generall to pray for all, forthwith he deſcends to ſpecialls, as *Voſſius* acknowledgeth, *Generi ſpeciem ſubjicit*; now look in what ſort the Species is to be underſtood, after the ſame manner is the Generall to be underſtood. Now the Specialls mentioned, are certain ſorts or conditions of men, as Kings, and ſuch as are in authority; therefore the generall [all] muſt in like manner be underſtood of all ſorts, and all conditions of men: upon this conſideration alſo it was that *Auſtin* did inſiſt, in the place before alleadged: *Præceperat* (ſaith he) *Apoſtolus ut oraretur pro ſingulis hominibus, & ſpecialiter addiderat pro Regibus, & iis qui in ſublimitate ſunt, qui putari poterant faſtu & ſuperbia ſeculari a fidei Chriſtianæ humilitate abhorrere. Proinde dicens, hoc enim bonum eſt coram ſalvatore noſtro Deo, id eſt, ut etiam pro talibus oretur; ſtatim ut deſperationem tolleret, addit, qui omnes homines vult ſalvos fieri, & in agnitionem veritatis venire. Hoc quippe Deus bonum judicavit, ut orationibus humilium dignaretur, præſtare ſalutem ſublimium.* Now I come to conſider what this Author hath to ſay againſt this expoſition, for he gives us very gravely to underſtand, that *it gives him little ſatisfaction*: we are therefore to expect ſome better ſatisfaction from him.

It is true that [all] is ſo uſed in Scripture, not only ſome times, but very frequently; let him come to inſtance in his ſenſe, we are ready to inſtance with him for ours. But *the Text* (ſaith he) *ſhewes we are to underſtand the individualls and not the kindes.* Where firſt (I doubt) his ignorance, in underſtanding the diſtinction aright, is his beſt ground of oppoſition. When *Auſtin* urgeth for his interpretation, that of the Phariſes tything *omne olus*, every hearb, who doubts but they tythe Individuall hearbs. In like ſort when *Peter* ſaw in a veſſell let down unto him πᾶν τετράποδον every foure footed beaſt; no queſtion but Individuall beaſts were let down unto him, not every one of every kind, but of every kind or of moſt kinds, or of many kinds ſome, ſo that the meaning of the diſtinction is not to exclude all individualls (as this Author ſeems to carry the matter,) but only, to exclude a neceſſity of underſtanding all individualls of all ſorts. It is enough if God will ſave ſome of all ſorts, that is, of all conditions ſome individualls. Then, ſeeing he undertakes out of the very Text, to give us better ſatisfaction, then either *Auſtin* or our Divines have hitherto received, it muſt needs be a ſhame for him to leave the preſent Text, and fetch grounds elſewhere, for the clearing of *Pauls* meaning here. Now let us obſerve, how congruouſly or incongruouſly to his own undertakings, he carryeth himſelfe in this buſineſſe: of the duty enjoyned, and of the motive annexed, there is no queſtion: but whereas he ſhapes the coherence thus, and makes *Paul* in effect to ſpeak after this manner; *our charity muſt reach to all to whom God extends his love to; God will have all to be ſaved, and therefore we muſt pray for all.* Though all this were granted him, it makes nothing for him: but over and above here are cauſeleſſe errours more then enough:

For, firſt, our charity muſt extend farther then Gods love; was not *Jacob* bound to carry himſelfe charitably towards his brother *Eſau*? though Gods hatred of *Eſau*, we know, was as ancient as his love to *Iacob*.

2. We are not bound to extend our charity ſo far as God extends his love; for many thouſands there be in the World, (not to ſpeak of the Elect departed this life) towards whom it may be God extends his love, which yet are unknown to us; & are we bound to pray for we know not whom. Again, Gods love, with this Author, is extended as farre as his will to ſave; and that is extended to all and every one: and unleſſe God be now changed, it muſt extend to them now after they are damned, and muſt our charity be extended towards them alſo? But he proceeds, let us proceed with him. *Now* (ſaith he) [*all*] *in the duty ſignifies every man*; but that we deny; he gives his reaſon, *for no man though wicked and prophane, is to be excluded from our prayers.*

Againſt this I have two exceptions, (and yet if the whole be granted him, it maketh nothing for him:) my firſt exception is this; he promiſed to give us ſatisfaction out of the Text it ſelfe; but who ſeeth not but that this rule of his, is brought in quite beſides the Text: I from the Text have proved, and from the coherence between the generall and the ſpeciall, that the ſpeciall being certain particular conditions of men, the generall [all] muſt conformably be underſtood of all conditions.

My ſecond exception is this; he obtrudes upon us, that *no man, though wicked and prophane, is to be excluded from our Prayers.* I confeſſe I doe not find my ſelfe apt to exclude any from my prayers; but I cannot endure, that a bold fellow ſhould obtrude his

rules upon us as Oracles. The Apostle Saint *John* forbids us to pray for them that sinne a sinne unto death. But let all this be granted, what then? *If it extends to every one in the duty, it must have the same extent in the motive too*; but this I deny; he saith, *else the motive will not reach home, nor have strength enough to enforce the duty*: but this likewise I deny; and shew withall, how the motive shall reach home, and have strength enough even to enforce this duty, according to this Authors accommodation of it; albeit God hath a will not to save all and every one, but of all sorts and all conditions some; of Kings some, of them that are in Authority some; For seeing God saves of all sorts some, why should not every Christian Subject, pray for his Prince and Rulers, seeing it may be they are those some, whom God means to save, even of the ranke of Princes, of the ranke of Governors, and of men in Authority. For God hath not revealed to us, who they are whom he hath elected, and who they are whom he hath reprobated. If he had, *Austin* tells us what we should doe in that case, *De Civit. Dei. lib.21. cap. 24. Si de aliquibus ita Ecclesia certa esset, ut qui sunt illi etiam nosset, qui licet adhuc in hac vitâ sint constituti, tamen prædestinati sunt in æternum ignem ire cum Diabolo, tam pro iis non oraret, quam pro ipso.* If it shall be farther urged, that we are to pray for all Kings, and all that are in Authority, not only for our own; I answer, that this is nothing agreeable to the end of such prayers here expressed by the Apostle, namely, *That under them we may live a quiet and peaceable life in all Godlinesse and honesty.* And what have we here in England, to doe with the King of *Bungo*, that we should pray for him, or for the Kings *in terrâ australi incognitâ*, discovered by *Ferdinando de Quir*, or for the great Duke of *Crapulia*?

3. As for the second interpretation; I doe not find it so usuall with our Divines: *Cajetan* distinguisheth here between *voluntas signi* and *beneplaciti*; so doth *Aquinas*, and this distinction of *voluntas occulta* and *revelata*, is usually reduced to that of *voluntas signi* and *beneplaciti*; But *voluntas signi*, and *voluntas revelata*, is more congruously applied to the things which God commands, then to the things which God himselfe worketh; as for example, he commands faith and repentance; and the commandements of God, are usually called the will of God in Scripture, though improperly; and thus the distinction is plain. God commands one thing, but it is not necessary, that he should will, that that which he commands shall come to passe: As for example, God commanded *Abraham* to sacrifice *Isaack*, yet he determined that *Isaack* should not be sacrificed, as appeared by the event. In like manner he commanded *Pharaoh* to let Israel goe, yet withall told *Moses* he would harden his heart, that he should not let Israel goe. But this will of God called *voluntas signi* and *Revelata*, cannot so congruously be said to passe upon mans salvation. Yet because God may be said to command salvation, in as much as he commands faith and repentance, that we may be saved; and in this sense, men are exhorted sometimes to save themselves; As, *Save your selves from this froward generation*; and *Save some out of the fire with feare*; and *That thou maist both save thy selfe and them that heare thee*; therefore we are content also to admit of this distinction, and consider with what judgement and sufficiency this Author doth impugne it.

Acts 2.40. Jud.23. 1 Tim.4. 16.

1. By his first opposition, it appears, that meer ignorance bears him out against this distinction; For we doe acknowledge, that Gods revealed will, and his words revealing it, are true interpretations of his own mind and meaning; though not of such a meaning as he expects should be fashioned. For he conceives that Gods will in this case, is only of what shall be done; which is most untrue: Hereby is only signified, what is mans duty to doe, although it may be God will not give him effectuall grace to doe it. As for examples sake, when God commanded *Pharaoh* to let Israel goe; hereby was signified, that God would have it to be *Pharaohs* duty to let Israel goe; though withall he professes to *Moses*, that he would harden *Pharaohs* heart, whereupon he should refuse to let them goe. So when God commanded *Abraham* to sacrifice *Isaack*, hereby it was signified, that it was Gods will to make it *Abrahams* duty to sacrifice his Sonne, albeit God had determined, that when *Abraham* came to poynt of execution of that which was enjoyned him, he would hold *Abrahams* hand, and content himselfe with *Abrahams* readinesse, and good heart to obey God in this.

2. As to the second; it is untrue that any such thing followeth as this Author pretendeth, namely, that two contrary wills shall be found in God; For first there is no contrariety in the wills here shaped by the Author himselfe; thus, *many shall be damned,*

and

and thoſe, many may be ſaved. As for the word *irrevocable*, wherewith this Author ſtuffes his propoſition, that is no attribute of damnation, or the manner thereof, but rather of Gods decrees; wherein ſtill he proceeds and ſpares not to foame out his own ſhame, deſiring to make Gods decrees of a revocable nature. Secondly, he underſtands not the accommodation of the diſtinction aright, which is not directly to ſalvation and immediatly, but rather to *præcepta, conſilia, remedia,* (as *Aquinas* expreſſeth it) of *voluntas ſigni*, which is all one in this caſe with *voluntas revelata.*

1. Applyed to Gods commandement, joyned with a will not to give grace to obay his commandement, thus, *it's Pharaohs duty to let Iſrael goe; 'Tis not Gods will that Pharaoh ſhall let Iſrael goe*, for he meaneth to harden his heart to the contrary.

2. Applyed to ſalvation, conſequent or not conſequent, according as men ſhall be found to obey or diſobey Gods commandement: thus, *it's my will, that as many as believe and repent ſhall be ſaved*, and conſequently it's true, *If thou believeſt (whoever thou art) and repenteſt, thou ſhalt be ſaved.* I will give grace to believe and repent to ſome only, whereby they may be ſaved; between thoſe in like manner, there is no contrariety at all.

3. And if there be no contrariety at all, then ſurely it followes not by this Authors Logick, that if one of them be good, the other muſt be bad. I ſay by this Authors Logick; for now adaies men are given ſo much to Rhetorick, that they forget all good Logick, if ever they learnt any: who I pray gives any ſuch rule, that if one contrary be good, the other muſt be bad? If heat be good, is cold bad? Or if white be good, is black bad? But as for the caſe we treat of, if theſe wills were found to be contrary, one of them ſhould deſtroy the other, and the other ſhould have no being at all; and in caſe it hath no being, ſhall it be ſaid to be bad? Yes, like enough, by the learning of the Arminians. I come to the Fifth.

DISCOURSE.

SECT. V.

2. PEter 3.9. *Not willing that any ſhould periſh, but that all ſhould come to repentance.* This Scripture is not ſo liable to thoſe exceptions, which are made againſt the former teſtimonies, for it is a negative propoſition, and muſt be taken diſtributively; and therefore ſpeaks that in plain termes, which is contrary to abſolute reprobation.

That which is uſually replied is this, that the perſons here ſpoken of, are the Elect only. God is not willing that any of the Elect ſhould periſh. But the contrary appears plainly in the Text; for the perſons here ſpoken of, are thoſe towards whom God exerciſeth much long ſuffering and patience; and who are they? Are they the Elect only, or chiefly? No, but the Reprobates rather, that dye for their contempt of grace. Reprobates are the proper objects of Gods long ſuffering and patience, as we may ſee, *Rom.* 2.4. where the Apoſtle ſpeaking of ſuch as goe on in ſinne, and treaſure up unto themſelves wrath againſt the day of wrath, ſaith that God uſeth patience towards them, that ſo he might lead them to repentance: and *Rom.* 9.22. He endureth (ſaith the Text) with much long ſuffering the veſſells of wrath fitted to deſtruction. Reprobates therefore as well as others doth *Peter* here ſpeak of, and ſaith, that God would have none of them to periſh; if they doe periſh, it is their own fault and folly, and not Gods abſolute pleaſure, who would have none to periſh.

TWISSE.

Conſideration.

HEre be odde gambolls; as when he ſaith the propoſition here is negative, whereas the propoſitions are two, and the latter affirmative, as well as the former is negative. As for the taking of it diſtributively, as he ſpeaks, *the Text expreſſeth the negative diſtributively*; implying belike, that when we interpreted the former

former place *de generibus singulorum*, it was not to be taken distributively, which is a very shallow conceit, for it is apparent we distribute it *de generibus singulorum*; and more then that, of the particulars of each kind, only we doe not distribute it of all the particulars. In like manner, though the Text in this place expresseth *a distribution*, saying, *not willing*, any to *perish*, this distribution is not extended to all: Nay, it admits of a greater limitation then the former place did by our interpretation; for τίνες here must be referred to that which goes before in these words, *God is patient to us ward not willing any to perish*, that is, τίνας ἡμᾶς, any *of us* to perish, but all to come to repentance, that is πάντας ἡμᾶς, all of us; which can admit of no other sense then all such as the Apostle was; he saith it is contrary to *absolute reprobation*; that is wind; when he proveth it then we will believe it, his word is no oracle.

2. Let us see how he disproves their interpretation, who accommodate it to Gods Elect. *The persons here mentioned* (he saith) *are those towards whom God exerciseth long suffering and patience*, and demandeth whether these are *the Elect only or chiefly*? and answereth himselfe negatively; saying, that *the reprobates are the proper objects of Gods long suffering and patience*, which he proveth out of *Rom.* 2.4. and *Rom.* 9.22. and so concludes the argument very learnedly and judiciously Arminian like, *ex omnibus affirmativis, in secundâ Figurâ*; which of what force it is every weak Logician knoweth; for thus in effect is his argument, *They of whom God will have none to perish, are such towards whom God expresseth much long suffering and patience; But the Reprobates are they towards whom God expresseth much long suffering and patience; Therefore the Reprobates are they, of whom God will have none to perish.*

2. And whereas the Apostle saith, *God is patient towards us*, the meaning according to this Authors judicious enlargement is, *towards us who are partly elect and partly reprobates*: and so likewise when he saith, 2 *Pet.* 1.2. *To you who have obtained like precious faith with us*, that is, *with us of whom some are elect and some reprobates.* And 1 *Pet.* 1.3. *God hath begotten us to a lively hope, by the resurrection of Jesus Christ*, that is, *begotten us, some of whom are elect and some reprobates.*

3. Now because the Apostle saith plainly and simply, *who is patient towards us*; this Author desiring to frame it in a suitable manner, to that of the Apostle, *Rom.* 2. 4. whereunto he hath a hungry desire to reduce it, therefore he makes bold to say, that the persons here mentioned by Saint *Peter* are such, *towards whom God exerciseth long suffering and patience*: Thus again he is willing very obsequiously to follow *Lysanders* counsell, who advised, when a Lyons skinne would not serve the turne, to piece it up with a Foxe skinne. We on the other side, though it cannot be denied, but that God doth μακροθυμεῖν towards such as Saint *Peter* was, and those to whom he wrote, *who had obtained like precious faith with himselfe and his fellow Apostles, and other believers*; which cannot be denied to have been the elect of God, (so he calls them to whom he wrote, 1 *Pet.* 1.2.) yet we spare to draw any argument therehence, because we know full well, that God doth μακροθυμεῖν, and useth long suffering towards the Reprobates also. So that we could not conclude that we would herehence, but either by a Syllogisme vitious in the forme, as this Author doth, or by a Syllogisme, that would be as faulty in the matter, thus; God shewes patience to none but Reprobates; they of whom God will have none to perish are such, as towards whom God shewes patience; therefore God will not have any Reprobate to perish. And is not this a proper doctrine, that God will not have any Reprobate to perish, both for the overthrowing of Gods omnipotency; for is it not a cleare case and undeniable, that all Reprobates doe perish? As also for the overthrowing of Gods immutability; for can it be denied, that when God damnes them, he will have them to perish? Which if before he would not, can it be avoided, but that Gods will must be changed? And lastly, for the bringing in of manifest contrariety into the will of God; seeing they dare not deny that God did from everlasting ordaine every reprobate unto damnation: I say they dare not deny this in plain termes, though their carriage is such, as if their meaning were, that Gods will in decreeing their damnation is conditionall *quoad actum volentis*, as touching the very act of willing, whence it followeth that God shall not will their damnation untill their death in infidelity and impenitency; for it is fit the condition should exist before the thing conditionated, whose existence depends thereupon. As for that he addes in the close, *If they doe perish it is their own fault and folly*; we make no question hereof, though nevertheless we may well maintain, that it is Gods absolute pleasure, not to take them off from their sinfull and foolish

courses

courſes, nor to ſet an end to theſe vitious courſes of theirs, which he could if it pleaſed him, as well as he did ſet an end to the abominable courſes of *Manaſſes*, as alſo to the perſecution and bloudy courſes of *Saul*; towards whom he did undoubtedly μακροθυμεῖν, and exerciſe much long ſuffering and patience; though herein there is no difference between them and reprobates, or very little; according to that of *Auſtin*, *Iſtorum neminem* (*non prædeſtinatorum*) *adducit Deus ad ſalubrem ſpiritualem q. pœnitentiam, quâ homo Deo reconciliatur in Chriſto; ſive illis ampliorem pœnitentiam, ſive non imparem præbeat: contrà Julian. Pelagian. lib.* 5. *cap.* 4. I come to the laſt of this ranke.

DISCOURSE.

SECT. VI.

TO Theſe teſtimonies, I may adde thoſe conditionall ſpeeches, if thou ſeek him he will be found of thee; but if thou forſake him he will caſt thee off, for ever, 1 *Chron.* 28. 9. If ye ſeek him, he will be found of you; but if you forſake him, he will forſake you. 2 *Chron.* 15. 2. If thou doe well, ſhalt thou not be accepted? but if thou doſt ill, ſinne lies at the doore. *Gen.* 4. 7. The juſt ſhall live by faith, but if any man withdraw himſelfe, my ſoule *non approbabit eum*, ſhall have no pleaſure in him, he ſhall be a Reprobate. In all theſe and many other places it is cleare (for ought I can ſee) that God forſakes no man, conſidered ſimply in the fall, till by actuall ſinnes and continuance in them he forſakes God. Now if God reject no man from Salvation in time or in act and deed, till he rejects God, then ſurely he rejected no man in purpoſe and decree, but ſuch a one as he foreſaw, would reject and caſt off him. For Gods acts in time, are regulated by his decrees before time. *Epheſ.* 1. 11. God worketh all things (ſaith the Apoſtle) according to the counſell of his own will; and therefore there muſt be an exact conformity between them, as between *regulam* and *regulatum*, the rule and the thing meaſured by the rule. By whatſoever therefore God doth in the World, we may know what he purpoſed to doe before the World; and by his actuall caſting men off, when they grow rebellious and impenitent, and not before, we may certainly gather, that he decreed to caſt them off, for their foreſeen rebellion and impenitency, and not before. Beſides it is all one in ſubſtance, to caſt a man off indeed, and to entertain a reſolution to doe it; our *velle* and *facere* are all one in Gods account, and the reaſon is, becauſe where there is a deliberate and ſetled will, the deed will follow, if nothing hinder; much more is Gods will and deed all one, ſeeing his will is omnipotent, and irreſiſtible, and whatſoever he wills directly and abſolutely, is certainly done when the time comes.

All theſe plain Scriptures doth this opinion contradict *in terminis*, and not only theſe, but the whole courſe of Scriptures, by which it is much ſafer for a man to frame his opinions, then by a few places pickt up here and there, and thoſe obſcure ones too: What Saint *Auſtin* ſpeaks in another place, I may ſafely ſay in this, *numquid ideo negandum quod apertum eſt, quia comprehendi non poteſt, quod occultum eſt*? Shall we contradict plain places, becauſe we cannot comprehend the obſcure? *Aug. de bono perſever. c.* 14. *Secundum plura* (ſaith *Tertullian*) *pauciora ſunt intelligenda; & ne unius ſermo ſubvertat alios; ſecundum omnes potius quam adverſum omnes intelligendus erit*, A few teſtimonies muſt be expounded according to the whole courſe of Scriptures, and not this according to a few teſtimonies. This is my firſt reaſon.

TWISSE

Conſideration.

TO the places of Scripture here alleadged, I give the interpretation, to prevent the confuſion of things that differ, which all affect who preferre the darkneſſe

neſſe of Errour before the light of truth; for it is moſt advantageous to ſuch, to fiſh in troubled waters.

To the two firſt, I ſay; God is firſt ſought of us before we find him, as touching the obtaining of many bleſſings at the hands of God according to that, *Ezech.* 36. 37. *I will yet be ſought of the houſe of Iſrael, to performe it unto them.* But as touching the obtaining of an heart to ſeek him, thus God is found of us before we ſeek him; according to that, *Eſ.* 65. 1. *I have been found of them that ſought me not*: witneſſe *Saul* marching with a commiſſion from the Prieſts to Damaſcus, to bind all that called on the name of Jeſus.

To the third I anſwer, by diſtinguiſhing acceptation, as we diſtinguiſh love; Love is either *complacentiæ* or *beneficentiæ*; ſo acceptation is either unto reward, or unto complacency; Rewards alwaies follow our doing well; but grace of doing well is alwaies a fruit of Gods favour towards us in Chriſt.

To the laſt *the juſt ſhall live by faith*; But there is a grace of God preventing faith; *cur ille credat, ille non credat*, what is the reaſon but the meere pleaſure of God giving the grace of Faith to one, and denying it to another, according to that of the Apoſtle, *He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth. They that withdraw themſelves my ſoule ſhall have no pleaſure in them*; The meaning is, they ſhall feele the ſmart of his diſpleaſure; but before they withdrew themſelves God took not that pleaſure in them, as to give them his cuſtodient grace, to keep them from withdrawing themſelves; which grace, and that out of his good pleaſure he afforded unto others: But this grace comes in no account throughout with this Author, like unto the Remonſtrants, who would have no other notice taken of any other counſell of God, then that whereby he decreeth to ſave believers and damne unbelievers. But if you call them to enquire of Gods decree, to beſtow the grace of Faith and repentance upon ſome, and not on others; as whether it proceeds abſolutely or conditionally, they uſually lend a deafe eare to this; whereby it is as cleare as the Sunne, what eſtimation they make of the grace of regeneration, of the grace of Faith, and of repentance; and after what manner they give God the glory of it. By the way obſerve I pray, how he makes the ſtate of man in being a reprobate conſequent to his withdrawing himſelfe, which undoubtedly is a Temporall act, and accordingly the act of Reprobation, whereby a man is denominated a reprobate, to be meerely Temporall; and conſequently ſuch an act muſt election be alſo, *viz.* not eternall but Temporall.

Still he keepeth himſelfe in his ſtrength of confuſion, as moſt advantageous for him; as in ſaying, *God forſakes no man, till by actuall ſinnes and continuance in them he forſaketh God.* But albeit God forſaketh no man, as touching the inflicting of puniſhment, untill man commits actuall ſinne, and continueth therein impenitently; yet before this God did forſake him, as touching the denyall of this grace cuſtodient from ſinne; and the denyall of the grace of repentance to riſe out of ſinne, which yet he grants to many; as in ſhewing mercy to whom he will, like as whom he will he hardneth, and ſo accordingly cures in ſome, that naturall infidely and hardneſſe of heart wherein we are all borne, and leaves it uncured in others. Now conſider we his argument following, which is this. *If God reject no man from ſalvation in time, or in act and deed till he reject God, then ſurely he rejected no man in purpoſe and decree, but ſuch a one as he foreſaw would reject and caſt off God.* Now this argument not one of our Divines deny, not only as it is applied to reprobation; but neither doe we deny it, applied unto election. For we willingly profeſſe, that like as God beſtowes ſalvation on none, but ſuch as he then findes believers, penitent, and given to good works: in like ſort wee all profeſſe, that God decrees to beſtow ſalvation on none but ſuch as he foreſeeth will believe, repent, and become ſtudious of good works. Like enough, many doe wilfully diſſemble the true ſtate of the Queſtion between us: others ignorantly miſtake it. The queſtion is not whether God decrees to beſtow ſalvation on ſuch as he foreſeeth will believe, and reject thoſe from ſalvation whom he foreſeeeth will not believe; but of the order of reaſon between theſe decrees of God, and the foreſight of obedience on the one ſide, and diſobedience on the other; that is, whether like as faith, repentance, and good works in men of ripe years doe

Note

doe precede their ſalvation, as diſpoſing cauſes thereunto; ſo the fore-ſight of faith, repentance, and good works, precede election, as diſpoſing cauſes or prerequiſites thereunto. In like manner on the other ſide, whether, as finall perſeverance in ſinne precedes damnation, as the meritorious cauſe thereof; So finall perſeverance in ſinne as foreſeen by God precedes reprobation as the decree of Damnation, as the meritorious cauſe thereof: So that the argument here mentioned (which is all his ſtrength in this place) rightly applyed muſt runne thus. Faith, repentance, and good works actually exiſtent precede ſalvation, as the diſpoſing cauſes thereunto; therefore faith, repentance, and good works foreſeen precede election, as the diſpoſing cauſes thereunto; and what is this, but as good as in expreſſe termes to profeſſe, that election is of faith, repentance, and good works: though it be in direct contradiction unto Saint *Paul*, profeſſing *in terminis* (to ſpeak in this Divines language) that *the purpoſe of God according to election is not of works*. So on the other ſide, Finall perſeverance in ſinne precedes damnation, as the meritorious cauſe thereof; therefore finall perſeverance in ſinne foreſeen, precedes the decree of damnation, as the meritorious cauſe thereof. And then what is to make reprobation to be of evill works, if this be not? Whereas Saint *Paul*, look by what argumants he proves that election is not of good works, *viz.* becauſe before *Jacob* and *Eſau* were borne, or had done good or evill, it was ſaid of them the Elder ſhall ſerve the Younger: by the ſame argument it is equally evident that Reprobation is not of evill works. Yet we acknowledge an exact conformity between Gods decrees and the execution thereof: becauſe like as God damnes no man but for ſinne, ſo he decreed to damne no man but for ſinne: where ſinne is in each place made the meritorious cauſe of damnation, not of the decree of damnation. And like as God beſtowes ſalvation on no man of ripe years, but by way of reward of faith, repentance, and good works, ſo he decreed to beſtow ſalvation on no man of ripe years, but by way of reward of faith, repentance, and good works; where faith repentance and good works, are in each place made the diſpoſing cauſes to ſalvation, but not to election. There was never any ſo madde (ſaith *Aquinas*) as to ſay that merits are the cauſe of predeſtination, as touching the act of God predeſtinating, and Why? but becauſe ſo is the cauſe of predeſtination to be enquired into, as the cauſe of Gods will is enquired into: but formerly he had ſhewed that there can be no cauſe of Gods will, as touching the act of God willing: Now let every one judge whether the act of reprobation, be not as clearly the act of Gods will, as the act of predeſtination; and conſequently whether it be not equally as mad a courſe (in *Aquinas* his judgement) to deviſe a cauſe of reprobation, as to deviſe a cauſe of predeſtination on the part of Gods will. And no marvail, for the act of Gods will is eternall, all the works of the creature are temporall: Then, the act of Gods will is God himſelfe, for there is no accident in God; and therefore they may as well ſet themſelves to deviſe a cauſe of God, as a cauſe of Gods will. His phraſe of caſting off, is ambiguous; if it ſignifieth the denyall of ſalvation, it followeth diſobedience; if it ſignifieth the deniall of grace, it precedes diſobedience, in what kind ſoever.

3. Our *velle* and *facere* are both temporall; in God it is otherwiſe; for his deeds are temporall, and may admit the works of men precedaneous thereunto; but his reſolutions are his decrees, and they are all eternall, and can admit no work of man precedaneous thereunto; yet is God as juſt in the one as in the other. For like as he damnes no man but for ſinne, ſo he never decreed to damne any man but for ſinne; But as touching the grace of regeneration, the grace of faith and repentance, in the granting and denying of this, the Apoſtle plainly tells us, he proceeds meerly according to the good pleaſure of his will; as when he ſaith, *The Lord hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth*: And here alſo God is as juſt in his decrees as in his executions. For if it be juſt with him, to give this grace to whom he will, and deny it to whom he will; it is as juſt with him, to decree the giving of it to whom he will, and the denying of it alſo to whom he will. And why ſhall not the Lord take liberty to cure infidelity and hardneſſe of heart in whom he will, as he cured it in *Manaſſes* and *Saul*; and leave it uncured in whom he will, as he left it uncured in many a proud Phariſee, and proud Philoſopher,

notwithstanding all their Morality they boasted of? Very seasonably he confesseth Gods will to be omnipotent and irresistible, when nevertheless, he makes him to will the salvation of all Reprobates, though not one of them is saved. But by that which followes, by will omnipotent and irresistible, it seems he understandeth only will absolute, which he distinguisheth from will conditionate, which can be no other (I suppose) then this, my will is that all and every one shall be saved, in case he believe and repent. Now seeing it is as true, that 'tis Gods will that they shall be damned, in case they believe not and repent not, let every sober man judge, whether this deserve to be accounted, a will of saving rather then a will of damning; especially in case all men naturally, are farre more prone to infidelity and impenitency, then to faith and repentance. As for a will conditionate in God, like enough this Author carryeth it hand over head without distinction, as he doth many other things besides: whereas no such will is agreeable to the divine nature, *quoad actum volentis*, as touching the act of willing, as both *Bradwardine* by clear reason, and *Piscator* out of the word of God have demonstrated, but only *quoad res volitas*, as touching the things willed by him.

4. I have shewed the poverty of his performances, by the particular examination of every place alleadged by him, and made it plain, how he betraies his own nakednesse of interpretation of Scripture, and of argumentation throughout; and therewithall, the vanity of this his boast, that our doctrine of absolute reprobation, doth contradict these plain Scriptures. But he like a brave fellow well conceited of his atchievements, and having thereby gotten some authority to himselfe, is bold to give his word, that *it contradicts also the whole course of Scripture*; which I verily believe he is as well able to performe, as he hath performed the former; and very judiciously takes upon him to distinguish between the whole course of Scriptures, and a few places pickt up here and there, as if they were no part of the whole course of Scripture: Belike by reason of their obscurity, as he pretends, no matter if they were expunged; like as owles are offended with day-light. Our Saviour tells us of some that loved darkenesse rather then light, because their deeds were evill. None hate the light of Gods truth, more then such as are possessed with errours, as with familiar spirits, especially when they have been found to play the Apostates from Gods truth. Whether I have dashed my selfe upon the rocks of *Austins* censure, by contradicting any Scripture that he hath brought, or only his corrupt and vile interpretation and accommodation of them, let the indifferent judge. Yet what more plain then this, *Gods purpose of election is not of works*; especially compared with the manner how Saint *Paul* proves it. What more plain then this? *God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth*. It is apparent he utterly declines the criticall point of these controversies, which is as touching Gods giving grace, even the grace of faith and repentance; and of what spirit that savoureth let every one judge. As for interpreting any place, we doe not abridge his liberty in interpreting it after what manner he thinks good, but we are ready to weigh it, and if we find it too light, to esteem of it as it deserves: neither doe we refuse to take into consideration, what he or any of his complices are pleased to insist upon.

DISCOURSE.

DISCOURSE.

The Second sort of Arguments Convincing drawn from Gods Attributes.

SECT. I.

As touching the Generall.

SEcondly it fights with some principall Attributes of God, therefore it cannot be true. For God useth not to make decrees contrary to his own glorious nature, and incompatible with those excellent Attributes, by which he hath discovered part of hi mselfe to men.

Two things are here to be premised.

1. That Gods chief Attributes are those perfections, in the manifestation of which by acts conformable to them, God is most glorified, which are Mercy, Justice, Truth,&c. For God is more honoured by the exercise of these amongst men, then by the putting forth of his unlimited power and Soveraignty; as a King is more renowned among his Subjects, for his clemency, equity, candid and faire dealing, then for his Dominion and Authority, or any thing that is done only for the manifestation thereof. And there is good reason for it. For,

1. Power is no vertue, but mercy, justice, and truth are; acts of power are not Morally good of themselves, but are made good or evill by their concomitants: if they be accompanied with justice, mercy,&c. they are good, if otherwise, they are naught. For *justum oportet esse quod laudem meretur*.

2. Power and Soveraignty may as well be shewed in barbarous and unjust actions, as in their contraries. *Saul* shewed his authority and power to the full, in slaying the Lords Priests, and *Nebuchadnezzar* in casting the three Children into the fiery furnace,and *Daniell* into the Lyons Denne; but no mercy, nor justice, nor any thing else that was good.

2. The second thing that is to be preconsidered is, that justice, mercy, and truth in God, are the same in nature with those vertues in men, though infinitely different in degree (as light in the aire,is the same with light in the Sunne in nature, not in degrees) and that which is just, mercifull, and upright in men, is so in God too. And by these vertues in our selves, and such acts as are conformable to them, *tanquam ex pede Herculem*, we may safely measure the same in God: For otherwise these things would follow.

1. The common and received distinction of Divine Attributes, into communicable and incommunicable, would fall to the ground: for against it this might be said, that the mercy,justice,truth, and other vertues that are in us, are not Gods perfections in a lower degree communicated to us, but things of a different nature.

2. Men cannot be truly said, to be made after Gods image, *Gen.*1.27. Nor when they are regenerated, to be renewed after the same image, *Col.*3.10. And to be made partakers of the Divine nature, 2 *Pet.*1.4. That Picture cannot be the picture of such a man, which doth not in its parts and lineaments clearly resemble him; nor can we be truly the image of God, in respect of our graces, if in these graces there be not a resemblance of Gods Attributes.

3. We may not safely imitate God, as we are commanded; *Be you perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect*, *Matth.*5.48. and *be ye holy as I am holy*. Nor when we shew forth mercy, justice, and truth in our actions, can we be properly said to imitate God, if these be one thing in God, and in men another.

These two things being thus premised, *viz.* that Gods mercy, justice, and truth, are three of his chief Attributes, in the exercise of which he takes himselfe to be much glorified, and that we are to measure these Attributes by the same vertues in ourselves. I come to the proofe of my second reason against absolute reprobation, which is, that it oppoeth some of Gods principall Attributes, particularly his justice, mercy, and truth.

TWISSE.

Conſideration.

I Cannot but wonder at the performances of the true Author of this Diſcourſe, in comparing that which goes before, with that which comes after; His poverty of argumentation out of Scripture, and the exuberancy of his diſcourſe following. Before he was in ſome ſtraits, but now he ſeems to have gotten Sea roome enough: yet this is my comfort, I ſeem to perceive out of what chimney all this ſmoak proceeds, and to be as well acquainted with the ſpirit that breatheth here, as if I were at his elbow while he penned it. *Agnoſco veteris veſtigia flammæ*: ſuch like are Doctor *Jacksons* diſcourſes; and him I have known of old, and his Epheſtion alſo; I profeſſe willingly of Scholar acquaintance, they were my greateſt and deareſt; But ſeeing it hath pleaſed God to put ſuch a difference between us; I would have both them and the World know, I doe as little regard them as feare them.

Arminius himſelfe is never more plauſible, then in ſuch like extravagant diſcourſes as a poſitive Theologue: But theſe inſpirations were never derived from him; they are flowers of another garden. Theſe have been ſhapen in a more Philoſophicall brain whereof ſome having gotten the reputation, give Oracles therehence, firſt to forme interpretations of Scriptures, in congruity to theſe Theorems, as the true Author bluſheth not to profeſſe; which when he hath perſwaded the World of, I ſee no cauſe to the contrary, but he may adventure a degree farther, and perſwade the burning of the Bible, ſo farre as it concerneth the Doctrine of Predeſtination and Reprobation, Grace and Free-will, and content themſelves with theſe magiſteriall precepts, as moſt ſufficient and ſoveraigne for the endoctrinations of the Chriſtian World in theſe poynts. But he might have ſpared his pains in proving this conſequence, *that if our Doctrine of Reprobation be contradictory to Gods principall attributes it cannot be true.* I ſay he might have ſpared the proofe hereof, for all that he brings in proofe of this is but darkneſſe in compariſon of the domeſticall light, and ſelfe-evidence, which this conſequence carryeth with it. His premiſes here, and diſcourſe thereof is like unto the Turkes parly before the encounter, when he challenged any one of *Scanderbegs* army to a ſingle combate. For as that parley was meerely complementall, and to no purpoſe, ſave only, as he might conceit, to abate the fervor of his oppoſite, who longed to be dealing with him; ſo this introduction, I find to be of no Scholaſticall uſe in the world, but meerely Politick, to work ſome impreſſion upon the readers affections, where by it may come to paſſe, that when he reads of Gods mercy and juſtice, as here it is ſet forth, he may be the more enclined to judge thereof, according to the genius of human mercy and juſtice. Yet I am content to give my ſelfe to be wrought upon by theſe pretty contemplations, as farre as I ſhall be convicted of any truth and ſobriety in them: though I willingly profeſſe I am very ſuſpicious (for I love to betray my infirmities) that there is little or no truth and ſobriety at all in them.

1. Now becauſe he hopes to hatch much advantage unto his cauſe out of theſe attributes, and to that purpoſe he ſitts very long upon them, though his market may be never the better for all that. He tells us theſe are Gods chief attributes, and as it appeareth by that which followeth, his practice is to diſparage his power (which I call the Lords Soveraignty) in compariſon to theſe; Now it ſeems they are chiefe indeed in his opinion, for the furthering of his cauſe; but as for any abſolute chiefty they have in God, I am not as yet acquainted therewith, what I may be by this Authors performances I know not; yet in the next page ſave one, he profeſſeth expreſſely, *That all Gods excellencies are infinitely good, and one is not greater then another*; wherein I doe much approve his judgement, as ſavouring of more depth then this, which yet I think not that he, who pretends to be the Author of this diſcourſe, in reſpect of his minority, ſhould be likely to broach; as for other reſpects of principality, I ſhall be ready to take notice of them in due place. But when he ſaith, *God is moſt glorified in the manifeſtation of mercy, juſtice, and truth*, it is a very odde phraſe: For it is one thing to be glorious, another thing to be glorified; dare he deny that God is as glorious in his

his power and ſoveraignty, as in his mercy, juſtice, and truth? As for the glorifying of him, that depends upon the will of the creature. It may be ſome are more thankfull unto God, for bleſſing them with health, and riches, and honour, and preferment; then for beſtowing his Goſpell upon them; but will it follow herehence, that his goodneſſe in giving riches, &c. is more glorious then his goodneſſe is ſeen in giving us his Word and Goſpell? We read that when God laid the foundations of the earth, *the Starres of the morning praiſed God together, and all the children of God rejoyced, Job.* 38. 7. did theſe Angells glorify God for his mercy, juſtice, and truth, in the creating of them? We read ſometimes of Gods power, ſometimes of his wiſdome manifeſted in the Creation, as *Jer.* 10. 11. and 51. 11. and *Pſal:* 136. 5. *Jer.* 10. 12. &c. But no where have I read (that I can remember) he made the World by his mercy, juſtice, or truth; and *Revel.* 4. 11. I find the glory of power given unto God in the creation, by the 24 Elders, but neither there, nor any where elſe (that I know) is the glory of his mercy, juſtice, and truth, given unto God therein. *Thou art worthy O Lord, to receive glory, and honour, and power; for thou haſt created all things, and for thy will ſake, they have bee and are created.* And albeit men faile in giving God the glory of his power and wiſdome as they ſhould, will it follow herehence, that God is not ſo much to be glorified for his power and wiſdome, as for mercy, juſtice, and truth? yet who failes in this, that failes not in the uſe of the Lords Prayer; the concluſion whereof is this, *For thine is the Kingdome, and power, and glory?* And indeed albeit Power and Wiſdome may be ſhewed other waies, then in the way of mercy, juſtice, and truth; yet Gods mercy, juſtice, and truth, cannot be ſhewed without the ſimultaneous demonſtration of his power and wiſdome: And therefore when God comes to make good his gracious promiſe, for the delivering of Iſrael out of Egypt: which cannot be denied to have been a ſingular work of mercy, juſtice, and truth; the Lord profeſſeth that then he would make himſelfe known unto them by the name, *Jehovah*, by which name he was not known before. The Incarnation of the Sonne of God, was it not an admirable work, as well in the way of power, and wiſdome, as in the way of mercy, juſtice, and truth? I am apt to confound Gods juſtice with his truth, ere I am aware, without having that awfull regard to the authority of this writer, as perhaps may ſeem fit: But I hope it is a pardonable fault, conſidering my education hitherto in divinity; whereby I have attained only thus farre, to the acknowledgement of juſtice Divine; for juſtice conſiſteth, in giving every one his due; now this due being either in reſpect of God, or the creature: Juſtice Divine in giving God his due, *Aquinas* hath taught me, that it is all one with Gods wiſdome, promoting his ends by congruous means; juſtice Divine in giving the creature his due, I have learnt to depend wholy on Gods determination, manifeſted by his promiſes and threatnings, and this is commonly called *juſtitia fidelitatis*, which I take to be all one with truth. But I am very willing to be better informed by this Author, and I give my ſelfe to his contemplations, to have my thoughts faſhioned by them as they can; and if hitherto they have not transformed me into a new Creed, I cannot help that. Now if it be ſo that Gods power and wiſdome accompany the demonſtration of his mercy, juſtice, and truth, I cannot ſee how God is honoured more by the exerciſe of the one ſort, then of the other, but rather on the contrary. So that albeit a King is more renowned among his Subjects, for his clemency, equity, candid and faire dealing, then for his dominion and authority; yet I doe not eaſily perceive, how God is renowned more for his clemency, equity, &c. then for his power, &c. yet again this ſeems to me a very poore argument; to conclude Clemency to be a chiefe attribute of God, becauſe men doe more magnify him for that, then for his Power. For conſider, a Malefactor going to execution, is called back and ſaved by the Kings pardon, this man (be ſure) will magnify the King more for his clemency in ſaving him, then he would for his juſtice in putting him to death: but will it follow herehence, that Clemency is a more chiefe attribute of a King then juſtice? *Solomon* the greateſt of Kings hath ſaid, the Throne is eſtabliſhed by Juſtice: and it was wont to be ſaid, *fiat juſtitia, ruat orbis.* No ſuch thing is ſaid of Mercy. Then again the King could not doe this but by vertue of his prerogative, yet the Malefactor magnifies him not for his prerogative, but for the favourable uſe of it for his good, for that is all he reſpects: yet aske I pray any man of judgement, which is the chiefer attribute of a King, and more glorious of the two; his prerogative or his clemency? Clemency is a very vulgar vertue, but the royall prerogative is peculiar to one; A Thiefe after a robbery committed on the high-way,

meeting

meeting with a begger that beggeth a penny, if he aſtoniſh him with the gift of twelve pence, the begger is very likely more highly to magnify him, then any honeſt man going on the way, that beſtowes but an halfe penny upon him; yet, Whoſe liberality is the greater of the two? Carnall men renowne others for the benefit they receive by them; not according to their true worth: yet there is a farther difference; humane authority may be abuſed, and Soveraignty on earth is not alwaies joyned with good Morality, much leſſe with Piety; but in caſe a man could not ſinne, the more honour and authority is laid upon him, the more glorious ſhould he be; as being backt with the greater power to execute his goodneſſe. Thus it is with God, it is impoſſible he ſhould abuſe his ſoveraignty; yea his mercy and juſtice are one and the ſame reality with his power: what a vanity then is it to diſcourſe as this Author doth, in preferring one attribute of God before another, as if God were more glorious in the one then in the other. But he hath farther reaſons for this, let us conſider them: 1. *Power* (ſaith he) *is no vertue, nor morally good, but mercy juſtice and truth are.* I anſwer: Though it be ſo, yet who will ſay, the glory of vertue is greater then the glory of power?

2. Eſpecially conſidering, that vertue is common to the meaneſt.

3. A little vertue joyned with power, ſhall bring forth farre better fruits, then a great deale of vertue without power.

4. Though it be ſo in man, whoſe power may be abuſed, ſhall we transferre it to God, whoſe power cannot be abuſed, his power and his goodneſſe being all one?

5. Morall vertues denote a goodneſſe removeable where it is, obtainable where it is not; but no ſuch goodneſſe can be found in God, and conſequently no Morall vertue in proper ſpeech, whatſoever is in him, that being naturall and eſſentiall unto him.

6. Laſtly, to power only and ſoveraignty we owe obedience, and not to goodneſſe, and juriſdiction is farre more glorious then ſubjection. Yet by the way it is untrue (in my judgement) that *acts of Power are made good by being accompanied with juſtice*, ſpeaking of Morall goodneſſe; as acts of vertue alone they are morally good, not as acts of power. If *juſtum oportet eſſe quod laudem meretur*; then juſtice if not alone, yet chiefly, ſhall be that whereby one is renowned: yet herehence it followes, that every act of Gods power ſhall *laudem mereri*; becauſe it is impoſſible that any thing he doth ſhould be otherwiſe then juſt, ſuch a *juſtitia condecentiæ* followeth all his actions; otherwiſe we muſt grant, that God hath power to doe that which is unjuſt.

2. And accordingly, though power humane and Angelicall, may be ſhewed in barbarous actions; yet power Divine cannot; let him doe whatſoever he is able, it ſhall not be unjuſt: let God turne all the World into nothing, another manner of deſtruction then that of *Sauls* ſlaying the Lords Prieſts, or *Nebuchadnezzars* caſting the three Children into the fiery Furnace, yet dares this Author ſay, that God herein ſhould be unjuſt.

I come to the ſecond of his premiſes.

2. We have had a taſt of this Authors faculty in roaving at large, and within the Horizon of his own braine, we ſhall drink a deeper draught of it ere we part. And once again I willingly profeſſe, it cannot enter into my beliefe, that theſe conceits have dropt from the fancy of a young Divine; ſome old beaten Naturaliſt rather doth imploy his braine to doe the Arminians this ſervice. I never found hitherto that Arminius, or any of his Batavian followers have thus diſcourſed, *that juſtice, mercy, and truth in God, are the ſame in nature, with thoſe vertues in men, though infinitely differing in degree.* I conceive Arminius (though wild enough in his 20 reaſons, and eſpecially in his reaſons drawn from the conſideration of Gods juſtice) to be more Orthodoxe, and farre more Scholaſticall then ſo; though I nothing doubt, we have a generation amongſt us, that affect to have all learning in Divinity, to goe by their rules of Philoſophy, and yet the baſeſt Philoſophy I think that ever was deviſed. And this Author whoſoever he be, ſeems herein to diſcourſe after ſuch a manner, as if he were of the number of thoſe that heard the Devill read Lectures through a grate in the Univerſity of *Toledo*. *If juſtice mercy and truth in God, are the ſame in nature, with thoſe vertues that are in men*, then there is ſomething in man, that is the very eſſence of God; For undoubtedly whatſoever is in God, is of his eſſence; yet thoſe are they that attribute Manicheiſme unto us. And ſeeing the vertues of man are accidents, it followes that that, which under the ſame name is attributed to God, is either an accident in God;

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or if it be his eſſence, then the eſſence of God, is of the ſame nature with accidents in man.

Thirdly; hence it followes, that the Divine perfections conſiſt of degrees, and conſequently muſt needs be accidentall unto him, not ſubſtantiall; for ſubſtance admits no degrees.

Fourthly; if juſtice humane be of the ſame nature with juſtice Divine, it followeth, not only that, that which is juſt in man is juſt with God, but that it muſt be after the ſame manner juſt; that like as mens juſtice conſiſteth in obedience to Gods law, implying ſubjection thereunto: So juſtice Divine muſt conſiſt in obedience to Gods law implying ſubjection. And like as man is obliged to be juſt, in the ſame manner God is obliged to be juſt. And conſequently like as *Saul* ſinned and became unjuſt in ſlaying the Lords Prieſts, ſo had God been unjuſt in doing the like.

Fiftly; man ſinneth in ſuffering his brother to ſinne, when it lies in his power to keepe him from ſinne; and conſequently, if that which is unjuſt with man is unjuſt with God, God ſinneth as often as he ſuffereth any ſinne to be committed in the world, for undoubtedly he could prevent it. *Auguſt. contra Julian. Pelag. lib. 5. cap. 4. Nos certe, ſi eos, in quos nobis poteſtas eſt ante oculos noſtros, perpetrare ſcelera permittamus, rei cum ipſis erimus: Quam vero innumerabilia illa permitit fieri ante oculos ſuos; quæ unicuique, ſi voluiſſet, nullâ ratione permitteret,* But let us ſee how he proves this, for he adventures upon it like a tall fellow, and that with variety of demonſtration.

1. The firſt is drawn from the received diſtinction of divine Attributes, namely into ſuch as are communicable unto the creature, and ſuch as are incommunicable; but here he conceales his Authority. But let him bring forth the teſtimony of any Divine, that maintains any Attribute Divine to be the ſame *quoad nomen & nominis rationem*, with any Attribute humane. Yet we may talke of Gods Attributes ſo, as for diſtinction ſake to ſay, ſome are ſuch as are alſo Attributed to man, others are not; without maintaining, that humane vertues are of the ſame nature with Attribute Divine. Life is a Divine Attribute, it is alſo attributed to man, to a beaſt, to a plant; But will any wiſe man ſay that the life of God is of the ſame nature with the life of a Man, of a Beaſt, of a Plant? What more equivocall then the word *Canis?* Attributed to a Starre, to a Fiſh, to a Foure-footed creature on the Earth; I anſwer much more equivocall is every thing in common attributed to God and Man; For whatſoever is in God, is his Eſſence, but between the Eſſence of God, and the eſſence of Man, there is a vaſter difference, then between the eſſence of a Starre, of a Fiſh, of a Dogge; how much more difference is there between the Eſſence of God, and an accident in man, ſuch as his vertues are. In a word, the vertue of Man is of an annihilable condition, and if it be of the ſame nature with ſomething in the nature of God, why ſhould not ſomething in the nature of God be of an annihilable condition? I marvaile not if men of this generation are apt to profeſſe that they will turne Atheiſts rather then concurre in ſome poynts with the Contra-Remonſtrants; for their diſcourſes breath Atheiſme in a very high degree. It is a queſtion among Schoolemen, whether *Ens* (the moſt abſtract notion of all other) be predicated univocally of God and the creature; the Dominicans utterly deny it; *Scotus* maintains the contrary with ſome curioſity of argumentation: but his Arguments are anſwered by the Dominicans and particularly by *Verſor* on the Metaphyſicks; but never, I think, was it heard of *Scotus* or any other (till now) that the vertues of man are of the ſame nature with the Divine Attributes, differing only in degree.

I come to his ſecond Argument.

2. It was wont to be accounted that man was the image of God, not in reſpect of the qualities of his mind and will only, but even in reſpect of his Eſſence alſo; And ſome have been anciently condemned for denying this: why then doe we not ſay that the Eſſence of man is of the ſame nature with the Eſſence of God differing only in degree. In the next place the power of underſtanding and liberty of will in man a bodily creature, brings him neareſt to God, of all bodily creatures: it was wont to be ſaid that all other creatures had *veſtigia Dei*, but man was *imago Dei*; as in whom is repreſented the Divine Nature as intelligent and free; ſo farre forth, as a compound creature of

body and ſoule can repreſent him; but who hath ever ſaid that the underſtanding of God was of the ſame nature with the underſtanding of man: and the will of God of the ſame nature with the will of man? It is well known that the underſtanding, and will humane, are but naturall faculties in man; but the underſtanding and will Divine, is the very eſſence of God; and if mans eſſence be not of the ſame nature with his faculties, doth it become us to profeſſe that the eſſence of God is of the ſame nature with the naturall faculties of man? As for the graces of Gods ſpirit, what are theſe but the three Theologicall vertues; all other are but Morall vertues ſanctified by theſe; Now ſhew me what Faith there is in God of the ſame nature with our Faith differing only in degree? What hope there is in God of the ſame nature with our hope, differing only in degree, what charity there is in God of the ſame nature with our Charity, differing only in degree. Theſe indeed being of all other the moſt peculiar fruits of regeneration, whereby we are renewed after the image of God, as touching the adventitious qualification of our natures, ſhould have Attributes divine anſwerable unto them (if any) of the ſame nature with them, differing only in degree. Yet herein (as I conceive) conſiſts not ſo much our participation of the Divine Nature, as in that, the Spirit of God the Father, and God the Sonne is communicated unto us, given unto us to be the immediate fountain of all actions and motions ſpirituall in us.

3. And albeit theſe Attributes, which in common doe denominate God and man, are one thing in God, and in man another: yet this nothing derogates from our imitation of God; and ſtriving to be perfect and holy in our kind as creatures; like as God is perfect and holy in his kind as Creator. And that I may repreſent ſome authority for my diſcourſe, whereas this Author repreſents none for his, it is a poynt generally received in the Schooles, that in this weakneſſe of our underſtanding, we come to know what God is by negation rather then by affirmation. *Capreolus* upon the firſt of the Sentences *Diſt.* 2. *Queſt.* 1. rehearſeth diverſe paſſages out of *Aquinas* to this purpoſe, as out of 1. *Contra Gentes* cap. 14.

In conſideratione Divinæ ſubſtantiæ præcipue utendum eſt via remotionis. Nam Divina ſubſtantia omnem formam quam intellectus noſter attingit, ſuâ excedit immenſitate. Et ſic ipſam apprehendere non poſſumus, cognoſcendo quid eſt, ſed aliqualiter ejus notitiam habemus, cognoſcendo quid non eſt; tantóque ejus notitiæ magis appropinquamus, quanto plura per intellectum noſtrum poterimus ab eo removere. Tanto enim unumquodque perfectiùs cognoſcitur, quanto differentias ejus ab alio pleniùs intuemur. Quià in conſideratione Divinæ ſubſtantiæ non poſſumus accipere quid, quaſi genus, nec diſtinctionem ab aliis rebus per differentias affirmativas accipere poſſumus; eam oportet accipere per differentias Negativas. Id. 3. Contra gentes cap. 47. Per effectus Dei pertingere poſſumus ut cognoſcamus de Deo, quia eſt, & quod cauſa aliorum eſt, aliis ſupereminens & ab omnibus remotus: & hoc eſt ultimum & perfectiſſimum noſtræ cognitionis in hac vitâ, ut Dionyſius dixit lib. de Myſticâ Theologiâ. Cum Deo quaſi ignoto conjungimur, quod quidem contingit, cùm de Deo, quid non ſit, cognoſcimus

In the conſideration of the Divine Eſſence, we muſt chiefly uſe the way of negation: for the Divine Eſſence, through its immenſity, doth exceed every forme that our underſtanding can conceive: So that we cannot apprehend it by knowing what it is; but after a ſort we have the knowledge thereof, by knowing what it is not. And ſo much nearer doe we approach to the knowledge thereof, the more we are able to remove from the nature of God. For every thing is known ſo much the more perfectly by how much the more at full we doe behold how it differeth from other things. Now in the conſiderationof the Divine eſſence, we cannot take any thing as the Genus thereof; neither can we apprehend its diſtinction from other things, by differences affirmative; and therefore we muſt apprehend it by differences negative. The ſame *Thomas* in his Third Book *Contra Gent. cap.* 47. By the effects of God (ſaith he) we may attain to know that God is, and that he is the cauſe of other things eminent above them, and removed from them all: and this is the laſt and moſt perfect degree of our knowledge in this life, as ſaith *Dionyſius* in his Book of Myſticall Divinity: We are conjoyned with God as unknown which verily comes to paſſe, when we know of God what he is not, but

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mus, quid verò ſit penitùs manet ignotum: unde & ad hujuſmodi ſublimiſſimæ cognitionis ignorantiam demonſtrandam, dicitur de Moſe Exod. 20. quòd acceſſit ad caliginem in qua Deus erat.

what he is it remains utterly unknown unto us; and therefore to demonſtrate our ignorance of this moſt ſublime knowledge, it is ſaid of *Moſes Exod.* 20. that he came unto the darkneſſe where God was.

The ſame *Capreolus* proceeds to ſhew out of *Aquinas* in 1 *Sent. Diſt.* 8. *q.* 1. *art.* 1. *ad* 4. How we muſt make progreſſe in our knowledge of God, by way of remotion or negation.

Quando, inquit, in divinis procedimus per viam remotionis, primò negamus corporalia, & Secundò intellectualia, ſecundum quod inveniuntur in creaturis, ut bonitas & ſapientia, & tunc remanet in intellectu Quod eſt, & nihil amplius, unde eſt, ſicut in quadam confuſione.

When (ſaith he) we proceed by way of remotion, or negation, in ſearching out the Divine nature, firſt we deny of him all corporall things, and ſecondly we deny of him all intellectuall things, after ſuch a ſort as they are found in the creatures, as godneſſe and wiſdome, (mark this well for theſe and ſuch like are the vertues which this Author ſaith are of the ſame nature in God and man differing only in degree) and *then there remains in the underſtanding, id quod eſt* (as much as to ſay *τὸ Ens*) *and nothing more; and hence* the underſtanding *remains as in a certain confuſion.* And indeed the notion of entity is moſt generall, moſt abſtract, and if any notion ſignifies one and the ſame nature, ſuch as may be affirmed of God and the creature, ſurely this is it. Now obſerve *Aquinas* his judgement concerning this, out of the ſame *Capreolus* in theſe words.

Ad ultimum autem, Eſſentiam ipſam, ſecundum quod eſt in creaturis, ab ipſo removemus, & tunc remanet (intellectus noſter) in quadam tenebrâ ignorantiæ; ſecundum quam ignorantiam, quantum ad ſtatum viæ pertinet, optime Deo conjungimur, ut Dionyſius dicit, & hæc eſt caligo in qua Deus habitare dicitur.

To the laſt (I anſwer) the very entity or exiſtence in the creatures we remove from God, and then our underſtanding remains in the darkneſſe of ignorance; according to which ignorance, ſo farre forth as it pertains to our condition (as *Viatores*) and in the way, we are conjoyned with God in the beſt manner; as *Denis* ſaith: and this is the darknes, wherein God is ſaid to dwell.

By this let any man judge, whether this Authors diſcourſe be not as oppoſite to the diſcourſe of *Aquinas*, as touching the nature of God in reſemblance to ours, as the Antipodes are to us. And withall I doe not find throughout his diſcourſe following, that he makes any uſe of theſe premiſes. And indeed there is no need of them at all: For if he cannot prove this Doctrine of ours repugnant either to Gods Mercy, or to his Truth, or to his Juſtice, theſe premiſes will ſtand him in no ſtead: and if he can prove it to be repugnant to thoſe Attributes of his, his argument ſhall ſtand in the ſame force, as well without theſe premiſes as with them.

Now, how well he makes good the repugnancy of our Doctrine to Gods mercy, we are in the next place to conſider.

DISCOURSE.

SECT. II.

As touching the First Speciall.

Gods Mercy.

1. IT oppoſeth Gods mercy. God is mercifull. It is a great part of his Title. *Exod.* 34. 6. *Mercifull and gracious. He is mercy in the abſtract:* 1 *John* 4.16. *God is love. A Father of mercies, and God of all conſolations.* 2 *Cor.* 1.3. Σωτὴρ, *a Saviour of men.* 1 *Tim.* 4. 10. Two waies is the mercy of God ſpoken of in Scripture, 1. abſolutely, 2. comparatively. 1. Abſolutely; and ſo it is ſet out in lofty and ſtately termes; its called *rich mercy. Epheſ.* 2.4. *Great kindneſſe. John* 4. 2. *Abundant mercy.* 1 *Pet.* 1.2. *Love without height or depth, bredth or length, or any dimenſions: love paſſing knowledge. Epheſ.* 3. 18, 19.

2. Comparatively. It is compared with his own juſtice, and with the love that dwells in the creatures, and is advanced above both.

1. It is ſometimes compared with his juſtice, and advanced above that, not in reſpect of its eſſence; for all Gods excellencies are infinitely good, and one is not greater then another; but in other things that concerne the expreſſions of it, particularly in theſe,

1. In the naturalneſſe and dearneſſe of it unto God. It is ſaid of mercy, *Mich.* 7. 18. It pleaſeth him, or he delights in mercy, but juſtice and judgement is called his ſtrange work, *alienum a naturâ ſuâ. Iſai.* 28.21. He doth not afflict willingly nor grieve the children of men. *Lam.* 3.33.

2. In the frequent exerciſe of it ſelfe, *Exod.* 34.6. He is ſlow to anger but abundant in goodneſſe. Mercies are beſtowed every day, judgements inflicted but now and then, ſparingly, and after a long time of forbearance, when there is no remedy. 2 *Chron.* 36.15. *All the day long have I ſtretched out my hands to a gainſaying and rebellious people. Iſai.* 65.2. that is, I have been patient a long time, and in that long day I have not been idle, but employed in exhortations, promiſes, and many mercies, whereby I might doe you good. God waits long for mens converſion, as the Marriner for the turning of the wind.

3. In its amplitude or objects to whom it is extended. *Exod* 20. 5. *Viſiting the iniquities of Fathers upon their children to the third and fourth generation, but ſhewing mercy to thouſands:* implying that his mercy is more largely extended then his juſtice and that look how much three or foure come ſhort of a thouſand, ſo much doth his juſtice come ſhort of his mercy in exerciſe of it.

4. In the occaſions that move God to exerciſe them: It is a great matter that moves God to puniſh, as we may ſee, *Gen.* 6.5,6,7,12,13. When the wickedneſſe of man was great upon the earth, and all fleſh had corrupted his way, then God thinks of puniſhment. He would not deſtroy the Amorites, till their wickedneſſe was full, *Gen.* 15. 16. *Quoties volui* (ſaith Chriſt to Jeruſalem) *Math.* 23.37. *How often would I have gathered you*, that is, I have not taken advantages againſt you: nor upon the firſt, ſecond, or third unkindneſſe caſt you off, ſmall matters have not moved me to deſtroy thee O Jeruſalem. But how ſmall an occaſion doth God take to ſpare man? When God had examined Sodome, and found their ſinnes to be anſwerable to their crye, yet then for tenne righteous mens ſakes would he have ſpared Sodome. *Gen* 18.32. Nay, he would have ſpared Jeruſalem, if the Prophet by ſearching, could have found one man that did execute judgement, and ſeek the truth *Jer.* 5.1. What a ſmall and ſlender Humiliation made him to ſpare wicked *Ahab* and his houſe a long time. 1 *King.* 21.29. And the repentance of *Neneve*, whoſe wickedneſſe cryed to the Lord for vengeance; *Jonas* 3.2. did eaſily procure her a pardon.

Thus is Gods Mercy advanced above his juſtice.

2. It is alſo compared with the affection of a Father to his Sonne, of a tender mother to her child, and of the moſt affectionate brute creatures to their young ones, and ſet above them all. It goes beyond a Fathers affection to his Sonne. *Matth.* 7.11. *If you that are evill, can give good gifts to your children, how much more will your heavenly Father give good things to them that aske him?* What doth this [*quando magis*] imply? but that Gods love outſtrips a Fathers? and ſo it doth a Mothers too, *Iſai.* 49. 15. *Can a Woman forget her ſucking child, that ſhe ſhould not have compaſſion on the Sonne of her wombe? yea ſhe may forget, yet will I not forget thee.* Women are compaſſionate towards their Children, becauſe they are the fruit of their wombes, and are a part of themſelves: but moſt indulgent are they toward thoſe children to whom they are Nurſes, as well as Mothers, to their ſucking children: and yet Women may forget their children, their ſucking children: but as for God, he can never forget his children. And as if thoſe compariſons were too ſmall to expreſſe Gods affection to his creatures, he proceeds farther, and compares himſelfe, with one of the moſt affectionate Females among unreaſonable creatures, the [Hen] *Math.* 23.37. *O Jeruſalem Jeruſalem, how oft would I have gathered thee, as a Hen gathereth her chicken under her wings?* No bird (ſaith *Auguſt.*) expreſſeth ſuch tender love to her young

Auguſt. *Tract.* 15. *in Joan.* p. 16. 18.

young ones, as the Hen doth. *Videmus nidificare Paſſeres quoſlibet, ante oculos noſtros, hirundines, circonias, columbas quotidie videmus nidificare, quos niſi quando in nidis videmus, parentes eſſe non agnoſcimus. Gallina vero ſic infirmatur in pullis ſuis, ut etiamſi ipſi pulli non ſequantur, filios non videas, matrem tamen intelliges: Ita ſit alis demiſſis, plumis hiſpida, voce rauca, omnibus membris demiſſa & abjecta, ut (quemadmodum dixi) etſi filios non videas matrem tamen intelligas.* No Fowles diſcover themſelves to be Mothers, ſo much as Hennes doe: others when we ſee them in their neſt with their young, we know them to be Mothers, but no way elſe: but the Hen diſcovers her ſelfe to be ſo, even then when her Chickens doe not follow her, her feathers ſtand up, her wings hang downe, ſhe clocks mournfully, and goes feebly; ſo that we may know her to be a Mother, when yet we cannot ſee her brood. He hath alſo ſuch another ſpeech in another place, and concludes it with theſe Words, *Quare ergo Dominus, niſi propter hoc, Gallina eſſe voluit, in ſanctâ Scripturâ dicens.* O Jeruſalem, Jeruſalem, *quoties volui te congregare ut gallina, &c.* Our Lord and Saviour did therefore compare himſelfe to a Hen, rather then any other creature, becauſe of her ſingular expreſſions of love to her young ones, even when they are out of her ſight. Aug. *in Pſal.* 58. *pag.* 212. B.C.

By theſe things we ſee how highly the Scriptures ſpeak of Gods mercy, eſpecially in the expreſſions of it to Mankind; To which teſtimonies let me adde theſe few more, *Pſal.* 8. 4. *Lord what is man that thou art mindfull of him, &c. Prov.* 8.31. *In the children of men did the wiſdome of God delight himſelfe, when the foundations of the earth were appoynted. He took not the nature of Angells but the ſeed of Abraham. Heb.* 2.16. *When the bountifulneſſe and love of God our Saviour toward man appeared. Tit.* 3. 4. (φιλανθρωπία) the originall word is: where doe we read of φιλαγγελία or φιλοκτισία. More mercifull is God to man, then to all other creatures.

With ſuch a mercy cannot ſtand ſuch a decree; abſolute Reprobation being once granted, we may (me thinks) more properly call God a Father of cruelties, then of mercies, and [hatred then of love:] and the Devills names, [Satan and Ἀπολλύων] an adverſary, a deſtroyer may be fitter for him then Σωτὴρ a Saviour; which I tremble to think. Doth mercy pleaſe him, when he of his own will only hath made ſuch a decree, as ſhewes farre more ſeverity towards poore men, then mercy? Is he ſlow to anger, when he hath taken ſuch a ſmall and ſpeedy occaſion to puniſh the greater part of men in Hell torments for ever, and for one ſinne once committed, hath ſhut up the greater part of men under invincible unbelief and damnation? Is his mercy abundant, doth it extend it ſelfe farther then juſtice, when it is tackt up ſo ſhort, limited to a few choſen ones, when 100 for one at leaſt, (take in all parts of the World) are unavoidably caſt away, out of his only will and pleaſure? Or doth his love paſſe knowledge, when we ſee daily greater love then this in men and other creatures? What Father and Mother (that have not only caſt off Fatherhood and Motherhood, but humanity too) (ſo the Authors Copy hath it) would determine their children to certain death, or to cruell torments worſe then death, for one only offence, and that committed too, not by them in their own perſons, but by ſome other, and only imputed unto them? How much leſſe would they give themſelves to beget Children, and bring them forth, that they might bring them to the rack, fire, gallowes, and ſuch like tortures and deaths?

But to deliver things a little more cloſely. Foure things (in my conceit) being well and diſtinctly conſidered, doe make it apparent, that this decree is incompatible with Gods mercy.

1. That *Adams* ſinne was the ſinne of mans nature only, and no mans perſonall tranſgreſſion but *Adams*; it was neither committed, nor conſented to by any of his poſterity in their own perſons.

2. That it was the ſinne of our nature, not by generation, for then th ſinnes of our Grand-fathers and Fathers, would be our ſinnes alſo, becauſe we come from them: and they would be our ſinnes ſo much the more, by how much nearer we are to the ſtock, from which we doe immediatly ſpring, then to the firſt root and common Father of Mankind. It is the ſinne of our nature by imputation only, it was Gods will that he ſhould ſtand up for a publique perſon, and that in him all men ſhould ſtand or fall. This is generally granted by Divines, and particularly by that excellent ſervant of God M. *Calvin. Neq; enim factum eſt* (ſaith he) *ut a ſalute exciderant omnes unius parentis culpâ.* And a little after (he ſaith) *Hoc cum naturæ nequeat aſcribi, ab admirabili Dei conſilio profectum eſſe minimè obſcurum eſt.* And a little after, thus: *unde factum eſt, ut tot gentes uuà cum earum liberis, infantibus, æterna morte involveret lapſus Adæ abſq; remedio, niſi quia Deo ità viſum eſt.*

3. That God did pardon it in Adam, who did actually and voluntarily commit it in his own perſon.

4. That Chriſt came into the World to take away *peccatum mundi*, the ſinne of the World. *Ioh.* 1. 29. That God either did or might have ſatisfied his wronged juſtice in the blood of the Covenant for all man kind, and without any impeachment to juſtice, might have opened a way of Salvation to all and every man.

Theſe things being well conſidered, will make no man (I think) to conclude in his thoughts, that if there be any ſuch decree, God is not mercifull to man at all: much leſſe is he more mercifull (ſuppoſing this decree) to men, then he is to other creatures, but more ſharpe and ſevere then he is to other creatures, to the Devills themſelves.

1. To other creatures, becauſe the moſt of men are determined by his omnipotent decree, to ſuch a being, as is a thouſand times worſe then no being at all; whereas other creatures, even the baſeſt of them, though they perhaps have but a contemptible being, yet they have ſuch a beeing as is much better then no being at all: it is farre better not to be at all, then to be eternally miſerable without any poſſibility of the contrary: for ſo ſaith our Saviour ſpeaking of *Judas*: *It had been good for that man if he never had been borne.* Men would not have accepted of life and being, when firſt they entred upon poſſeſſion of it, if they had known upon what hard conditions it was to be tendred, and that it was to be charged with ſuch an intereſt, as can no waies be recompenſed by the benefits of life; or (did men firmely believe this decree) they would at adventure, with *Job*, curſe their birth-day, be willingly releaſed from the right of creatures, and deſire that their immortall ſoules might vaniſh into nothing. What *Minutius* ſaith of Pagans, might be truly affirmed of men in generall; *Malunt extingui penitus, quam ad ſupplicia reparari.* Nay Parents out of pitty to their Children, would wiſh that they Math. 26.24. *Minut. Felix* p. 113.

they might be borne Snakes and Toads, rather then men; and creatures, whoſe being ſhall at laſt be reſolved into nothing, rather then immortall Spirits.

2. Then to the very Devills alſo, who are ſet forth in Scripture, to be the greateſt ſpectacles of Gods wrath, and irefull ſeverity. In one thing this decree makes moſt men and Devills equall, *Utriſq; deſperata ſalus*, they are both ſure to be damned; but in three things men are in a farre worſe condition by it.

1. In their appoyntment to Hell, not for their own proper perſonall ſinnes, for which the Devills ſuffer, but for the ſinnes of another man, made theirs only *By Gods order and pleaſure.*

2. In their inevitable deſtination to deſtruction, under a ſhew of the contrary. The Devills, as they are decreed to damnation, ſo they know it, they expect it, they look for no other: but men, even thoſe that are appoynted unto wrath, are yet fed up with hopes of Salvation, and made to believe that the whole buſineſſe is put into their hands; ſo as that if they doe periſh, it is not [*defectu miſericordiæ*] becauſe God hath no mercy on them, but [*defectu voluntatis propriæ,*] becauſe they will not be ſaved, when yet there is no ſuch mercy. Now if it be worſe to be deluded in miſery, then ſimply to be miſerable, then the condition of men in this reſpect, is made by this decree to be worſe then the ſtate of Devills.

3. In their obligation to believe, and the aggravation of their puniſhment by not believing. The Devills, becauſe they muſt be damned, are not commanded to believe in Chriſt, nor is their puniſhment encreaſed by not believing: but poore men, who (by this decree) can ſcape Hell no more then the Devills, muſt yet be tied to believe in Chriſt, and muſt have their torments encreaſed if they believe not. Theſe things being ſo (I think) I may conclude that this decree of abſolute reprobation overthrowes the mercy of God in generall, and toward mankind.

Nor doth that quiet my mind, which is uſually anſwered to theſe objections; *viz.* That God by this decree, doth fully manifeſt his juſtice and his mercy too; his juſtice towards the Reprobates, and his mercy toward the choſen veſſells: and that it is neceſſary that his decrees ſhall be ſo ordered, as that both theſe may be clearly manifeſted by them. This (I ſay) doth not ſatisfy; for,

1. Gods mercy is revealed to be rich mercy, abundant, long ſuffering, beyond apprehenſion, and ſurmounting his juſtice, in its objects and expreſſions. Now ſuch a mercy as this, ſet forth with ſuch glorious titles, cloathed with ſuch lovely properties, and exceeding the ability of any mans conception, ſuch a mercy (I ſay) is not manifeſted by this decree.

2. Neither is the pure and ſpotleſſe juſtice of God ſet forth by this abſolute decree, as I now come to ſhew. this being my ſecond argument, drawn from the Attributes of God, againſt abſolute reprobation.

TWISSE.

Conſideration.

HEre we have a great deale of noyſe, and the moſt waſtfull diſcourſe that ever I yet met withall, in the enlarging of a moſt hungry argument; the anſwer whereunto himſelfe perceives, and ſets down (as he thinks good) in a few words, after three large leaves ſpent in the enlarging of his oppoſition; namely to this effect; that whatſoever he can ſay, in the advancing of Gods mercy we willingly acknowledge: but withall we ſay, this mercy of God which makes God ſo glorious, is peculiarly manifeſted towards the veſſells of mercy, whom God hath prepared unto glory, in diſtinction from the veſſells of wrath, as we read *Rom. 9.* 23. and that in a higher degree then he hath mentioned; this being one ſpeciall end, why God ſuffereth with long patience, the veſſells of wrath prepared to deſtruction, *Rom. 9.* 22. namely, *That he might declare the riches of his glory upon the veſſells of mercy, which he hath prepared unto glory, v.* 23. And after ſo much froth of words ſpent to no purpoſe unleſſe to beguile his reader, and dull him with verboſity, that he might not attend, and obſerve how accurately he performes in the iſſue, that which he intends. Conſider (I beſeech you) what a meager and ſtarveling reply he puts to this. *Gods mercy* (ſaith he) *is revealed to be rich mercy, abundant, long ſuffering, beyond apppehenſion*; we grant all this, and adde that it is glorious alſo; and makes the partakers of it to rejoyce, *with joy unſpeakable and glorious*; but this belongs only to them that believe, and to certain who are called *veſſells of mercy*, in diſtinction from *veſſells of wrath*, *Rom. 9.* 22, 23. which *veſſells of mercy*, in diſtinction from *veſſells of wrath*, muſt needs be the elect only, in diſtinction from Reprobates: with what face can he deny, that ſuch a mercy is manifeſted on the Elect by our Doctrine?

2. I farther adde that ſuch a mercy is not manifeſted by his Doctrine as by ours, for the glory of Gods mercy conſiſts in this, that it is of free grace pardoning our ſinnes, regenerating us, changing our hearts, giving faith and repentance to ſome, when

when he denies it to others; all this I ſay is of meere grace, by our Doctrine without reſpect to any preparation or qualification in man; according to that of the Apoſtle, *He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth*: this is not their Doctrine, if it were, I ſee no cauſe of any materiall difference between us.

3. And I find it ſtrange, that men ſhould grow to ſuch a degree of immodeſty, as to affect ſingularity, and to ſhew a dexterity, in ſuch ſort to advance Gods mercy, as to obſcure and deface his grace, as this Author doth; for all along you ſhall not find him to magnify Gods free grace: whereas Mercy ſhewed to one rather then to another, in reſpect of his being better diſpoſed for the receiving of it more then another, is rather of the nature of juſtice, then of Mercy diſtinct from juſtice.

4. And to this purpoſe he takes no pains to ſet down, wherein this mercy conſiſts, which he ſo much amplifies, but carryeth it throughout in hugger mugger, and in the clouds of generality, that it might appeare the more likely, to be indifferently extended to all; and albeit ſometimes he expreſſeth it, to be the love of a Father towards his children, yet it is too too probable, that he extends this to all and every one, as the children of God by creation; And therefore particulates not wherein it conſiſts, as namely whether in mercy temporall or ſpirituall; and as touching mercy ſpirituall, whether this be not the pardoning of mens ſinnes, together with the illumination of the mind, ſanctification of the will, change of the heart, and giving of faith, repentance, obedience, and finall perſeverance therein. For had he particulated thoſe, he had apparently marred his own market, and been driven to looſe that in retaile, which he hoped to gaine in groſſe; For theſe mercies are not extended to all. But their meaning is, God offers theſe to all, and that any faile of them, it is becauſe man diſpoſeth not himſelfe for the receiving of them. This is the iſſue of his advancing Gods mercy, utterly to diſparage the freedome of Gods grace. Now of the Divine mercy in this ſenſe, to wit, as freely extended to all, he hath not one word throughout, as I can remember, in ſo vaſt premiſes; all that he ſpeaks of the extention of Gods mercy to variety of objects, is diſpatched in three lines of theſe his three large leaves; as where he ſaith, *his mercy is more largely extended then his juſtice, and that look how much three or foure come ſhort of a thouſand, ſo much doth his juſtice come ſhort of his mercy in the exerciſe of it*; And upon this poore interpretation, he grounds the only ſubſtantiall part of his reply, to our anſwer to this his argument. For to ſay that *Gods mercy is rich, abundant, long ſuffering, beyond apprehenſion*, is nothing to the purpoſe. For all this hinders not, but that the application of it may be, and is, made only to certain veſſells, who are called *veſſells of mercy*, in diſtinction from *veſſells of wrath*, *Rom.* 9. 22. 23. Therefore he addes, *That it ſurmounts his juſtice in its objects and expreſſions:* wherein what he means by *its expreſſions*, I know not. For I find no compariſon made by him between *Gods mercy and his juſtice in its expreſſions*; but only in reſpect of the objects, and there the expreſſion of juſtice, ſeems more quick then the expreſſion of mercy: And as for the extention of mercy, to more then juſtice is extended to, he diſpatcheth in three lines, as I ſaid, of theſe three leaves of his diſcourſe. But let us ſee what force he finds in that compariſon to ſerve his turne. Firſt he ſaieth the compariſon is between three and foure on the one ſide, and a thouſand on the other, as if the odds were a thouſand to three or foure: but how doth he prove that? The Text compares three or foure generations to thouſands; not to a thouſand generations, but to thouſands: and he boldly conceives it to be underſtood of thouſands of generations; though it be much more then the World conſiſts of, from the beginning of the World to the end of it: For ſuppoſe the World ſhall laſt ſeaven or eight thouſand years; how many years will he allow to a generation? Suppoſe he allow but twenty, to explode the cuſtome of the Germans of whom *Tacitus* writes, that *Sera virginum venus*, which to this day is continued: yet a thouſand of ſuch generations muſt make the World to conſiſt of twenty thouſand years: But if it conſiſt but of ſeaven or eight thouſand years, you muſt allow but ſeaven or eight years to a generation, to make up one thouſand generations. Then againe the World was now two thouſand years old when this was delivered, ſo that it had not above ſix thouſand years to continue, and accordingly but ſix years was from thenceforth to be allowed to a generation; And all this liberality of allowance, is no more then will make the child a coat, to compleat one thouſand generations; whereas the Text ſpeaks of thouſands in the plural number, and the leaſt of plurality is two thouſand; ſo that to help this, we muſt allow but three years to a generation, by which account they

they had need be married at two, and have a child at three, and who then ſhould rock the cradle? But leave we theſe fooleries, and content our ſelves with the plain Text, and not piece it out with our brainſick additions. We know that for *Abrahams* ſake who feared him, and for the covenants ſake he made with him, he had mercy on thouſands of his poſterity, to bring them out of Egypt, ſix hundred thouſand men from twenty years old to threeſcore, and take them unto him to be his peculiar people, which continued for the ſpace of about 1600 years; and now for 1600 years they have been caſt off from being his people. And of the goodneſſe of God towards *Abraham*, in chooſing his ſeed after him, even many thouſands of them, the Jewes had ſenſible experience that very day he ſpake unto them from Mount Sinai; he did not mean to trouble their braines with any *Algebra* in counting up a thouſand generations. But ſuppoſe this were granted him; yet theſe that feare him, being only within the pale of his Church, what a ſmall handfull were theſe, in compariſon to all the world of heathens beſides, that hated him? Marke what difference S. *Paul* puts between the Jewes and the Gentiles, when he ſaith, *we Jewes by nature, not ſinners of the Gentiles. Gal.* 2. And the Pſalmiſt before him *Pſal.* 147. *He ſheweth his word unto Jacob, his ſtatutes and ordinances to Iſrael, he hath not dealt ſo with every nation, neither have they known his judgements.* According whereunto the Apoſtle having demanded, ſaying, *What is then the preferment of the Jew? or what is the profit of circumciſion?* Anſwereth thus, *Much every way, and chiefly becauſe unto them were committed the Oracles of God. Rom.* 3. 1,2. And the ſame Apoſtle doth not acknowledge the Gentiles to have obtained mercy at the hands of God, untill the time of their calling by the Miniſtry of the Goſpell. *Rom.* 11. 30. in theſe words: *Ye in times paſt have not believed God, yet have now obtained mercy through their unbeliefe.* This might ſuffice for anſwer to this argument, taking it in the full ſtrength thereof. But I am content to runne over the whole diſcourſe, and to take every part of it into conſideration.

1. He ſaith, *God is mercy in the abſtract, and Love.* By this it is apparent that the Attributes Divine, are the very Eſſence Divine, otherwiſe they could not be predicated thereof in the abſtract, and conſequently, they can no more be of the ſame nature with vertues Morall in us, then the Divine Eſſence can be of the ſame nature with an accident.

2. He is a Saviour of men; true, and it is as true: *that he ſaveth both man and beaſt*: and as for men, though he be a Saviour of them all, yet *in ſpeciall ſort of them that believe.*

3. When he ſaith of the love of Chriſt, that it is *without height, and depth, and length, and breadth*, he doth overlaſh: for the Apoſtles prayer is in the place quoted by him on the behalfe of the Ephesians, *that Chriſt may dwell in their hearts by Faith, that being rooted and grounded in love, they may be able to comprehend with all Saints, what is the breadth and length, and depth, & height.* For though the height of it be ſuch, as is incomprehenſible by us in this World, yet the Apoſtle ſuppoſeth an height, depth, length, and breadth thereof, rather then denies it.

4. He ſaith Gods Mercy is advanced above his Juſtice; *not in reſpect of its eſſence, for all Gods excellencies are infinitely good, and one is not greater then another; but in things that concerne the expreſſions of it.* Here we have words, but can any wiſe man draw it to any ſober ſenſe? What I pray is it to advance mercy above juſtice, in things that concerne the expreſſions of it?

He ſaith it is more naturall and deare to God then his juſtice: what reaſon is there for this, if the one be equally as excellent as the other? To make this good with ſome colour at leaſt; he alleadgeth *Mich.* 7. 18. *Mercy pleaſeth him, or he delights in it.* The like we read *Jer.* 9. 24. namely, *that God delights in mercy*: and in the ſame place the Lord profeſſeth joyntly, that he delights in judgement. But *Iſaiah* 28. 21. *Judgement is called his ſtrange worke*; Now three ſeverall times, have I received this, from three ſeverall hands of Arminians; each giving the ſame interpretation of it, as if it were called a ſtrange work, becauſe it is *alienum a naturâ Dei.* I know none but Papiſts doe juſtify them in this interpretation; in my judgement a moſt unreaſonable expoſition; the Lord taking unto himſelfe the execution of judgement, as his peculiar, ſaying, *vengeance is mine and I will repay*; And Magiſtrates are but Gods Miniſters for this; And he profeſſeth his delight in this as well as in the execution of mercy. It is true he doth not inflict judgement without cauſe, for that were not a work of judgement in proper ſpeech, but of power, and abſoluteneſſe rather, as in turning a holy and innocent

Rom. 12. 19.

creature

creature into nothing. And in that reſpect he is ſaid not to afflict willingly; ſinne alwaies deſerving it. Mercy is of another nature, and ſuppoſeth free grace, though I find little or no notice this Author takes of this, throughout his diſcourſe; Neither doe I find that he or any Arminian acknowledge, that the change of a mans heart is wrought in a man of the meere grace of God, without any motive cauſe in the creature. Neither doe all Papiſts concurre in this interpretation, for *Lyra* and *Burgenſis* are together by the eares hereabouts; and our Divines as *Junius* and *Piſcator* doe render it, *opus inſolens & terribile*, an unuſuall and terrible judgement, interpreting it of bringing the Babylonians upon them; ſo ſtrange a worke, that they ſhould wonder at it. And as *Moſes* foretold, that God ſhould bring upon them *Wonderfull judgements*. *Deut.* 28. So the Prophet *Abakuk* ſets it forth in like manner. *Abak.* 1.5. *Behold among the Heathen, and regard and wonder and marvaile, for I will worke a worke in your daies; you will not believe it, though it be told you. For loe, I raiſe up the Caldeans, that bitter and furious nation, which ſhall goe upon the breadth of the Land to poſſeſſe the dwelling places that are not theirs.* And, *Jer.* 19.3. *Behold I will bring a plague upon this place which whoſoever heareth his eares ſhall tingle.* For ſeeing Gods lawes are ſtrange things unto them. *Hoſ.* 8. 12. God would bring ſuch judgements upon them, that ſhould be as ſtrange unto them. And in the ſame phraſe it is ſaid that *deſtruction is to the wicked, and ſtrange puniſhment to the workers of iniquity*. *Job.* 31.3. Yet be this granted him, it is nothing to the purpoſe. For be it never ſo deere unto God, yet if he reſtraineth his chiefe mercy which conſiſts in changing the heart (whereof this Author ſeems unwilling to take any diſtinct notice) only to the Elect, called accordingly in Scripture *veſſells of mercy*, in diſtinction from *veſſells of wrath*, which are the Reprobates, this nothing prejudiceth the abſoluteneſſe of reprobation. Lamen. 3.

And as for the frequent exerciſe thereof; we read, *Zeph.* 3. 5. That *every morning God bringeth his judgements to light*: and as for the mercy which conſiſts in regenerating man, which alone is to the preſent purpoſe; it is apparent, that it is farre leſſe frequently ſhewed, then the contrary judgement in obduration; And certainly the veſſells of mercy are by farre fewer then the veſſells of wrath: and as for temporall mercies, the more frequent they are, the worſe, where the ſpirit of regeneration is wanting, through the corruption of man, that makes him thereupon the more obdurate.

The vanity of the next, as touching the amplitude of the objects whereto mercy is extended (though this alone is to the preſent purpoſe) I have already ſufficiently diſcovered; it being apparent that in Scripture phraſe, only the Elect are counted *veſſells of mercy*, and all the reſt *veſſells of wrath*.

As there be examples of Gods long ſuffering and patience, ſo we have fearfull examples of the ſuddaineſſe of Gods judgements, taking Men and Women away in the very act of ſinne. Thus the Iſraelites in the Wilderneſſe, when the fleſh of Quailes was in their mouth, the heavy wrath of God came upon them, and ſent them to the graves of luſt. *Zimri* and *Cozbi* periſhed in their inceſtuous act, and gave up both luſt and ghoſt together. *Balſhazzar* a King, cut off in his drunken revells, to make good the Prophecy of *Iſaiah*, *The night of my pleaſures hath he turned into feare unto me*. And in like manner the wrath of God ſeazed upon *Herod* in his pride. But above all, this appears in Gods dealings with his Angells, who ſinned once, and fell for ever without all hope of recovery. And as for Gods ſparing a man in caſe God gives not repentance, what will be the iſſue, but filling up of the meaſure of their ſinnes? For to ſpeak in *Auſtins* language, *Contra Julian. Pelag. lib.* 5. *cap.* 4. *Quantamlibet præbuerit patientiam, niſi Deus dederit, quis agit pœnitentiam?* Now the caſe is cleare, God gives repentance to a very few, who are in Scripture called veſſells of mercy; which nothing at all prejudiceth the abſoluteneſſe of reprobation.

5. Of the riches of Gods mercies to his children, we nothing doubt: but what doth this prejudice the abſoluteneſſe of reprobating thoſe whom he never meaneth to make his children? But here it is to be ſuſpected, that this Author accounts all and every one the children of God; for forthwith he confounds this notion with the notion of creatures, quite contrary to the moſt generall current of Scripture, not of the New Teſtament only, which teacheth us, that *we are the children of God by faith in Chriſt Jeſus*. Gal. 3. and *if children then heires, even heirs of God, and heirs annext with Chriſt*. Rom. 8. But of the old Teſtament alſo. *Gen.* 6.2. *The ſonnes of God ſaw the daugh-*

ters of men that they were faire,&c. Exod.4.22. Thou ſhalt ſay to Pharaoh, thus ſaith the Lord, Iſrael is my Sonne, my firſt borne; wherefore I ſay, let my Sonne goe that he may ſerve me: if thou refuſe to let him goe, behold I will viſit thy Sonne, even thy firſt borne. Deut. 14. 1. Ye are the children of the Lord your God. 2. Thou art an holy people to the Lord thy God, and the Lord hath choſen thee to be a precious people to himſelfe, above all the people that are upon the earth.

That of the Hen, though we give him liberty to amplify her naturall affections, *as one of the moſt affectionate Females among unreaſonable creatures*, yet doth it nothing profit him for it repreſents Gods love appropriated to his Children, which nothing prejudiceth the abſoluteneſſe of his power reprobating others. Nay rather as it juſtifies his abſoluteneſſe in electing them, if we conſider the meere grace of God to have made the difference, as the Scripture ſheweth. *Deut. 7. 7. The Lord loved you becauſe he loved you*; and *Deut.9.* at large he beats them out of all conceit of any righteouſneſſe in them, moving the Lord to plant them in the Land of Canaan; ſo by conſequent it juſtifies the Doctrine of abſolute reprobation alſo: for as much as the Apoſtle profeſſeth, that like as *God hath mercy on whom he will, ſo alſo he hardneth whom he will.* Yet here is much matter made of the Hen; like as D. *Jackſon* hath done it before him, but he betrayes no ſuch authority for it out of *Auſtin* as this Author doth: to whom he is beholding for it, himſelfe beſt knoweth; If the pedegree be enquired into, their conceits may be found to be of kinne; yet give me leave to ſay ſomewhat of this ſimilitude alſo.

And firſt, this Author commits a very great Anomaly, in entring upon it with ſuch ſtate, as proves nothing anſwerable to his own profeſſion anon after, almoſt in the ſame breath. Marke the ſtate (I pray) of his entrance hereupon, thus: *And as if theſe compariſons were too ſmall too expreſſe Gods affection to his creatures, he proceeds farther*: now the compariſons preceding were taken from reaſonable creatures, as namely from Fatherly and Motherly affections (amongſt men) towards their children; and *theſe compariſons he ſignifies to have been to ſmall, to expreſſe Gods affections to his creatures*: and that therefore the Lord proceeds farther, and compares himſelfe to a *Hen*, which he ſaith is one of the moſt affectionate females among unreaſonable creatures; not daring to ſay, tis more affectionate then creatures reaſonable; yet moſt improvidently carried away with affectation of a Rhetoricall flouriſh, he faignes a gradation from creatures leſſe affectionate, to creatures more affectionate, and preſently himſelfe beats out the braines of his invention, (before he is aware) as ſoon as it is borne.

As for *Auſtins* amplification of the affectionate nature of an Hen above other creatures; we may conſider that *Auſtins* Tractates on *John*, are of the nature of Sermons, and therein the ancients doe accommodate themſelves to popular amplifications. It is true we doe not know *Sparrowes, Swallowes, Storkes, Doves, to be Mothers, but when we ſee them in their neſts*; but what is the true reaſon hereof? Is it not becauſe their young ones are wild, and as ſoon as they are apt to fly, one flies one way, and another flies another way, they come together no more; it is not ſo with chickens which are tame creatures, and we ſee the carriage of the Hen towards them, we doe not ſee the carriage of other fowles towards their young ones.

Yet we read not the like of a Hen, as of a Storke, that when her neſt was on fire, out of a deſire to ſave them with her wings from the fire, hath not forſaken her young ones till ſhee was burnt her ſelfe; And we have ſeen alſo how a Hen hath ſometimes peckt her young ones, and driven them from her, when they would have rooſted under her.

And in my judgement our Saviour doth not repreſent his tender affection to the Jewes, by the generall affection of an Hen to hers, but to that particular carriage of hers in deſiring to gather her chickens under her wings. * Neither doe I think that he who invited thoſe mighty men, but unto what? unto a Hen, was to expreſſe his ſingularity of affection towards them: be it that God is more mercifull to man then to all other creatures; whence I pray proceeds this? is it not meerly from the good pleaſure of his own will? and if ſo, why may he not, out of the meere pleaſure of his own will reſtraine his ſaving mercy to ſome few, who are accordingly called in Scripture expreſſely *veſſells of mercy*; diſtinguiſhed from all the reſt who are called *veſſells of wrath.*

* The Doctor here alludes unto a known ſong.

Whereas

Whereas he ſaith, that *with ſuch a mercy cannot ſtand ſuch a Decree, as abſolute reprobation*. We anſwer; neither doe we ſay any ſuch decree doth ſtand with ſuch a mercy; it is rather abſolute election ſtands with ſuch a mercy, then any reprobation. The Scripture plainly giving us to underſtand, that they on whom reprobation paſſeth, are *not veſſells of mercy, but veſſells of wrath*. But like as God though he ſpared not Angells when they fell, nor left any way open unto them for repentance, whereby to returne to his grace and favour, yet he ſpared man, and left a way open unto him, to returne to his grace and favour by faith in Chriſt. In like ſort, though God were pleaſed abſolutely to elect ſome amongſt men, yet this nothing precludes him from dealing as abſolutely in reprobating others, that is, in purpoſing to deny them the ſpirit of faith and repentance, whereby they might riſe after they were fallen; which grace moſt freely and abſolutely he decreed to beſtow, and as freely and abſolutely he doth beſtow on others, according to that of the Apoſtle, *Rom. 9. 18. he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth*. By this I pray judge of the inſipid nature of this diſcourſe, yet ſee the foulneſſe of his mouth; unleſſe God be indifferent unto all, and make all veſſells of mercy, *he is a Father of Cruelty, and more properly ſo to be called, then a Father of mercies*, and the very name of the Devill (for ſo he takes upon him to interpret that name in the Revelation Ἀπολλύων *a Deſtroyer*) is good enough for him. And the conſcience of his own piety, no doubt expert in Paraphraſing, and ſhaping ſome Rhetoricall flouriſhes, and paſſionate expreſſions, bears him out with ſuch confidence as to feare no Blaſphemy. It is very likely he hath a high conceit of theſe performances, that he is ſo bold, as to profeſſe in effect, that if the contrary be true, then will he be guilty of as great Blaſphemy, as to have called God Satan; yet ſee the abſurdity (that throughout he may be like himſelfe) of his diſcourſe; whatſoever God be accounted by him in reſpect of reprobates, doth this any way hinder him from being the Father of mercies towards his elect, who alone in Scripture phraſe are called *veſſells of mercy*? His hatred of *Eſau*, doth it any way hinder his love to *Jacob*? If to damne be to deſtroy, and no creature hath power to damne but God only, can any be a deſtroyer in this kind but God, as the efficient cauſe of Damnation and deſtruction? But in caſe our Doctrine holds, doth he damne any but for ſinne? and ſhall he in this caſe be ſtiled Ἀπολλύων, in the ſenſe it is delivered in the Revelation? What thinks he? If many thouſands, even all the Infants of Turkes and Sarazens dying in originall ſinne, are tormented by him in Hell fire, is he to be accounted the father of cruelties for this? And I profeſſe I cannot deviſe a greater ſhew and appearance of cruelty, then in this. Now I beſeech you conſider the ſpirit that breatheth in this man; dares he cenſure God, as a Father of cruelties for executing eternall death upon them that are guilty of it? Now hath not he himſelfe profeſſed, that all borne in originall ſinne, are borne guilty of eternall death? his words are theſe, Fol. 2. p. 2. *That all mankind is involved in the firſt ſinne, and the fruits thereof, which are corruption of nature, and the guilt of eternall death*. And this he confidently believes. Now I ſhould think, that there is no ſhew of cruelty in executing eternall death on them that are guilty of it: For if God were cruell herein, then alſo he were cruell in damning each one whom he doth damne both Men and Angells. Now I pray, let every ſober reader judge, which is the greater cruelty of the two, to execute eternall death on him that is guilty of it, or to make him by meere imputation guilty of eternall death, who otherwiſe is not guilty of it? Is not this latter farre greater cruelty then the former? Or indeed the only cruelty; there being no cruelty in the other at all? (like as *Cicero* ſaid, for a Mule to bring forth having conceived, is no ſtrange thing, but for a Mule to conceive that indeed is prodigious.) Now this latter is this Authors doctrine, expreſſely profeſſing in the next page to that where now we are, *that the ſinne of Adam* (the fruit whereof he makes to be the *guilt of eternall death.*) *is the ſinne of our nature by imputation only*: whence it followeth, that God makes all men guilty of eternall death by imputation only. Now judge I pray which of us makes God the Father of cruelties, he or wee? This is the fruit of oppoſition to Gods grace; for how can they taſt of that grace of God which they impugne, and in impugning it, how can it be but that they ſhould be given over to

the curſe of Gods wrath, to fill up the meaſure of their ſinne, as it is ſaid of the Jewes, *to fulfill their ſinne alway, for the wrath of God is come upon them to the uttermoſt*; yea, and to be ſtricken with the ſpirit of giddineſſe alſo; and become like a drunken man, that erreth in his vomit, the iſſue whereof is to defile himſelfe, and thoſe that are neareſt to him. Yet he trembles to think of theſe blaſphemies; for in all this you muſt think his zeale is very warme, and his piety reakes. So *Saul* perſecuted the Saints of God as blaſpheamers; but when God did ſtrike him downe with a light from Heaven, that he found that himſelfe only was the blaſpheamer. 1 *Tim.*1. Well, I am contented to conſider his reaking fit.

Doth his mercy pleaſe him, when he hath made ſuch a decree, as ſhewes farre more ſeverity towards men then mercy? Why (holy Sir) Gods ſeverity towards ſome, who in Scripture are called *veſſells of wrath*, what doth it hinder Gods mercy towards his elect? Gods ſeverity towards the Jewes, did it any whit qualify Gods bountifulneſſe towards the Gentiles? I marvaile not, he holds up his diſcourſe of Gods mercy in generall, that ſo it might be appliable to all; this was a pretty dogge-trick of his. But if Gods mercy hath his courſe towards his children only, as himſelfe makes the accommodation, if God be ſevere towards thoſe who are none of his, ſhall this any way prejudice his mercy towards them? or if he take liberty to account all Gods creatures his children by reaſon of creation, why doth he not extend the mercy of God to Devills alſo, and for ſhame leave off his former diſtinction of φιλανθρωπία, and φιλαγγελία, and confeſſe ingeniouſly, that tis not worth a ruſh. But whether he will acknowledge it or no, the Apoſtle plainly ſpeaks of veſſells of mercy, in diſtinction from veſſels of wrath, and ſurely the courſe of his wrath on them, doth nothing impaire the free courſe of his mercy toward others. But give we him leave to breath on: *Is he ſlow to anger, when he hath taken ſuch a ſmall and ſpeedy occaſion to puniſh the greater part of men in Hell torments for ever, and for one ſinne once committed, hath ſhut up the greater part of men under invincible unbeliefe and damnation?* Now, I pray, apply this his devout interrogation unto the Angells that fell, who upon the firſt ſinne committed by them, have ever ſince been ſhut up under invincible hardneſſe of heart, and damnation. Yet what doth this hinder his ſlowneſſe of anger, which is to be underſtood of the execution of his wrath; not of his decree. For all the decrees of God are everlaſting, nor can be otherwiſe. And as for the execution of wrath, the Devills themſelves feele it not yet; *they are reſerved to the judgement of the great day; they believe and tremble*; they cryed out to our Saviour, *art thou come to torment us before our time?* Nay ſuppoſe all were to be damned to eternall death as ſoon as they were borne, what injuſtice were there in this, if ſo be all be found guilty of eternall death, which this Author denies not? Nay farther, he ſaith it is God that hath made them guilty of it by meere imputation: yet as for the corruption of nature, which he makes to be the other fruit of *Adams* ſinne, I doe not find that he aſcribes that to divine imputation. Now what is the nature of this corruption, is it invincible unbeliefe or no? if it be, then he diſputes againſt himſelfe, as well as againſt us; if it be not, what unbeliefe doth he call it, or is it no unbeliefe at all? So I demand whether it be invincible hardneſſe of heart or no? if not, whether at all it is to be called hardneſſe of heart? if notwithſtanding this corruption a man hath power to believe, to obay, power to yeeld to any ſpirituall good whereto he ſhall be excited, why doth he call it naturall corruption? The Apoſtle plainly profeſſeth of them *that are in the fleſh, that they cannot pleaſe God*; that *the naturall man perceiveth not the things of God, and that he cannot know them*: of ſome, *that they could not believe*: of others, *that they cannot repent*. But be all this granted, he is never a whit the leſſe ſlow to anger, that is, to puniſh; the Devills themſelves as yet doe rather feare then feele his wrath.

Laſtly, touching puniſhing in hell, it is either ſpoken of Infants, or Men of ripe years, if of Infants departing in infancy; if guilty of eternall death, tis no injuſtice to inflict it; and though he be ſlow to anger towards ſome, yet it is not neceſſary he ſhould be ſo to others. The Scriptures witneſſe the contrary, in the flood where Infants periſhed as well as others; and in the deſtruction of Sodome by fire, where none were ſpared ſave *Lot* and his two Daughters. As for men of ripe years, their damnation is not for originall ſinne only, but for actuall ſinnes unrepented of. The Angells fell irrecoverably upon one actuall ſinne; I know not the like condition of any beſides. And as for the ſmallneſſe of *Adams* ſinne, which this Author is pleaſed to extenuate, by calling it *a ſmall occaſion*, as if he were of his ſpirit that ſaid, If God turned

Adam

Adam out of Paradiſe for eating an Apple, ſhall not I turne thee out of my ſervice for purloyning a fat Capon? Why doth he not charge God rather, for making all men hereupon guilty of eternall death by meere imputation, as himſelfe ſaith; then for inflicting eternall death only on them that are guilty of it, as we ſay? But let we him finiſh the Declamation he hath begunne. *Is his mercy abundant, doth it extend it ſelfe farther then juſtice, when it is tackt up ſo ſhort, limited to a very few choſen ones, when a hundred for one at leaſt are unavoidably caſt away, out of his only will and pleaſure.* As touching this I have already ſhewed, how much he is out in his *Algebra*, but let that paſſe, unleſſe this Divine take upon him to deliver truer Oracles then Saint *Paul*, we are bound to believe, that the elect only are *veſſells of mercy*, diſtinguiſhed from reprobates, as *veſſells of wrath. Rom.* 9. 22,23. and toward theſe alone it is, that his mercy is abundant, in the way of beſtowing ſaving and ſpirituall graces. It is untrue, that he hath proved any ſuch thing as he pretends, namely that Gods mercy is extended to more perſons then his juſtice. And applied aright, namely as touching mercy ſeen in pardoning ſinnes, in changing the heart, and ſaving ſoules, which are peculiar to Gods elect, the moſt brazen faced oppoſite to Gods holy truth that liveth cannot deny, but that they to whom theſe are granted, are farre fewer then they to whom they are denied. And if within the Church only (for there only are found ſuch as feare God) his mercy extends to thouſands of them that feare him, when but to the third and fourth generation he puniſheth the ſinnes of the Father upon the Children, (which is all the proofe this Author brings to this purpoſe) it followeth not herehence, that his mercy extendeth any whit to more then doth his juſtice, conſidering the ſmall proportion of thoſe within the Church, and therein of them that feare him, in compariſon to thoſe without the Church. And like as viſiting the ſinne of Fathers, which is commonly underſtood of temporall puniſhments, ſo in proportion the mercy is to be underſtood of temporall mercy. And we well know that it is nothing neceſſary, that a man that fears God, ſhould have children. And like as God doth not alwaies thus viſit the ſinnes of Fathers upon the Children; in like ſort it is not alwaies neceſſary, that God ſhould ſhew mercy to thouſands of every one of them that feare him. He dealt ſo with *Abraham*, *Iſaack*, and *Iacob*; they to whom the Law was delivered, knew this full well; then again, muſt not they who look to have an intereſt in this gracious promiſe, look unto it, that they walk in the ſteps of their Forefathers that feared God? By all which may appeare, the ſuperficiary nature of this Diſputants argumentation, even then, when the zeale of his cauſe makes him, as moſt confident, ſo alſo moſt luxuriant. Laſtly, doe we ſay that God damnes any man out of *his only will and pleaſure*? Doe we not profeſſe that he damnes no man but for ſinne? And as he damnes no man but for ſinne, ſo likewiſe that he decreed to damne no man but for ſinne, though there could be no cauſe of this his decree, but of his meere will and pleaſure he made this decree, namely, to damne many thouſands for their ſinnes. But let him come to an end of this his roaving diſcourſe, when he thinks good and not before. *Or doth his love paſſe knowledge, when we ſee daily greater love then this in men, and other creatures. What Father or Mother, would determine their children to certain death, or to cruell torments worſe then death, for one only offence, and that committed too, not by them in their own perſons, but by ſome other, and only imputed unto them? How much leſſe would they give themſelves to beget Children, and bring them forth, that they might bring them to the rack, fire, gallowes, and ſuch like tortures and deaths;* What doe I heare? Doth man or any creature, ſhew more love to their Children, then God doth towards his Elect? Did they ever provide ſuch a ſacrifice to make ſatisfaction for their Childrens ſinnes, as God did provide for his? Yea but reprobates alſo are Gods Children, this muſt needs be his meaning, though in plain termes he ſpared to expreſſe ſo much. How unnaturall then was Chriſt, who would not pray for the World if they were all his children? And what meant he to profeſſe, that he ſanctified himſelfe only for them for whom he prayed? Which ſanctification of himſelfe, was in reſpect of the offering up of himſelfe upon the croſſe, as *Maldonate* confeſſeth, was the interpretation of all the Fathers whom he had read. And in that prayer profeſſeth of them ſaying, *they are thine, and thou gaveſt them unto me*, as much as to ſay; the World was not his. And farther conſider; Is it ſafe to meaſure out Gods proceedings, by the proceedings of men? What Father or Mother would be content to execute a Child of theirs upon the Gallowes, when by ſome capitall crime he hath deſerved it? How much leſſe hold them upon the rack of continuall tortures; what then? muſt not God be allowed to inflict eternall death upon his creatures? And

what hath an earthly Father or Mother to doe, either to determine or execute death on any? This belongs to God not to man, unleſſe he make choyce of them, as of his Miniſters for the execution of vengeance. But this Author is nothing yet awaked out of his dreames, or his Arminian Lethargy. Yet I hope he will grant that God did foreſee all this, even the ſinnes of *Judas* in betraying, and of the Jewes in crucifying the Sonne of God; yet nevertheleſſe, he was content to bring forth both him and them into the World. Now what earthly Father and Mother, would not make choyce rather to be Childleſſe, then to bring forth ſuch children as ſhould deale with them, as *Nero* dealt with his Mother? Proceed then: and as from the affections of earthly Fathers and Mothers, he diſputes againſt the abſoluteneſſe of Gods decrees, ſo alſo in the next place, let him conclude the like, to the utter overthrowing of Gods foreknowledge. Yet who of our Divine ſaith, that God for one offence hath determined death and tortures to any reprobate of ripe years? Doe they not all profeſſe, that as many as dye in actuall ſinnes unrepented of, God determined to damne them for thoſe actuall ſinnes unrepented of? I doe not think he can alleadge any that denies this. Againe, what one of our Divines maintaines that Infants periſhing in originall ſinne, are damned for that ſinne, which is made theirs only by imputation? What a ſhameleſſe habit hath he gotten to himſelfe to deliver untruths? yet will he not (I warrant you) be accounted a Pelagian, neither will he plainly deny originall ſinne as *Grevincovius* is ſaid to have done, and that *teſtibus convinci potuit*. Their Tenets are nothing leſſe ſhamefull, then Pelagius his Tenets were, only they have not that ingenuity which Pelagius had, in profeſſing plainly, that there was no originall ſinne conveyed unto us by propagation.

Now he comes more cloſely unto the matter, yet but a little neither; a looſe and diſſolute diſcourſe is moſt ſuitable with his Genius.

1. *Adams* ſinne was no mans perſonall ſinne but *Adams*; true, for there was no man then but *Adam*; but all men being the poſterity of *Adam*, were then in *Adam*, in that one perſon of *Adam*, and in him all have ſinned, ſaith the Apoſtle, *Rom.*5. and without conſent to ſinne they could not ſinne.

2. When he ſaith this ſinne of *Adam*, was not the ſinne of our nature by generation; it is ſo wild an expreſſion, that I profeſſe I cannot deviſe any tolerable ſenſe of it. That we were in *Adam* when he ſinned, it was fully ſufficient to bring upon us that corruption, that depth of corruption wherein we are all conceived and borne, and not by imputation. What Divine amongſt Papiſts or Proteſtants is he, that maintains, that *Adams* ſinne, was the ſinne of our nature by imputation? This is undoubtedly one of Arminius his flowers, which this Author takes up among the reſt, to make himſelfe a noſegay to ſmell unto. It was Gods will that all ſhould ſtand or fall in him. For if it had pleaſed him, he could have deſtroyed *Adam* for his tranſgreſſion, and made a new ſtock, from whom to derive the World of Mankind: But reſolving all ſhould deſcend from him, he muſt withall reſolve, that upon the ſinne of *Adam*, and of them all in him, they muſt take from him ſuch natures as *Adams* nature, and therein all our natures were made corrupt by ſinne; excepting Gods grace to provide better, both for *Adam* and his poſterity, as he thought good. So that look in what ſort *Adams* nature was corrupted by ſinne, in ſuch ſort muſt we receive corrupt natures from him. Here *Calvin* is brought in with a robe of commendation, *as an excellent ſervant of God*: But God knowes his heart, and the hearts of all that oppoſe Gods truth in theſe poynts. Tis true that *Calvin* ſaith, both in reſpect of Gods power, to have propagated Mankind from another originall then from *Adam*, as alſo in reſpect of his power, to reforme corrupt nature, in whomſoever it pleaſed him. But did *Calvin* think it poſſible, for corrupt nature, to propagate any other nature then it ſelfe is? God made man *after his Image and likeneſſe*; but afterwards we read that *Adam* brought forth a ſonne, *after his Image and likeneſſe*; *who can bring a clean thing out of that which is uncleane*, ſaith the book of *Job*? *And that which is borne of fleſh is fleſh*, ſaith our Saviour. But doth it herehence follow, or doth *Calvin*, or any Calviniſt, or Lutheran, or Papiſt, ſay, that *Adams* ſinne is made ours only by imputation? The caſe is not alike of other parents. For *Adam* was created in grace, and endued with the ſpirit of God: this holy condition was loſt by the ſinne of *Adam*, and we receiving our natures from him, in the ſtate of his corruption, muſt therewithall receive, natures bereaved of grace, and of the ſpirit of God. No ſuch detriment to our pure nature was wrought, or could be wrought, by the tranſgreſſion of any other progenitor

nitor, no, nor by any other ſinne of *Adam* beſides the firſt.

3. God did pardon it in *Adam* upon his repentance, ſo is he ready to pardon it, and all actuall ſinnes alſo of all men upon their repentance. And God renewed *Adam* too, of his free grace after he was corrupt, and regenerated him by ſhewing mercy upon him; But this work proceeds according to the meer pleaſure of Gods will, as the Apoſtle witneſſeth ſaying, *He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth.*

4. Chriſt came into the World, to take away the ſinnes of the World, that is by ſatisfaction for ſinne, to merit the pardon of it, nor pardon of ſinne only, but ſalvation of ſoule alſo; but for whom? ſurely for none but ſuch as ſhould ſooner or latter believe in him; for God hath ordained that theſe benefits of Chriſts death and obedience, ſhould not be diſtributed abſolutely, but conditionally, to wit, upon the condition of faith. But as for the benefits of faith and repentance, theſe are not benefits communicable upon a condition; for what condition can precede them but a worke of man? and it was condemned 1200 years agoe: to ſay grace is given according unto merits, that *Bellarmine* interprets ſimply of works; though Papiſts are apt enough to ſtand for merits, and the Apoſtle ſaith in plain tearmes, that God doth not call us 2 Tim. 1.9. according unto works; theſe therefore are communicated according to the meere pleaſure of Gods will: He might have given faith to all, but he would not, *I will ſhew mercy on whom I will ſhew mercy, and I will have compaſſion on whom I will have compaſſion. Exod.* 33.

Theſe things (he ſaith) *being well conſidered, will make any man* (as he thinks) *to conclude in his thoughts, that if there be any ſuch decree, God is not mercifull to men at all.* A moſt unſhamefac't pretence, and ſavouring of a ſpirit that hath expectorated all naturall ingenuity: doth not every one perceive, that all this nothing at all hinders the incomprehenſible nature of Gods mercy towards his Elect? Dares he himſelfe in plain termes deny this, namely that it nothing prejudiceth the courſe of Gods mercy towards his Elect? For what if by the ſinne wherein they are borne, they be made guilty of eternall death, yet if God be pleaſed to pardon this ſinne, nor this only, but all actuall tranſgreſſions of theirs; yea, and break the yoake of their corruption, and as he ſeeth their wayes ſo to heale them, yea to heale their rebellions, and backſlidings, to ſubdue their iniquities, to rule them with a mighty hand, to make them paſſe under the rod, and bring them unto the bond of the covenant, and when he hath brought them thither, to hold them there, to perfect the good work he hath begun in them; As he hath laid the foundation of his temple in their hearts, ſo to finiſh it, to be the Author and finiſher of their faith, and as of their faith, ſo of their repentance, to hold them in his hands, ſo that none ſhall take them therehence, to keep them by the power of God through faith unto ſalvation, to build them upon a rock that the gates of hell ſhall not prevaile againſt them; either to deliver them from the howre of temptation, or to deliver them out of it, or ſo to order it, that it ſhall not be above their ſtrength, to be with them when they goe through the water, and through the fire, that the floods ſhall not overwhelme them, the fire ſhall not burne them, but as he leads them into it, ſo he will ſupport them in it, and lead them through it, as he led the Children of Iſrael into the red ſea, and in the red ſea (as an horſe in the Wilderneſſe, that they ſhould not ſtumble) and out of the red ſea, into the Wilderneſſe, and in the Wilderneſſe, and out of the Wilderneſſe; In a word, to fulfill the good pleaſure of his goodneſſe towards them, his grace in them, and every good work that he hath appoynted for them; in ſuch ſort that the beaſt ſhall not prevaile over them, untill they have finiſhed their teſtimony: and in which reſpect Saint *Stephen*, even when the ſtones flew about his eares as thick as haile, ſeems to have gone to his death, as compoſedly as a man goes to his bed; having ended his Sermon firſt, his prayer for them in the next place, and laſtly the commending of his own ſpirit into the hands of God: this mercy, this rich mercy, this unſpeakable mercy, this Author moſt virulently, and moſt unconſcionably, in cunning and crafty carriage, labours to obſcure and deface, and to diſpute us out of the faith of it, if it lay in his power (which lies not in the power of the Devills themſelves) as much as himſelfe, and his informers ſcorne to apprehend any hope of it; And all this as unſipidly and unſcholaſtically, as profanely, by generall and indefinite termes, ſaying, by this Doctrine of ours *God is not mercifull to men at all*; wherein I gueſſe his lurking hole is, in the indefinite condition of the terme *Men*; for dares he ſay, that by this doctrine of ours

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we make God unmercifull to all men, even to the very Elect? Yet when he ſaith, *to men at all*, the face of his diſcourſe in the common underſtanding of it, ſhould look this way. But if his meaning be, that he is not made mercifull to all; hath himſelfe any farther improved the mercy of God, then by enlarging of it unto the children of God? And if he by children of God, underſtand all men created by him, and we, only thoſe, whom God hath adopted in Chriſt and regenerated, I pray conſider, which of us, delivereth himſelfe in beſt congruity to the Scripture phraſe and meaning? Can he be ignorant, who they be whom the Scripture ſtiles *veſſells of mercy*? Or that theſe are ſet in oppoſition to *veſſells of wrath*; and would he have us as brainſick as himſelfe to put no difference in the accommodation of Gods mercy; between *veſſells of mercy*, and *veſſells of wrath*? As for the compariſon between men and other creatures, he is like himſelfe throughout in the execution thereof.

1. He undertakes to ſhew, that God is not ſo mercifull to men as to bruit creatures; *moſt men are determined by Gods omnipotent decree, to ſuch a being as is a thouſand times worſe then no being at all.* To let paſſe the abſurdity of the compariſon, comparing things incomparable, to wit, *being with no being*; and aſcribing a *betterneſſe to no being*, which is as much as to aſcribe a better being to no being. Doth not he himſelfe acknowledge that as the elect are but few amongſt them that are called, ſo the number of Reprobates, is farre greater then the number of the Elect? Doth not himſelfe maintaine, *that God hath determined all reprobates* (that is the moſt of men) *by his omnipotent decree, to ſuch a being as is a thouſand times worſe then no being at all*, according to his judgement, and that this determination Divine is everlaſting? or though he dare not in plain tearmes deny, that God hath determined moſt of men to damnation. Doth he not here bewray the diſpoſition of his heart, namely, either to maintaine that Gods decrees are not everlaſting, nor determined concerning men, untill their deaths, or that they are of a revocable nature? Or will he fly to the qualification of the Divine decree here mentioned, and ſay that albeit the moſt part of men are deſtinated to damnation by the decree divine, yet not by an omnipotent decree? I gueſſe his meaning is not by an abſolute, but by a conditionall decree; for as for any diſtinction of Divine decrees, into decrees omnipotent, I never yet read or heard; but this Gentleman being of a phraſifying ſpirit, we muſt permit him ſometimes to overlaſh, otherwiſe we ſhall not have occaſion to ſay of him, as *Auguſtus* ſaid ſometimes of *Haterius*, *Haterius noſter ſufflaminandus eſt.* But if by a conditionall decree only, God hath reprobated thoſe whom he hath reprobated, then the decrees of reprobation cannot be eternall, but muſt needs be temporall; for *res conditionata*, the thing conditionated cannot exiſt before the condition it ſelfe (whereupon it depends) hath exiſtence. Now the condition of reprobation is meerly temporall, to wit, finall perſeverance in infidelity or impenitency.

2. What if the condition of other creatures, be better then the condition of reprobates? For what ſober man ſhould expect that the condition of impenitent ſinners ſhould be better in the end, then the condition of beaſts, who have made themſelves worſe then beaſts? But then he will ſay, what ſhall become of all thoſe amplifications of Gods mercy towards men, commended to us in holy Scripture? I anſwere they all have place concerning Gods children, Gods elect, the Scripture phraſe acknowledging no other veſſells of mercy, and counting all others in diſtinction from them veſſell of wrath; and one end whereto tends Gods providence towards theſe veſſells, the Apoſtle ſignifies plainly to be the amplification of his mercy towards the veſſells of mercy. *Rom.* 9.22, 23. Which may be unfolded thus, that by ſeeing the miſerable conditions of veſſells of wrath, they may be more ſenſible of Gods mercy towards them, in putting ſo gracious a difference between them.

3. It cannot be denied, but God foreſaw what the condition of moſt men would be, if they were brought forth into the World; What then did God mean to bring them forth? Where was his mercy in this? Were it not a thouſand times better for them not to be borne? And by being borne, was it not infallible that their condition would be a thouſand times worſe then the condition of beaſts, according to this Authors grave and Philoſophicall diſcourſe?

4. Conſider though God foreſaw, that being ſo dealt withall, as God meant they ſhould be, they would never repent nor believe; yet ſeeing God had other means and motives in ſtore, which he knew full well would prove effectuall, to bring them to faith and repentance, were he pleaſed to uſe them; (as Arminius acknowledgeth,

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as I have often cited him, and it cannot be denied by the maintainers of *ſcientia media.*) Where was Gods mercy, that would both have them brought forth, and uſe only ſuch means to bring them to faith and repentance, which he knew would prove ineffectuall, and reſolved not to uſe ſuch means with them, which hee knew would prove effectuall thereunto? I appeale to the judgement of every ſober man, whether this proceeded not meerely from Gods abſolute decree to make them veſſells of Wrath, that is fit veſſells in whom ſhould ſhine the glory of his vindicative juſtice; *even to ſhew the riches of his glory towards the veſſells of mercy, whom he had prepared unto glory*, as on whom he was pleaſed to beſtow ſuch means of grace, as he knew full well would prove effectuall to bring them to faith and repentance, and finall perſeverance, that ſo their ſoules might be ſaved in the day of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt: Marke I beſeech you an evident demonſtration from invincible grounds of the truth, which this Author by baſe and ſuperficiary conſiderations, labours to deface and exſtinguiſh if he could. For what if in the ſtate of nothing, they were ſo intelligent as this Author faines them, as to know to what end God made them, and thereupon, would not accept of life? What if afterwards they ſhould curſe the day of their birth, and wiſh they had been made Toads or Snakes? What ſhall God be therefore ſtraitned in the exerciſe of his power, to make what creatures he will, and to what end he will? For *qui dedit eſſe*, good reaſon, *quo fine ſint habeat poteſtatem*: What if the clay were ſo intelligent as to know, that it ſhould be faſhioned into a veſſell for a cloſe-ſtoole or chamberpot, when his neighbour clay ſhall be faſhioned into a drinking cup to ſerve at the table of King *Agathocles*, and it, out of the clayey ſtomack and pride thereof, ſhall repine and grudge to be ſo baſely uſed, and ſay (in one of *Æſops* Fables) that it had rather continue clay ſtill; ſhall therefore the potter forgoe his ſoveraignty in making of the ſame lumpe one veſſell unto honour, and another unto diſhonour? What if God ſhould tell *Nebuchodonoſor* that after he is dead, his ſcull ſhould be turned to ſome ſuch baſe uſe, and that ſome common jakes ſhould have the bottome of it pitcht with his bones; and he thereupon ſhould wiſh he had never been rather; ſhall this be ſufficient to derogate from the Soveraigne power of God, or reſtrain him from the like, or from giving *Jehoiakims* body no better burying then the buriall of an Aſſe? Or cauſe ſtately and proud *Jezabells* body to be eaten of doggs? O what baſe manner of diſcourſes are theſe to deflower the Power and Soveraignty of the Almighty! but I wonder not if after men have proſtituted allhoneſty in oppoſing the grace of God, they are ſoon found to looſe their witts alſo. Yet I have not done, I muſt not pretermit to anſwer his Scripture paſſage. What if it had been good for *Iudas* he had never been borne; it were as true if there were no abſolute decree of God for his damnation, but foreknowledge only that he would be damned; but ſhall God therefore be forbidden upon the forfeiture of the reputation of his goodneſſe, to bring forth *Iudas* into the World? But by the way our Saviours words doe not import hereby, that it were better for him he had not been: for a being he might have had though never borne into life, as many a one hath had, that never ſaw the light of the Sunne, their wombe being their grave. But becauſe ſome mens tongues runne ryot againſt me, for the interpretation of this paſſage, which I make in my *Vindiciæ*, not ſparing to profeſſe they will turne Atheiſts. when that is true, and as ready they have been to profeſſe under their hand, that they will ſooner deny there is a God then concurre with the Contra-Remonſtrants in their Doctrine of Reprobation: I pray let them be enquired of, whether they, or any wiſe man elſe, was ever known after ſuch a manner to outface the interpretation that *Maldonate* gives of that very place, which here I will ſubjoyne for ſpeciall reaſon: thus then *Maldonate*, *De quo verbo nimis fortaſſe ſubtiliter quidam diſputant, quomodo melius Iudæ fuiſſet, natum non eſſe, cum non eſſe, nullum, damnatum eſſe, aliquod bonum ſit; aliquid enim eſt, qui damnatus eſt; omne autem quod eſt, qua eſt, bonum eſt. Hieronymus judicat exiſtimaſſe aliquos, Iudam fuiſſe, antequam naſceretur, Chriſtumq; certo conſilio non dixiſſe, melius fuiſſet homini illi, ſi numquam fuiſſet, ſed ſi natus non eſſet, quaſi, etiamſi non naſceretur, futurus fuiſſet, ideoq; naturalia bona ſine malis habiturus. Suſpicor D. Hieronymum Originiſtas notare voluiſſe, qui omnes animas initio creatas fuiſſe crediderunt & pro ſuo quamque merito aut expertem manere corporis, aut in corpus tanquam in carcerem mitti; & vero Origines ipſe ita hoc loco*

scribere videtur, ut non longe ab eâ sententiâ abhorrere videatur. Eodem fere modo, Enthymius interpretatur: at length he addes his own interpretation of the place in the words following, *Sed non sunt hujusmodi, Scripturæ locutiones ad Scholarum excutiendæ subtilitatem: sunt enim proverbiales, & sumptæ de vulgo, in quibus quidam plerumq; hyperbolicum esse solet, ut apud* Job. cap. 3.11. *Quare non in vulvâ mortuus sum? Egressus ex utero non saltem perii? Et* cap.10.18,19. *Quare de vulvâ aduxisti me? Qui utinam consumptus essem ne oculus me videret, fuissem, quasi non essem, de utero translatus ad tumulum. Et* cap.3.3. *Et* Jer. 20.14. *Pereat dies in qua natus sum. Hæc enim omnia non tam deliberato animi judicio, quam per querimoniam quæ mala sua amplificare solet, dicta sunt. Christus ergo ita de Juda loquitur, quemadmodum credibile erat, ipsum de se in supplicijs positum esse loquuturum. Erat autem credibile eum dicturum esse utinam nunquam natus essem, melius mihi fuisset non nasci, quam ista pati; cum* Job *&* Jeremias *viri sanctissimi multo minora passi idem dixerint. Adde quod Christus non dicit melius futurum fuisse, ut* Judas *non nascitur, sed melius futurum illi esse, id est, ejus opinione, & judicio: quemadmodum multis res adversas patientibus accidere videmus, ut corrupto dolore judicio mortem vitæ anteponant, cum dubium non sit melius esse vivere quam mori.*

2. I come to the comparison he makes between men and Devills, objecting that our Doctrine makes God lesse mercifull to men then to Devills. *In one thing* (saith he) *this decree makes most men and Devills equall, utriusq; desperata salus, they are both sure to be damned.* Now I say, this is most untrue. What man living is in a worse state then *Manasses* was, when he made his Children passe through the fire to Devills, gave himselfe to Witchcraft and Sorcery, and filled Jerusalem with bloud? On *Saul* when flesh'd with the bloud of *Stephen*, and *Ferox scelerum quia prima provenerant*, he got a commission from the High Priest to goe to Damascus, and bind all that called on the name of the Lord Jesus; yet it appeared in the issue that both these were the elect of God. Doe not they themselves professe that reprobation is upon finall perseverance in infidelity or impenitency? So that there is no sufficient evidence of reprobation, but this finall perseverance in sinne. In like sort by their Doctrine, none can be sure of his election untill he be dead, because they constitute it upon foresight of finall perseverance in faith and repentance. It is true if God should reveale to any that he is a reprobate, he might be sure he should be damned, and that as well according to their shaping of reprobation, as according unto our.

But in three things he saith men are in a farre worse condition by it; let us consider them.

1. The first is, *In their appoyntment unto Hell, not for their own proper personall sinnes, but for the sinnes of another, made theirs only by Gods order and pleasure.*

Now I see why he pretends to oppose the Sublapsarian way (keeping his liberty upon every occasion to ejaculate what his malice can suggest unto him against the Sublapsarian.) For only against the Sublapsarian way this objection hath place; and that not justly, but most unjustly, most untruely. For not one of them that I know, doth maintain that God by reprobation intended to damne, either *Cain*, or *Judas*, or *Esau*, but for their actuall sinnes and transgressions unrepented of. And as for those Heathen Infants who perish in originall sinne, they perish for that corruption wherein they are borne, which is as naturall unto them as the Leprosy of the Father, or any hereditary disease is naturally derived to the Child; by vertue whereof they are borne children of wrath, as the Apostle expresseth, and if to be borne children of wrath, be to be in a worse condition then Devills, seeing to be borne children of wrath, is not our making; if it be of Gods making, and that according to Gods meer pleasure; it must be acknowledged, that this is a worse condition, and nevertheless God is to be justified herein: *and wisdome is justified of her Children*: and if Arminius will not concurre with us herein, sure I am Papists will. For thus *Bellarmine* discourseth, *De lib. arbit. lib.2.cap. ult. Longe major justitiæ rigor apparet in reprobatione hominum quam Angelorum, tum quia maximam partem hominum, minimam Angelorum reprobavit, tum etiam quoniam Angelorum nullum Deus pœnæ sempiternæ addicit, nisi propter culpam propriâ voluntate comissam, hominum autem plurimos damnat propter solum Originale peccatum, quod alienâ voluntate commissum fuisse non dubium est.* And yet though in this respect, the rigor be greater, nevertheles considering the punishments of Infants, which *Austin* professeth to be *mitissimam*, thus it is qualified that undoubtedly it is better for thē to be as they are then to be Devills. Though as touching the kinds & degrees of punishmēt, that is of a mysterious nature, the Scripture cōcealing

ling it, and we have no help of reaſon to ſuccour us in the inveſtigation thereof. Farre better, our care be to avoid it, both as well by orthodoxy of Faith, as by holineſſe of life. And him that looks for ſalvation by grace it behooves, to look unto it, how he ſhapes this grace of God, leaſt if he be found to mock God, giving the main ſtock of his converſion to his own Free will, rather then unto God, he may be mocked in the end, and meet with no better Salvation, then the liberty of his will can procure him, which will prove condemnation rather then ſalvation. See (I pray) what giddineſſe of ſpirit he betrayes, in laying ſuch a crimination to our charge, whereunto himſelfe is obnoxious in an equall degree, or in a higher degree then wee. For he hath confeſſed, that God of his meer pleaſure, makes all Infants guilty of eternall death; now where appears the greater rigour? on our ſide, who ſay, God inflicts eternall death on none, but ſuch as are guilty of eternall death? or rather on his ſide who ſaith, that God of his meer pleaſure, makes men guilty of eternall death?

2. The ſecond is, that their inevitable deſtination to deſtruction, is under ſhew of the contrary: the Devills as they are decreed to damnation, ſo they know it, but men even thoſe that are appointed unto *wrath, are yet fed up with hopes of ſalvation.* Is it poſſible that a man in his right witts ſhould ſo miſerably forget, and ſo ſhamefully carry himſelfe? Doth not he himſelfe maintain that all reprobates are from everlaſting appoynted to eternall death? It may be his meaning is, that no reprobate is appoynted to eternall death untill his death; ſo making Gods decrees temporall, and denying them to be eternall. But if this be his opinion, what Arminian or Remonſtrant concurres with him in this? But if reprobation and election be eternall; how doe we feed reprobates up with the hope of ſalvation, more then he himſelfe? Doth he think none but the elect are his heares? (for I doe not know whether he may run, and whether his ſhallow witts may carry him: whether to the dreaming of an univerſall election with *Huberus.*) And doth he not feed up all his hearers with hope of ſalvation as well as we? And how doe wee feed them up with hopes of ſalvation? Doe we feed our hearers with any other hopes of ſalvation, then are builded upon faith and repentance, and finall perſeverance therein? And doe we not ſtrike them as well with the terrours of God, and fears of damnation, in caſe they doe not believe in Chriſt, or not break off their ſinnes by repentance? And doth not he the like? Or if he hath good grounds of hope, that all and every one that hears him, is or may be an elect of God, why may not we or any other Miniſter, have as good grounds as he for ſuch an hope? But what doth he mean ſo ſuperficially to preſume, that we teach *that men doe not periſh, defectu miſericordiæ divinæ, but defectu voluntatis propriæ?* Why ſhould he ſo confidently preſume, that we ſhould teach ſuch contradiction to the doctrine of *Auguſtine*, who profeſſeth expreſſely of many, that they periſh *non tam quia ipſi ſervari nolint, quam quia Deus non vult.* As is apparent of all Infants that periſh in originall ſinne, out of the Church of God: Nay why ſhould he preſume of all us to be ſtricken with the ſame ſpirit either of infatuation or obſtinacy, as to Preach a Doctrine ſo directly contrary to the holy doctrine of Saint *Paul*, profeſſing, that *God hath mercy on whom he will, &c.* And to our Saviour whoſe profeſſion is, that *therefore men heare not Gods word becauſe they are not of God.* How otherwiſe could the damnation of the veſſells of wrath, tend to the augmentation of the riches of Gods glory towards the veſſells of mercy; namely, when they ſhall conſider, that it was the meer grace of God to put ſo mercifull a difference between them and others; regenerating them, and beſtowing faith and repentance on them, the beſtowing whereof he denyed to many thouſand others, yet withall it is true that men therefore doe not believe and repent, becauſe they will not: but if you aske *quare nolunt*, ſaith *Auſtin*, *imus in longum*; yet to this he accommodates his anſwer thus, men will not many things either *quia latet*, they know not the benefit of it, or *quia non delectat*, it is not pleaſing to them. *At* (ſaith he) *ut innoteſcat quod latebat, & ſuave fiat quod non delectabat, Dei gratia eſt, quæ humanas adjuvat voluntates.* We doe not ſmother this truth of God, that we may delude men, we rather repreſent how all fleſh are obnoxious and endangered unto God; that all are borne in ſinne, and therewithall children of wrath, and ſuch as deſerve to be made the generation of Gods curſe; and that it is at his pleaſure to ſhew mercy on any: only the word of God hath power to raiſe us from the dead, his voyce pierceth the graves, and makes dead *Lazarus* heare it, and it is his courſe to call ſome at the firſt, ſome at the laſt hower of the day; Thus we deſire to bring them acquainted firſt with the ſpirit of

This is alſo leadged alſo by our Britiſh Divines in the Synod of *Dort:* Rom. 9. 18. Iohn 8. 47. Rom. 9. 23.

bondage, to make them feare, that ſo they may be prepared for the ſpirit of Adoption, whereby they ſhall cry Abba father: neither doe we deſpaire of any that are humbled with feare, we count rather their caſe moſt deſperate, who are nothing moved hereby, or that perſwade themſelves they have power to believe when they will, and repent when they will; we account no greater illuſions of Satan then theſe; yet theſe abominable opinions may be foſtered by ſome, and masked with a pretence of great piety forſooth, and a ſhew of holineſſe, and a zeale of defending Gods glory, and ſalving the honour of his mercy, juſtice and truth.

3. The third is, *in their obligation to believe, and the aggravation of their puniſhment by not believing. The Divells, becauſe they muſt be damned, are not commanded to believe in Chriſt, yet poore men muſt be tied to believe in Chriſt, and their torments muſt be encreaſed if they believe not.* I make no doubt but this Author is as confident of his learned and judicious carriage in ſhaping this compariſon, as that *the fruit of Adams ſinne is the guilt of eternall death in all mankind.* But none ſo bold (we commonly ſay) as blind Bayard: and it ſeems either he knowes not, or conſiders not, that the firſt ſinne of Angells was unto them as death unto man; that ſinne placed them *extra viam*, and *in termino incurabilis miſeriæ*, as death only *placeth* wicked men in the like caſe. Now we doe not ſay that God commands man after he is dead to believe in Chriſt, any more then he commands obedience unto Angells, ſince their caſe is become deſperate. The Divells are not commanded to believe or repent, becauſe God doth not, nor never did purpoſe to damne any of them for want of faith, or of repentance, but for their firſt Apoſtacy from God. But it is otherwiſe with man, for God doth not purpoſe to damne any of them but for ſinne unrepented of. And therefore as good reaſon there is, why their damnation ſhould be encreaſed, for want of repentance and acknowledging of Gods truth, as why the Devills ſhould be damned for their firſt Apoſtacy. If perhaps (as it is likely enough) this Author to hold up his compariſon, ſhall fly to Gods decree of reprobation, upon ſuppoſition whereof, it was impoſſible that men ſhould either believe or repent; I anſwere firſt, that in like ſort upon ſuppoſition of Gods foreknowledge, that they would neither believe nor repent, it followeth as neceſſarily, as it is neceſſary that Gods knowledge ſhould be infallible, that it was impoſſible they ſhould believe and repent: and the like followeth as neceſſarily of the Apoſtacy of Angells, as of the infidelity and impenitency of man. And as men are pretended to harden themſelves in vitious courſes upon ſuppoſition of the unalterable nature of Gods decree; So *Auſtin* gives inſtance in like manner of one that hardened himſelfe upon pretence of Gods infallible knowledge. *De bono perſever. cap. 15. Fuit quidem in noſtro Monaſterio, qui corripientibus fratribus, cur quædam non facienda faceret, & facienda non faceret, reſpondebat, qualiſcunq; nunc ſim, talis ero, qualem me Deus eſſe futurum præſcivit. Qui profecto & verum dicebat, & hoc vero, non proficiebat in bonum, ſed uſq; adeo profecit in malum, ut deſerta Monaſterii ſocietate, fieret canis reverſus ad ſuum vomitum, & tamen adhuc qualis ſit futurus, incertum eſt.* Secondly I anſwer, that the like may be ſaid of Angells upon preſuppoſition of Gods decree to deny the grace of ſtanding unto them, which *Auſtin* profeſſeth expreſſely, namely, that either in their creation *minorem acceperunt amoris divini gratiam*; or that afterwards, the reaſon why the one ſort ſtood when the other fell was this, to wit, becauſe they were *amplius adjuti* then their fellowes, and conſequently the other *minus adjuti*. And as God gave grace to the elect Angells, which he denyed to others: So it cannot be denied, but that from everlaſting he decreed, both to beſtow it upon the one, and deny it unto the other. Now howſoever I know the Arminian party cannot ſwallow this morſell; yet by this it appears how ſuperficiary is that augmentation of the difference between Men and Angells, wherewith this Author contents himſelfe: yet notwithſtanding it is not want of faith alone that condemneth any man; by want of Faith man is left to the covenant of works, to ſtand or fall according to his own righteouſneſſe or unrighteouſneſſe: whereof if he faile, and withall deſpiſeth the counſell of God offered him in his Goſpell, is there noe good reaſon, his condemnation ſhould be the greater? For certainly it is in the power of a naturall man, to afford as much faith to this, as to many a vile and fabulous relation, which is farre leſſe credible by judgement naturall: we ſee both prophane perſons and hypocrites, ſo farre to believe the Goſpell, as to embrace a formall profeſſion thereof, and ſometimes proceed ſo farre therein, as that 'tis a hard matter to diſtinguiſh them from ſincere profeſſors: yet we ſay a true faith is only ſuch as is infuſed into the heart of man, by the ſpirit of God in regeneration.

Now,

Now, what one of our Divines can be repreſented, that ever was known to affirme, that the damnation of any man ſhall be encreaſed, becauſe God did not regenerate him, and in regeneration inſpire a Divine faith into him? As for our anſwer in generall to this argument conſidered in briefe, and this Authors reply; my refutation thereof I diſpatcht in the firſt place. Although he carrieth himſelfe not fairely in relating the anſwer on our part; in as much as therein he mixeth the conſideration of juſtice divine, which is aliene from the preſent purpoſe, with the conſideration of mercy divine, which alone is congruous; that ſo while he puts off the plenary juſtification of his reply, to that which is aliene, he may ſeem to undertake a full juſtification of his reply to the whole. But I hope we ſhall be as able by Gods aſſiſtance, to manifeſt his ſiniſter carriage in the interpretation of Gods juſtice, as we have done already, as touching his accommodation of Gods mercy.

DISCOURSE.

SECT. III.

This I divide into Five Subſections.

SUBSECT. I.

IT Fights with the juſtice of God, &c.

The Lord, ſaith *David*, is righteous in all his waies, *Pſal.* 145. The judgements of the Lord, ſaith *Solomon*, are weight and meaſure, *Prov.* 16. 11. That is, exact and without all exception. So juſt is God, that he offers the juſtice of his decrees and waies, to the triall of humane underſtanding. *Iſai.* 5. 3. Judge I pray you, betweene me and my vineyard: and *Ezech.* 18. 25. He is content to prove himſelfe juſt by plain arguments, through the whole chapter; *Are not my waies equall, and your waies unequall?* And he permitted *Abraham* when he was in his greateſt humility, acknowledging himſelfe to be but Duſt and Aſhes, to reaſon with him about the equity of his doings; Wilt thou ſlay the righteous with the wicked? Shall not the judge of all the earth doe right? *Gen.* 18. 23, 25. And *Moſes* alſo, *Num.* 16. 22. is ſuffered to argue Gods juſtice in the ſame manner; *Shall one man ſinne, and wilt thou be wroth with all the Congregation?* In a word; ſo evidently juſt is God in all his proceedings, that many both good and bad, who have felt his juſtice have cleared God, and deepely charged themſelves, witneſſe, *Ezra*, *Nehemiah*, and *Daniell* in their ninth Chapters, and *Adonibezek*, *Judges* 1. 7. and the Emperour *Mauricius*, who having ſeen his children butchered, and waiting every minute for the bloudy ſtroake of death, brake out into theſe words; *Juſtus es Domine, & juſtum eſt judicium tuum.* Righteous art thou O Lord, and juſt is thy judgement. With this inviolable juſtice of God, abſolute reprobation (of ſuch eſpecially as are commanded to believe and called to Salvation) cannot be reconciled. My reaſons are theſe. *Oſiand. Eccleſ. Hiſt. Cent. 5. p. 260.*

1. Becauſe it makes God to puniſh the righteous with the wicked, as it is taught the Supralapſarian way, directly, as it is defended the Sublapſarian way by good conſequence.

The Sublapſarians preſent man to God in his decrees of reprobation conſidered without ſinne, and will have God to determine the infliction of unſpeakable miſery upon millions of men, without conſideration of any evill in them originall or actuall (as I have touched before) and ſo they make him plainly to be a deſtroyer of the righteous.

The Sublapſarians (for againſt their way have I tied my ſelfe to bend my reaſons) preſent man to God, conſidered indeed in originall ſinne, which is a ſinne (ſo farre as it concernes *Adams* poſterity) made ours only by Gods order and appointment, and ſo in effect, they ſay, 1. That God did lay upon every man a neceſſity of being borne in originall ſinne. 2. That he hath determined for that ſinne, to caſt away the farre greater part of Mankind for ever; and ſo they make God to doe by two acts, the one accompanying the other, which the other ſay he did by one: and they will not ſtick, if they be put to it, to ſay as D. *Twiſſe* doth, *Quod Deus poteſt intercedente libera ſua conſtitutione, illud etiam abſolute poterit, vel ſine ali unâ conſtitutione intercedente.* That if God may decree men to hell (for that is the thing he ſpeaks of) for *Adams* ſinne, which is derived to them by the only conſtitution of God, he may as well doe it abſolutely, without any ſuch conſtitution. It is all one in ſubſtance, to decree the miſery of an innocent man, and to purpoſe, that he ſhall be involved in a ſinne, that ſo he may be brought to miſery: neither of theſe Decrees are juſt. *Non juſtitia juſta dicetur* (ſaith *Fulgentius*) *ſi puniendum reum non inveniſſe ſed feciſſe dicatur: major vero erit injuſtitia, ſi lapſo Deus retribuat pœnam, quem ſtantem prædeſtinaſſe dicitur ad ruinam.* D. *Twiſſe l.* 2. *digr.* 1. *p.* 15. *Fulgent. ad Monim. l.* 1.

TWISSE

Conſideration.

WIth us Chriſtians there is no doubt or queſtion made of the truth of this, that God is righteous in all his waies: yea though he command *Abraham* to ſacrifice his ſonne; and though he cauſed not only *Achan* to be ſtoned for his treſpaſſing about the excommunicate thing, but his children alſo with him; and though he viſit the ſinne of Fathers upon the Children to the third and fourth generation of them that hate him. And though in the drowning of the World, he cauſed Infants to periſh with their parents, ſome in their Mothers wombe, ſome hanging on their Mothers breaſts: And ſo in the deſtruction of *Sodome* and *Gomorrah* with fire from heaven. And not ſo only, but the righteous God hath given us power over inferiour creatures, to weare them out in ſerving our turnes with them, yea and to knock them in the heads, to cut their throats, and ſtrangle them as we think good: and we are no whit the more unrighteous in executing this power, which God hath given us upon them: yea in giving his own and holy Sonne to be reviled, blaſpheamed, betrayed, condemned, crucified, ſo to make his ſoule an offering for our ſinnes. In all theſe waies the Lord is righteous, and holy in all his works. *Solomon* ſaith, *Prov.* 16.11. That a juſt weight and ballance are the Lords, all the weights of the bagge are his worke. And the ſame *Solomon* in the ſame chapter ſaith, v.4. *The Lord hath made all things for himſelfe, yea even the wicked againſt the day of evill.* This revives in me the remembrance of a pretty ſtory; An odde fellow came to his Neighbour to borrow a buſhell of Malt, ſaying, the merciſull is righteous and lendeth; the other anſwered him in the ſame element ſaying, The ungodly borroweth and payeth not againe; Where is that ſaith the borrower? Where is yours ſaith the other? Why, ſaith he, the place I mentioned is in the 37 *Pſalme*. So is mine too, ſaith the other. But proceed we along with him: Whereas he ſaith Gods judgements are without exception, that is untrue, for we find the Apoſtle Saint *Paul* to take notice of exceptions made againſt the waies of God in ſome particular caſes; as when God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth: upon the propoſall of this Doctrine the Apoſtle takes notice of ſuch an exception as this. Thou wilt ſay then, why doth he yet complaine, for who hath reſiſted his will: and the juſtification hereof, the Apoſtle derives from no other conſideration then this, that God is our Creator, and we are his creatures: And that as the Potter hath power over the clay of the ſame lump, to make one veſſell to honour, and another to diſhonour; ſo hath God. *O man* (ſaith *Paul*) *who art thou that diſputeſt with God, ſhall the thing formed, ſay to him that formed it, why haſt thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over the clay?* And as the Pſalmiſt ſaith, *That Gods judgements are like a great deepe*: So the Apoſtle profeſſeth, *That his judgements are unſearcheable, and his waies paſt finding out*. And in the common opinion this is delivered as touching the depth of Gods counſell in reprobation and predeſtination; and by the coherence of the words, with that which goes before it, appears to be ſpoken upon Gods diſpenſing and denying grace to whom he will, and when he will; As for example; like as there was a time when God had a Church in the World, without diſtinction of Jewes and Gentiles, ſo afterwards the providence of God was to diſplay it ſelfe after three ſeverall waies, the firſt was in gathering a Church unto himſelfe out of the World, from out of the poſterity of *Abraham*, theſe were called the Jewes, in diſtinction from the Gentiles, who for a long time had not obtained mercy, as the Apoſtle ſpeaks, *Rom.* 11.30. *In as much as they believed not:* And this diſpenſation of grace peculiar unto the Jewes, with rejection of the Gentiles, continued for about 1600 years. Then God gathered a Church among the Gentiles, with rejection of the Jewes, as the Apoſtle ſignifies in the place before alleadged, ſaying, *now you have obtained mercy through their unbeliefe*. And this diſpenſation of Gods grace peculiar unto the Gentiles, hath continued now, for about 1600 years. And we believe a time ſhall come, for the calling of the Jewes, and then the Church of God ſhall conſiſt both of

Rom. 9. 18, 19, 20, 21.

Rom. 11. 33.

Jewes

Jewes and Gentiles, and the generall calling of them, as the Apoſtle ſignifies, *Rom.* 11. 12. If the fall of them be the riches of the World, and the diminiſhing of them the riches of the Gentiles, how much more their fulneſſe: and v. 15. If the caſting away of them be the reconciling of the World, what ſhall the receiving of them be but life from the dead: and v. 31. Even ſo have theſe alſo now not believed, that through your (Gentiles) mercy, they alſo (the Jewes) might obtain mercy. For God hath concluded them all under unbeliefe, that he might have mercy on all. And hereupon it is, that the Apoſtle breaks forth into admiration of this various providence of God, and different diſpenſation of his grace, ſaying, *O the depth of the riches both of the wiſdome and knowledge of God, how unſearcheable are his judgements, and his waies paſt finding out?* So that albeit the juſtice of God, be apparent to the underſtanding of man in ſome of his waies, yet not in all. Neither doth it follow, that becauſe God offers the juſtice of his courſes, to the triall of humane underſtanding in ſome particulars, therefore he offers it to the ſame triall in all; or that the underſtanding of man is able to comprehend it in all. Not only carnall men cry out ſometimes, Where is the God of judgement? *Mal.* 2. 17. Again, it is in vain to ſerve God, and what profit is it that we have kept his commandements, that we have walked humbly before the Lord of hoſts? But even the children of wiſdome, which are apt to juſtify her, are yet ſometimes offended through weakneſſe of faith, or want of judgement to comprehend the depth of Gods providence, when they have conſidered the ſtrange proſperity of the wicked, as *Job.* 21. 6, 7, 8. and *David*, *Pſal.* 73. and *Jeremy*, *Jer.* 12.

But to conſider punctually the inſtances here particulated. Firſt not one of them treats of Gods decrees, though this Author boldly claps then in amongſt the waies of God: And theſe places throughout entreat not of the decrees themſelves, but of the executions of Gods decrees. As that *Iſaiah* 5. 3. *Judge I pray you between me and my vineyard*; yet this was meere grace and not juſtice; but the laying of it waſt, (as there he threatneth) for the unfruitfulneſſe thereof, was juſt even in the conſcience of man: So likewiſe the waies of God mentioned, *Ezech.* 18. 25. are moſt equall, as namely in rewarding the obedient, and puniſhing the diſobedient. In like ſort there is no queſtion to be made of Gods decrees, concerning the rewarding the one, and puniſhing the other. And it is as true, that all this is nothing to the purpoſe. The main queſtion being touching Gods decree, to give the grace of obedience to one, and deny it unto others; and of the execution hereof, in ſhewing mercy on whom he will, and hardning whom he will. No reaſon hereof can be deviſed by man without falling into manifeſt abſurdity, or manifeſt hereſy, or both. It is true God will not ſlay the righteous with the wicked: for the Infants of wicked Parents, untill God be pleaſed to regenerate them, are not to be accounted righteous, as being borne children of wrath. *Epheſ.* 2. 3. And therefore as in the conflagration of Sodome, God took a courſe to ſave righteous *Lot*, yet the Infant children of the Sodomites were conſumed in the ſame fire with their Parents. And in like manner I anſwere to that of *Moſes*. *Num.* 16. 22. *Shall one man ſinne, and wilt thou be angry with all the congregation?* You know though *Korah* might be, and in likelihood he was the principall inſtigator yet *Dathan* and *Abiran* the ſonnes of *Eliab*, and *On*, the ſonne of *Peleth*, the ſonnes of *Reuben* joyned with him in the ſeparation, and with theſe were joyned no leſſe then 250 Captains of the aſſembly, and they famous in the congregation and men of renowne. Nor did thoſe alone periſh in this their ſeparation, but their families alſo. So that whereas when *Moſes* exhorted all the reſt to depart from the tents of thoſe wicked men, and thereupon *Dathan* and *Abiram* came out and ſtood in the doore of the Tent, with their Wives, and their Sonnes, and their little Children, all theſe were ſwallowed up, and went downe quick into the pit: and doe you think their little Children were partners with them in this conſpiracy? And is not this judgement ſtrange? What can juſtify this, but the power of God, is Lord over his creature, together with that originall corruption that is found in every one when they come into the world? Gueſſe, I pray, how happy this Author is in his obſervations. This makes me remember, how at my firſt coming into this place, having to deale with certain Browniſts, being willed thereunto by our Dioceſan: An old man among the reſt, was willing to conferre, ſo we would give him liberty to open his mind at full; we willingly condeſcended unto him, and thereupon he began to alleadge places of Scripture to juſtify his ſeparation; and whereſoever he found the word ſeperate, that he took up for an argument on his ſide (like him that did ſet downe every ſhip that

Rom. 9. 18.

Gen. 19.

arrived

arrived in the harbour at *Athens*, as one of his ſhipps) and amongſt the reſt, this 16 chapter of Numbers afforded him one authority v. 21. where the Lord ſpeaks unto *Moſes* and *Aaron*, ſaying, *ſeparate your ſelves from among this congregation*; whereunto I anſwered; here indeed is a ſeparation commanded, but from whom? Surely from thoſe who roſe up in rebellion againſt *Moſes* and *Aaron*: Now if you can prove us to be ſuch, as riſe up in rebellion againſt *Moſes* and *Aaron*, then, in the name of God *ſeparate your ſelves from us*: But if we are not the men that riſe up in rebellion againſt *Moſes* and *Aaron*, but you rather, then are not you commanded to ſeparate from us, but we rather are commanded to ſeparate from you; yet we deſire only, that you will not ſeparate from us, and all ſhall be well. But to returne, what doth this author think? Was God in a paſſion, or ſomething precipitate when he ſaid, *ſeparate your ſelves from among this congregation, that I may conſume them all at once*, and did *Moſes* moderate him as being more ſtaid of the two? I hope, if God had done as much as he offered to doe, his action had been juſtifiable, as well in the one as in the other. Certainly God ſhould be juſt, even in turning his holy Angells into nothing: and was juſt in expoſing his holy Sonne to tortures unexpreſſable upon the croſſe; other manner of proceedings, then were thoſe which were uſed towards *Adonibezek* and *Mauricius*: they juſtified God from conſideration of their former ſinnes: No ſuch courſe of juſtification could have place in annihilating Angells, or had courſe in breaking the Holy Sonne of God for our iniquities. Yet theſe inſtances are remarkable to obſerve therein, the felicity of this Authors diſcourſe. For firſt, was it God indeed that executed
Judg. 1. 6, 7. this judgement upon *Adonibezek*? Now the Text ſaith, the children of *Judah* were they that dealt thus with him: did God then uſe their free wills, as his inſtruments for the execution of this judgement? And how was this? Was it by working them hereunto, or only by concurring with them to this act, as foreſeeing they would doe ſuch an act, and thereupon decreeing to concurre to the producing of that act? If God did work them hereunto, then can God work the will of any man to the doing of any free act freely: for who dares ſay that the children of Iſrael did not as freely doe this as ought elſe? But if God only concurred with them, to the doing of it *modò vellent*, and only, upon foreſight that they would doe it, decreed to concurre to the doing of it, calls he this Gods execution of judgement, depending meerely upon the pleaſure of man foreſeen by God?

As for the out-rage executed upon *Mauricius* by *Phocas*, this was no leſſe then abominable villany, as committed by him. Yet if God uſed him as an inſtrument herein, to execute his judgement, then God by the ſinfull act of one, can and doth puniſh the ſame of another, and conſequently God muſt be the Author of that ſinfull act, whereby he puniſheth another, and that by Arminius his rule, which is this, *Omnis pœna non permittitur ſed infligitur a Deo, & habet Deum authorem.* Now I come to conſider his accommodation of ſo impertinent a diſcourſe. He ſaith *abſolute reprobation cannot be reconciled with this juſtice Divine*: we ſay there is no need at all of reconcilement: for what an inſipid thing is it, to talke of a courſe of reconciling them, who were never at odds? But he takes upon him to prove the repugnancy between them by three reaſons.

1. The firſt whereof is this. *It makes God to puniſh the righteous with the wicked, as it is taught the Supralapſarian way directly.* I confeſſe here is a direct ſomewhat, but whether a direct truth, or a direct lye, let the indifferent judge. He adventureth the proofe of it thus: *The Supralapſarians preſent man in his decree of Reprobation conſidered without ſinne:* that is true I confeſſe, and it is as true that they preſent him conſidered without righteouſneſſe alſo; and for good reaſon, becauſe Gods decree was eternall, and the creature at that time had no being. & to conſider a thing that hath no being, as having being, is not ſo much *conſiderare*, to conſider, as *errare* or *fingere*, to *erre* or *feign*, this I have delivered in my *Vindiciæ gratiæ Dei*, and that in the firſt part of the firſt book. And this Author pretends he hath read the ſecond, yet he takes no courſe to refute this or ought elſe. But let him goe on. *God* (he ſaith) *is made by them to determine the infliction of miſery on men without conſideration of ſinne, either Originall or actuall.* Firſt, let it be granted, yet herehence it followeth not, that *he is made to be a deſtroyer of the righteous, or to puniſh the righteous with the wicked*, which was that he affirmed. To determine puniſhment is one thing, to puniſh is another thing. Certainly in the opinion of thoſe he ſpeaks of, God puniſheth none but the wicked; the very conſcience of this Author cannot but convict him of falſhood in this crimination: For certainly by their opinion it doth

not

not follow but that every one is found wicked, when God doth puniſh him. I may as well ſay in moſt abſolute congruity, that by their opinion, God doth puniſh men, before they have any being by creation: for ſuch they were indeed, and neither wicked nor righteous; when God paſſed the decree of reprobation upon them. But neither doe theſe Divines maintain, that God did decree to damne any man but for ſinne. Nay, I goe farther: let the object of reprobation be men not yet created, and ſo conſidered, as I have proved it to be ſo, herehence it no way followes, that the decree of reprobration, is in any moment of reaſon or nature, before the conſideration or *citra conſiderationem peccati*: and this alſo have I proved. This Author boldly ſuppoſeth the contrary to be true, without any proofe, yet pretends he hath read my *Vindiciæ Gratiæ Dei* farther off then where I have handled this. I ſay he pretends it, but I doe not know how he comes by this, it may be as Capons come by Chickens.

Hence he proceeds to the Sublapſarians alſo, the whole Synod of Dort (as 'tis ſuppoſed) our Brittain Divines, and all; *for againſt their way he hath tyed himſelfe to bend his reaſons*, but ſo, that as the Pope by his grants, doth never bind his own hands, for this Author hath power to untye himſelfe at pleaſure, and to fly out againſt the Supralapſarians alſo: as *Scanderbeg* did againſt the two Perſian challengers; but he was put thereunto, becauſe they contrary to the compact, ſet both at once on him. But this champion like a tall fellow, and of a brave ſpirit, as if he ſhould not have his hands full of a whole Synod, lets fly at all: They indeed, I mean the Sublapſarians, conſider mankind in originall ſinne; this he may well ſuppoſe: but he goes farther, and ſuppoſeth alſo, that *this ſinne is made ours only by Gods order and appoyntment*: For ſo, ſaith he, *they in effect doe ſay.*

1. *That God did lay upon every man, a neceſſity of being borne in Originall ſinne.* But in this alſo he ſpeaks at pleaſure, quoting no paſſage of any Author. God may be ſaid to lay upon man a neceſſity of eternall condemnation, dying in ſinne unrepented of: yet no ſober man will ſay, that God is the author of a mans condemnation, by Gods only order and pleaſure; For this implies, that there is no meritorious cauſe of condemnation in man. God (we ſay) of meer pleaſure, beſtowes the grace of repentance on whom he will; becauſe he finds all equall in naturall corruption, and no difference in any, whereby to move God to beſtow grace on him rather then on another. The caſe is not alike when God comes to beſtow ſalvation and inflict damnation; for ſome he finds dying in ſinnes, others dying in the Lord: yet we deny not but by power abſolute, and ſecluding the determination of his own will, he could annihilate the righteous as well as the wicked. In like ſort the whole courſe of nature depends meerely upon the pleaſure of God: yet we ſay it is naturall for a Leprous perſon, to beget a Leprous perſon: and ſo as naturall it is, for that which is borne of the fleſh to be fleſh, though each depends upon the conſtitution of God. For albeit *Adam* loſt the ſpirit of God by his tranſgreſſion, and all ſupernaturall graces wherewith he was endued; yet like as God by regeneration, of his meere pleaſure reſtored them afterwards to *Adam*, and in due time doth reſtore them to every one of his Elect: ſo in their very conception, if it pleaſed God, he could for Chriſts ſake infuſe them; notwithſtanding the ſinne of *Adam*; and conſequently it is the free act of God, in refuſing after this manner to deale with them. Yet this nothing hinders, but that the propagation of ſpirituall corruption unto all *Adams* poſterity, may be as naturall as the propagation of any hereditary diſeaſe from the Father to the child: and over and above, that it is not in the way of meer pleaſure, but in the way of juſtice; for the ſinne of *Adam*, which was the ſinne of our nature, bereaving him of that originall righteouſneſſe wherein he was created: and cauſing all mankind to be, 1. Derived from him, whereas he could have otherwiſe provided, 2. And that from *Adam* after his nature was corrupt with ſinne, whereas he could have derived poſterity from him before his fall, had it pleaſed him. And therefore I approve the ſecond Canon of the Synod of *Dort*, whereunto our Engliſh Divines with many others ſubſcribed: where they profeſſe, that the corruption derived from *Adam* to his poſterity was, *per vitioſæ naturæ propagationem juſto Dei judicio derivata.* This I take to be much different from ſaying, *Adams* ſinne is made ours by meer pleaſure, or by imputation only. So the fifteenth Article in the confeſſion *Eccleſiarum Belgicarum* runs thus; *Credimus Adami in obedientiâ, peccatum originis in totum genus humanum diffuſum eſſe: quod eſt totius naturæ corruptio, & vitium hæreditarium, quo & ipſi infantes in matris ſuæ utero polluti ſunt, quodque veluti radix omne peccatorum genus in homine producit; ideoq; ita*

fœdum & execrabile eſt coram Deo, ut ad generis humani condemnationem ſufficiat. Our Brittain Divines, in their ſecond Theſis upon the third and fourth Articles, explicate themſelves concerning the condition of originall ſinne in this manner. *Lapſæ voluntati ineſt non tantum peccandi poſſibilitas, ſed etiam præceps ad peccandum inclinatio; Nec aliter ſe poteſt res habere in homine corrupto, nondum per divinam juſtitiam reſtaurato: cùm ea ſit natura voluntatis, ut nuda manere nequeat, ſed ab uno, cui adhæſerat, objecto excidens, aliud quærat, quod cupidè amplectatur, ideo per ſpontaneam defectionem habitualiter adverſa a Deo creatore, in creaturam effræni impetu fertur, ac cum ea libidinoſe ac turpiter fornicatur, ſemper avida fruendi utendis, ac vetita moliendi ac patrandi. Quid mirum ergo ſi talis voluntas ſit Diaboli mancipium?* I find indeed in *Corvinus* ſuch a profeſſion of his, namely, that *ex puro Dei arbitrio, qui Adami peccatum nobis imputare voluit, etiam in nos reatus derivatus eſt.* And *Walæus* in anſwer unto him writes thus; *Nec quinto illo ad Rom. Capite, ad quod nos hic Corvinus remittit, quicquam tale dicitur aut innuitur, nempe quod ex mero Dei arbitrio pendeat hæc primi peccati imputatio.*

2. The Second thing he puts upon our Divines is, *That God hath determined for that ſinne, to caſt away the farre greater part of mankind for ever: and ſo they make God to doe that by two acts, the one accompanying the other, which the other ſay he did by one.* To which I anſwer, Firſt, that if they ſay that God doth no more by two acts, then, the other ſay, God did by one, ſeeing I have proved that the other doe no way maintain that God doth puniſh the righteous with the wicked, which is his immodeſt and unſhamefac't crimination; no nor doe they maintain, that God determined to damne any but for ſinne, and which is more then that, ſuppoſing *humanum genus nondum conditum*, to be the object of reprobation, yet doth it not follow, that in any moment of nature, the decree of damnation is before the conſideration of ſinne; ſurely neither will it follow, by the Sublapſarian Doctrine, that God doth not decree to puniſh any man with damnation, but for thoſe ſinnes wherein he dyeth unrepented of; much leſſe that God doth puniſh the righteous with the wicked, which is the crimination of this Author, propoſed, I doubt, againſt his own conſcience. Tis true, ſome periſh only in originall ſinne, and that juſtly: for if they be borne children of wrath, is it ſtrange if they dye children of wrath? And is it not juſt with God to inflict eternall death on them, whom this Author profeſſeth to be guilty of eternall death? only he ſaith, that God of his meer pleaſure, makes them guilty of eternall death: That is his ſaying, not ours: For though we ſay originall ſinne makes a man guilty of eternall death, by the free conſtitution of God; yet we ſay not, that this free conſtitution of God was made of his meer pleaſure, but *juſto Dei judicio*: like as whoſoever believes not ſhall be damned, here damnation is by the free conſtitution of God, made the portion of unbelievers: but dares this Author inferre herehence, that it is not made ſo *juſto Dei judicio*? indeed God gives grace according to the meere pleaſure of his will: but no wiſe man will ſay, that he damnes men according to the meere pleaſure of his will; for this phraſe implies, that there is no cauſe thereof on mans part: And indeed there is no cauſe on mans part, why God ſhould give him grace, but there is cauſe enough on mans part, why God ſhould inflict damnation on him, and yet this work of God though juſt, is never a whit the leſſe free. So in damning for originall ſinne only, though Gods conſtitution hereof be juſt, yet is it never a whit the leſſe free; and though it be free, yet it is never a whit the leſſe juſt: And like as damnation is inflicted on finall impenitents, *ſola Dei conſtitutione*, only by vertue of this conſtitution Divine, *whoſoever repents not of his ſinne ſhall be damned*; (for it is apparent, God might have annihilated them, had it ſo pleaſed him) yet is it never a whit the leſſe juſt. In like ſort it is by the ſole conſtitution of God, that originall ſinne is propagated to all men, Chriſt excepted. for God could have derived mankind from another ſtock after *Adams* fall: and as he doth regenerate men uſually by his word, ſo he might if it pleaſed him, in their very conception give them his ſpirit, and thoſe ſupernaturall graces, whereof *Adam* was deprived by ſinne: yet the propagation of ſinne from *Adam* to poſterity, is never a whit the leſſe juſt; no nor any whit the leſſe naturall; like as the whole courſe of nature, depends upon the alone conſtitution of God. But when I ſay that God can without reſpect of ſinne, inflict any torment upon his creature, this is delivered of power abſolute. This power the Lord did execute upon his own ſonne: for what was his ſinne? Was he not the ſpotleſſe lamb of God? Yet what agonies did he ſuffer in the garden, what torments and terrours upon the croſſe, when hee cryed out *My God, my God, Why haſt thou forſaken mee?* But the like

like power he doth not execute on us, only he gives us authority to exerciſe the like power over other creatures: if the powder of an Hare burnt alive in an Oven, be found to be wholſome for us, he gives us leave thus to deale with him, and the like: yet have not theſe creatures ſinned either againſt God, or againſt us. Of this abſolute power of God, I have diſcourſed more ſparingly in the place cited by him, *Lib.* 1. *p.* 2. *De Electione, digreſ.* 3. If this Author hath any mind to except againſt it, either in whole or in part, he might have tried his ſtrength, and not contented himſelfe, with ſhewing his teeth only. Yet by his leave, whether thoſe he ſpeaks of, will concurre with me in this, it is more then I know, but to ſerve his turne at this preſent againſt thoſe whom he hath tyed himſelfe to oppoſe, as he profeſſeth, he cares little what he avoucheth to ſave himſelfe of farther pains. By the way let me take notice of one argument more then I dreamt of, for the maintenance of Gods abſolute power to inflict any pain upon a creature, and that of his meer pleaſure, which this Author ere he is aware ſuggeſts unto me; And accordingly thus I diſpute. If God can out of his meer pleaſure make a man guilty of eternall death, ſurely it ſeems that of his meer pleaſure he may inflict eternall death on any. But God can of his meer pleaſure make a man guilty of eternall death, as I prove out of this Author, who profeſſeth that God out of his meer pleaſure, made all mankind guilty of eternall death: Now we commonly ſay, that *ab actu ad potentiam valet argumentum.* And ſee farther how miſerably he overlaſheth. The higheſt degree whereunto he can improve the harſhneſſe of our Doctrine is this, that we ſhould teach, that *God doth decree the miſery of an innocent man.* Now I pray conſider, is it not as harſh, that God ſhould decree the death, the agonies, the ſorrowes, and tortures of an innocent man? And is it not apparent, that God decreed the death and thoſe unſpeakable ſorrowes of his innocent ſonne? Yet we ſay not that God decreed any other mans death or damnation, but only for ſinne. But it is all one in his opinion to ſay, *God decrees the miſery of an innocent man, and to purpoſe that he ſhall be involved in a ſinne, that ſo he may be brought to miſery.* Firſt, I ſay his opinion is no Oracle, if it were, the world would ſoon grow wild. Secondly, this ſufficeth not to prove his crimination, which was this, that by our Doctrine, we make God *to puniſh the righteous with the wicked,* not that we make God to doe that which is all one in ſubſtance. Thirdly, his beſt arguments are his phraſes, whereby he hopes to ſeaſon others affections as well as his own; as in ſaying God purpoſed man ſhall be involved in ſinne: For if he ſpeake of mankind, made guilty of the ſinne of *Adam,* he forgets his own Tenet; that *God of his meer pleaſure makes Adams ſinne the ſinne of his poſterity,* and thereby of his meer pleaſure makes them guilty of eternall death. And as touching our Tenet herein, is there any ſuch harſhneſſe in ſaying, that God cauſeth a leprous child to be borne of Leprous parents? But if he ſpeak it in generall of any ſinne, for which any man is damned, our Doctrine is, that the ſinnes which come to paſſe, muſt needs be permitted by God, and for God to permit any ſinne, is to will that ſuch a ſinne ſhall come to paſſe by Gods permiſſion. *Arminius* himſelfe profeſſing, that if God permit a man to will that which is evill, *Neceſſe eſt ut nullo argumentorum genere perſuadeatur ad nolendum.* And the Scripture is expreſſe as touching the fouleſt actions that ever were committed by man, to wit, in the moſt contumelious uſages of the ſonne of God, namely that *both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles, and people of Iſraell were gathered together, to doe what Gods hand, and Gods Counſell had predetermined to be done.* And when *Fulgentius* ſaith, that God had been unjuſt, if he had predeſtinated *ſtantem ad ruinam; ad ruinam* here is *ad peccatum,* and Predeſtination in the Fathers ſenſe, is only *eorum quæ Deus ipſe facturus erat,* which God himſelfe meant to effect, not what he meant to ſuffer. That they took predeſtination in this ſenſe, it appears by *Auſtin. lib.* 2. *de bono perſever. c.* 17. his words are theſe. *In ſua quæ falli mutarique non poteſt præſcientia opera ſua futura diſponere, illud omnino, nec aliud quicquam eſt prædeſtinare.* Marke it well, *opera ſua,* his works, now ſinne is no work of God, but a work of the creature only.

I come to his ſecond reaſon.

DISCOURSE.

SUBSECT. II.

IT is against Gods Justice, because it makes him to require faith in Christ, of those to whom he hath in his absolute purpose denied both ability to believe, and a Christ to believe in.

That Reprobates are bound to believe as well as others, it is the constant Doctrine of Divines; amongst whom *Zanchius* delivers it for a Thesis: *Quisque* (saith he) *mandato Dei tenetur credere se ad salutem æternam in Christo fuisse electum, maximè is qui fidem in Christum profitetur.* And in his explication of this Thesis he saith, *Cum dicimus unumquemq; teneri hoc credere, neminem, ne reprobos quidem, qui neque unquam credent, nec credere in Christum possunt, excipimus; & nisi credant, gravissime omnium peccant.* Every man, especially he that professeth Christ, is bound to believe that he is chosen in Christ to salvation; every man without exception, even the Reprobate himselfe; and if he believe it not, he commits a most grievous sinne above all others. This that he saith, he proves by *Iohn* 16. 9. The spirit shall convince the World of sinne, because they believe not in me: Reprobates therefore are bound to believe.

Zanch. lib. 5. c. 2. de nat. Dei, q. 1. de prædest. Sanct.

But now they cannot be justly bound to believe if they be absolute and inevitable Reprobates, for three causes.

1. Because it is Gods will that they shall not believe; and it appears to be so, because it is his peremptory will that they shall have no power to believe; for its a Maxime in Logick, that *Qui vult aliquid in causâ, vult effectum ex ista causa necessario profluentem:* No man will say that it is Gods serious will, that such a man shall live, when it is his will, that he shall not have the concourse of his providence, and the act of preservation: now will any say (that forget not themselves) that God doth unfainedly will that those men shall believe, whom he will not furnish with necessary power to believe. Now if it be Gods will, that absolute reprobates shall in no wise believe, they cannot in justice be tied to believe. For no man is bound to an act against Gods peremptory will.

2. Because it is impossible that they should believe, they want power to believe, and must want it still: God hath decreed they shall have none to their dying day: without power to believe, they can no more believe, then a man can see without an eye, and live without a Soule. *Nemo obligatur ad impossibilia.* To believe is absolutely impossible unto them; and therefore in justice they can be tyed to believe no more then a man can be bound to fly like a Bird, or to reach heaven with the top of his finger.

3. Because they have no object of faith. *Credere jubet, & fidei nullum objectum ponit:* This decree makes God to oblige men to believe, and to give them no Christ to believe in, and to punish them as transgressors of the covenant of grace, when yet they have no more right unto it, or part in it, then the very Devills. Can God justly bind men to believe a lye? To believe that Christ died for them, when it is no such matter? If a man should command his Servant to eate, and punish him for not eating, and in the mean time fully resolve that he shall have no meat to eate: Would any reasonable man say that he were just in such a command, such a punishment? Change but the names, the case is the same.

TWISSE

Consideration.

IN this discourse on the poynt of Gods justice, this Author seems to storme, and shewes great confidence of bearing downe all before him: but the more ridiculous will it prove in the issue, when it shall appeare, that all this wind beats down no corne. He takes his rise from a particular opinion of *Zanchy*, whose opinion is, that all, even Reprobates are bound to believe they are elected in Christ unto salvation, though never they shall believe nor can believe. But doth this Author himselfe concurre with *Zanchy* in this opinion? If he did, I presume it were upon some better ground then the authority of *Zanchy*; and in all likelihood we should have heard of those grounds: or doth himselfe believe, that that passage *Ioh.* 16. 9. *He shall convict the World of sinne, because they believed not in me,* doth evince as much, or import as much

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as that is, whereunto *Zanchy* drives it? If he doth not concurre with *Zanchy* in either of theſe, why ſhould he tye us to the particular authority of *Zanchy*? Muſt we be bound to ſtand to every interpretation of our Divines, or every particular opinion of theirs, wherein perhaps they were ſingular? Secondly, ſuppoſe this opinion of *Zanchy* be a truth, and ſuppoſe we concurre with him herein, will it from this opinion follow, that therefore even Reprobates, have power to believe? Who ſeeth not that it is a flat contradiction to the antecedent? For the Doctrine of *Zanchy* as here it is related, is this, that even Reprobates, though they cannot believe, yet are they bound to believe. Now will it herehence follow that therefore they have power to believe? Whereas it is manifeſtly ſuppoſed in the antecedent that they cannot believe. And to my underſtanding, the diſtinction of Elect and Reprobate in this caſe is moſt unſeaſonable. For to what end doe we Preach unto our hearers, that all ſorts of men are bound to believe, but this, to wit, that every one that heareth us, being privy to his condition, may underſtand that he, of what condition ſoever he be, which is ſuppoſed to be better known to him, then to the Preacher, or at leaſt as well, is bound to believe. But as for theſe different conditions of elect and reprobate, no man can be privy to the one, untill he doth believe; nor to the other, untill finall perſeverance in unbeliefe. And if I liſt, I could alleadge the opinion of another Divine (who is very peremptory in his way) profeſſing that the Miniſters calling upon us to believe, is no commandement at all, but like a Kings gracious Proclamation unto certain malifactors, who are all accuſed of High Treaſon, giving them to underſtand, that in caſe they will voluntarily confeſſe their ſinne, and accept of his gracious pardon offered them, he will moſt graciouſly pardon them. But if they will not, but ſtand rather to their triall, preſuming to acquit themſelves right well, and prove themſelves to be true Subjects, let them ſtand to the adventure, and iſſue of their tryall. And that thus the covenant of grace is offered to be received by them only, who feare to come, and dare not come to the tryall of the Covenant of works. But I will not content my ſelfe, in putting off *Zanchy* in this manner; although by the way I cannot but profeſſe, that were I of their opinion, who teach that God gives unto all and every one, when they come into the World, a certain grace, for the enlivening of their wills, whereby they are enabled to will any ſpirituall good, whereto they ſhall be excited; I ſee no reaſon but that the way is open to everlaſting life, as well by the covenant of works, as by the covenant of grace: for let perfect obedience be the ſpirituall good whereto they are excited, let them but will it, as it is ſuppoſed they can; and then God will be ready to concurre to the doing of it, like as to the work in us τὸ *credere*, and τὸ *reſipiſcere*, *modò velimus*, ſo alſo I ſhould think, to work in us perfect obedience *modò velimus*. And in this caſe I pray conſider, what need were there of faith in Chriſt on their part, more then on the part of the Holy Angells; certainly there would be no need of repentance.

Thirdly therefore conſider we the conſtant Doctrine of Divines, not that Reprobates are bound to believe, but that all that heare the Goſpell are bound to believe: but in what ſenſe? *Piſcator* ſaith, as I remember, that the thing, which all ſuch are bound to believe, is the Goſpell; according to that *Mar.* 1. *Repent ye and believe the Goſpell*. Now to believe the Goſpell is one thing, the ſumme whereof is this, *That Jeſus Chriſt came into the World to ſave ſinners*; but to believe in Chriſt is another thing, which yet this Author diſtinguiſheth not, though it appears by the courſe of his argumentation, that he draws to this meaning, and that in a particular ſenſe, which is this, *to believe that Chriſt died for them*; as appears expreſſely in the latter end of this Section. And no marvaile if this Author carry himſelfe ſo confidently in this, being, as he is, armed with ſuch confidence. But I am glad that in one place or other, he ſprings his meaning, that we may have the fairer flight at him, to pull down his pride, and ſweep away his vain confidence: though we deale upon the moſt plauſible argument of the Arminians, and which they think inſoluble. My anſwer is; firſt, Look in what ſenſe *Arminius* ſaith Chriſt died for us, in the ſame ſenſe we may be held to ſay (without prejudice to our Tenet) of abſolute reprobation, that all who heare the Goſpell are bound to believe that Chriſt died for them. For the meaning that Arminius makes of Chriſts dying for us, is this, Chriſt dyed, for this end, that ſatisfaction being made for ſinne, the Lord now may pardon ſinne, upon what condition he will; which indeed is to dye for obtaining a poſſibility of the redemption of all, but for the actuall redemption of none at all. Secondly, But I liſt not to content my ſelfe with this;

therefore I farther anſwer, by diſtinction of the phraſe of dying for us, that we may not cheat our ſelves by the confounding of things that differ. To dye for us, or for all, is to dye for our benefit, or for the benefit of all: Now theſe benefits are of a different nature, whereof ſome are beſtowed upon man only conditionally (though for Chriſts ſake) and they are the pardon of ſinne and Salvation of the Soule, and theſe God doth conferre only upon the condition of faith and repentance. Now I am ready to profeſſe, and that, I ſuppoſe, as out of the mouth of all our Divines, that every one who hears the Goſpell (without diſtinction between Elect and Reprobate) is bound to believe that Chriſt died for him, ſo farre as to procure both the pardon of his ſinnes, and the ſalvation of his ſoule, in caſe he believe and repent. But there are other benefits, which Chriſt by his obedience hath merited for us, namely, the benefit of faith and repentance. *For it pleaſed the Father, that in him ſhould all fulneſſe dwell,* Col. 1. And *He hath bleſſed us with all ſpirituall bleſſings in Chriſt*, that is, for Chriſts ſake: and God works in us, *that which is pleaſing in his ſight through Jeſus Chriſt*, and therefore ſeeing nothing is more pleaſing in Gods ſight on our part, then faith and repentance, even theſe alſo, I ſhould think, God works in us through Jeſus Chriſt: and the Apoſtle praies in the behalfe of the Epheſians, for peace, and faith, and love from God the Father, and the Lord Jeſus Chriſt, that is, as I interpret it, from God the Father, Sonne, and Holy Ghoſt, as an efficient cauſe, and from the Lord Jeſus Chriſt, God and Man, as a meritorious cauſe thereof. Now I demand whether this Author can ſay truly, that tis the conſtant opinion of our Divines, that all who heare the Goſpell, whether Elect or Reprobate, are bound to believe, that Chriſt dyed to procure them faith and repentance. Nay doth any Arminian at this day believe this, or can he name any Arminian that doth avouch this? Nay doth himſelfe believe this? If he doth not, if he cannot ſhew any Arminian that doth, with what face can he charge this opinion upon us, as if we ſhould extend the obligation to believe, much farther then the Arminians doe, whereas uſually they criminate us, for not extending it ſo farre as we ſhould. And indeed there is a main difference between theſe benefits and the former: For as touching the former, namely pardon of ſinne and ſalvation, God doth not uſe to conferre them, but conditionally, to wit, upon the condition of faith and repentance. But as for faith and repentance, doth God conferre them conditionally alſo? If ſo, then let them make known to us, what that condition is on mans part, and whatſoever it be, let them look unto it, how they can avoid the making of grace, to wit, the grace of faith and repentance, to be given according unto works. But if theſe graces are conferred abſolutely, and Chriſt dyed for all to this end, that faith and repentance ſhould be conferred abſolutely upon all, then it followeth manifeſtly herehence, that all muſt believe and repent, and conſequently all muſt be ſaved. So that not only Election (as *Huberus* that renegate faigned) muſt be univerſall, but Salvation alſo. Thus have I given in my anſwer diſtinctly, to that which he delivered moſt confuſedly. Fourthly I come to the ſcanning of the particular opinion of *Zanchy*, namely, that every one that hears the Goſpell, whether elect or reprobate (for ſo I ſuppoſe it proceeds, to wit, only of them, who heare the Goſpell, though this Author, takes no conſideration of that neither, but hand-over-head, laies about him like a mad man) is bound to believe, that he is elect in Chriſt; and will trye whether I cannot reduce that opinion of his alſo, to a faire interpretation. And here firſt I obſerve, *Zanchy* is not charged to maintain, that every hearer of the Goſpell, is bound to believe, that he is elect in Chriſt unto faith and repentance, but only to ſalvation: that puts me in good heart, that *Zanchy* & I ſhall ſhake hands of fellowſhip in the end, and part good friends. Secondly, I diſtinguiſh between abſolute-Election unto Salvation, and election unto Salvation-abſolute. The firſt only removes all cauſe on mans part of election, the latter removes all cauſe on mans part of ſalvation. By cauſe of ſalvation I mean only a diſpoſing cauſe, ſuch as faith, repentance, and good works are, as whereby (to expreſſe it in the Apoſtles phraſe) we are *made meet partakers of the inheritance of the Saints of light*. Now albeit *Zanchy* maintains as we doe, that all the elect are abſolutely elected unto ſalvation, there being no cauſe on mans part of his election, as we have learned: yet neither *Zanchy* nor we doe maintain that God doth elect any unto ſalvation abſolute, that is, to bring him to ſalvation, without any diſpoſing of him thereunto by faith and repentance. Now to accommodate that opinion of *Zanchy*, I ſay it may have a good ſenſe, to ſay that every hearer is bound to believe, both that Chriſt dyed to procure Salvation for him, in caſe he doe believe, and

Eph. 1. 3. Heb. 13. 21.

Eph. 6. 23.

Col. 1. 12.

that

that God ordained that he ſhould be ſaved, in caſe he doe believe; where beliefe is made the condition only of ſalvation, not of the Divine ordination; and the confuſion of theſe by the Arminians, doth uſually make them confident and inſolent, and in a word, *Magnas Tragœdias excitare.* But take away the confuſion of things that differ, their combes are cut, their locks are ſhorne, and they are but as another man. Now having ſhewed in what ſenſe every hearer, is bound to believe that Chriſt died for him, and in what ſenſe not, let us conſider of what worth this Authors arguments are, breathing nothing but ſmoak and fire, I will not ſay, like the great *Poran*, but like fell *Dragon*; but I nothing doubt we ſhall pare his nailes, and make him calme enough ere we have done with him, ſo that a little child ſhall be able enough to lead him. Now that they cannot be juſtly bound to believe, if they be abſolute reprobates he takes upon him to prove by three reaſons.

1. The firſt is, becauſe *it is Gods will that they ſhall not believe, becauſe it is his peremptory will, that they ſhall have no power to believe.* I anſwere, it is indeed the will of Gods decree, that is, he hath decreed not to give any Reprobate a juſtifying faith, but hence it followeth not, that therefore they cannot believe thus farre the contents of the Goſpell, namely, that both Chriſt hath merited, and God hath ordained, that as many as doe believe ſhall be ſaved. For this, as I take it, is not uſually accounted by our Divines a juſtifying faith, but rather it comes within the compaſſe of ſuch a faith, as is commonly counted faith hiſtoricall.

Secondly I anſwer, it followeth not, that becauſe God hath decreed to deny them the grace of faith, therefore they are not bound to believe; which I prove by Scripture: For was not *Pharaoh* bound to let Iſrael goe, when *Moſes* was ſent to him from the Lord, to command him in the name of the Lord, to let Iſrael goe? Yet the Scripture plainly teacheth us, that the Lord told *Moſes* that he would harden *Pharaohs* heart, and that he ſhould not let Iſrael goe. What I pray is now become of his reaſon, compared with the light of Scripture? And what have we to doe to enquire into Gods counſells, as whether he hath decreed to give us grace or no? Is it not enough to bind us to obedience, for God to command this or that unto us? Did *Abraham* enquire in his thoughts, whether it were his purpoſe yea or no, that *Iſaack* ſhould be ſacrificed? Nothing leſſe; but upon the Lords command, he forthwith addreſſeth himſelfe to the worke, riſing early in the morning, and going forward in the Lords buſineſſe. Then again, we find by common experience, that naturall men are too confident rather, and preſumptuous of their power, then diffident, and diſtruſtfull; *dicere ſolet humana ſuperbia* (ſaith *Auſtin*) *ſi ſciſſem feciſſem*: it were better for them if they did acknowledge their impotency, and by what means this corruption of theirs is brought upon them, that would bring them nearer to the Kingdome of God. But if I have a debtor, whom I know to be a Bankerupt, but he knowes it not, but having many bagges of Braſſe or Copper pieces, which he takes to be Gold, conceits himſelfe able enough to pay all his debts, and more too: ſhall I be ſaid to commit any indecent thing, by urging him to pay that he oweth? This argument is as old as *Pelagius*: but what was *Auſtin* his anſwer? *In mandato cognoſce quid debeas habere, in corruptione cognoſce tuo te vitio non habere, in oratione cognoſce unde poſſis habere.*

Exod. 7. 2, 3.

De Grat. & lib. arbit. c. 2.

3. Laſtly, if God cannot juſtly command, and by command bind man to obey, in caſe he hath no power to obey; in like ſort God cannot juſtly complaine of their diſobedience, who being hardned by God, cannot obey him: And indeed as this Author argueth againſt the juſtice of Gods commands in this caſe, ſo the Apoſtle brings in one arguing the injuſtice of Gods complaints in the like caſe. For having delivered this Doctrine, that God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth: forthwith he brings in one tumultuating againſt it in this manner. *Thou wilt ſay then why doth he yet complaine, for who hath reſiſted his will?* And if any man be not aſhamed to argue as he did (ſaith *Auſtin*) let us not be aſhamed to anſwer as the Apoſtle did: and how was that? Surely only thus: *O man who art thou that diſputeſt with God? ſhall the thing formed, ſay to him that formed it, Why haſt thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over the clay, of the ſame lump to make one veſſell unto honour, and another unto diſhonour?* And albeit this, I trow, ſhould be ſufficient to ſatisfy a Chriſtian, yet we obſerve farther, how this Author confounds impotency Morall, which conſiſteth in the corruption of mans powers naturall, and impotency naturall, which conſiſteth in bereaving him of power naturall. The Lord tells us by his Prophet *Jeremy*, that *Like as a Blackamore cannot change his ſkinne, nor a Leopard his ſpotts, no more can they doe good, that are*

Rom. 9. 18.

Jer. 13. 23.

accuſtomed

accuſtomed unto evill. Now if a man taken in ſtealth ſhall plead thus before a Judge, My Lord, I beſeech you have compaſſion upon me, for I have ſo long time inured my hands to pilfering, that now I cannot forbeare it: will this be accepted as a good plea to ſave him from the Gallowes. Again, it is obſerved that men are naturally prone to runne upon the committing of things forbidden them; *Gens humana ruit per vetitum nefas: & nitimur in vetitum*: yet this is no juſt excuſe. Laſtly; as for faith, it is well known that Divines diſtinguiſh between *fides acquiſita*, and *fides infuſa*; that we may call a faith naturally acquired, which is found in carnall perſons, whether prophane or Hypocriticall: and this is a faith inſpired by Gods ſpirit. The object of each is all one, and a Man may ſuffer Martyrdome for the one as well as for the other, which manifeſteth the pertinacious adherence thereunto. And it appears that all profeſſions have had their Martyrs; *Ucali Fartax* a Calabrian borne, endured the Gallies fourteen years, rather then he would turne Turke; yet at length he became a Turke, and only in ſpleen to be revenged on a Turke, who had given him a boxe on the eare, and became a great man amongſt them: And at the famous battell of *Lepanto*, he alone maintained his Squadron entire, and beat the Chriſtians. But to returne, albeit it be not in the power of nature to believe *fide infuſâ*, yet is it in the power of nature to believe the Goſpell *fide acquiſitâ*, which depends partly upon a mans education, and partly upon reaſon, conſidering the credibility of the Chriſtian way, by light of naturall obſervations, above all other waies in the World. And when men refuſe to embrace the Goſpell, not ſo much becauſe of the credibility of it, but becauſe it is not congruous to their naturall affections, as our Saviour tells the Jewes, *Light came*
Ioh. 3. *into the World, and men loved darkneſſe rather then light, becauſe their deeds are evill*: Is there any reaſon why their condemnation ſhould be any whit the eaſier for this? Neither have I ever read, or heard it taught by any, that men ſhall be damned for not believing *fide infuſâ*, which is as much as to ſay, becauſe God hath not regenerated them; but either becauſe they have refuſed to believe, or elſe if they have embraced the Goſpell, for not living anſwerable thereunto, which alſo is in their power, *quoad exteriorem vitæ emendationem*, though it be not in their power to regenerate their wills, and change their hearts, any more then it is to illuminate their minds: yet I never read that any mans damnation, was any whit the more encreaſed for not performing theſe acts. Thus farre I have been content to expatiate in the way of reaſonable diſcourſe, to meet with this Diſputer in his own element; though every ſober Chriſtian (I ſhould think) ſhould reſt ſatisfied with the word of God, which both teacheth us that *the naturall man perceiveth not the things of God, neither can he know them, becauſe they are ſpiritually diſcerned*, & that *all men are found dead in treſpaſſes and ſinnes*, before the ſpirit of regeneration comes, *that men cannot believe*, that they *cannot repent*, that *they that are in the fleſh cannot pleaſe God*; and that a man hardned cannot obey; and yet withall, that God doth command faith, repentance, and obedience, and complaines of default in performance. And if any man charge ſuch courſes as unjuſt, what is the Apoſtles courſe in meeting with ſuch imputations, but either to ſhew, that the word attributes ſuch a courſe to God, and therefore it cannot be unjuſt, as *Rom.* 9. 14. *What ſhall we ſay then, is there unrighteouſneſſe with God?* God forbid, for *he ſaith to Moſes, I will have compaſſion on him, on whom I will have compaſſion, and I will ſhew mercy on him, to whom I will ſhew mercy*: or to fly to the conſideration of the Lords dominion over all, as Creator over his creatures. I come to his ſecond reaſon.

2. And that is, *becauſe it is impoſſible that they ſhould believe, they want power to believe, and muſt want it ſtill. God hath decreed they ſhall have none to their dying day.* I anſwer: This argument is the very ſame with the former, not ſo much as differently dreſſt, or *crambe bis cocta*, and therefore my former anſwer will ſerve in every particular. Yet adde this alſo, this impoſſibility is only upon ſuppoſition of Gods Decree, which nothing hinders the liberty of the creature, in doing freely what he doth, and freely leaving undone what he doth not, as appears manifeſtly by divers inſtances. For upon ſuppoſition of
Iohn 19.33, 36. Gods decree, that not a bone of Chriſt ſhould be broken, it was impoſſible they ſhould be broken: yet who doubts, but that the Souldiers did as freely abſtaine from the breaking of Chriſts bones, as they did freely break the others bones? And the Text notes the reaſon why they brake not Chriſts bones, to wit, becauſe they ſaw he was dead already. In like ſort upon ſuppoſition of Gods decree, that *Joſiah* by name ſhould burne the Prophets bones upon the Altar: *Cyrus* by name ſhould build him a Citty, and let goe his captives; it was impoſſible that it ſhould be otherwiſe: yet I think

think no wiſe man doubts but that *Joſiah* did the one, and *Cyrus* the other, as freely as they did any thing in their lives. And therefore this Author doth miſerably overlaſh in the element of his Philoſophy, and rationall diſcourſe, in ſaying, *a man in juſtice can be tyed to believe no more, then a man can be bound to fly like a Bird, or to reach heaven with the top of his finger*. He might as well ſay, that becauſe God had determined that the Souldiers ſhould not breake Chriſts bones, therefore they had no more power to breake Chriſts bones, then they had power *to fly like a Bird, or to reach Heaven with the top of their finger*. Certainly there is no man but by grace may be enabled to believe: but never was any man known to affirme, that by grace a man may be enabled to fly like a Bird, or to reach Heaven with the top of his finger. If this be not miſerably to over-reach, I know not what is. As for his rule, *Nemo obligatur ad impoſſibile*, judge I pray of the truth of it by this; What if a man by a vitious converſation, hath made it as impoſſible for him to doe good, as it is impoſſible for a Blackemore to change his skinne, or a Leopard his ſpots; Shall he therefore be obliged no longer to doe good? And as by our own ſinnes committed by our perſons, ſo by the ſinne of *Adam*, which was the ſinne of our nature, upon the whole nature of man was this impotency brought, as the Scriptures teach, and none that I know were known in the dayes of *Auſtin*, to deny, but the *Plagians*. *Ier.* 13. 27.

I come to the Third.

3. Now this depends upon a notorious confuſion of things that differ. For I have ſhewed, how the Lord hath given them a ſufficient object of that faith, which he requires of them, as touching *Chriſts* dyeing for them; namily, to believe that Chriſt hath merited the pardon of ſinne, and ſalvation for as many as believe in him, in ſuch ſort, that if all, and every one throughout the World ſhould believe in him; they ſhould be ſaved by him. And this depends meerely upon the ſufficiency of Chriſts merits, and undoubtedly it was the will of God, that Chriſts merits ſhould be of ſuch a value, as was ſufficient for the ſalvation of all, and every one: otherwiſe it were not true, that if all and every one ſhould believe in Chriſt, they ſhould be ſaved by the vertue of Chriſt merits. But as for any obligation to believe that Chriſt died to procure faith and repentance for all and every one; I never yet heard or read of any Arminian, that he believed it. Nay in their *Apologia Remonſtrantium*, or *Cenſura Cenſuræ*, they plainly profeſſe, that Chriſt died not at all to merit faith, and regeneration for any. In like ſort it is not credible to me, that any Arminian believes, that Chriſt dyed for any ſo, as to procure pardon of ſinne and ſalvation abſolutely for him, whether he believe or no, provided that he live to be capable of faith and repentance, and to enjoy the Goſpell, and the Preaching of Chriſt crucified. And like as it is no lye, but truth, that Chriſt dyed to procure ſalvation, to as many as believe in him, ſo in being obliged to believe this, or puniſhed for not believing it, is neither to be obliged to the believing of a lye, nor puniſhed for not believing it. Therefore it is falſe to ſay there is no ſuch matter. For look in what ſenſe they are bound to believe that Chriſt died for them, in the ſame ſenſe it is moſt true, that Chriſt died for them; they are bound to believe that Chriſt dyed to procure ſalvation for every one that believeth: and it is moſt true, that in like manner, Chriſt hath procured the ſalvation of every one that believes: ſo that here is a truth to feed upon, and they that oppoſe it, are ſtrengthned in their vaine confidence by a meere miſt of confuſion, which they raiſe unto themſelves and others, that ſo they may ſet the better face upon that lye, which they hold in their right hand, wherewith they are ſo enamoured that they had rather forſake their own mercies, then forgoe it. And ſo I come to the third and laſt reaſon in generall drawn from Gods juſtice.

DISCOURSE.

SUBSECT. III.

THe third reaſon why abſolute Reprobation infringeth Gods juſtice is, becauſe it will have him to puniſh men for the omiſſion of an act, which is made impoſſible unto them by his own decree, not by that decree alone whereby he determined to give them no power to believe, having loſt it, but by that decree alſo, by which he purpoſeth that we ſhould partake with *Adam* in his ſinne, and be ſtripped of all that ſupernaturall power, which we had by Gods free grant, beſtowed upon us in Adam before the fall: Theſe are my reaſons which move me to think, that this abſolute decree is repugnant to Gods juſtice.

TWISSE

Conſideration.

I Have already ſhewed how Gods decree and impoſſibility ariſing upon ſuppoſition thereof, doth no way prejudice the liberty of the creature, as by pregnant paſſages of the Scripture is made plaine unto us. And as for the other decree here ſpoken of; Firſt it is untrue which he ſuppoſeth, that, God by a ſpeciall decree decreed all mankind to be made partakers of *Adams* ſinne, and therein to be ſtripped of all ſupernaturall power, which before the had by Gods free grant. For if it were juſt with God to decree, that *Adams* nature, upon his ſinning, ſhould be bereaved of all ſupernaturall power, which formerly he enjoyed, this and this alone ſhould ſuffice to bereave all his poſterity of ſupernaturall power to doe that which is good. For ſeeing all his poſterity did receive their natures from *Adam* after his fall, they muſt therewithall neceſſarily receive their natures from him, bereaved of all ſupernaturall power unto that which is good, untill ſuch time, as God be pleaſed of his free grace to reſtore it by regeneration. 2. Is it not good reaſon that God, for *Adams* ſinne, ſhould bereave us of all ſupernaturall power in *Adam*, as of his meere grace he did adorne us all with ſupernaturall power in *Adam*? 3. Notwithſtanding this depravation of ſupernaturall power in *Adam*, yet we acknowledge that nevertheleſſe, whatſoever ſinne a man commits, he committeth freely: and the Schoole hath taught it before us, *Aquin. p. 1. q. 23. art. 3. ad. 3. licet aliquis non poſſit gratiam adipiſci qui reprobatur a Deo, tamen quòd in hoc peccatum vel illud labatur, ex ejus libero arbitrio contingit, undè & merito ſibi imputatur in culpam.*

DISCOURSE.

SUBSECT. IV.

TWo things are uſually anſwered. Firſt, that there are many things delivered for truths in Scripture, (among which this is one) which are above the reach of humane capacity, and therefore are we quietly to ſubmit, as to other revealed truths, ſo to this, and not to be ſo bold as to examine the juſtice of this decree, or any thing elſe in it, by our ſhallow and erring underſtandings. But this anſwer takes not away the arguments, for I have theſe things to reply.

1. That though there be diverſe things revealed in Gods word, which are above reaſon, viz. That there are three Perſons and one God; and that Chriſt was borne of a Virgin; that the world was made of nothing, that the dead ſhall be raiſed, &c. to all which we muſt captivate our underſtandings, and yeeld a firme aſſent *propter authoritatem dicentis*: yet there is nothing revealed therein, abhorring from, and odious to ſound and right reaſon; for it cannot be, that the moſt excellent gifts of God, Faith and Reaſon, Nature and Scripture ſhould overthrow one another: and that the wiſe God, who is the fountain of all right reaſon, ſhould diſcover any thing to us in his word, or enjoyne us any thing to be believed, which is *vere* ἄλογον, truly and properly unreaſonable. Our faith is an act of our ſervice of God, and Gods ſervice is *cultus* λογικὸς, a reaſonable ſervice. *Rom.* 12. 2. and Gods word is alſo γάλα λογικὸν καὶ ἄδολον, milk reaſonable and without guile; they are ſo called, no doubt, to ſhew that there is a ſweet harmony between faith and reaſon, things revealed, and mens underſtandings: though there be a diſproportion, yet there is no contradiction between them.

2. That therefore all thoſe Doctrines which are adverſe and repugnant to underſtandings, purged from prejudice and falſe principles, are not to be taken for doctrines of Scripture, but devices of men corrupting Scripture by falſe gloſſes and interpretations, and conſequently, that this abſolute reprobation of ſo many millions of miſerable men, out of Gods only will and pleaſure, becauſe it is moſt irkeſome to the eares and underſtandings of all ſorts of men beſt and worſt, that ſtand indifferent to the entertainment of any truths, that may appeare to be ſo, is no doctrine of the Text, no part of the word of God.

3. That howbeit ſome things in Scripture, which are peculiar to the Goſpell, are above our underſtandings, and muſt without heſitation be believed, yet there are many things there, which have their foundation in nature, and may be apprehended by the light of nature, and demonſtrated by reaſon; and among theſe things the juſtice of Gods waies is one, as I have ſhewed before out of *Iſaiah* 5. 3. and *Ezek.* 18. and it is but a meer evaſion, when the abſolute decree is proved by ſound reaſons to be unjuſt, to ſay, reaſon is blind, and muſt not be judge, but the Scripture only: for God offers the juſtice of his waies to the tryall of reaſon.

TWISSE

Conſideration.

THis Author ſeems to ſwell, in the conceit of his rationall performances, as if never any fly ſitting upon a cart-wheele in a Sommers day had made ſuch a duſt as he had made. And faſhioning to himſelfe a victorious conqueſt, as if all his adverſaries were but Pigmies to this Anakim, glad to runne into corners, or into Acorn-cups to hide themſelves there. For his reaſons like ſome hobgoblins, doe ſo fright them, more then all the ſpirits that ſtand by the naked man in the book of Moones: And therefore all the help they have, if we believe this *Pygopolinices* is to charme them, by ſaying, that *many things are delivered in Scripture, which are above the reach of humane capacity, among which this is one, &c.* And I take this to be ſound. For otherwiſe, why ſhould the Doctrine of Godlineſſe, be called *a myſtery of Godlineſſe.* And the Schooles teach, that *Fides eſt aſſenſus inevidens*: and *Cajetan* who was no gras-hopper, 1 Tim. 3. 16.

as great an Anakim as this Author, or his familiar ſpirit takes himſelfe to be, ſpares not to profeſſe, that about the reconciling of Gods predeſtination with the liberty of mans will (a poynt that comes ſo neere to this in hand as a poynt can doe) there are many diſtinctions deviſed by the learned, but yet he ſaith of them, that they did not *quietare intellectum*, and therefore that he did *captivare ſuum in obſequium fidei*: and *Alvarez*, no dwarfe neither in Scholaſticall, that is, rationall Divinity, addeth that herein *Cajetan piiſſimè & doctiſſimè loquitur*. But who they are, that have taken notice, of thoſe arguments here ſpecified, and at the ſight of them were ſo ſton'd, as at the ſight of ſome *Meduſas* head, and thereupon came to this courſe of incantation or pacification, he doth very wiſely conceale, and like a man of authority, puts it upon us to take it upon his word. Yet I doe not remember that I have reſted my ſelfe upon any ſuch courſe, though the holy Apoſtle thinks it ſufficient to cleare any courſe of God from injuſtice, by proving that Scripture doth attribute ſuch a courſe unto God, as I have ſhewed out of *Rom.*9.14. It is true, the ſpirit which this Author breaths, is the right Pelagian ſpirit, according to the Pelagians in *Bradwardines* daies: for their vaunt was, that they could not be refuted by any reaſon Philoſophicall, but only by certain naked authorities Theologicall, (as I have heard of a Schollar, ſometimes challenged by a friend and kinſman of his, for being given (as he heard) to the Arminian Tenet, made a ready anſwer with proteſtation, that that opinion was very plauſible, but that S^t *Paul* was againſt it.) And therefore *Bradwardine* undertakes to confute them by reaſon Philoſophicall; ſo farre off was he from being cowed with their vain boaſts and braggs. His words are theſe; *Sicut antiqui Pelagiani ventoſo nomine ſecularium ſcientiarum inflati conſiſtorium Theologicum contemnentes Philoſophicum flagitabant; ita & moderni. Audivi namq; quoſdam advocatos Pelagii, licet multum provectos in ſacris apicibus; affirmantes Pelagium nuſquam potuiſſe convinci per naturalem & Philoſophicam rationem; ſed vix arguebatur utcunq;, per quaſdam authoritates Theologicas, maxime autem per authoritatem Eccleſiæ, quæ Satrapis non placebat: Quapropter per rationes & authoritates Philoſophicas ipſos diſpoſui reformare.* And for my part, though I affect not in thoſe poynts, to goe beyond Scripture and Chriſtian reaſon, yet I am content to be led whetherſoever my adverſary thinks good to lead me: And as a Schollar of my acquaintance being left handed, and accordingly caſting his cloake over the right ſhoulder, was anſwered by a Cittizen obſerving it, when he enquired his way, ſaying, when you ſhall come to ſuch a place, you muſt turne on your right hand, meaning indeed, on the left; ſo likewiſe I am nothing afraid of this mans Philoſophy, nor his Abettors neither, nothing doubting, but as many as I find oppoſing this divine truth, which we maintain, their beſt dexterity, in Philoſophicall and rationall diſcourſe, will prove but a left handed Philoſophy: and in this very field of argumentation, I purpoſe to lay upon him ere we part. But let us firſt conſider the things that he replies.

1. He ſaith, *There is nothing in Scripture abhorring from ſound and right reaſon*, he addes, *Odious too*: as if his Philoſophy had taught him, that it is the part of reaſon to hate, and not rather of affections. This rule when we were initiates in the Univerſity, we were ſoon acquainted with: Yet this Author to vent his fulneſſe, caſts himſelfe upon an unneceſſary proofe thereof, and the miſchiefe is, that his proofe maketh his cauſe worſe then it was before. For having formerly made the compariſon between the word of God, and ſound and right reaſon; in his reaſon he ſtates the compariſon between faith and reaſon, nature and Scripture, not diſtinguiſhing between nature corrupt, and uncorrupt, reaſon corrupt and uncorrupt. Our ſervice of God is reaſonable, in as much as it is performed by reaſonable creatures, and the rule thereof is not naturall reaſon, but meerely the word of God. In whom was naturall reaſon more eminent, then in Philoſophers? Yet were they wont to be called *Hæreticorum Patriarchæ*: and the Apoſtle hath profeſſe of all ſuch, that the things of God ſeem fooliſhneſſe unto them, 1 *Cor.* 2. 14. Now I pray conſider ſoberly, how reaſonable ſuch courſes are judged to be, which are accounted fooliſhneſſe, and *what a ſweet harmony there is between things revealed, and mens underſtandings*; and whether *reaſonable*, and *fooliſh*, be not a plain contradiction; as well as *wiſe*, and *fooliſh*. If we enjoy a more pure and refined reaſon then they, let us give illumination Divine the glory of it: and ſay with him in *Job*, *verily there is a ſpirit in man, but the illumination of the Almighty giveth underſtanding*. And ſeeing the word of God, is the only means of Divine illumination, let us thank Gods word for all. I come to the ſecond Materiall of his reply.

Rom. 12. 1.

Iob. 32. 8.

2. And that is this, that *all thoſe Doctrine which are adverſe and repugnant to underſtandings*

dings purged from prejudice and falſe principles, are not to be taken for Doctrines of Scripture, but devices of men, corrupting Scripture by falſe gloſſes and interpretations. No marvaile that when men oppoſe the miſteries of Godlineſſe, they fall upon the myſteries of iniquity. Here we have a rule given to try whether a Doctrine propoſed, be to be taken for a Doctrine of Scripture yea or no? And mark it well, I beſeech you, and I deſire that every ſober man will mark it well, and judge whether it deſerve not to be numbred amongſt the βάθη Σατανᾶ, the depths of Satan: And withall judge whether the pretended Author of this diſcourſe, can in any probability be the Author of this, and whether it becomes not rather ſome old beaten Souldier in Arminianiſme, that takes upon him to be the Maſter and Dictator of Sentences. About *Regula fidei*, the rule of Faith, there is much queſtion between us and Papiſts; the meaning whereof is, what that is whereinto muſt be made the laſt reſolution of our Faith? We ſay it is the word of God contained in the Books of the Old Teſtament and the New; Papiſts ſay, it is the voyce of the Church. This Author deviſeth a new way, which I think was never heard off before, except among the Socinians, namely, that it is *the judgement of underſtandings purged from prejudice and falſe Principles.* For albeit the Doctrine of Faith, we judge to be contained no where, but in Gods word, yet notwithſtanding as touching the meaning of it, nothing muſt be taken to be the true meaning of Scripture, how fairely ſoever grounded thereupon in ſhew, unleſſe withall it ſeem nothing repugnant to *underſtandings purged from prejudice and falſe principles.* Into this therefore muſt be made the laſt reſolution of our faith.

Again, where ſhall we meet with theſe judges as they are here deſcribed, to wit, as *having their underſtandings purged from prejudice and falſe principles*: undoubtedly, like as the Church of Rome, when they have once brought the matter hitherto, that the laſt reſolution of faith, muſt be made into the voyce of the Church, are confident enough, that when the queſtion is made of the voyce of the Church, where that is to be found, they ſhall undoubtedly be able to carry it for the Church of Rome: So theſe Arminians, or Socinians rather, when they have once brought the matter to this paſſe, that the laſt reſolution of our faith muſt be made into the judgement of mens *underſtandings purged from prejudice and falſe principles*; and that the queſtion beginneth to be made of underſtandings thus purified, where they are to be found, they will be ſo favourable to themſelves, as to conceive, that ſuch underſtandings are to be found no where, but amongſt the nation of the Arminians; or at leaſt among ſuch, whoſe judgements are naturally inclined towards their Tenets. But is this a decent courſe to reſt in the judgement of any mans underſtanding, whereas the ſoundnes of his underſtanding is not, nor cannot be diſcerned, but by the ſtrength of his argument: and again, conſidering the judgement of man is miſerably corrupted in ſuch ſort, as that *the things of God ſeem fooliſhneſſe unto them*, Is it not much fitter that we ſhould judge of every mans underſtanding by Gods word, which cannot erre, rather then judge of the meaning of the word by the underſtanding of man? Let any man uſe his underſtanding in opening and interpreting the word of God unto us, and clearing the meaning thereof unto us as much as he can, by reaſon, by argument, by demonſtration, but ſtill let it be indifferent for any to judge, in what congruity his interpretation ſtands with the Text it ſelfe, and no mans judgement to be a rule of Faith unto others.

Before he goes off from this, he gives another deſcription of thoſe, whoſe judgements muſt be the rule of the right interpretation of Scripture; to wit, ſuch as *ſtand indifferent to the entertainment of any truths.* Now this ſeems to me to be as poore as the former, or rather much poorer. For this indifferency as I take it, is in reſpect of affections; now albeit a man may be thus diſpoſed, in reſpect of his affections, yet he may be of a very weak judgement; as for example, I have heard of a good man, that was ſometimes wavering about the poynt of Ceremonies, yet very willing to receive information; and therefore conferres with both ſides, as well ſuch as held them lawfull in the uſe, as with thoſe that held them unlawfull, and ſtill was carried every way with the force of their reaſons, who conferred with him for the preſent. Then again, ſuppoſe the indifferent were moſt fit to judge, where ſhall we find thoſe indifferent perſons, or who ſhall give rules, and what rules, according whereto to proceed in this our inquiſition? Again, who are to be preſuppoſed in likelihood, to be the more indifferent, then ſuch as have not hitherto been verſed in theſe controverſies, and is it fit, that they who have been many years verſed in them, ſhould ſtand to the judge-

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ment of thoſe who are little or nothing exerciſed therein? Laſtly is the creature fit to judge of the Soveraignty of his creator, or being conceived of the freedome of his own will, to judge how farre it is reaſonable, God ſhould have power over his will and no farther? When the Apoſtle calls upon the Corinthians, to judge whether that which he wrote unto them, were the commandements of God or no, whom doth he call unto this office? Doth he call any other but ſuch as are ſpirituall? *If there be any amongſt you that is a Prophet, or ſpirituall, let him know that theſe things are the commandements of God.* 1 *Cor.* 14. He doth not ſay, if there be any amongſt you, that hath his underſtanding purged from prejudice, and falſe principles, let him know that theſe things which I write unto you, are the commandements of God. And the ſame Apoſtle tells us, that the *things of God are ſpiritually to be diſcerned.* 1 *Cor.*2.14.

Yet it is remarkable, that he appeals to the judgement not of the beſt only, but the worſt alſo in this: but ſomething qualified I confeſſe, to wit, provided that they *ſtand indifferent to the entertainment of any truths.* Marke it well, *of any truths*: and who are theſe? Not poſſeſſed with the entertainment of any Truths, but indifferent to the entertainment of them, I ſay who are theſe? The regenerate or unregenerate? Here I am at a ſtand, not knowing which way to take. But it may be this is ſpoken only in reference to our Doctrine of abſolute Reprobation. But of whatſoever it be ſpoken, let him give inſtance in either or in both; it ſeems he is indifferent to have it take place either way, for he propoſed it of beſt and worſt. But why ſhould he preſuppoſe an unregenerate man to be indifferent, to the entertainment of any truth? Whereas the Apoſtle profeſſeth of a naturall man, that he cannot know the things of God, and he gives the reaſon of it, becauſe *they are ſpiritually diſcerned*; and formerly ſaid that they were *fooliſhneſſe unto him.* Yet I willingly confeſſe, the Doctrine of abſolute Reprobation, is very harſh to the judgement and affections of carnall men; and ſuch as we had never embraced, had it not been for the word of God, which plainly profeſſeth, that
Rom.9.11. *election is not of* (good) *works*; and that by ſuch an argument, as whereby it is manifeſt, 1. That election is as well proved not to be of faith, as not of works. 2. That reprobation is not of evill works; yet the harſhneſſe hereof, is nothing like ſo much appearing in its proper colours, as upon their deciphering and blazing of it, who are as zealous for making election to be upon foreſight of faith and works (though this latter member, they are loath to have the World take notice of) as they are oppoſite to the abſoluteneſſe of reprobation. Now whereas before I have ſhewed, that there is a great deale of difference between abſolute election unto ſalvation, and election unto ſalvation abſolute: And that not one of our Divines doth maintain, that God doth elect men unto ſalvation abſolute, but to obtain ſalvation upon their faith and repentance, and finall perſeverance therein: In like ſort there is as great difference between abſolute reprobation unto damnation, and reprobation unto damnation abſolute. And if none of our Divines doe maintain, that God ordains any man of ripe years to obtain ſalvation, otherwiſe then upon their faith and repentance, and finall perſeverance: how much leſſe doe they maintain, that God ordains any man unto damnation, otherwiſe then for his ſinne and finall perſeverance therein without repentance? Whereas theſe enemies of the grace of God, as Saint *Auſtin* ſometimes called the *Pelagians*, to make their cauſe more plauſible to the affections of carnall men carry the matter ſo, as if we maintained that God ordained them to be damned abſolutely, and for the meer pleaſure of God, concealing the only cauſe for which God ordained, that they ſhould be damned, namely, for the wilfull tranſgreſſion of Gods holy Commandements. Only the giving and denying of the grace of regeneration, the giving of faith and repentance, for the curing of that naturall infidelity and impenitency that is found in all; and the leaving it uncured by denying faith and repentance: this indeed we maintain to be abſolute, according to that of Saint *Paul*, he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth. *Rom.*9.18. Now, dare any of them deny faith and repentance to be the gift of God? They doe not, they dare not; only of late they have come thus farre, as to deny that Chriſt merited faith and regeneration for any. Secondly, inquire whether God gives faith and repentance to ſome, and denyes it to others of his meere will and pleaſure, or becauſe he finds ſome good works in the one, which he finds not in the other. Here is the critical poynt, we defend no other abſoluteneſſe of election and reprobation, but ſuch as depends wholly on this, namely, that God finding men equall in corruption, hath compaſſion on ſome, giving them faith and repentance, which he denies unto others:

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All other abſoluteneſſe of Election and Reprobation, beſides that which we undertake by cleare demonſtration to deduce herehence, we utterly renounce. Neither can our adverſaries be ſo groſſely ignorant, as not to perceive that this is the criticall poynt of theſe controverſies, the reſolution of the truths wherein, will ſet an end to all contention about Election and Reprobation. Why then doe they not deale plainly, and try their ſtrength in this, whereby they ſhould carry themſelves fairely and ingenuouſly, and deale above board. For here alone is that abſoluteneſſe of God in execution, which we maintaine; but here they are not ſo prone to ſhew their hornes: this argument is not ſo fit for the raiſing of clamours and Tragedies. And hating the truth of God as touching his ſoveraignty over his creatures, to have compaſſion on whom he will, and to harden whom he will; as alſo the prerogatives of his grace, to work us effectually to that which is pleaſing in his ſight, and that in whom he will alſo: yet not daring plainly to deliver their mind in this, as wherein they are found moſt abſurd, and encumbred with ſhamefull contradictions; therefore by the back dore as it were, they hope to diſcredit it, and by oppoſing the abſoluteneſſe of Reprobation, to ſupplant and undermine the Doctrine of Gods free grace. And not content with this, they miſerably corrupt our doctrine alſo, in the poynt of abſolute Reprobation, drawing it to this; as if not reprobation only, but damnation alſo were made abſolute by us: and that God damned men not ſo much in the way of juſtice for their ſinne, as of his own meere pleaſure. At length to come to the third particular of his reply.

3. And that is this, *that howbeit ſome things in Scripture, which are peculiar to the Goſpell, are above our underſtandings, and muſt without heſitation be believed: yet many things there, have their foundation in nature, and may be apprehended by the light of nature; and amongſt theſe, the juſtice of Gods waies is one, as hath been ſhewed. Iſai* 5.3. and *Ezek.* 18. To this I anſwer, That the wáies of God mentioned *Iſai.* 5.3. is only in his expecting fruits after ſo great pains that he had taken, in husbanding his vineyard. And *Ezek.* 18. conſiſts only in rendring unto men according to their waies. Neither doth it follow, that becauſe the juſtice of God doth plainly appeare in theſe particulars, therefore it doth appeare as cleerely, or comprehenſively in all others. Is there no difference between the waies of God there mentioned, and the waies of Gods juſtice mentioned in other place; as namely, in cauſing the Sonnes of *Achan* to be ſtoned to death with *Achan* himſelfe, for his Sacriledge: in drowning the old World, not ſparing the very Infants and ſucklings: and for their conſpiracy againſt *Moſes* and *Aaron*, cauſing the earth to ſwallow up not *Dathan* and *Abiram* only, but their Wives and Children, and all that they had? So in conſuming *Sodom* and *Gomorrah* with fire. And as for the puniſhing of of ſinne, this is no peculiar truth of the Goſpell. I had thought the Goſpell, in the proper nature thereof, had been above reaſon altogether, and no way capable of demonſtration. And as for the juſtice of God, muſt not this ſuppoſe him to be a free agent? Or was this known to *Ariſtotle* by all the light of nature whereunto he attained? We that believe him to be a free agent, and withall the creator of all, are ready to demonſtrate, that it is in his power to doe what he will with his creature, and that not only to annihilate him, though never ſo holy, but to inflict what paine ſoever upon him, yea even the torment of hell fire; which *Medina* acknowledgeth to have been *Communem omnium Theologorum ſententiam, viz.* that this he can doe, *ut Dominus vitæ & mortis*; as I have ſhewed in my *Vindiciæ gratiæ Dei*, and by variety of arguments proved it, more then once in two ſeverall digreſſions, which this Author pretends to have ſeen, yet anſwereth not one of them. And as for juſtice divine toward the creature (whereupon this Author doth with ſuch confidence diſcourſe,) both *Vaſquez* and *Suarez* Jeſuits, in other poynts concerning Gods juſtice, are miſerably at odds, yet joyntly concurre in this, that all juſtice Divine, doth preſuppoſe the free determination of Gods will: Now, becauſe I find this Gentleman, ſo conceited of the purity of his rationall faculty, and the power thereof, as to require that all interpretation of Scripture, ſhould veyle bonnet to the ſoveraignty thereof; I purpoſe to try his ability this way, for the expediting of certain arguments about the abſoluteneſſe of Gods decrees in generall, and particularly of the decree of Reprobation. Therefore to combate with him on his own ground, and in his own element, I diſpute thus.

1. No temporall thing can be the cauſe of that which is eternall, but the ſinnes of men are all temporall, whereas Reprobation is eternall, therefore the ſinnes of men cannot be the cauſe of Reprobation.

If it be ſaid, that ſinne is not made the cauſe of reprobation, but as it exiſts in Gods foreſight, and ſo not ſo much ſinne as the preſcience of ſinne is the cauſe of reprobation. I reply, that this device cannot ſtand, *viz.* that the preſcience of ſinne ſhould be the cauſe of reprobation, and that for this reaſon; The cauſe of reprobation whereof we enquire, is of the nature of a meritorious cauſe, But the preſcience of God can no way be ſaid to be a meritorious cauſe thereof. Science and preſcience are cauſes of Gods works in the kind of an efficient Phyſicall, not in the kind of an efficient morall, ſuch as are all cauſes meritorious.

If it be farther ſaid, that not ſo much the foreſight of ſin, as (to ſpeak more properly) ſinne foreſeen is the cauſe of reprobation: I reply againſt it in this manner; ſinne foreſeen doth ſuppoſe *Gods* decree to permit ſinne, and conſequently if ſinne foreſeene be before reprobation, then alſo the decree of permitting ſinne is before the decree of reprobation, that is, the decree of damning for ſinne. But this cannot be, as I endeavour to prove by two reaſons. The firſt is this; There is no order in intentions, but between the intention of the end and the intention of the means, and the order is this, that the intention of the end is before the intention of the means. Therefore if the decree of permitting ſinne be before the decree of damning for ſinne, the decree of permitting ſinne muſt be the intention of the end, and the decree of damning for ſinne muſt be the intention of the meanes. But this is notoriouſly untrue: For it is apparent that damnation tends not to the permiſſion of ſinne, as the end thereof; for if it did then men were damned to this end, that they might be permitted to ſinne. But far more likely it is, that ſinne ſhould be permitted to this end, that a man might be damned, which yet by no means doe I avouch; other reaſons I have, to ſhew the vanity of this argumentation. I rather profeſſe, that permiſſion of ſinne and damnation are not ſubordinate as end & means, but coordinate, both being means tending joyntly to a farther end, which, under correction from underſtandings purged from prejudice and falſe principles, I take to be the manifeſtation of Gods glory in the way of juſtice vindicative.

2. My ſecond reaſon is, if permiſſion of ſinne be firſt in intention and then damnation, it followes that permiſſion of ſinne ſhould be laſt in execution; but this is moſt abſurd, namely, that a man ſhould be firſt damned, and then ſuffered to ſinne.

2. My ſecond principall argument is this; Reprobation, as it ſignifies Gods decree, is the act of Gods will; now the act of Gods will is the very will of God, and the will of God is Gods eſſence, and like as there can be no cauſe of Gods eſſence, ſo there can be no cauſe of Gods will, or of the act thereof. Upon ſome ſuch arguments as theſe, *Aquinas* diſputes, that the predeſtination of Chriſt, cannot be the cauſe of our predeſtination; adding that they are one act in God. And when he comes to the reſolution of the queſtion, he grants all as touching *actum volentis*, that the one cannot be the cauſe of the other; But only *quoad prædeſtinationis terminum*, which is grace and glory, or the things predeſtinated. Chriſt is the cauſe of them, but not of our predeſtination, as touching the act of God predeſtinating. And I think I may be bold to preſume, that Chriſts merits are of as great force to be the cauſe, why God ſhould elect man unto ſalvation; as mans ſinnes are of force, to be the cauſe why God ſhould reprobate him unto damnation. The ſame *Aquinas* (a tall fellow as touching Scolaſticall argumentation) hath profeſſed that *no man hath been ſo mad as to ſay that merits are the cauſe of predeſtination, quoad actum prædeſtinantis*; and why, but becauſe there can be no cauſe on mans part of the will of God *quoad actum volentis*. Now reprobation is well knowne to be the will of God as well as election; and therefore no cauſe can there be on mans part thereof, *quoad actum reprobantis*. And it is well knowne, there is a predeſtination unto death, as well as unto life, and conſequently tis as mad a thing in his judgement to maintaine, that merits are the cauſe there of *quoad actum prædeſtinantis*

God by efficacious grace could breake off any mans infidelity if it pleaſed him, that is, by affording him ſuch a motion unto faith, as he foreſaw would be yeelded unto: this is eaſily proved by the evident confeſſion of *Arminius* formerly ſpecified. Now, Why doth *God* ſo order it, as to move ſome in ſuch a manner, as he foreſees they will believe; others in ſuch a māner as he foreſees they will not believe? but becauſe his purpoſe is to manifeſt the glory of his grace in the ſalvation of the one, and the glory of his juſtice in the damnation of the other. Herein I appeale to the judgement and

conſcience

conſcience of every reaſonable creature that underſtands it, in ſpight of all prejudice and falſe principles to corrupt him.

4. In ſaying ſinne foreſeen is the cauſe of Gods decree of damnation, they preſuppoſe a preſcience of ſinne, as of a thing future, without all ground. For nothing can be foreknown as future, unleſſe it be future: now theſe diſputers preſuppoſe a futurition of ſinne, and that from eternity, without all ground. For conſider, no ſinne is future in its own nature, for in its own nature it is meerely poſſible and indifferent, as well not to be future, as to become future; and therefore it cannot paſſe out of the condition of a thing meerely poſſible, into the condition of a thing future without a cauſe. Now what cauſe doe theſe men deviſe of the futurition of ſinne? *Extra Deum*, nothing can be the cauſe thereof: For this paſſage of things out of the condition of things poſſible, into the condition of things future, was from everlaſting, for from everlaſting they were future; otherwiſe, God could not have known them from everlaſting, And conſequently the cauſe of this paſſage, muſt be acknowledged to have been from everlaſting, and conſequently nothing without God could be the cauſe of it, ſeeing nothing without God was from everlaſting. Therefore the cauſe hereof muſt be found *intra Deum*, within God; then either the will of God, which theſe men doe utterly diſclaime, or the knowledge of God; but that is confeſſed to preſuppoſe things future, rather then to make them ſo; or the eſſence of God; now that may be conſidered either as working neceſſarily, (and if in that manner it were the cauſe of things future, then all ſuch things ſhould become future by neceſſity of nature, which to ſay is Atheiſticall) or as working freely; and this is to grant, that the will of God is the cauſe why every thing meerely poſſible in its own nature doth paſſe from everlaſting into the condition of a thing future, if ſo be it were future at all. And indeed ſeeing no other cauſe can be pitched upon, this free will of God muſt be acknowledged to be the cauſe of it: And conſequently the reaſon why every thing becomes future is, becauſe God hath determined it ſhall come to paſſe; but with this difference, All good things God hath determined ſhall come to paſſe by his effection, All evill things God hath determined ſhall come to paſſe by his permiſſion. And the Scripture naturally affords plentifull teſtimony to confirme this, without forcing it to interpretations congruous hereunto, upon preſumptuous grounds that theſe arguments proceed from underſtandings purged from prejudice and falſe principles.

5. My fifth argument is this. If ſinne be the cauſe of Reprobation, that is, of the decree of damnation, then either by neceſſity of nature, or by the conſtitution of God; not by neceſſity of nature, as all, that hitherto I have known confeſſe. But I ſay neither can it be by the free conſtitution of God; for mark what a notorious abſurdity followeth hence, and that unavoidably, namely, *that God did ordaine, that upon foreſight of ſinne, he would ordaine them to damnation*; marke it well, *God did ordaine that he would ordaine, or God did decree that he would decree*. In which words Gods eternall decree is made the object of Gods decree. Whereas it is well known that the objects of Gods decrees are meerely things temporall, and cannot be things eternall: we truly ſay God did decree to create the World, to preſerve the World, to redeeme us, call us, juſtify us, ſanctify and ſave us, but it cannot be truly ſaid, that God did decree to decree, or ordaine to ordaine: for to decree is the act of Gods will, and therefore it cannot be the object of the act of Gods will. Yet theſe arguments I am not ſo enamoured with, as to force the interpretations of Scripture to ſuch a ſenſe, as is ſutable hereunto, preſuming of the purity of my underſtanding, as purged from prejudice and falſe principles. I could willingly content my ſelfe with obſervation of the Apoſtles diſcourſe, in arguing to this effect; *Before the Children were borne, or had done good or evill, it was ſaid the elder ſhall ſerve the younger: therefore the purpoſe of God according to election ſtands not of works*. In like manner may I diſcourſe: *Before the Children were borne or had done good or evill, it was ſaid the elder ſhall ſerve the younger: therefore the purpoſe of God concerning Reprobation ſtands not of works*. And like as hence it is inferred, that therefore election ſtands not of good works; ſo therehence may I inferre, that therefore reprobation ſtands not of evill works. Rom. 9. 11.

6. If ſinne foreſeen be the cauſe meritorious of reprobation, then faith and repentance and good workes are the diſpoſing cauſes unto election. For there-

fore evill works foreſeen are made the meritorious cauſe of reprobation, becauſe evill works exſiſtent, are the meritorious cauſe of damnation. And if this be true, then alſo becauſe Faith and Repentance and good workes, are the diſpoſing cauſes unto ſalvation, then by the ſame force of reaſon, faith, repentance, and good workes foreſeen, muſt be the diſpoſing cauſe unto election; But faith, repentance, and good workes foreſeen, are not the diſpoſing cauſes unto election; as I prove thus.

1. If they were then the purpoſe of God according to election, ſhould be of faith, repentance, and good works, which is expreſſely denyed by the Apoſtle, as touching the laſt part; and may as evidently be proved *to be denied by him* in effect of the other parts alſo, by the ſame force of argumentation which he uſeth: as for example, from this anticedent of the Apoſtles, *before the Children were borne, or had done good or evill*, it no more evidently followeth that therefore the purpoſe of God according to election is not of workes, than it followeth that the ſame purpoſe of God according to election is not of faith, nor of repentance: For before they were borne they were no more capable of faith; or of repentance, than of any other good works. And undoubtedly faith and repentance are as good works, as any other.

2. If God doth abſolutely work faith in ſome, and not in others according to the meer pleaſure of his will, then it cannot be ſaid, that faith foreſeen, is the cauſe of any mans election. For in this caſe faith is rather the means of ſalvation, then ſalvation a means of faith; and conſequently, the intention of ſalvation rather precedes the intention of faith, than the intention of faith can be ſaid to precede the intention of ſalvation. And to this the Scripture accords, *Acts* 13 48. *As many believed as were ordained to everlaſting life*, making ordination to everlaſting life the cauſe why men believed; anſwerable hereunto is that *Acts* 2. laſt. *God added daily to the Church ſuch as ſhould be ſaved*: and that of *Paul* to *Titus*, *according to the faith of Gods elect*: So that according to *Pauls* phraſe *fides eſt electorum*, but according to the Arminians Doctrine the inverſe hereof is a more proper and naturall predication, as to ſay, *electio eſt fidelium*.

But God doth abſolutely work faith in ſome men, according to the meer pleaſure of his will, denying the ſame grace to others: which I prove;

1. By Scripture. *Rom.* 9.18. *God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth*, compared with *Rom.* 11.30. *Yee in times paſt have not believed, but now have obtained mercy*; where it appears by the Antitheſis, that to find mercy is to believe, that is, to obtain the grace of faith at the hands of God, in Saint *Pauls* phraſe.

2. By cleare reaſon: for if it be not the meer pleaſure of Gods will, that is the cauſe hereof, then the cauſe hereof muſt be ſome good workes, which he finds in ſome, and not in others; whence it manifeſtly followeth, that God giveth grace according unto works, which in the phraſe of the ancients is according to merits: and for 1200 years together, this hath been reputed in the Church of God meere Pelagianiſme.

2. I further demand, what that good worke is, whereupon God workes it in one, when he refuſeth to worke it in another? Here the anſwer I find given is this, that God doth work in man τὸ *velle credere modo velit*. Now of the abſurdity hereof, I appeale to the very light of nature, and let all the books that ever were written on this argument be ſearched, and let it be enquired, whether ever any did expreſſe themſelves in the manner of ſo palpable and groſſe abſurdity: as wherein the act of willing is made the condition of it ſelfe: whence it followeth evidently, that it muſt be both before it ſelfe, and after it ſelfe; for the condition muſt allwaies exſiſt before the thing conditionated. Yet they are driven upon theſe rocks of abſurdities in ſpight of their teeth: ſo ſhamefull is the iſſue of their diſcourſes, who, in hatred of Gods truth revealed in Gods word, and in a proud conceit of their own performances in the way of argumentation, dare preſcribe rules to all others, how to carry themſelves in the interpretation of Scriptures; as namely, to be ſo warie, as that they doe not deliver any thing, *repugnant to underſtandings purged from prejudice and falſe principles*: as if the word of God ſuppoſed them that are admitted to the ſtudying thereof, to have their underſtandings already purged from prejudice and falſe principles: not that it is given by God for this very end, namely, to purge

purge our underſtandings: for what is the illumination or opening of the eyes of the mind, other than the purging of the underſtanding from prejudice and falſe principles: and how miſerable theſe aeriall diſputers doe betray themſelves, and manifeſt how they are tranſported with prejudice, and corrupted not with falſe only, but groſſe principles, by this it may appeare in part.

I come to the conſideration of his reply to the ſecond anſwer, which here he repreſents.

DISCOURSE.

SUBSECT. V.

SEcondly it is anſwered, that God is not bound to reſtore men power to believe, becauſe they once had it, and have loſt it through their own fault; as a Maſter is not bound to renew his Servants ſtock, if he have waſted it by his bad husbandry.

But this anſwer doth yet ſatisfy me as little as the former: for I grant that God is ſimply and abſolutely bound to no man, he is *agens liberrimum*, a moſt free diſpenſer of his own favours, both what he will, and to whom he will; but yet he is conditionally; *determinavit ſeipſum*, he hath bound himſelfe to give ſupernaturall abilities to men by three things.

1. Firſt *Decernendo*, the Almighty is eternally ſubject to his own decree, or elſe he would be mutable; and therefore what gifts ſoever he hath decreed to men, he is bound to give them by vertue of his decree.

2. Secondly *Promittendo*. We uſe to ſay promiſe is debt, it is juſtice to performe what it was free to promiſe; and whoſoever he be that promiſeth, and payeth not, is guilty of a treſpaſſe (witneſſe *Ananias* and *Saphira*) and unworthy of the Kingdome of Heaven. *Pſal.* 15.4. If therefore God hath made a promiſe of any gift or grace to men, this promiſe binds him to performance.

3. Thirdly *Legem ferendo*. By giving men a Law to keepe, which without ſupernaturall power, they cannot keep any more than they can eat a rock. By ſuch a Law the Almighty lawgiver binds himſelfe to his creatures, to give them ſuch power as may enable them to keep that law; or elſe he becomes the true and proper cauſe of the tranſgreſſion of it. We ſhall find God evermore giving ſtrength, when he giveth a command: when he commanded the creatures to encreaſe and multiply, he gave them a multiplying vertue. when Chriſt bid the lame man ariſe, take up his bed, and walke, he puts into his limbs an ability of walking: when *Adam* had a ſpirituall law given him to obey, which without ſpirituall ſtrength he could not, God gave him ſtrength anſwerable to the law, as all Divines agree, conſenting to that noted ſpeech of *Auſtin*, that *Adam* had *poſſe non cadere*, though he never had *non poſſe cadere*; a power and poſſibility, though not a neceſſity of continuing in obedience. That I may bring this home to my purpoſe. I ſay that God is bound to reſtore unto men, power to believe, ſuppoſing theſe waies that follow.

1. That he hath vouchſafed to enter into a New Covenant of Peace with men, when he needed not. 2. That in that Covenant he requireth obedience at mens hands, even at theirs that periſh. 3. That he promiſeth eternall life to every man, if he obey and keep the Covenant. 4. That he puniſheth the diſobedient with everlaſting death. Theſe particulars ſuppoſed, the moſt free God who is neceſſarily bound to none, is engaged to give ability of believing to men; nor can he juſtly without this gift, puniſh the diſobedient any more, then a Magiſtrate having put out a mans eyes for an offence, can command this man with juſtice to read a book, and becauſe he reads not, put him to death: Or then a Maſter (that I may returne the Simile in the anſwer) when he hath taken away from his Servant the ſtock, which he hath miſimployed, can afterward exact of him a juſt imployment of the ſame ſtock, and puniſh him becauſe he imployeth it not. I conclude therefore, that the abſolute and inevitable reprobation of ſuch men as are called to believe in Chriſt, and puniſhed if they believe not, is utterly repugnant to the juſtice of God, and therefore cannot be a part of his word.

TWISSE.

Conſideration.

THis Second anſwer is in like manner, delivered at pleaſure, without quoting the Author of it: And no marvaile if this Author deſires to have the making of his own bed, that he may lye the more ſoftly. Yet touching the ſimilitude here mentioned let it be ſtated aright: a Maſter truſts his ſervant with a ſtock, not to receive it from him againe, though the ſtock be of a moveable nature, but to receive from him in lieu thereof, ſome yearely emolument. In this caſe let him ſay what he can againſt it: now here his diſcourſe is for the moſt part at large, ſhewing how *God*, though a moſt free agent, may oblige himſelfe to his creature.

1. *Decremendo*; whether hereby *God* doth bind himſelfe to his creature (which hath no being at all when *Gods* decrees are made) or to himſelfe rather, it is little or nothing materiall to the preſent: what ſoever it be that God decrees, we are ſure that muſt come to paſſe, provided that we doe not make his decrees of a revocable nature with ſome; but as touching any uſe of Gods obliging himſelfe this way unto his creature, this Author is content to ſay nothing at all, in the accomodation.

2. *Promittendo.* And we willingly grant, that what God promiſeth he never failes to performe, after that manner as he hath promiſed: as namely in caſe he hath promiſed that as many as believe in Chriſt ſhall be ſaved, we nothing doubt, but if all the world ſhould believe in Chriſt, all the world ſhould be ſaved. But whether any deviſe a promiſe concerning the giving of faith & repentance unto all, & every one; and that whether conditionately or abſolutely this Author is content to ſay juſt nothing. As likewiſe, neither doth he take upon him to plead any promiſe of God, to give to all and every one power to believe or power to repent.

3. *Legem ferendo.* This alone of all the three ſerves his turne, and therefore here he doth expatiate, much more than in the former. And herehence he inferres, that God binds himſelfe to give ſupernaturall power, to keep the Law he commands, provided the Law be ſuch, as without ſupernaturall power, he can no more keepe it, than eat a rock. Now this accommodated to *Adam*, had need of explication, ſeeing we read of no other Law given unto him, than of abſtaining from a certain fruit: which I doe not deliver as if I doubted, but that to the performance of obedience herein, a ſupernaturall power was requiſite; but only to ſignify, that it were worth the labour to give a congruous explication of it. Though of *Adam* I nothing doubt but he was indued with ſupernaturall power, to performe other manner of duties than this. And yet again, this denomination of power ſupernaturall, had need alſo of explication; for though that power which Adam had given him in creation, be ſupernaturall to us, yet our Divines uſually conceive it as naturall unto *Adam*, received together with his nature, and ſuch as ſhould have been naturall unto us all, had *Adam* continued in his originall integrity. But I am content to let that paſſe; only whereas he ſaith, *that by ſuch a law the Allmighty law-giver binds himſelfe to his creatures, to give them ſuch power as may enable them to keepe that law*; I think rather if any obligation had place in this caſe, it were rather to maintaine the power already given them, than to give it. For every law-giver rather preſuppoſeth ability of obedience in them, to whom he gives a law; then firſt gives a law and then gives ability to performe obedience thereunto. And certainly God firſt created man after his owne image, before he gave him any law to be a rule of his obedience unto his creatour. So I take the multiplying vertue, was given to his creatures in their creation, before he ſaid *encreaſe and multiply*: In the curing of the lame man, his word indeed was a word of power, like as when he ſaid let there be light, and there was light. For though it goe under the forme of a command, yet it was not ſo properly a command (which is to command obedience) as the going forth of vertuous efficacy to create: like as that alſo *Ezek.* 37. *O ye dry bones heare the voyce of the Lord.* And undoubtedly the ſtrength of obedience given unto *Adam* preceded Gods command, for his abſtaining from the fruit of the tree, in the midſt of the Garden. He had in his creation given him

him, *poſſe non cadere*, not *non poſſe cadere*, the event manifeſted as much: and it is as true according to the ſame *Auſtin*, that God gave him *poſſe ſtare ſi vellet*, not *velle quod potuit*. But that God is bound to reſtore, any ſuch power unto mankind, which they have wilfully loſt, is boldly avouched, but let us conſider how Scholaſtically it is proved.

1. The firſt reaſon hereof is, becauſe *God hath vouchſafed to enter into a new Covenant of Peace with men, when he needed not.* To this I anſwer, that God hath entred into a new Covenant with men, is an indefinite propoſition, as touching the perſons included in this Covenant, and being not in a neceſſary matter but contingent, this Covenant proceeding meerely from the good pleaſure of God, it hath no more force than to ſignify, that God hath vouchſafed *to enter into a new Covenant of peace with ſome men*, which we wilingly grant but not with all, neither doth this propoſition, enforce any ſuch meaning. And that God hath not entred into a new Covenant with all, I prove by theſe reaſons.

1. As many as are under the Covenant of grace, ſinne ſhall have no dominion over them. *Rom.* 6. 14. *Sinne ſhall not have the dominion over you, for you are not under the law but under grace.* But ſinne hath the dominion over too many, even over the moſt part of the world, as we find by lamentable experience, therefore too many, even the moſt part of the World, are not compriſed under the Covenant of grace.

2. The covenant of Grace, doth covenant on Gods part, not only to give ſalvation upon condition of faith and repentance, but for Chriſts ſake to renew mens natures alſo, and to give them faith and repentance. As appears by diverſe paſſages of Scripture: *Jer.* 31.31. Behold the dayes come ſaith the Lord, that I will make a new Covenant with the houſe of Iſrael, and with the houſe of Judah. *v.* 32. Not according to the Covenant, that I made with their Fathers, when I took them by the hand, to bring them out of the land of Egypt, the which my Covenant they brake, though I was a Father unto them. But this ſhall be the Covenant that I will make with the houſe of Iſrael, after thoſe daies ſaith the Lord, I will put my Law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts, and I will be their God, and they ſhall be my people.

Ezek. 36. 26. A new heart alſo will I give you, and a new ſpirit will I put within you, and I will take away the ſtony heart out of your bodies, and will give you an heart of fleſh, and I will put my ſpirit within you, and cauſe you to walk in my Statutes, and ye ſhall keep my judgements and doe them. *Ezek.* 20.23. I will ſurely rule you with a mighty hand, &c. 37. And will cauſe you to paſſe under the rod, and bring you into the bond of the Covenant. *Iſai.* 57. 18. I have ſeen his waies, and will heale him. *Hoſ.* 14.5. I will heale their rebellions, I will love them freely. And that faith it ſelfe and repentance, is the gift of God, who hath taken upon him by his covenant of grace, to be our Lord and our God to ſanctify us, is manifeſt by diverſe pregnant paſſages of holy Scriptures.

2. I come to his ſecond reaſon. *And in that Covenant he requires obedience at mens hands, even at theirs that periſh.* God in his covenant of Grace requires obedience unto ſalvation, but of his free grace undertakes to regenerate them, and work them to obedience; but how? Agreeable unto their rationall natures, that is by admonition, inſtruction, exhortation, that is to work faith and repentance, by exhorting and perſwading them unto repentance: And becauſe this he performes by his Miniſters, to whom he hath not revealed who they are, whom he hath choſen, therefore he commands them to Preach indifferently unto all, perſwade all, exhort all, unto faith and repentance, whereof alſo he makes this uſe even towards reprobates, that whereas they are naturally confident of their ability, to doe as much as any other, and as *Auſtin* ſaith *dicere ſolet humana ſuperbia ſi ſciſſem, feciſſem.* The Lord by his Miniſtry takes from them this excuſe, ſo that unto all that heare is this truth delivered, *whoſoever believeth and repenteth ſhall be ſaved:* and thereupon every one is exhorted in the name of the Lord to believe and repent. But God reſolveth to worke faith and repentance in none, but thoſe whom he hath choſen, according to that *Acts* 13. 48. *As many believed as were ordained to everlaſting life.* And withall the Doctrine delivered in the Goſpell is ſuch, and ſo confirmed, as may juſtly make them inexcuſable that doe not believe: when it ſhall appeare, that many a vile legend they are apt to believe, and in the mean time deſpiſe Gods holy Oracles, by divine Authority, many waies confirmed unto them.

3.

3. It is moſt true, eternall life is promiſed to every on that obeyeth and keeps Covenant with God; but God over and above worketh ſome unto obedience, unto faith and repentance, beſtowing theſe gratious giftes on them, even on whom he will, when he hardeneth others even whom he will. *Rom.* 9. 18.

4. *He puniſheth the diſobedient with eternall death*; true: but acording unto what Covenant? Not according unto the Covenant of grace, that is only a Covenant for Salvation, but according unto the Covenant of the law, the Covenant of works.

Whereas herehence this Author inferres, *that the moſt free God is ingaged to give ability of believing unto men*: he may as well inferre, that he is engaged to give ability unto men to the keeping of his law, and what need was there of Chriſts coming into the world? Seeing by his coming into the world, we have gained no better condition by the Arminian Tenet, than to be ſaved if we will; and if men have ability to to keepe the law even by the law, they may be ſaved if they will: and it will follow as well, that God, without giving this ability to keepe the law, cannot juſtly puniſh the tranſgreſſours of it; as that God without giving men ability to believe cannot puniſh men for not believing: *no more than a Magiſtrate having put out a mans eyes for an offence, can command this man with juſtice to read a booke, and becauſe he reads not, put him to death.* But this is a very vile ſimile, and ſtands in no tolerable proportion to that whereunto it is reſembled. For the man thus bereaved of his eyes hath a will to read, and conſequently it is no fault for not reading: for all ſinne is in the will. But it is not ſo, in not obeying either Law or Goſpell. If a man had a will to obey and believe but he could not, in ſuch a caſe it were unreaſonable he ſhould be puniſhed. But in the caſe of diſobedience unto God, we ſpeake of, all the fault is in the will voluntarily and wilfully, they neither will obey the one, nor the other: *like as they that have accuſtomed themſelves to doe evill, can not doe good, as a blackemoore cannot change his skinne.* Yet with this difference, that man is never a whit the more excuſable, or leſſe puniſhable for not doing that which is good; not ſo the blackemore, for not changing his skinne. But ſuch is the ſhamefull iſſue of them that confound impotency Morall with impotency naturall, as if there were no difference. As wild is the compariſon following, of the Maſters exacting from his Servant a juſt employment of that ſtock, which he hath taken from him. An evill ſervant may have a will to play the good husband in imploying his Maſters ſtock, where he pleaſed to intruſt him with it: But though he hath a will to be faithful and thrifty, yet without matter to worke upon, he cannot exerciſe this fidelity of his to his Maſters behoofe. Shew the like will in a carnall man to beleive if he could, and if God bereave him of power, in ſuch a caſe, then conclude the unreaſonableneſſe of Gods courſes herein. But if the Maſter gave him a ſtock to employ, upon a reſonable rent to be payd him yearly for certaine yeares: if ſo be the ſervant waſt the ſtock, Shall it not be lawfull for the Maſter nevertheleſſe to require his debt? And bid him pay that he owes him? This is the caſe we ſpeake of. In *Adam* we all have ſinned, ſaith the Apoſtle, and thereby have waſted that ſtock of grace which God had given us, and ſo diſabled our ſelves to performe that duty we owe to God: What therefore? Shall not God call upon us to pay our debts, becauſe we are become bankrupts? Eſpecially conſidering the naturall man is proud enough of his abilities to performe any thing that is good. And as for ability to believe, is there not a kind of faith performed by prophane perſons, by Hypocrites, who concurre with the beſt in the profeſſion of the Goſpell? Nay, Is there not a ſecret kind of hypocriſie, as when a man thinks his heart is upright towards God, when indeed it is not? Otherwiſe what ſhould move Saint *Paul* to call upon the Corinthians *to examine themſelves whether they were in the faith, ſaying, Know you not your ſelves how that Chriſt is in you, except ye be reprobates?* 2 *Cor.* 13.5. It is true there is a faith infuſed by the ſpirit of God in regeneration; but who ever ſaid that any man was damned, becauſe he doth not believe with ſuch a faith? As much as to ſay, that non-regeneration is the meritorious cauſe of damnation. Now how well he hath proved that our Doctrine in the poynt of abſolute reprobation is repugnant to Gods juſtice, let the indifferent judge.

DISCOURSE.

SECT. IV.

Which I divide into Three Subsections.

SUBSECT. I.

THe Third Attribute which it oppugneth, is the truth of God. God is a God of truth, *Deut.* 32.4. Truth it selfe. *Ioh.*14. 6. So called because he is the fountain of truth, and the perfection of truth, without the least mixture of false-hood; the strength of Israell cannot lye. 1 *Sam.* 15. 29. Never could any man justly charge him with dissembling; Let God be true and every man a lyar, (saith the Apostle) that he might be justified in his sayings, and overcome when he is judged. *Rom.*3.4. That is, men may lye, (for all men are lyars) but God cannot lye, (for God is true:) if any man should goe about to challenge him of untruth, his challenge would easily appeare to be a calumny. The truth of God, like a glorious Sunne, will break through all those clouds of accusations which seek to obscure and hide it. *Simile gaudet Simili*; God loves such as are of a true heart. *Psal.* 51 6. And hath an hypocrite in utrer detestation, and therefore he must needs be true himselfe. No man (for ought I know) doubts of it.

But by this decree is God made untrue, and hypocriticall in his dealing with all men, and in all matters that concerne their eternall estate; particularly, in his commands, in his offers of grace and glory, in his threats, in his passionate wishes and desires of mens chiefest good, and in his expostulations and commiserations also.

1. In his commands; for by this doctrine God commands those men to repent and believe, whom he secretly purposeth shall never believe. Now whom God commands to believe and repent, those he outwardly willes should believe and repent. For by his commandements he signifies his will and pleasure, and he must inwardly and heartily will it too, or else he dissembles: For words if they be true, are an interpretation of the mind, when they are not, are meere impostures, and simulations.

2. In his offers of grace and glory: these offers he makes to such as refuse them, and perish for refusing them, as well as unto those who doe accept them to their salvation. This is evident *Math.* 22. where those were invited to the wedding that came not. And *Acts* 3.26. Where tis said, To you hath God sent his Sonne Jesus to blesse you, in turning every one of you from your iniquities. *Math.* 23. 37. How oft would I have gathered of you, saith Christ, speaking of such as neglect the day of their visitation, and so lost their salvation: This is evident also by reason, for as many as are under the commandement, are under the promise too, as we may see, *Acts* 2.38,39. Repent and be Baptized every one of you, and you shall receive the gift of the holy Ghost; for to you, and to your Children is the promise made. In Which words *Peter* makes the command and the promise of equall extent, both universall: And there is reason for it, for he makes the promise his motive to perswade obedience to the command; and it would not have reacht home, if it had not respected all those, to whom he gives the command.

No man, Reprobate or other, thinks any lesse; every man that hears the Gospell Preached, takes himselfe to be under the gratious offer of eternall life; and upon these thoughts hath some desires, some hopes of it, and stirres up himselfe to forsake some pleasing sinnes, which otherwise he would not part with, and to doe some unpleasing duties, which otherwise he would not doe; Now, if God doth not meane that most of those to whom he offers his grace and glory shall have either, will he not be found halting in his offers?

Zanchy tells us roundly, that every man that is called, is bound to think that he is elected; otherwise he doth offer great injury unto God, and doth *perstringere Deum mendacii, qui illi in verbo dicit se velle salutem ejus, & in hunc finem ad Christum vocasse*. In which speech he plainly implies, that if God call a man, whom he hath absolutely rejected, he doth but delude him when he calls him. The like speech hath *Bucer*; *Primum quod Deo debes, est ut credas esse te ab eo prædestinatum, nam id ni credas, facis eum tibi, cum te ad salutem vocat per evangelium, illudere*. A man must believe that he is predestinated, or else he makes God to mock him when he calls him. A man therefore that is not predestinate, but an absolute reprobate, when he is called to salvation, is but deluded; it is the necessary result of their speeches. If a creditor should resolve upon no termes to forgive his debtor one farthing of the debt, and yet make him offers to remit the whole upon some conditions, and bind the offers which he makes, with a deep and solemne oath, Would we not say that he is a ranke dissembler, and a meer deluder of his poor debtor? We can say no lesse of God, if it be true that he hath irrevocably decreed, at no hand to save such particular men, and yet promiseth, and sweareth, that he will save them if they will believe his promises and repent. What can such promises be but meere delusions of miserable men?

L.5. *de nat. Dei cap.*2.

Bucer *in cap.* 8. *ad Rom. q. de prædest.*

3. In his threats and commination also (by this doctrine) is God made to be hollow and unsincere, for, Against what sinnes are they denounced? Alwaies against actuall sinnes: we never read that they

they are denounced againſt us for originall ſinnes, for the tranſgreſſion of *Adam*, or for that corruption of nature, which we brought with us into the world; and conſequently they import that the ſinnes for which men goe to hell, are their actuall tranſgreſſions. But if it be true that God decreed man to hell for originall ſinne, that which thoſe threatnings import and ſignify is not true, and ſo God is not ſincere to them. Beſides; all threatnings imply, that evills threatned may be avoyded, for therefore are they denounced, that men by them might come to repentance, and ſo eſcape the evill that are threatned: but if ſome men be peremptorily ordained to deſtruction, then their deſtruction cannot be prevented, and ſo the threatning of damnation (in this reſpect alſo) doth ſignify an untruth, and God in them deales not plainly with men.

TWISSE

Conſideration.

THat God is true, we make no more doubt than that there is a God at all: and that God is as farre from hypocriſy as hypocrites are farre from him. They that beat their fellow ſervants, and eate and drinke with the drunken, we are taught ſhall haue there portion with hypocrites: and we judge it impoſſible that God ſhould cheriſh any ſuch diſpoſition in himſelfe, which he ſo hates in others. But how God is made untrue and hypocriticall in his dealings with men in all (or in any) matters, that concerne their eternall eſtate by our doctrine of Reprobation, more than by our doctrine of election, it is a myſtery unto me; whether we conſider his commands, his offers of grace and glory, his threats, his paſſionate wiſhes and deſires of mens chiefeſt good, and in his expoſtulations and commiſerations alſo. But come we to examine how learnedly and judiciouſly this is carryed throughout in the particulars.

1. That God commands by his Miniſters many to believe and repent, whom he ſecretly purpoſeth ſhall never believe we willingly grant; like as he comanded *Abraham* to ſacrifice *Iſaack*, and yet ſecretly purpoſed that he ſhould not ſacrifice him. This is evident by the word of God, for both his command given to *Abraham* to this purpoſe is there expreſſed, as alſo his effectuall hindering of *Abraham*, when he came to the point of ſacrifyſing him; and looke what God did, that he ſecretly purpoſed to to doe: For he doth all things according to the counſell of his will *Epheſ*. 1. 11. Only here is the difference, God commanding *Abraham* to ſacrifice his *Sonne*, did poſitively hinder him from ſacrificing *Iſaack*, but God commanding all to heare the Goſpell to believe, doth not hinder them from believing, when they are willing to beleive. But only refuſeth to give them that grace whereby alone their naturall infidelity might be cured; according to thoſe words of our Saviour, *Yee therefore heare them* (my wordes) *not, becauſe yee are not of God. Iohn.* 8. 47.

Now let every ſober man judge, whether Gods courſe be not to be cenſured for hypocriſy, as well in the one as in the other: yet is this a moſt triviall argument, and thus uſually anſwered by our Divines, and particularly by Maſter *Perkins*. But this author takes no notice of this our common anſwer, to reply againſt it, but is content to pretermit it in ſilence; a manifeſt evidence that he hath nothing of worth to ſay againſt it: for I cannot conceive him to be ſo ignorant, as not to know this uſuall anſwer of our Divines. But let we him proceed in his courſe. *Whom God commands to believe and repent, thoſe he outwardly wills ſhould believe and repent; for by his commands he ſignifies his will and pleaſure, and he muſt inwardly and heartily will it too, or elſe he diſſembles.* All this is as congruouſly appliable to Gods commandement given unto *Abraham* for the ſacrificing of *Iſaack*, as to the commandement of believing and repenting given unto any; although there is a vaſt difference between Gods commandement of Sacrificing *Iſaack*, and his commandement of believing. For God himſelfe gave the one immediately, and that to a particular perſon, *Abraham*: But God commands his Miniſters to preach his Goſpell unto all, that are preſent to heare them, and why? But as he tells *Paul. Acts* 18. 9. becauſe *he hath much people*, in the place whereto he ſends them, and yet tells them not who thoſe people are, who his elect are and who are not. But they, though thereupon they proceed to Preach unto all without difference, yet ſo, as aiming at the ſalvation of the elect. *I doe all things for all men*, ſaith

Saint

Saint *Paul*, 1 *Cor.* 6. 22. *That I may ſave ſome*; and who are they? Let himſelfe anſwere, where he ſaith, *I ſuffer all things for the elects ſake*; and by the way where he diſtinguiſheth of *Gods willing outwardly and inwardly*, I willingly profeſſe I never read nor heard of it before. Gods words and commandements are outward, and uttered by him, but his will is alwaies inward, though it may be, and is ſignified by his words, and ſo is his will ſignified alwaies by his commandements; But what will? Not that ſuch a thing as God commands ſhall be done, as this Author ignorantly conceives, but that it ſhall be their duty, (to whom the commandement is given) to doe that which is commanded: for if Gods will were that ſuch a thing ſhould be done *de facto*, undoubtedly it ſhould be done and come to paſſe *de facto*, *for who hath reſiſted his will?* So that here we have a true interpretation of the mind of God by his commandement, to wit, *quid ab homine fieri debeat*, but no interpretation of any ſuch mind in God, as if *fieri vellet*, whatſoever he commands. For the caſe is cleare and undeniable that Gods will was, that *Iſaack* ſhould not be ſacrificed, as well as by his command, to make it *Abrahams* duty to ſacrifice him. The like was the caſe of *Pharaoh* to whom the Lord ſent a meſſage by *Moſes* to let Iſraell goe: hereupon it was *Pharaohs* duty to let Iſraell goe, and that upon Gods command, God thereby ſignifying his will to make this act *Pharaohs* duty; But was it Gods will alſo that *Pharaoh* ſhould *de facto* obey, and let Iſraell goe upon this command? If ſo, why doth God tell *Moſes* that he *will harden Pharaohs heart, and that he ſhall not let Iſraell goe.*

2 Tim. 2. 10.

Note

Rom. 9. 19.

Where we have a manifeſt example of the great difference of the objects of Gods will; the one what Gods will was, that *Pharaoh* ought to doe; and the other what his will was ſhould be done by him: the letting of Iſraell goe, was that which *Pharaoh* ought to doe by the will of God, but the not letting of Iſraell goe by *Pharaoh*, was that which God willed ſhould come to paſſe; And why doth not this Author take boldneſſe to cenſure theſe proceedings of the Lord with *Pharaoh* as hypocriticall proceedings? The ſame ſpirit will ſerve the turne for both, though not without betraying as much judgement as honeſty. In the like ſort, it might be urged of the very elect, as of the reprobate, for the very elect are not alwaies converted at the firſt hearing of the Goſpell, nor till the time God hath appoynted for their effectuall vocation: yet from their firſt hearing of the Goſpell, this command is made unto them, and thereby is ſignified Gods will that they ought to believe it, yet is it not Gods will that they ſhall believe, and be converted untill the time that God hath appoynted. That which in my judgement is more to the purpoſe is this, that by commanding to believe, he ſuppoſeth them at leaſt in pretence to be indued with a power to believe; but then ſay I in like manner, he ſuppoſeth them to be indifferent to believe or not to believe, as they will, that is either to yeeld or elſe to reſiſt; now this is indifferent to be objected as well againſt election, as againſt reprobation: For like as wee ſay it cannot be that the reprobate ſhould believe *de facto*, ſo wee ſay it cannot be, that the elect ſhould not beliefe at that time, *de facto*, which God hath appoynted for their effectuall converſion. And what advantage this Author can hence worke to himſelfe, I will be ready to take into conſideration, as ſoone as it is offered. So that hitherto I hope, I have freed the divine courſe maintained by us, from all juſt imputation of *impoſture and diſſimulation*: let him looke to it how he can cleare his conſcience from the impiety of his crimination. I come to the Second.

2. Here thoſe *offers of grace and glory*, which wee aſcribe to God, he chargeth with impoſture and ſimulation. But he contents himſelfe with the generality of grace, that is for his beſt advantage. I will anſwere to each part. As for glory or ſalvation, wee offer it unto none, (neither doe we teach that God makes offer of it unto any) but to ſuch as finally perſevere in faith and repentance, according to that, Revelations 3. *To him that overcometh, I will give to ſit with mee in my throne, even as I alſo overcame, and am ſet downe with my Father in his Throne. And be thou faithfull unto the death, and I will give thee a Crowne of life.* And *Gal.* 6. *Be not weary of well doing, for in good time ye ſhall reape if ye faint not.* And accordingly we teach, that it is the will of God, that *as many as believe & repent and perſevere therein, ſhall be ſaved*: & no other will of God is

ſignified

ſignified herein. And if this be true, that God doth will this, and no other thing then this is ſignified in his offers of glory and ſalvation.

What colour of impoſture and diſſimulation, doth appeare in all this? For glory and ſalvation, God doth not will that it ſhall be the portion of any one of ripe yeares, abſolutely but conditionally, to wit, if he repent and believe. And in caſe all and every one of the World ſhould believe and repent, all and every one (how notorious ſinners ſoever they be found) ſhall be ſaved; ſuch is the ſufficiency of Chriſts merits. I ſay this is true, not of them only, who are invited to the Wedding. *Math.* 22. Nor of them only, to whom Saint *Peter* ſpeaketh, *Acts* 3. 26. Or to them only, of whom our Saviour ſpeaketh, *Math.* 23. 37. But of all and every one throughout the World: and it is as true, that none of them ſhall be ſaved, if they dye in infidelity and impenitency, this God himſelfe ſignifyeth to be his will by his promiſe, *Acts* 2. 28, 29. on the one part, and on both parts, *Mark* 16. 16. And as God ſignifieth this to be his will, ſo indeed is his will according to our doctrine, and there is no colour of impoſture or ſimulation in all this. In like ſort as touching the grace of pardon of ſinne, this alſo God offers unto all that heare the Goſpell, but how? Not abſolutely but conditionally, in caſe they believe and repent; and it is Gods will that every one who believeth, ſhall have his ſinne pardoned; none that I know either thinketh or teacheth otherwiſe, whether he falleth out either to be elect or reprobate; though how to diſtinguiſh men according unto this difference I know not, I leave that unto God.

And accordingly as touching the *deſire and hopes*, that hereupon ariſe in the thoughts of Reprobates, I am nothing acquainted with them, any more than I am with their perſons: as likewiſe neither am I private to their ſtirring up of themſelves *to forſake ſome pleaſing ſinnes, which otherwiſe they would not part with; and to doe ſome unpleaſing duties, which otherwiſe they would not doe*: But in generall I have read in *Auſtin*, that God calleth ſome (though Reprobates) *ut proficiant ad exteriorem vitæ emendationem quo mitius puniantur.* But I can hardly believe, that *Herod* was any one of them, though he did many things at his admonition, becauſe I ſee a ſhametull iſſue, giving way to the cutting off *Iohn Baptiſts* head, for the gratifying of a wanton damſell.

Now like as we ſay, God doth ſignify his meaning to be, that as many as believe and repent ſhall have their ſinnes pardoned, and their ſoules ſaved: So if it can be proved that there is no ſuch meaning in God, then in my poore judgement it cannot be avoyded, but that God muſt be found halting in his offers. But for my part, I acknowledge ſuch a meaning in God, neither have I to this houre, found any one of our Divines either by word or writing to have denyed this to be the meaning of God: and I wonder what this Author means after this manner to carry himſelfe in the cloudes of generalities; and whether it be through ſillineſſe, or malitiouſneſſe I am to ſeeke: but if I may be ſo bold as to gueſſe, I think the root of all this his ſuperficiary diſcourſe is the confounding of abſolute Reprobation with abſolute Damnation, and in like ſort abſolute election with ſalvation abſolute: for as for pardon of ſinne, and ſalvation, we acknowledge them to be beſtowed on men of ripe years conditionally; and as God beſtowes them, ſo alſo he decreed to beſtow them (we ſay) conditionally, to wit, in caſe they believe and repent: but in caſe they believe and repent not, damnation is their portion, and that by the decree of God. But as touching the gift of faith and repentance, theſe we maintain to be given of God abſolutely, according to the meere pleaſure of his will: and accordingly denyed unto others, as the Apoſtle ſignifieth, ſaying, *He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth.* But this Author meddles not hitherto with theſe gifts, but keeps himſelfe to the graces of pardon of ſinne, and of ſalvation, which God beſtowes conditionally; and ſignifies his meaning to be, to beſtow them conditionally, namely, in caſe they believe and repent, and not otherwiſe, and ſuch indeed we maintaine to have been his meaning, and that from everlaſting. So that in all this there is no colour of impoſture or ſimulation. But in that which followeth, he ſtealeth upon the grace of faith it ſelfe; let us ſee how clearely, and with what felicity he carryeth himſelfe, and whether it be not anſwerable to his former carriage which he continueth throughout.

Rom. 9. 18.

Zanchy

Zanchy (he ſaith) *tells us roundly, that every man that is called, is bound to think he is elected*; but why doth he not ſpeake out and ſay, *that every one is bound* (in the opinion of *Zanchy*) *to believe that he is elected*, as formerly he related it. I grant that to believe is to think, for *credere*, is defined to be *cum aſſenſione cogitare*, but thoughts he knows are very wild, they have their courſe in dreames; as a hungry man may dreame that he eateth and drinketh, but when he awaketh, his ſoule is empty. And as for that doctrine of *Zanchy*, I have already given a faire interpretation of it, upon conſideration that he ſpeaks it of election not unto faith, but unto ſalvation: and ſeeing God hath manifeſted in his word his determination to give ſalvation to every one that believeth, it followeth herehence, that every one is bound to believe, that as many as doe believe ſhall be ſaved: and conſequently every one that heareth the Goſpell is bound to believe, That God hath determined to beſtow Salvation on him, in caſe hee be found to believe. The like conſtruction may be given of *Bucers* Doctrine; namely, that God hath predeſtinated him to obtain Salvation in caſe he believe, not otherwiſe. For God hath not predeſtinated any man of ripe years to obtain Salvation, whether he believe or not. And ſeeing God hath plainly profeſſed that whoſoever believeth ſhall be ſaved. *Mar.* 16. 16. If I doe not accordingly believe, that God hath predeſtinated me to obtain ſalvation in caſe I doe believe, I doe hereby make God to delude me in ſaying *Whoſoever believeth ſhall be ſaved*. And whereas this Author upon the back of this addeth, *that a man therefore that is not predeſtinate, but an abſolute reprobate, when he is called to ſalvation is but deluded; and that this is the neceſſary refult of our ſpeeches*. All the colour of this his inference, depends meerely upon confuſion of things that differ. For he diſtinguiſheth not between abſolute predeſtination unto ſalvation, and predeſtination unto ſalvation abſolute: likewiſe he diſtinguiſheth not between abſolute reprobation unto damnation, and reprobation unto damnation abſolute: neither doth he diſtinguiſh between predeſtination unto faith, and predeſtination unto ſalvation; nor between reprobation from faith, and reprobation unto damnation. And the abſoluteneſſe of predeſtination appears only in predeſtination unto faith, not in predeſtination unto ſalvation. For ſalvation being beſtowed on none of ripe years, but by way of reward of their faith, repentance and good works; hence it followes, that God predeſtinates none unto ſalvation of ripe years, but by way of reward of their obedience. But as for predeſtination unto faith, it is cleare, that God purpoſeth abſolutely to beſtow faith on whom he will. So on the other ſide damnation being inflicted on none, but for ſinne God hath deſtinated no man unto damnation but for ſinne. But as touching obduration, like as God hardneth whom he will, ſo he decreed to proceed herein, to wit, in hardening of men according to the meere pleaſure of his will, that is, abſolutely. Now let us not ſuffer a cauteriate conſcience, to ſmother a plain truth, with the confuſion of thoſe things which are to be diſtinguiſhed. Abſolute is oppoſed to conditionate; and this diſtinction applied to Gods will is to be underſtood not *quoad actum volentis, ſed quoad res volitas*; as for example, God decrees that a man ſhall be ſaved upon condition of faith, this is called *voluntas conditionata*, ſo *Voſſius* expounds it. *Hiſt. Pelag. lib.* 7. *p.* 638. his words are theſe, *Aliqua vult cum conditione, quæ idcirco in effectum non prodeunt niſi conditione impletâ*. Some things (God) willeth with a condition, which come not unto effect, but upon the fulfilling of the condition; this is plainly underſtood, not of the act of willing, but of the things willed, which he calls *aliqua*, and the inſtance he gives us is this, *quo modo omnes homines ſalvari vult, ſed per & propter Chriſtum fide apprehenſum*, after which manner he will have all to be ſaved, but by and for Chriſt apprehended by faith; where faith is plainly made the condition of ſalvation, not of Gods will; yet this will of God, he calls forthwith a conditionate will, and that according to the ancients, in theſe words, *de hac conditionatâ illâ Dei voluntate extant longe plurima apud veteres Scriptores*. By which it is manifeſt, that *voluntas conditionata*, is by *Voſſius* ſo called, and in his opinion by the ancients, *not on the part of God willing*, as if there were any condition thereof, which *Bradwardine* hath diſproved as a thing impoſſible, well neere 200 years agoe; but on the part of the things willed by God; now the things willed by God are either abſolutely ſo willed, or conditionally: as for example, pardon of ſinne and ſalvation, are only conditionally willed by God: to wit, upon the condition of faith and repentance, but as for the gift of faith and repentance, they are willed by God to be

1 Tim. 2. 4.

beſtowed abſolutely, to wit, according to the meer pleaſure of Gods will, hence it followeth that the will of God to conferre ſalvation, is only *voluntas coditionata*, and denominates not a man abſolutely predeſtinated, but only conditionally, ſtill underſtanding it not *quoad actum volentis*, but *quoad res volitas*, as *Voſſius* himſelfe interprets it, and that according to the ancients. In like ſort the will of God to inflict damnation, is a conditionate will according to the ſame conſtruction that *Voſſius* makes of a will conditionate, according to the Fathers; and denominates not a man abſolutely reprobated, but only conditionally. Now this being the will that *Zanchy* and *Bucer* ſpeak of, moſt prepoſterouſly doth this Author ſhape a man hereupon, to be termed an abſolute predeſtinate, or an abſolute reprobate: For in this reſpect, like as the will of God in this caſe, is accounted not *abſoluta* but *conditionata*, ſo the perſon denominated hereby, in all equity is to be accounted, not predeſtinated abſolutely, but conditionally, nor reprobated abſolutely but conditionally. But in reſpect of another will of God, I willingly confeſſe, one may be accounted predeſtinate abſolutely, and another reprobated abſolutely, to wit, in reſpect of the will of giving the grace of faith and repentance unto one, and denying it to another: And that becauſe faith and repentance are not given and denied upon any condition, but abſolutely, according to the meer pleaſure of God; as we are ready to maintaine. But herehence no ſpecies of contradiction ariſeth, for like as it is no contradiction to ſay that God willeth abſolutely unto *Paul* the grace of faith and repentance, and conditionally willeth unto him and every one ſalvation, to wit, upon condition of faith and repentance: In like ſort, there is no contradiction to ſay, that the ſame man is predeſtinated abſolutely unto faith, and conditionally unto ſalvation: In like ſort it may be ſaid without all contradiction, that the ſame man is both reprobated abſolutely from faith, and yet reprobated conditionally from glory unto condemnation. And laſtly, in like manner, there is no contradiction to ſay, that the ſame man is predeſtinated conditionally to obtain ſalvation; and yet abſolutely reprobated from faith: eſpecially ſeeing it is all one, to be predeſtinated conditionally to obtain ſalvation, and conditionally to obtain damnation: For he that is ordained to be ſaved in caſe he believe, is therewithall ordained to be damned in caſe he believe not: The ground whereof is, that of our Saviour *Whoſoever believeth ſhall be ſaved, whoſoever believeth not ſhall be damned.* Now if God may both will unto a man ſalvation conditionally, to wit, upon condition he believeth, and yet withall will the deniall of faith abſolutely unto him, without all contradiction, (as I have already proved) it followeth, that without all contradiction, a man may be ſaid both to be predeſtinated to obtain ſalvation conditionally, *viz.* In caſe he doe believe, and ſo to be predeſtinated abſolutely, to be hardned, or to have the grace of faith denyed him. So that this Authors concluſion depends meerely upon confuſion of different denominations of a man ſaid to be abſolutely, or conditionally predeſtinated: which may be in reſpect of different things whereto he is predeſtinated, to the one abſolutly, to the other conditionally, and conſequently without all contradiction. For he that is abſolutely reprobated from the grace of faith, may yet be conditionally predeſtinated unto ſalvation. For to be conditionally predeſtinated unto ſalvation, is to be conditionally predeſtinated unto damnation, and what ſober man will ſay, that there is any contradiction in this, to ſay, that the ſame man is both conditionally reprobated unto damnation, and abſolutely reprobated from faith. Faith being ſuch a gift of God, that like as God abſolutely beſtowes it on ſome, ſo as abſolutely he denies it to others. But as for condemnation, that is inflicted on none but for ſinne, like as ſalvation is beſtowed on none of ripe years, but as a reward of obedience. In like manner God decreed not either to beſtow the one, or inflict the other but conditionally, to wit, upon condition of faith on the one ſide, and upon condition of infidelity on the other. Now if ſuch confuſion be committed in theſe denominations of the predeſtinate and reprobate, abſolutely and conditionally, on the part of things willed by God, as namely in reſpect of grace and glory on the one ſide, and in reſpect of the denyall of grace and glory, together with inflicting of damnation on the other: How much more muſt this confuſion be augmented, if not only different things willed by God (as before mentioned) are confounded, but over and above the act of Gods will is confounded with things willed by him. For as for the act of Gods will, that it admitts no condition, I have formerly demonſtrated by diverſe arguments; one whereof, and that invincible, is this; If ſinne be the cauſe or condition of Gods will,

Mar. 16. 16.

or

or decree of damnation, then either by neceſſity of nature, or by the conſtitution of God; not by neceſſity of nature (as all confeſſe,) nor (ſay I) can it be by any conſtitution of God, as I prove thus; If by the conſtitution of God, then God hath ordained that upon the foreſight of ſinne, he will ordaine men unto ſalvation; where the eternall ordination of God, is made the object of Gods eternall ordination; a thing utterly impoſſible, it being apparent that nothing can be the object of Gods eternall ordination or decree, but things temporall. The ſimilitude whereby he illuſtrates, not his concluſion, but the pretended abſurdity of our doctrine, is moſt aliene. For God is not like unto a creditor, *Who reſolves upon no termes to forgive his debtor one farthing of his debt, and yet makes offer to remit the whole debt upon ſome conditions.* For as God hath profeſſed that *whoſoever believeth ſhall be ſaved*, ſo; Hath not God reſolved that *whoſoever believeth ſhall be ſaved?* Was ever any of our Divines known to deny this? But herein they joyne iſſue with their adverſaries, as the Contra-Remonſtrants did with the Remonſtrants, namely, in maintaining that this is not the whole decree of predeſtination; But that there is another decree of predeſtination beſides this; namely, that God over and above hath determined to beſtow faith on ſome. So on the other ſide, none of our Divines were ever known to deny, that God hath decreed, that whoſoever believes not ſhall be damned; but further they profeſſe, that this is not the whole decree of reprobation, but that there is another decree concerning reprobation beſides this, namely, that God hath over and above decreed to deny ſome the grace of faith, and that abſolutely. Now whereas he ſaith, we maintain that God hath irrevocably decreed not to ſave ſome, whom he promiſeth that he will ſave if they believe; Is he well in his witts, for charging us with that, by way of crimination, which no underſtanding Divine among the Arminians themſelves dare deny? I mean as touching the poynt of Gods irrevocable decree. For what Arminian hath dared in plain tearmes to profeſſe, that Gods decrees are of a revocable nature? Whereas the meere preſcience of God, is ſufficient to make them irrevocable; How much more if Gods preſcience be grounded upon his decree? as indeed there is no other ground imaginable, without falling upon manifeſt Atheiſme. But whereas he faſhioneth our Doctrine, ſo as if we ſaid, that God hath decreed at no hand to ſave them, to whom he promiſeth ſalvation upon condition of faith; this is a notorious untruth, and ſuch as implyeth manifeſt contradiction: For to ſay he hath reſolved *at no hand to ſave them*, is as much as to ſay, that he hath reſolved to ſave them on no condition. But if he hath promiſed to ſave them in caſe they believe, undoubtedly he hath reſolved, to ſave them upon condition of faith. Only Gods reſolution to ſave them, is not held in ſuſpence, conſidering that from everlaſting, he well knew who would believe, and who would not; and therefore he knew this, becauſe he purpoſed to grant faith unto the one, and deny it unto the other. So that in all this cry, we have little wooll, no ſubſtance of any ſound proofe, but meere clamours and miſerable confuſion; as God ſees how well it becomes him to ſmite them with the ſpirit of confuſion, that build Babell of their own invention, and oppoſe the truth, the precious truth of his ſoveraignty over his creatures, and of the prerogative of his free grace, to have mercy on whom he will, like as he ſhewes his power in hardening whom he will, and in ſmiting with giddineſſe whom he will.

Mar. 16. 16.

3. In the next place, we are to heare how God, by our Doctrine in *his threats and comminations is hollow, and unſincere.* I willingly grant theſe are alwaies denounced againſt actuall ſinnes, as alſo that the ſinnes for which men goe to hell, are actuall ſinnes, if they live to be conſcious of actuall tranſgreſſions. *But if God have decreed men to hell for originall ſinne, then God* (ſaith he) *is not true, and ſo not ſincere.* This is utterly unconſequent; For God can manifeſt his pleaſure otherwiſe than by his threatnings. Of the Sodomites it is ſaid, *they ſuffer the vengeance of eternall fire*; and Infants periſhed therein, as well as men of ripe years: And the Apoſtle plainly ſaith, that *we have all ſinned in Adam, and that the wages of ſinne is death*, without diſtinction; and that all are borne children of wrath, and therefore as many as dye in that condition, dye children of wrath. And whence hath this Author learned, that the ſinne of *Adam* hath brought upon us the guilt of eternall death, as formerly he hath profeſſed: but if I be not deceived, this extends farther than to Infants, and in as much as ſome of our Divines conceive the corrupt maſſe, to be the object of reprobation, hereupon he conceits, they make God to damne all Reprobates for originall ſinne; whereas their doctrine is no other than this, that God determines to damne every man for no other

Rom. 5. 12. Rom. 6. 22. Ephes. 2. 3.

sinnes, but such wherein they dye unrepented of, whether they be originall or actuall. Threatnings are denounced unto all to this end, that men may know, that by continuing in sinne without repentance there is no hope of mercy, and therefore as they desire to be saved, it is there duty to breake them off by repentance: And in particular unto some that by this consideration, God may bring them unto repentance. But these are only Gods elect, but as for others God never brings unto them true repentance, according to that of S. *Austin*, *Istorum neminem adducit Deus ad salubrem spiritalemq; pœnitentiam qua homo reconciliatur Deo in Christo sive illis ampliorum patientiam sive non imparem præbeat.* Yet God ordaines no man of ripe yeares unto destruction but for sinne finally continued in, without repentance; and the threatning of damnation signifyes no other thing but this, that if they repent not, they shall be damned, which is most true to whomsoever it is pronounced; and this dealing of God is plain enough. But these Divines would not have faith and repentance to be the gifts of God, but the workes of mens free-wills, that so they might be their own crafts-men of their salvation.

Contra Julian Pelag. l. 5. c. 4.

DISCOURSE.

SUBSECT. II.

4. GOd is also full of guile in the other things before named, by this opinion, *viz.* in his passionate wishes, that even those men might repent, that repent not, and might be saved that through their impenitency are not saved. Of these we read *Deuter.* 5. 29. Oh that there were such a heart in them to feare me, that it might goe well with them. And in *Psal.* 18. 13. O that my people had harkened unto mee, and Israell had walked in my wayes. And *Isaiah.* 48. 18. Oh that thou hadst harkened unto my commandements. &c.

2. In his expostulations. *Isai.* 5. 3. judge I pray you between me and my vineyard, what could I have done more for my vineyard? *Ier.* 2. throughout. Especially *v.* 5. and 31. Have I been a wilderneſſe unto Israell, or a land of darkneſſe? And *c.* 32. Can a maid forget her ornaments, or a bride her attire, yet my people have forgotten mee dayes without number. *Ezek.* 33. 11. Turne yee, turne yee, O yee house of Israell why will ye dye?

3. In his commiserations also of the woefull condition of foolish men, that would not be reclaymed. *Hos.* 11. 8. How shall I give thee up Ephraim, how shall I deliver thee O Israell? My repentings are kindled together, my heart is turned within me, and *Math.* 23. 37. O Jerusalem Jerusalem which killest the Prophets, and stonest them that are sent unto thee. In all these there is but little sincerity, if there be a setled resolution that the most of those, towards whom those wishes, chidings, and melting considerations are used, shall be unavoydable damned. Gods fairest offers, his sweetest invitations, his greatest sympathies, and amplest curtesies, (if this doctrine be true) come very little short I think of *Absolons* feast, *Ioabs* congie, the kisse of *Iudas*, and the *Hysnaes* teares, for in all these, *aliud animo vult, aliud verbis significat*; he sayeth one thing and meanes another, and therefore dissembles. This is so evident, that some maintainers of absolute reprobation doe not deny it, but ascribe unto God *Sanctam simulationem, duplicem personam, duplicem voluntatem* a Holy counterfeiting a double face, a double will, by which they offer extreame injury unto God, for *tolerabilius est* (saith Tertullian) *duos divisos quam unum versipellem Deum prædicare.* It is more tolerable to set up two Gods then a double and deceitfull God. If this be granted, Iesuits have no cause to be ashamed of their equivocations: nor Polititians of their Holy water, and crafty dissimulations; men need not be afraid to cogge and lye, and deale deceitfully one with another, but are rather to be commended for their courtship and complements, and false-heartednesse, because in this they doe but imitate God, to whom whosoever they be that come neerest, they are the best. But howsoever some doe inconsiderately ascribe such things to God, the most (I know) would tremble to entertaine such thoughts: and therefore the more horrible it is, to lay such things to the charge of the Almighty, the farther I take this opinion to be from all truth and honesty.

Tertul. lib. cont. praxeam.

TWISSE

Conſideration.

GOD (he ſaith) by our Doctrine, *is made full of guile in his paſſionate wiſhes, that even theſe men might repent, that repent not.* The guile I gueſſe conſiſts in this, that God hereby makes ſhew, that he would have them to repent, when yet indeed, he hath no ſuch will. To this I anſwer, that by the ſame reaſon he might conclude, that God carrieth himſelfe with guile, in taking unto himſelfe eyes, and eares, and hands, and heart, for hereby he makes ſhew that he hath the members of a man. But to this we anſwer, that this ſhew is only unto them that underſtand that properly, which is to be taken figuratively: ſo that it is not the word of God, ſo much as the weakneſſe of men in underſtanding it, that caſts this colour. For theſe things indeed, are ſpoken only per ἀνθρωποπάθειαν, which is a metaphoricall kind of ſpeech. And if God takes liberty to conforme himſelfe to the members of our body, may not he take as great liberty to conforme himſelfe to the paſſions of our minds, and to aſſume unto him, the paſſions of feare, wrath, and jealouſy, joy, ſorrow, and ſuch like? *Iſai.* 63.8. *For he ſaid ſurely they are my people, Children that will not lye, ſo he was their Saviour:* yet what followeth in the next verſe ſave one: *But they rebelled and vexed his holy ſpirit.* According to the courſe of this Divines ſuperficiall conſideration, a man might conceive, that God is ſubject to errour, and improvidence, as well as man; for God ſaid *ſurely they will not lye*, but it appeared by the event, that they did lye. So that hereupon we are driven to conclude, that the former paſſage is delivered per ἀνθρωποπάθειαν, in conformity to a mans judgement, who promiſeth unto himſelfe better obedience from his child for the time to come, then afterwards he finds. In like ſort, God in his paſſionate wiſhes, conformes himſelfe to the condition of man, who uſeth this ſometimes, as a means to worke impreſſion upon his child, to be more carefull to order his converſation towards his parents. And this being apt to work upon a child, though but naturally ingenuous, why may not God uſe this courſe? nay if he ſhould not uſe this courſe, he could not be ſaid to doe all for his vineyard, that could be done, in the way of outward husbandry. So that paſſionate wiſhes, are but a paſſionate kind of exhortation; *God through us doth beſeech you* (ſaith *Paul*) *we pray you in Chriſts ſtead, to be reconciled unto God.* 2 *Cor.* 5.20. Yet nevertheleſſe the ſame Apoſtle profeſſeth that the *Goſpell was a ſavour of death unto death to ſome*, 2 *Cor.* 2.15. Now the Goſpell includes all theſe and ſuch like patheticall admonitions; And hereby God doth effectually ſignify, how much he delights in the obedience of the creature, and in the glorifying of his mercy in their ſalvation. But yet this mercy of God, in giving the grace of obedience, is not ſhewed indifferently towards all, but only to ſome, even whom the Lord will. *Rom* 9.18. And this conſideration drives us to interpret ſuch paſſionate wiſhes not properly, but figuratively. For whereas the Lord ſaith, *Deut.* 5.29. *Oh that there were ſuch an heart in them to feare me.* Who can deny but that God could give them ſuch an heart, if it pleaſed him? And the ſame *Moſes* profeſſeth of theſe very people of Iſraell, that God had not given them ſuch an heart for the ſpace of 40 years. *Deut.*29.4. *you have ſeen the great temptations and ſignes*; But the Lord hath not given you an heart to perceive, nor eyes to ſee, nor eares to heare unto this day, and *Jerem.* 32.40. He makes promiſe of giving it to ſome; *I will put my feare in their heart, that they ſhall never depart away from me.* In like ſort whereas the Lord ſaith, *Iſai.* 48.18. *Oh that thou hadſt hearkened unto my commandements. Pſal.* 81.13. Oh that my people had hearkened unto me, and Iſrael had walked in my waies! who doubts but that it was in the power of God, to work them hereunto, by boaring their eares, and circumciſing them, by regenerating them, and ſo making them to be borne of God; that *ſo being of God, they might heare his words. Iohn* 8.47. *As alſo to put his own ſpirit within them, and cauſe them to walke in his ſtatutes, and keep his judgements and doe them: Ezek.* 36.27.

2. In his expoſtulations, in that, *Iſai.*5.3. *What could I have done more for my vineyard?* What doth this ſignify more, than that more could not be done? But how? In the way of outward Husbandry, conforming himſelfe to an husbandman, that hath planted a vineyard. For can it be denied, but that God could have made them fruitfull, had it pleaſed

pleaſed him: and though *Paul* plants and *Apollo* watereth, yet, Is it not Gods peculiar
Heb.12. 2. office to give the encreaſe? Is it not he *that worketh in us every good thing that is pleaſing in his ſight through Jeſus Chriſt.* *Heb.*13.21. Is not he both the Author and finiſher of our faith? Was it not he that gave repentance unto Iſraell; *Acts* 5.31. And to the Gentiles. *Acts* 11.18. And muſt we not waite with our hearers, *if ſo be God may give them repentance?* 2 *Tim.*2.25. And as for that of *Jerem.*2. 32. *Can a Maid forget her Ornament, or a Bride her attire, yet my people have forgotten mee. And have I been a Wilderneſſe unto Iſraell, or a*
v. 31. *land of darkneſſe.* Is not this exprobration of their unthankfulneſſe juſt, and without guile, unleſſe God doe actually change all their hearts. Yet this might be a means and alſo was, and is, and ever ſhall continue to be a means to bring Gods people to repentance. And undoubtedly the worſt of them, had power to have abſtained from many of thoſe foule ſinnes, yea from all of them, wherewith God doth upbraid them; albeit to abſtaine from any ſinne in a gracious manner, be a worke of Gods ſpeciall grace, which he affords not, according to mens workes (which way tends all this eager but ſuperficiary diſcourſe) but according to his own purpoſe and grace. 3. *Hoſea* 11.8. God repreſents as it were a conflict within him, between his mercy and juſtice; and his mercy hath the glory of the day; But wherein? To ſpare them, though their ſinnes deſerved at his hands, that he ſhould make them as *Adma* and *Zeboim*, as *Sodome* and *Gomorrah*. He would rather ſhew himſelfe to be as he is, *God*, and and not *Man*; And wherein? But in this, man may pardon his enemy, but cannot change his heart, it is otherwiſe with God, he can both pardon our ſinnes, and change our hearts, and to this purpoſe he becomes our Lord and our God, and walkes in the midſt of us, as the holy one of Iſraell, to *ſanctify us*, as it followeth in the ſame place of *Hoſea*, *v.*10. *They ſhall walk after the Lord, he ſhall roare like a Lyon, viz.* In ſuch expoſtulations, comminations, &c. but the iſſue ſhall be gracious; for *when he ſhall roare, then the children of the Weſt ſhall feare*, that *is feare unto him*, as *Hoſ.* 3.5. That is, come flying unto him, and to his goodneſſe with feare: like Birds ſcared from one place, fly with greater ſpeed to another: ſo conſcience affrighted with ſenſe of ſinne, and apprehenſion of Gods wrath, ſhall fly from his wrath, unto his mercy, *to his goodneſſe*: whereof God ſhall make unto them a full repreſentation in *David* their King, that is in Chriſt, as in whom we behold the glory of Gods grace with open face, and *trepidare* in Latine, is found to be of the ſame ſignification with *feſtinare*. And *v.* 11. Is manifeſted as much, as where it is ſaid, *They ſhall feare as a ſparrow out of Egypt, and as a Dove out of the land of Egypt; and I will place them in their houſes, ſaith the Lord.* That is, come flying unto the Lord with feare. As for that *Math.* 23.37. O Jeruſalem, how oft would I: &c. This is of another nature, as being delivered by Chriſt the ſonne of God, made under the Law, who, as in his manhood, he might entertaine ſuch deſires in proper ſpeech, ſo by the Law of God, was bound to deſire the converſion of his brethren, as well as any other Prophet, or man of God, or miniſter of his word. But ſuch confuſion becomes this diſcourſe right well.

In all this (he ſaith) *there is little ſincerity, if there be a ſecret reſolution, that the moſt of thoſe, towards whom thoſe wiſhes, chidings, and commiſerations are uſed, ſhall be unavoydably damned.* But what if but one of them, towards whom theſe are uſed, by a ſecret reſolution ſhall be unavoydably damned, is there ſincerity enough in theſe courſes divine? Sure-if this reſolution, concerning the unavoydable damnation of the one, doth not prejudice Gods ſincerity, neither ſhall ſuch a reſolution concerning the damnation of two, or of two hundred, or thouſands, or the moſt, any way prejudice ſincerity divine. But this kind of diſcourſe, is ſpread all over this Treatiſe, like a ſcab only to worke upon vulgar affection, where judgement is wanting to obſerve the frothy condition of it. And whereas he ſaith that in all this God *aliud animo vult aliud verbis ſignificat*, its moſt untrue, as to every one ſhould be made manifeſt, according to the right underſtanding of it, had he been pleaſed to accommodate it ſeverally, and ſhew what that is, which God ſignifies by his word, and what that is, which he willeth in his heart. And indeed, as in the poynt of Gods commandement, I have ſhewed there is no colour of contradiction between it, and Gods purpoſe, but only according to this Authors ſuperficiary interpretation. For to command a thing, is only to will, that it ſhall be our duty to doe it: notwithſtanding which, it is apparent, God may purpoſe not to give grace to worke the doing of it. So in every one of the reſt, had he inſtanced as it became him, and ſhewed wherein the guile conſiſted, the abſurdity of this crimination might have been made as manifeſt as in this. That which he conceales

ceales, and which he would have his readers rather take to themſelves, than ſhew himſelfe clearely to ſtand to the maintainance thereof, ſeems to be this; that every one hath power given him to believe, to repent, to change his heart, yea to regenerate himſelfe, but it ſticks in his teeth, and he dares not ſpeake it out plainly. Only he keepes himſelfe to Gods reſolution, concerning mans unavoydable damnation; yet we maintaine not that any contingent things come to paſſe unavoydably, that were utterly againſt the nature of a contingent thing, which is to come to paſſe, ſo as joyned with a poſſibility of not coming to paſſe. And as for damnation in particular, we acknowledge it throughout, to be avoydable by repentance, and not otherwiſe, unto men of ripe years. And as for repentance, we ſay, that there is no man but may repent as long as he lives, through grace: ſo that in the iſſue the maine poynt to be debated herein is, whether every man living hath ſuch a grace given him as whereby he may repent. But upon this poynt though his whole diſcourſe be grounded thereupon, yet is he content to ſay juſt nothing; leaſt their ſhamefull and moſt unconſcionable courſes in diſhonouring the grace of God, ſhould be diſcovered and brought to light. But conſider in a word or two as touching this *univerſall grace*, which they make to conſiſt in the inabling of the will, *to will any good thing whereunto they ſhall be excited.* If ſuch a grace be univerſall, then every one hath power to believe, and power to repent. But this is untrue, for the Apoſtle telleth us of ſome, *that they cannot repent. Rom.* 2.4. of the naturall man, *that he cannot diſcerne the things of God; and that they are fooliſhneſſe unto him*; and while they ſeeme fooliſhneſſe unto him, is it poſſible that therein *he ſhould diſcerne the wiſdome of God?* 1 *Cor.* 2.14. our Saviour tells us of ſome, that *they cannot believe: Ioh.* 12.46. and tells others to their face, ſaying, *How can you believe, when ye receive honour one of another, and ſeeke not the honour that comes from God only, Ioh.* 5.44. Likewiſe of them that are in the fleſh Saint *Paul* ſaith, *They cannot pleaſe God. Rom.* 8.8. 2. It is the habit of faith that inables us to believe, ſo that if all men have power to believe, it muſt be confeſſed, that all men have faith, but the Apoſtle ſaith, *Fides non eſt omnium*; 2 *Theſ.* 3.2. *Tit.* 1.1. he ſaith it is *electorum*; like as *Auſtin* profeſſeth *Habere fidem, ſicut & habere charitatem gratiæ eſt fidelium: de prædeſt. Sanct. cap.* 5. 3. Whoſoever hath power to prduce a vitall act, hath life in him; and conſequently, whoſoever hath power to produce any act of the life of grace, hath the life of grace in him: But the acts of faith and repentance, are the acts of the life of grace, therefore whoſoever hath power to produce theſe, hath in him the life of grace. But this is not true of all, for the Scripture teſtifies of ſome, that they are dead in ſinne. *Epheſ.* 2. 1. Are ſtrangers from the life of God. *Epheſ.* 4. 18. Againe, then all ſhould be regenerated, but that is untrue, for regeneration is ſignified, *Pſal.* 19. in Scripture to be wrought by the word of God. 1 *Peter.* 1.23. *Iam.* 1. 17. But all have not the word of God. 4. If a man hath power to believe and repent, then the reaſon why a man doth not believe and repent, is not becauſe he cannot, but becauſe he will not; ſo that in the iſſue it comes to this, that a man may believe if he will, repent if he will; But ſuch a power is not grace, but nature rather, as appears by *Auſtin.* l. 1. *de Gneſi contra Manich. cap.* 3. where he profeſſeth, that *omnes poſſunt credere ſi velint*: now compare this, with that he hath in the ſame place, where though he ſaith that *omnes credere poſſint ſi velint*, yet *poſſe credere*, ſimply taken, ariſeth meerely out of the gift of charity; which he profeſſeth to be *gratiæ fidelium, de prædeſt. Sanct. c.* 5. But there he profeſſeth that *poſſe habere fidem*, is *naturæ hominum*, the very naturall condition of all men. I farther prove it by reaſon thus; Look by what power I can believe if I will, by the ſame power I can refuſe to believe if I will; Now ſuch a power is no other, then whereby a man is indifferent to doe good or evill: but ſuch a condition is not grace; for grace is goodneſſe, now goodneſſe doth not diſpoſe any, either to good or evill indifferently, but preciſely to that which is good; like as naughtineſſe diſpoſeth a man only to that which is evill.

He ſleepes ſo ſweetly upon his Arminian pillow, that his very dreames make him confident of the evidence of his deductions. And he gives reaſons for it, and that of moſt force for conviction, namely, the confeſſion of his adverſaries; the *maintainers of abſolute reprobation, for even they*, he ſaith, *doe not deny this, but aſcribe unto God ſanctam ſimulationem, duplicem perſonam, duplicem voluntatem.* But he names none, content to ſing to himſelf & his Muſes throughout, when he relats what our ſides anſwer to his profound diſcourſes. And I commend his wiſdome more then his honeſty in this, for if he had quoted his Authors herein, it may be ſomething might have bin diſcovered that would

be little pleaſing unto him: yet herein he confounds things much different; for as for a double will aſcribed unto God, all the Learned doe acknowledge ſo much, and the Scriptures teſtify it; as namely, that his decree is called the will of God: as, *what the Lord willeth, that hath he done, both in heaven and in earth, and who hath reſiſted his will?* as alſo that Gods commandement is called uſually the will of God, as, *This is the will of God, even your ſanctification, that every one ſhould know how to poſſeſſe his veſſell in holineſſe, and honour, and not in the luſt of concupiſcence, as the Gentiles doe which know not God.* 1 *Theſ.* 4. 4,5. as for *duplicem perſonam*, that is a phraſe which I never read before, yet the phraſe of ἀνθρωποπάθεια, is uſually in the Holy Scripture, as when God takes unto him both the members of a mans body, and the paſſions of his mind; and ſo ſpeakes in the way of condeſcenſion to our infirmities, as to put upon himſelfe the perſon of a man: and this is undenyable by all that are not *Anthropomorphites*. And as touching our bleſſed Saviour, we acknowledge in him *duplicem naturam*, a double nature, though not *duplicem perſonam*, a double perſon, and accordingly ſometimes, he both ſpeakes of himſelfe, and is ſpoken of, as touching the nature of his God-head, and ſometimes as touching the nature of his Man-hood. As for the firſt, that alone is materiall to his preſent purpoſe, namely, as touching *Sancta Simulatio*, aſcribed unto God by our Divines. Now it were worth the while to know who is his Author in this, and that of the paſſages alleadged by this Author, doth profeſſe that they doe repreſent in God *an holy kind of ſimulation*: How could he exſpect that this ſhould give any ſatisfaction, ſeeing he conceales the Author of it? And what reader would not be moved, with a very greedy deſire to know the Author of ſuch an interpretation of the paſſages alleadged by this Divine, that he might conſider whether it be rightly alleadged or no; and if rightly, with what ſobriety they deliver it? Now I remember well to have read in *Piſcator*, that the Scripture attributes in a certaine place *Simulation* unto Chriſt, not in any paſſage of this nature wee treat of, as namely, *Luke* 24. 28. Where it is ſaid, *he made as though hee would goe farther*: like enough to irritate their devotions, and to provoke their zealous deſire ſo much the more to retaine him a little longer. And I willingly profeſſe not the Simulation, but the Diſſimulation of this Author in this caſe hath ſtirred up a deſire in me to be ſatisfied, as touching the Author of this *Sancta Simulatio*. Now I find in *Piſcator* his anſwer to *Vorſtius* his *Paraſcuen*, the firſt part pag. 29. both that place of ſimulation attributed unto Chriſt out of *Luke* 24. 28. And alſo, how that in the examples of Gods meſſages ſent to *Hezekiah*, that *he ſhould dye and not live*; And to the Ninevites by *Jonah*, *Yet forty daies and Nineve ſhall be deſtroyed*, his opinion is, that therein God doth ſignify care, *ſe velle quod non vult*. His words are theſe; *Adhæc etſi Deus interdum ſignificet ſe velle quod non vult, non tamen propterea hypocriſeos inſimulandus eſt*; (for this *Vorſtius* objected unto him) *Sed potius ſapientia ejus agnoſcenda in hominibus ad ſerias preces & ſeriam pœnitentiam adducendis; ut liquet in exemplo Regis Ezekiæ recuperantis ſanitatem & Ninivitarum conſervatorum*: and whereas *Vorſtius* laies to his charge, that in ſaying God commands one thing, and purpoſeth another, he doth impute unto God Hypocriſy, (which is the very ſubſtance of this Authors anſwere in this place.) See I pray how he anſwers it without attributing any *holy ſimulation* at all unto God in this caſe. *Ad præcepta vero quod attinet: non ſtatim ſequitur Deum agere Hipocritam ſi quid præcipiat, quod fieri nolit; etenim hypocritam is demum agit, qui ſimulat pietatem quâ caret. 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be little pleaſing unto him: yet herein he confounds things much different; for as for a double will aſcribed unto God, all the Learned doe acknowledge ſo much, and the Scriptures teſtify it; as namely, that his decree is called the will of God: as, *what the Lord willeth, that hath he done, both in heaven and in earth, and who hath reſiſted his will?* as alſo that Gods commandement is called uſually the will of God, as, *This is the will of God, even your ſanctification, that every one ſhould know how to poſſeſſe his veſſell in holineſſe, and honour, and not in the luſt of concupiſcence, as the Gentiles doe which know not God.* 1 *Theſ.* 4. 4,5. as for *duplicem perſonam*, that is a phraſe which I never read before, yet the phraſe of ἀνθρωποπάθεια, is uſually in the Holy Scripture, as when God takes unto him both the members of a mans body, and the paſſions of his mind; and ſo ſpeakes in the way of condeſcenſion to our infirmities, as to put upon himſelfe the perſon of a man: and this is undenyable by all that are not *Anthropomorphites*. And as touching our bleſſed Saviour, we acknowledge in him *duplicem naturam*, a double nature, though not *duplicem perſonam*, a double perſon, and accordingly ſometimes, he both ſpeakes of himſelfe, and is ſpoken of, as touching the nature of his God-head, and ſometimes as touching the nature of his Man-hood. As for the firſt, that alone is materiall to his preſent purpoſe, namely, as touching *Sancta Simulatio*, aſcribed unto God by our Divines. Now it were worth the while to know who is his Author in this, and that of the paſſages alleadged by this Author, doth profeſſe that they doe repreſent in God *an holy kind of ſimulation*: How could he exſpect that this ſhould give any ſatisfaction, ſeeing he conceales the Author of it? And what reader would not be moved, with a very greedy deſire to know the Author of ſuch an interpretation of the paſſages alleadged by this Divine, that he might conſider whether it be rightly alleadged or no; and if rightly, with what ſobriety they deliver it? Now I remember well to have read in *Piſcator*, that the Scripture attributes in a certaine place *Simulation* unto Chriſt, not in any paſſage of this nature wee treat of, as namely, *Luke* 24. 28. Where it is ſaid, *he made as though hee would goe farther*: like enough to irritate their devotions, and to provoke their zealous deſire ſo much the more to retaine him a little longer. And I willingly profeſſe not the Simulation, but the Diſſimulation of this Author in this caſe hath ſtirred up a deſire in me to be ſatisfied, as touching the Author of this *Sancta Simulatio*. Now I find in *Piſcator* his anſwer to *Vorſtius* his *Paraſceuen*, the firſt part pag. 29. both that place of ſimulation attributed unto Chriſt out of *Luke* 24. 28. And alſo, how that in the examples of Gods meſſages ſent to *Hezekiah*, that
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But this anſwer is too ſhort. Tis true indeed, God will have all men to be ſaved only upon condition they will believe and repent; according to the ſpeech of Saint *Ambroſe*, *Deus vult omnes ſalvari ſi & ipſi velint*; for if he would abſolutely have it ſo what can hinder it? who hath reſiſted his will? And it is true likewiſe that a conditionall promiſe may be ſeriouſe as well as an abſolute; but then the condition muſt be poſſible unto them, to whom the offer and promiſe is made; and the performance of the condition muſt be a part of Gods will, as well as the ſalvation promiſed; or elſe the promiſe cannot be candid and ſincere. In ſubſtance it is all one, not to offer a curteſy at all and and to offer it under a condition not poſſible, and in circumſtance it is farre better to deny a benefite abſolutly, than ſo to promiſe it. For ſuch a promiſe is a denyall under a colour of the contrary. The Lawyers tell us that a contract *Sub conditione impræſtabili nullus æſtimatur*: And the Logicians, that *propoſitio conditionalis quæ habet annexam conditionem impoſſibilem, æquipollet ſimpliciter neganti*. Any offer which is made upon a condition not performeable by the party is equivalent to a bare negation. It is all one for a man to deny a piece of money flatly to one blind man, and to promiſe it to another blind man upon a condition that he will looke upon it with his eyes, and it is all one for a man that hath a daughter to beſtow in marriage to tell the ſuitor I will giue you my daughter if you will bnt ſpan the earth and touch the heavens with yonr finger; and to tell him plainly, ſet your heart at reſt I will never beſtow her upon you. And thus have I ſhewed the contrariety of this opinion to the principall attributes of God: which is my ſecond generall reaſon againſt it

TWISSE.

Conſideration.

THat Salvation, and that by the ordinance of God, is only obtaineable by men of ripe years, by faith and repentance, as alſo, that in caſe every one ſhould believe and repent, every one ſhould be ſaved, is without queſtion.
Mark. 16.16. For hath not our Saviour profeſſed, that *whoſoever believeth ſhall be ſaved*; and doth it not undeniably follow herehence, that it is Gods will, that *whoſoever believeth ſhall be ſaved*: Neither is this any wiſh as this Author faigneth, neither doth any of our Divines ſay, that ever I read, or till now heard of, that *God wiſheth that all that believe ſhall be ſaved*; this being a moſt abſurd ſpeech and contradiction to the ordinance of God. For thoſe things which God or man are ſaid to wiſh, are ſuch which doe not alwaies come to paſſe: but this ordinance of God, *whoſoever believeth ſhall be ſaved*, is more ſtable than the covenant which God hath made with day and night. Not any Arminian that ever I read, doth expreſſe himſelfe in ſo proſtitute a manner, as to ſay, *God ſeriouſly wiſheth the ſalvation of Reprobates, in caſe they believe*. For he hath not wiſhed, but ordained, and made it a poſitive law, that *whoſoever believeth ſhall be ſaved*, and herehence it followeth, that if all and every one, from the beginning of the World to the end, ſhall believe in Chriſt, all and every one of them ſhall be ſaved. But when *they ſpeake of velleity in God*, or wiſhing, the object thereof they make not to be *the ſalvation of men in caſe they repent*, but abſolutely *the ſalvation of men*: which kind of *velleity*, is reſolved indeed in the iſſue, into a conditionate will, thus; Gods will is, that all ſhall be ſaved in caſe they repent: not thus, *I doe wiſh that all may be ſaved in caſe they repent*, according to the moſt abſurd fiction of this Author. At length he grants that *God will have all men to be ſaved, only upon condition they will believe and repent; and that conditionall promiſe may be ſerious, as well as an abſolute: but then* (ſaith he) *the condition muſt be poſſible to them, to whom the offer and promiſe is made, and the performance of the condition muſt be a part of Gods will, as well as the ſalvation promiſed, or elſe the promiſe cannot be candid and ſincere*. Whereto I anſwer, that it is confeſſed on both ſides, that God hath ordained, that all that believe ſhall be ſaved, and conſequently it muſt be granted, that the promiſe of ſalvation hereupon, to wit, upon faith, muſt needs be candid and ſincere, it being the promiſe of God. Now ſhall we herehence inferre hand over head, that therefore *the condition muſt be poſſible unto all, in ſpight* of all other evidences to the contrary, though never ſo plainly and expreſſely laid downe unto us in holy Scripture; as namely, that a *naturall man perceives not the things of God, they are fooliſhneſſe unto him, neither can he know them, becauſe they are ſpiritually diſcerned*. 1 *Cor.* 2. 14. That they that are in the fleſh cannot pleaſe God. *Rom.* 8. 8. That they who are accuſtomed to doe evill, can no more doe good, then a Blackemore change his skinne, or the Leopard his

his ſpots. *Jer.* 13.23. This is the immodeſt courſe of this Author, to ſet up one piece of Scripture, by his paltry conſequences, to outface another, nothing leſſe evident. Notwithſtanding this Scripture diſcovereth unto us, how this impotency of doing good, is contracted unto us all, by ſinning in *Adam*, as whereupon we were bereaved of grace, and of the ſpirit of God: yet if he would deale fairely, and deny originall ſinne, he ſhould erre no more then *Pelagius* did, and withall, he ſhould have as much ingenuity as *Pelagius* had: But now though equall to him in the one, yet is he inferiour to him in the other. But come we nearer to him than ſo; What one of our Divines denyeth the performance of this condition to be poſſible to al men? But is it fit that he ſhould talke of poſſibility (as he doth at large,) without any reference to the grace of God? And dares he ſay that it is poſſible to any man, whether elect or reprobate, without grace? I ſay he dares not ſay ſo much, though like enough, he and all the Sect of them, have a good mind to it. What then is the iſſue of all this Controverſy between us, but to enquire what manner of grace that is, without which it cannot be, that any ſhould believe? Is it only ſuch a grace, as gives only power to believe? This is no better than plain Pelagianiſme, as appears by *Auſtin de grat. Chriſt. con. Pelag. & cæleſt. c. 6.* and in the end, where he comes to make an overture for the compounding of the Controverſy between them: Or, Is it ſome other grace prevenient, working only Morally by way of perſwaſion? This alſo appears clearely to have been the opinion of *Pelagius*, in the ſame book of *Auſtin* cap. 10. And he challengeth him to the acknowledging of another manner of grace, if he will not only be called a Chriſtian, but be indeed a Chriſtian: Or Laſtly, is it only grace ſubſequent, by way of concourſe, as to ſay, that God workes in us the act of believing, provided that we will believe? This, this is that *Helena*, that our homeborne Arminians are inamoured with, meere Pelagianiſme: for who ſeeth not, that thus *the grace of faith is conferred according to the acts of willing in men*, which is as much as to ſay, tis conferred according to works. Then marke yet farther abſurdities; for thus God hath not mercy on whom he will in giving faith, but on whom man will; and what colour is there in this caſe, for any ſuch objection to be made hereupon, as is deviſed by the Apoſtle? Thou wilt ſay then, why doth he yet complaine, for who hath reſiſted his will? Further conſider; Doth not God in this manner concurre to the moſt ſinfull act that is commited in the world? And why then doe we not as well ſay; that the commiſſion of ſinne is not poſſible without grace ſubſequent; for certainly tis not poſſible without divine concourſe. Laſtly ſay farther, what is the grace required to the very act of willing; Doth God work this alſo by grace ſubſequent? As much as to ſay, God works in us the act of willing, provided we worke it in our ſelves. Such morſells as theſe can eaſily goe downe with theſe ſtomacks, which are apt to tumultuate upon the hearing that God hath power to make whom he will veſſells of mercy, or veſſells of wrath; man muſt be the crafts-maſter of his own fortunes, and it were neither agreeable to Gods mercy, nor to his juſtice, nor to his truth, unleſſe their free-will hath the greateſt glory of their converſion; and God be admitted no more to the working of that act of faith, and of repentance, than to the working of the moſt ſinfull act that is committed in the world. But I find it nothing ſtrange, that as many as refuſe to be in ſubjection unto God, have liberty enough to be made vaſſalls, and be brought in ſubjection unto their own corrupt and unreaſonable fancies. For the word of God forſooth muſt be tempered, and interpreted according to the rules of their reaſon; their reaſon muſt not be ordered, and ſquared according unto the word of God. But to proceed, the Lawyers rule of the nullity of a contract, *ſub conditione impræſtabili*, is nothing to the preſent purpoſe: For the caſe is not alike between man and man; and between God and man. God ſtands not at the pleaſure of man, to contract in what manner he thinks good. And when he hath given him power to performe, whatſoever at any time he ſhall command him; if man diſable himſelfe, ſhall God hereby be deprived of his right to command what he thinks good, and to puniſh for diſobedience as he thinks good? We read of ſome, that have cut off their thumbs, to diſable themſelves for military ſervice: is it not juſt with men to puniſh ſuch, as runne away after they have received their preſſe monies? But there is yet another geofaile in the accommodation of this rule of Law. For, *conditio impræſtabilis* there, is ſuch as cannot be performed by reaſon of impotency naturall; but the impotency we ſpeake of, in the caſe between God and man, is meerely impotency morall; to wit, therefore they cannot, becauſe they will not, were it not for the corrup-

Ro. 9. 18, 19.

Rom: 9. 21, 22, 23.

tion of their will, no power were wanting in man to believe, and repent. But as *Auſtin* ſaith, alleadged by the Brittaine Divines out of *Retract.* 1. 15. *Voluntas ſine charitate eſt tota vitioſa cupiditas*; and upon the 3d and 4th artic. *De converſione, qua denotat immediatum opus Dei hominem regenerantis. Theſi.* 2. They profeſſe that *in voluntate lapſa eſt potentia paſſiva ad eſſe hoc ſupernaturale extrinſecus adveniens, recipiendum, non autem activa, ad idem vel per ſe, vel cum alio producendum. Jer.* 17.14. *Sana me domine & Sanabor.* And out of the Synodicall Epiſtle of the Biſhops of Africa to the ſame purpoſe, they alleadge this paſſage, *In vivificandis hominibus Deus nullum initium voluntatis humanæ expectat, ſed ipſam voluntatem bonam faciendo vivificat.* And alſo that of *Auſtin de corep. & gra. cap.* 14. *Creatio in Chriſto in libertatem voluntatis facta eſt, & ſine nobis: ſi in libertatem, tum non ex libertate: ſi ſine nobis, tum penes nos non eſt hoc Dei opus impedire.* Be it all one *to deny a piece of mony flatly to a blind man, and to promiſe it upon a condition, that he will looke upon it with his eyes*: In like ſort, as touching the Reprobate, God hath no purpoſe to give ſalvation, but to deny
Mark. 16.16. it rather; although he give this generall rule, that whoſoever believeth ſhall be ſaved; and therefore he gives this rule, becauſe he purpoſeth by theſe means, to draw his elect unto Chriſt by faith; ſuch a manner being moſt agreeable to their reaſonable natures. And the reaſon why the rule is propoſed to all, is, becauſe partly Gods Miniſters are not acquainted with Gods counſell ſo farre, as to know whom he hath elected; partly in reſpect that the more carnall men are, the more confident they are of performing any ſuch duties, I meane of power to performe it, as namely to believe, to obey, to repent: partly to the end, that ſome hereby may be brought, *ad exteriorem vitæ emendationem, quo mitius puniantur*, as *Auſtin* ſometimes ſpeaketh: as alſo becauſe there is a kind of faith, performeable by a naturall man; for we ſee both prophane perſons and Hypocrites, concurre in an outward profeſſion of Chriſtianity, with the children of God: yet there is a great difference between blindneſſe naturall, and blindneſſe ſpirituall; for in the one there is a will and deſire to ſee, not ſo in the other; the one being impotency naturall, the other morall. And in a word, there is no impotency morall in man, that hath not been brought upon him through ſinne, either originall, of actuall. As for the ſpanning of the earth, or touching the heaven with ones finger, this never was in the power of man; but to believe any word of God, I hope this Author will not deny to have been ſometimes in the power of man: nay he ſeems to be of opinion, that it is in the power of all men ſtill, yet he would not be thought to deny originall ſinne. One thing yet remaines to be conſidered; he ſaid *to whom the promiſe of ſalvation is made, the performance of the condition, muſt be a part of Gods will, as well as the ſalvation promiſed*: But of what will of God muſt this be a part? Of his will as it ſignifies his commandement? We grant it is; for he commands, ſaying, Repent and believe the Goſpell; and by this commandement it is apparent, that it is the will of God, that it ſhall be the duty of every man, that hears this commandement, to obey it. But will he have it a part of Gods will, to worke it effectually in all? And how I pray? Either by way of grace prevenient, or by way of grace ſubſequent? Not by way of grace prevenient, for then all that heare the Goſpell, ſhould believe and be ſaved; for to worke Faith effectually that way, is to worke the will unto Faith. As for the working of it by way of grace *ſubſequent*; this I have been lately taught by an Arminian, to be no other than the working of it by way of concourſe, and that depends on the will of man: and we doe not deny, but that if any Reprobate will believe, God will concurre to the working of this beliefe; but ſo we ſay, (and no Arminian that I know will deny it) that if man will work any ſinfull act, God will concurre to the working of it; in as much as 'tis generally held, that no acts of the creature, can be performed without Gods concurrence thereunto. Now how well, and how judicially this Author hath plaid his part in ſhewing the contrariety of our opinion to the Attributes of God, I am content the indifferent may judge.

TWISSE.

DISCOURSE.

The third sort of Reasons, namely, that it is contrary to the nature and end of Gods gifts conferred upon men.

SECT. I.

THirdly, it is contrary to the nature and end of Gods giftes conferred upon, men which gifts are of two sorts:

1. Gifts of nature, our creation, sustentation; preservation, together with health, strength, beauty, wisdome; &c.

2. Gifts of grace, which have a more immediate relation to everlasting life, and are means either, 1. Of purchasing salvation, *viz.* the coming of Christ into the world to be made a sacrifice for sinne; or. 2. Of applying the salvation purchased, namely, the Ministry of the Word and Sacraments, the long suffering of God, the illumination of mens understandings, the plantation of many excellent vertues in their hearts, and many more of the like sort.

What the true use and end of these gifts of nature and grace is, the Scripture doth plainly and particularly shew us. First, for the gifts of nature, we find that they are bestowed on all that have them, for the encouraging and enabling of them to serve God, and save their soules: for, *Act.* 14. 16, 17. the Apostle saith, that God (even in these times wherein he permitted the Gentiles to walke in their own wayes, and with-held from them the light of his holy word,) did give unto the people of the world, raine from Heaven, and fruitfull seasons, filling their harts with food and gladnes, by these not leaving him selfe without witnesse: which implyes that he gave them these good things, make himselfe known unto them, and so that he might draw them to glorify him, according to their knowledge of him, *Acts.* 17. 26. The Apostle saith directly, that men are therefore made and placed in this world, and appointed to their severall times and dwellings; that they may seeke God and finde him, that is, that they may serve him and save themselves; for what is it to seeke God but to serve him? And what is it to finde God, but to enjoy his face and favour here and in Heaven? *Cælum quippe & terra & mare, omnisq; creatura quæ videri & intelligi potest, ad hanc præcipue disposita est humani generis utilitatem; & natura rationalis de contemplatione tot specierum, & de experimentis tot bonorum, de perceptione tot munerum, ad cultum & dilectionem sui imbueretur auctoris, implentis omnia spiritu Dei, in quo vivimus, movemur, & sumus.* They are the words of *Prosper*: therefore is every creature made and ordained, especially, that mankind which is indued with knowledge and ability to discourse, might by the sight of soe many goodly sorts of creatures, and the tast of so many blessings, be drawne to the love and service of his and their maker. And a little after, in the same Chap. he saith, *Quod ergo in Israel per constitutionem legis, et prophetica eloquia gerebatur, hoc in universis nationibus totius creaturæ testimonia et bonitatis Dei miracula semper egerunt:* looke of what use the law and Prophets were to the Israelites; of the same use were the gifts of creation and providence to the Gentiles. God intended not to doe to the Gentiles (as the *Manichees* say he dealt with the Iewes) to feed them and fat them up with more outward blessings, as so many hoggs and swines with husks and acornes, but to draw them up by these to an expectation of better things, and a carefull endeavour to please God, that soe they might obtaine them. The end of all creatures and of all created gifts bestowed upon man is subordinate to the end of man; mans end is to glorify God on Earth and to enjoy perpetuall society with him in Heaven. And their end is to encourage and direct man to atchieve that high and noble end which his Creator hath appointed him.

Prosper de vocat. gent. l. 2. c. 4. p. 428.

TWISSE

Consideration.

HEre we have a roaving discourse: I must pick out of it what I can, to draw it up to some sense of argument: the ground of all the pith and substance of it, is two places in the *Acts*, and two passages out of *Prosper*. The first out of *Acts* 14. 16, 17. *God in times past suffered all the Gentiles to walke in their own waies; nevertheless he left not himselfe without witnesse, in that he did good, and gave us raine from heaven, and fruitfull seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladnesse.* Now as for the first verse of these

tion of their will, no power were wanting in man to believe, and repent. But as *Auſtin* ſaith, alleadged by the Brittaine Divines out of *Retract.* 1. 15. *Voluntas ſine charitate eſt tota vitioſa cupiditas*; and upon the 3d and 4th artic. *De converſione, qua denotat immediatum opus Dei hominem regenerantis. Theſ.* 2. They profeſſe that *in voluntate lapſa eſt potentia paſſiva ad eſſe hoc ſupernaturale extrinſecus adveniens, recipiendum, non autem activa, ad idem vel per ſe, vel cum alio producendum. Jer.* 17. 14. *Sana me domine & Sanabor.* And out of the Synodicall Epiſtle of the Biſhops of Africa to the ſame purpoſe, they alleadge this paſſage, *In vivificandis hominibus Deus nullum initium voluntatis humanæ expectat, ſed ipſam voluntatem bonam faciendo vivificat.* And alſo that of *Auſtin de corep. & gra. cap.* 14. *Creatio in Chriſto in libertatem voluntatis facta eſt, & ſine nobis: ſi in libertatem, tum non ex libertate: ſi ſine nobis, tum penes nos non eſt hoc Dei opus impedire.* Be it all one *to deny a piece of mony flatly to a blind man, and to promiſe it upon a condition, that he will looke upon it with his eyes*: In like ſort, as touching the Reprobate, God hath no purpoſe to give ſalvation, but to deny
Mark. 16. 16. it rather; although he give this generall rule, that whoſoever believeth ſhall be ſaved; and therefore he gives this rule, becauſe he purpoſeth by theſe means, to draw his elect unto Chriſt by faith; ſuch a manner being moſt agreeable to their reaſonable natures. And the reaſon why the rule is propoſed to all, is, becauſe partly Gods Miniſters are not acquainted with Gods counſell ſo farre, as to know whom he hath elected; partly in reſpect that the more carnall men are, the more confident they are of performing any ſuch duties, I meane of power to performe it, as namely to believe, to obey, to repent: partly to the end, that ſome hereby may be brought, *ad exteriorem vitæ emendationem, quo mitius puniantur*, as *Auſtin* ſometimes ſpeaketh: as alſo becauſe there is a kind of faith, performeable by a naturall man; for we ſee both prophane perſons and Hypocrites, concurre in an outward profeſſion of Chriſtianity, with the children of God: yet there is a great difference between blindneſſe naturall, and blindneſſe ſpirituall; for in the one there is a will and deſire to ſee, not ſo in the other; the one being impotency naturall, the other morall. And in a word, there is no impotency morall in man, that hath not been brought upon him through ſinne, either originall, of actuall. As for the ſpanning of the earth, or touching the heaven with ones finger, this never was in the power of man; but to believe any word of God, I hope this Author will not deny to have been ſometimes in the power of man: nay he ſeems to be of opinion, that it is in the power of all men ſtill, yet he would not be thought to deny originall ſinne. One thing yet remaines to be conſidered; he ſaid *to whom the promiſe of ſalvation is made, the performance of the condition, muſt be a part of Gods will, as well as the ſalvation promiſed*: But of what will of God muſt this be a part? Of his will as it ſignifies his commandement? We grant it is; for he commands, ſaying, Repent and believe the Goſpell; and by this commandement it is apparent, that it is the will of God, that it ſhall be the duty of every man, that hears this commandement, to obey it. But will he have it a part of Gods will, to worke it effectually in all? And how I pray? Either by way of grace prevenient, or by way of grace ſubſequent? Not by way of grace prevenient, for then all that heare the Goſpell, ſhould believe and be ſaved; for to worke Faith effectually that way, is to worke the will unto Faith. As for the working of it by way of grace *ſubſequent*; this I have been lately taught by an Arminian, to be no other than the working of it by way of concourſe, and that depends on the will of man: and we doe not deny, but that if any Reprobate will believe, God will concurre to the working of this beliefe; but ſo we ſay, (and no Arminian that I know will deny it) that if man will work any ſinfull act, God will concurre to the working of it; in as much as 'tis generally held, that no acts of the creature, can be performed without Gods concurrence thereunto. Now how well, and how judicially this Author hath plaid his part in ſhewing the contrariety of our opinion to the Attributes of God, I am content the indifferent may judge.

TWISSE.

DISCOURSE.

The third ſort of Reaſons, namely, that it is contrary to the nature and end of Gods gifts conferred upon men.

SECT. I.

Thirdly, it is contrary to the nature and end of Gods giftes conferred upon, men which gifts are of two ſorts:

1. Gifts of nature, our creation, ſuſtentation; preſervation, together with health, ſtrength, beauty, wiſdome; &c.

2. Gifts of grace, which have a more immediate relation to everlaſting life, and are means either, 1. Of purchaſing ſalvation, *viz.* the coming of Chriſt into the world to be made a ſacrifice for ſinne; or. 2. Of applying the ſalvation purchaſed, namely, the Miniſtry of the Word and Sacraments, the long ſuffering of God, the illumination of mens underſtandings, the plantation of many excellent vertues in their hearts, and many more of the like ſort.

What the true uſe and end of theſe gifts of nature and grace is, the Scripture doth plainly and particularly ſhew us. Firſt, for the gifts of nature, we find that they are beſtowed on all that have them, for the encouraging and enabling of them to ſerve God, and ſave their ſoules: for, *Act.* 14. 16, 17. the Apoſtle ſaith, that God (even in theſe times wherein he permitted the Gentiles to walke in their own wayes, and with-held from them the light of his holy word,) did give unto the people of the world, raine from Heaven, and fruitfull ſeaſons, filling their harts with food and gladnes, by theſe not leaving him ſelfe without witneſſe: which implyes that he gave them theſe good things, make himſelfe known unto them, and ſo that he might draw them to glorify him, according to their knowledge of him, *Acts.* 17. 26. The Apoſtle ſaith directly, that men are therefore made and placed in this world, and appointed to their ſeverall times and dwellings; that they may ſeeke God and finde him, that is, that they may ſerve him and ſave themſelves; for what is it to ſeeke God but to ſerve him? And what is it to finde God, but to enjoy his face and favour here and in Heaven? *Cælum quippe & terra & mare, omniſq; creatura quæ videri & intelligi poteſt, ad hanc præcipue diſpoſita eſt humani generis utilitatem; & natura rationalis de contemplatione tot ſpecierum, & de experimentis tot bonorum, de perceptione tot munerum, ad cultum & dilectionem ſui imbueretur author is, implentis omnia ſpiritu Dei, in quo vivimus, movemur, & ſumus.* They are the words of *Proſper*: therefore is every creature made and ordained, eſpecially, that mankind which is indued with knowledge and ability to diſcourſe, might by the ſight of ſoe many goodly ſorts of creatures, and the taſt of ſo many bleſſings, be drawne to the love and ſervice of his and their maker. And a little after, in the ſame Chap. he ſaith, *Quod ergo in Iſrael per conſtitutionem legis, et prophetica eloquia gerebatur, hoc in univerſis nationibus totius creaturæ teſtimonia et bonitatis Dei miracula ſemper egerunt*: looke of what uſe the law and Prophets were to the Iſraelites; of the ſame uſe were the gifts of creation and providence to the Gentiles. God intended not to doe to the Gentiles (as the *Manichees* ſay he dealt with the Iewes) to feed them and fat them up with more outward bleſſings, as ſo many hoggs and ſwines with huſks and acornes, but to draw them up by theſe to an expectation of better things, and a carefull endeavour to pleaſe God, that ſoe they might obtaine them. The end of all creatures and of all created gifts beſtowed upon man is ſubordinate to the end of man; mans end is to glorify God on Earth and to enjoy perpetuall ſociety with him in Heaven. And their end is to encourage and direct man to atchieve that high and noble end which his Creator hath appointed him.

Proſper de vocat. gent. l. 2. c. 4. p. 428.

TWISSE

Conſideration.

Here we have a roaving diſcourſe: I muſt pick out of it what I can, to draw it up to ſome ſenſe of argument: the ground of all the pith and ſubſtance of it, is two places in the *Acts*, and two paſſages out of *Proſper*. The firſt out of *Acts* 14. 16, 17. *God in times paſt ſuffered all the Gentiles to walke in their own waies; nevertheleſſe he left not himſelfe without witneſſe, in that he did good, and gave us raine from heaven, and fruitfull ſeaſons, filling our hearts with food and gladneſſe.* Now as for the firſt verſe of theſe

theſe, he is content to ſay nothing at all thereof; neither to deliver what thoſe wayes were, nor in what ſenſe God is ſaid to ſuffer them to walke therein: which yet may eaſily be cleared, by comparing it with what is delivered, *Acts* 17.30. Where the times preceding the Goſpell, are called *times of ignorance*. The times *of this ignorance*, and this agreeth with the comparative difference made between Jewes and Gentiles, *Pſal.* 147. 19. *He ſheweth his words unto Iacob, his ſtatutes and judgements unto Iſraell.* v.20. *He hath not dealt ſo with any Nation: and as for his judgements, they have not known them.* So that by the *wayes of the Gentiles*, I underſtand *the wayes of Ignorance*; and theſe are no other than the wayes of darkneſſe, and can bring forth no better fruit, than the works of darkneſſe; according to that of the Apoſtle, *Epheſ.*5.8. Ye were darkneſſe but now are
Rom.13.12. light in the Lord, walke therefore as children of the light. And againe, the night is paſſed, the day is at hand, let us therefore caſt away the workes of darkneſſe, and put upon us the armour of light. And as for Gods ſuffering of them to walke in thoſe wayes, that is expreſſed in another phraſe, *Acts* 17.30. thus, And the *times of this ignorance God winked at*; and the meaning thereof appeares by the Antitheſis, in the adverſative following, thus, *But now he admoniſheth every man every where to repent.* Thus formerly he dealt with the Jewes, giving them a law, and ſending Prophets from time to time, to call them to obedience, to repentance: but ſuch were not his gracious proceedings with the Gentiles. But give we him leave to follow his own advantage. God left not himſelfe without witneſſe, in ſending raine and fruitfull ſeaſons. So it was in moſt places, I know none but Egypt excepted, and that is to be excepted; not only by evidence of Phyloſophicall inquiſition after the cauſe thereof, in that queſti-
Deut.11. 10, 11, 12. on, *Utrum Ægyptus ſit implaviata?* but by evidence out of Gods word. *Deut.* 11. 10, 11, 12. *The land whether thou goeſt to poſſeſſe, is not as the Land of Ægypt, from whence ye came, where thou ſowedſt thy ſeed, and wateredſt it with thy foot as a garden of hearbs; but the land whither ye goe to poſſeſſe it, is a land of mountaines and vallies, and drinketh water of the raine of heaven. This Land doth the Lord your God care for; the eyes of the Lord thy God are upon it, from the beginning of the yeare to the end of the yeare.* Yet had they fruitfull ſeaſons by the inundation of *Nilus*; but this was not ſo apt to diſpoſe them, to take notice of a divine providence, as the common courſe of fructifying the Land by raine. But yet the whole world in the frame thereof, was ſufficient evidence of the *Eternall power and Godhead. Rom.* 1.20. and *Pſal.*19. 1. *The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament ſheweth his handy worke.* And albeit *Ariſtotle*, the greateſt of Philoſophers, maintained the eternity thereof without beginning; yet he confeſſeth ingeniouſly in his Book *De cælo*, that all that went before him maintained *mundum genitum eſſe*; neither was his diſcourſe of power to raze out that naturall inſtinct hereof, which ſeems to be graven in the hearts of men, and was the chiefe ground of that univerſall acknowledgment of a divine power ſupreame. Now as God made himſelf known by his works ſo I nothing doubt but herewithall it was their duty to know him, and according to their knowledge to ſerve him and glorifie him, in acknowledgment of his glorious nature, ſo farre as they took notice of it; But as for a rule whereby they ſhould worſhip him, I know none that God had given them, or that they could gather from contemplation of the creatures. And ſurely the knowledge of God, as a Creator only, is nothing ſufficient to ſalvation; but the knowledge of him as a redeemer: And therefore *ſeeing the World by wiſdome knew not God in the wiſdome of God, it pleaſed God by the fooliſhneſſe of Preaching to ſave them that believe.* 1 *Cor.* 1.21. And the Gentiles are ſet forth unto us in Scripture, as ſuch *who knew not God.* 1 *Theſ.* 4.5. 2 *Theſ.* 1.8. And had they means ſufficient without, and ability ſufficient within to know him? How could it be that none of them ſhould know him? Was it becauſe they would not? How abſurd a conceit is this to every one that underſtands, and conſiders common Principles of Philoſophy, namely, that the things that are ſubject to our free-will, are *contingentia æqualiter*, as ſoon falling out one way as the other? And it is well known not only what paines they have taken, but alſo with what ſtrange ſucceſſe, in ſearching after the nature of the firſt mover, as appears by *Ariſtotle* in the 12th of his Metaphyſicks. Yet did not he attain (for ought ever I could find) to the acknowledgement of his free agency, in the making of the world, and in the government thereof. Yet were they inexcuſable (and
Rom.1.23. thus farre their knowledge brought them. *Rom.*1.20.) in changing *the glory of the incorruptible God, to the ſimilitude of the image of a corruptible man, and of birds, and of fourefooted beaſts, and of creeping things.* The other place is *Acts* 17.26. That he takes to be more full for his purpoſe; there the Apoſtle ſpeaking in an Univerſity, and which had been miſe-

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rably corrupted with the Atheiſticall doctrine of *Ariſtotle*, concerning an eternity of the World, and Gods working neceſſarily, not freely, tending to the quenching of that light of naturall inſtinct, which is more or leſſe found in all, as touching the Divine providence; yet the Apoſtle even amongſt ſuch makes bold to ſuppoſe the creation of the World by God; and that therefore he is Lord of Heaven and Earth; and alſo obtrudeth upon their naturall conſciences, that *God it is who giveth life, and breath, and all things*; and *that he of one bloud* (whom we know to be *Adam*) *made all mankind, to dwell on all the face of the Earth*; that he hath aſſigned the ſeaſons (of the yeare, and what are they but Spring, Summer, Autumne, Winter, depending upon the motions of the heaven above) *and the bounds of their habitations*, what is that but the ſeverall habitable parts of the earth, for the habitation of all creatures, in whoſe Noſtrills is the breath of life; not that every man, or Nation, hath his place of habitation appoynted by God, (though this alſo be true, but nothing agreeable to Arminian Divinity, which like an Eaſt wind, blaſts the providence of God throughout) this the Apoſtle doth not obtrude upon them; but the former generalls only; and all this God hath done ζητεῖν τὸ κύριον, that *they ſhould ſeeke the Lord*; now this may be underſtood two waies, either *de facto*, God did intend that this indeed ſhould be done by them; or *ex officio*, that it ſhould be their duty: of this diſtinction this Author takes no notice, but hand over head, takes it in the firſt ſenſe, as it were in ſpight both of the Apoſtle, ſaying, Who hath reſiſted his will? And of the Pſalmiſt, profeſſing that what *he willeth he hath done, both in Heaven and Earth*. But indeed this is mans duty to endeavour to know him that made him: to this purpoſe he hath indued him with an underſtanding hçart; The ſpirit of man being as the lampe of God which ſearcheth all inwardneſſe; But as for the words following, *if happily they might* Prov. 20.27. *ſeeke after him and find him*; though he be not farre from every one of us; ſo that though he be not farre from every one of us, in as much as in him *we live and move, and have our being*, and though they ſhould ſeeke after him, yet upon an if, the Apoſtle plainly puts the finding of him. For albeit *Durand* profeſſeth, that by the very light of nature we may attaine to the knowledge of God, touching theſe things that belong to the unity of his nature; yet who ever amongſt the Gentiles attained hereunto, after all their ſearch? God *hath ſet the World in mans heart*, ſaith *Solomon*, yet can he *not find out* Eccleſ. 3. 11. *the worke that he hath wrought from the beginning to the end*: we are yet to ſeeke in the knowledge of the creature, how much more in the knowledge of the Creator? Yet what ſhall all ſuch knowledge profit a man, if he be ignorant in the knowledge of him as a redeemer?

I come to *Proſper l. 2. De vocatione Gentium cap. 4.* God hath ſo diſpoſed of the World, as *that the reaſonable creature, by the contemplation of Gods workes, and taſt of ſo many bleſſings, imbueretur*, he doth not ſay *might be drawne*, but *imbueretur, might be indued*, to wit, with the knowledge of God in ſuch ſort, as to *move him ad cultum & dilectionem Dei*. And all here mentioned both as touching the knowledge of God, and touching the ſervice and love of him; is but as the object of mans duty, ſignifying what ought to be done by him, not as the object of Gods decree, as whereby he determined what ſhould be done indeed by him. For had he determined this, who could have reſiſted him? Shall we ſay that *voluntatis omnipotentis effectus impeditur a voluntate creaturæ*, as *Auſtin* expreſſeth the abſurdity hereof? As for that which followeth, not in the ſame Chapter, as this Author writes, (whether out of his own reading or miſtaking anothers dictates I know not) but in the chapter following, to wit, c. 2. the former place being indeed c. 1. according to my book, not cap. 4. As this Author quotes it. And it is a truth conſidered in generall, for ζητεῖν τὸ κύριον, to ſeeke the Lord, God did move both Jewes and Gentiles; the Jewes by his word over & above his workes; but the Gentiles only by his workes. But the manner of the revelation made to the one and to the other, was farre different, as the ſame Author expreſſeth cap. 3. *Aliter eos juvit quos ad cognoſcendum ſe cæli & terræ teſtimoniis conveniebat, aliter illos, quibus non ſolum elementorum famulatu ſed etiam doctrina legis Prophetarum, oraculis, miraculorum ſignis, & Angelorum cooperationibus conſulebat, &c.* God (he ſaith) *intended not to feed the Gentiles with outward and more common bleſſings, but to draw them up by theſe to an expectation of better things, and a carefull endeavour to pleaſe God that they might obtain them.* But what bleſſings had the Gentiles more than common bleſſings; doth he particulate any? And as for the expectation of better things, than the things of this world, whereunto he pretends God doth draw them hereby; what oracle hath he for this? *Proſper* in the Book wherein Enchirid. cap. 96.

he inſiſts hath nothing at all of any poſſibility of knowledge of God unto ſalvation, arriveable unto by the meere contemplation of the creature; neither have I found any ſuch Oracle throughout the Nation of the Arminians. Nay he profeſſeth plainly, that that knowledge of God, which is attaineable by the contemplation of the creature is not ſufficient, unleſſe he enjoy the true light, to diſcuſſe the darkneſſe of mans heart. *De vocatione Gent. l.2. cap.6.* his words are theſe. *Tam acerbo natura humana vulnere ſauciata eſt, ut ad cognitionem Dei neminem contemplatio ſpontanea plenè valeat erudire, niſi obumbrationem cordis vera lux diſcuſſerit.* And the Apoſtle more than once profeſſeth
Epheſ.2.12. of the *Gentiles*, *that they were without hope*; And the taſt of the powers of the world
1 Theſ.4.13. to come, ſeemes to be, by the Apoſtle, aſcribed to the word of God as the cauſe of it. *Heb. 6.* Yet 'tis true, the Heathen had odde notions of a condition after death, (as many as believed the immortality of the ſoule) but where I pray, was it upwards in heaven, or downewards rather under the earth, as *Styx*, *Phlegeton*? and the *Campi Eliſii*? yet *Cicero* looks upwards I confeſſe in his *Tuſculans* queſtions, but yet he goes no farther than the ſtarres; and this was their expectation of better things; though *Adrian* an Emperour and a Schollar too, bemoans himſelfe, that he knew not what ſhould become of his poore ſoule, *Animula vagula blandula, Hoſpes comeſq; corporis; Quæ tu abibis in loca, nec ut ſoles dabis jocos, horridula, rigida, nudula.* But this Author moſt confidently ſuppoſeth, that theſe better things are manifeſt by the creatures; by the contemplation whereof, he might attaine to the knowledge of them: and then I doubt not, but he might entertaine a hope to attaine them; provided he carefully endeavoured to pleaſe God, (which this Author conceaves to have been very poſſible) and therewithall knew what that was, by doing whereof, he might be ſure to pleaſe God: And all this he obtrudes upon his Reader, by a moſt diſſolute courſe, without one crumme of reaſon for it. In like ſort, he diſcourſeth very confidently of the end of man, without diſtinction of any relation hereof; as if the end of man were equally known as well by light of nature, as by revelation of Gods
Prov.16.4. word. *Solomon* telleth us, *That God made all things for himſelfe, even the wicked againſt the day of evill.* Was this known to the Gentiles by the light of nature? Not one of all the Philoſophers of old acknowledged the Worlds creation out of nothing; and who ever manifeſted any ſuch faith among them, as of enjoying a perpetuall ſociety with God in heaven? But it may be they all erred in interpreting the book of nature aright, and underſtanding the language thereof concerning this poynt of faith. This Author may doe well to cleare the World of this errour, and that out of the book of the creatures, and then proceed to interpret unto us therehence, a generall reſurrection alſo. And if he could find Chriſt there too, togeather with the Incarnation of the Sonne of God, and his death and paſſion, reſurrection and aſcenſion, and ſitting at the right hand of God to make requeſts for us, and our juſtification by faith in him, togeather with regenera-
1 Cor.1.32. tion alſo, and the generall judgement; then no doubt though the Goſpell ſhould continue to be a ſcandall to the Jewes, yet ſurely through the incomprehenſible benefit of his comfortable atchievements, it ſhould continue no longer to be fooliſhneſſe unto the Gentiles; only our faith ſhould then ceaſe, and be turned into ſight, before we are brought to the ſeeing of the face of God. And yet I ſee no great need of Chriſt, if it be in the power of an Heathen man to know what it is to pleaſe God, and to have an heart to pleaſe him; For certainly as many as know what it is to pleaſe God, and have an heart to pleaſe him, God will never hurt them, much leſſe damne
Rom.8.8. them to hell. Yet the Apoſtle telleth us, that *they that are in the fleſh cannot pleaſe God*: but whether this Author thinks Heathens, to be amongſt the number of them that are in the fleſh, I know not. But I little wonder, when an Arminian ſpirit of giddineſſe hath poſſeſſed him, if he proceed to the confounding not only of the Law with the Goſpell, but heatheniſme alſo (ſuch as might be) with Chriſtianity. But ſuppoſe a man might attaine to as much knowledge, by the meere contemplation of the book of nature, as we doe obtain by the Revelation of Gods word, yet we that conceive the knowledge of Gods word to be no impediment to the abſoluteneſſe of reprobation, muſt needs find our ſelves as much as nothing ſtreightned herein, by this Authors roaving diſcourſe, as touching the generall providence of God in his works: as long as
Rom.9.18. that of the Apoſtle (*he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth*) ſhall ſtand and be received for the word of God; we ſhall never want ground for maintaining the abſoluteneſſe both of election by the one, and by juſt proportion, of Reprobation alſo

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by the other. For ſo long as God doth abſolutely, and according to the meere pleaſure of his will, decree to have mercy upon ſome, by giving them faith and repentance, for the curing of their infidelity and hardneſſe of heart, this is very ſufficient to maintain the abſoluteneſſe of election unto grace, and if God doth abſolutely, and according to the meere pleaſure of his will decree, to harden others, by denying them the grace of faith and repentance, ſo to leave their naturall infidelity and hardneſſe of heart uncured, this ſhall be as ſufficient to maintaine the abſoluteneſſe of Reprobation from grace. As for election unto ſalvation, though the decree thereof can admit no cauſe, yet we ſay that God by this decree, doth not decree to beſtow ſalvation on any man of ripe yeares, but by way of reward of faith, repentance, and good workes: as for the decree of Reprobation from glory, and to damnation; though the decree hath no cauſe, yet we ſay that God by this decree, doth not decree to inflict damnation on any, but for ſinne unrepented of: only I confeſſe, that as touching the interpretation of thoſe words of Saint *Paul*, (*He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth*) I doe not know how it may be charmed by good witts, leaſt it may ſeem repugnant to ſome reaſon gathered by contemplation of the creatures; for ſome affect, ſuch a courſe in theſe daies, namely to temper Gods word according to the light of naturall reaſon; whereas in the ſimplicity of inſtitution wherein I have been brought up, I have been taught that the light of naturall reaſon ought rather to be regulated by the word of God. Rom. 9. 18.

DISCOURSE.

SECT. II.

NOw for the gifts of grace, they are all given to them that enjoy them for the ſame uſe and end alſo.

1. Chriſt came into the world, not that he might be a rock of offence, at which the greater part of men might ſtumble and fall; but ſhed his bloud, and by his bloudſhed to purchaſe Salvation unto all mankind, not only for thoſe that are ſaved, but for thoſe alſo who through their wilfull impenitency and unbeliefe are not ſaved; as we may, ſee, *Iohn.* 3. 17. God ſent his ſonne (ſaith our Saviour) into the world, not to condemne the world, but that the world through him might be ſaved; In which words the end of his coming into the world is ſet downe; 1. Negatively [not to condemne the world.] 2. Affirmatively. [But that the world through him might be ſaved] and therefore fully. The like ſpeech we have, *Iohn* 12. 47. I came not to judg the world but to ſave it. Theſe Negatives joyned with the Affirmative deliveryes of the end of Chriſts comming ſhew that the Salvation of all men was the only end of his coming, the end excluſively, no other end was properly intended but this. The ſonne of man came to ſeeke and to ſave that which was loſt *Luk.* 19. 10. that is every man becauſe every man was loſt. And *Acts* 3. 26. To you hath God ſent his Sonne Ieſus to bleſſe you in turning every one of you from your iniquityes [every one] that is, you that reject him, as well as you that receive him. The end of Chriſts coming then into the world was the Salvation of all and every one therein.

TWISSE

Conſideration.

IF the gifts of grace are given for the ſame uſe and end, for which was given *Creation and Providence to the Gentiles*; then look to what end the gifts of grace are given, to the ſame end tends the making and governing of the World by God: as much as to ſay, look to what end tends the Book of Gods Word, to the ſame end tends the Book of Gods Creatures. And like as

Chriſt came into the World for the ſalvation of all, and every one. So the book of Gods creatures was given for the ſame end, namely, for the ſalvation of all and every one; and conſequently it followeth (ſeeing Gods wiſdome preſcribes congruous means to the end intended by him) that the book of the creatures, is a very congruous means for the ſalvation of all and every one. But whether this Author will have that knowledge of God revealed in the book of the creatures, tend only to this end, like as he ſaith, Chriſt came into the world, only to this end, I know not: Sure I am
Rom.1. 19, 20. that Saint *Paul* ſaith, that *the inviſible things of God are made manifeſt from the creation in his works, even his eternall power and Godhead,* εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἀναπολογήτους, that they might be without excuſe.

In the next place he tells us poſitively, *that Chriſt came not into the World, that he might be a rock of offence, at which the greater part of men might ſtumble and fall; but to ſhed his bloud, and by his bloudſhed to purchaſe ſalvation for all mankind,* &c. But this Antitheſis which here he makes, is ſtark naught; For this very ſhedding of his bloud, in a word *Chriſt crucified,* this very thing (I ſay) was it, that was both a *Scandall to the Jewes, and fooliſhneſſe to the Gentiles. 1 Cor.1.23.* And that not only the *greater part of men might ſtumble and fall at this rock of offence,* but all and every one, I thought it had been without all queſtion: Nay undoubtedly all had ſtumbled, that is, had been taken with unbeliefe, if God in mercy had not provided better for them by the power of his grace. For dare any Arminian deny faith to be the gift of God? But was it not Gods will that not only the greater part might ſtumble, but that indeed they ſhould *de facto ſtumble at this rock, and fall;* and conſequently that Chriſt came into the World, with ſuch a purpoſe of God concerning them? I prove it thus; Firſt out of *Iſaiah. 8.14. He ſhall be as a ſtone of ſtumbling, and a rock of offence to both the houſes of Iſrael, for a gin and for a ſnare to the inhabitants of Ieruſalem.* 2. Againe, 1 *Pet.2.8.* The Apoſtle profeſſeth, that *To them who are diſobedient, Chriſt is made a ſtone to ſtumble at, and a rock of offence, being diſobedient:* and addeth expreſſely, that *hereunto they were ordained.* 3. Thirdly, Did not God intend that they ſhould not be of God, as many as are not regenerated by him? If he did intend this, (and how can a man be of God, but by Gods making, and how is this poſſible to be done, without God his intending of it?) Then alſo he did intend *they ſhould not heare Chriſts words, and conſequently, that they ſhould ſtumble at him; for therefore men heare not Chriſts words, becauſe they are not of God. Iohn 8.47.* Yet let him winne his opinion by argument, and weare it. But that out of *Iohn 3.17. God ſent his Sonne into the world, not to condemne the world, but that the world ſhould be ſaved by him,* is a great deale too ſhort to make the Child a coate; likewiſe that *Iohn 12.47.* is of no farther extent. The terme *World* in each is an indefinite terme, and it is in a contingent matter, and therefore it is equivalent only to a particular propoſition, and not to an univerſall; Had it been delivered not of the world only, but of all the world, nor ſo only, but of all men in the world? yet *Proſper*, ſo much inſiſted upon by this Author, hath provided to our hands a faire interpretation, namely, that all men in Scripture phraſe, is taken ſometimes for *all the elect only.* As *De vocatione gent. l.2.c.1. Apparuit gratia ſalutaris Dei omnibus hominibus, & tamen miniſtri gratiæ odio erant omnibus hominibus: habente quidem ſalutis ſuæ damnum rebellium portione, ſed obtinente plenitudinis cenſum fidelium dignitate.* And *lib.1. c.3. Habet ergo populus Dei plenitudinem in electis & præſcitis atq; ab hominum generalitate diſcretis, ſpecialis quædam eſt univerſitas.* Yet in my judgement, our Saviours words in each place tend only to ſhew, that his coming into the World in humility, was only to performe the worke of mans redemption; and not to pronounce the ſentence of condemnation on any, as he ſhall doe at the laſt judgement, when he ſhall come in glory. And yet becauſe much is to be done for a quiet life, let us diſtinguiſh the benefits of Chriſts merits; Salvation we know is to be conferred on none of ripe yeares, but ſuch as believe and repent; and undoubtedly if all and every one ſhould believe and repent, all and every one ſhould be ſaved by him: on the other ſide, if not one ſhould believe and repent, not one ſhould be ſaved by him. But what doth this Author think of faith and repentance? Are theſe alſo benefits purchaſed unto us by the merits of Chriſt? This is the poynt that puts all the Arminians to their purgation. If they be ſo, then I demand, Whether Chriſt purchaſed theſe to be obtained by all and every one, abſolutely or conditionally? if abſolutely, then all and every one muſt have faith and repentance; and conſequently, all and every one muſt be ſaved: if only conditionally, then let them name upon what condition the gift of faith is to be obtained, and let them look to it, how they avoyd the giving of grace according to

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mens works, which in the phraſe of the Anciens, is the giving of grace according to mens merits. *The ſonne of man came to ſeeke that which was loſt.* Luk. 19.10. We grant that; but when it is added, that is every man, we deny this: As for the reaſon added, for every man was loſt; put theſe propoſitions into a Syllogiſme, and ſee what ſtuffe it will make; thus, *Chriſt came to ſave that which was loſt; every man was loſt; therefore Chriſt came to ſave every man.* Now let every young Sophiſter judge, whether here be not foure termes; had it been ſaid, that Chriſt came to ſave every one that is loſt, the place had been indeed alleadged to the purpoſe. It is alſo ſaid, I am not ſent but to the loſt ſheepe of the houſe of Iſrael; let this be underſtood only as touching the exerciſing of Chriſts Miniſtry among them; for this Author (I ſuppoſe) will not ſay he was ſent to redeem them only; will it herehence follow, that ſeeing every one of them was loſt, therefore he exerciſed his Miniſtry unto every one of them? how improbable a thing is this? How much leſſe did he exerciſe his Miniſtry amongſt the twelve Tribes diſperſed in *Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, &c.* Yet my former diſtinction may ſerve to accommodate the buſineſſe, and to cleare the truth, although we prove ſo liberall as to grant him his hearts deſire. Laſtly as touching that, *Acts* 3. 26. *To you hath God ſent his Sonne to bleſſe you, in turning every one of you from your iniquities; every one of you*, that is, ſaith this Authors gloſſe, *as well you that receive him, as you that receive him not.* But let us not carry the matter in hugger mugger, without diſtinction. If this were the end of Chriſts coming into the world, then it was intended by ſome one or other, and that muſt needs be God; Now did God intend that they ſhould be turned from their iniquities abſolutely or conditionally? If abſolutely then all muſt be turned from them; if conditionally, then ſhew what that condition is; if faith, we willingly grant, that as many as believe ſhall be bleſſed, and turned from their iniquities. For Chriſt indeed dyed for this end, namely, *to redeeme us from our iniquities, and to purge us a peculiar people unto himſelfe zealous of good workes*; But as for faith and repentance which is alſo a gift of Chriſt, Chriſt did not purchaſe this for all abſolutely, for if he did then all ſhould believe; if conditionally, then upon ſome work of man, and conſequently the gift and grace of faith, ſhall be beſtowed according unto mans works; which is expreſſe Pelagianiſme. To the contrary, that Chriſt died not for all; I prove thus: Firſt, the reaſon why none can lay any thing to the charge of Gods elect, is becauſe Chriſt died for them *Rom.* 8. If therefore Chriſt died for all, none can lay any thing to the charge of a Reprobate, more then to the charge of Gods Elect. Secondly, Chriſt prayed only for thoſe who either did or ſhould believe in him; and for whom he prayed for them only he ſanctified himſelfe. *Joh.* 17. And what is the meaning of the ſanctifying of himſelfe for them, but that he meant to offer up himſelfe in Sacrifice upon the croſſe for them; as *Maldonate* confeſſeth, was the joynt interpretation of all the Fathers, whom he had read. Thirdly, did he dye only for all then living, or which ſhould afterwards be brought forth into the World, or for all from the beginning of the world? If ſo, then he dyed for all thoſe that already were damned. Fourthly, if he dyed for them, then Chriſt hath made ſatisfaction for their ſinnes; and is it decent that any man ſhould fry in Hell, for thoſe ſinnes for which Chriſt hath ſatisfied? Laſtly, if Chriſt hath died for all, then hath he merited Salvation for all; and ſhall any faile of that ſalvation which Chriſt hath merited for them? Is it decent that God the Father, ſhould deale with Chriſt his Sonne, not according to the exigence of his merits? If we had merited ſalvation for our ſelves would God in juſtice have denied it unto us? Why then ſhould he deny any man ſalvation, in caſe Chriſt hath merited ſalvation for him?

Math. 15. 24.

Titus 2. 14.

Rom. 8. 33. 34.

John 17. 9, 19.

DISCOURSE.

SECT. III.

2. THe Miniſtry of the Word and Sacraments is given alſo to the ſame end, and is in its owne proper nature and uſe an inſtrument of conveying the ſpirit of regeneration to thoſe that enjoy it, and to all thoſe: I cannot have better prooſes for this than thoſe that our Reverend Divines of *Dort* have gathered to my hands. *Iſa.* 59. 21. This is my Covenant with them (ſayth the Lord) my ſpirit which is upon thee, and my words which I have

Suffrag. Britt. p. 30. 31. *Art.* 2. *Theſ.* 5.

I have put in thy mouth, shall not depart out of thy mouth, nor out of the mouth of thy seed, nor seeds seed for ever. *Hinc patet* (say they) from these words it appears, that the Word and Spirit are joyned together in the Ministry of the Word, with an inseperable bond by promise of God. Hence it is that the Ministers of the New Testament are called Ministers not of the letter but of
2 Cor. 3. 6, 8. the Spirit, not of the letter which kills, but of the Spirit which gives life: and the Ministry of the Gospell is called διακονία τοῦ πνεύματος, in the same place; v. 8. the Ministry of the Spirit. Hence is the Gospell called χάρις σωτήριος grace bringing Salvation, Tit. 2. 11. and λόγος καταλλαγῆς The word of reconciliation. 2 *Cor.* 5. 19. To these let me adde 1 *Pet.* 1. 23. where the word is called the seed of the new birth, and 2 *Cor.* 5. 20. where Ministers are called Embassadours for Christ, to beseech men to be reconciled to God; and they are so called to shew that the Word preached, is by Gods appointment an instrument to make men new creatures, and that the matter of Ministers errand is peace and reconciliation; and the proper fruit of it in Gods intent is not the obduration and destruction, but the conversion and salvation of men. The same men out of *Ioh.* 15. 22. (if I had not come and spoken to them, they should not have had sinne, but now they have no cloake for their sinne) doe say it is evident, that Christ in his Preaching did administer so much inward grace, as was sufficient to convince those that rejected the Gospell of positive unbeliefe, and so to render them obnoxious to just punishment, and consequently (say I) so much as sufficed by their good husbandry, to have converted and saved them. For that grace leaves none inexcusable, which is unsufficient to convert them. I will conclude that which they say of this gratious intention of God in the Ministry of the Word,
Prosp. ad cap: Gall: resp. ad obiect: 4. with that speech of *Prosper* cited by them in the same place; *non omnes vocari ad gratiam eos, quibus omnibus Evangelium prædicatur, nonrecte dicitur; etiamsi sint qui Evangelio non obaudiant.* They that say, that all those to whom the Gospell is Preached (even those that obay not the Gospell) are not called to grace, they say an untruth. God looks for grapes (sayth the text) *Isai.* 5. 2. What doth this imply? but that it was Gods principall aime in the husbandry which he bestowed upon the Church of Israell, that it should bring forth good fruit, though in the end it did not. How oft would I have gathered you, sayth Christ to Jerusalem, *Math.* 23. 37. and in *John*, 5. 34. These things have I spoken to you that ye might be saved, but ye will not come unto me that ye might have life. v. 40. Intimating no lesse than this that it was his full intent by his preaching to gather and to save those very particular men that in the end were not gathered nor saved through their neglect or contempt of Christs Ministry,

TWISSE

Consideration.

NO question but *The word of God is the sword of the spirit. Ephes.* 6. *And the Law of the Lord is a perfect Law, converting the Soule, Psal.* 19. And it seemes to be delivered in opposition to the Book of the creatures, as if he had said, though *The Heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth his handy work*, yet this is the peculiar prerogative of the Book of Gods word, and the Doctrine contained therein, that *it converteth the soule*: and upon this is grounded the great preferment of the Jews above the Gentiles, *chiefely that unto them were committed the Oracles of God.* Yet this Author is content to make no difference, between the use and end of the Book of Creatures, and the Book of Gods word; but professeth the use and end of both, to be the very same. The passage alleadged out of the suffrages of the Brittain Divines, is most aliene from the present purpose: For the Thesis of theirs, proceedeth of the administration of grace by the word, not of regeneration, but of conviction of all such, who believe not, and continue impenitent; that through their own fault, they perish for neglecting or contemning the Gospell. *In Ecclesia, ubi, juxta promissum hoc Evangelii, salus omnibus offertur, ea est administratio gratiæ, quæ sufficit ad convincendos omnes impenitentes & incredulos, quod sua culpa voluntaria, & vel neglectu, vel contemptu Evangelii perierint, & oblatum beneficium amiserint.* And in the explication of this Thesis, they propose two things to be cleared. 1. *That some measure of grace is ordinarily administred in the Ministry of the Gospell; aliquam mensuram gratiæ ordinarie in Ministerio Evangelii administrari*: and for proofe hereof alone, they alleadge this passage out of *Isai.* 59. *ult.* This is my covenant with them saith the Lord, *My spirit which is upon thee, and my words which I have put in thy mouth, shall not depart out of thy mouth: So that the word and spirit are joyned togeather alwaies*; but not alwaies to regenerate; but either to regenerate and bring to obedience, or to convict of disobedience.

And accordingly, *The Ministers of the New Testament, are called Ministers not of the letter, but of the spirit*: that is not of the Law; the Ministry whereof, is not the Ministry of the

the ſpirit, but yet this is rightly to be underſtood, to wit, of the ſpirit of adoption, for undoubtedly even the Miniſtry of the Law, is the Miniſtry of the Spirit alſo, but of the ſpirit of bondage, to hold men under feare: it is called the Miniſtry of condemnation, and the reaſon hereof I conceive to be, becauſe God doth not concurre with the Miniſtry of the Law, by the holy Spirit, to worke any man to the performance of the condition of the Law, which is exact and perfect obedience: but thus he doth concurre with the Miniſtry of the Goſpell, namely, by his ſpirit, to work men to the performance of the condition thereof, which is faith in Chriſt, and true repentance, therefore the letter, to wit of the Law, is called a killing letter; but the Goſpell is joyned with a quickning ſpirit, and therefore *Piſcator* conceives, that the Goſpell in this place is called by the name of the ſpirit. Soe then the Goſpell giveth life by the ſpirit which accompanyeth the Miniſtry thereof; but to whom? To all, as this Author ſuppoſeth? Nothing leſſe, the generall experience of the world doth manifeſt the untruth thereof. But this Author is ready to ſuppoſe (though not very forward to ſpeake out in this) that it would regenerate if men were not defective to them ſelves. So then man muſt firſt performe ſome worke on his part, and then the ſpirit of the Goſpell doth regenerate them: as much as to ſay the grace of regeneration, is diſpenſed by God according to ſome work of man, which in plain termes *Pelagius* durſt not profeſſe, but joyned with others to anathematize it in the Synod of *Palaſtine*. Yet this Doctrine is the very *Helena* wherewith the Arminians are enamored. Now the Apoſtle profeſſeth in plaine termes of himſelfe and his fellow-labourers, *we are unto God the ſweet ſavour of Chriſt in them that are ſaved, and in them which periſh; to the one we are the ſavour of death unto death and to the other a ſavour of life unto life.* So then it is χάρις σωτήριος & Tit. 2. 11. and λόγος καταλλαγῆς *the word of reconciliation.* 2 Cor. 5. 19. *And the ſeed of the new birth.* 1 Pet. 1. 23. As where by God regenerates man; according to that of Saint *Iames*, *of his owne will hath he begotten us by the word of truth*, *Iam.* 1. 18. Not whereby man doth regenerate himſelfe according to the Arminian tenet, whoſe doctrine it is, that God workes in us τὸ *velle credere and reſipiſcere modò velimus*. Now as God hath mercy on wom he will in converting his heart unto obedience, of faith and repentance, Rom. 9. 18. and 11. 30. So God regenerates whom he will. So that we all grant that Gods word is *by Gods appointment an inſtrument to make men new creatures*. But whom? Not all indifferently, but the elect of God called the ſheepe of Chriſt; *Iohn* 10. 16. *Other ſheepe have I which are not of this fold, them alſo muſt I bring and they ſhall heare my voyce.* Marke I pray, who they are that ſhall heare Chriſts voyce, to wit, Chriſts ſheepe, called alſo Chriſts people. Acts. 18. 9, 10. *Then ſaid the Lord to Paul by night in a viſion feare not but ſpeake and hold not thy peace, for I am with thee and no man ſhall lay hands on thee to hurt thee, for I have much people in this City.* *Paul* knew not who theſe were, yet for their ſakes being thus encouraged, he would goe on to Preach, and to *become all things to all men, that he might ſave ſome.* 1 Cor. 6. 22. And who were theſe *ſome*, but the elect, as elſewhere he ſignifies, ſaying, I endure all things for the elects ſake, called alſo the children of God. *Ioh.* 11. 51, 52. *This he ſpake not of himſelfe, but being High-Prieſt that ſame yeare, he Propheſyed that Jeſus ſhould dye for that Nation, and not for that Nation only, but that he ſhould gather together in one, the children of God which were ſcattered.* This gathering was to be performed by *the word the inſtrument, by Gods appoyntment, to make men new creatures*: but upon whom ſhould it worke effectually? The Text plainly calleth them, and ſetts them forth unto us, by the name of Gods children. *The ſame men* (ſaith this Author) that is, our Brittaine Divines at the Synod of *Dort*, *doe ſay out of Iohn* 15. 22. (*If I had not come and ſpoken to them, they ſhould not have had ſinne, but now they have no cloake for their ſinne*) *it is evident that Chriſt in his Preaching did adminiſter ſo much inward grace as was ſufficient to convince thoſe that rejected the Goſpell of poſitive unbeliefe, and ſo to render them obnoxious to juſt puniſhment; Now hence this Author frames this inference, And conſequently* (*I ſay*) *ſo much as ſufficed by their good husbandry, to have converted & ſaved them; For that grace leaves none unexcuſable which is inſufficient to convert them.* Now to this I anſwer, If our Divines had acknowledged any ſuch conſequence to be juſt, they had a faire calling to make profeſſion of it at that time. But conſider we the reſt of their *Theſis* delivered in the ſame place. The firſt is this, *Ex ſpeciali amore & intentione tum Dei patris tum Chriſti, mortuus eſt Chriſtus pro electis, ut illis remiſſionem peccatorum & ſaluem æternam reipſa obtineret, & infallibiliter conferret.* It was of the intention and ſpeciall love of God the Father and God the Sonne, that Chriſt ſhould dye for the elect, effectually to procure for them, and infallibly to conferre on them pardon of ſinne,

Rom. 8. 2 Cor. 3. 9.

2 Cor. 2. 15, 16.

2 Tim. 2. 10.

and

and ſalvation. The ſecond is this, *Ex hoc eodem amore per & propter meritum & interceſſionem Chriſti dantur iiſdem electis fides, & perſeverantia, cæteraq; omnia per quæ conditio fœderis impletur, & beneficium promiſſum, id eſt, vita æterna infallibiliter obtinetur:* out of the ſame love through and for Chriſt are given, to the ſame elect, faith and perſeverance, and all other things, whereby the condition of the covenant is fulfilled. The third is this, *Deus lapſi generis humani miſereatus, miſit filium ſuum qui ſeipſum dedit pretium redemptionis pro peccatis totius mundi*; God having compaſſion on mankind fallen, ſent his Sonne who gave himſelfe, a price of redemption for the ſinnes of the whole World: this I underſtand of the ſufficiency of the price given, whereby it comes to paſſe, that Chriſt is *remedium univerſo generi humano applicabile*: as I have received from the mouth of one of thoſe, and a principall one, in ſuch ſort, that if all the World ſhould believe, all the World ſhould be ſaved: now marke I pray, how they carry themſelves in the explication of this Theſis, and what difference they put betweene Chriſts dying for the elect, and his dying for others. *Sic ergo pro omnibus mortuus eſt ut omnes & ſinguli mediante fide poſſint virtute ἀντιλύτρου hujus remiſſionem peccatorum & vitam æternam conſequi: Sic pro electis eſt mortuus ut ex merito mortis ejus ſecundum æternũ Dei beneplacitum ſpecialiter illis deſtinato & fidem infallibiliter obtineant & vitam æternã.* So Chriſt died for all that all & every one by faith intervening, may by vertue of this redemption, obtaine pardon of ſinne, and ſalvation: the meaning whereof is this, that every one may obtaine remiſſion of ſinne and ſalvation in caſe he doth believe, not that they have power to believe; For they profeſſe immediatly before, that whereas God hath ordained that after the acceptation of Chriſts ſacrifice, remiſſion of ſinne and ſalvation, ſhall be conferred on none, but ſuch as believe on the redeemer, here the ſecret decree of election openeth it ſelfe, *when the price which was paid for all* (marke the explication hereof in the words following) *and which unto all believers ſhall redound, certainly to eternall ſalvation, yet it doth not profit all, becauſe it is not given to all to fulfill the condition of this covenant*; as much as to ſay,
Mark.16.16. becauſe faith is not given to all. The fourth Theſis. *In hoc merito mortis Chriſti fundatur univerſale promiſſum Evangelicum juxta quod omnes in Chriſtum credentes remiſſionem peccatorum & vitam æternam conſequantur.* In this merit of Chriſt, is founded that univerſall promiſe of the Goſpell, according whereto all that believe in Chriſt ſhall obtaine pardon of ſinne, and everlaſting life. The fifth Theſis, Is that which this Author inſiſts upon, but prepoſterouſly applyed by him; the Theſis runs thus, *In Eccleſia ubi juxta promiſſum hoc ſalus omnibus effertur, ea eſt adminiſtratio gratiæ quæ ſufficit ad convincendos omnes impœnitentes & incredulos, quod ſuâ culpa voluntaria & neglectu vel contemptu Evangelii perierint.* Take the laſt Theſis in the laſt place. *Non obſtante hoc pacto univerſali de ſalvandis credentibus, Deus nullo pacto aut promiſſo tenetur Evangelium aut gratiam ſalutiferam omnibus & ſingulis communicare.* Notwithſtanding this generall covenant of ſaving believers, God is not tied by any covenant or promiſe to communicate the Goſpell and ſaving grace to all and every one. And that he beſtowes it on ſome, paſſing by others, it is of divine mercy and liberty. But let us examine the ſobriety of the conſequence, which this Author makes: namely, that if *the grace adminiſtred in the Goſpell, be ſufficient to convict them who reſiſt it of poſitive unbeliefe, then it is ſufficient alſo by their good Husbandry to convert them.* Marke I pray the nature of grace here ſhaped thus, *ſufficient by their good Husbandry* (to wit, by the good Husbandry of the hearers) *to convert them.* Now wherein doth this converſion conſiſt? Surely in believing, for of unbeliefe they are convicted by the Goſpell, as many as contemne or neglect it: and hence he inferres, that it was ſufficient to convert them, which muſt be by the Antitheſis, to bring them to faith, provided that they (that is the hearers) play the good husbands in the uſing of it; But what is it to play the good husbands? Theſe and ſuch like Phraſiologies, are the uſuall ſculking courſes of the Arminians, like the inke which the Fiſh *Sæpia* caſts forth, that ſhe may thereby the better hide her ſelfe, and eſcape from the hands of the Fiſher. But certainly it muſt be ſome worke or other to be performed by the hearer, whereby he ſhall be brought to faith: therefore I ſay, it is either the worke of Faith it ſelfe, or ſome other worke preceding it: not of faith it ſelfe, for faith it ſelfe, cannot in reaſon be ſaid to be a worke, whereby a man is brought to faith. Secondly, herehence it followeth, that Mans good husbandry, being here diſtinguiſhed from the worke of Faith it ſelfe, the act of Faith is hereby made the work of mans will, not of Gods grace: if ſome work preceding faith, whereupon faith is wrought by grace, it followeth that the grace of faith, is given according to mans works: this is the foule iſſue of their tenet, making faith either not at all the worke

of

of God, or if wrought by God, to be wrought according to mans worke. And thus they ſhape the grace of God, conferring faith, not only towards Reprobates, but alſo towards the elect. Now obſerve I beſeech you, how our Brittaine Divines doe purpoſely reject this Doctrine in the Synod of *Dort* art. 3. in their third Theſis, of thoſe which are rejected by them. The Theſis which they reject is, *poſitis omnibus gratiæ operationibus quibus Deus ad efficiendam hanc converſionem utitur, voluntatem hominis relinqui in æquilibrio: velitne credere vel non credere convertete ſe ad Deum vel non convertere.* All the operations of grace ſuppoſed, the will of man is left in an even ballance, whether he will believe or no, whether he will convert himſelfe to God or no: this is the very opinion of this Author, againſt which our worthy Divines diſpute there in this manner. *If this were ſo, then it would follow that God by his grace, is not the principall cauſe of mans believing and converſion, but man by his free will rather: For in this caſe God ſhall not predominantly worke mans converſion, but upon condition only, to wit, in caſe the will firſt move it ſelfe whereby the leſſe worke is given to God, and the greater worke to man, to wit in mans converſion. 2. Herehence it will follow that God gives no more grace to the Elect than to the Reprobate, and that the elect are not bound to be more thankefull to God than the non-elect, becauſe the worke of God in both is no other than to place the will in an even ballance. 3. The grace of converſion is given with an intention that it ſhall prove effectuall and to move, nay rather to bring man to the producing of the act of faith, in ſuch ſort, as it cannot be made in vaine; Hæc gratia a nullo duro corde reſpuitur ideo quippe tribuitur ut cordis duritia primitus auferatur.*

And ſeeing the good Husbandry of mans conſiſts in obedience to the Goſpell it appears hereby, that the grace they ſpeake of is no other than the Goſpell, exhorting to repentance, and this we confeſſe is ſufficient in a certain kind, to wit, in the kind of inſtruction and exhortation: and is not this ſufficient to convict of unbeliefe as many as wilfully reſiſt it, and ſuch is the condition of all in hearing the Goſpell, to whom God gives not the grace of converſion, for as Saint *Auſtin* ſaith, *Libertas ſine gratiâ non eſt libertas ſed contumacia*, and no other impotency of beliefe doe we aſcribe to a naturall man, but ſuch as conſiſts in contumacy, which is meerely a fault and corruption of the will, not the defect of any naturall power: and therefore as I ſaid, the impotemcy of converting to God by faith and repentance, is impotency morall, conſiſting meerely in the corruption of the will; and there is no queſtion but every man hath as much power to believe as *Simon Magus*, of whom it is ſaid that he believed. *Fides in voluntate eſt* (ſaith *Auſtin*) *& credimus quando volumus*, but the will of man is ſo corrupt, that without ſpeciall preparation by Gods grace, it is rather wilfully ſet to walke in the waies of fleſh and bloud, than obſequious to that which is good: we make no queſtion but that as *Proſper* ſaith, every one that heareth the Goſpell, is thereby called unto grace, even to obtaine pardon of ſinne and ſalvation upon his faith in Chriſt and is called upon alſo to believe: but withall we ſay with our Brittaine Divines, *Art.* 3. *De Converſione Theſi* 1ª. In the explication thereof, that God gives his elect not only *poſſe credere ſi velint* (which in *Auſtins* opinion *lib.* 1. *de gen. contra Manic. cap.* 3. and *de prædeſt. Sanct. cap.* 5. is common to all,) but *velle credere*, nay they ſpare not to profeſſe that if God ſhould worke in us only *poſſe credere*, *poſſe convertere*, and leave the act of believing and converting to mans free will, we ſhould all doe as *Adam* did; and fall from God through our free will, and never bring this poſſibility into act; take their own words. *Quod ſi vires quaſdam infundendo daret Deus tantum poſſe credere, poſſe convertere, ipſum interim actum committeret libero hominum arbitrio, certe quod primus parens fecit faceremus omnes: libero arbitrio a Deo deficeremus nec poſſibilitatem hanc in actum perduceremus. Hæc itaq́ eximia eſt illa ſpecialis gratia qua non modo poſſunt credere ſi velint, ſed & volunt cum poſſunt. Phil.* 3. 13. *Dat Deus nobis & velle & perficere.* As for that which he diſcourſeth of Gods *principall aime, that the Church of Iſraell ſhould bring forth good fruit*: let us ſpeake plainly, and not cheat our ſelves firſt, and then become impoſtors unto others: was it that which God did principally intend? Gods intentions are his decrees, now if God did decree they ſhould bring forth fruit *de facto, who hath reſiſted his will?* Nay take their own rules according to their doctrine of *Scientia media*. Why did God give them only ſuch a grace to move them unto fruitfulnes, which he foreſaw they would reſiſt? And refuſe to give ſuch grace, as he foreſaw would not be reſiſted, and that without all prejudice to their wills? Let thē anſwer unto this, for that God in the ſtorehouſe of his wiſdome hath ſuch courſes as being uſed, he foreſeeth infalliby that any ſin will be hindred. *Arminius* acknowledgeth, as I have oftē alleadged him. But we may ſafely ſay, 1. That God

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intended it ſhould be their duty to bring forth fruit. 2. If he did farther intend that the Church of Iſrael ſhould *de facto* bring forth fruit, this he did bring to paſſe alſo: but withall let us conſider what the Apoſtle teacheth us, and take that along with us alſo, namely, *that all are not Iſrael, that are of Iſrael*; and ſo in his elect he effecteth this. 3. I doubt not but this is pronounced chiefely for the elects ſake, and though they are not as yet ſo fruitfull as they ſhould be, yet I nothing doubt, but this paſſionate expoſtulation, was a means to turne them to the Lord, that is, ſome of them: For God calls them not all at once, but ſome at one houre of the day, ſome at another. 4. It might be a means to bring others alſo, though not to true converſion, yet *ad exteriorem vitæ emendationem*. As for that of our Saviour over Jeruſalem *Math.* 23. 37. That is of another condition in two reſpects. Jeruſalem neither ſaw his teares, nor heard his bemoaning of it; but we heare of it, and read it in his word, and it is equally effectuall with the elect of God, and others alſo; as the expoſtulation we read *Iſai.* 5. Secondly our Saviour was a man as well as God, and though the Sonne of God, yet made under the Law, and accordingly as much bound to deſire and endeavour the ſalvation of all amongſt whom he was ſent, as any Prophet, or Apoſtle, or Miniſter of Gods word. That in the 5. *Iob.* 34. *Theſe things have I ſpoken unto you, that ye might be ſaved*; What is the meaning thereof but this. *Theſe things have I ſpoken unto you*, exhorting you to believe, that ye might be ſaved; according to that v. 24. *He that heareth me, and believeth him that ſent me, hath everlaſting life, and ſhall not come into condemnation, but hath paſſed from death to life*: and by the words following, in the words alleadged by him it appears, that there is no other intention of ſalvation meant, than in caſe they believe: *But ye will not come unto me that ye might have life*, v. 40. And as before I ſaid, Chriſt being made under the Law, was bound, as well as we are, to deſire the ſalvation of his Brethren, that is to deſire and labour the converſion of thoſe to whom he was ſent, that ſo they might be ſaved.

Note

DISCOURSE.

SECT. IV.

THis is alſo the uſe and end for which the Sacraments were ordained, as we may ſee *Luk.* 7. 30. Where we have theſe wordes, But the Scribes and Phariſees and expounders of the Law deſpiſed the councell of God againſt them ſelves, and were not Baptized of *Iohn*. In which words thus much is plainly included, that it was Gods counſell and purpoſe in *Iohns* Baptiſme, to bring them to Chriſt, and in him to Heaven; much more is it in the end of Chriſts Baptiſme which is more excellent than *Iohns* was, not in ſubſtance but in the fulneſſe of grace adminiſtred, and diſpenſed by it.

Mark. 1. 4.

All that have been Baptized into Chriſt (ſayth the Apoſtle) have been Baptized unto his death. *Rom.* 6. 3. And *Gal.* 3. 29. All ye that are Baptized into Chriſt have put on Chriſt, the very phraſes there uſed ſhew, that Baptiſme is in its originall intention an inſtrument of uniting men to Chriſt and giving them communion with him in the benefits of his death: except a man be borne of water (ſaith Chriſt) and of the ſpirit, he cannot &c. *Ioh.* 3. 5. In which words are delivered two things. 1. The neceſſity of regeneration, (except a man be born again.) 2. The working cauſes of it, efficient, the Spirit of God, inſtrumentall the Sacrament of Baptiſme, there called water from the outward matter of it. Baptiſme therefore is appointed to be a means of regeneration to all thoſe that are Baptized, and doth effect it in all that doe not put an obſtacle in the way to hinder it. For this cauſe doth the Apoſtell dignifye it (the laver of regeneration) *Titus* 3. 5. I will ſhut up this with *Acts.* 2. 38. Where *Peter* ſayth, repent and be Baptized every one of you for the remiſſion of ſinnes: plainly implying that therefore is Baptiſme ordained to be received that thoſe who doe receive it might have their ſinnes remitted.

Epheſ. 5. 26.

The patience of God alſo, which is another ſingular donation and gift of God to men, is exerciſed to this very end, as appeares *Rom.* 2. 4. Deſpiſeſt thou the riches of his goodneſſe, and forbearance, and long ſuffering, not knowing that the goodneſſe of God leadeth thee to repentance? But thou, after thy hardneſſe of heart that canſt not repent, heapeſt up &c. In theſe words we may note for our purpoſe, 1. Gods end and intent in forbearing ſinners, and that is the leading of them to repentance, and ſo to Salvation, (for repentance is *Per ſe ordinata ad ſalutem* as a means to the end.) 2. The perſons to whom God intends this good by his forbearance, and they are ſuch as diſpiſe the riches of his goodneſſe, and have hard and impenitent hearts. 3. The iſſue and event of this theire contempt of Gods patience, and that is a treaſuring up wrath unto themſelves againſt the day of wrath. Out of all which laid togeher ariſeth thus much, That God by ſparing wicked men, who have hard and impenitent hearts, intends their everlaſting good, though they, by the abuſe of his patience, and refuſall to repent, doe treaſure up to themſelues wrath and eternall miſery. The like to this is delivered in the 2 *Peter* 3. 9. God is not ſlack, (as ſome men count ſlackneſſe) but patient toward us, that is, us men. And why patient towards us? Becauſe he would have none to periſh. The end therefore of Gods patience is mans repentance and Salvation.

TWISSE

Conſideration.

THough this Author doth little anſwer your expectation, in confining himſelfe to Reprobation, therein to give you ſatisfaction, as touching the reaſon why he hath changed his mind in certain controverſies; yet it may be, his purpoſe is to make you amends, by acquainting you with ſome miſteries of his, concerning Baptiſme, out of *Luk.*7. 30. Where it is ſaid of the Scribes and Phariſes, that in refuſing to be Baptized of *Iohn*, they *deſpiſed the counſell of God againſt themſelves*; hence he inferres, *that it was Gods counſell and purpoſe in Iohns Baptiſme, to bring them to Chriſt, and in him to heaven:* as much as to ſay God purpoſed to bring them to Chriſt and to heaven, but they would not; and ſo it came to paſſe that *Omnipotentis Dei voluntatis effectus*, was hindered by the will of the creature, which *Auſtin* accounted a very foule abſurdity, as if God were not able to bring them to Chriſt: yet our Saviour profeſſeth, that *like as none can come unto him except the Father draw him*, ſo on the other ſide, *every one that the Father giveth me comes unto me, Ioh.6. And the Apoſtle ſaith, Who hath reſiſted his will? Omnipotente facilitate convertit*, ſaith *Auſtin*, *& ex nolentibus volentes facit.* But as for the Text, ſuppoſe the Evangeliſt had called it the purpoſe of God, yet the object of his purpoſe is not expreſſed, and why might it not be Gods purpoſe to make it their duty to hearken to *Iohn*, and to ſubmit to the Lords Ordinance adminiſtred by *Iohn*, as well as Gods purpoſe that they ſhould obey him, and be perſwaded to be Baptized by him: yea and much rather too, conſidering the foule abſurdity wherewith this interpretation is charged, as formerly I have ſhewed; and he muſt have the ſtomack of an *Oſtrich*, that can digeſt it. But where I pray was it ever read or heard before, that Gods purpoſe is at any time deſpiſed? Gods counſell indeed is too often deſpiſed, as when he ſaith, *I councell thee to buy of mee gold, &c. Revel.*3. And the counſell of God ſignifieth no other will of God, than is the will of commandement, of admonition, of exhortation, and ſuch like. But whereas he talkes of a greater fulneſſe of grace in the Baptiſme of Chriſt, than in the Baptiſme of *Iohn*, this beliefe is one of his myſteries concerning Baptiſme. *Iohn* Preached Chriſt unto the people, *Acts* 19. 4. And *Iohns* Baptiſme was the Baptiſme of repentance for the remiſſion of ſinnes, that is, Preaching of repentance, he adminiſtred Baptiſme unto them in aſſurance of the forgiveneſſe of their ſinnes, upon their repentance. And therefore he put off the Scribes and Phariſes, calling upon them to bring forth fruits of repentance firſt. So *Peter* ſpeakes of the Baptiſme of Chriſt, *Acts* 2. Repent and be Baptized for the forgiveneſſe of your ſinnes. So was circumciſion unto the Jewes a Seale of the righteouſneſſe of faith, that is, of the forgiveneſſe of ſinnes through faith. It ſeems this Author is none of the Rhemiſts adverſary in this, who upon *Math.* 3. 11. writes thus. *It is an Article of our adverſaries, that the Baptiſme of Chriſt, is no better then the Baptiſme of Iohn, they make it of no more value or efficacy for remiſſion of ſinnes, and grace, and juſtification than was Iohns: whereunto* Mr Fulke makes anſwer, ſaying, *Remiſſion of ſinne is proper unto God as well in* Iohns *Baptiſme, as in the Baptiſme of Chriſt, and that* Iohn *in that place compares the Miniſtry of Man with the authority and power of God, and though ſome of the ancient Fathers were of another opinion, yet* Saint Marke *ſaith expreſſely, That* Iohn *Preached the Baptiſme of repentance, unto forgiveneſſe of ſinnes. And who can ſeparate forgiveneſſe of ſinnes from true repentance? When the Lord promiſeth, at what time ſoever the ſinner repenteth, to pardon his ſinnes. The ſeale of Baptiſme alſo added to the doctrine of Repentance, muſt needs teſtify remiſſion of ſinnes, namely, the ſoule to be waſhed by mercy, as the body is with water. Neither doth this doctrine derogate any thing from the Baptiſme of Chriſt, ſeeing it is Chriſt that forgiveth ſinnes, and giveth grace in the Baptiſme miniſtred by* Iohn *and miniſtred by his Apoſtles: For* Iohns *Baptiſme was by Gods inſtitution, not of* Iohns *deviſing.*

Enchirid. c. 46.

Iohn 6.

It is true, *All that have been Baptized into Chriſt, have been Baptized into his death, Rom.* 6.3. and *Gal.*3. 26. *All that have been Baptized into Chriſt, have put on Chriſt.* But take Baptiſme aright, and let *Peter* be an interpreter of *Paul. Baptiſme ſaveth us*, ſaith he, 1 *Pet.* 3. 21. But leaſt you ſhould miſtake him, marke what he addes, *Not the putting away the filth of the fleſh, here is the outward Baptizing with water, but the interrogation which a good conſcience makes to God.* Nay let *Paul* be an interpreter of himſelfe. 1 *Cor.* 6. 12:

But ye are waſhed, but ye are ſanctifyed, but ye are juſtified in the name of the Lord Jeſus, and by the ſpirit of our God. Now I willingly confeſſe, that as many as are waſhed and ſanctified and juſtified by the ſpirit of God, have put on Chriſt, and are Baptized into his death, to the mortifying and crucifying the old man in them. And as by the Baptiſme of the ſpirit we doe put on Chriſt, ſo are we united unto Chriſt, and have a communion with him in the benefits of his death. But as for the intention of Baptiſme of water, I know none it hath, much leſſe doe I know how to put a difference between intention originall, and ſome other intention which he conceales, content to ſuffer the diſtinction, to fly with one wing. The Baptizers intention I am ſomewhat acquainted with: On mans part, to Baptize ſuch as are brought to the font for that purpoſe, and by Baptiſme to conſecrate them to the ſervice of that God, who is one in nature, but three in perſons, Father, Sonne, and Holy Ghoſt: on Gods part, to ſeale unto us the righteouſneſſe of faith, which I learne out of *Rom.* 4. 11. In the deſcription of Circumciſion, and the meaning thereof, I take to be the aſſuring of forgiveneſſe of ſinnes to them that believe, and this is congruous to the deſcription both of *Johns* Baptiſme, and Chriſts Baptiſme ſet forth unto us in holy Scripture. As for that *Iohn* 3.5. *Except a man be borne of Water and of the Spirit, he cannot &c.* Maſter *Fulke* in his anſwer to the Rhemiſts on that verſe writes thus; *It is not neceſſary in this place by Water, to underſtand materiall Water, but rather the purifying grace of Chriſt, as,* cap. 4. v. 11. *Whereof the waſhing with water in Baptiſme, is an outward ſigne and ſeale, which alſo is termed fire,* Math. 3. 11. *The water therefore in Baptiſme is not our regeneration properly, but a Sacrament and ſeale thereof;* Iſid. Origen. l. 7. cap. de Spiritu Sancto. *Aliud eſt aqua Sacramenti, aliud aqua quæ ſignificat Spiritum Dei; aqua enim Sacramenti viſibilis eſt, aqua ſpiritus ſancti inviſibilis eſt, iſta abluit corpus, & ſignificat quid ſit in anima, per illum autem ſpiritum Sanctum anima mundatur, & ſaginatur.* And a little after, *Indeed* (ſaith he) *the words of our Saviour Chriſt are not properly of the externall Sacrament more then,* Ioh. 6. *Of the other Sacrament; except you eate the fleſh of the Sonne of man, and drinke his bloud, you have no life in you: whereas all Infants are excluded from that Sacrament, and conſequently ſhould be excluded from life, if the words were meant of the outward Sacraments. And the Fathers of the ancient Church, which thought Baptiſme was neceſſary, did likewiſe think the communion to be as neceſſary for Infants;* as Auguſtine, Innocentius *Biſhop of Rome, and all the Church of their time, for any thing we can gather by their writings. Finally, when the word of Water in this Text ſignifieth the purifying grace of Chriſt, rather than the outward element of Baptiſme, here can be no argument drawn out of this place, that Sacraments conferre grace of the worke wrought, but according to the diſpenſation of Gods ſpirit, who worketh according to his own pleaſure;* as in this chap. v. 8. 1 Cor. 12. When this Author talkes of the neceſſity of regeneration, I doubt he conſiders not, that hence it followeth, that either all that dye unbaptized are damned, (for I preſume he ſpeaks of the neceſſity of it unto ſalvation,) or that many thouſands are now adaies regenerated without any Sacrament of regeneration. That the Spirit of God is the efficient cauſe of Regeneration, I think no Chriſtian doubteth; but this Author maketh the Baptizing with Water to be an efficient alſo, as when he ſaith, *Baptiſme is appoynted to be a means of Regeneration to all that are Baptized, and not only ſo, but that it doth effect it alſo in all that doe not put an obſtacle in the way to hinder it.* I acknowledge willingly that Baptiſme materiall, is an inſtrument, to wit, both as a ſigne & as a ſeale: But that it is an inſtrument in any other kind of operation, than belongs to a ſigne and ſeale, I have not hitherto learned out of the word of God. And as I remember, *Arminius* was ſometimes challenged for Heterodoxy about the Sacraments; and withall, that his Apology was this, he never aſcribed any other efficacy unto the Sacraments, than is denoted under the tearmes of Signes and Seales; but no marvaile, if a degenerated condition hath ſeized on any, that ſuch *proficiunt in pejus*, and grow more and more degenerate. The phraſe uſed here in calling Baptiſme a means of regeneration, ſounds harſh in my eares, we commonly ſay, and it is the doctrine of our Catechiſme, *that a Sacrament is an outward and viſible ſigne, of an inward and inviſible grace*: now this grace in Baptiſme I take to be the grace of regeneration; and is it a decent expreſſion to ſay, that *the ſigne of Regeneration is the means of Regeneration?* As for *Baptiſmus ſpiritus*, the Baptiſme of the ſpirit, that is the very working of regeneration, but *Baptiſmus fluminis*, the Baptiſme of water, that is the adminiſtration of the outward ſigne, and ſeale of the grace of regeneration. The word Preacheth forgiveneſſe of ſinnes to all that believe, ſo doth the Sacrament of Baptiſme; but the word Preacheth this to the eare, the Sacrament to the eye. The word aſſureth it, for it is Gods word, the Sacrament

aſſures

aſſures it, for it is Gods ſeale, but neither of theſe worketh the aſſurance without the ſpirit of God: and as for the working of Faith it ſelfe, I have read that Faith comes by hearing, I no where read that Faith comes by the being Baptized. And ſure I am when men of ripe yeares came to be Baptized, they were firſt *Catechumini*, then *competentes*, and none admitted unto Baptiſme, unleſſe the word had formerly brought them unto faith. The Apoſtle calls Baptiſme *the laver of regeneration*, by the Rhemiſts tranſlation, the fountain of regeneration, by the former Engliſh tranſlation, the *waſhing of regeneration*, by the laſt: but whereas this Author dignifies it with this title, *becauſe it doth effect regeneration in all that doe not put an obſtacle in the way to hinder it*:- if this Author ſhall prove it (while his head is hot,) we ſhall give that credence to it, as it deſerves; in the mean time, it ſtands for a bold affirmation; let him take his time to make it appeare to be ſound: the Rhemiſts upon the place have this note; *As before in the Sacrament of holy Orders* [1 Tim. 4. 2 Tim. 1.] *So here it is plaine that Baptiſme giveth grace, and that by it, as by an inſtrumentall cauſe, we be ſaved.* Maſter *Fulkes* anſwer is this, *Here is no word to prove that Baptiſme giveth grace of the worke wrought, but the Apoſtle ſaith that God hath ſaved us by the renewing of the Holy Ghoſt, which is teſtified by the Sacrament of Baptiſme* (marke I pray the office of Baptiſme in Maſter *Fulkes* judgement, *to teſtify the renewing,*) *which is Sacramentally the laver of regeneration; not by the worke wrought but by the grace of Gods ſpirit, by which we are juſtified. So ſpeaketh Saint Peter, and explicateth himſelfe* 1 Pet. 3.21. *Baptiſme ſaveth us not the waſhing of the fleſh of the body, but the interrogation of a good conſcience.* And becauſe I know no obſtacle that an Infant can put to hinder the effect of it, for I ſuppoſe the obſtacle muſt be rationall, and Infants are not come to the uſe of reaſon, to performe any rationall act, which may prove any rationall obſtacle; therefore it ſeems this Authors opinion is, that all who are Baptized in the Church, are regenerate: this indeed was the profeſſion of Maſter *Mountague* before he was Biſhop; and was anſwered by Biſhop *Carelton*, as touching the beſt firmament of his opinion; the Book of our Common-Prayer, where the Child Baptized is ſaid to be regenerate; that is to be underſtood *Sacramento tenus*, which is Saint *Auſtins* phraſe, and which he diſtinguiſheth from *truly regenerate*: And Biſhop *Uſher* in his Hiſtory of *Gotteſchalcus*, alleadgeth out of the Author of the imperfect work upon *Mathew, Hom.* 5. this ſentence, *Eos qui cum tentati fuerint, ſuperantur, & pereunt, videri quidem filios Dei factos propter aquam Baptiſmatis, revera tamen non eſſe filios Dei, quia non ſunt in Spiritu Baptizati.* As alſo out of *Auſtin De Unitate Eccleſiæ, cap.* 19. *Viſibilem Baptiſmum poſſe habere, & alienos qui regnum Dei non poſſidebunt: ſed eſſe donum Spiritus Sancti quod proprium eorum eſt tantum qui regnabunt cum Chriſto in æternum.* And laſtly out of the ſame *Auſtin*, as he is alleadged by *Peter Lombard, l.* 4. *Sent. diſt.* 4. *Sacramenta in ſolis electis efficere quod figurant.* All this is to be found in that Book of Biſhop *Uſher* p. 188. Beſides many more pregnant paſſages are collected by him for the ſame purpoſe. And not to charge him with authority only, but with ſome reaſon; when Saint, *James* ſaith *Jam.* 1. 18. *Of his own will he hath begotten us by the word of truth*; what I pray is here meant by *the word of truth*? Is it not the Goſpell, to wit, The Preaching of Chriſt crucified? Now conſider to whom doth he write, but to the twelve Tribes, that is, to the Chriſtian Jewes, *ſuch as were begotten to a lively hope by the reſurrection of Jeſus Chriſt*, as Saint *Peter* ſpeakes writing alſo to the Jewes. If then theſe Jewes were regenerated by the Preaching of the Goſpell, ſurely they were not regenerated by Circumciſion; and if regeneration were not neceſſarily annexed to the Sacrament of Circumciſion, amongſt the Jewes, then neither is it neceſſarily affixed to the Sacrament of Baptiſme amongſt the Chriſtians. For our Divines doe uſually maintaine againſt the Papiſts, that the Sacraments of the Old Teſtament, were as effectuall to the Jewes, as the Sacraments of the New Teſtament are effectuall unto us Chriſtians. It is true, Baptiſme is ordained, *that thoſe which doe receive it may have the remiſſion of their ſinnes*, but not abſolutely, but conditionally, to wit, in caſe they believe and repent, as appears both in that place, *Acts* 2.38. and *Rom.* 4.11. And Baptiſme as a Seale doth aſſure hereof, only in caſe they believe and repent; and therefore none of ripe years were admitted unto Baptiſme, untill they made profeſſion of their faith, and as for Infants, they were alſo anciently ſaid to be Baptized *in fide Parentum.*

Gods patience Rom. 2.4. *And the goodneſſe of God manifeſted therein, leadeth a Man to repentance*: ſo doe his judgements alſo, *Hoſ.* 5. In their affliction they will ſeeke me early; and ſo doth Gods word: and all this only in the way of a moving cauſe, and exciting to repentance, *every morning God brings his judgements to light, he faileth not yet; will not*

the wicked be aſhamed. Zeph 3. 5. But it is the duty of all to be moved by his word, by his works, by his mercyes, by his judgments, to turne to the Lord by true repentance. But God alone is he that workes them hereunto, without whoſe efficacious grace none of all theſe courſes will prevaile, as *Iſai.* 57. 17. *For his wicked covetouſneſſe I was angry with him and have ſmiten him, I hid me and was angry.* They wanted neither admonition from his word, nor from his corrections yet they profited by neither, as it followeth; *yet he went away and turned after the way of his own heart*: yet what is Gods reſolution, but to overcome their ſtubborneſſe by the power of his grace, as there we read; *I have ſeen his waies, and will heale them*: now who are theſe whom he leads ſo, as to bring them to repentance, let *Auſtin* anſwer, *Contra Julian. Pelag. l.* 5. *c.* 4. *Bonitas Dei te ad pœnitentiam adducit, verum eſſe conſtat, ſed quem prædeſtinavit adducit*, and he adds a reaſon, *Quamtamlibet enim præbuerit pœnitentiam, niſi Deus dederit, quis agit pœnitentiam.* And in the ſame Chapter profeſſeth, touching the *Non-prædeſtinate*, that God never brings them to wholſome and ſpirituall repentance, whereby a man is reconciled to God in Chriſt, whether God affords them greater patience than he affords his elect; or nothing leſſe? His words are theſe, *Iſtorum neminem adducit ad pœnitentiam ſalutrem, & ſpiritualem, qua homo in Chriſto reconciliatur Deo, ſive illis ampliorem patientiam, ſive non imparem præbeat*: God intends by this his patience, that it is the duty of all to repent; that is, that they ſhould repent *ex officio*; but did he intend they ſhould *de facto* repent? what then could hinder it? Then he would afford them efficacious grace, to heale them, as he promiſeth *Iſai* 57. 18. Then would he rule them with a *mighty hand, and make them paſſe under the rodde, and bring them unto the bond of the covenant.* So then to the poynt in particular here obſerved. 1. God leads all to repentance by his goodneſſe, manifeſted in his forbearance and long ſuffering, by way of admonition, that it is their duty to turne unto God by repentance, while he gives them time and ſpace for repentance. 2. But as for thoſe whom he hath elected, he not only thus leads, but alſo effectually brings them to repentance, in the time he hath appoynted, before which time they are found ſometimes to deſpiſe the riches of his goodneſſe, and to have hard and impenitent hearts, as much as any Reprobate: who more foule in the committing of horrible abominations than *Manaſſes?* Who more furious in perſecuting the Church of God then *Saul*? Yet God took away the ſtony heart (and what is harder then ſtone) out of their bowells, and ſo he doth to all whom he regenerates. 3. As touching a finall contempt of Gods patience, that is peculiar unto Reprobates; as for the elect, though ſome are called at the firſt houre of the day, ſome not till the laſt, yet all are effectually called, before they drop out of the World. To ſay that God intends the everlaſting good of Reprobates, is to deny the firſt Article of our Creed, even Gods omnipotency, as *Auſtin* hath diſputed 1200 years agoe; we find in our ſelves, that whatſoever we will doe, if we doe not it, it is either becauſe we cannot doe it, or becauſe our will is changed, but to aſcribe either mutability or impotency to God, is intollerable in a Chriſtian, and it cannot be denied, but God did from everlaſting intend their everlaſting damnation: ſo that to ſay he did intend their everlaſting good, is flat contradiction; neither is there any way to charme it, but by ſaying, God intends their everlaſting good conditionally; but to intend it after ſuch a manner, is apparently no more to intend their ſalvation than their damnation, nay leſſe rather; conſidering the conditions of ſalvation are utterly impoſſible unto man, unleſſe God correct, and cure his corrupt nature; but this grace he diſpenſeth according to the meere pleaſure of his will, as the Apoſtle ſignifyeth in ſaying, *he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth.* As for that 2 *Pet.* 3. 9. *He is patient towards us, not willing τινας any of us to periſh*, it hath been already conſidered; but here he interpreteth *towards us*, as if it had been ſaid, *towards us men*, and I hope the elect are men, as well as others: but what ground hath he for this liberty of interpretation? Why may he not take the liberty in interpreting of *Iohn*, as well as *Peter*, both were pillars; (*Gal.* 2.) where he ſaith, *They went out from us, but they were not of us, for had they been of us, they had continued with us*; and ſtill ſwalloweth a palpable abſurdity following hereupon, even to the denying of Gods omnipotency, in as flat contradiction to the Apoſtle, where he profeſſeth, that God hath mercy on whom he will, which is not to have mercy on all, but on ſome only, hardening others, as *Rom.* 11. The election hath obtained it, but the reſt are hardned.

DISCOURSE.

DISCOURSE.

SECT. V.

IN the laſt place thoſe other gifts of God, whereby mens underſtandings are enlightened, and their ſoules beautifyed, (which are knowledge, repentance, fortitude, liberality, temperance, humility, charity, and ſuch like) are beſtowed upon all them that have them, (among whom are many that may prove Reprobates in the end) that by the exerciſe of them, and continuance in them, they might be Saved. The Reprobates are adorned with many of thoſe graces, as apears plainly by many Scriptures, eſpecially *Hebr.* 6. 4. Where the Apoſtle ſayes, that it is impoſſible for thoſe that have been enlightned, taſted the heavenly gift, been made partakers of the Holy Ghoſt, taſted the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come, if they fall away, ſhould be renewed by repentance: and the graces which the Apoſtle ſpeakes of here, are not ordinary and common, but ſpeciall graces, illumination, faith, reliſh of the ſweetneſſe of Gods Word, and the taſt of Heaven. The perſons ſpoken of, are Apoſtates, ſuch as are under the poſſibility of falling away, (for upon a dainger not poſſible cannot be built a ſolid exhortation) and if Apoſtates then Reprobates, and the thing intimated is that upon Apoſtates and Reprobates are theſe gifts beſtowed. The Like ſpeech we have: *Hebr.* 10. 26. For if we ſinne willingly, after we have received the knowledge of the truth, there remaines no more ſacrifice for ſinne &c. from whence we collect, that men that ſinne willingly and unpardonably, may receive the knowledge of the truth, yea and be ſanctifyed by the bloud of the Teſtament and the Spirit of grace, v. 29. 2 *Pet.* 2. 20. They may eſcape the filthineſſe of the world *i. e.* be waſhed from their former ſins by repentance, the uncleane ſpirit may goe out of them. *Mat.* 12. 43. They may receive the word with joy, *Mat.* 13. 20. And many excellent graces they may have beſides: All which graces are not given them that they might abuſe them, and ſo purchaſe to themſelves the greater damnation; or that they might doe good to others with them, but none to themſelves; but rather that as by the former gifts of nature, ſo by theſe of grace, they may obtaine Salvation. If God aime at this in thoſe gifts that are farther off, much more in theſe, which make thoſe that have them (like the yong man in the Goſpel) not farre from the kingdome of Heaven. Thus we ſee what end God aimes at in his gifts to men.

Suffrag. Britt. p. 41. Theſ. 2. & p. 43. Theſ. 3.

TWISSE

Conſideration.

THeſe gifts this Author formerly deſcribed to be gifts of grace, applying ſalvation unto men, which he diſtinguiſheth from gifts of grace purchaſing ſalvation, in the entrance upon this reaſon of his. Now it is apparent, that moſt of theſe gifts have been found in the heathen men: and who was ever heard to call theſe vertues found in the heathen, gifts of grace, applying the ſalvation purchaſed by Chriſt, whereof they were wholy ignorant, like as of Chriſt himſelfe. And whereas he makes, faith and repentance, to be gifts communicated unto ſuch, who (as he expreſſeth it,) doe prove Reprobates in the end; Saint *Auſtin* to the contrary, as formerly I have alleadged him out of his 5. *lib. contra Julian Pelag.* c. 5. Expreſſely profeſſeth of the *Non prædeſtinate*, that God brings *not one of them to wholſome and Spirituall repentance, whereby a man is reconciled to God in Chriſt*: And our Brittaine Divines in the Synod of *Dort*, upon the 5th Article and fourth poſition, profeſſe in like manner of all ſuch as are none of Gods elect, that it is manifeſt *they never really and truly attaine that change and renovation of the mind, and affections, which accompanieth juſtification; nay, nor that which doth immediatly prepare or diſpoſe to juſtification. For they never ſeriouſly repent, they are never affected with hearty ſorrow for offending God by ſinning, nor doe they come to any humble contrition of heart, nor conceive a firme reſolution to offend any more.* And whereas he ſaith, that ſuch doe prove Reprobates in the end, he may as well ſay of others, that they prove elect in the end, which doth wholly favour, of ſhapeing the decrees of God, to be of a temporall condition, and not eternall; unleſſe he delivers it of the manifeſtation of

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it in the judgement of men, which yet as touching Reprobates cannot appeare untill their death, and 'tis a very hard matter for any man, to paſſe upon men generally the cenſure of elect, or reprobates; the hypocriſy of man hath ſuch power to evacuate the one, and the ſecret operation of Gods mercy and grace the other. How farre reprobates may attain to the illunination of their mind, and renovation of their wills, and reformation of their lives, is ſet downe more fully by our Brittain Divines in the Synod of *Dort*, than by this Author; not one particular (if I miſtake not) being mentioned here, as touching the places of Scripture, containing the indication thereof, which is not ſet downe there, and ſome there are ſet downe, which are not ſet downe here. In their firſt poſition concerning thoſe who are not elect, upon the fifth Article (this Authors quotation here leaving out the Article) and by a wild reference to the page, being fitter to confound a Reader than direct him) the firſt poſition there is this, "There is a certain ſupernaturall enlightning granted to ſome of "them who are not elect, by the power whereof they underſtand thoſe things to be "true, which are revealed in the word of God, and yeeld an unfained aſcent unto "them. And in the explication of it *Luke* 8.13. "The ſeed which fell upon the ſto-"ny ground, noteth unto us ſuch hearers, as for a while believe, that is, thoſe that "for a while give aſcent to things revealed from above, and eſpecially to the cove-"nant of the Goſpell; and thereby it is plaine, that this their aſcent, is no way faig-"ned, becauſe they received the word with joy. *Acts* 8. 30. And afterwards they give a farther reaſon of it thus, "For it is not to be imputed for a fault to any man, "that he is fallen from an Hypocriticall faith, neither can a ſhipwrack be made of a "faigned faith, but only a detection and manifeſtation of it, nor indeed can he ſuf-"fer ſhipwrack, who was never in the ſhippe. 2 *Pet.* 2.20. Some are ſaid to have eſ-"caped from the filthineſſe of the world, by the knowledge of the Lord, whoſe lat-"ter end is worſe than their beginning: and of thoſe *Ioh.* 12.42. who believed in "Chriſt, but did not confeſſe him, they write that they believed with an unfaigned "dogmaticall faith, which then lay ſecretly hid in their hearts: but never ſhewed it "ſelfe in any outward profeſſion, for feare of danger enſuing. Thir ſecond poſition is this, "In theſe fore-mentioned, there doth ariſe out of this knowledge and "faith, a certain change of their affections, and ſome kind of amendment of their "manners. This they prove out of *Math.* 13.20. *They received the word with joy*: and 1 *Kings* 21.17. concerning *Ahabs* humbling of himſelfe: and out of *Heb.* 6.4. alleadged by this Author, and over and above out of *v.* 6. obſerve a renovation alſo, in as much as it is ſaid, *That it is impoſſible they ſhould be renued againe*, which implyeth, that they had been formerly renued in ſome ſort, and out of Chap. 10. 19. *That they trod under foot the blood of the Covenant, by which they are ſanctified*; and that they attained to ſome amendment of life, they prove both by the example of *Herod*; and out of 2 *Pet.* 2.20. where tis ſaid of them, *that they had eſcaped from the filthineſſe of the world.* And Chap. 1. 9. Where they are ſaid to have forgotten *that they were purged from their old ſinnes.* And out of *Math.* 12.43. Where 'tis ſaid the unclean ſpirit was departed out of them, and that all this was not faigned, *but that they proceeded out of the power of thoſe diſpoſitions unto grace, and from the inſpiration of the Holy Ghoſt*: yet notwithſtanding all this in their fourth poſition they pronounce, *that they never attaine unto the ſtate of adoption and juſtification*: and in their explication of it, that they never attaine the change and renovation of the mind and affections, *which doth immediatly prepare and diſpoſe unto juſtification; For they never ſeriouſly repent &c.* at large. Now ſeeing God brings them no farther, as he doth his elect; with what ſobriety can it be ſaid, that God intends their ſalvation? And as for the poynt of ſanctification, which here is attributed to them, other Divines doe not goe ſo farre, as to interpet it of any inward ſanctification, as *Paræus*; *Erat autem* (ſaith he) *Sanctificatio Apoſtolorum non interna ſed externa in profeſſione fidei, & participatione ſacramentorum externa conſiſtens, erant ſanctificati, hoc eſt, a Judæis & Paganis profeſſione ſegregati, & pro veris Chriſtianis habiti. Loquitur enim ſecundum judicium charitatis, quæ omnes de doctrina foris conſentientes habet pro ſanctificatis, licet non omnes cordibus vere ſint ſanctificati, Non eergo hinc ſequitur, Apoſtatas. Vere fuiſſe regeneratos. Pro quibus enim Chriſtus ne orare quidem dignatus eſt, eos multo minus ſanguine ſuo ſanctificavit: ideo Johannes Apoſtatas de Eccleſia renatorum fuiſſe negat: ex nobis egreſſi ſunt, quia non erant ex nobis. Et Petrus vocat eos canes & porcos redentes ad vomitum, & volutabrum, canis vero etiam poſt vomitum eſt canis, & ſus lota eſt ſus, canem vero & ſuem ſe ſemper manſiſſe, & ille & iſta per reditum ad vomitum & volutabrum declarat.* *Cameron* likewiſe in in his *Myroth.* p.334. *Dupliciter ſanctificantur homi-*

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In the Engliſh Tranſlation.
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nes alii abſolute, ut ſoli fideles, cum ſcilicet non tantum ab aliis hominibus ſegregantur (hoc enim verbum ſanctificare ſæpe ſignificat in Scriptura) a Deo, ſed & remiſſione peccatorum apprehenſa & Spiritus Sancti virtute ſanctificati, & in ſanctitatis ſtudio permanent. Alii comparate, qui ſcilicet ſeparantur quidem ab aliis hominibus externa fidei profeſſione, & aliqua fortè vitæ inſtituti immutatione, at non ſanctificantur abſolute ut fideles, ad hoc poſterius ſanctificationis genus pertinet hoc Apoſtoli dictum, in quo ſanctificatus fuit. But albeit they were truly ſanctified, (to ſuppoſe that for the preſent) yet if God purpoſed not to give them perſeverance therein, undoubtedly he intended not their ſalvation. Nay, no Arminian denies, but that God did from everlaſting intend the ſalvation of all ſuch Apoſtates; and to ſay that he had a velleity to ſave them, is to daſh a mans ſelfe againſt the rock of abſurdity, as to deny Gods omnipotency, unleſſe he will ſay Gods mind is changed: and to talke of a conditionate will intending their ſalvation, is no more to ſay, that he intends their ſalvation in caſe they doe believe, than to ſay, he intends their damnation in caſe they doe not believe. And as for his allegation out of the ſuffrages of our Divines in the Synod of *Dort*, that is very wild, neither mentioning the Article, nor rightly quoting the page: though the things here propoſed are moſtly taken out of the firſt and ſecond Theſis, concerning the *Non-elect*, upon the fifth Article: but no glimps doe I find there, of any ſuch end of Gods granting theſe diſpoſitions, as that thereby they might be brought unto ſalvation; though as in the elect ſuch like diſpoſitions are, ſo in the Reprobate, they might be preparations to farther grace, if it pleaſed God ſo to ordaine as to bring them on forward to juſtification and true ſanctification conjunct therewith, and thereby unto ſalvation.

As for the ends which God doth intend thereby, to wit, by bringing them ſo farre; look whatſoever God doth bring to paſſe hereby, that God doth intend. For nothing can fall out caſually unto God. If they doe perſevere in this condition, to wit. as touching the outward emendation of their life, it is, *ut mitius puniantur*, as *Auſtin* expreſſeth himſelfe ſomewhere, which now doth not come to my remembrance, if they fall from it, whereupon they ſhall be more grievouſly puniſhed: this alſo was intended by God. Or if others are bettered by them, undoubtedly this alſo was intended by God, as alſo to teach all others not to content themſelves with ſuperficiall renovation, ſuperficiall obedience; and ſo likewiſe illumination clearely takes away that excuſe, which ſome are apt to make, as *Auſtin* obſerves, namely, *Dicere ſolet humana ſuperbia ſi ſciſſem feciſſem.* Which how well this Author infringeth, we are to conſider in the next place. *De grat. & lib. arb. c. 2.*

DISCOURSE.

SECT. VI.

BUt there are ſome Scriptures which ſeem to ſay the contrary. *v: g. Rom.* 1. 20. Where God is ſaid to reveale himſelfe to the Gentiles by the creatures εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἀναπολογήτους that they might be without excuſe. *Luke* 2. 34. *Simeon* ſaid of Chriſt, that he is appointed for the falling, and riſing againe of many in Iſraell; and. 1 *Cor.* 1. 23. I preach Chriſt (ſayth *Paul*) to the Jewes a ſtumbling blocke. 2 *Cor.* 2. 16. We are the ſweet ſavor of death unto death: and it ſeems by theſe places, that God gives theſe things to ſome, that they may ſtumble, and be left without excuſe; What ſhall we ſay therefore to theſe places? Of all theſe Scriptures in generall, I may ſay this, that they are to be underſtood of the end, which is many times effected by theſe gifts of God, and not of the end that is primarily intended in them; and they ſhew what Chriſt, the Word Preached, and the gifts of nature and grace, are (occaſionally) to ſome men through their voluntary rebellion againſt God, and his Ordinances; and not what they are (intentionally) in Gods firſt thoughts and reſolutions. He intends them for them, for their good, though many times they receive them to their hurt: it is with Gods Ordinances and gifts (and that very often too) as it is ſometimes with Phyſick, it is given by the Phyſitian for the Patients good, many times through the diſtemper of his body, it doth him hurt. And as it is with the Sunne, God intends by the ſhining of it, the enlightning and clearing of men, and other creatures in this inferior World, others are hurt by the light of it, (accidentally) by reaſon of the climates wherein they live, or the ill affectedneſſe of their eyes and bodies. So the bleſſings of God, which out of his abundant goodneſſe, are beſtowed upon men for their eternall good, through the ill frame and temper of their heart, doe effect their hurt; partly becauſe lighting upon naughty hearts, they looſe their force and edge, (for *quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis*;) and partly becauſe of the ſeverity of God, who as he hath an antecedent and gratious will to doe men good, ſo he hath a conſequent and judiciary will of giving up wicked men to the luſts of their hearts, and of permitting them to daſh

againſt Chriſt, and other means of eternall life, and ſo to fall into endleſſe miſery and miſchiefe, as we may ſee, *Pſal.* 101.11,12. and *Rev.*22.11. *He that is filthy let him be filthy ſtill.*

Now if this be the meaning of thoſe Scriptures, then they thwart nothing that hath been ſaid of Gods gracious intent of promoting the eternall good of men, by his bleſſings beſtowed upon them. For *argumentum ab eventu ad intentionem Dei non valet*; becauſe no ſinfull event is properly under Gods will and decree, but his preſcience only, or at moſt under a permiſſive decree, and many things happen in the World, which are beſides the antecedent and principall purpoſe of God, not becauſe there is any want of power in God, but becauſe his will is oftentimes conditionall, and therefore not effected, becauſe the condition is not performed.

TWISSE.

Conſideration.

THe gifts of grace he ſpeakes of are three. 1. The knowledge of God revealed in his workes, 2. Chriſt, 3. The Goſpell; for theſe alone are they, whereof the objection proceeds, which he propoſeth to be anſwered. Of the firſt: it is moſt true, that the end thereof repreſented in the objection, is effected by it, to wit, the bereaving men of excuſe, as namely in a certain kind, which *Auſtin* interpreteth, *De grat. & lib. arb.* c. 2. in this manner, *Quomodo dicit inexcuſabiles niſi de illa excuſatione, qua dicere ſolet humana ſuperbia ſi ſciſſem feciſſem, ideo non feci, quia neſcivi.* How doth he call them inexcuſable, but in reſpect of ſuch an excuſe, which the pride of man moveth him to uſe, ſaying, had I known it I would have done it, therefore I did it not, becauſe I knew it not: thus the Gentiles were left without excuſe, in turning the glory of the incorruptible God, to the ſimilitude of the image of a corruptible man, &c. And for as much as he had ſufficiently manifeſted himſelfe by his workes, to be eternall, and conſequently uncorruptible. So that knowledge ſufficiently revealed, doth alwaies take away the pretence of ignorance for a mans excuſe, whether a man have any need of excuſe, as in caſe he lives not anſwerable to his knowledge, or no need at all to excuſe himſelfe, as in caſe he doth conforme himſelfe to that knowledge which God hath given him, in which caſe he is not ſaid to be inexcuſable, though pretence of ignorance by way of excuſe is taken from him, as well as from others; but becauſe he hath no need of any ſuch excuſe, as depends upon pretence of ignorance, therefore he is not denominated inexcuſable, but ſuch only who would excuſe themſelves by ſuch a pretence, but cannot. But as touching the other gifts of grace mentioned, to wit, 1. Chriſt, 2. The Goſpell, 'tis moſt untrue that the end ſpecified, is effected by them: for Chriſt doth not effect the falling of any; neither is the *ſetting of him up*, any cauſe of any mans falling, neither is the ſtumbling of any, effected by the Preaching of the Goſpell; for what is mens ſtumbling thereat, but their diſobedience thereunto. 1 *Pet.*2.8. Now the Goſpell doth not effect any mans diſobedience, but the corrupt heart of man alone is the efficient cauſe thereof. And I cannot ſufficiently wonder, at ſo crude a conceit as this Author manifeſteth, by ſo inconſiderate an expreſſion. I grant the end primarily intended, was no other then Gods glory: But as for the ſalvation of Reprobates, that is neither primarily nor ſecondarily, nor at all intended by God, as I have often demonſtrated; both in as much as God hath from everlaſting intended their damnation, and therefore cannot without contradiction intend their ſalvation. And withall God is unchangeable and omnipotent, and therefore as he can procure the Salvation of any, if withall he intends and wills to procure it, undoubtedly ſuch a one ſhall be ſaved. Againſt all which, this Author proceeds without taking any courſe to charme thoſe foule abſurdities whereinto he precipitates himſelfe. And when he ſaith of the ſtumbling of many at the Goſpell, that it is not *primarily intended*, he doth moſt inconſiderately confeſſe, that it is intended by God, though not primarily, which is enough for us; and the Apoſtle is expreſſe, profeſſing of ſuch who ſtumble at the word through diſobedience, *That thereunto they were ordained.* 1 *Pet.* 2.8. Neither doe we ſay that the Goſpell or Chriſt, is the cauſe of any mans falling; but onely the

the occaſion thereof: mans corrupt heart alone (as formerly I ſaid) being the cauſe thereof. But God intends their ſtumbling ſhall come to paſſe, which muſt needs be, in caſe it is through diſobedience that they ſtumble, and God hath purpoſed to deny them the grace of obedience, as indeed he hath to many, like as he doth deny it to many; as appeareth by his hardening of many, even whom he will, like as on the other ſide, he hath mercy on whom he will. So Chriſts carriage was not the cauſe, but the occaſion only of the Jewes plotting againſt him, becauſe *they obſerved that he did many miracles, and if they let him alone, all men would believe in him, and the Romans would come and take away both their place, and the Nation. Ioh.* 11.47,48. Yet look what they did againſt him, God had before intended and determined to be done; *For both Herod, and Pontius Pilate together with the Gentiles, and people of Iſraell, were gathered together, to doe what Gods hand and counſell had determined before to be done. Acts* 4.28. Yet not primarily intended neither, for all this was to a farther end, namely, to procure the redemption of the World, yea of ſome of them who crucified him. Yet there was a farther end than all this, namely, the glory of God, in the way of mercy mixt with juſtice, and that brought to paſſe by admirable power and wiſdome. This was firſt in Gods thoughts and reſolutions, as the ſupreame end, all the reſt were but as meanes tending thereunto: yet doe we not ſay *this was intentionally in Gods firſt thoughts and reſolutions*, which is as if he ſhould ſay, *intentionally in Gods intentions*; and with the like genius of ſobriety, he diſtinguiſheth between *occaſionally* and *intentionally*, incloſing the tearmes with a parentheſis, as if there were ſome great judgement, though little wit, in this diſtinction, and therefore would have it obſerveable. Occaſion is juſtly diſtinguiſhed from a cauſe, but I never found it diſtinguiſhed from intention, till now. It ſeemes he would ſay accidentally or caſually, for ſuch alone are *præter intentionem*, if any, and ſo fit to be oppoſed to *intentionally*; but this diſtinction ſticks in his teeth, he was loath in plaine tearmes to expreſſe ſo ſhamefull an opinion, as to profeſſe that any thing comes to paſſe in the World, beſides Gods intention, which is the diſtinction of things fortuitous in *Ariſtotle*. Nay, he leaves place for Gods intention of them *ſecondarily*, denying only that he intends them primarily. But ſtill he keepes this concluſion, and holds that up, whatſoever becomes of his premiſes, as when he ſaith *God intends them for them, for their good*, that is his Oracle; but Saint Pauls Oracle is, that *the inviſible things of God, that is his eternall power and Godhead, are ſeen by the Creation of the World being conſidered in his workes, εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἀναπολογήτους, that they may be without excuſe*, and that the Preachers of the Goſpell, were unto God a ſweet ſavour of Chriſt in them that are ſaved, and in them that periſh; without putting any difference according to this Authors Gemora, that this is to be underſtood of the one *occaſionally*, of the other *intentionally*. But to ranſack this alſo, and to ſpeake diſtinctly, What is the good that God hereby intended them? Was it Salvation? And how did he intend that unto them? Was it intended to be their portion, whether they believed in Chriſt or no? Undoubtedly his meaning can be no other then this, he intended they ſhould be ſaved by him, provided they did believe in him: Now what Chriſtian was there ever known to deny this, namely, that as many as believed in Chriſt, ſhould be ſaved by him? But let me aske another queſtion, Did God intend they ſhould believe in him? Yes ſurely in the opinion of this Author: but is not faith the gift of God? They are aſhamed to deny this, at leaſt *in concione populi*, whatſoever they doe *conſeſſu familiari*. Why then did not God give them faith? Why ſurely becauſe they refuſed to believe in him, ſo that had they believed in him, then God would have given them faith; as much as to ſay, had they beſtowed faith on themſelves, then God would have beſtowed faith on them: this is their ſobriety that oppoſe the grace of God, and ſuch be their ſobriety ſtill that fall away from the truth of God. If Phyſick doe the Patients harme through the diſtemper of their bodies, this muſt be through the ignorance of the Phyſitian, who either knowes not the diſtemper of their body, or elſe knowes not how to maſter it. But ſpare, I pray, to make God obnoxious to the like ignorance or impotency, when the Lord ſaith, *I have ſeen his wayes and will heale them, Iſai.* 57. 18. When was it ever known that ſuch a patient was not healed? What greater diſtemper of the ſoule than back-ſliding or Rebellion? Yet when God ſaith I will heale their back-ſliding, and I will heale their Rebellions. *Hoſea* 14. *verſ.* 4. When was it ever knowne, that any of his Patients, were not the better for his operation, but the worſe rather? At length, that breakes out of this Author, that formerly

ſtuck in the way, like a burre in his throat, as when he ſaith *that God intends the chearing of men by the ſhining of the Sunne*, but that ſome are ſcorched by the heat of it, ſome hurt by the light of it, is accidentally, as if theſe effects were not intended by God; as much as to ſay, that God doth not intend, that the ſunne ſhould ſcorch *in Zona torrida*, though the ſunne works by neceſſity of nature, and cannot but ſcorch there, as the *Abiſſines* felt to their ſmart, who were wont to pray unto the ſunne as he was riſing to ſpare them, but after he was paſſed, and going downe, to curſe as faſt for his ſcorching of them, whence it is conceived that proverbe came, *plures adorant ſolem orientem quam occidentem*: as naturall it is to the light to ſcatter the ſight, and if by ſcattering the eye be ill affected, this is as naturall to the ſunne; like as to make ſweet flowers ſend forth their odoriferous ſavours, as a dung-mixen, to exhale an unſavoury ſmell: but ſuppoſe a man ſhould looſe his ſight by the light, as ſome have by the light of the ſunne, being kept long in ſome darke place before, ſhall this be accidentall unto God, wheras the Prophet profeſſeth, *there is no evill in the City which the Lord hath not done?* Like as Gods bleſſing it is, that neither the ſun ſcorcheth him by day, nor the influence of the Moon, or any other planet, hurt him by night. But come we to the Apodoſis of the ſimile, He renewes his cocciſmes of *Gods bleſſings out of his abundant goodneſſe, beſtowed on men for their good*; which is a generall ſpeech, and in the generality nothing to the preſent purpoſe, we know *God ſaveth both man and beaſt*, he makes his ſunne to ſhine, and his raine to fall on the juſt and on the unjuſt, but as for the knowledge of God revealed in his creature, whatſoever is brought forth according to it, we doubt not but God intended it, as civill ſociety, and ſome naturall feare of God, and civill converſation; where any thing is done contrary unto it, the Apoſtle hath diſcovered unto us, the end of naturall revelation is, *that they might be without excuſe*; they connot ſay, *ſi ſciſſem feciſſem*, that excuſe is taken from them. As for the dictates of ſupernumerary Apoſtles, we have no cauſe to regard them, eſpecially when they are cantradictitions to the word of God, and Chriſtian reaſon, the Goſpell is unto God throughout a ſweet ſavour in Chriſt, *both in them that are ſaved, and in them that periſh*; It is true, that it is through the corruptions of mens hearts, that men doe not yeeld obedience to it, but that corruption God can cure, and doth cure where it pleaſeth him; that men doe obey, 'tis alſo through the good temper of their hearts, but through the grace of God, curing that corruption in them, that he leaves uncured in others; And we willingly grant, that he intends their ſalvation in whom he means to cure this corruption, to bring them to the obedience of faith: but moſt abſurd it is to ſay, that he intends their ſalvation, on whom he never meant to ſhew any ſuch mercy, but rather to harden them; where the honeſt and good heart is wanting, the word proves not fruitfull, but only where ſuch an heart is found. Now it is Gods work, (I know) alone to take away the ſtony heart, and to give an heart of fleſh. But this Author carryeth himſelfe ſo throughout, that he would have this worke to be the work of mans free will, not of God, any other way than by perſwaſion, admonition, exhortation, and concourſe; many talke of *Robin Hood* that never ſhot in his Bow; and this Author talkes of the anticedent will of God, which I doubt whether he underſtands either the meaning of *Damaſcen* herein, or of *Cryſoſtom* either *Voſſius* reduceth it as I have ſhewed before, to *Voluntas conditionata*, thus, God willeth that men ſhould be ſaved if they believe, is it not as true, that his will is, they ſhall be damned if they doe not believe? this is the only gratious will this Author magnifyes; but God give me experience of another manner of his gratious will towards me, namely, as he ſeeth my wayes, ſo to heale them, yea, and to rule me with a mighty hand, ſo he make me to paſſe under the rod, and bring me unto the bond of his covenant. But yet ſee I pray whether this Author be yet come to the ſobriety of his ſences, in ſpeaking here of Gods ſeverity in the way of a *will judiciary*; as when *he gives wicked men up to the luſt of their hearts, and permits them to daſh againſt Chriſt, and other meanes of eternall life*, Now I pray conſider, who are thoſe wicked men whom God thus gives over to their luſts? Were we not all ſuch? Did not God find us all weltering in our bloud. *Ezek.* 16.? Had not we all ſtony hearts. *Ezek.* 36.? Were we not all blind, lame, deafe, nay were we not dead in ſinnes. *Epheſ.* 2. 1.? Did not the Goſpell find the *Epheſians* ſo? Did not the Word of truth find the *Jewes* ſo? *James*, 1.18. How then comes this difference that Chriſt is a ſtumbling blocke to ſome and not to others? We ſay the difference is, becauſe God hath mercy on ſome, and hardens others. *Rom.* 9. 18. Becauſe ſome are borne of God, therefore they heare Gods Word, others are not borne of God, and therefore they

heare

heare not Gods word. *Ioh.*8.47. The Arminians ſay *God giveth power to every one by an univerſall grace to will any good whereto he ſhall be excited.* So when the Goſpell is Preached, every one hath power to obey it: if he doth obey it, then Chriſt is a precious ſtone to him, but if it diſobey it, then he is given up to the luſts of his heart, and *permitted to daſh againſt Chriſt, and other meanes of eternall life.* Here we have a phraſe, but we are to ſeeke of the meaning thereof; what is it to daſh againſt Chriſt? It muſt needs be to commit ſome ſinne or other, for that is the object of Gods permition, for of all other things God is acounted the Author, not the permitter, the object of permition is nothing but ſinne, now what ſinne can that be, whereby we are ſaid to daſh againſt Chriſt, and other meanes of ſalvation, but diſobedience to Chriſt and to the meanes of grace: ſo that from the firſt to the laſt, the ſence comes to this, as many as diſobey Chriſt and the meanes of grace, they are given over to the luſts of their hearts, and permitted to daſh againſt Chriſt and other means of eternall life, that is, are permitted to diſobey Chriſt and to reſiſt other means of eternal life. So that their diſobedience to Chriſt and the Goſpell is very punctually and juditiouſly ſet downe to precede by two degrees their diſobedience to Chriſt, and his Goſpell. Some may thinke that this Arminian profilite doth not carry himſelfe well in his buſineſſe and for betraying the nakedneſſe of his cauſe may be in dainger to be excommunicated out of their Synagogue. But Sir you muſt believe it, this is the very leproſy of their Doctrine that over ſpreds it from the crowne of the head to the ſole of the foot, and they are in love with it, accounting it not only ſanity, but perfect beauty. God indeed is ſaid in Scripture, to give men over to their luſts, when he forbears either courſes of admonition and reproofe by his word, or by his judgements in his workes, or when he forbears to reſtraine Satan, as formerly he did: but diſobedience to the Goſpell undoubtedly is, *hoc ipſo*, a daſhing againſt Chriſt, althongh God may continue to admoniſh and exhort even to the end; as to prophane and hypocriticall perſons in the Church, he gives not over this courſe of his untill the end. I have often repreſented the abſurdity of this Authors conceit, *of a gracious intent in God, of promoting the eternall good of Reprobates*; whereas it cannot be denied, that God hath from everlaſting intended their damnation: and as for our ſaying, that God intends they ſhall be without excuſe, that Chriſt is ſet up for their falling, that the Goſpell *is unto God a ſweet ſavour in Chriſt, not only in them that are ſaved, but in them that periſh.* This Author is ſo farre from overthrowing the truth of it, that (beſides other abſurdities delivered by him in the way) the Author himſelfe hath no heart to deny it, only ſaying, that *God intends it not primarily*, which is rather to grant that he intends it (though not primarily as whereabouts there is no queſtion) than to deny it, and that *occaſionally they are ſo*; whereas no man but himſelfe hath ſaid (in ſaying that they doe effect this end) that Chriſt or the Goſpell are the cauſe hereof, but only that they are the occaſion. But this hinders not Gods intention of them: For undoubtedly God intends as well things occaſioned as things cauſed, though not in his firſt thoughts and reſolutions, which belongs rather to the end than to the meanes, to wit, to be firſt intended. So that in plaine tearmes, he hath not hitherto dared to deny, that God intends them, though he manifeſts a good mind to maintaine, that they come to paſſe accidentally and caſually in reſpect of God; For he ſpares not to profeſſe, that the ſcorching of men, and the hurting of weake eyes falls out accidentally, and that to God; for he propoſeth this by way of diſtinction, from that which God intends, which he ſaith is the chearing of men by the light of the Sunne: like as here he denies that mens ſtumbling at Chriſt, is a thing intended by God; like as in ſaying a *ſinnefull event is not properly under Gods will and decree, but under his preſcience only, or at moſt under a permiſſive decree.* And this I confeſſe, is a very plauſible doctrine in the judgement of fleſh and bloud; ſave that this Authors faint carriage in the delivering of it, is enough to make a man ſuſpect it, as plauſible as it is, yet it is hardly true and ſound. For he dares not ſay, *that a ſinfull event is not at all under Gods decree*, only that he ſaith, *it is not properly under Gods decree.* But Saint Peter ſpeaking of them that ſtumbled at the word of God through diſobedience, profeſſeth in plaine termes, that hereunto they were ordained, 1 *Pet.*2.6. And all the Apoſtles there aſſembled. *Acts* 4. 28. Doe profeſſe, *that both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and people of Iſraell, were gathered together againſt the Holy Sonne of God, to doe what Gods hand, and Gods counſell had determined before to be done.* And ere I part I hope to prove, that any ſinfull act that comes to paſſe in the world, is as properly intended of God, as any good act whatſoever, although there be a vaſt

difference in the bringing of them forth: God causing the one, & only permitting the other as it is evill. And that because it comes under Gods prescience, & it is well they are not so Atheistical as to deny Gods prescience; but I doubt not to make it good, that either they must deny that every thing comes under Gods prescience, or they must grant that every thing comes under Gods decree. For consider, nothing can be foreknowne of God as future, unlesse it be future. Now let us quietly enquire how any thing becomes future, and if any cause hereof can with reason be devised without the decree of God, let us all become Arminians, and deny God either at all to be, or to be a free agent, but working by necessity of nature: For if future things be future of their own nature, then all things must be acknowledged to come to passe by necessity of their owne nature, which is to deny God. But if things be of their owne nature meerly possible, and indifferent to become either *future* or *non-future*, then there must be acknowledged some cause whereby they are brought out of the condition of things meerly possible, into the condition of things future. And this cause must exist from everlasting, otherwise it should not be so ancient as the effect thereof, for it is well knowne that all things future have been future from everlasting, otherwise God could not have foreknown them from everlasting: but all confesse that God from everlasting foreknew every future thing; Therefore the cause making them to passe out of the condition of things meerly possible (such as they were of their owne nature) into the condition of things future, was also from everlasting. Now consider where was this cause to be found? Not without God: for nothing without God either was or is everlasting without beginning; therefore is it to be found within God or no where. Consider in the next place, what is that within God which is fit to be the cause hereof. We say 'tis his decree, but this Author cannot away with that. Therefore *Si quid noviſti rectius iſto candidus imperti*. Certainly the knowledge of God cannot be the cause; for as *Aquinas* saith, that causeth nothing but as joyned with Gods will, and therefore it is commonly conceived that foreknowledge doth rather presuppose things future than make them so: nothing then remaines to be the cause hereof, but the essence of God. Now the essence of God may be considered two waies, either as working necessarily, or as working freely: if it be the cause of things future as working necessarily, then it followeth that God shall produce them by necessity of nature, which utterly overthrowes Divine providence. What remaines then but that we must be driven to confesse that Divine essence makes them future, as working freely, which is as much as to professe, that Gods will and decree is that alone, which maketh things to passe out of the condition of things meerly possible in to the condition of things future. And I challenge the whole Nation of Arminians, and Jesuites to answer this argument. Yet this decree we willingly acknowledge is a permissive decree: but look that we understand that aright also; thus God decreeth this or that evill to come to passe by his permission, like as good things he decreeth shall come to passe by his effection: and that upon Gods permission, it is necessary that that which he permits shal come to passe, is acknowledged not only by our Divines, but by *Vorstius*, by Arminians, by *Navarettus* the *Dominican* as I have quoted thē in my *Vindiciæ gratiæ Dei*, which yet they deliver without clear expressing how: which I perform thus, look what God decrees to permit, it is necessary that it should come to passe, but how? Not necessarily but contingently & freely, And the Scripture is expresse as before expressed, that the most barbarous actions cōmited against Christ by *Herod*, *Pontius Pilate*, together with the Gentiles and people of Israell, in their contumelious usages of him, were all predetermined by the hand and counsell of God. Marke the issue of this Authors most frivolous discourses: for this will whereof he speakes, whereby God is pretended gratiously to will mans Salvation, conditionall; as much as to say, 'tis Gods will that a man shall be Saved in case he believe in Christ; now what Christian was ever known to deny this. Secondly, consider whether this deserves to be called a will to save more than a will to damne, for like as 'tis certaine a man shall be saved if he believe in Christ, so it is most certaine a man shall be damned if he believe not, and withall consider to which of these the nature of man is most prone, whether to faith or to infidelity.

DISCOURSE.

DISCOURSE.

SECT. VII.

BUt by this opinion the gifts of nature and grace have another end, either God doth not meane them unto those that perish, albeit they doe enjoy them; because they are mingled in the world with the elect, to whom only they are directed: or if he doe, he meaneth they shall have them, and by them be lifted up above the common rank of men, [*ut lapsu graviore ruant*] that their fall may be the greater: for how can God intend that those men should receive them or any good by any of them, whom he hath by an absolute decree cut off and rejected utterly from grace and glory. More particularly by, this doctrine,

1. Christ came not into the world to procure the Salvation of them that perish, because they were inevitably preordained to perish.

2. The word is not sent to them, or if it be, it is that they might slight it or contemne it and increase their damnation by the contempt of it; and so these inconveniences will arise;

1. That God is a meere deceiver of miserable men whom he calls to Salvation in the name of his Sonne, by the preaching of his word; because he fully intends to most men the contrary to that which he fairly presends: *Suffrag. Britaine. p. 43.*

2. That Ministers are but false witnesses; because in their Ministry they offer Salvation conditionally to many, who are determined to damnation absolutely:

3. The Ministry of the Word canot leave men inexcusable, for Reprobates may have this just plea: Lord, dost thou punish for not believing in thy Sonne, when thou didest call us to believe by the preaching of thy Word, thou didest decree to leave us (woefull men) in *Adams* sinne, to leave us neither power to believe, nor a Christ to believe in; how canst thou justly charge us with sinne, or encrease our punishment for not believing in him, whom thou didest resolve before the world was that we should never believe in. That Ministry gives men a faire excuse which is given to no other end than to leave them without excuse.

4. The Sacraments (by this opinion) signify nothing, seale up, conferre nothing to such as are not Saved, but are meere blankes and empty ordinances unto them not through the fault of men but by the primary and absolute will of God.

5. Lastly, other gifts bestowed upon men of what nature soever they be, are to the most that receive them in Gods absolute intention,

1. Unprofitable, such as shall never doe them good in reference to their finall condition.

2. Dangerous and hurtfull, given them not of love but extreame hatred, not that they might use them well and be Blessed in so doeing, but that they might use them ill, and by ill using of them procure unto themselves the greater damnation. God lifts them up (as the Divell did Christ) to the pinacle of the Temple that they might fall, and loades them with knowledge and other goodly indowments that with the weight of them, he might sink them into Hell, and so by good consequence Gods chiefest gifts are intended, and laid as snares to entrap mens Soules. Men that have them have little cause to be proud of them, (for they are the more unhappy because they have them) or small reason to be thankfull for them, or to love the giver of them, but to hate rather, because they are but giftlesse gifts, no better than an usurers bounty, *Jaells* courtesie *Sauls* bestowing *Michal* to *David*, or a bayte for a proud fish which he swallowes with an hooke to boote.

TWISSE

Consideration.

WEE have hitherto received a poore and hungry discourse, but now in the accommodation of it he thunders & lightneth, as his manner is, both the Master and the Disciple would have it in their owne power to make themselves elect, otherwise it seemes they have little comfort, and therefore they discharge a great noise of thunder against our Doctrine of reprobation: as if they would awe God to give them liberty to elect themselves, otherwise they will powder his absoluteness, in taking upon him to Reprobate whom he list. Me thinkes these Arminians talke in the spirit of Dr *Story*, as if they would scould us out of our faith, I will not say God out of his Throne; but he is able to plead his owne

own, we are unworthy to plead for him, yet thus farre he is pleased to honour us, as to admit us to plead for him, like as he is the God that pleades the cause of his people: I have shewed how absurdly this Author makes the salvation of reprobates to be intended by God, which yet in the issue is but after a conditionall manner, which is no more to intend their salvation, then their condemnation: well let us see the quality of these absurdities he fastens upon us. The first is, that God doth not meane the gifts of nature and grace unto those that perish: where to I answer, That as touching the gifts of nature, there is no colour for this, for they (as the Author sets them downe) are these, creation, sustentation, preservation, health, beauty, wisdome; now let any sober man consider whether it be possible, that it should not be Gods meaning for as many as doe enjoy them, to enjoy them. As for the gifts of grace, these he divides into graces purchasing Salvation, and graces applying Salvation, after it is purchased: the grace purchasing Salvation is Christ; now we say that Salvation is purchased, to be conferred upon every man of ripe yeares conditionall only, namly, in case he believes, and on all that doe believe; for our Saviour hath said *that whosoever believes shall be saved, whosoever believes not shall be damned*: as for the purchasing the grace of faith, that we say is so purchased to be conferred absolutly and not upon condition of any worke for that is manifest Pelagianisme, and therefore Christ dyed not to procure that for all, for then all should believe *de facto*, & be saved: therefore we say, he dyed to procnre this only for his elect. But the Arminians doe now openly professe to the world. that Christ merited not faith and regeneration for any: so that God meant not, that Christ should be given to any for the purchasing of faith for him. So that herein certainly they are more to blame than we, by this Authors rules. As for the graces of applying Salvation, these are the *Ministry of the word and Sacraments, the long suffering of God, the illumination of mens understandings, the plantation of many exellent vertues in their hearts*. I will answer particularly concerning thē all, leaving those many more which he conceales, to his owne enjoying the contemplation of them. And first as touching the Ministry of the Word and Sacraments, we willingly professe, that we find no monument of the Americans enjoying of them before the discovery of that westerne world by *Columbus Vesputius*, and *Magellan*, no nor to this day in the *terra incognita Australi*, whereof relation is made by *Ferdenando de Quir*: but herein I confesse the Arminians goe beyond us in there spirituall discoveries; for, by the Catoptricke glasse of their owne fancy, they tell us, that though Christ hath not been preached amongst them by man, yet it may be he hath been preacht amongst them by Angells, and deliver it for certaine, that having universall grace given them, if they use that well: as many as use it well shall have the Gospell preached unto them, if not by men yet by Angells: but as for the administration of the Sacraments by Angells also they have discovered nothing unto us hitherunto that I know. And as for Gods patience, undoubtedly they enjoy it as much as we, if they be as long lived as we. And I know nothing to the contrary as touching illumination naturall: that I doubt is not meant to be comprehended under the graces, aplying Salvation purchased by Christ, yet why not as well as fortitude, liberality, temperance, humility, chastity, and truly herein I doe not find them any whit inferiour unto Christians, in some they went beyond us apparently; if we goe beyond them in any thing, I for my part take it to be in gace rather than nature. As for illumination spirituall, huhumane I know none they had, and as for Angelicall Revelation that is a dish of Lettice for Arminian lippes; I want faith to give me any stomach to it: I come to those exellent vertues which this Author pretendes to have been planted in their hearts; had he spared faith and repentance I could willingly have acknowledged the rest amongst heathens, and that according to Gods meaning; but what soever and in whome soever they are found, he thinks too hardly of us, when he saith, that God according to our opinion, doth not meane them to those that enioy them: and if he doth meane them unto such, surely they are directed unto them: how is it possible it should be otherwise, especially as touching vertues, yea and the Ministry of the Word also, for he commanded them to Preach the Gospell to every creature, to wit, where they came: only we willingly confesse, then he doth not meane any of those shall bring any of them that perish unto Salvation. Secondly, as touching the lifting up of them up a bove the common ranke of men by these giftes, heare is a miserable confused discourse, so many things being put together, to make up one tearme in a propositon;

but

but it is beneficiall to ſome to fiſh in troubled waters, and if my anſwer ſavour of the like confuſion it is nothing ſtrange, for hè that walkes in the Sunne, muſt needs be coloured. But I think I may ſay, looke what gifts men have, *cæteris paribus*, they are above the ranke of thoſe that have them not, but that they are given *ut lapſu graviore cadant*, *That their fall may be the greater*, This deſerves to be particularly conſidered. Firſt, in generall, I ſay whoſoever doth by occaſion of thoſe gifts here ſpoken of, *fall the more grievouſly* (which in many particulars is a myſtery to me, to the conſideration whereof I purpoſe to deſcend in the next place) God did both intend that ſuch a fall of theirs ſhould come to paſſe by his permiſſion, and that upon ſuch an occaſion: for even they that ſtumble at Gods word through diſobedience, and expreſſely ſaid by *Peter* to be ordained therennto, thus I look out for a ground for that I deliver, giving leave to the adverſaries of Gods truth to roave at pleaſure in the pouring forth of their impious dictates: but come we to the particulars, & firſt as touching the gifts of nature, I confes as touching the firſt of them (*creation*) that if that had not been, he had never fallen, but nevertheleſſe when God reſolved to create, he reſolved to create all things for himſelfe, *Even the wicked againſt the day of evill*, and if I erre in that I have an honourable Prophet to be my companion, even *Solomon* himſelfe. Prov. 16. 4. As for preſervation and ſuſtentation, I willingly confeſſe that if *Judas* had periſhed before he had been admitted into Chriſts ſervice, his damnation had been the more eaſy: and God electing him *ad prodendum ſanguinem* (if I may be ſo bold as to ſpeak in *Auſtins* language) did determine that his ſinne by Gods permiſſion ſhould be the more grievous, by occaſion of his advancement into the number of Chriſts diſciples. As for health, ſtrength, beauty, wiſdome, I ſee no reaſon why they ſhould promote any mans damnation, but that a foole, or an ill-favoured, or a weake, or a ſickly perſon, may be as great a ſinner as the wiſe man, or beautifull, or ſtrong, or healthy. How, becauſe Chriſt died for the ſalvation of as many as doe believe, which we all hold, or dyed to procure faith & regeneration for none (as the Arminians hold) any man is promoted to a greater meaſure of ſinne thereby, is a miſtery to me. As touching the miniſtry of the word, Saint *Peter* ſpeakes plainly of ſome, that *it had been better for them they had never known the way of righteouſneſſe, than after they have known it, to depart from the holy Commandement given to them*, he ſaith not this of all, & *Auſtin* profeſſeth of ſome Reprobates, that by the Goſpell they are called *Vt proficiant ad exteriorem vitæ emendationem quo mitius puniantur*. As for the patience of God S. *Paul* profeſſeth plainly, that *ſome after the hardneſſe of their hearts which cannot repent, deſpiſing the patience and long ſuffering of God, and therein his goodneſſe leading them to repentance, doe thereby treaſure up wrath againſt the day of wrath, and Reprobation of the juſt judgement of God.* Rom. 2. 5. And I ſhould think that even this God intended ſhould come to paſſe by his permiſſion, otherwiſe he would have given them repentance, or ſhortned their daies, for give me leave to ſay with *Auſtin*, *Quantamlibet prebuerit patientiam, niſi Deus dederit, quis agat pœnitentiam. Contra Julian. Pelag. l. 5. c. 4.* As for knowledge, that doth cleerely take away excuſe, grounded upon pretence of ignorance, and like as our Saviour ſaid to his Diſciples *Ioh. 13. If you know theſe things happy are yee if you doe them*: So likewiſe the more men know good things, the more unhappy are they, if they doe them not: yet it is not neceſſary that knowledge ſhould aggravate the damnation of the Reprobate, as in caſe they doe thereby, *proficere ad exteriorem vitæ emendationem*, for in this caſe ſurely, *mititus punientur*, but if they doe grow worſe by occaſion of their knowledge, we ſpare not to profeſſe that God intended this ſhould come to paſſe by his permiſſion, why not as well as the crucifying of the Sonne of God? *Act.* 4. 28. As for the vertues in the laſt place, which here are pretended alſo to be given to worke for their harme, and among them faith and repentance, we are ſo farre from affirming, that they are given for the harme of them that periſh, that we to the contrary maintaine, that they are given to none but Gods elect, and to bring them unto ſalvation, *Acts* 13. 48. *As many believed as were ordained to eternall life.* And faith is called the faith of the elect. *Tit.* 1. 1. and *Acts* 11. 18. Then *hath God alſo unto the Gentiles given repentance unto life.* Marke it well, not unto death, but unto life: And *Auſtin* long agoe hath profeſſed, that of thoſe who are not predeſtinated, God brings not one unto wholſome and ſpirituall repentance, whereby a man is reconciled unto God in Chriſt. Knowledge is here ſhufled in among the reſt of theſe vertues, as if that were not all one with the illumination of the mind, at leaſt moſt deſervedly to be ranged with it. As for other vertues here mentioned, as *fortitude, liberality, temperance, humility, chaſtity*, where theſe vertues are beſtowed after a naturall manner (for no other- *Contra Juli. Pelag. l. 5. cap. 4.*

wiſe, nor in any gracious manner, are they found in Reprobates, as I ſuppoſe, ready to be called at any time to an account upon that poynt, and to manifeſt ſix maine differences between the morall vertues of heathen men, and the ſame vertues (in name, and as touching the ſubſtance of the acts, wrought by them in Chriſtians) I ſhould think they are rather given for their good that enjoy them, than for their harme, namely, *Ut proficiant ad exteriorem vitæ emendationem, quo mitius puniantur.* All the harme that may come by them, that I can deviſe for the preſent, is to grow proud of them: and I willingly profeſſe, that nothing makes a greater ſeparation from God then pride, and it may be, Moraliſts fret at this, that their Morality is no better eſteemed of. But what thinke you? May a man be proud of humility, for that is one of the excellent vertues here ſpecified; why not, of the naturall humility which is in them? As Sir *Philip Sidney* obſerves in his defence of Poetry, that Philoſophers write Bookes againſt vaine-glory, whereunto nevertheleſſe they ſet their names. So they might write Books in commendation of humility, and thereunto ſet their names alſo. Yet I am not truly of ſuch an opinion, as to think, that God ſhould give any of theſe vertues, to the end they ſhould grow proud of them: for I doe not find it any way requiſite to a proud man, that he ſhould be vertuous: for in my judgement, pride is a very humble vice, and diſdaines not to dwell in the hearts of the meaneſt. *Plato* could diſcerne it through *Antiſthenes* his patcht coate: and when *Diogenes* trod under foot *Platoes* hangings, ſaying, I tread under my foot *Platoes* pride: it is obſerved that he did this *majori feſtu*, with greater pride: And as one ſometimes ſaid, a man may be as proud of a Cloakebagge which he carrieth behind him, as Cardinall *Campeius* was of his Sumpter-horſe, that followed after him; and yet that pride of his, might be of no better then of Brick-bats when all was known, what ſhew ſoever it made unto the people. And men of generous minds, and parts, and meanes anſwerable, are many times found, through the grace of God, more truly humble, than many a baſe fellow, that hath nothing to be made reckoning of but his own conceit. As the fly ſitting upon the Cart wheele in a dry Summer, ſaid, ſee what a duſt I make. Saint *Pauls* righteouſneſſe which he ſpeakes of, *Phil.* 3. I take to be better than the vertue of any Philoſopher, which yet he accounted but dung, that he might winne Chriſt. But by the way I obſerve how liberall theſe men are, in acknowledging the gifts of God in groſſe, which they will be found utterly to deny if they be examined upon them in particular. As for example, Morall vertues (we commonly ſay) are *Habitus acquiſiti*, acquiſite habits, and that by frequentation of conſimilar acts, whereupon the habit ariſeth naturally: Now doe theſe men maintaine that God is the Author of theſe acts, otherwiſe than by concourſe, working in them, τὸ *velle & facere modò velint?* I can ſhew it under the hands of ſome of them in expreſſe termes. Now I pray you, is not God the Author of every evill act after this manner, as well as of any good, by their own confeſſion? for they grant that God concurres to every ſinnefull act, & works τὸ *velle* and *facere* thereof alſo, *modò homines velint.* Who then is ſo ſimple as not to obſerve, that they make God the Author of vertues after no other manner, than they make him the Author of vices: Yet they are content to talke liberally of the gifts of God, only to cheat the ſimple; I meane as many as are not acquainted with their juggling: as for us wee maintaine, that God determines the will, not only to the ſubſtance of a good act by determination naturall, but alſo to the goodneſſe of it by determination ſupernatural: as for example, no vertuous act is truly good, but as it is performed out of the love of God, but what love? Out of ſuch a love of God, as is joyned with the contempt of himſelfe (judge you whether ſuch a love may be performed by power of nature) and this *amor uſq; ad contemptum ſui*, *Gerſon* makes to be the character of the child of God: like as *amor ſui uſq; ad contemptum Dei*, he make the character of a child of the Devill. But to draw to an end of this confuſed diſcourſe, wherein are clapt together gifts of nature, ſeaven whereof are reckoned up, as creation, ſuſtentation, preſervation, health, ſtrength, beauty and wiſdome; and gifts of grace, & that either purchaſing ſalvation as Chriſt, or applying ſalvation, which are of foure ſorts. 1. The Miniſtry of the word & Sacraments, 2. Gods patience, 3. Illumination of the mind, 4. The plantation of many excellent vertues, eight whereof are particulated, as 1. knowledge, 2. faith, 3. repentance, 4. fortitude, 5. liberality, 6. temperance, 7. humility, 8. chaſtity, (which by this time I have gotten by heart ere I am aware, I am ſo beaten to it, through a tedious diſcourſe) of all which hand over head, it is affirmed that either God meanes them not to

them

them that enjoy them, but as they are mingled with the elect, which hath no colour as I can perceive, ſave of the Miniſtry of the Word & Sacraments, for is it ſober to impute to any, to ſay that creation, or preſervation, or health, ſtrength, beauty, wiſdome, or Chriſt himſelfe, or Gods patience, or illumination of mind, or the vertues he ſpeakes of; as knowledge, faith, repentance, fortitude, liberality, temperance, humility, chaſtity, are not given to any, but as they are mingled among the elect? Or that they are given for their hurt: touching this laſt I anſwere in briefe, that it is a very abſurd thing to ſay, that God gives any of theſe gifts to man to this end, that they may by occaſion be hurt by them: but God both gives them, and (in caſe they prove an occaſion of harme, of ſinne unto them) he permits them through occaſion from them to ſinne, and therein to preſevere (as touching Reprobates) to damne them for their ſinnes, to the manifeſtation of his own glory, in the way of juſtice vindicative: as alſo hereby, the more *To declare the riches of his glory upon the veſſells of mercy which he hath prepared unto glory.* *Rom.* 9.23. When they ſhall find, that had not God put a gracious and mercifull difference between them and others, Chriſt had been a rock of offence, as well unto them as unto others: the Goſpell had been a ſavour of death unto death to them, as well as others. All other gifts which God hath beſtowed upon them, look in what ſort they have been an occaſion of falling unto others, ſo they might have been in like ſort, an occaſion of falling unto them alſo: for it is as true as the word of God is true, that the Goſpell is a ſavour of death unto death to ſome: and that Chriſt was ſet up as well for the falling of ſome, as for the riſing of others: *yea a rock to fall upon to both the houſes of Iſraell, and as a ſnare, and as a net to the Inhabitants of Jeruſalem, and many among them ſhall ſtumble and ſhall fall, and ſhall be broken, and ſhall be ſnared, and ſhall be taken. And that as many as ſtumble at the word, and are diſobedient, they were thereunto ordained.* And the holy Prophet wanted not faith when he delivered this execration, let *their table be a ſnare before them, and their proſperity their ruine.* And how poorely this Author labours to charme the energy of theſe & ſuch like paſſages, let the indifferent judge by that which is delivered. As for the laſt of an abſolute decree, cutting off and rejecting ſome from grace and glory, I will end this with repreſenting the ſottiſh condition of this Author, herein parbreaking his ſtomack, without all judgement and ſobriety. Firſt obſerve, how he claps together grace and glory, as if there were no difference in the manner of Gods cutting off from the one & from the other. (whereas the manner of Gods cutting off from the one, as it is maintained by us, is ſuch as impudency it ſelfe, hath not the face to lay any thing to our charge therein.) As for the manner of Gods cutting off from the other, as it is maintained by us, there is indeed ſuch abſoluteneſſe, as they maligne bitterly, but withall it is ſo cleerely ſet down in holy Scripture, that their hearts ſerve them not with open face to vent their ſpleen againſt it; and that is a chiefe reaſon of this Authors declining the other controverſies, and keeping himſelfe only to this, though I verily think, this hath proceeded from the counſell of his abettors: And for the ſame reaſon it is, that he claps togeather the cuting off from grace and glory. But I will take leave to diſtinguiſh them, and anſwer diſtinctly to both a part, to make their madneſſe and unreaſonableneſſe more apparent. And firſt I will ſpeake of Gods abſolute decree of cutting off from glory. Now this is well known to be oppoſed to a decree conditionall, as in the end of the former Section this Author calls it, and uſeth it, as according to their own doctrine, in oppoſition to ours, but moſt indiſcreetely and unlearnedly. This conditionall will of God is to be underſtood, *quoad res volitas*, as touching the things willed by God, ſo *Voſſius* accommodates it in his Hiſtory of the Pelagian Hereſy, as before I have ſhewed, and makes it all one in effect with Gods antecedent will: and D. *Iackſon* in his Book of Divine providence treating hereof, profeſſeth in plaine termes, that the diſtinction of *Voluntas antecedens* and *conſequens*, is to be underſtood, *quoad res volitas*, as touching the things willed. Now the thing willed here, is the cutting off from glory: now this Author togeather with his inſtructer, will have the will of God concerning this, to be conditionall, to wit, that it is Gods will, that no man ſhall be cut off from glory, but for ſinne, now we ſay ſo too, and profeſſe, that like as God hath not ordained that any ſhall be damned, but for finall perſeverance in ſinne: ſo likewiſe God hath not ordained that any man ſhall be cut off from glory, but for finall perſeverance in ſinne. But whereas the Remonſtrants maintained, that there is no other decree of Reprobation but this, and ſo likewiſe on the other ſide, that there is no decree of Predeſtination, but ſuch as is properly oppoſite hereunto, namely this, *That the decree*

2 Cor. 1. 15, 16.

Luke. 2. 34. Iſai. 8. 18.

1 Peter. 1. 8.

Pſal. 69. 22.

by which God hath purpoſed in Chriſt, and for Chriſt, to ſave thoſe that believe and repent to the end, is the whole and entire decree of Predeſtination unto ſalvation. On this poynt the Contra-Remonſtrants oppoſed them: and accordingly our Brittaine Divines, make this the firſt erroneous opinion, which they reject upon the firſt Article as touching election. And likewiſe as touching Reprobation, the firſt erroneous opinion which they reject, is this, *That the decree by which God from all eternity, and that irrevocably, hath purpoſed out of lapſed mankind to leave none, but the impenitent and incredulous in ſinne, and under the wrath of God, as being aliens from Chriſt, is the whole and entire decree of reprobation.* This I ſay is the firſt erroneous opinion which our Brittaine Divines reject: which this Author takes no notice of, but moſt unlearnedly diſcovers, that he underſtands not the ſtate of the queſtion. Secondly, Now I come to Gods abſolute decree of cutting off from grace, this we willingly confeſſe, is meerely abſolute and unconditionall *quoad res volitas*, as touching the things willed by God; for the things willed by God herein, are the denyall of mercy, and grace, to regenerate ſome; the denyall of the grace of faith and repentance, concerning which the Apoſtle profeſſeth, that God proceeds herein, meerely according to the good pleaſure of his will, *Rom.9.18.* He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth. *Rom.11.30. Even as they in times paſt have not believed God, yet have now obtained mercy through their unbeliefe.* Where *to obtaine mercy*, in the Apoſtles language, is plainely as much as to believe. *Auſtin* in many places juſtifies this, *Epiſt.105. ad Sixtum. Cum [illegible]tem ille credat, ille non credat, cum ambo idem audiunt: etſi miraculum in eorum conſpectu fiat, ambo idem vident, altitudo eſt divitiarum ſapientiæ & ſcientiæ Dei: cujus inſcrutabilia ſunt judicia & apud quem non eſt iniquitas: dum cujus vult miſeretur, & quem vult indurat.* And neere the end, *Audiat hæc & non contemnat, quod ſi contempſerit, ut contemneret inveniat ſe obduratum.* Enchirid. 98. *Quis porro tam impie deſipiat ut dicat, Deum malas hominum voluntates quas voluerit, quando voluerit, ubi voluerit, in bonum non poſſe convertere? Sed cum facit pro miſericordia facit: cum autem non facit per judicium non facit, quoniam cujus vult miſeretur, & quem vult obdurat:* Here *miſereri cujus vult*, is *voluntates hominum quas vult in bonum convertere.* See *lib.1. De grat. Chriſti, contra Pelag. & Cæleſt. cap.46.* He cites this ſaying out of *Ambroſe. Sed Deus quem dignatur vocat, & quem vult religioſum facit.* And thereupon breakes out into this exclamation. *O ſenſum hominis Dei ex ipſo fonte gratiæ Dei hauſtum, videte ſi non Propheticum illud eſt, miſerebor cujus miſertus ero: & Apoſtolicum illud non volentis neq; currentis ſed miſerentis Dei: quia ut dicit etiam noſtrorum temporum homo ejus quem dignatur vocat, & quem vult religioſum facit.* Here *Miſereri, Rom.9.18.* is all one with *Vocare, & Religioſum facere.* And *lib.1. ad Simplician: cap.2. Unde datur intelligi, quod infra utrumq; poſuit, ergo cujus vult miſeretur, & quem vult indurat, ita ſententiæ ſuperiori poteſt congruere, ut obduratio Dei ſit nolle miſereri, ut non ab illo itrogetur aliquid quo ſit homo deterior, ſed tantum quo ſit melior non erogetur; quod ſi fit nulla diſtinctione meritorum, quis non erumpat in eam vocem quam ſibi objecit Apoſtolus, dicis itaq; mihi, quid adhuc conqueritur, nam voluntati ejus quis reſiſtit: conqueritur enim Deus ſæpe de hominibus ſicut per innumerabiles apparet ſcripturarum locos, quod nolint credere & recte vivere.* So that the meliority of man, which God workes *ſine meritorum diſtinctione*, doth by *Auſtins* jndgement conſiſt *in recte vivendo & recte credendo*, now here is the proper field of Scholaſticall combate betwixt us. *Ecce Rhodus, ecce Saltus*, let them try their ſtrength to the uttermoſt, to prove that the reaſon why God regenerates one, and not another, why God beſtowes faith and repentance upon one, and not on another, is becauſe man hath diſpoſed himſelfe by ſome good worke performed by him, which another hath not: and when they have proved this, then will we truly confeſſe, that *Pelagianiſmus eſt vere Chriſtianiſmus*, not *Semi-Pelagianiſmus* only, as it was ſometimes objected to *Arminius*. But proceed we to the particulars following, for by this Doctrine of Gods abſolute decree in oppoſition to their conditionall decree, this Author ſaith;

1. *Chriſt came not into the World to procure the ſalvation of them that periſh.* I anſwere, That look in what ſort he came into the World, to procure the ſalvation of them that periſh by their Doctrine, after the ſame ſort he came to procure their ſalvation by our Doctrine. For as it is their Doctrine, that God decreed that for Chriſts ſake, ſalvation ſhould redound to all that believe, ſo is this our Doctrine alſo: but we deny that this is the whole decree of predeſtination. We farther ſay, that God purpoſed to beſtow Faith on ſome, and not on others, and accordingly to ſend Chriſt to merit faith and regeneration for them, which the Remonſtrants in the *Cenſura Cenſuræ*, doe now a daies utterly deny; and if this Author, together with his inſtructer, think that

Chriſt

Chriſt was ſent to merit faith and regeneration for all, then either abſolutely or conditionally; if abſolutely, then all muſt believe *de facto*, and be regenerated; if conditionally, then let them diſcover unto us this condition, and avoyd direct Pelagianiſme if they can. 2. Indeed we think the word is not ſent to all that periſh, we find it by manifeſt experience: in reference to Miniſtry humane, and if they have ſo ſtrenuouſly rubd their own foreheads, as to faine out of their own heads a Miniſtry Angelicall, let them not expect that we ſhould take their forgeries for Oracles Divine. 3. It is not true, that where it is ſent among them that periſh, 'tis ſent only that they ſhould ſlight it, it may be ſent as well, *ut proficiant ad exteriorem vitæ emendationem quo mitius puniantur*: as for thoſe that doe ſlight it, and ſtumble at it, being diſobedient, Saint *Peter* plainly ſaith, that *hereunto they were ordained*. Let them therefore cry downe *Peter* firſt, and then we will take it in good part, to be cryed downe alſo. And if God ſent his Sonne into the World to be crucified by ſome; why might not he as well ſend the Preaching of Chriſt into the World, to be ſlighted and deſpiſed by others: and Saint *Paul* hath profeſſed, that the Preachers of it, are unto God a ſweet ſavour in Chriſt, even in them that periſh: Yet we ſay not that this is the end why God ſends it to any: But we ſay God both ſends it, and permits many to ſlight it, and to perſevere in the contempt of it, that he may manifeſt his glory in their juſt condemnation, and declare thereby alſo the riches of his glory on the veſſells of mercy, whom he hath prepared unto glory, by making it appeare, what a mercifull difference God hath put between them, and others. To the particulars ſubordinate hereunto, I anſwer diſtinctly thus.

1. God deceives none in calling them to Salvation, in the name of his Sonne, by the preaching of his Word, any more by our Doctrine, than by the Doctrine of this Author: for as he maintaines that God intends Salvation to all men, no otherwiſe than in caſe they believe, ſo doe we; and as we maintaine that God doth fully intend to moſt the contrary, but no otherwiſe than in caſe they believe not, ſo doth he: only as touching the obtaining of faith and regeneration, here is the difference between us: we maintaine with Saint *Paul*, that God hath mercy on whom he will, in beſtowing the grace of faith and regeneration, and hardeneth whom he will by denying of it; ſoe doth not he: and accordingly we ſay, Chriſt merited faith and regeneration for his elect. But the Remonſtrants openly profeſſe that he merited faith and regeneration for none at all. Hereby let the indifferent judge which of us makes God the greateſt deceiver they or we. And the truth is, this Author nor his inſtructer, are willing to diſcover themſelves in this poynt, for feare leaſt nothing ſhould ſave them from breaking their necks, but to be received upon the featherbed of Pelagianiſme: ſo fearfull a precipice is likely there to meet with them; at the margent of this, there ſtands a wild quotation thus, *Suffrag: Britaine, p.*43. as if the Author was loath his meaning ſhould be found: or it may be in tranſcribing the copy ſent him he did miſtake. But the Article upon which theſe Theſes are dilivered he utterly leaves out, like as in his former quotation of the ſufferages. But after much ſearching I gueſſe I find that which he refers unto on the 3. Article, 3. Poſition, which is pag: 166. in *Synod. Dordarc*: and in the Engliſh ſufferages of our Divines of Great *Britaine*, the poſition is this, *whome God doth thus prepare by his Spirit* (as was ſignifyed in the former poſition) *through the meanes of the word, thoſe doth he truly and ſeriouſly invite and call to faith and converſion*. I make no queſtion but whatſoever God doth, he doth truly and ſeriouſly: And as for that *ſancta ſimulatio* which this Author formerly upbraided our Divines with, for attributing it unto God, I have formerly diſcovered the falſe nature of that aſpertion, though he thought to walke in the clouds, that his jugling might not be diſcovered. The explicatiō of the poſition is added thus, *By the nature of the benefit offered, and by the evident word of God we muſt judge of thoſe helpes of graces which are beſtowed on men, and not by the abuſe of them. Therefore when the Goſpell of its' owne nature calls men unto repentance and Salvation, when the incitements and Divine graces tend the ſame way, wee muſt not thinke any thing is done fainedly by God; this is proved too.* All theſe I willingly acknowledge neither doe I know any of our Divines that deny it; and more particularly I am willing to particulate wherein I take it to conſiſt. God hereby doth ſignify that as many as believe ſhall be Saved: and ſo I ſay he doth ſeriouſly intend as much; as likewiſe, that none ſhall be ſaved without faith; likewiſe God doth ſignify, that he is well pleaſed, with faith and converſion, in whomſoever he finds it, and herein he deales moſt truly and ſeriouſly, likewiſe here-

by he ſignifies his own will to make it their duty to believe, which alſo is moſt true and ſerious. But none of all theſe I know full well, will ſatisfy theſe with whom wee deale; unleſſe we acknowledge, that God hath a kind of velleity alſo, both of their converſion and ſalvation; but let them ſhew me any paſſage out of theſe Suffrages where this is acknowledged. They adde, *If God ſhould not ſeriouſly invite all whom he vouchſafeth this gift of his Word and ſpirite, to a ſerious converſion, ſurely both God ſhould deceive many whom he calls in his Sonnes name, and the meſſengers of the Evangelicall promiſe might be accuſed of falſewitneſſe, and thoſe which being called to converſion, doe neglect to obey, might be more excuſable.* All this I willingly grant, neither doe I know any Divine of ours that denyes it, according to the three particulars formerly ſpecifyed, wherein I deſired to explicate the truth and ſerioufneſſe of all this, though thoſe worthy Divines of ours goe not ſo farre. As for their laſt clauſe which is this, *For that calling by the Word and ſpirit cannot be thought to leave men unexcuſable, which is only exhibited to this end, to make them unexcuſable.* I willingly confeſſe I doe not ſufficiently underſtand them in this. For albeit I have already particulated divers things werein the ſeriouſneſſe of this Divine invitation doth conſiſt, (neither doe I find any end of this Divine invitation mentioned at all by theſe our Divines, whom from my heart I honour for their juſt deſert;) yet to me it ſeemes moſt cleare, that Revelation doth ſo neceſſarily take away excuſe, upon pretence of ignorance, aud admonition, and invitation, as neceſſarily takes away excuſe, upon pretence of not being admoniſhed and invited, that if God did invite them to no other end than this, namely to take away theſe excuſes, ſurely theſe excuſes were clearly taken away, and conſequently ſo farre they ſhould prove unexcuſable: But I gueſſe they take the denomination of *inexcuſable*, not according to the ſignification formall as it ſignifyes bereaved of excuſe: but rather according to the ſignification materiall, connotated thereby which is faultineſſe, and in this ſence I confeſſe, it is ordinarily taken togeither with the condition of being without excuſe, and thus & in this ſenſe I willingly ſubſcribe unto them, and therewithall ſhew what I take to be their meaning, namely this, that if God, making ſhew that if they belie ve he will accept them, and that they ſhall be Saved, did not indeed meane that he would in that caſe accept and ſave them, then there were no reaſon why they ſhould be accounted faulty and condemned for their not believing. Thus in a deſire exactly to conforme my ſelfe to the judgement of theſe worthyes of our Church, made choyſe of by our Soveraign to be ſent in ſo Honourable an Embaſſage, to countenance that famous Synod of the moſt reformed Churches; I have made bold to interpret them, and to ſhew my concurrence with them, although I have not conſulted with any of them upon that poynt, which if I had; like enough I might have received better ſatisfaction: And I hope they will not diſdaine that without conſulting them I have adventured thus to interpret them; and what doe I know whether their judgement may not prove to be the very ſame, and that in deed they had no other meaning.

2. My former anſwer will ſerve for this, Gods Miniſters doe offer Salvation conditionally, to wit, upon condition of faith, neither, are any ordained to be condemned, but in caſe of infidelity: yet I ſee the cunning carriage of this Authors inſtructer, for he would faine fly from the abſoluteneſſe, or conditionality of Gods decree, as touching the things willed *quoad res volitas*, unto the abſoluteneſſe or conditionality of it: *quoad actum volentis*, as touching the act of willing, although both *Voſſius* practiſe, and this Authors alſo in expreſſing his owne meaning of Gods conditionall will, and Doctor *Jacksons* profeſſion is to the contrary: namely that it is to be taken *quoad res volitas* only, and not *quoad actum volentis*: but withall we teach, that Gods Miniſters doe not only teach upon what tearmes on mans part, God will either beſtow ſalvation, or inflict damnation: but alſo they teach that upon no tearmes on our parts, but meerely according to the good pleaſure of his own will, doth God ſhew mercy unto ſome, beſtowing faith and repentance upon them, and by denying the ſame grace harden others, and they are the true witneſſes of God, equally in both.

3. Neither is there any iuſt excuſe hereby left to Reprobates, yet I confeſſe, this were a very plauſible pretence, if we had no Oracles of God at all to be the rule of our faith, concerning God, and his providence: but as we have, ſo we faile not therein, of a direct anſwer hereunto, *Rom.* 9. For after the Apoſtle had profeſſed, *That God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth*: v. 18. Forthwith he

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brings in this ojection upon the ſtage v. 19. *Thou wilt ſay then, why doth he yet complaine? for who hath reſiſted his will?* And both *Bellarmine* and Arminians confeſſe, that where obduration hath place, there is no power of obedience: And the Apoſtle himſelfe implyes no leſſe in that place. Now what doth the Apoſtle anſwer hereunto but this v. 20. *O man who art thou, which diſputeſt with God? ſhall the thing formed ſay to him that formed it why haſt thou formed me thus?* 21. *Hath not the Potter power over the clay of the ſame lumpe to make one veſſell to honour and another to diſhonour?* as much as to ſay, if God be acknowledged to be our Creatour, we muſt give him leave to doe what he will with his creature, for doth not every creature doe what he will with the worke of his hand? Every tradeſman in his trade takes as much liberty to doe with the workmanſhip of his hands, as this comes to. And *Medina* hath not ſpared to profeſſe, and that *tanquam ex concordi omnium Theologorum ſententiâ*: that if God ſhould inflict the very paines of Hell upon an innocent creature; he ſhall doe no unjuſt act, though herein he ſhould not carry himſelfe as *Judex*, Judge, but as *Dominus vitæ & mortis* as Lord of life amd Death. And we all know what power God giveth us over inferiour creatures, to ſtrangle ſome, to cut the throats of others, to knocke downe others, not with reference to the moderation of their paine, but only to the wholſome condition of their fleſh unto us. And we know what power God executed upon his own deare Sonne to break him for our iniquityes, on him to lay the chaſtiſement of our peace, that ſo by his ſtripes we might be healed. But let that paſſe, let us try another way that may be anſwered unto this. Suppoſe not one ſhall be condemned for want of faith, but only left to be judged by the covenant of workes, who ſeeth not but that the ſame plea hath place here as well as in the former caſe, and God may be as well chalenged for injuſtice, in condemning men for breach of the law, who have no power to keepe the law? And who ſees not how ready this Author is to juſtifye this plea, and conſequently acknowledge that every man hath power to keepe the law; and ſo to bring us back againe to the covenant of works, or to confound the covenant of grace with the covenant of works: which indeed is their courſe throughout. For they maintaine that every man hath univerſall grace for the enlivening of their wills, whereby they are inabled to will any ſpirituall good whereto they ſhall be excited, and who doubts but obedience to the law, and that in all perfection, is a ſpirituall good: againe they maintaine that they can believe if they will, and ſo accordingly doe any good thing that they will: and indeed were not the will in fault, I know no naturall power defective in the performance of any good, that a man hath a will unto: this I can ſhew under the hands of one of them, in a manuſcript ſent unto me. And I have good reaſon to conceive there are more hands in it than one. Thirdly conſider, doſt thou complaine thou hadſt no power to believe, but I pray thee tell me, haſt thou any will to believe? If thou neither haſt, nor ever hadſt any will to believe, what a ſhamefull and unreaſonable thing is it to complaine that thou haſt no power to believe? Saint *Paul* had a moſt gratious will, but he found in himſelfe no power to doe that he would, but what is the iſſue of this complaint? To fly to the face of God? Nothing leſſe! but to confeſſe his own wretchedneſſe, and flee unto God in this manner, *who ſhall deliver me from the body of this death?* And receiving a gracious anſwer concerning this, concludes with thankes, *I thank my God through my Lord Jeſus Chriſt*: if I have a will to believe, to repent, I have no cauſe to complaine, but to runne rather unto God with thankes for this, and pray him to give that power, which I find wanting in me. And indeed (as I may adde in the fourth place) this impotency of believing, and infidelity, the fruit of naturall corruption common to all, is meerely a morall impotency, and the very ground of it is, the corruption of the will: therefore men cannot believe, cannot repent, cannot doe any thing pleaſing unto God, becauſe they will not, they have no delight therein; but all their delight is carnall, ſenſuall, and *becauſe they are in the fleſh they cannot pleaſe God*: and becauſe of the hardneſſe of their hearts they cannot repent, ſinne is to them as a ſweet morſell unto an Epicure, which he rolleth under his tongue. Fiftly, doſt thou blaſpheame God, becauſe of Leprous Parents, thou art begot and conceived, and borne a leprous child? What impudency then is it in thee, to challenge him for injuſtice, in that the ſpirituall leproſy of thy firſt Parents, is propagated to thy ſoule. Laſtly, if thou renounceſt the Goſpell, what reaſon haſt thou to complaine of want of power to embrace it, ſo farre as not to renounce it? haſt thou not as much power to believe, as *Simon Magus* had? as many a prophane perſon

Rom. 7. 18, 19. 24. 25. Rom. 8.

and

and hipocrite hath, that is, bred and brought up in the Chnrch of God? Hadſt thou gone ſo farre as they, and performed ſubmiſſion unto the Goſpell, by profeſſing it, ſurely thou ſhouldeſt never be brought to condemnation for not profeſſing of it, but rather for not walking according to the rule of it; which thou promiſedſt when firſt thou gaveſt thy name to Chriſt. I come to the third.

3. Look what the Word promiſeth, that doe the Sacraments ſeale: the word promiſeth Juſtification & Salvation to all that beleive, the ſame doth the Sacraments ſeal. As Circumſion *Rom.* 4.5. *Is ſaid to be the ſeale of the Righteouſnes of faith* ſo is Baptiſme: it did in our Saviours dayes and in the dayes of his Apoſtles ſeale to the believer, and penitent Perſon the aſſurance of the forgiveneſſe of their ſinnes; over and above Baptiſme is the Sacrament of our birth in Chriſt, and the Lords Supper of our growth in Chriſt, each an outward and viſible ſigne of an inward & inviſible grace. But what is the grace wereof the Sacrament is a ſigne? Is it a power to doe good if a man will? Call you that grace which is not ſo much as goodneſſe, for certainly goodneſſe conſiſts not in a power to doe good if a man will, but in a definite inclination of the will it ſelfe, to delight in that which is good, and to be prone to doe it. But this grace whereof Baptiſme is a ſigne, is *ſuo tempore conferenda*, like as Circumciſion was, even to thoſe Jewes who yet were not regenerated, untill they were partakers of the Goſpell. *Jam.* 1 18. *Of his own will hath he begotten us by the word of truth.* Writing unto the twelve tribes of the Jewes. And it is very ſtrange to me, that regeneration ſhould ſo many years goe before vocation. But this oppoſite Doctrine, and the ſealing of a blanke is nothing ſtrange to me: I was acquainted with it twenty yeares agoe, and I ſeeme plainly to diſcerne the chimney from whence all the ſmoake comes.

4. As for other gifts beſtowed on the Reprobates.

1. We willingly confeſſe they ſhall never bring them to ſalvation, be they as great as thoſe who were beſtowed on *Ariſtotle*, *Plato*, *Ariſtides*, *Sophocles*, and the moſt learned morall and wiſe men of the World, that never were acquainted with the myſtery of Godlineſſe: it was wont to be received generally for a truth, that *Extra Eccleſiam non eſt ſalus*; But Arminians take liberty to coyne new Articles of our Creed.

2. But yet they may doe them good, hereby they may *Proficere ad exteriorem vitæ emendationem quo mitius puniantur.* For certainly it ſhall be eaſier in the day of judgement, for *Cicero* then for *Catiline*, for *Auguſtus* than for *Tiberius*, for *Trajan* than for *Heliogabalus*.

3. And therefore it is certainly falſe that they are hurtfull, and that they proceed out of extreme hatred. And as for love, the Scripture teacheth us that *Jacob* was loved of God, and *Eſau* hated, each before they were borne. Such is the condition of all the elect as *Jacob*, of all the Reprobates as *Eſau*; and in *Thomas Aquinas* his judgement, *Non velle alicui vitam æternam eſt ipſum odiſſe.* Knowledge I confeſſe of the myſteries of Godlineſſe, where life and converſation is not anſwerable, doth encreaſe mens condemnation: neither is God bound to change the corrupt heart of any man: if they are workers of iniquity Chriſt will not know them at the great day, though they have Propheſyed in his name, and in his name caſt out Devills; neither was it ever heard of, that the graces of edification, and graces of ſanctification muſt goe together, and that God in giving the one, is bound to give the other. As for being proud of them, pride for ought I know, requires no other cauſes but domeſticall corruption: but he that acknowledgeth God to be the giver of any gift, and hath an heart to be thankfull for it, I make no doubt but he hath more grace than of edification only: certainly the gifts they have, ſinke them not to hell, but their corrupt heart in abuſing them. And hath a man no cauſe to be thankfull unto God for one gift, unleſſe he will adde another? The Gentiles are charged for unthankfulneſſe *Rom.* 1. But it ſeems by this Authors Divinity, it was without cauſe, unleſſe we will with this Author ſay, they all had ſufficiency of meanes without, and power within to bring them to ſalvation: and what had Iſraell more? Or the elect of God more in any age? True, for according to the Arminian tenet, an elect hath no more cauſe to be thankfull to God for any converting grace, than a Reprobate. In a word, what good act wrought in the heart of man, whether of faith or of repentance, or any kind of obedience, hath man cauſe to be thankfull to God for, when God workes it in him no otherwiſe than *modò homo velit*, and ſo they confeſſe he workes every ſinfull

act?

act? Have they not in this caſe more cauſe to thank themſelves than to thank God? And unleſſe we concurre with them in ſo ſhameleſſe, unchriſtian, graceleſſe, and ſenſeleſſe an opinion, and in effect, if God converts the heart of man according to the meere pleaſure of his will, and hardeneth others: all the gifts that he beſtowes on man, are cenſured by this audacious cenſurer, *as Sauls beſtowing Michal on David, Jaells courteſy, and uſurers bounty, &c. or a baite for a poore fiſh*, as if God needed any ſuch courſe to permit him to ſinne in what kind or degree ſoever, to expoſe him to any degree of condemnation; or as if the Creator hath not power to doe what he will with his creature, any more than an Uſurer hath over his poore brother, or *Saul* over *David*, or the like. Thus the conſideration of his third reaſon I have brought to an end. I come to the Fourth.

DISCOURSE.

The Fourth Reaſon. It is prejudiciall to Piety.

SECT. I.

MY Fourth Generall againſt abſolute reprobation is, It is a hinderance of Piety: it ſerveth to diſcourage holineſſe, and encourage prophaneneſſe. It makes Miniſters negligent in Preaching, Praying, and every duty elſe, that tends to the eternall good of their People. It makes people careleſſe alſo of hearing, reading, praying, inſtructing their families, examining their conſciences, faſting and mourning for their ſinnes, and all other godly exerciſes. In a word, it cuts aſuder in my opinion the very ſinewes of religion, and pulls away the ſtrongeſt inducements to an holy life. Therefore it is no true and wholſome doctrine. That it doth ſo, it will appeare theſe two waies that follow. 1. It takes away (Hope) and (Feare) Hope of attaining any good by Godlineſſe; Feare of ſuſtaining any hurt by wickedneſſe: and ſo it takes away two principall props of Religion. This reaſon may be reſolved into two branches. Hope and Feare uphold Godlineſſe: Were it not for theſe it would fall to ruine: by theſe are men ſtrongly led on to vertue, and with-held from vice.

1. Hope doth (*excitare*) ſtirre men up to beginne, and (*corroborare*) ſtrengthen in the doing of any good action begunne. By this hope of heaven did our Saviour ſtirre up himſelfe to endure the Croſſe and deſpiſe the ſhame *Heb.*12 By this he heartned his Diſciples to doe and ſuffer for his ſake *Math.*5.11. *Abraham* left his Country and kindred at Gods call, becauſe he looked for a Citty whoſe builder and maker was God. *Heb.*11.8,9,10. *Moſes* left all the pleaſures and treaſures of Ægypt, and endured afflictions with the people of God, becauſe he ſaw him that was inviſible *v.*27. The Martyrs endured racks, gibbets, Lyons, ſword, fire, with a world of other torments, becauſe they looked for a better reſurrection, *v.*35. *Paul* endeavours alwaies to keep a good conſcience through the hope of a bleſſed reſurrection. *Acts* 24.15. All the heroicall acts of active and paſſive obedience, have ſprung from the hope of a weight of glory.

Husbandmen, Souldiers, Merchants, are all whetted on by hope to diligence in their callings, as daily experience ſhewes. Hope (ſaith *Aquinas*) *confert ad operationem*, and he proveth it firſt by Scripture 1 *Cor.*9.10. He which Eareth and Threſheth muſt Eare and Threſh in hope: And then by a twofold reaſon. 1. From the Nature of hopes object, *Bonum arduum & poſſibile*, ſome excellent good attainable by induſtry. *Exiſtimatio ardui excitat attentionem*, hope to get that by paines, which is conceived to be a thing of worth, ſtirres up to paines taking. 2. From the effect of hope, which is *delectatio*, an inward pleaſure, which the party that lives under hope is affected with by his hope. There is no man which hath an inward contentment and ſatisfaction of heart in the work that he hath to doe, but goes on merrily. The hope of Heaven therefore is a great encouragement to piety.

2. The feare of Hell alſo is a ſtrong curb to hold men in from Wickedneſſe, and therefore (ſaith one) God hath planted in men a feare of vengeance, that by it, as the ſhip by the rudder, the ſoule may be preſently, turn'd aſide from any rocks, or gulfes, or quick-ſands of ſinne, when it is neere them, and ſo may ſteere its courſe another way. For this cauſe, feare of God, and abſtaining from evill, are often joyned together in Scripture *Job.*1.1. *Exod.*1.17. And the want of this feare is made the root of all licentiouſneſſe in ſinning *Gen.*20.11. Nor doth feare only hinder a bad action, but it promotes a good. It hinders a bad action directly, becauſe it is *fuga mali*, a flying from that evill of miſery, which is annexed to the evill of ſinne; and it promotes a good action accidentally, becauſe men think that they are never ſo ſafe from the miſchiefe which they feare, as when they are exerciſed in ſuch imployments as tend to the getting of a contrary ſtate.

Worke out your ſalvation (ſaith the Apoſtle) with feare and trembling; implying, that the working out of ſalvation goes not on handſomly except the fear of miſſing it be an ingredient to the work.

The ſecond branch of this Reaſon is, That by the abſolute decree Feare and hope are taken away. For hope is properly exerciſed about *Bonum futurum & poſſibile haberi*, ſome good thing that may be obtained, not a good thing that muſt be obtained of neceſſity: and the object of feare is *malum poſſibile vitari*, an evill that may be eſcaped. For *metus eſt fuga mali*, feare is a flying from evill, and therefore ſuppoſeth that the evill is avoydable; for no man will fly from an evill that cannot be prevented, but will yeild himſelfe up to it, as *Cæſar* did to the murtherers in the Senate houſe. Now by this decree Heaven and Hell are not *objecta poſſibilia*, but *neceſſaria*. Heaven ſhall unavoydably be obtained by thoſe that are elected, and Hell muſt as certainly be endured, by thoſe that in Gods eternall purpoſe are rejected. For men have no power to alter their eternall ſtates: all men by this decree, are precisely determined *ad unum*, to one ſtate, to neceſſary ſalvation, or neceſſary damnation, without any power or liberty to chooſe whether.

And from hence the concluſion is cleere, that the abſolute decree, takes away the chiefeſt inducements to holineſſe, and determents from wickedneſſe, and conſequently hinders a Godly life exceedingly.

TWISSE.

Conſideration.

TRavailers report of the Territory of *Venice*, that the farther they goe into it, the ſtronger and ſtronger they find it. But ſuch is not the condition of this Authors diſcourſe; for the farther I wade into it, the weaker and weaker it appeares. And to this I anſwer firſt in generall, That our Brittaine Divines make anſwer to the like crimination made againſt our Doctrine upon the 5. Article p.168. according to the Engliſh tranſlation of it; ſaying, Both Gods truth, and mans experience, eaſily wipe off this aſperſion. For this Chriſtian perſwaſion of perſeverance and ſalvation, not only in reſpect of its own nature, but alſo according to the very event in the Church, doth by Gods bleſſing produce a quite contrary effect. Firſt in reſpect of the thing it ſelfe. The certainty of the end doth not take away, but eſtabliſh the uſe of the meanes. And the ſame holy men, who upon ſure grounds promiſe unto themſelves, both conſtancy in the way of this Pilgrimage, and fruition of God in their everlaſting home, know alſo that theſe are not obtained without performance of the duties of holineſſe, and the avoydance of contrary vices: And therefore they turne not their backs from theſe meanes, but induſtriouſly embrace and proſecute them. 1 *Iohn* 3.3. Every man that hath this hope in himſelfe, purifyeth himſelfe, even as he is pure. *Eſay* 38.5. When *Hezechiah* had received that promiſe from God of an addition of fifteen years to his life, he did not therefore neglect the uſe of medicines or meat, but, that this promiſed event might be brought into act, he applyed for the cure of his body, the plaiſter which was preſcribed unto him by the Prophet. The Apoſtle doth altogether reject this conſequence of carnall ſecurity imputed to this Doctrine, and that with a kind of indignation *Rom.*6.1. Shall we continue in ſinne that grace may abound? God forbid. How ſhall we which are dead to ſinne, live any longer therein? As if S. *Paul* would intimate unto us, not only the incongruity, but alſo the impoſſibility of ſuch a ſequel. 2. As touching the event; true it is, that any the moſt wholſome truth of God, may be perverted by the abuſe of men. But upon this doctrine, we cannot acknowledge that there groweth any ſuch inconvenience, no not *de facto*, that is, in the event it ſelfe. Let us take a view of the reformed Churches, in which this confidence of perſeverance and inviolable adoption is believed and maintained. Doe we find that thereupon the bridle is let looſe unto ryot? That piety is trampled downe? We give thankes unto God through our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, that amongſt ours (who enjoy this full perſwaſion of ſpirituall comfort, and are confident that there is an inheritance which cannot be loſt, laid up for them in Heaven) there is not found leſſe care of Godlineſſe, nor leſſe endeavour (ſo farre forth as mans infirmity will ſuffer) to live an unblameable life, then is to be found among any ſort of theſe, who pinne their perſeverance on their own free will, and will not grant it to flow from any foregoing election of God. This may ſuffice for anſwer to the generality of the crimination.

From the generality he deſcends to ſpecialties. And in the firſt place he urgeth, It takes away hope and feare. He beginnes with hope, and enlargeth himſelfe in the commendation thereof out of Scripture, *By this hope of Heaven, did our Saviour ſtirre up himſelfe to endure the croſſe, and deſpiſe the ſhame. Heb.* 12. He could not alleadge a more pregnant paſſage to cut his own throat, and mortify the vigour of his argument; For in this place it depends upon ſuch a notion of hope, as ſignifies *only a poſſibility of obtaining a future good, and not a neceſſity of obtaining it*, as afterwards himſelfe accommodates it, and ſo he will have the hope which here he inſiſts upon, ſuch as is mixed with feare; as if our Saviour were in doubt of obtaining a Crowne of glory. *By this he heartned his Diſciples to ſuffer for his ſake. Math.*5.12. *Rejoyce and be glad for great is your reward in heaven.* Here alſo we have no hope mixed with fear, whereupon he heartens them; but the very aſſurance of faith grounded upon Chriſts promiſe, and what greater aſſurance then

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this? The like promiſe for aſſurance of faith is made *Math.*10.32. And indeed hope in the Scripture phraſe (though in theſe places there is no mention thereof) is but an expectation of enjoying that whereof we have a certain aſſurance by Faith. The object of faith being *Verbum rei*, of hope, *res verbi*, as *Luther* is ſaid to diſtinguiſh them. Such is the hope ſignified by our looking for the Saviour *Phil.*3.20. For therefore we look for him, becauſe we are perſwaded by the aſſurance of faith, that he ſhall come, and that as a Saviour unto us, as there 'tis expreſſed in theſe words, *Who ſhall change our vile bodies, and make them like to his glorious body.* Such is the hope mentioned, *Col.* 1.5. as grounded upon their *true knowledge of the grace of Chriſt* v. 6. And upon their *Faith* v.4. For upon believing we rejoyce *with joy unſpeakable and glorious*, 1 *Pet.* 1. And this joy is *in hope of the glory of God*, *Rom.*5.2. Of the ſame nature is that hope *Tit.*2.13. So *Abrahams* looking for a Citty *whoſe builder and maker is God. Heb.*11. 8, 9, 10. But was not this hope of his grounded upon aſſurance of faith to enjoy it? So *Moſes* his ſeeing of him that was inviſible, was by the eye of faith. And the ſcope of that whole Chapter, is for the commendation of faith; a faith therefore they had of a better reſurrection, and the certainty hereof, was the certainty of faith. Now let every ſober reader judge, which of our doctrines doth more tend to the juſtifying of a certainty of ſalvation, the Arminians or ours.

That which followeth of *the Husbandmen, Merchants, Souldiers*, is farre of another nature; their hopes of their ends have no ground of faith: many times it comes to paſſe, that *ſpem mentita ſeges*,& though *aliquis pendens in cruce vota facit*,yet moſt commonly it proves but a vaine hope. Merchants many times prove bankrupts; and Souldiers when they are moſt erected with hope of victory, doe ſometimes moſt ſhamefully take the foyle: What a proud meſſage did *Benhadab* ſend to *Ahab* 1 *King.* 20. 10. *The Gods doe ſo to mee, and more alſo, if the duſt of Samaria be enough to all the people that follow mee, for every man an handfull.* But *Ahab* anſwered him ſaying. *Let not him that girdeth his harneſſe boaſt himſelfe as he that putteth it off.* At the battle of *Lipſich* upon *Tillies* defeating of the Duke of *Saxony*, word hereof was diſpatched with poſt haſt to the Emperour, together with ſome of the Dukes Enſignes, and ſcoffes upon the Duke himſelfe; they were confident of beating *Sweden* and that ſo all Germany ſhould be theirs; but herein that old Lad reckoned before his hoſt; the ſame Poſt brought heavy newes to *Vienna* at length, of a great diſcomfiture to the Imperialiſts, and of the victorious Army of the King of Sweden. Yet a hope not only upon weake, but ſometimes upon very vaine grounds, ſtirres up the ſpirit; how much more upon certain grounds of good ſucceſſe, as that of the Apoſtle *Rom.* 6. *Sinne ſhall not have the dominion over you, for yee are not under the Law but under grace, therefore let not ſinne raigne over you*, as much as to ſay, Play the men, fight valiantly the Lords battailes againſt ſinne and Satan, for yee ſhall have the victory in the end.

The feare of Hell is a curbe to hold men in from wickedneſſe I willingly confeſſe, but the knowledge hereof is not naturall, but by revelation divine, which to carnall men who live by ſight is of little force: Witneſſe the ſtory of the Welch-man who robbing an honeſt man upon the high way, and being told by him, that he ſhould anſwer for it at the day of judgement, ſaiſt thou me ſo (quoth the thiefe) and wilt thou truſt me till that day, then give me thy cloake too. We finde by experience, the moſt uncleane perſon, if he meets with never ſo beautifull a piece, yet if he knowes ſhee hath the Poxe; the feare of infection will be of more power to reſtraine him then the feare of Hell. Yet God by his word workes in men, (even in carnall men) as a taſt of the ſweetneſſe of Heaven, ſo of the bitterneſſe of Hell; the one to erect with hope, the other to awe with feare: and in both reſpects they may be ſaid (in my judgement) to have a taſt of the powers of the World to come. And like as *the Law was added becauſe of tranſgreſſion*, that is, to reſtraine tranſgreſſion, as ſome expound it: ſo likewiſe the repreſentation of Gods wrath and jealouſy, may in the ſanctions thereof have good force in this. And in the Godly alſo I make no queſtion, but it is of good uſe; though the love of God, hath in great meaſure overcome that ſervile feare; yet as their faith is not ſo perfect, as to be voyd of all doubting, ſo neither is their hope ſo perfect, as to be free from all mixture of feare: But the chaſt feare, the filiall feare, feare of diſpleaſing God who hath been ſo gracious unto them, is that feare which is predominant in ſuch. And even feare of Gods fatherly chaſtiſements in this world, is an hedge of thornes keeping them within

the goodneſſe of the Lord, and farre more forcible then the feare of Hell fire to the carnall Goſpeller. And this Author doth carry himſelfe very unlearnedly in confounding their differences, and diſcourſing of the feare of God without diſtinction; As if the feare of of God in *Job.*1.1. were the feare of Hell, and the feare of the Midwives *Exod.*1.17. As if there were no difference between ſervile feare, and a filiall feare. Saint *Paul* was ſo confident of his ſalvation, that he profeſſeth his perſwaſion, *That neither death, nor life, nor Angells, nor Principalities, nor powers, nor things preſent, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, ſhould be able to ſeparate him from the love of God, which is in Chriſt Jeſus. Rom.*8.38. Yet 2 *Cor.*5.11. *Knowing* therefore (ſaith he) *the feare of the Lord we perſwade men. Gen.* 20.11. *Abraham* ſaid, *The feare of God is not in this place*, therefore they will kill me for my Wifes ſake. But doth this Author carry himſelfe as it becomes a Divine, to take *the feare of God*, whereſoever he meets with it, for no other feare then the feare of Hell. Certainly the *feare of God is as a fountaine of life to avoyd the ſnares of death.* Yet I preſume though our Saviour was nothing affected with the feare of hell, yet was he never a whit the leſſe forward to all holy converſation; Nor *Paul* neither, though he profeſſeth, *I know whom I have truſted &c. The Lord will deliver me from every evill worke, and preſerve me to his heavenly Kingdome.*

That *feare and trembling Phil.*2.13. is not feare of hell, but humility, ſtanding in oppoſition to preſumption of a mans own ſtrength; as appears by the reaſon, wherewith the Apoſtle enforceth that exhortation of his, *To worke out our ſalvation with feare and trembling:* for ſaith he, *God it is that worketh in you both the will and the deed, according to his good pleaſure.* And if *the working out of our ſalvation goes not on handſomely, except the feare of miſſing it, be an ingredient to the worke*, as this Author diſcourſeth; then it ſeemes his feare of miſſing makes him goe on more handſomely, in working out his ſalvation, then either *Paul* the Apoſtle, or our Saviour did: for I no where find that our Saviour feared the miſſing of it; no nor *Paul* neither, after his converſion; though he knew full well, that conſcionable carriage in his vocation, was a neceſſary meanes, without which he could not obtaine it; and therefore profeſſeth, that *he did beat downe his body, and bring it in ſubjection, leaſt Preaching unto others himſelfe ſhould become a caſt away.*

We deny that *by the abſolute decree maintained by us, hope and feare are taken away*; and we prove it by an invincible argument. For undoubtedly the decree of Chriſts ſalvation, was abſolute, yet did not this take away either hope or feare: for it is recorded of him, That *for the hope that was ſet before him, he deſpiſed the ſhame*, and alſo, *that he was heard in that which he feared*: though ſinfull feare, and ſlaviſh feare, was farre from him, as farre as hell from heaven. The object of Chriſtian hope is not only a good thing poſſible to be had, but certainly to be had. For we read of πληροφορία ἐλπίδος. *Heb.* 6. A full aſſurance of hope, were it of a thing uncertaine, how indecent were it for the Apoſtle to compare it to an Anchor 1 *Iohn* 3.3. *He that hath this hope purgeth himſelfe as he is pure.* Was this a wavering hope, grounded upon an uncertain apprehenſion? Marke the verſe immediately preceding, and conſider whether it doth not enforce the contrary. *Now are we the ſonnes of God, but yet it is not made manifeſt what we ſhall be: And we know* (marke his aſſurance well) *that when he ſhall be made manifeſt, we ſhall be like him, for we ſhall ſee him as he is.* The deſcription of feare, is anſwerable to the deſcription of hope: we were wont to define the one by the expectation, *appropinquantis boni*, the other by the expectation *imminentis mali.* Yet it is true the object of the one is ſuch a good, as in its own nature is poſſible to be obtained, and of the other, is ſuch an evill as is poſſible to be avoyded. But like as eternall life is not attainable without faith and repentance; ſo neither is damnation avoydable, but by faith and repentance. And we willingly grant that both eternall life is attainable, and damnation avoydable by faith and repentance, yet undoubtedly the unpreventable nature of an evill, doth no way hinder a mans feare, unleſſe he knowes it to be unpreventable. Neither doth the knowledge of the unpreventable nature thereof hinder feare, but improveth it rather, in as much as in ſuch a caſe, there is no place for any hope to qualify the feare. And this is farther apparent by the example of the Devills, of whom Saint *Iames* ſaith *That they believe and tremble*, ſurely they doe not tremble the leſſe, becauſe their torment is unpreventable by the appoyntment of of God: yet doe they not give themſelves up to their ſorrowes, but cryed out to our Saviour, *What have we to doe with thee thou Jeſus the Sonne of God, art thou come to torment us before our time: Cæſars* caſe was not the caſe of feare, for feare is the apprehenſion of an evill before it come; but *Cæſar* was ſo farre from fearing, that though he were

forewarned

forewarned to take heed of the Ides of March (as I remember) leaſt they proved fatall to him, was ſo far from apprehending any feare thereupon, that going that day to the Senate Houſe, and meeting by the way with him who had given him that warning, he called him by his name, and to ſhew his fearleſſe condition ſayd, *The Ides of March are come*; true Sr quoth the other, but they are not yet paſt. The mortall wound in the Senate Houſe was given him before he feared it; for of thirty and odde wounds there received, it is written that every one of them was mortall. His heroicall ſpirit bare him out nevertheleſſe (not againſt the feare, for that was now out of ſeaſon, but) againſt the ſenſe of mortall paine, in ſuch ſort, as not to commit any indecent thing, in dying under the hands of ſo many Aſſaſſinates either in word or deed; for not a word of diſtemper, was uttered by him, only to *Brutus* his neere Kinſman, and deare unto him, when he came upon him in like manner as the reſt, he ſaid καὶ σὺ τέκνον, and took care to gather his garments in ſuch ſort about *ut honeſte caderet*. Heaven and hell are ordained by God as the portion, of the righteous the one, of the wicked the other. I hope this Author will not deny but that Heaven (according to his phraſe) was unavoydably obtained by our Saviour, yet this nothing hindred his hope, but rather confirmed it by caſting out of feare. And the hope of Chriſt is the firſt thing this Author inſtanceth in, while he amplifies the nature of hope; but in his large expatiation thereon, according to his courſe he ſpent ſo much time, that he might well forget it, before he come to the accommodation of it unto his Argument. And indeed hope in Scripture phraſe, is the looking for of Chriſt, and the glory he brings with him; and what a ſenſeleſſe thing is it to conceive, that the more ſure we are of bleſſedneſſe, the leſſe we ſhould expect and look for the enjoyment of it? Doth not our Saviour bid his Diſciples *Luke* 10. 20. not to rejoyce in this, that Devills are ſubdued unto them, but rather to rejoyce in this, *that their names are written in heaven*. Now let any ſober man judge, whether this joy ſhall be of force to expectorate our hope, and not rather to confirme and increaſe it. As for Hell, I know none are aſſured thereof, as of their due portion, but the Devills, yet they feare and tremble never a whit the leſſe for that. But men while they live on earth, not one of them in particular that I know are, or have any juſt ground to be aſſured of their damnation. For albeit faith in Chriſt may well be an aſſurance of mans election; yet nothing but finall perſeverance in infidelity or impenitency, can be a juſt aſſurance to any man of his damnation. As for the eternall ſtates of men, they are not exiſtent, but only in Gods intention, and conſequently to alter their eternall ſtates, is to alter Gods intentions. Now what Arminian of theſe daies, that is of any learning and judgement, dares boldly affirme, that it is in the power of the creature to alter Gods intentions. In like ſort with what ſobriety can any man deny, that every man is determined either to ſalvation or damnation, the preſcience of God being ſufficient hereunto; and we acknowledge that none is ordained by God to be damned, but for finall perſeverance in ſinne unrepented of: none to be ſaved of ripe yeares, but by way of reward for his faith, obedience, repentance. As for power and liberty to chooſe either, let that be firſt rightly ſtated: *Moſes Deut.* 30. 19. (or the Lord rather by him) profeſſeth that he hath ſet before them *life and death*; and exhorts them *to chooſe life*, the meaning whereof is to chooſe that, the conſequent whereunto is life; now that was obedience unto the lawes and holy ordinances of God. Now as touching the power and liberty, to chooſe this, we ſay,

1. That this power was given to all in *Adam*, and we have all loſt it in him through ſinne: for we all ſinned in him, as the Apoſtle in expreſſe tearmes profeſſeth *Rom.* 5. 12.

2. The power that we have loſt in *Adam*, is no naturall power, but a morall power like unto that whereof the Lord ſpeaketh by the Prophet *Jeremy*. *Jere.* 13. 23. *Can a Blackamore change his skinne? Or the Leopard his ſpotts? No more can you doe good, that are accuſtomed to evill*. Nor will any ſober man judge that ſuch an impotency as this doth make a man excuſable? In the like ſort our Saviour unto the Jewes: *John.* 5. 44. *How can yee believe that receive Honour one of another, and ſeek not the Honour that comes of God only?* So that this impotency is meerly morall, ariſing from the corruption of their wills. Had a man a will to believe to repent, but withall had no power to believe and repent though he would, here indeed were a juſt cauſe of excuſe: but all the fault hereof is in the will of man. This our *Britaine* Divines at the *Synod* of *Dort* upon the 3. and 4. Articles of the ſecond Poſition expreſſe in this manner. *The*

nature of man being by voluntary Apoſtacy habitually turned from God the creatour, it runs to the creature, with an unbridled appetite, and in a luſtfull and baſe manner commits fornication with it, being always deſirous to ſet her heart and reſt on thoſe things which ought only to be uſed on the by, and to attempt and accompliſh things forbidden. What marvell then if ſuch a will be the bondſlave to the Devill. The will without charity is nothing but a vitious deſire, inordinata cupiditas. Aug: Retract. 1.5. 3. Yet the ſame *Auſtin* profeſſeth Lib. 1. *de Gen. cont: Manich: cap. 3. credere poſſunt & ab amore viſibilium rerum & temporalium, ſe ad ejus præcepta ſervanda convertere ſi velint.* And *ad Marcel. De ſpiritu & littra.* proves at large that *fides in voluntate eſt.* Only it is the grace of God to prepare the will, *ut velit*, and ſo to encreaſe with the gift of charity *ut poſſit*, ſo that there is a great deale of difference between *poſſe ſi velit*, and *poſſe ſimpliciter, in Auſtins* judgment *poſſe ſi velit* is leſſe then *velle*, but *poſſe ſimpliciter*, is more then *velle*. 4. Laſtly what meanes this Author to diſcourſe thus hand overhead *of power and liberty to chooſe whether* as if (whatſoever they pretend) their true meaning were, that man hath power to believe and repent without grace. For as for power to believe and repent through Gods grace no man denyes. Why then doth he not try his ſtrength on this point which indeed is the criticall point of theſe controverſies, and wherein it will clearly appeare, whether they differ one jot from the Pelagians. For the queſtion between the Pelagians, and the Catholiques in *Auſtins* dayes was not about the poſſibility of willing or doing that which is good, but only about the act of willing and doing: And herein they granted inſtruction and exhortation requiſite. All the queſtion was about the working of his will, to will and doe that which is good, as appeares by *Auſtin* in his booke *De gratia Chriſti contra Pelag: & Cæleſti: cap. 6.* And repeated againe towards the end, coming to an iſſue of the buſineſſe, after he had diſcovered much concerning *Ambroſe* his opinion thereabouts.

Retract. lib. 1. c. 10.

But whatſoever his premiſes be, in his concluſion he commonly ſpeakes it home, as herein ſaying, It is cleare *that the abſolute decree, takes away the cheifeſt inducements to holineſſe, and determents from wickedneſſe*, to wit, becauſe it takes away hope and feare; whence it followeth, that ſeeing Chriſt had hope of heaven, he was not abſolutely deſtinated unto glory. And ſeeing the Devills are ſaid to believe and tremble, therefore certainly their damnation is yet preventable, although there is yet this maine difference between reprobate men on earth, and Devills, that though the Devills are aſſured of their reprobation, yet no man either is, or can by any ordinary way be aſſured of his reprobation. I conclude thus, This his Diſcourſe tends mainly againſt all certainty of Salvation: whence it followes, that either he had no certainty of his ſalvation while he was with us, or if he had, it ſtands him upon now to profeſſe that he hath utterly loſt it.

DISCOURSE.

SECT. II.

2. THe injuriouſneſſe of this Doctrine to Godly life, may farther appeare by theſe conſiderations that follow, one depending upon another.

1. Abſolute and peremptory decrees are inevitable, whatſoever the things be about which they are exerciſed; and mens everlaſting ſtates, if they be abſolutely determined, are altogether undeclinable. *Stat fati lex indeclinabilis*, the law of deſtiny is undeclinable. And the reaſon is, becauſe it hath an inevitable cauſe, the adamantine decrees of Allmighty God, which are indeclinable two waves.

1. Irreverſible, lyable to no repeale (as the Statures are which are made in our Parliaments:) but farre more unalterable then the Lawes of the Medes and Perſians. As I have ſpoken ſo will I bring it to paſſe: I have purpoſed, and I will doe it. *Eſay.* 46. 11. Men doe many times bite in their words againe, becauſe they doe utter things raſhly, and doe repeale their Statutes and Ordinances, becauſe they ſee ſome inconveniences in them, which they could not foreſee: but God never alters or calls in his abſolute decrees becauſe they are all made with great wiſdome and foreſight.

2. Irreſiſtible. It lies not in the power of any creature to diſanull them. Who hath reſiſted his will? *Rom.* 9. 19. Our God is in Heaven: he doth whatſoever he will: *Pſal.* 115. 3. Whatſoever is once determined by his abſolute will is no wayes alterable by the will of man. It is more poſſible for a man to hinder the riſing of the Sunne, or to ſtay his courſe in the Heaven, to ſtop the revolu-

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tions of the yeare, and overturne the whole course of nature, then to make the least alteration in any of Gods absolute decrees.

2. Mens actions about ends, and things determined by an absolute decree are vaine and fruitlesse; and the reason is, because they cannot make them otherwise then they were determined to be; and therefore in vaine doe men labour to obtaine Everlasting Life and avoid Eternall Death, if there be noe liberty and power in their hands to choose Life or Death, but must of necessity take that which is assigned them, be it Life or Death; for by their labour they effect just nothing; for if they be absolutely appointed to distruction, their hearing, reading, praying, almes-giving, and mourning for their sinnes cannot possibly procure their Salvation; damned they must be. And if they be absolutely ordayned to Savation, their neglect of holy dutyes, their ignorance, their love of pleasures and continuance in a course of ungodlinesse, cannot bring them unto damnation; they must be Saved: If so many Soules in a Parish be in this manner decreed to Heaven or Hell, the Minister Preacheth in vaine, and the people heare in vaine. For there cannot one Soule be Saved, for all their paines, which is ordained to Hell, nor one Soule be cast away by their negligence, which is appoynted for Heaven. It is in vaine for thee (saith Christ to *Saul*) to kicke against the pricks: (*i.*) to endeavour by thy persecutions and slaughters to root out my Church in the world; because the preservation of it is absolutely decreed in Heaven. Teaching us by that speech, that a mans labour in any thing whatsoever, is never profitable, except it be exercised about an end attainable thereby, and without it not possible. Act. 9. 5.

3, Men are not willing to be employed in fruitlesse actions if they knowe it. I so runne (saith the Apostle) not as uncertainely; so fight I, not as on that beates the Ayre: but I keep under my body and bring it into subjection, least that by any meanes, when I have Preached unto others I my selfe should be a cast-away. The meaning is, I endeavour to keepe Gods commandements, I fight with the tentations of the Divill the allurements of the world, and mine owne corruptions, I keep my body low by watchings and fastings, and other severe acts of holy discipline. But *Cui bono?* doe I all this at randome? Uncertaine whether I shall get any good, or prevent any mischiefe hereby? No, but I doe this, as one that is sure that by so doing, I shall obtaine Eternal Life, and otherwise I cannot escape Eternall Death: intimating in these words the common disposition of men, which is to labour where some proportionable good is to be gotten, or evill prevented, otherwise to spare their heads and their hands too. 1 Cor. 9. 25.

TWISSE

Consideration.

TO talke of the decrees divine as things evitable or inevitable, is very absurd: for things denominated evitable or inevitable are only things to come, not yet existent; but such are not decrees divine, they are as everlasting as God himselfe without any begining of duration. As for the things decreed by God, they are of a double nature. For God hath decreed some things to come to passe necessarily, other things to come to passe contingently. Now those things that come to passe contingently do so come to passe (and that by the decree of God) as joyned with a possibility not to come to passe, and consequently to come to passe so as joyned with a possibility to be avoyded. Such are Salvation and damnation in as much as God hath annexed these as rewards, unto finall perseverance in faith and repentance, the one; unto finall perseverance in sinne unrepented of, the other. This is the undeclinable law of Gods decree, that, *whosoever believes shall be Saved and whosoever believes not shall be damned.* But we doe not say, that this is the whole decree of predestination and Reprobation, with the Remonstrants, and with this Author. But that there is another decree of God, the effect whereof is as undeniable, as the effect of the former, which this Author dissembleth throughout: and the effect of this decree is not conditionall like unto the effects of the former decree, but absolute. And it is the more strange that this Author should so much insist upon the effects of the former, & nothing at all on this: wheras the effects of the former nothing at all serve his turne, but through meere confusion: for he carieth the matter so as if we maintained that God doth decree to dispense Salvation and damnation absolutly according to the meare pleasure of his will, and not conditionally as he finds his creatures either dying in faith or dying in sinne, which is most untrue. And yet his usuall course to relieve himselfe in the case of impertinency and extravagancy is to fly to the effects of the other decree which we willingly confesse to be absolute; yet hath he no appetite to deale directly in the discussing thereof. Now we professe that Mar. 16. 16.

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as God according to the meere pleaſure of his will beſtowes faith and repentance on ſome and denies it to others, according to that of the Apoſtle. He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. *Rom.* 9. 18. So God from everlaſting decreed, according to the meere pleaſure of his will to beſtowe the gift of faith & repentance on ſome & deny it to others. All the decrees of God we acknowledge to be unchangeable from within, irreſiſtible from without. Yet this Author applyes theſe attributes only to Gods abſolute decrees, intimating that it is otherwiſe with Gods conditionall decrees: which conceit of his ſavoureth of the ſame learning and judgment with the reſt. Beſides it is his courſe hand over head to talke of the diſtinction of Gods decrees, into decrees abſolute, and decrees conditionall: whereas the decrees of God as touching the acts of God willing, admit noe ſuch diſtinction; the act of Gods will being allways abſolute and never conditionall, as both *Piſcator* theologically hath proved againſt *Vorſtius* and *Bradwardine* moſt ſcholaſtically hath demonſtrated; and by other reaſons may be demonſtrated and made as cleare as the Sunne; ſome of which reaſons I have formerly mentioned in this diſcourſe: only *quoad res volitas* as touching the things willed this diſtinctiō hath place; as both Dr *Jackſon* in his booke of *Providence* acknowlegeth of that diſtinction of *Voluntas antecedens & voluntas conſequens* (which by *Voſſius* interpretation is all one with *voluntas abſoluta & voluntas conditionata*) namely that it is to be underſtood only *quoad res volitas*. And in the ſame ſenſe is *voluntas conditionata* interpreted, as appears by the practice of *Voſſius** and of this Author throughout. Now in this ſenſe we doe not acknowledge that Gods decrees of Salvation and damnation are abſolute, but merely conditionall; ſo that this Author doth but fight with his own ſhadow in this his argumentation, making as ſhamefull a miſtake as ever *Don Quixot* did, when he conceived the Barbars baſon to be the Helmet of *Mambrino*, and fell furiouſly upon him, in a zeale of martiall glory, to recover *Spolia opima*, ſo fat and rich ſpoyles. By the way obſerve, to alter Gods abſolute decrees, is no other thing, then to alter that which is once determined by Gods abſolute will. For after this different manner doth this Author expreſſe one and the ſame thing in this Section. Now conſider, *is not the riſing of the Sunne the courſe of Heaven, the revolution of the yeare, the whole courſe of nature*, ſome of theſe things which are determined by Gods abſolute will? With what giddineſſe then doth he affirme that to hinder or ſtay or overturne any of theſe is more poſſible then to make alteration in Gods decrees; ſeeing to make alteration in Gods decrees is but to alter things which God hath once determined by his abſolute will. But as for Salvation and damnation theſe are not determined by God, like as the riſing of the Sunne, the courſe of Heaven the revolutions of the yeare, and the whole courſe of nature. For theſe are determined by God to come to paſſe abſolutly; but the Salvation or damnation of man are determined by God to come to paſſe conditionally.

* Hiſtor. Pelag. p. 638.

2. And accordingly mans ends are not determined by an abſolute decree, like unto the riſing of the Sunne. For the riſing of the Sunne is by God determined to come to paſſe abſolutely, ſo are not the ſpeciall ends of men, to wit, Salvation and damnation (for theſe are the ends of men which this Author ſpeakes of) theſe (as I ſaid) are determined to come to paſſe not abſolutely but conditionally: And therefore mens actions hereabouts, are not vaine and fruitleſſe: And the reaſon is becauſe mans Salvation is determined to befall him only in caſe he believe and repent and become ſtudious of good works: In like ſort damnation is determined to none of ripe yeares, but in caſe he gives off all care of faith repentance and good workes. Did God determine a man ſhall be Saved whether they be good or evill, like as he determined the Sunne ſhould riſe whether men ſleepe or wake, whether they be idle or well occupied (for ſo he makes his Sunne to ſhine and the raine to fall upon the juſt and unjuſt) then indeed mans actions in furthering their Salvation were vaine and fruitleſſe. But the Antecedent is a notorous untruth. For our Saviour hath profeſſed in expreſſe termes that whoſoever believeth ſhall be Saved, and whoſoever believes not ſhall be damned. As for the liberty and power of a man to performe faith and repentance, whether this be granted unto all? Is an other queſtion, which this Author might have diſcuſſed had it pleaſed him, and taken upon him to maintaine univerſall grace; but he declines this throughout, like as others of this ſect too, fearing therein ſome precipice. And herein we are willing to grant that God hath abſolutely determined that ſome ſhall believe and repent, as he hath determined

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the Sunne riſing, not upon any condition in man, but according to the meere pleaſure of his will, beſtowing the grace of faith on ſome, and denying it to others. For if God did beſtow faith on man upon condition of ſome precedent work in man, then grace ſhould be given according to mens works (that is in the phraſe of the Antients) according to mens merits, which is direct Pelagianiſme, and condemned in the Synod of Paleſtine above twelve hundred years agoe. But this Author carrieth himſelfe very prepoſterouſly, thus confounding two queſtions into one: the one, Whether ſalvation be determined by God, to be conferred abſolutely on man? Which we deny as much as himſelfe doth. The other is, Whether faith and repentance be determined by God to be conferred on man conditionally? Which we maintaine; and wonder not a little that this Authors ſtomack (working like the raging Sea) chiefly againſt this, yet dares not come to the debating of this, no nor ſo much as in plaine termes to ſpeake out his opinion, and profeſſe, that the reaſon why God beſtowes faith on one, and not on another, is becauſe he finds ſome diſpoſition or work in him, on whom he beſtowes faith, which he finds not in another to whom he denies it. Yet he goes on moſt ridiculouſly in the ſame tenour, ſaying. *If they be abſolutely appoynted to deſtruction, their hearing, reading, praying, almeſgiving, and mourning for their ſinnes, cannot poſsibly procure their ſalvation: damned they muſt be.* But we ſtill deny that men are abſolutely appoynted to deſtructiō, we willingly grant the elect are abſolutely appointed unto grace, namely to have regeneration, faith and repentance to be conferred upon them, and that abſolutely, not upon any foregoing condition performed by them, but according to the meere pleaſure of God; but as for ſalvation, that is appointed to be beſtowed upon them, only by way of reward of foregoing faith, repentance, and good workes, obſerve by the way, how he conſiders not the contradictious nature of that which he imputes unto us. As firſt that we deny man to have any liberty or power to chooſe life and death. And ſecondly, that we maintain, *That their hearing, reading, praying, almeſgiving, and mourning for their ſinnes, cannot poſſibly procure their ſalvation*; which is to imply, that they have power to *heare, read, pray, give almes, and mourne for their ſinnes*, and conſequently that they have power to chooſe life or death. For to chooſe life or death, is no other then to embrace ſuch courſes, as by the ordinance of God, lead to life or death. Now ſuch *are hearing, reading, praying, giving aſmes, and mourning for ſinnes*; for theſe courſes are the way to everlaſting life. Yet as touching the latter, well we may ſay that Reprobates can neither heare, nor read, nor pray, nor give almes as they ought, nor mourne for their ſins; yet ſurely we are ſo farre from ſaying, that theſe courſes cannot poſſibly procure ſalvation, that on the contrary rather, we are ready to profeſſe that theſe courſes rightly uſed, ſhall infallibly procure ſalvation; for there is none more pretious mourning, then to mourne for ſinne; and our Saviour hath pronounced them bleſſed, adding, that they ſhall be comforted. Was it ever heard amongſt us, that men ſhould be damned for reading, hearing, praying, and mourning for their ſinnes? Yet the word of God teacheth us, that men may houle, yet be farre enough off from mourning for their ſinnes, as *Hoſ.* 7.14. *They cryed not unto me when they houled upon their beds: they aſſembled themſelves for corne and wine, & they rebelled againſt me.* And if men be damned notwithſtanding ſuch mourning, I ſhould think it is nothing ſtrange. Of the ſame tenour is that which followeth. *If they be abſolutely ordained to ſalvation, their neglect of holy duties, their ignorance their love of pleaſure, and continuance in a courſe of ungodlineſſe, cannot bring them to damnation*; as if this were our doctrine: whereas to the contrary we maintain, that from election flowes holineſſe. *Eph.* 1.4. *Who hath elected us in Chriſt, that we ſhould be holy.* And faith, *Acts* 13.48. *As many believed as were ordained to everlaſting life.* And 2 *Theſ.* 2.13. *God hath elected you unto ſalvation, by ſanctification of the ſpirit, and faith of the truth.* And indeed our profeſſion is, That Gods purpoſe is to beſtow ſalvation by way of reward of faith, repentance, and good workes: And accordingly there is no other aſſurance of election, then by faith and holineſſe. 1 *Theſ.* 1.3,4. *Remembring the work of your faith, the labour of your love, and the patience of your hope, knowing beloved brethren, that ye are elect of God.* And therefore Saint *Peter* exhorts Chriſtians, *To make their election and vocation ſure, by joyning vertue with their faith, and with vertue knowledge, and with knowledge temperance, and with temperance patience, and with patience Godlineſſe, and with Godlineſſe Brotherly kindneſſe, and with Brotherly kindneſſe Love.* 2 *Pet.* 1. 5,6,7.10. But it were pitty this Author ſhould have liberty denyed him *ſervire ſcænæ*, and to execute his Hiſtoricall part in conforming our Doctrine to the Hereſy of the Predeſtinatians, (ſo called) as it is recorded by *Sigebert*. And indeed the very Doctrine

of *Auſtin*, was charged with the ſame crimination: For albeit *Sigebert* profeſſeth that this Hereſy aroſe *ex Auguſtini libris male intellectis*: out of *Auſtins* Book not rightly underſtood; yet the learned Arch-Biſhop of *Armach*, had made it manifeſt, that this very crimination was charged upon *Auſtins* doctrine. *Hiſtor. Gotteſc. pag.* 22. And that out of the beginning of the 6. book *Hypomneſticon* or *Hypognoſticon*. The words are theſe, and I pray mark it well, whether it be not punctually the very objection which this Author makes in this place: *Credere nos vel prædicare jugillatis (quia cum lege Dei & Prophetis cum Evangelio Chriſti ejuſq; Apoſtolis Prædeſtinationem dicimus) quod Deus quoſdam hominum ſic prædeſtinet ad vitam regni cælorum, ut ſi nolent orare, aut jejunare, aut in omni opere divino vigiles eſſe, eos omnino perire non poſſe, nec prorſus ſui debere eſſe ſollicitos, quos Deus, quia voluit ſemel jam eligendo prædeſtinavit ad vitam: Quiſdam vero ſic prædeſtinavit in Gehennæ pœnam, ut etiam ſi credere velint, ſi jejuniis & orationibus omnig; ſe voluntati divinæ ſubjecerint in his Deum non delectari, & vitam illis æternam in toto dari non poſſe; ſic electione prædeſtinatos eſſe ut pereant.* Judge I pray whether this be not the very objection charged upon the doctrine of *Auſtin*, which this Author chargeth upon our doctrine. And indeed that moſt learned Biſhop ſheweth, how that albeit, the Predeſtinatian hereſy is pretended by *Sigebert* to have riſen out of *Auſtins* bookes not rightly underſtood, as alſo by *Tyro Proſper* (Auncient to *Sigebert*) as he is ſet forth in Print; yet *Tyro* himſelfe plainly profeſſeth, that the Hereſy mentioned *orta eſt ab Auguſtino*, roſe from *Auguſtine* himſelfe, as appears by the Manuſcripts of that Author, which that learned Biſhop had ſearched, one found in *Bennet* Colledge in *Cambridge*, and another in the Kings Library: whereby it is apparent, that this pretended Hereſy of the Predeſtinatians (no Author thereof being ever known to the world) was a meere nick-name deviſed by the Remnants of the Pelagians, and reproachfully caſt upon the doctrine of *Auſtin*, as now a daies it is upon our doctrine, which is the ſame with *Auſtins*. As for the Miniſters Preaching in vaine in ſome ſenſe, and in ſome caſes; this is nothing ſtrange to them that have their eyes fixed on Gods oracles, and not on the oracles of their own braines. For the Prophet *Eſaiah* thus complaines, and that as ſome conceive in the perſon of Chriſt, *Then I ſaid, I have laboured in vaine, I have ſpent my ſtrength for nought, and in vaine, yet ſurely my judgement is with the Lord, and my worke with my God.* And *Jerem.* 8.8. *How dare ye ſay, we are wiſe, and the love of the Lord is with us? Loe certainly in vaine made he it, the penne of the ſcribe is in vaine.* And *Ierem.*6.29. *The bellowes are burnt, the lead is conſumed of the fire: the founder melteth in vaine: for the wicked are not plucked away. Reprobate ſilver ſhall man call them, becauſe the Lord hath rejected them.* And like as the ſowing of ſeed is ſometimes in vaine. *Levit.*26 16. So why may not Preaching be in vaine, which is a ſowing of ſeed alſo. Yet in reſpect of Gods end, it is not in vaine: For he hath the ends he aimed at; for even in them that periſh, there ariſeth *a ſweet ſavour unto God* 2 *Cor.*2.15. As well as in them that are ſaved. And if they ſtumble at the word being diſobedient, Saint *Peter* telleth us, that hereunto they were odained 1 *Pet.* 2. 8. Yea and *Auſtin* tells us, that even Reprobates by the Miniſtry of Gods word, are ſometimes brought *ad exteriorem vitæ emendationem, quo mitius puniantur.* And as for the Preachers of the Word, *their labour is not in vaine in the Lord.* 1 *Cor.* 15. laſt. And *Eſay* 49.4. *My judgement is with the Lord, and my worke with my God.* For even Chriſt himſelfe was forſaken of many. *John* 6. Yet was that no diſparagement to him before God. They deſire indeed that all men might be ſaved that are partakers of their Miniſtry, as they are bound in charity, but with ſubmiſſion to the will of God, ſo that finally their deſires in the iſſue are terminated only in the elect. They became all things to all men, that they may ſave ſome. 1 *Cor.*6. And who are they let *Paul* ſpeake. *I endure all things for the elect ſake.* As for the hearers themſelves, as many as are elect, they believe by it ſooner or later and are brought to repentance. 2 *Tim.* 2.25. And finally to ſalvation, *That thou maiſt both ſave thy ſelfe and them that heare thee,* (ſaith *Paul* to *Timothy*) So that to them ſurely 'tis not in vaine; And as for Reprobates they are convicted by it of their unbeliefe, *Suffrag. Britt.* on the 3. & 4. Articles. Excuſe is taken from them for they cannot plead that they never heard the Goſpel, whereby mē are admoniſhed to repent *Act.*17.30. Thereby to excuſe themſelves: yea & ſometimes they may be the better for it, in reſpect of an outward cōformity, only it is in vain in reſpect that ſalvation is not obtained by them though the Goſpel & the Miniſtry thereof be a means tēding thereunto, in as much as it openeth the way of ſalvation, & diſcovereth all falſe waies. But *paines* for obtaining ſalvation, and Hell, are ill joyned together; For therefore hell is their portion becauſe they neglect the means of ſalvation, and take no paines about it

Iſai. 49.4.

2 Tim. 2. 10.

1 Tim. 4.16.

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at leaſt *good paines*. For our Saviour plainly tells us of ſome that *they ſhall ſeek to enter in at the ſtraight gate, and ſhall not be able* Luk. 13.24. It ſeems they took ſome paines, though they were not able to enter. We are accounted Predeſtinarian Heretiques for ſaying ſo much; but I hope he will not reckon our Saviour too amongſt the number. So *Eſay* 58.2. *Yet they ſeeke mee daily, and will know my waies, even as a Nation that did righteouſly and had not forſaken the ſtatutes of their God: They aske of me ordinances of juſtice. They will draw neer unto God, ſaying. Wherefore have we faſted and thou ſeeſt it not? We have puniſhed our ſelves & thou regardeſt it not.* Here is devotion and paines too, in the way thereof, but I think they had never a whit the better intereſt in heaven for this. Doth this doctrine alſo ſavour of the Predeſtinarian hereſy? As for that pretended paſſage out of *Acts* 9. *It is in vain for thee to kick againſt the pricks*, I find no ſuch ſaying of Chriſt to *Saul* but σκληρὸν an hard thing; for ſhall he not wound himſelfe that doth ſo, more then hurt the pricks themſelves? So was *Paul* by thoſe perſecuting courſes of his, in the high-way to damnation; yet it is true alſo, Gods Church is nothing damnified by the perſecutions and martyrdomes of Gods Saints. For *ſanguis Martyrum ſemen Eccleſiæ*; one is cut off, but many riſe up in the place of a few. Like as a ſeed of corne falls into the ground and dyes; but a blade ſprings out of that one that dyes, and brings forth an eare of many graines. By the way I am wondrous glad to heare the acknowledgement of a precious truth, to breake forth out of the mouth of this Author ere he is aware, namely, That the preſervation of Gods Church is abſolutely decreed in heaven. For marke I beſeech you, wherein the preſervation of Gods Church conſiſts. 1. One is in preſerving them that are called from Apoſtacy. If this be abſolutely decreed, then the perſeverance of men in the ſtate of grace is abſolutely decreed; and conſequently it is abſolutely maintained; And if perſeverance in faith be abſolutely maintained; then faith it ſelfe was abſolutely wrought, and abſolutely decreed to every one that enjoyeth it. 2. Another is the reſtraining of Tyrants from perſecuting the profeſſors of Chriſt: If this be abſolutely decreed, then the free actions of men are abſolutely decreed by God: for to abſtaine from perſecuting is undoubtedly a free action of man. 3. But in caſe both Tyrants are permitted to rage, and many are permitted to fall away; And all are mortall and muſt dye; therefore the next effectuall meanes of preſerving the Church, is the raiſing of others in their place to profeſſe the Goſpell. Now this is wrought by the effectuall calling and converting of men unto faith in Chriſt, and conſequently the effectuall calling and converting of men is abſolutely decreed by God. Thus truth hath prevailed over the mouth of errour, to make it teſtify for Gods truth and againſt errour: *Magna eſt veritas, ut prævalebit.* Here this Author hath raiſed ſpirits againſt himſelfe improvidently; let him try how he can lay them, and conjure them downe againe. 3. I come unto the third. I willingly grant that men are not willing to be exerciſed about fruitleſſe actions; And as for the actions ſpecified by Saint *Paul*; as they were not fruitleſſe to him; ſo I make no queſtion but that they are in like manner profitable to all that performe them, as *Paul* did, namely the actions of mortification. We have Saint *Pauls* word for it, which is of ſome force (if ſo be he be not reputed among the number of Predeſtinarian heretiques, as well as *Auſtin* and our Divines) *If by the ſpirit you mortify the deeds of the fleſh, ye ſhall live.* Endeavour goes beyond deſire: yet *Nehemiah* commends himſelfe to God in this manner. *We that deſire to feare thy name.* And the holy Prophet *Eſay*. *The deſire of our hearts is towards thy name, and to the remembrance of thee.* And S. *Paul*. *We deſire to live honeſtly.* And to fight with the temptations of the Devill, the allurements of the World, and a mans own corruptions, is undoubtedly a manifeſt token of a true Souldier of Chriſt Jeſus. And mortification in ſpeciall; ſuch need not doubt, but that they ſhall crucify the fleſh, with the affections and luſts. *For they that walke in the ſpirit, ſhall not fulfill the luſts of the fleſh*; their faith ſhall give them the victory over the world, and God in his good time will tread Satan under their feet.

Rom. 8.
Nehem. 1.
Eſ. 26.
Heb. 13.
Gal. 5.
1 Ioh. 5.
Rom. 16.

DISCOURSE.

SECT. III.

TO be exerciſed in fruitleſſe affaires, it is both a folly and a miſery. 1. A folly, for, *de neceſſariis nemo ſapiens deliberat*, ſaith the Philoſopher. And our Saviour ſpeaking of things above our power; *Cur eſtis ſolliciti?* ſaith he to his Diſciples, *Mat.* 6.27. *Luke* 12. 25,26. Why take ye thought about ſuch things? Which is as much as if he had ſaid, It is an argument of folly in you, to trouble your ſelves about ſuch things, as lye not in your liberty. 2. A miſery in the opinions of all men, as the fable of *Syſiphus* implies, who (as the Poets feigne) is puniſhed for his robberies in hell, with the rolling of a great ſtone to the top of a ſharpe hill, where it cannot reſt, but preſently comes tumbling downe againe. The Morall of that fable is, that it is a torment, and a torment fit for Hell; for a man to be ſet about any worke that is fruitleſſe and vaine. Men will rather be exerciſed in high and hard imployments, that produce proportionable ends; then pick ſtrawes, play with feathers, or with *Domitian*, ſpend their time in flapping or killing of flies, or doe any other eaſy workes, which end in nothing but ayre and emptineſſe, except they be fooles or ſelfe-tormentors. And therefore when *Balaam* once ſaw that the Lord had fully determined to bleſſe Iſraell, and that all his Sorceries could not effect the contrary; he preſently gave over, and ſet no more enchantments; And reaſon teacheth every man to doe the like.

If any man were fully poſſeſt with a perſwaſion that this temporall eſtate were determined in Heaven, and that he ſhould be worth juſt ſo much, neither more nor leſſe; he would conclude, that his care and paines could not profit him, nor his idleneſſe impoveriſh him: and ſo would be quickly perſwaded to take his eaſe. And if it were evident, that every Common-wealth had a fatall period, beyond which it could not paſſe, and ſhort of which it could not come, and that all occurrences good or bad, were abſolutely preordained by the Almighty, then the King would call no Parliament, uſe no Privy Counſell: for there would be no uſe of them at all. As once a famous Privy-Councellor told our late Queene *Elizabeth*, men would neither make lawes nor obey them, but would take the Councell of the Poet.

Solvite mortales animos, curiſq; levate,
Totq; ſupervacuis animum deplete querelis:
Fata regunt orbem, certa ſtant omnia lege.

From theſe three premiſes laid together, it followes directly, that the doctrine of an abſolute decree, which determines mens ends preciſely; is no friend to a Godly life. For if events abſolutely decreed be unavoydable; if mens actions about unavoydable ends be unprofitable; if in unprofitable imployments men will have no hand willingly: men that know and conſider this, will have nothing to doe with the practice of Godlineſſe. For their ends being abſolutely pitched and therefore unavoydable; they will conclude, that their labour in Religion will be unprofitable, and ſo will not labour in it at all.

That which hath been ſaid, may be yet farther confirmed by two witneſſes. The one of them is by two witneſſes. The one of them is our *Calvin*, who in his Inſtitutions hath theſe words: *Si quis ita plebem compellet; ſi non creditis, ideo fit, quia jam divinitus exitio prædeſtinati eſtis; is non modo ignaviam fovet: ſed etiam in dulget malitiæ.* If any man (ſaith he) ſhould ſpeake thus to people; If there be any among you that believe not, it is becauſe ye are ordained to deſtruction; this man would not only cheriſh ſlothfulneſſe, but wickednesſe alſo. Which is as much to ſay (me thinkes) as this; if a man ſhould ſet out the doctrine of abſolute reprobation in its colours, and explaine it to a people in a cleare and lively faſhion, he would hereby open a doore to liberty and prophanenetſe.

Inſtit. lib. 3. *c.*23. *Sect.* 14.

The other witneſſe is a man of another ſtampe, the miſerable *Landgrave* of *Turing*, of whom it is recorded by *Heiſterbachius*, that being admoniſhed by his friends, of his vitious and dangerous converſation and condition, he made them this anſwer: *Si prædeſtinatus ſum nulla peccata poterunt mihi Regnum Cœlorum auferre: ſi præſcitus nulla bona mihi illud valebunt conferre.* If I be elected no ſinnes can bereave me of heaven; if I be a reprobate, no good deeds can help me to heaven. I conclude therefore that by this opinion (which is taught for one of Gods principall truths;) Religion is, or may be made a very great looſer, which is my fourth generall reaſon againſt it.

Hiſt. lib. 1. *de memor. hiſt. c.*27. *p.*38.

TWISSE.

Conſideration.

DE *neceſſariis nemo ſapiens deliberat*; This is true of things neceſſary by courſe of nature, not of things neceſſary meerely upon ſuppoſition of Gods decree. For ſuch things are as often contingent as neceſſary; For as he decreeth that ſome things ſhall come to paſſe neceſſarily, ſo he decreeth that other things

things ſhall be brought to paſſe contingently: As the buying of the Prophets bones by *Joſiah*, *Cyrus* his dimiſſion of the Jews out of Babylon to goe to their own Country: the contumelious uſages of Chriſt by *Herod* and *Pontius Pilate*, together with the Gentiles and people of Iſrael, were neceſſary in reſpect of Gods decree; it being expreſſely teſtified by the Apoſtles with one mouth, that all theſe were gathered together againſt the holy Sonne of God, to doe what Gods hand, and Gods Counſell predetermined to be done. *Act.* 4.28. Yet who is ſo impudent as to deny, that all theſe did freely, whatſoever they did againſt Chriſt. In like ſort you know what was the courſe of proceedings againſt Proteſtants in Queene *Maries* daies, when they were convicted by Eccleſiaſtiques of ſuch opinions, which they accounted hereticall, and which were made capitall by Law of the Land: then they were delivered over unto the ſecular power, to be put to death. So that herein, to wit, firſt in making ſuch bloudy Lawes. Secondly, in executing them for the eſtabliſhment of Popiſh Religion: The Kings gave their power to the Beaſt, that is, implyed their Regall power and authority to the countenancing of Romiſh Religion: this undoubtedly was a contingent thing. Yet was this determined by God (as the Scripture teſtifies *Revel.* 17.17.) *God hath put in their hearts* (that is in the hearts of the tenne Kings) *to fulfill his decree, and to be of one conſent, and to give their Kingdome unto the Beaſt, untill the word of God be fulfilled.* Againe, ſuppoſe God hath determined my ſalvation; yet if he hath determined to ſave me no other way then is revealed in his word, namely, *by growing in* 1 Pet. 3. *grace, and in the knowledge of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt*: If he hath made known unto us *that,* Gal. 6. *without holineſſe no man ſhall ſee God.* That a man in good time ſhall reape, provided that he faint not, nor be weary of well doing. Who ſeeth not that a neceſſity of Godly life is laid upon all that will be ſaved. Now God hath revealed this latter expreſſely unto us in his word, but as for the ſalvation of particular perſons; we have no ſuch revelation at all ſet downe unto us in Gods word, but in generall thus. *Whoſoever believeth ſhall be ſaved, whoſoever believeth not ſhall be damned. Be thou faithfull unto the death, and thou ſhalt receive a Crowne of life. Whoſoever continueth unto the end ſhall be ſaved.* And good workes (as *Bernard* ſaith) are *via Regni*, though not *cauſa regnandi*. Therefore if any man deſire to come to the Kingdome of Heaven, he muſt be carefull to walke in the way that leadeth thither. The Word ſaith not to any man in particular. *Thou ſhalt be* Rom. 10. *ſaved, but, If thou ſhalt confeſſe with thy mouth the Lord Jeſus, and ſhalt believe in thine heart, that God hath raiſed him from the dead, thou ſhalt be ſaved.* Such was not the promiſe made to *Paul* concerning the ſaving of them, who were in the ſhip with him, but it proceeded in an anſolute forme. *Acts* 27.23,24. *There ſtood by me this night the Angell of God whoſe I am, and whom I ſerve, ſaying. Feare not Paul, for thou muſt be brought before Cæſar: and loe God hath given unto thee freely, all that ſaile with thee.* Here is a manifeſt ſignification of Gods decree and determination to ſave all that were in the ſhip: yet did this make *Paul* or the reſt negligent in uſing ſuch meanes whereby they might ſave themſelves? It is apparent that it did not: For the Mariners they thought to fly out of the ſhip; and to that purpoſe had let downe the boat into the Sea, under colour as though they would caſt anchor out of the foreſhip, meaning to provide for themſelves, and leaving others to ſhift for themſelves. But *Paul* perceiving this, and the dangerous condition of it unto the reſt, as that which would bereave them of the ordinary meanes of preſervation, *he ſaid to the Centurion and the Souldiers, except theſe abide in the ſhip, ye cannot be ſafe.* Did not *Paul* feare the failing af his own credit and reputation? Who having before aſſured them, and that by the meſſage of an Angell of their ſafe coming to land; now on the other ſide tells them, that unleſſe the Marriners abide in the ſhip, they could not be ſafe? Nothing leſſe; neither did the Captaine and Souldiers fly in his face, as an impoſtor, and one that had abuſed them; as by this Authors dictates they might, eſpecially if he had had the Catechiſing of them; but rather of themſelves conceiving it an unreaſonable thing ſo to depend upon the promiſe of man or Angell, as not to uſe the beſt meanes that lay in their power: Forthwith the Souldiers cut off the ropes of the boat, and let it fall away, chooſing rather to looſe their boat (which yet was of good uſe too) then their Marriners. This was not all, but *Paul* uſeth ſpirituall meanes, and by exhortation comforteth them, that ſo they might take heart, and the better ſet themſelves to the uſe of the beſt meanes, not weakely but couragiouſly for their preſervation. *This is the Fourteenth day that ye have tarried, and continued faſting receiving nothing. Wherefore I exhort you to take meat, for this is for your ſafeguard, for there ſhall not an hayre fall from the head of any of you. And when he had thus ſpoken he*

tooke bread, and gave thankes to God in preſence of them all, and brake it, and began to eate. Then were they all of good courage and they alſo tooke meat. Well at length the ſhip brake, and the Centurion commanded, that they that could ſwim ſhould caſt themſelves firſt into the Sea, and goe out to Land; and the others ſome on boards, and ſome on certaine pieces of the Ship. Here to the end we ſee no meanes neglected; And ſo *it came to paſſe* (to wit by uſe of ſuch meanes) *that they all eſcaped to Land.* Yet was the promiſe of their Salvation made to *Paul* in an abſolute forme, ſo is not the promiſe of Salvation made to us. Now I leave it to the indifferent to judge of the wiſdome of this Authors diſcourſe. Yet *non* deliberation is no ſuffitient evidence of the needleſſe condition of meanes. For *Ariſtotle* ſayth that *Ars non deliberat*, not becauſe he uſeth no meanes to bring about his ends, but becauſe the Artificer which is his crafts-maſter, is not to ſeeke of the meanes. For the ſame reaſon deliberation is not incident unto God, his wiſdome is nothing the leſſe in diſcerning congruous meanes to bring about his intended ends. As for that of our Saviour *Cur eſtis ſolliciti de veſtitu?* Surely tis not of any thing above our power in reſpect of uſe of meanes; Indeed to ad one Cubit to our ſtature is not in our power, neither doe I know any that take thought thereof, But it is no more in mans power to bleſſe his owne cares and labours for the procuring of himſelfe meat, drinke, rayment, then it is in his power to adde a cubit or two unto his ſtature. Therefore it becomes us not μεεμνᾶν that is, to diſtract our ſelves with carking cares, as touching the end of our affaires, but he forbids us not to be carefull in the uſe of means. For to this purpoſe God would not have *Adam* to be idle in Paradiſe, he muſt dreſſe the Garden, though the thriving of ought thereby was not ſo much by his care as by Gods providence. And therefore he hath given us ſix dayes to worke and commands us to doe all our works therein; but as for the iſſue of our labours, leave that to God & his bleſſing; And whether our labours are ſucceſſefull or not ſucceſſefull, not to trouble our ſelves there abouts. It was ſpoken to the ſingular cõmendation of Dr *Raynolds* by him that Preached his funerall Sermon, *that he was moſt carfull of the means, moſt careleſſe of the end.* Thus I have endevored to diſtinguiſh thoſe things which this Authours very judiciouſly confounds. And as it was no folly for *Paul* to doe as he did that all good meanes might be uſed for their preſervation; ſo much leſſe was miſery, nay they had bene in amiſerable caſe, had they neglected any due meanes to preſerve themſelves: for St *Paul* (notwithhanding the meſſage delivered unto him by an Angell, and his promiſe therupon made unto the Centution) ſpared not to profeſſe that *unleſſe the Mariners ſtaid in the ſhip they could not be Saved*: ſo that this Authours fable of *Syſiphus*, is no better accommodated then the reſt, ſave that herein he may refreſh his reader, & thank him for his curteſie, for repreſenting unto him as in a glaſſe the nature of his proceedings. For in this his diſcourſe he doth very accuratly play the part of *Syſiphus* for he takes great paines in kindeling a fire, but alaſſe he cannot warme himſelfe thereby; he muſt blow his nails ſtill; there is no remedy. And truly I ſee noe reaſon to the contrary, but that a man as profitably beſtowes his paines in picking ſtrawes, or playing with feathers, as this Authour doth in ſuch maner of diſcourſes. *Domitian* killed flyes, but this Author doth not ſo much as flap a flye; only I confeſſe he doth very energetically diſcover the nakedneſſe of his owne diſcourſe. And ſuch be the iſſue of thoſe that affect a name by becomming Arminian Proſelits; and ſhew as litle grace in their writings, as it becomes them whoſe growth in perfection (by their owne account) is to appoſe the grace of God Pelagian like, whom *Auſtin* was bould to call the enemyes of Gods graee; Indeed it was high tyme for *Balaam* to leave his ſorceries when he ſaw the Lord was determined to bleſſe *Iſrael*, For his ſorceries were no meanes to bleſſe them, but to curſe them rather. In like ſort, if I am perſwaded that God hath appoynted me unto Salvation, it will be high tyme for me to leave off all care of faith repentance and good workes, when this Author ſhall make it appeare, that theſe ſtudies are no more conducent (in Gods ordination) unto ſalvation, then *Balaams* ſorceries were to the bleſſing of Iſrael, but rather the high-way unto damnation, as his ſorceries were to the curſing of the Lords people.

I make no doubt (what this Authors creed is to the contrary I care not) but that every mans temporall eſtate is determined in heaven, as well as *Pauls* eſcaping ſafe out of ſhipwrack, and all that were in the ſame ſhip, to the number of two hundred threſcore and ſixteen ſoules, yet both Paul and all the reſt did not take their eaſe, but were vigilant to take all opportunity, to uſe the beſt meanes for their ſafe arrivall at the land; ſome by ſwimming, ſome by ſitting on bords, ſome on one piece of the ſhip

ſome

ſome on another, *and ſo* (and not but ſo) *they came all ſafe to land.* And as our Divines in the Synod of *Dort* obſerve, albeit the Lord had promiſed *Ezechiah*, he ſhould recover, and fifteen years more ſhould be added to his life, yet he refuſed not the counſaile of the Prophet *Eſay*, in laying a plaſter of figges unto his ſore. We know what was the forme of *Ionahs* Preaching to the Ninivites *Ion.* 3. 4. *Yet forty daies and Niniveh ſhall be deſtroyed.* Here we have an abſolute forme of ſentence denounced againſt them. *And the people of Niniveh believed God,* Yet did they not give over all courſes for the pacifying of the wrath of God, *but proclaimed a faſt, and put on ſack-cloath, from the greateſt of them to the leaſt of them; the King himſelfe ariſing from his throne, and laying his robe from him, and covering himſelfe with ſack-cloath, and ſitting in aſhes, and commanding others to doe the like.* And mark their reaſon. *Who can tell if God will turne and repent, and turne from his fierce wrath that we periſh not.* In like ſort damnation being determined to none, but to ſuch as are finally impenitent: and this being not doubtfully or obſcurely, but clearely revealed unto us in Gods word, ſhall our endeavours to turne unto God by Godly ſorow and repentance, be accounted vaine and fruitleſſe in the judgement of any ſober man? And let this Author look unto it, that theſe Ninivites doe not one day riſe in judgement againſt him; And not the Ninivites only, but the Stoicks alſo, who as they acknowledged ſome things *fatalia*, ſo they confeſſed there were ſome things *confatalia*; And this very argument here uſed they commonly called ἀργὸς λόγος, an idle argumentation; becauſe it tended to the humouring of men in their idle courſes: And thus is it cenſured above 1500 yeares agoe by *Cicero* in his Booke *De fato. It is the bleſſing of God that makes men fat,* and if God hath determined this, and man knows it, will he therefore ſit ſtill and ſtarve himſelfe? *It is the bleſſing of God that makes men rich.* God promiſed as much to the Iſraelites, in caſe they kept his Commandements, which commandements did not inſtruct them in good husbandry; but where they inſtigated hereby to neglect any uſuall meanes of making themſelves rich? Nothing leſſe, nay God was jealous leaſt in preſumption of their owne wiſe and thriftie courſes they ſhould give the glory of it to themſelves and not to God. *Deut.* 8. 17. *Beware leaſt thou ſay in thy heart, My power and the ſtrength of mine owne hand hath prepared me this abundance. But remember the Lord thy God: for it is he which giveth thee power to get ſubſtance.* If it be ſayd that God hath not determined to make any man fat, but by feeding; nor any man rich but by labouring in ſome vocation, or other, I anſwer, That neither hath God determined to bring any man to Salvation, *but by Sanctification of the ſpirit and faith of the truth* 2 *Theſſ.* 2. 13. By feeding on Gods Word, *which is the word of grace able to ſave our Soules. Iam.* 1. *and to build further and to give us an inheritance among them that are ſanctified through faith in him.* In like ſort if God hath appoynted every *Commonwealth* a fatall period, yet if he hath appointed to bring them to flouriſhing eſtate by certaine meanes, or to deſolation no otherwiſe then by neglecting the meanes of proſperitie, as it is aparent he doth not, would any wiſe man conclude hence, that it were bootleſſe either to call Parliaments or to make uſe of privy Councelors? But this Author perhaps will reply, that this is not abſolutely to ordaine a period to a ſtate, for as much as the period is brought to paſſe by meanes. Be it ſo; Now let the indifferernt conſider whether we doe maintaine, that the periods of men, to wit Salvation on the one ſide and damnation on the other, are by God brought to paſſe without meanes. Doe we maintaine that God dannes or decreeth to damne any man but for finall perſeverance in ſinne? Doe we maintaine that God brings any man to Salvation (if he come to the uſe of reaſon) but by faith repentance and good-workes? But the truth is this Authors ignorance in part, and in part a dexterity that this Sect hath to confound things that differ, is his beſt armour of proofe, to hold up his confidence in ſpending his powder liberally, but without ſhot. For ſalvation is not beſtowed, or damnation inflicted abſolutely, but that meerely upon the foregoing of faith and repentance; this meerely upon finall perſeverance in ſinne. Only regeneration together with the grace of faith and repentance, is beſtowed abſolutely by God upon whom he will, and denyed to whom he will, according to that of *Paul, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth.* And it is very ſtrange that this being the criticall poynt, and the moſt momentous poynt of controverſy, and ſuch, the deciſion whereof carryeth with it the deciſion of all the reſt, this Author ſhould unſhamefacedly decline it. But ſome there be that hate the light becauſe their workes are evill; but doth it become him to taxe others for declining the triall, when none ſheweth more vile carriage this way then himſelfe? What that Privy-Councellor was, I know not,

v. 5.

v. 9.

Act. 20. 32.

nor

nor have I any evidence of the truth of the story, but as it lyeth dictated at pleasure; I have shewed how it nothing disadvantageth our cause, though the Author of that speech were not only a Privy-Councellor but a great Divine too. Yet amongst many good, there might be some bad in Queen *Elizabeths* dayes. If that were true which is reported to have been mentioned by Dr *Lively* in a Lecture of his in *Cambridge*, namely that a certaine Booke was found under a Privy-Councellors pillow, whose inscription was this *De tribus Mundi impostoribus, Mose, Christo, Mahumite.* As for fate stoicall (to give the Divell his right) I no where find it maintained by any of them so as to prejudice mens wills, but by many great ones I find this expressly denyed and hereof I have already spoken more at large.

Still he keepes his course in impugning *an absolute decree determining mens ends precisely*: What secret misteries he conceales in the Word, *precisely*. I know not; but it is aparent, we maintaine no such determining the Salvation of any man, so as to exclude a Godly life. We both know and teach that *without Holinesse* (as much as to say without a Godly life) *no man shall see God.* But we further say, that this is not wholy the decree of predestination, though this Author with his Remonstrants would faine rest here: but we farther say, that a Godly life is the gift of Gods grace, and that God bestowes this gift on whom he will; but this Author hath no great lust to oppose us here. The more Equivocall a phraise is, the fitter it is to serve his turne, that lyes upon advantages, to promote error and obscure truth. And therefore keepes himselfe to the *absolute decree and precise determinations*; either not understanding or not considering, that an absolute decree may be taken divers waies, either *quoad actum volentis* as touching the act of God willing, or *quoad res volitas*, as touching the things willed, the decree properly signifies the act of God willing; but this Author inconsideratly takes it *quoad res volitas* as touching the things willed all along, as appeares by his opposing it *to decree or will conditionall*; And will conditionall with him is such, as when the thing willed is not effected *because the condition is not performed.* They are his owne words in the last Section save one of his former sorts of reasons, the very last words. As for example, the will of Saving men is not accomplished, because men doe not believe. Then as touching the things willed Gods decrees being considered, here also arise different considerations; for as much as the things willed are different Grace and Glory; As for Glory and Salvation we doe not say that God hath decreed to confer that absolutly, but only conditionally; yet thereupon he stiks throughout. supposing his adversaries to maintaine an absolute decree concerning the conferring of Salvation abolutely, which is most untrue, wherein he fights without any adversary; yet there he dischargeth himselfe very strenuously, and layes about him like a mad man. But as for grace, to wit, the grace of regeneration, the grace of faith and repentance; this we readily professe that God doth bestow it absolutly, to wit, on whom he will, according to the meere pleasure of his will. All this, It is the glory of this Author in his discourse most juditiously to confound; which made him the more to abound in matter, that he might seem to say some thing, when indeed it is nothing, *supple* to the purpose. And to meet with him in every particular of his conclusion; The events (to wit of Salvation or damnation) are not at all decreed by God to come to passe absolutely, but meerely conditionally, and consequently not unavoydably, but avoydably rather; like as things that come to passe contingently doe come to passe with a possibility not to come to passe, and accordingly God decreed they should came to passe contingently; And consequently mens actions hereabouts are not unprofitable, nay they are both necessary for obtayning the ends here intimated, & such as never faile of obtayning them. As for example. *Sanctification of the spirit, and faith of the truth*, never faile of procuring Salvation; for as much as God ordained by these meanes to bring men unto Salvation 2 *Thess.* 2. 13. And by no meanes else. And therefore most absurd it is to conceive, that the practise of Godlinesse proves unprofitable, and from such wild promises the unprofitable nature of the prctise of Godlinesse, can prove no better then a wild conclusion.

I come to his two witnesses; the first is *Calv. Inst. l.* 3. *c.* 23. *sect.* 14. *Si quis ita plebem compellet; si non creditis, ideo fit, quia jam divinitus exitio destinati estis, is non modo ignaviam fovet, sed indulget malitiæ. This* (saith this Author) *is as much to say as this; If a man should set downe the doctrine of Reprobation in its colours, and explaine it to people in a cleare and lively fashion, he would hereby open a doore to liberty and prophaneneſſe.* Now this *Calvin* delivereth as out of *Austin*; as appeareth both by his entrance hereunto, and by his shutting up of it;

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His entrance into it is this. *Et tamen ut ſingulare ædificationis ſtudium ſancto viro fuit,* (that is *Auſtin*) *ſic docendi veri rationem temperat ut prudenter caveatur, quoad licet, offenſio. Nam iquæ vere dicuntur congruenter ſimul poſſe dici admonet;* The man he ſpeakes of ſtill is *Auſtin*, as is apparent to him that ſhall conſider the coherence of this Section with the former. Then he ſets downe the inconvenient manner of Preaching this truth, as *Auſtin* doth, though not in *Auſtins* words but in his owne. *Si quis ita plebem compellet; ſi non creditis, ideo fit, quia jam divinitus exitio deſtinati eſtis. &c.* And ſhutting the whole up he expreſſely names *Auſtin*, miſliking ſuch manner of Preaching thus; *Tales itaq; Auguſtinus non immerito tanquam vel inſulſos Doctores, vel ſiniſtros & ominoſos Prophetas ab Eccleſia jubet faceſſere.* What is the myſtery then of this, that *Calvin* is here brought in for a witneſſe, in making a relation of *Auſtins* diſcourſe, and *Auſtin* himſelfe whoſe judgement *Calvin* doth but relate is pretermitted, eſpecially conſidering that *Auſtins* teſtimony, where it ſerves his turne, would give farre more credit to his cauſe then *Calvins*: you will give me leave to gueſſe at the miſtery, which I take to be this; *Calvin* is well known to be oppoſite unto him in the doctrine of reprobation; but *Calvin* acknowledging that this Doctrine might be delivered in a harſh manner, which yet nothing moved him from entertaining it: this harſh manner of propounding it, is enough to ſerve this Authors turne, to defame it both in his own conceit, and in the conceit of others, ſuch as himſelfe. For as for *Calvins* opinion to the contrary, that is of no conſideration with him, yea though *Luther* alſo joyne with him in this. He e is eſpecially in theſe daies, and with ſome perſons ſo contemptible, as never was honeſt man more. But to bring in *Auſtin* acknowledging this Doctrine, and taking notice of ſome harſh manners in propounding it, and yet notwithſtanding embracing it in deſpight of the harſhneſſe thereof, and ſhewing withall, how this harſh manner of propounding the ſame truth may be tempered; his Authority this Author well knew, and conſidered would be of greater Authority to ſway for it, then ſome harſhneſſe in the propounder, or this Authors *Me thinks*, would ſway againſt it: And therefore he thought fit to ſpare the bringing in of *Auſtin* to teſtify for him, and contents himſelfe to bring *Calvin* only upon the ſtage, though he doth but relate in effect the diſcourſe of *Auſtin*; Thus as formerly I ſaid, this Treatiſe ſavours more of the Fox then of the Lyon. But let us bring him unto *Auſtin De bono perſeverantiæ. cap.* 16. Where the objection made by them of *Marſeiles* againſt *Auſtins* Doctrine of Predeſtination is propoſed thus. *Sed aiunt ut ſcribitis neminem poſſe correptionis ſtimulis excitari, ſi dicatur in conventu Eccleſiæ audientibus multis. Ita ſe habet de prædeſtinatione definita ſententia voluntatis Dei, ut alii ex vobis de infidelitate, accepta obediendi voluntate veneritis ad fidem, vel accepta maneatis in fide: cæteri verò qui in peccatorum delectatione remoramini, ideo nondum ſurrexiſtis, quia nec dum vos adjutorium gratiæ miſerantis erexit. Veruntamen ſi qui eſtis nondum vocati, quos gratia ſua prædeſtinaverit elegendos, accipietis eandem gratiam, qua velitis & ſitis electi: Et ſi qui obeditis ſi prædeſtinati eſtis reliciendi, ſubtrahentur obediendi vires, ut obedire ceſſitis.* But they ſay (as you write) that no man can be excited by the good of reprehenſion, if in the congregation before many, the Preacher ſhall thus diſcourſe. Such is the ſentence of Gods will determined as touching predeſtination, that ſome of you receiving the will of obedience, ſhall come from infidelity unto faith, or receiving the gift of perſeverance ſhall continue therein. But if there be any among you who are not called, whom God hath through his grace predeſtinated to be elected, they ſhall receive the ſame grace, whereby to will to be, & to become elect. And if there be any of you, who obey the Goſpell, that are predeſtinated to be rejected, the ſtrength of obeying ſhall be taken from you, that you may ceaſe to obey. Here is the objection againſt it, *Auſtins* doctrine of predeſtination, and reprobation at full; his anſwer to it followeth at full; but how? Not in denying ought that hereby is implyed concerning his doctrine of Predeſtination, but to the contrary; Firſt ſhewing that this harſh propoſition of things, muſt not deterre us from the embracing of it; Secondly, ſhewing how the ſame truth may be delivered in a more temperate manner. *Ita cum dicuntur* (ſaith he) *ita nos a confitenda Dei gratia,* i. e. *quæ non ſecundum merita noſtra datur, & a confitenda ſecundum eam prædeſtinatione Sanctorum*; that is, Theſe things thus delivered, muſt not deterre us from confeſſing Gods grace, which is not given according unto workes, and from confeſſing the predeſtination of Saints, according thereunto. Where obſerve I beſeech you how farre he joynes together the doctrine of Gods free grace, with his doctrine of predeſtination according to his Tenet, which here was oppoſed by the ſame

Argument, wherewith the Author in this place oppugneth ours. Manifeſtly giving to underſtand, that his doctrine of Predeſtination could not be impugned as there it is, but withall they that impugne it, muſt deny the freeneſſe of Gods grace, & maintain that it is given according unto works or merits. So that as he anſwers them, ſo we may take liberty to anſwer this Author, and ſay that this argument of his muſt not deterre us from confeſſing predeſtination according to Gods free grace; leaſt ſo we be driven to maintaine *that Grace is given according unto works*. And the reaſon is manifeſt; For if it be not of the meere pleaſure of God, that he beſtowes faith on one, & denyes it unto another, then the reaſon hereof muſt be becauſe God findes ſome better diſpoſition in one then in another, and therefore he gives him, that is better diſpoſed, the grace of faith which he denyes unto another. Now this both in *Auſtins* judgement & in cleare reaſon appears to be the maintaining, that grace is given according unto workes, which is condemned in the Synod of *Paleſtine* above 1200 years agoe. Yet *Auſtin* reſts not here, but ſhewes how the ſame objection may have place, as well for the overthrowing of preſcience divine, as for the overthrowing of predeſtination divine. We (ſaith he) muſt no more be dererred by this objection from confeſſing, the freeneſſe of Gods grace, and predeſtination divine ſuitable thereunto, then we are hereby deterred from acknowledging Gods fore-knowledge, and ſhewes how the ſame objection may be accommodated againſt Gods fore-knowledge, thus: *Sive nunc recte vivatis ſive non recte; tales vos eritis poſtea quales vos deus futuros eſſe præſcivit, vel boni ſi bonos vel mali ſi malos*. That is, Whether at this time you live well or not well, ſuch you ſhall be as God foreſeeth you will be; either good if he foreſeeth it will come to paſſe, or evill if he foreſeeth you will be evill. Now (ſaith he) if upon the hearing of this, ſome are converted unto ſlothfulneſſe (this is the very objection propoſed by *Calvin* for the matter of it, but the forme is different. For *Calvin* ſaith the Preacher, doth *cheriſh ſlothfulneſſe, &c. Auſtin* ſignifieth only, that by ſuch kind of Preaching, men take occaſion of ſlothfulneſſe, and therefore it is fit that *Calvin* ſhould in that ſenſe only be interpreted, ſeeing he only relates in effect that which he findes in *Auſtin*,) ſuppoſe (ſaith *Auſtin* going on) *That hereupon they runne after their luſt, ſhall we therefore thinke, that to be falſe, which was delivered as concerning Gods fore-knowledge?* Then he tells a Hiſtory of his own experience, namely how one in the ſame monaſtery whereof he was, abuſed in this manner the doctrine of fore-knowledge. For when his brethren reproved him he would ſtubbornly anſwer, *Whatſoever I am now, ſurely I ſhall goe out of the World, ſuch as God foreſeeth I will be*. Wherein ſaith *Auſtin*, he ſpeakes truth, but he was ſo farre from profiting by it unto good, that at length he utterly forſooke our ſociety, returning as a dog to his vomit; and yet what he will be, ſaith he, the Lord knoweth. Now who doubts but that our doctrine of juſtification by faith, and not by workes, may be an occaſion to ſome, to abuſe the grace of God unto wantonneſſe; ſuch there were even in the Apoſtles daies: but what? Shall we therefore renounce that doctrine? I am not yet come to the tempering of the manner of propoſing this doctrine, I have more to ſay before I come to that. What difference is there in harſhneſſe between theſe doctrines, *If ye doe not believe, therefore ye doe not believe, becauſe God hath ordained you to deſtruction*, and this, *If ye doe not believe, therefore ye doe not believe becauſe God hath not regenerated you*: Let any man ſhew how a doore is open to ſlothfulneſſe, more by the one, then by the other; eſpecially conſidering the ground of all, is mans inability to believe, without this grace of God effectually preventing and working him unto faith. Now this doctine is plainly taught, and that particularly of certain perſons, to their faces: *Ioh* 8.. *He that is of God heareth Gods word, ye therefore heare them not, becauſe ye are not of God*. The phraſe, *to be of God*, I interpret here of regeneration, but both *Auſtin* of old, and our Divines of late, doe interpret of election; and ſo it is preciſely the ſame with the Preaching of reprobation in his true colours, as this Author interprets it, and paſſeth this cenſure upon it, as opening a doore to liberty and profaneneſſe; which may I confeſſe well be occaſionally to carnall men, or to men poſſeſt with prejudicate opinions, yet here it appears plainly, to be in effect the ſame with that which our Saviour himſelfe Preached. But take this withall; as it may be an occaſion of ſlothfulneſſe, ſo it may be a meanes to humble men, and beat them out of the preſumptuous conceit of their own ſufficiency to heare Gods word, to believe, to repent, and the like; and thereby to prepare them to look up unto God, and to waite for him in his ordinances, if ſo be as the Angell came downe to move the waters in the poole of Bethesda, to make them medicinable; ſo Gods ſpirit

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may come downe and make his word powerfull to the regenerating of them, to the working of faith, and repentance in them. And I appeale to every ſober mans judgement, whether to this end tended not the very like Doctrine and admonition propoſed by *Moſes* to the Children of Iſrael in the Wilderneſſe. *Deut.*29. 2, 3, 4. *Ye have ſeen all that the Lord did before your eyes in the land of Egypt unto Pharaoh and all his ſervants, and unto all his Land. The great temptations which thine eyes have ſeene thoſe great miracles and wonders. Yet the Lord hath not given you a heart to perceive, and eyes to ſee, and eares to heare unto this day.* For is it not *Moſes* his purpoſe to ſet before their eyes how little they have profited in obedience and thankfulneſſe unto God, and amendment of life, by all thoſe great workes of his, in the way of mercy towards them, and in the way of judgement towards the Egyptians? And what was the cauſe of all this, but the hardneſſe of their hearts, and the blindneſſe of their eyes? and to what end doth he tell them, that God alone can take away this hardneſſe of heart, and blindneſſe of mind, which hitherto he had not done? Might he not ſeem to juſtify them, in walking after the hardneſſe of their hearts by this, and harden them therein by this Doctrine of his? like as this Author caſts the like aſperſion in part upon the like Doctrine of ours? Yet *Moſes* paſſeth not for this, ſo he might ſet them in a right courſe, to be made partakers of Gods grace, and that by the miniſtry of the Law, to humble and prepare them for the grace of God, which is the Evangelicall uſe of the Law. And it is remarkable that in the firſt verſe of this Chapter, theſe words are ſaid to be *the words of the Covenant, which the Lord commanded Moſes to make with the Children of Iſrael in the land of Moab, beſide the Covenant which he made with them in Horeb.* Wherefore ſeeing the Covenant made in Horeb, was the Covenant of the Law, it followeth that this Covenant is the Covenant of grace, and theſe words are the words of the Covenant of grace, which is plainly expreſſed in the next Chapter v. 6. *And the Lord thy God, will circumciſe thine heart, and the heart of thy ſeed, that thou maieſt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy ſoule, that thou maieſt live.* And what is the uſuall preparation hereunto but to humble men by convicting them of ſinne, and of their utter inability to help themſelves, and that nothing but Gods grace is able to give them *an heart to perceive, and eyes to ſee, and eares to heare.* But yet becauſe we doe not ſpeake in the ſame meaſure of the ſpirit, and of power, as *Moſes* and our Saviour did, therefore we labour to decline all harſhneſſe as much as lyeth in our power, where we ſee occaſion is like to be taken of offence. Therefore firſt as touching this diſcourſe of *Calvins. If you believe not, therefore it is, becauſe you are already deſtinated unto damnation.* I ſay this is untrue more waies then one. Firſt if he conceives deſtination unto damnation, goes before Gods decree to deny faith: this I utterly deny, and have already proved, that in no moment of reaſon doth the decree of damnation precede the decree of denying grace. Therefore Gods decree to deny them grace, is rather the cauſe why they believe not then the decree of damnation. Secondly whether we take it of the one or of the other, or of both, yet the propoſition is utterly untrue. For it doth not follow, that becauſe a man doth not as yet believe, therefore God hath decreed to deny him faith; and becauſe he hath ſo decreed, therefore he denies him faith. For he that believes not to day, may believe to morrow. *Saul* was ſome times a perſecutor of Gods Church; but was it at that time lawfull to conclude, that becauſe he did not then believe therefore he was deſtinated unto damnation: ſo that the reaſon indeed is, either becauſe God hath not decreed at all to give them faith, or becauſe the time which God hath ordained for their converſion is not yet come. This is ſo cleare that *Calvin* himſelfe were he alive, would not gainſay upon conſideration. Neither doth he juſtify this diſcourſe, but only ſaith, we muſt be more wiſe, then ſo to diſcourſe to our Auditors. But this Author in ſaying, this is to ſet downe our doctrine of reprobation in its colours, delivers that which is ſhamefully untrue, and nothing ſutable with our doctrine. More neere to the matter we ſhould ſay rather, That like as therefore a man heareth Gods word becauſe he is of God (that is as I interpret it, becauſe he is regenerated of God) ſo therefore men heare them not, becauſe they are not of God, that is not yet regenerated; but yet nevertheleſſe they may be in good time. Yet here alſo there is ſome defect for want of cleare explication of this truth; For will you conclude hence, that non-regeneration is the cauſe of infidelity (as ſome doe in effect)? Why but this is either notoriouſly falſe, or if true it is true in ſuch a ſenſe, as whereby God is no more the cauſe thereof, then a Phyſitian is the cauſe of a diſeaſe, becauſe he will not cure it. For infidelity is a naturall fruit of mans he-

reditary corruption, and God alone can cure it, but if he will not, God is not to be ſaid to be the cauſe of any diſobedience iſſuing therefrom, otherwiſe then *per modum non removentis*, by way of not removing the cauſe of it; or *per modum non dantis quod prohiberet*, by way of not curing the cauſe, that is, by not giving faith. Now what harſhneſſe there is in this, to as many as doe not concurre with the Pelagians, ſo as in plain termes to profeſſe, *that Grace is given according to mens works*; And the objection framed againſt *Auſtin*, and grounded upon that doctrine which he acknowledged ranne thus. *Cæteri qui in peccatorum delectatione remoramini ideo nondum ſurrexiſtis, quia nec dum vos adjutorium gratiæ miſerantis erexit.* Therefore you are not riſen out of that delight you took in ſinne, becauſe the ſuccour of Gods grace hath not raiſed you, not as *Calvin* expreſſeth it. *Therefore you believe not, becauſe ye are ordained to deſtruction.* And
Ioh. 8. this very doctrine, as formerly I ſaid, our Saviour ſpares not to apply to ſome particular perſons, and Preach it to their faces; like as *Moſes* Preacheth the very ſame doctrine to the Children of Iſrael, *Deut.* 29.2,3,4. Yet *Auſtin* to prevent harſhneſſe doth not like this manner of propoſing it ſo well, *ſeeing it may be and it is fit it ſhould be delivered coveniently thus. Si qui autem adhuc in peccatorum damnabilium delectatione remoramini apprehenditis ſaluberrimam diſciplinam. Quod tamen cum feceritis, nolite extolli quaſi de operibus veſtris, aut gloriari, quaſi non acceperitis.* If any of you doe yet continue in the delightfull courſe of damnable ſinnes take hold of wholeſome diſcipline, which when you have done, be not proud thereof as of your own work, or Glory as if you had not received this grace of God. Now what advantagious ſervice this firſt witneſſe hath done him, I am well content the indifferent may judge. I come to his ſecond witneſſe, that is of the Land-grave of Turing, reported by *Heſſerbachius*; as I remember it is about the Twelfth Century of yeares ſince our Saviours incarnation. *This man being admoniſhed by his friends of his dangerous and vitious courſes, made this anſwer. Si prædeſtinatus ſum nulla peccata poterunt mihi Regnum Cælorum auferre; Si præſcitus, nulla bona mihi illud valebunt conferre.* It is not the firſt time I have met with this ſtory; not in *Voſſius* only, but in an Arminian Manuſcript; it ſeems they make ſome account of it; yet I ſee no cauſe they ſhould make any ſuch account thereof. It is the common voyce of prophane perſons corrupting the doctrine of Predeſtination to ſerve their own turnes. My ſelfe remember an inſtance of it in my minority, when I was little more then a child; and I remember both the Perſon whom, and the place where it was delivered, and it was accounted as a ſigne of a prophane heart; yet this *Voſſius* makes uſe of, as an inſtance forſooth of a Predeſtination Heretique. And I wonder why they doe not deviſe as well a *Præſcientiarian* Hereſy; and that by as good an inſtance as this, of one of *Auſtins* Monkes, who being reproved by his brethren, made the like anſwer as touching Gods *præſcience*, but yet with more ſobriety, ſaying, *Whatſoever I am now, I ſhall be ſuch as God foreſeeth I will be.* Yet herein as *Auſtin* profeſſeth, he ſpake nothing but truth; but the ſaying of the *Landgrave* implyes a notorious untruth, namely, that if he were predeſtinated he ſhould be Saved, though he continued in his ſinfull courſes; Now this I ſay is a groſſe untruth; For predeſtination is the preparation of Grace (as *Auſtin* deſineth it) and conſequently ſuch as are predeſtinated ſhall be taken off from their ſinfull courſes in good time, and by Grace be brought unto Salvation. In like ſort he ſuppoſeth a Reprobate may be truly righteous; whereas *Auſtin* profeſſeth of ſuch, as are not predeſtinate that *God brings none of them to wholſome and ſpirituall repentance, whereby man is reconciled unto God in Chriſt, what patience ſoever he affords them. Contr. Jul. Pelag. l.5.c.4.* Nay this kind of Argumentation, drawn from deſtiny Stoicall, wherewith our adverſaries doe uſually reproach our doctrine of Predeſtination, like as the Pelagians did in the ſame manner reproach Saint *Auſtins* doctrine concerning Predeſtination. I ſay this argument was in courſe, and profligated in the daies of *Cicero*, and cenſured as ἀργὸς λόγος, an idle argumentation (as before I mentioned) and it is to be ſeen in *Cicero* his book *De Fato*; and thereupon they diſtinguiſhed of ſome things which they called, *Fatalia*, as victory, and ſome things which they called, *Confatalia*, as all neceſſary meanes requiſite to the getting of the victory. And *Origen* though he be accounted a favourer of our adverſaries Doctrine in his writings, yet he ſhewes the vanitie of this Argument applyed to fate, wherby undoubtedly he meanes providence divine. For he propoſeth ſuch a kind of objection, as if a ſicke man ſhould diſpute himſelf from taking Phyſick after this maner. *Either by deſtiny is it appointed I ſhall recover or no; If my deſtiny be to recover I ſhall recover though I uſe no Phyſicke, if my deſtiny be not to recover, all the Phyſitians in the world ſhal doe me no good.* And the vanity of this is repreſented

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by the like argument in another manner thus: *If it be thy desteny to beget children, whether thou useſt the company of Woemen or no, thou ſhalt beget children:* And concludes thus; *Ut enim hic ſi fieri non poteſt ut quis procreat, niſi cum muliere concubuerit, ſic ſi valetudinis recuperatio medicinæ via efficitur neceſſario adhibetur medicus.* The Greeke of *Origen* is ſet downe at large by *Turnebus* in his diſputation upon *Cicero* his book *De Fato*, againſt *Ramus*. Now judge you I pray, what colour of detriment to Religion, hath he produced from our doctrine of abſolute Reprobation, and whether his diſcourſe herein is any better then the imagination of a vaine thing.

DISCOURSE.

SECT. IV.

BUt there are two things chiefly, which are ſaid for the vindicating of this opinion from this crimination.

1. Firſt, that many of them which believe and defend this opinion, are Godly and holy men, and therefore it doth not of it ſelfe open a way to liberty; but through the wickedneſſe of men, who pervert the ſweeteſt, and the ſureſt truths revealed in Gods word, to their own damnation.

Reſp. It cannot (I confeſſe) be denyed, that many of this opinion are Godly men, but it is no thankes to their opinion, that they are ſo; (the true and naturall genius of which is to breed ſloth, to drowne men in carnall ſecurity, and to countenance carnall liberty.) but to ſome thing elſe, either to Gods providence, (who will not ſuffer this doctrine for his own glory and the good of men, to have any great ſtroake in their lives;) or to mens incogitancy, who think not of reducing it *ad praxim*, or drawing concluſions out of it, but reſt in the naked ſpeculation of it, as they doe of many others; or laſtly to ſome good practicall concluſions, which they meet with in the word of God, and apply to their lives (as they doe not the former deductions) ſuch as theſe are for example; Be ye holy as I an holy. Without holineſſe no man ſhall ſee God. If ye conſent and obey, ye ſhall eat the good things of the land. Godlineſſe hath the promiſe of this life and of the life to come, and ſuch like. And hence we may learne to meaſure this opinion, not by ſome few of the men that hold it, but by the ſequels, which the Logick even of ſimple men, if they ſhould apply their braines to ponder and conſider it, would fetch out of it. No man that hath thoroughly ſuckt it in, and underſtood the force of it, but will either relinquiſh it, or live according to the naturall importment of it, that is, licentiouſly.

2. Secondly, it is ſaid, that albeit this Doctrine doth teach, that men are abſolutely elected, or abſolutely rejected; yet it tells no man who in particular is elected, who rejected, (that muſt appeare by themſelves and their lives) and ſo it doth not ſtifle holy endeavours in any, but rather encourage them in every man, becauſe it makes them to be ſignes, whereby men muſt and may get the knowledge of their election.

Reſp. For anſwer to this (in my judgement or the preſent) the ignorance of a mans particular caſe doth not alter the caſe a jot. For he that believes in generall, that many and they the greateſt company without compariſon, are inevitably ordained to deſtruction, and a few others unto ſalvation; is able out of theſe two generall propoſitions, to make theſe particular concluſions, and to reaſon thus with himſelfe; Either I am abſolutely choſen to grace and glory, or abſolutely caſt off from both, If I be choſen, I muſt of neceſſity believe and be ſaved; If I be caſt off I muſt as neceſſarily not believe and be damned, Therefore what need I take thought either way about meanes or end? My end is pitched in Heaven, and the meanes too, my finall perſeverance in faith and my ſalvation; or my continuance in unbeliefe and my damnation. If I lye under this neceſſity of believing, and being ſaved, or of dying in unbeliefe, and being damned, in vaine doe I trouble my ſelfe about meanes or end, I have my ſuperſedeas, I may take mine eaſe, and ſo I will, it is enough for me to ſit downe and waite what God will doe unto me.

And in this manner (it is to be feared) doe too many reaſon in their hearts, and by this very ground (though they will not perhaps acknowledge it) encourage themſelves to prophaneneſſe. Though men cannot hide their wickedneſſe, yet they will hide their grounds which fleſh them in it, either through modeſty, or to avoyde ſome farther ignominy. The foole hath ſaid in his heart there is no God: *Pſal.* 40. *Suetonius de Vita Tiberii c.* 69. *p.* 180. Saies of *Tiberius* that he was *circa Deos & religiones negligentior, quippe addictus Mathematicæ, perſuaſionibus plenus omnia fato agi.*

TWISSE

Conſideration.

I have already made anſwer to his objections after my maner; it remaines I conſider what he delivereth in debilitating thoſe anſwers which he takes in to conſideration.

1. This anſwer was made by our *Brittaine* Divines in the *Synod* of *Dort* upon the firſt Article, but ſo, as that they propoſed it not by it ſelfe alone, but joyntly with ſhewing that neither the Nature of our Doctrine doth any way prove any hinderance unto pietie; as formerly I have made mention therof.

Whereas he ſayth that *many of this* (our) *opinion are Godly men but that is no thankes to their opinion that they are ſo.* I anſwer, that neither doe we give the glory of our Godlineſſe to our good opinion, nor have cauſe to thanke it therefore; but we give God the Glory both of leading us into this truth amongſt many others, and for that Godlineſſe that is in us alſo. For we acknowledge that God is able to convict our conſciences of that trueth hereof, and yet refuſe to lead us thereby into any Holineſſe at all. Yet let every ſober man judge who are in a fairer way to true Holineſſe, or who are more likely to be in the ſtate of true Holineſſe, they that oppoſe the grace of God in working our wills to faith and repentance, or they that acknowledge it. They who maintaine that God of the meere pleaſure of his will, regenerates us, endueth us with the ſpirit of faith and repentance; or they who maintaine that God doth not give faith and repentance to whom he will. Neither is it the meaning of S^t *Paul* where he ſayeth God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth; but rather where he findes an abſolute diſpoſition or worke in one, which he finds not in an other. Againe conſider I pray indifferently, who are more likely to be partakers of Gods grace; they who truly magnifie it as the Author of their faith and repentance and of every good worke performed by them, and that in a preventing manner; or they that pretend to make Gods grace to be the Author of their faith and repentance and every good worke only by giving them power to believe, if they will (which we are able to prove both by the judgment of *Auſtin* and by cleare reaſon to be meere nature and not grace) and accordingly exhorting them to believe, and laſt of all concurring with them to the producing of the act of faith in them in caſe they will; And ſeeing grace proves effectuall only by this ſubſequent manner of operation; whether they doe not plainely mocke God in making him the Author of grace, ſeing in reſpect of this effectuall operation they might as well make him the Author of every ſinfull act as of every gratious act, For it is agreed on all hands that God concurres as well to every ſinfull act as any gratious act. Whereas he ſayth, *The true and naturall genius of our Tenet is to breed ſloth, and to drowne men in carnall ſecurity, and to countenance carnall libertie.* I anſwer theſe words of his are but wind, his reaſons I have already conſidered, and proved them to be of no weight. For they depend partly upon a vaine ſuppoſition, as if we maintained that God hath oppointed men unto Salvation though they live as they liſt, whereas our doctrine is directly contradictious here unto. For we teach that God ordaines no man of ripe yeares to obtaine Salvation *but by Sanctification of the ſpirit and faith of the truth* as we are plainly taught 2 *Theſſ.* 2. 13. And the Evangeliſt ſignifies as much, where he ſaieth. *As many believed as were ordained to Everlaſting Life. Act.* 13. 48. It may be as well ſaid that as many repented, as many gave themſelves to worke out their Salvation with feare and trembling to purge themſelues from all pollutions of fleſh and ſpirit, and to perfect Holineſſe in the feare of God, as were ordained to Salvation: partly becauſe we maintaine that God gives faith and repentance and regeneration to whom he will, that is only to thoſe whom he hath choſen, denying the ſame grace and that abſolutely; unto all others, which if it be not true; but that God doth grant it, or ordaine it according to mens workes, then we muſt all turne Pelagians, whom *Auſtin* calls *inimicos gratiæ Dei*; And in ſuch a caſe judge I pray whether it be poſſible that ſuch can be partakers of Gods grace, namely, if they are the enemies of Gods grace. Is

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it poſſible that he who partakes of Gods ſanctifying grace ſhould ſtand out in hoſtile oppoſition againſt it? Can we be at once both friends of the Bridegroom and enimies of his grace? Further conſider more particularly wherein doth this conſiſt, which he imputes unto us, *of drowning men in carnall ſecuritie*, is it in denying unto man any grace that he attributes unto him? Surely well we may deny unto every Reprobate ſuch a grace as he himſelfe hates, and impugnes to wit, grace effectually preventing the will, and making man to believe and repent, but if you ſcanne every particular of thoſe which he calleth grace, you ſhall find that we deny not any one of them unto Reprobates more then he doth. This perhaps may ſeeme ſtrange unto you; therefore it deſerves the more carefully to be conſidered; for I doubt not but to make it good. Grace ſubſequent is the only effectuall grace with them, and that conſiſts in Gods concurrence to the working of faith in the heart of man, if man will worke it in him ſelfe. Now dare they ſay we deny, this namely, Gods concourſe to the act of faith, whereas we maintaine with them that God concurres to every act, even to the moſt ſinfull act, that ever was committed ſince the world began; only we are a ſhamed to call this concurrence grace, becauſe it is found to have courſe as well in the producing of evill actions, as in the producing of good. So that if every man in the world ſhould believe, we deny not but that God ſhould concurre with him to the working of that belief, we profeſſe that if every Reprobate in the world will believe, God is ready to concurre with him to the act of that will of that belief. From the conſideration of their grace ſubſequent I ariſe to the conſideration of their grace prevenient, and that is two fold, one is the grace exciting, to wit, by morall admonition, ſuaſion, exhortation, This act we are willing to call and account a gratious act, & we doe as willingly acknowledge that God affords it unto all Reprobates (as well as to the elect) within the pale of the Church. For every one that appeares in any Congregation is equally exhorted to believe, to repent, to turne from their wicked wayes. So that hitherto we find no difference. We willingly acknowledge that Reprobates are partakers of theſe operations divine as well as the elect. One grace prevenient remaines, which is *habituall*, and which our adverſaries will have to be univerſall and it conſiſtes in a power to believe and repent, and to will any ſpirituall good whereunto they were excited, and accordingly they call it the enlivening of mans will. This I deliver by experience of what I have ſeen under the hands of ſome of them. Yet they will not acknowledge that all are regenerate; yet what is regeneration, but the infuſion of life ſpirituall, and that chiefly into the will; And they will have the will to be enlivened by grace, which cannot be ſpoken in reſpect of life naturall, therefore it muſt proceed of life ſpirituall, unleſſe they will deviſe a life intermediate between life naturall, and life ſpirituall. Some times they call it a power to believe if they will, and ſuch a power *Auſtin* acknowledgeth common to all, lib. 1. *Gen. ad liter*: cap 3. And juſtifies it in his *Retract*. lib. 16. Now this ſeemes ſomewhat ſtrange, conſidering the very regenerate have not ſuch ſtrength of goodneſſe, as whereby they are inabled to doe what good they would, as *Rom.* 7. 18. *To will is preſent with me but I find, not to performe that which is good. And Gal:* 5. 17. *The fleſh luſteth againſt the ſpirit, and the ſpirit againſt the fleſh, and theſe are contrary one to the other, ſo that ye cannot doe the ſame things that ye would.* To helpe this and to cleare *Auſtin* from contradiction to expreſſe Scripture in this; I find that *poſſe ſi velit* is one thing, *poſſe* ſimply delivered is another thing. And this I find diſtinguiſhed in that very place of *Auſtines Retractations*; For whereas as he had ſayd in that lib. 1. *de Gen. contr. Man.* cap 3. That, *Omnes homines poſſunt ſi velint*, both *credere*, and *ab amore viſibilium rerum & temporalium ſe ad Dei præcepta implenda convertere*. And comming to retract this, and perceiving what advantage the Pelagians might ſnatch hence for the countenancing of their cauſe, in extolling the power of nature, he wiſely prevents that by expounding himſelfe, and clearing his owne meaning thus. *Non exiſtiment novi hæretici Pelagiani ſecundum eos eſſe dictum*; manifeſting thereby that this was the Pelagian Tenet yet were they not to be blamed for this, but only becauſe they called not in Gods grace for further helpe then this, ſave only in the way of inſtruction. For *Auſtin* concurred with them ſtill in this particular even then when he wrote his books of *Retractations*, as there it followes in theſe words *Verum eſt enim omnino* (marke by this Emphaſis with what aſſurance of faith he delivered this) *Omnes homines hoc poſſe ſi velint*: Thus farre he goes along with them: but then marke wherin he goes beyond them in theſe words following; *Sed præparatur voluntas a Domino & tantum augetur munere charitatis ut poſſint*; When he ſayeth, *præparatur voluntas a Domino*,

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the effect thereof undoubtedly is *ut velint* which is the ſtate and condition of the regenerate, who yet may complaine that they cannot doe that which they would as the Apoſtle formerly ſignifies, that is that ſimply and effectually they have not yet power enough to what they will; therefore *Auſtin* addes to the preparation of the will, *ut velint*, an augmentation of ſtrength *ut poſſint*, ſaying *tantumq; augetur munere charitatis ut poſſint*; that is; not only to will that which is good, but ſo intenſely to will it, as to prevaile over the fleſh luſting againſt the ſpirit, whereby it comes, *ut non modo velint, ſed & poſſint*; and conſequently *& efficiant quod velint*. So that *poſſe ſimpliciter* doth include *velle*; and addes ſuch ſtrength thereto as now to goe on to the doing of that it wills without reſtraint from the fleſh. And that this *poſſe* is but an augmentation of the gratious diſpoſition of the will, appeares by the ſame *Auſtin de corrept. & gratia. cap. 11, Prima gratia eſt qua fit ut habeat homo juſtitiam ſi velit, ſecunda ergo plus poteſt, qua etiam fit ut velit, & tantum velit tanto q; ardore diligat, ut carnis voluntatem contraria concupiſcentem voluntate ſpiritus vincat.* The firſt grace is that whereby a man may have righteouſneſſe if he will, therfore the ſecond grace is of more power, as whereby a man is made to will and that in ſuch meaſure, as by the will of the ſpirit to overcome the will of the fleſh affecting that which is contrary thereunto. And in the very next chapter, c. 12. He calles this prevailing will, *Poſſe* ſimply, *Tantum ſpiritu ſancto accenditur voluntas eorum, ut ideo poſſint, quia ſic velint, & ideo velint, quia Deus ſic operatur ut velint*; Their will is in ſuch meaſure inflamed with the HolySpirit, that therfore they are able (to doe that which is good) becauſe they will in ſuch a meaſure, & therefore they will in ſuch a meaſure becauſe God ſo works as to make them willing in ſuch meaſure: *Auſtin* goes on in this manner *Nam ſi in tanta infirmitate vitæ hujus ipſis relinqueretur voluntas ſua, ut in adjutorio Dei manerent ſi vellent, nec Deus in iis operaretur ut vellent inter tot & tantas tentationes infirmitate ſua voluntas ipſa ſuccumberet, & ideo perſeverare non poſſent, quia deficientes infirmitate nec vellent, aut non ita vellent infirmitate voluntatis ut poſſent.* For if in ſo great infirmitie of this life, their will were left unto thē, that in the helpe of God they might continue if they would, & God ſhould not work in them that they would, amongſt ſo many and ſo great tentations, this will it ſelfe would ſinke (under the burthen of them) and therefore could not perſevere, becauſe failing through infirmity they would not, or (at leaſt) they would not in ſuch a meaſure, through the wills infirmity, as to be able to ſtand. So that *poſſe ſimpliciter* ſtill with *Auſtin* includes the will, and is a denomination of the will, ariſing from the ſtrength of it prevailing above the fleſh, luſting to the contrary. In like ſort *Honorius Auguſtodunenſis de prædeſt. & lib. arbit*: diverſe times aſcribes *poſſe* to grace ſubſequent, like as he aſcribes *velle* to grace prevenient, as when he ſayth; *Deus operatur in electis ſuis ſua gratia præveniendo velle, & ſubſequendo poſſe.* And againe, *gratiam accipimus, cum nos Deus prævenit, ut velimus, & ſubſequitur ut poſſimus.* And againe *Gratia Dei prævenit ut bonum quod ſprevit cupiat, & ſequitur ut illud implere prævaleat.* So that in effect this *poſſe* comes to be all one with *agere* or *perficere quod volumus*. For when we not only will that which is good, but ſo affectionately will it, as to prevaile over the fleſh luſting againſt it, all inward impediments being thus maſtered, the perfecting of that we will muſt needes follow. But as for that *poſſe ſi velint*, this goes before the willing of it And I ſee no reaſon to the contrary but that we may with *Auſtin* acknowledge ſuch a power common to all; which in the diſputations between *Auſtin* and *Pelagius* was called *poſſibilitas agendi quod bonum eſt*; and *Auſtin* was ſo farre from excepting againſt it as maintained by *Pelagius*, that more then once; he profeſſeth, that in caſe like as he acknowledged *poſſe* to be from God, ſo he would acknowledge *velle* and *agere* to be from God he ſhould be received for a good Catholique in this, by *Auſtins* judgment. I will cite a paſſage or two out of *Auſtin* expreſly ſignifying this, & that out of his booke *de gratia Chriſti, contra Pelag: & Cæleſt:* The firſt is cap 6. *Pelagius* his words are theſe. *Qui ipſius voluntatis & operis poſſibilitatem dedit* whereupon *Auſtin* writeth thus *Hanc autem poſſibilitatem in natura eum ponere, de verbis ejus ſuperioribus clarum eſt. Sed ne nihil de gratia dixiſſe videretur, adjunxit, Quiq; ipſam poſſibilitatem gratiæ ſuæ adjuvat ſemper auxilio; non ait, ipſam voluntatem vel ipſam operationem, quod ſi diceret, non abhorrere a doctrina Apoſtolica videretur*: as much as to ſay, did he acknowledge this he ſhould be a good Catholique; Now *ad juvare voluntatem & operationem*, in *Auſtins* phraſe is effectually, *operari ut velit & operetur homo quod bonum eſt*; as appeares by that which followeth. *Sed ait* (to wit *Pelagius*) *ipſam poſſibilitatem illud videlicet ex tribus quod in natura locavit gratiæ ſuæ adjuvat ſemper auxilio.* Now marke *Auſtins* interpretation of him thus, *ut ſcilicet in voluntate & actione non ideo laus ſit Dei & hominis quia ſic vult homo, ut tamen ejus voluntati*

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luntati Deus ardorem dilectionis inſpiret; ſo that *adjuvare voluntatem* in *Auſtins* phraſe, is *inſpirare voluntati dilectationis ardorem*. So then I ſee no reaſon, but that wee may well grant unto our adverſaries, that all men have a power to believe if they will, and from the *love of temporall things, to convert themſelves to the keeping of Gods commandements*; But this is meere nature in *Auſtins* judgement; for he calls it in that very chapter, *naturalem poſſibilitatem*, and cap. 47. coming to an iſſue: *Si ergo conſenſerit nobis, non ſolam poſſibilitatem, ſed ipſam quoque voluntatem & actionem divinitus adjuvari, & ſic adjuvari, ut ſine ullo adjutorio nihil bene velimus & agamus, eamq; eſſe gratiam Dei per Jeſum Chriſtum, nihil de adjutorio gratiæ Dei, quantum arbitror, inter nos controverſiæ relinquetur*. And indeed to ſay that a man hath power to believe and repent if he will; this is not to maintaine any univerſall grace otherwiſe; then as nature may be called grace. For grace is goodneſſe, but goodneſſe doth not conſiſt in a power to do good if we will; but it is an habituall diſpoſing of the will to that which is good only, how much more is it ſo of grace which we count ſupernaturall goodneſſe. Neither is the maintenance of ſuch a power to doe good, any contradiction to holy Scripture, teſtifying that *Men cannot believe, cannot repent, cannot pleaſe God, cannot be ſubject to the law of God, cannot doe good*; For, this impotency is only morall, and the ſubject of this impotency is only the will and it conſiſts in the corruption thereof, being wholly turned away from God, and converted to the creature in an inordinate manner; *Enemies and ſtrangers from God, their minds being ſet on evill things. Col.* 1.21. And to ſay *that a man can believe if he will, can from the love of viſible and temporall things, convert himſelfe to the obſervation of Gods precepts if he will*, which *Auſtin* in his latter daies, even then when he wrote his Retractations, profeſſeth to be true *omninò*. And in his Book *ad Marcellinum De Spiritu & litera. cap.* 31. Profeſſeth it an abſurd thing to deny this namely, that every one may believe if he will. *Vide nunc utrum quiſq; credat ſi noluerit aut non credat ſi voluerit. Quod ſi abſurdum eſt &c.* And *cap.* 32. *Cum ergo fides in poteſtate ſit, quoniam cum vult quiſq; credit, & cum credit volens credit*. I ſay to affirme this (namely that a man can believe if he will) is no more then to ſay, that a dead man can ſpeake if he were alive. For as the Scripture teacheth, that all men are dead in ſinne, 'till the ſpirit of regeneration comes to breath into our hearts, the breath of a ſpirituall life; So this deadneſſe is to be found no where ſo much, as in the will. And therefore *Aquinas* profeſſeth, that a man is more corrupt, *quoad appetitum boni*, then *quoad intellectum veri*. The Heathen could profeſſe, *Video meliora proboq; deteriora ſequor*. And in my experience I find that Arminians doe not ſatisfie themſelves with this univerſality of grace, as to ſay, *A man can doe good if he will*, unleſſe they adde, that alſo *poteſt velle*; as I have obſerved in *Corvinus*. Aud thoſe whom I have in private been acquainted with doe not reſt in this, that *All men can believe if they will*, but they ſay alſo, that by univerſall grace, the will is enlivened, as I have ſeen under their hands, and thereby enabled to the willing of any ſpirituall good, whereto they ſhall be excited. So that if they reſted here, to wit, in ſaying, that by univerſall grace all men may believe if they will, there is no grace acknowledged by them, tending to the furtherance of the good of mankind, but we acknowledge it as well as they, and make the extenſion of it as large as they. And therefore the more vaine and voyd of all reaſon is their pretence, that we for want of acknowledging ſuch an univerſality of grace as they doe, *doe drowne men in carnall ſecurity, and countenance carnall liberty*. Only though we grant the reality of that which they maintaine, yet we deny that it deſerves to be called grace, as touching the firſt prevenient grace as they call it, which we with *Auſtin* ſay deſerves to be called nature rather then grace, as we ſpeake of grace, to wit, as diſtinct from nature, and indeed ſupernaturall. And as for grace ſubſequent, that conſiſting only in concourſe, we deny that to be grace; for as much as Gods concourſe is granted as well to any ſinfull act, as to any gracious act, as now adaies is commonly acknowledged on all ſides. But as for the enlivening of all mens wills, *and enabling them to will any ſpirituall good whereto they ſhall be excited* (for this is their very forme of words) we utterly deny this, and are ready to demonſtrate the unreaſonableneſſe thereof. For firſt ſeeing this cannot be underſtood of life naturall but of life ſpirituall, it followeth that all men by this doctrine are regenerated; and as they confeſſe this diſpoſition continues in all unto death, ſo it followeth, that all and every one ſhould dye in the ſtate of regeneration alſo: Secondly, ſeeing there are but three ſorts of qualities in the ſoule of a reaſonable creature, as *Ariſtotle* hath obſerved, to wit, powers, paſſions, and habits; it followeth that this enlivening of the will muſt conſiſt,

either in giving it new powers, or new paſſions, or new habits, which it had not before. But neither of theſe can be affirmed with any ſobriety, neither doe I find that they look to be called to any ſuch account, but in their aëriall contemplations of Gods attributes, eſpecially of his *mercy and juſtice*, ſhaped at pleaſure, doe conceive hand over head, that ſuch an enlivening there muſt be of the will of man in all, without troubling themſelves to enquire wherein it conſiſts. But let us proceed in our triall of the ſoundneſſe of it, by the touch-ſtone of rationall and Chriſtian diſcourſe. Firſt therefore, I ſay it can be no new power infuſed into the will by this enlivening; For the will it ſelfe is a power; and it was never heard that *potentia* can be *ſubjectum potentiæ*, a power can be the ſubject of a power; and that a power ſhould be in a power, as an accident in the ſubject thereof. Rationall powers are but two, the power of underſtanding, and the power of willing, and both theſe are naturall, following *ex principiis ſpeciei*, from the very nature of the humane ſoule, as all confeſſe. But ſome may ſay, are there not ſupernaturall powers beſtowed on man as well as naturall? I anſwer, theſe ſupernaturall powers, are but the elevating of the naturall powers unto ſupernaturall objects; as the underſtanding by enlightning it, and the will by ſanctifying it. Never was it ſaid, I preſume, that a man regenerate had two underſtandings in him, by the one to underſtand things naturall, and by the other to underſtand things ſpirituall; but that by the ſame underſtanding he underſtands both, but by light of nature the one, by light of grace the other. The holy Ghoſt ſaith, *That they who are accuſtomed to doe evill, can no more doe good, then a Blackemore can change his skinne, and a Leopard his ſpots*: Yet when men of evill become good, they get not new powers properly, but new diſpoſitions rather of their naturall powers, which we call habits, and may be called morall powers, but not of indifferency to doe good or evill, ſuch as the naturall power of the will is, but ſuch as whereby is wrought in the will, a good likeing of that which is good, an abhorring of that which is evill; ſo that indeed theſe morall powers doe not make the will able to will, but rather actually willing of that which is good in generall, which generall willingneſſe is ſpecified according to objects preſent, and opportunities offered of doing good in one kind rather then another. Like as juſtice makes a man willing unto juſt actions, which willingneſſe is exerciſed this way or that way, according to emergent occaſions. Secondly, no new paſſions are given by this enlivening of the will; well our paſſions may be ordered aright, both touching their objects, and touching the ſeaſon, and touching the meaſure, & touching the rule of them; and in reſpect of this gracious ordering of them, they may be called new; like as a man regenerate is called a new man, though as he hath the ſame members of his body, nor more nor leſſe, ſo he hath ſtill the ſame faculties and paſſions of the ſoule, no more nor no leſſe; but theſe faculties are better ſeaſoned, theſe paſſions are better ordered, and in like ſort, theſe members of the body, are better employed then they were before; before they were made *weapons of unrighteouſneſſe unto ſinne*, now they are made, *weapons of righteouſneſſe unto God. Rom.6.13.* Thirdly, let us enquire whether by this pretended enlivening of the will common to all men, there are any new habits engendred. For that is the moſt probable. And ſo we commonly ſay that in regeneration, beſides the receiving of the ſpirit of God to dwell in our hearts, which is a great miſtery, there are certaine habits whereby our naturall powers are elevated unto ſupernaturall objects, and thereby fitted to performe ſupernaturall acts; and theſe are but three, (and accordingly but three ſorts of ſupernatuall acts) and commonly accounted the three Theologicall vertues, *Faith*, *Hope*, and *Charity*; And all morall vertues, which for the ſubſtance of them, in reference to their acts whereby they are acquired, and which they doe bring forth, are found in naturall men, doe become Chriſtian graces, as they are ſanctified by theſe three, and as their actions doe proceed from theſe. By faith we apprehend things beyond the compaſſe of reaſon, by hope we wait for the enjoying of ſuch things, which neither eye hath ſeen, &c. And by charity, we love God (whom yet we have not ſeene) even to the contempt of our ſelves. Now I preſume they will not ſay that theſe *habits of Faith, Hope, and Charity*, are beſtowed upon all and every one, by that fained univerſall grace of theirs. And what other habits they doe or can deviſe, I have had as yet no experience, neither am I able to comprehend. And indeed faith doth not leave a man in indifferency to believe or no; nor hope to wait, or no; nor charity to love God, or no: but they doe all diſpoſe the heart of man to believe only, to wait upon God only, to love God only; they being

being the curing of infidelity, and despaire, & hatred of God, or rather the removing of them, yet but in part, as regeneration in this life is but in part, there being still a flesh in us lusting against the spirit. *Gal.*5.17. Thus we may maintaine, that albeit every man hath power to believe if he will, and repent if he will, a will to believe and a will to repent being the greatest worke in the work of grace, I meane the renovation of the will, and making it willing to that which is good, though it requires strength also to master the lusting of the flesh, whereby it growes simply and absolutely potent to doe every good thing, without any effectuall impediment from within, yet nevertheless, till this renovation be wrought by the hand of God, we may well say there is an utter impotency morall to doe any thing that is good and pleasing in the sight of God, whereby *they cannot believe, they cannot repent, they cannot be subject to the law of God,* And if to Preach this doctrine be *to breed sloth, to drowne men in carnall security, and to countenance carnall liberty*; then our Saviour did breed sloth &c. when he told his hearers plainly, *He that is of God heareth Gods words, ye therefore heare them not, because ye are not of God, Ioh.*8.47. As likewise when he Preached unto them in this maner. *No man can come to me, except the Father which sent me draw him. Ioh.* 6.44. And the Evangelist also in saying, *He hath blinded their eyes, and hardned their hearts, that they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their hearts, and should be converted, and I should heale them. Ioh.* 12.40. And none more then *Moses*, when he tells the people of Israel in the Wilderness, saying, *Ye have seen all that the Lord did before your eyes in the land of Egypt, unto Pharaoh and unto all his servants, and to all his land. The great temptations which thine eyes have seen, those great miracles and wonders, yet the Lord hath not given you an heart to perceive, and eyes to see, and eares to heare unto this day.* Yet this Author confesseth that our Saviours hearers, and *Moses* his hearers, *many of them might be Godly men; but no thankes to this doctrine of theirs that they were so (the true and naturall genius whereof* (to wit, of Christs doctrine and *Moses* his doctrine, for it is apparent, that it is the same with ours in this particular we now speake of) *is to breed sloth, to drowne men in carnall security, and to countenance carnall liberty) but to some thing else, either to Gods providence who will not suffer this Doctrine (for his own glory and the good of men) to have any great stroake in their lives; or to mens incogitancy, who think not of reducing it, ad praxim, or drawing conclusions out of it, but rest in the naked speculation of it, as they doe of many others; or lastly to some good practicall conclusions, which they meet with in Gods word, and apply to their lives (as they doe not the former deductions) such as these are. Be ye holy as I am holy: without holinesse no man shall see God: Speciatum admissi risum teneatis amici?* Yet I pray restraine that, and give your sorrow course rather in beholding such prophane aspersions cast upon the holy Doctrine of Christ, his Prophets and Apostles; as if thereby sloth were bred, and men drowned in carnall security, and carnall liberty countenanced. We are of another mind, for Wisedome is justified of her Children; we observe the wisedome of God herein to prevent the greatest illusions of Satan; and such Doctrines as stand in most opposition unto grace. The morality of Heathen men was admirable; yet were it farre greater, we conceive no greater opposition unto grace, then to look for justification by it. In the next place, we conceive there is no greater opposition unto grace, then for a man to arrogate unto himselfe, ability to doe that which is pleasing in the sight of God. Our Saviour hath said. *Iohn* 15. 4. that, *As the branch cannot beare fruit of it selfe, except it abide in the Vine, so neither can wee except we abide in him.* So that either all the World must be engrafted into Christ or else it is not possible they should bring forth sweet grapes. Yet these men will have all and every one, to have their wills enlivened and enabled to will any spirituall good, whereby they shall be excited. Is this doctrine of theirs fit to humble them, and not rather to puffe them up with a conceit of their own sufficiency? Is not our doctrine farre more fit to humble us, and to what other end tendeth that of *Moses*, *The Lord hath not given you an heart to perceive, eyes to see, and eares to heare unto this day*, But to beat them out of the conceit of any sufficiency in them, to profit either by Gods word, or by his works, so as to be drawn thereby to doe any thing that was pleasing in the sight of God; and can there be any true holinesse where humility is wanting? Againe, they are only thankfull unto God for giving them power to believe, to repent, and for exciting them hereunto; and concurring with them to the act of faith and repentance, for they acknowledge no other grace but this; We are bound by our doctrine to be thankfull, not only for these operations, but also for *causing us to walke in his statutes, to keepe his judgements and doe them, for healing our wayes, our back-slidings, our Rebellions*, they by their

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Doctrine, are bound to be thankfull unto God, for no other grace in the way of grace prevenient, then ſuch as he vouchſafeth to reprobates, and did vouchſafe to *Cain*, to *Judas*, and to the Divells themſelves; how is it that they are not ſtricken with feare, leaſt in this caſe their condition be no better, then the conditio u of reprobates though God in good time may provide better things for them, then their opinions have any congruity unto, having courſe only to the obſcuring and defacing of Gods grace? We by our doctrine are bound to give God thanks for ruling us with a mighty hand, and making us to paſſe under the rod, and bringing us unto the bond of the Covenant; for taking away our ſtony heart, and giving us an heart of fleſh; for circumciſing our hearts to love him with all our heart; for raiſing us out of the dead, when he found us dead in ſinne; for working in us both the will, and the deed of every good worke, not according to any thing in us, but according to his good pleaſure: And this is ſo farre from breeding ſloth in us, or to drowne us in carnall ſecurity in the Apoſtles judgement as that upon this very ground, as by a forceable inducement he exhorts us *to worke out our Salvation with feare and trembling*, manifeſtly implying, that when men are of another opinion, as namely to thinke that *the will and deed of any good thing is their owne worke*, or if they doe acknowledge it to be Gods work, yet if they doe not acknowledge it to be wrought by God, *according to his good pleaſure*, but according to ſome diſpoſition whereby they diſpoſe themſelves thereunto; that is the high-way to make them carnally ſecure, and how but by a carnall confidence that they have power to turne to God when they liſt, to believe and repent when they will, and withall that their wills are as pliable to good as to evill, and ſo make it an eaſy mater at any time to turne to God. I appeale to the judgment of every ſober conſcience to judge betweene us which of our Doctrines moſt tends to the countenancing of carnall ſecurity, according to the Tenor of the Apoſtles exhortation in this place and that in coherence with the reaſon whereby he doth enforce it, theirs, or ours. But to proceed, they acknowledge Chriſt to have merited for them only a power to believe and repent and meanes to excite them hereunto, and concourſe divine to the act of believing and repenting in caſe they will; we acknowledge not only all this, but over and above that Chriſt hath merited for us, the working of our wills effectually and predominantly hereunto, and that God makes us perfect to every good worke, working in us that which is pleaſing in his ſight through Jeſus Chriſt. Nay what will you ſay, if the Remonſtrants now a dayes openly profeſſe, that Chriſt merited not for any man faith and regeneration, and I commend them for their ingenuity, in dealing fairly and plainly confeſſing that which their opinion doth manifeſtly drive unto. Laſtly we confeſſe that God hath power as to *ſhew mercy on whom he will, and harden whom he will*, ſo to make whom he will a veſſell of mercy, and whom he will a veſſell of wrath, this we clearely profeſſe, namely, that God hath ſuch power even over our ſelves, and our childeren and all thoſe that are neere and deare unto us, as over any others: But this theſe adverſaries of ours now a days utterly deny; now I pray conſider whoſe doctrine ſavoreth of greater holineſſe in acknowledging the ſoveraignty of God over his creatures, theirs or ours? But it will not be labour loſt altogether to conſider thoſe cauſes whereunto he is pleaſed to impute that Godlineſſe, which is found in us. The firſt is Gods providence; and indeed I find them liberall enough in acknowledging Gods providence in generall termes, and as forward to blaſt it when they come to particulars. Now as for that providence which is the cauſe of Godlineſſe, we like plaine fellowes comonly call it grace, and the ground of this Authors ſubtility in calling it providence and not grace, I comprehend not. But what is that operation of providence divine or grace which is the cauſe of Godlineſſe? Is it any other in his opinion then that univerſall grace whereby they have power to be Godly and which grace God affords unto Reprobates, and that exciting grace whereby God perſwades them to be Godly, and his readineſſe to concurre to any act of Godlineſſe in caſe we will: and is not all this afforded (in his opinion) to Reprobates as well as to the elect, to them that have no Godlineſſe at all in them, as to them that have? And why may not this doctrine of ours wherby we maintaine, that *God workes in us both the will and the deed according to his goodpleaſure*, be a meanes to make us ſet our ſelves to the *working out of our Salvation with feare and trembling*, conſidering that the Apoſtle profeſſeth this doctrine of Gods energeticall operation of every good thing in us as a ſtrong inducement to worke out our Salvation with feare and trembling; and wherein conſiſts

Ezek. 20. 37.
Ezek. 37.
Deut. 30. 6.
Eph. 2.
Phil. 2. 13.

Heb. 13. 21.

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any mans Godlineſſe if not in this, to wit, in working out his Salvation with feare and trembling? And is it not apparent that we maintaine this doctrine. namely, that God is he who workes in us both the will and the deed, and every good thing, and that according to his good pleaſure in farre more undoubted manner then they doe. And how can it appeare that they doe acknowledge this? To give us power to will that which i good (which is the effect of that univerſall grace they talke of) is this to worke in us either the will or the deed? To excite us by perſwaſion and exhortation to will & doe that which is good, to believe and to repent, is to worke either in us the will or deed of that which is good, of faith of repentance? Laſtly to be ready to concurre with us to the will or deed of faith and repentance if ſo be we will concurre with him to the ſame, or to concurre with us to the producing of the act of willing & the act of doing that which is good, in caſe we produce the ſame act of willing and doing that which is good, is this to worke in us both the will and the deed? Conſider I pray is it not true that God is as ready to concurre with us to any ſinfull act, in caſe we will concurre with him; and doth he not concurre with man to the produceing of any ſinfull act, in caſe man at that time doth produce it; And will any ſober man ſay that this is alſo for God to worke in him both the will and the deed of every ſinfull act? And why might we not ſay ſo, if God workes it only by concourſe? Laſtly to worke in us both the will and the deed provided that man will concurre to the working hereof not otherwiſe, is this to worke it according to his good pleaſure, and not rather according to mans good pleaſure? And how I pray, or in what ſence doth he ſay that God by his providence will not ſuffer this doctrine to have any ſtroke in our lives? For if he ſuffers it not, then he hinders it; let it therefore be made appeare how he hinders it; To concurre with us, if we will concurre with him in the producing of any act of Godlineſſe, is this to hinder our carnall ſecurity? If ſo then to concurre with us to the producing of any ſinfull act is to hinder our Godlineſſe. Surely to give power whereby men are enabled to doe any ſpirituall good if they will is not to hinder carnall ſecurity, for ſuch a power is given to all by univerſall grace, yet this doth nothing hinder the carnall ſecurity of many thouſands. Or doth he hinder it by exciting us to the contrary? Yet if this doctrine (as we conceive) be apt to drowne us in carnall ſecurity, how can he be ſayd to hinder us from it? For either the doctrine muſt yeeld to ſuch excitations & exhortations from carnall ſecurity; or ſuch exhortations muſt yeeld to the doctrine, eſpecially conſidering what *Auſtin* ſayth, that if there be any difference betweene *docere* and *ſuadere* or *exhortari*; yet even this *doctrinæ generalitate comprehenditur*. And for incogitancy, which is a ſecond device, pretended as the cauſe why this doctrine doth not expoſe us to carnality, is it not incredible, theſe poynts being ſo much ventilated by them as none more? The Church of God having been exerciſed with none more (as I think) theſe hundred yeares; that men ſhould not think of, or conſider of thoſe dangerous conſequences in manners, as theſe doe forge in their own braines. And as for the laſt, imputing our Godlineſſe to ſome good practicall concluſions; may I not juſtly ſay, that if ever any man wrote with the ſpirit of giddineſſe, this Author deſerves to have a chiefe place amongſt them: For compare his anſwer to the ſecond objection with this; There he ſaith ſuch diſſolute concluſions as theſe following, doe ariſe out of this doctrine of ours: *If I be choſen, I muſt of neceſſity believe and be ſaved; If I be caſt off, I muſt as neceſſarily not believe and be damned; what need I therefore take thought either way about meanes or end.* Now will it not as well follow, *what need I therefore take thought of holineſſe, of obedience?* For even theſe are as good practicall concluſions. *Believe and thou ſhalt be ſaved. Repent and thou ſhalt be ſaved, and whoſoever believeth not ſhall be damned.* As theſe, *Be ye holy as I am holy. Without holineſſe no man ſhall ſee God. If ye conſent and obey, ye ſhall eate the good things of the Land.* And by the way obſerve I pray, with what judgement he calls them practicall concluſions; whereas all ſave two of them, are exhortations rather then concluſions; And thoſe two; to wit, *Without holineſſe no man ſhall ſee God*, and, *Godlineſſe hath the promiſes, both of this life &c.* I ſhould take them to be principles rather then concluſions. Whether ſimple men doe *apply their braines to ponder and conſider this doctrine or no*, I know not; but certainly the learned and Godly maintainers of it, have had cauſe enough to ponder it, and conſider it throughly, and have given evidence enough of their thorough conſideration of it; yet have they fetcht no ſuch ſequells out of it. If ſimple men doe, and our adverſaries be of the number of them, and content themſelves with ſuch ſimplicity; yet is it not

enough for us that the Apoſtle doth not? the holy Apoſtle S. *Paul*? but expreſſely enforceth the contrary there from; namely; *that becauſe of God worketh in us the will and the deed according to his good pleaſure, therefore it becomes us to worke out our Salvation with feare and trembling*? Now which of us doe moſt exactly concurre with the Apoſtle in mainning *that God doth worke in us both the will and the deed according to his good pleaſure*, I am very well content, that all the World both wiſe and ſimple, both Learned and unlearned may judge.

2. As touching the ſecond; Firſt let us conſider how the objection is ſhaped. Secondly, as it lies, with what judgement and ſobriety it is impugned.

1. It is true men are abſolutely elected or abſolutely rejected; but we content not our ſelves with generalities, wherein as *Ariſtotle* hath obſerved, doe lurke many equivocations: Neither doe we delight in confounding things that differ. Election and rejection or reprobation, and in generall the will of God, may be conſidered, either *Quoad actum voluntis*, as touching the act of God willing, or as touching the things willed. Of this diſtinction this Author takes no notice; It is fit for ſome and advantagious to fiſh in troubled waters. Now as touching the act of God willing; both *Aquinas* hath proved, that there can be no cauſe thereof; and withall profeſſeth, that never was any ſo mad as to ſay *That merites can be the cauſe of predeſtination, quoad actum prædeſtinantis*, as touching the act of God predeſtinating. And *Bradwardine* hath curiouſly diſputed this way that no will of God is conditionall, to will *quoad actum volentis*, And *Piſcator* againſt *Vorſtius* hath proved the ſame after his way; and by variety of demonſtration this way may be convinced, as in part I have ſhewed in this diſcourſe, both on the part of election, and on the part of reprobation. And both Dr *Jackſon* in his booke of *Providence*, profeſſeth that the diſtinction of *Voluntas antecedens* and *conſequens*, or antecedent and conſequent will in God is to be underſtood *quoad res volitas* as touching the things willed, as much as to ſay, *non quoad actum volentis*. And *Gerardus Voſſius* drawing the diſtinction of will antecedent and will conſequent unto the diſtinction of will abſolute and will conditionall, applyes it only *quoad res volitas*, and ſo interpriteth Fathers diſcourſe thereof; And of a conditionall will gives this inſtance; *God will have men to be Saved, in caſe they believe* where faith is clearely made the condition of Salvation, a temporall thing the condition of a temporall thing, not the condition of Gods will to ſave; it being no way fit that a temporall thing ſhould be made the condition of a thing eternall, ſuch as is Gods will to ſave. And this is more apparent by the reading of *Voſſius* himſelfe. Hiſtor: Pelag: l:7. treating of Gods will to ſave all. Now if we ſpeake thus of Gods will *quoad res volitas* as touching the *things willed*; theſe things willed being very different, wee have reaſon to conſider them diſtinctly alſo. Now theſe things are either grace or glory cõmonly called Salvation, And as touching grace, to wit, the grace of regeneration, the grace of faith and repentannee, we willingly confeſſe that Gods will to conferre them is ſo abſolute, that he hath determined to conferre them according to the meere pleaſure of his will, not according to mans workes (which is plaine Pelagianiſme and condemned in the Synod of *Paleſtine* above 1200 yeares agoe) and as he gives them to whom he will, ſo he denyes them to whom he will according to that *Rom. 9. 18. He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth*. But as touching Salvation or damnation in which reſpect this Author uſually ſpeakes of the abſolute or conditionall will of God; we uttererly deny, that God in the diſpenſation or adminiſtration, or execution of theſe proceeds or ever did decree to proceed according to the meere pleaſure of his owne will, but altogether according to theire workes. For albeit God hath made no law according whereto he meanes to proceed in giving or denying grace, yet hath he made a law according whereto he proceeds in beſtowing Salvation, and inflicting damnation. And the law is this: *Whoſever believeth ſhall be Saved, Whoſoever believeth not ſhall bedamned 2 Cor. 5. 10. We muſt all appeare before the Judgement Seate of Chriſt, that every man may receive the things, which are done in his body according to that he hath done, whether good or evill*. So that according to that ſence wherein this Author uſually ſpeakes of the abſolute and conditionall will of God, we utterly deny that God doth abſolutely elect any man to Salvation, or reject any man unto damnation; though he doth abſolutely elect ſome unto grace, that is to the grace of regeneration; to the grace of faith and repentance, and abſolutely reject others there from. For as much as he beſtowes theſe graces on ſome and denies them unto others not according to their workes, but according to the meere pleaſure

Hiſtor. hær. Pelag. l.7. th.2.p.638.

ſure of his owne will; but he doth not inflict damnaton or beſtow Salvation according to the meere pleaſure of his will, but according unto mans works. And as he carrieth himſelfe in the execution of Salvation and damnation, after the ſame manner he did from everlaſting decree to carry himſelfe, namely to Save no man of ripe yeares but by way of reward of their faith, repentance, and good workes; ſo to damne none but for their infidelity, impenitency and evill works. As for the manifeſtation of Gods will of election and reprobation unto any, we ſay, that ordinarily, man may be aſſured of his election. For the ſpirit of God is given to this very end *even to ſhed the love of God in our hearts*, that is, Gods love towards us. *Rom*: 5. 5. And what is the ſhedding therefore in our hearts, but his working in us a ſenſe and feeling thereof, eſpecially conſidering that the ſence of Gods love to us is the cauſe of our love to wards God; according to that 1 *John*. 4. 19. *We love him becauſe he loved us firſt*: and accordingly *the ſpirit* is ſayd *to teſtifie unto our ſpirits that we are the ſonnes Rom*. 8. And *if ſonnes then heyres, even heyres of God, and heyres annexed with Chriſt*. And the Apoſtle S^t *Peter* exhorts us *to give diligence te make our election & vocation ſure*; implying ma- 2 Pet. 1.
nifeſtly that men may be ſure of their election; otherwiſe why ſhould our Saviour wiſh his Diſciples to rejoyce not in this *that Divells were ſubdued unto them, but that their names* Luk. 10. 20.
were writen in Heaven. And by what meanes may a man be aſſured hereof, but either immediatly by the teſtimony of the ſpirit, or mediatly by the fruits of the ſpirit as the fruits of our election; one where of is faith plainly ſo ſignified *Act*, 13. 48. *As many believed as were ordained to everlaſting Life*. And *Act*. 2. laſt. *God added daily to the Church ſuch as ſhould be Saved*; And repentance is another: *Act*. 11. 18. *Then hath God unto the Gentiles alſo given repentance unto life*. Giving to underſtand that as many as to whom God giveth repentance, he hath ordained them unto life. And indeed by the worke of our faith, and labour of our love, and the patience of our hope, others come to be aſſured of our election (how much more our ſelves, no man knowing the things of mā ſo as the ſpirit of man 1 *Cor*: 2.) Thus S^t *Paul* profeſſeth his aſſurance of the election of the *Theſſalonians* 1 *Theſſ*. 1. 3, 4. *We remember the worke of your faith, and the labour of your love &c. Knowing beloved bretheren that ye are elect of God*. And hereupon he proceeds to aſſure them, that Antichriſt *by all his deceiveableneſſe of unrighteouſneſſe ſhall never prevaile over them*; in as much as he prevailes only over them that periſh 2 *Theſſ*: 2. 10. But as for them they are the elect of God; And how doth he know that? Surely by their faith and ſanctification which were viſible in them v: 13. *But we ought to give God thankes allwayes for you, bretheren beloved of the Lord, becauſe that God hath from the begining choſen you unto Salvation by ſanctification of the ſpirit and faith of the truth*. But as for reprobation we ſay that no man can by any ordinary way be aſſured thereof, ſeing nothing but finall perſeverance in infidelity or impenitency is the infallible ſigne thereof, whence it followes that no way of deſperation is open to one, but the way of aſſurance and abundance of conſolation is opened to the other, and thereby encouragement to proceed cheerefully in the wayes of Godlineſſe, being aſſured that the more holy they are the greater ſhall be their reward. And ſurely if certainty of ſalvation were a meanes of licentiouſneſſe, the Apoſtle S. *Peter* would never have exhorted us, *to give* 2 Pet. 1. 10.
diligence to make our calling and election ſure. And we manifeſtly ſeem to perceive ſtrength of encouragement hereby unto Godlineſſe; as being aſſured that Chriſt dyed for us, to the end we might live unto him. And God receives us as Sonnes and Daughters to this end, *that we ſhould purge our ſelves from all pollutions of fleſh and ſpirit, and perfect holineſſe* 2 Cor. 7. 1.
in the feare of God. As alſo being aſſured, that God will not lay our infirmities and & 6. laſt.
ſinnes unto our charge, and will be ready to keepe us from preſumptuous ſinnes, and however it fares with us, *Yet ſinne ſhall not have dominion over us*, (and conſequently we ſhall have the victory over it, either by obedience, or by repentance) becauſe we are not under the law but under grace. *Rom*. 6. 12. Now what encouragement is this to the Souldiers of Chriſt, to goe on chearefully and couragiouſly in fighting the Lords battailes againſt the world, the fleſh and the Divell, ſeing we are aſſured the day of victory and the glory of it ſhall be ours in the end: *God keeping us by his power through faith unto Salvation* 1 *Pet*. 1. *And delivering us from every evill worke* (to wit either by obedience or by repentance) *and preſerving us to his heavenly kingdome*; and that either, *by delivering us from the houre of tentation which comes all over the world Revel*: 3. *Or delivering us out of it* 2 *Pet*: 2. 9. Or having an eye to our ſtrength ſo to order it that we ſhall be able to beare it 1 *Cor*: 10. 14. As for thoſe that have not yet any comfortable evidence of their election; yea conſidering that they may have it, and albeit the number of

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the elect are by farre, fewer then the reprobate; yet conſidering how few have the Goſpell in compariſon, to thoſe that enjoy it not; though Turkes & Saracens and Heathens are without hope *Eph.* 2. 12. and 1 *Theſſ.* 4. 15. Yet we Chriſtians are not yea, albeit *of them that are called, but few are choſen Mat.* 20. 16. and 22, 14. Yet conſidering how many corrupt wayes there are amongſt Chriſtians, Neſtorians, Armenians, Abyſſines or Coptites, who joyne circumciſion with the Goſpel, as in *Egypt* and *Ethiopia*, (the *Greek* Church denying the proceeding of the Holy Ghoſt from the ſonne) and corrupted with many other ſuperſtitions. Laſtly conſidering how farre Antichriſtanity is ſpred and the abominable Idolatry of the Church of *Rome*, we whom God hath delivered out of *Babylon* have no cauſe (I meane any particular perſon) to project, that becauſe the elect are but few, therefore we are not of the number of them, and thereupon give over all care of hearkening to Gods word, which is the power of God unto Salvation and may ſhew its power upon us alſo we knowe not how ſoone, but rather as our Saviour anſwered (being demanded of his diſciples whether there were but few that ſhould be ſaved) ſaying ſtrive [*you*] *to enter in at the ſtreight gate*, plainly giving to underſtand, that as the gate is ſaid to be ſtreight that leadeth unto Life, ſo there be but few that enter thereat & therefore they ſhould ſtrive ſo much the more to be of the number of thoſe few. For what if along time we have little or nothing profited, what if we have cauſe to doubt whether we have any true faith or no; ſuch doubts maybe better ſignes then we are awar of; otherwiſe why ſhould the Apoſtle exhort the Corinthians *to examine themſelves and prove whether they were in the faith or no*? But however it fairs with us doth not the Apoſtle plainely teach us, that God calls ſome at the firſt houre of the day, ſome at the the third, ſome at the laſt?

2 Cor. 13. 5.

2. Now I come to the conſideration of his anſwer to the objection, as himſelf hath formed it. And firſt I obſerve, that whereas he pretends to build his anſwer upon conſideration of the number of Reprobats without compariſon greater then the number of the elect, yet the abſurd reaſoning which he brings hereupon, doth nothing at all depend on that. For albeit the number of the elect, were greater then the number of ſuch as are Reprobats, and that without compariſon; yet the reaſoning here deduced from the contrary propoſition hath equally place, as in the contrary caſe, As namely, to reaſon thus: *Either I am abſolutely choſen to grace and glory or abſolutely caſt off from both.* Secondly the joyning of grace and glory together, as this Anthor doth joyne them in this reaſoning ſhaped by him is a miſerable confounding of things that differ. For to be abſolutely choſen unto grace is to be ordained to have grace conferred upon him not according to any worke of his, but meerely according to the good pleaſure of Gods will, anſwerably to that of the Apoſtle, *God hath mercy on whom he will*, but no man is ſo choſen unto glory, as namely to be ordained to have Salvation beſtowed upon him not according unto workes, but according to the meere pleaſure of God, if we ſpeake of men of ripe yeares. For God hath ordained to beſtow Salvation on ſuch only by way of reward of their faith, repentance, and good workes. So on the other ſide to be abſolutely caſt off from grace, is to be ordained to have grace denied him; not according to any worke of his, but meerely according to the good pleaſure of Gods will, like as *Paul* profeſſeth, that *the Lord hardeneth whom he will*, But no man is ſo caſtaway from Glory, or unto damnation, as namely, to be ordained to be deprived of Glory and to be damned, meerely for the good pleaſure of God, but altogether for his infidelity, impenitency and evill workes. Thirdly, no ſuch thing followes as here is inferred from the ſuppoſition of election unto Salvation. For ſeing no man is elected to obtaine Salvation, whether he believe or no, but only in caſe he believe, hereupon men are rather excited to labour for faith, then to be careleſſe thereof; and farther we ſay, that as God hath ordained to bring them to Salvation, ſo he hath ordained to bring them hereunto by ſanctification and faith. 2 *Theſſ.* 2. 13. And the word of God is a powerfull meanes to worke them hereunto, even to the working out of their Salvation with feare and trembling, &

Phil. 2. 13.

that becauſe they are given to underſtand *that God is he who wroketh in them both the will and the deed according to his good pleaſure*. On the other ſide if a man be ordained to damnatiõ, yet ſeeing no man is ordained to be damned but for deſpiſing the means of grace in caſe he heare the Goſpel; & for ought any man knowes he may as well be ordained to ſalvation as to damnation; this I ſhould think, is rather an excitement not to deſpiſe or neglect the meanes of grace, then to deſpiſe or neglect them. Suppoſe God ſhould

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not damne any man, but annihilate them, and ſuppoſe this were known unto us; by the ſame argumentation it would follow, that a man ſhould have no care of good workes: But this conſequent is notoriouſly untrue. For ſeeing the perfection of my reaſonable nature, whereby I differ from brute Beaſts, conſiſteth in knowledge and morall vertues; and there is no knowledge that doth more ennoble us, then the knowledge of God, and no better rule of morality, then the law of God; ſurely it ſtood me upon in reaſon, to ſtrive according to my power to know God, and to be obedient rather then otherwiſe; although I know for certaine, that after certaine yeares, both body and ſoule ſhould be returned unto nothing. Come wee now to the conſideration of this reaſoning, in reſpect of grace. Suppoſe God hath elected me unto grace; yet ſeeing he beſtowes not grace but by his word, therefore there is no reaſon I ſhould neglect the uſe of his word, but rather good reaſon why I ſhould embrace it, and that with all earneſtneſſe. Like as in caſe God hath ordained I ſhall have Children, doth it hence follow that I neede not uſe the company of a Woman; becauſe ſeeing God hath decreed I ſhall have Children, therefore I may be ſure to have them, whether I company with a Woman or no, belike right as Capons come by Chicken? On the other ſide, ſuppoſe God hath not ordained me unto grace; yet hence it followeth not, that I ſhould neglect all care of morall vertue, yea or the uſe of Gods word. Firſt not of morall vertue; for next unto grace, morall vertue commends a man, and like as many heathens were famous for morality, without any ſanctifying grace; ſo may I be in the ſame kind of reputation alſo. And ſeeing no better rules of morality are to be found, then in the Scriptures, therefore may I well be moved to give my ſelfe to the ſtudy thereof. And *Auſtin* telleth us, that ſome, even of reprobates, by the word of God may *Proficere ad exteriorem vitæ emendationem, quò mitius puniantur.* Laſt of all, conſider how the like objections were made againſt that deſtiny, which was maintained by the Stoicks. *Carneades* was a great oppugner of the Stoicks, yet was aſhamed of ſuch a kind of Argumentation as this Author affecteth. For it was commonly accounted *ignava ratio*; and thus *Turnebus* writes of it, *Ignava autem iſta ratio, captioſa cum eſſet, & calumniæ plena, a Carneade non probabatur, alioq; argumento factum ſine ulla captione oppugnabat.* He had other manner of reaſons to oppoſe Fate Stoicall, then by ſo ſorry an argumentation as this. And this is delivered by *Turnebus*, upon that paſſage in *Cicero's* book *De Fato*, Where he ſheweth how *Chryſippus* did make anſwer unto this very argument in effect above 1600 yeares a goe; Take the words as they lye in *Cicero*, *Nec nos impediet illa ignava ratio quæ dicitur: Appellatur enim quidem a Philoſophis ἀργὸς λόγος, cui ſi pareamus, nihil eſt omnino quod agamus in vita. Hic enim interrogant* (now I beſeech you marke the argument well) *ſi fatum tibi eſt ex hoc morbo convaleſcere, ſive medicum adhibueris, ſive non, convaleſces. Item ſi fatum tibi eſt ex hoc morbo non convaleſcere ſive tu Medicum adhibueris, ſive non, non convaleſces.* If it be deſtined that you ſhall recover out of this diſeaſe, whether you uſe the help of a Phyſitian or no, you ſhall recover. Againe, if it be deſtined that you ſhall not recover out of this diſeaſe, whether you uſe a Phyſitian or no, you ſhall not recover. Now compare this, I pray, with this Authors argumentation in this place; *If I am choſen I muſt of neceſsity believe and be ſaved; What need therefore to take thought either about meanes or end? as much as to ſay, either of believing or of ſalvation.* Againe, *If I be caſt off, I muſt as neceſſarily not believe and be damned; In vaine therefore doe I trouble my ſelfe about meanes, or end*; as much as to ſay, about labouring and endeavouring for Faith, whereby I may avoyd damnation: And judge, I pray, whether there be one hayres breadth of difference, between theſe argumentations. For like as it is unreaſonable to conceive, that man is deſtined to recover out of ſickneſſe, but by uſe of meanes, ſuch as is the uſe of a Phyſitian; in like ſort, as unreaſonable it is to conceive, that God hath deſtined any man of ripe yeares to be brought to ſalvation, but by faith in Chriſt; or that God hath appoynted any man to be damned, but for want of faith, or want of repentance. Obſerve I pray the cenſure that is paſſed upon it in *Cicero*, *Rectè hoc genus interrogationis ignavum atq; iners nominatur, quod eadem ratione, omnis è vita tollitur actio.* And farther he ſheweth how that the ſame argument, if there were any force in it, might have place, without all mention of Fate. *Licet etiam immutare* (ſaith he,) *ut Fati nomen non adjunges, & eandem tamen teneas ſententiam hoc modo, ſi ex eternitate verum hoc fuit, ex iſto morbo convaleſces, ſive adhibueris medicum ſive non, convaleſces. Itemq; ſi ex æter-*

nitate hoc falſum fuerit, ex iſto morbo convaleſces, ſive adhibueris medicum, ſive non adhibueris, non convaleſces; deinde cætera. In the next place there it is ſhewed how *Chryſippus* made anſwer to this argument. *Hæc ratio a Cryſipo reprehenditur: Quædam enim ſunt (inquit) in rebus ſimplicia, quædam copulata: ſimplex eſt moretur eo die Socrates, Hinc ſive quid fecerit, ſive non fecerit, finitus eſt moriendi dies. At ſi ita fatum ſit, Naſcetur Oedipus Laio, non poterit dici, ſive Laius fuerit cum muliere, ſive non fuerit. Copulata enim res eſt & confatalis; ſic enim appellat quia ita fatum ſit, & concubiturum cum Uxore Laium & ex eo Oedipum procreaturum.* Then he illuſtrateth the abſurdity of the deduction in another manner thus, *Ut ſi eſſet dictum, luctabitur Olympiis Milo, & referret aliquis, Ergo ſive habuerit adverſarium ſive non habuerit, luctabitur, erraret. Eſt enim copulatum, luctabitur, quia ſine adverſario nulla luctatio eſt.* And he concludes all of this kind to be but captious argumentations, and that they admit the ſame ſolution. *Omnes igitur iſtius generis captiones, eodem modo refelluntur. Sive tu medicum adhibueris, ſive non adhibueris, captioſum: tam enim fatale eſt medicum adhibere quam convaleſcere. Hæc, ut dixi, confatalia ille appellat.* And this manner of ſolution was ſo ſufficient, that *Carneades* diſdained to preſſe the Stoicks with this kind of argumentation, though oppoſite enough to their opinion, as forthwith *Cicero* expreſſeth it. *Carneades hoc totum genus non probabat, & minùs inconſiderate concludi hanc rationem putabat: itaq; premebat alio modo, nec ullam adhibebat calumniam.* So that he condemned this as a calumnious argumentation againſt the Stoicks, though himſelfe were a ſore adverſary of theirs.

And therefore if any Chriſtians doe reaſon thus, either in their hearts to countenance them in prophane courſes; or juſtify ſuch reaſoning, thereby to oppoſe Gods free grace in election, the unreaſonableneſſe thereof being thus ſet forth, and acknowledged on both ſides by the very light of nature, let them take heed and feare leaſt heathen men riſe up in judgement againſt them. As for *Tiberius* his opinion and perſwaſion, *Omnia fato agi*, it is apparent what he underſtood by *Fatum*, for there it is ſaid, that he was *Mathematicæ addictus*; whereby it ſeems, he went no farther then the ſtarres, for the originall of his fate. But if *Tiberius* was *circa Deos & religiones negligentior*, were the Stoicks ſo too? I had thought that like as none were more oppoſite to the Epicures then they, ſo none were more religious and devout among the Heathens then they. Yet there is no opinion ſo true or good, but by a prophane heart may be abuſed. But as for the efficacy of Gods will, we are ſo farre from maintaining, that it takes away either the liberty of mans will, or the contingency of ſecond cauſes, that we profeſſe with *Aquinas*, that the root of all contingency, is the efficacious will of God; and with the Authors of the Articles of the Church of Ireland, Artic. 11. *That God did from all eternity ordaine, whatſoever in time ſhould come to paſſe; and yet neither the liberty, nor the contingency of ſecond cauſes, is thereby deſtroyed, but eſtabliſhed rather.*

DISCOURSE.

The Fift and laſt ſort of Reaſons.

It is an Enimy to True Comfort.

SECT. I.

I Am come to my laſt reaſon againſt it, drawn from the *Vncomfortableneſſe* of it: It is a doctrine full of deſperation, both to them that ſtand, and to them that are fallen, to men out of temptation, and in it.

It { 1. Leads men into temptation. / 2. Leaves men in it. } And therefore it is no part of Gods word, for that is εὐαγγέλιον, good newes to men, a ſtore-houſe of ſweet conſolations for them that ſtand, and ſuch as are fallen. Theſe things are written (ſaith the Apoſtle) *Rom.* 15.4. That by patience and conſolation of the Scriptures we might have hope; implying that therefore was the word written, and left to the Church, that by the comforts contained in it, thoſe poore ſoules that look towards heaven, might never want in any changes or chances of this mortall life, a ſweet gale of hope to refreſh them, and carry on their ſhip full merrily towards the Haven. It leads men into temptation, and into ſuch a one too, as is as ſharpe and dangerous as any the tempter hath. The Devill can eaſily perſwade any man that makes abſolute reprobation a part of his creed, that he is one of thoſe abſolute Reprobates; becauſe there are more abſolute Reprobates (even an hundred for one,) then abſolute choſen ones: and a man hath a great deale more reaſon to think that he is one of the moſt, then one of the leaſt, one of the huge multitude of inevitable caſtawaies, then one of the little flock, for whom God hath abſolutely prepared a Kingdome. Such a man is not only capable of, but framed and faſhioned by his opinion for this ſuggeſtion; which is a very ſore one, if we may believe *Calvin*, *Bucer*, and *Zanchius*.

Calvin tells us, *Quod nulla tentatione vel gravius, vel periculoſius fideles percellit Satan*, that the Devill cannot aſſault a believer with a temptation more dangerous. And a little after he ſaith, It is ſo much the deadlier, by how much commoner it is then any other, *Rariſſimus eſt cujus non interdum animus hac cogitatione feriatur, unde tibi ſalus niſi ex Dei electione? Electionis autem quæ tibi revelatio? Quæ ſi apud quempiam ſemel invaluit, aut diris tormentis miſerum perpetuo excruciat, aut reddit penitus attonitum.* So ordinary is the temptation, that he who is at all times free from it is a rare man (we are to conceive that he ſpeakes of thoſe that believe abſolute reprobation:) and ſo dangerous it is, that if it get ſtrength, he which is under it, is either miſerably tormented, or mightily aſtoniſhed. And a little after this, he ſaith againe. *Ergo ſi naufragium timemus, ſollicitè ab hoc ſcopulo cavendum, in quem nunquam ſine exitio impingitur*, He that will not wrack his ſoule muſt keep from this rock. *Inſtit: l: 3. c: 24. Sect: 4.*

Bucer alſo hath a paſſage like to this, *Vt caput omnis noxiæ tentationis* (ſaith he) *repellenda eſt quæſtio, ſumuſnè prædeſtinati? Nam qui de hoc dubitat, nec vocatum ſe, nec juſtificatum eſſe credere poterit, hoc eſt, nequit eſſe Chriſtianus*: This doubt whether we are predeſtinated or no? Muſt be repelled as the head of every pernitious temptation: for he that doubts of this cannot be a Chriſtian. *Præſumendum igitur ut principium fidei nos omnes eſſe a Deo præſcitos.* Every man therefore muſt preſume it as a principle of faith that he is elected. *In 8 Rom: q. 2. de prædeſt:*

This very ſpeech of *Bucers Zanchy* makes uſe of to the ſame purpoſe. We ſee then by the teſtimony of theſe worthy men, that this temptation is very dangerous and ordinary too, to ſuch as think there are abſolute reprobates. The truth of both will farther appeare by the example of *Petrus Hoſuanus* a Schoolemaſter in Hungary, who intending to hang himſelfe, ſignified in a letter which he left in his ſtudy for the ſatisfaction of his friends and Countrymen, the cauſe of it, in that writing he delivered theſe three things. *Zanch: lib: 5: de natura Dei. Quæſt: de Prædeſt. Georg. Major in 2 Tim. 2. Fol. 1109.*

1. That he was of *Calvins* and S. *Auſtins* opinion, that men are not dealt withall, *ſecundum bona*, or *mala opera*, according to their works good or evill, but that there are *occultiores cauſæ* more hidden cauſes of mens eternall condition.

2. That he was one of that woefull company of abſolute caſtawaies, *Vas formatum in ignominiam*, a veſſell prepared to diſhonour: and that therefore (though his life had been none of the worſt) he could not poſſibly be ſaved.

3. That being unable to beare the dreadfull apprehenſions of wrath, with which he was affrighted, he hanged himſelfe. For theſe are ſome of his laſt words there recorded, *Diſcedo igitur ad Lacus Infernales æternum dedecus patriæ meæ, Deo vos commendo, cujus miſericordia mihi negata eſt.* I goe to thoſe infernall lakes, a perpetuall reproach to my Country, commending you to God whoſe mercy is denyed mee.

Out of this example we may eaſily collect two things.

1. That men who think that there are many, whom God hath utterly rejected out of his only will and pleaſure, may be eaſily brought to think by Satans ſuggeſtion, that they are of that company: And

2. That this temptation is very dangerous; I conclude therefore the firſt part of my laſt Reaſon, that abſolute Reprobation leads men into temptation.

TWISSE

Conſideration.

AS I remember, when this Author firſt had reſort unto ſome prime ſtickler for the Arminian way to conferre with him there about, it was told me that this Authour ſhould alledge, that our doctrine of election was a comfortable doctrine: but then on the other ſide, it was alledged, that granting that, yet with all it did expoſe to deſſolutenes of life. And therefore I little expect any ſuch argument as this to be propoſed, leaſt of all to be ranged amonſt the nũber of thoſe that are taken to be of a convincing nature. Yet is it the leſſe ſtrange, becauſe the Apoſtle telleth us of ſome, that their courſe is *proficere in pejus*, to growe worſe aud worſe. But let us conſider, whether he ſpeeds any better in this then in the former. And whereas he ſaith, *It is a doctrine full of deſperation both to them that ſtand, and to them that are fallen.* I doe not find that in the accommodation of this argument, he takes any more notice of this diſtinction throughout this Section. The Goſpell is εὐαγγέλιον, and the power of God unto Salvation; but to whom? Surely to them *that believe. Rom.* 1. 16. and preſerve: *Be faithfull unto death and I will give thee a Crowne of Life. Revel.* 2. 10. *He that believeth in him is not condemned, but he that believeth not is condemned alredy, becauſe he hath not believed in the name of that only begotten Sonne of God John* 3. 18. Likewiſe the comfort which the Scripture miniſtreth to ſtrengthen men with patience to hold out in the promiſe of Everlaſting Life, though it be long in comming; as which is the portion only of ſuch as are not weary of well-doing, & faint not for according to that of the Apoſtle, *Be not weary of well-doing, ſo in good time yee ſhall reape if you faint not. Gal.* 6. 9. And as for poore ſoules, if they be poore in ſpirit, undoubtedly they are bleſſed, for theirs is the Kingdome of Heaven: And whoſe doctrine, the Arminian or ours, doth beſt maintaine *poverty of ſpirit*, I am very willing the different may judge Yet of the poore of the world and moſt diſpiſed, God doth chooſe to be rich in faith, and (in this poverty of ſpirit) *heires of the Kingdome which God hath prepared for them that love him.* And Gods Kingdome doth moſt conſiſt of ſuch poore and diſpiſed creatures. 1 *Cor:* 1, 27, 28. And as for this love of God, we acknowledge that God doth not leave it in his elect to the liberty of their wills, but rather that he workes it in them by the circumciſion of the heart: *Deut:* 30. 6. *The Lord thy God will circumciſe thine heart and the heart of thy ſeed to love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy ſoule that thou mayſt live.* And indeed the Kingdom is promiſed to none but ſuch as love him. *Jac:* 2. 5. *It is a ſingular conſolation that all things work together for the good of man;* but this conſolation is applyed *only to them that love God, which are called according to his purpoſe. Rom:* 8. 28. And as for the phraſe of looking towards Heaven, if thereby be meant *their waiting for Chriſts comming*, I make no queſtion but ſuch alſo *ſhall be delivered from the wrath to come.* 1 *Theſſ:* 1. 10. It being not poſſible they ſhould waite for him, unleſſe they *love his appearing:* and the Apoſtle hath aſſured ſuch that the Lord hath a Crowne of Righteouſneſſe in ſtore to beſtowe upon them 2 *Tim:* 4. 8. And I tãke the like phraiſe to ſignify no leſſe then the converſion of their hearts to God. *Jer:* 50. 4. *In thoſe dayes and in that time ſayth the Lord, the children of Iſraell ſhall come, they and the children of Judah together going, and weeping ſhall they goe, and ſeeke the Lord their God, v.* 5: *They ſhall aske the way to Sion with their faces thither-wards ſaying, come let us joyne our ſelves to the Lord in a perpetuall Covenant that ſhall not be forgotten.*

Iac. 2. 5.

Now I come to the particular accommodation of this argument againſt our doctrine. And of this he ſayth, that *It leads men into temptation, and into ſuch a one as is as ſharpe and dangerous as any the tempter hath.* Now the temptation here ſpoken of conſiſts in this, that *The Divell can eaſily perſwade a man that makes abſolute reprobation a part of his Creed, that he is one of thoſe abſolute reprobates becauſe thoſe are more abſolute reprobates (even an hundered for one) then abſolute choſen ons*, and a man hath a greatdeale more reaſon to thinke that he is one of the moſt then one of the leaſt, one of the huge multitude of inevitable caſtawayes, then on of that little flock, for whom God hath abſolutely prepared a Kingdome. And this he pretends to prove out of *Calvin*, *Bucer*, and *Zanchi-*

us;

us; and this togither with a ſtory related out of *Georgius* Major a Lutheran concerning *Petrus Gloſuanus*, a Schoole-maſter in Hungary is all his proofe. Now in anſwer hereunto I will proceed by degrees. Firſt he continueth ſtill to ſerve his turne with the equivocation of this phraiſe of *abſolute reprobation* without diſtinguiſhing: And albeit, it may be gathered by his diſcourſe, that as others doe, ſo he himſelfe conſiders it not *quoad actum volentis*, *as touching the act of God willing*, but *quoad res volitas*, *as touching the things willed*. Yet he is well pleaſed to confound the thiugs willed into one, as if they had no difference as touching their abſoluteneſſe, whereas the deniall of grace together with the inflicting of damnation, (which are the things willed by reprobation which accordingly is diſtinguiſhed *into Reprobation from grace, & reprobation from glory*, or unto damnation) are ſo different, that God doth decree indeed the abſoluteneſſe of the one, but he doth not at all decree the abſoluteneſſe of the other, but meerly the conditionall nature thereof. For grace he denieth and purpoſeth to deny abſolutely. For the Apoſtle plainly profeſſeth, That as *God hath mercy on whom he will Rom*: 9. 18. By bringing them unto faith. *Rom*. 11. 30. *So he hardeneth whom he will by denying faith unto them*. But as for Glory and damnation, like as God doth not abſolutely, ſo neither did he decree abſolutely to deny the one & inflict the other, but only conditionally, to wit, in caſe of finall perſeverance in ſin. Therefore I have reaſon to underſtand him of reprobation from grace, as often as he ſpeaks of abſolute reprobation, & cõſequently his meaning muſt be that God doth not deny grace, but upon condition of mans doing or not doing ſome thing, ſo that if either man did ſomething or leave undon ſome thing, thẽ God would give him grace, which for want thereof he doth not; which is as good, as in plain termes to profeſſe, *That grace is given according to works*. Then againe conſider, what is that grace, which is given upon condition, and not abſolutely by theſe mens opinion; Is it which thy call univerſall, and wherein conſiſts the enlivening of mans will, & the enabling of him *to will any ſpirituall good whereto, he ſhall be excited*? This cannot be given any otherwiſe then abſolutely; for as much as they make it to be given when a man commeth into the world: and to that purpoſe doe alleadge that, *John* 1. 9. *This is that true light which enlightens every man that commeth into the world*. Or Is it exciting grace, that is not given abſolutely? This cannot be neither; For this exciting grace is in the miniſtry of the Word. Now when the Goſpell is brought unto a Nation, not only the civill ſort; but the moſt prophane are made partakers of it indifferently; ſo that predeſtination hereunto muſt be acknowledged even by the Arminians themſeves to be abſolute, as it ſignifies predeſtination unto grace prevenient. So that if any predeſtination unto grace, be not abſolute but conditionall, it muſt needs be predeſtination unto grace ſubſequent. As for example, God doth decree to worke in man the act of willing that which is good; this decree (ſay they) is not abſolute but conditionall. Now I pray conſider what is, or can be the condition hereof, but the act of willing? And this indeed is their doctrine, as I have ſeen it under the hand of one of them, namely, that God doth work in us τὸ *velle modo velimus*, as much as to ſay, If we will make our ſelves willing to believe, to repent, to doe any good work, then God will make us willing hereunto. This is the iſſue of the comfortable doctrine of theſe *Arminians*; and unleſſe we concurre with them in ſuch unſober expreſſions, we expoſe our ſelves to the temptations of Satan (yea the foreſt temptations if we believe this Author;) and bereave our ſoules of all comfort from the Scriptures; As if divine conſolations were like to their argumentations, the one as unſober as the other. But let us conſider the force of his Argument; If it be ſo eaſy a matter for the Divell to perſwade a man of this, how came it to paſſe that he did not perſwade *Auſtin* hereof, or *Proſper*, or *Fulgentius*, or any of thoſe ancient writers, in this argument againſt the Pelagians: How is it that he could not performe ſo eaſy a matter upon *Calvin*, *Bucer*, *Beza*, *Zanchy*, *Junius*, *Piſcator*, or any other of thoſe famous writers in this argument? How is it that he prevailes over ſo few in compariſon? Nay, conſider was there ever any that was perſwaded, or can this Author produce any evidence to prove, that ever any was perſwaded that himſelfe was a Reprobate upon this ground, to wit, becauſe the number of Reprobates are by farre fewer then the number of Gods elect. though (as he ſpeakes) an hundered for one? I have read of diverſe, collected by *Goulartius* within that century of yeares next preceding his worke, that have caſt themſelves away in deſpaire; yet not all neither upon conceit of their abſolute reprobation: And of them that have ſo conceived, not one doe I find that hath entertained this conceit upon the ground here mentioned by this

Authour *Francis Spira* is a ſtrange preſident, but the ground of this deſperate condition is manifeſted to have bin this, that he cõceived himſelf to have ſinned the ſin againſt the Holy Ghoſt. Many in our dayes have been knowne to have made themſelues away, and this very yeare 1632, hath brought forth many ſtrange examples in this kind; but hitherto I have not heard that the ground of this their deſperate reſolutions was this, that the Devill had perſwaded them they were abſolute Reprobates, much leſſe that they were perſwaded hereunto by ſo ſorry a ground, as that which this Authour alledgeth. And as before I ſignified, all this muſt proceed of reprobation from grace; And if God deny grace upon the meere pleaſure of his will, and not according to mens workes, the way is open to deſperation, and it is an eaſy matter for the Devill to perſwade us that we are abſolute Reprobates; as this Authour with great zeale of his cauſe, belike upon the ſingular comfort he finds in his owne way, diſputeth. But over whom hath the Divell this power? Not over Heathens, for they are nothing acquainted with the doctrine of election, and reprobation; but over Chriſtians; Yet conſider I pray, who are Chriſtians, but ſuch as believe in Chriſt? And is it an eaſy matter for the Devill to perſwade ſuch as believe in Chriſt that they are Reprobates? If ſo then either as it is reprobation from grace, or as it ſignifies reprobation from glory, not as it ſignifies reprobation from grace; for it is ſuppoſed they are in the ſtate of grace, to wit, in the ſtate of faith, which is the prime grace. As for reprobation from glory, we doe not maintaine that God doth abſolutely deny that, or that he decreed abſolutely to deny that, but only to ſuch as ſhould be found to dye in ſinne. Againe, as many as maintaine abſolute reprobation, they doe withall maintain that faith is a fruit of election and conſequently by the Genius of their doctrine muſt conclude that they are elect and not Reprobates. Againe, they according to their doctrine doe maintaine, that who is once in the ſtate of regeneration connot fall away totally or finally: Therefore they are not ſo eaſy to be perſwaded that they are Reprobates at all, but elect rather. Let *them*, that is our adverſaries, looke to this, and that they are not eaſily perſwaded by the Devill that they are reprobates, at leaſt, that they neither have or can have any aſſurance of their election, for as much as they deny faith to be a fruit of election; and whatſoever their faith be, yet are of opinion that they may totally and finally fall from it, and be damned. Farther conſider, ſeeing this Authour denies not, but the damnation of every Reprobate is decreed by God everlaſtingly, and that irrevocably, though upon foreſight of finall perſeverance in ſinne. I pray what comfort is it for any man that he is not an abſolute Reprobate, if ſo be he is perſwaded that he is a Reprobate, and from everlaſting ordained to condemnation? Now I will prove that it is an eaſy matter for the Devill to perſwade any Arminian that he is a Reprobate, by the ſame argument which this Authour uſeth againſt us. For ſeeing the Reprobates are more by farre then the elect, even an hnndered for one, and withall that it is an eaſy thing for the Devill to perſwade any man that he is rather of that number which is greateſt then of that which is leaſt, hence it followes by his owne forme of argumentation that it is an eaſy matter for the Devill to perſwade any Arminian that he is a Reprobate. Yet the vanity of this argumentation I have formerly ſhewed by repreſenting firſt the vaſt number of Heathens in all ages in compariſon unto Chriſtians. Secondly the variety of Sects in Chriſtian Religion, and that moſt of them miſerably corrupt, together with the vaſt number of prophane perſons on the on ſide, and of Hypocrites on the other, why ſhould any man that is privy to his owne heart, as looking towards Heaven, be carried away with ſo baſe a pretence, as to conceive himſelfe to be a Reprobate, eſpecially conſidering the nature of man to hope the beſt of his fortunes, and that upon no ground to ſpeake of, as it appeares in thoſe who venture in Lotteries. Whereas every true Chriſtian believing in in Chriſt hath a certaine ground for the aſſurance of his election by our doctrine. And truly I am verily perſwaded the Devill is more wiſe then to think ſo baſe an illuſion as this, is likely to prevaile; Save that in caſe this Author or his Informator doe believe as they pretend, hereupon he may take advantage to work upon them according to their own rules to perſwade them thereby, that they are Reprobates: and 'till we find he hath prevailed ſo with them, we have no reaſon to conceive that it is an eaſy matter for him to perſwade us that we are abſolute Reprobates; no nor then neither conſidering that we make no ſuch rules, but rather conceive them to be the fancies of crackt or crazed braines. And the Devill had need be more wiſe then ſo, if he

practice

practice to prevaile with us, which undoubtedly, ſo long as God be pleaſed by his grace to keepe us in our right wits, he never ſhall: Certainly if they deſire to bring this rule into our faith, they muſt firſt manifeſt that the Devill hath ſo prevailed with them to make them conceive themſelues to be Reprobates; otherwiſe it cannot be they ſhould conceive ſo eaſy a matter for the Devill to perſwade any of us upon ſo ſorry a ground as this, that we are abſolute Reprobates. As for them that are fallen, (to proſecute that diſtinction this Authour gives according to the parts of it, which the Authour himſelfe doth not) Chriſtians fallen may be underſtood two manner of wayes, either as fallen from the ſtate of grace, or as fallen only into ſinne, but ſtill ſtanding in the ſtate of grace. As touching the firſt we acknowledge no ſuch falling away, S^t *John* profeſſing of certaine Apoſtates ſaying, *They went out from us, but they were not of us; for had they beene of us, they had continued with us.* As for ſuch as fall into ſinne, we that maintaine abſolute election and reprobation, doe withall maintaine with King *James* in the conference at *Hampton Court*, that all ſuch ſhall ariſe againe by repentance. And therfore there is no reaſon we ſhould conceive, upon the committing of any ſuch ſinne, that we are Reprobates; leaſt of all upon ſo baſe grounds as here are ſpecified by this Authour. Now I come to his proofe of this by his three teſtimonies. 1 Ioh. 2. 19.

1. The firſt whereof is the teſtimony of *Calvin*: whereto I anſwer firſt in generall, That not one of theſe Authours here mentioned take any notice of the ground whereupon this Authour builds, namely, of the paucity of the elect in compariſon to Reprobates, therehence to conclude, That it is an eaſy matter for the Devill to perſwade them that they are Reprobates, if they ſhould have beene ſure to have received ſo much from the pen of this Authour. More particularly I acknowledge the words of *Calvin* here alledged, namely, *that the Devill doth not aſſault the believer with a temptation more dangerous:* But why doth not this Authour goe on to tell, what the temptation is which as it were in a breath *Calvin* ſets downe thus, *Quam dum ipſos ſuæ electionis dubitatione inquietans, ſimul prava ejus extra viam inquirendæ cupitate ſolicitat.* It conſiſts of two parts. The firſt is *diſquieting of them with doubting of their election.* The ſecond is, his ſolliciting of them with an *ill deſire of inquiring about it, after a wrong way.* Both theſe *Calvin* ſo compounds, as to make up but one tentation: In the next place, *Calvin* ſhewes what it is for a man to inquire of his election a wrong way. *Extra viam inquirere voco, ubi in abditos divinæ ſapientiæ receſſus perrumpere homuncio conatur, & quo intelligat quid de ſe ſit conſtitutum apud Dei tribunal, ad ſupremam uſq; æternitatem penetrare.* To inquire after it out of the way, is, when a vile man endeavoureth to breake into the ſecrets of divine wiſdome, and to pierce into the higheſt eternity, to know what God hath ordained of him there. This he ſayeth is for *a man to caſt himſelfe into a deep, to be ſwallowed up of a bottomleſſe gulfe, and to throw himſelfe into innumerable ſnares, ſuch as he can never wind himſelfe out off.* And to this he ſayeth we are very prone; and hereupon comes in the next ſentence alledged by this Authour, *Rariſſimus enim eſt few there be whoſe minds are not taken up with this contemplation,* Whence doth Salvation come unto thee, but from Gods election? Now what revelation haſt thou of thine election? And if theſe thoughts doe once take hold of a man, either in cruell manner it torments miſerable man continually, or makes him altogether ſtand aſtoniſhed. All this is delivered by *Calvin* of them who enquire about their election a wrong way; the very ſame way being condemned alſo by King *James* in the conference at *Hampton Court*, or that which he there delivereth much at one. And all this, this Authour very judiciouſly conceales, thinking ſuch a dog-trick well becomes his free will, and his grace alſo. But then *Calvin* diſcovereth alſo another way, *in ea luſtranda*, that is, in diſcovering a mans election; and ſuch as wherein, *tuta eſt pacata, addo etiam jucunda, navigatio a man may ſaile ſafely, peaceably, and ſweetly:* and that they who ſearch after their election in a due order, *as it is contained in Gods Word, they are like to reape thence ſingular conſolation, eximium inde referent conſolationis fructum.* Then he ſhewes what this way is, and that we muſt beginne from our vocation (to wit, unto faith and unto repentance) and thence aſcend to our election, in this way he profeſſeth no uncomfortable condition, but moſt comfortable is likely to accrue unto him. The wrong way he warnes us to avoyd carefully: but withall profeſſeth, that no rocke at all is likely to be met withall in this right way. By this I deſire every indifferent perſon will judge aright of this Authours carriage.

2. The next is *Bucer* in 8. *ad Rom: q: de prædeſt:* Now *Bucers* diſcourſe, as it is related

lated by this Authour himſelfe appeares to tend to no other end but this, that Chriſtians ſhould not diſquiet themſelues with doubting, whether they are predeſtinate or no, but rather without doubt perſwade themſelues that they are of the number of thoſe whom God hath predeſtinate. And by this I perceive what is his meaning here in, which formerly I underſtood not, when this of *Bucer* was alleadged by this Authour to an other purpoſe. And his meaning ſeemes to be this, whoſoever is called and believes in Chriſt, ought to believe that he is predeſtinate. For indeed faith in his opinion is the fruit of our election, and from the like in the *Theſſal:* *Paul* was perſwaded of their election 1 *Theſſ:*1.3,4. *Remembring the worke of your faith and labour of your love, knowing that you are elected of God.* Now ſhall others hereby be drawne to be confident of our election, and ſhall not we our ſelves who alone are privy to the ſecret paſſages of our hearts, when others are not. Now I pray conſider, whether this be ſo much as to intimate that it is a farre eaſier matter for a man to be perſwaded that he is a Reprobate, then that he is of the number of Gods elect.

3. By this I perceive the meaning of *Zanchy* alſo, in ſaying, That every Chriſtian is bound to believe that he is elect: Let us in the name of God examine our faith whether it be true faith or no; but ſurely ſō farre as we are perſwaded of the truth of our faith, ſo farre have we no cauſe to doubt of our election. But this of *Zanchius* is no more to the purpoſe, whereunto this Authour alleadgeth it, than that of *Bucers*.

4. In the laſt place, I come to the relation of *Georgius Major* of a certaine Schoole-Maſter in *Hungary*, *Petrus Hoſuanus* by name, for ſo I find him called in *Dietricus*, though this Authour calls him *Iloſuanus*, miſtaking belike the copy which he tranſcribed. Now *Dietricus* relates it as out of *Georgius Major* as this Author doth. But I wonder not a little that *Oſiander* in his laſt Century makes no mention of it, that I can find, though I have ſearched after it, as the Woman in the Goſpell did after her loſt groat: Whether he gave any credit to *Georgius Major* his relation, I know not; or whether any thing came to his knowledge afterwards, as touching the unfaithfullneſſe thereof. But take we it as it lyes in this Authours relation.

1. That he profeſſed himſelfe of *Calvins* and *Auſtins* opinion: I hope this makes no more againſt *Calvin* and us, then it doth againſt *Auſtin* and all thoſe that tooke part with him, againſt the Pelagians in his dayes, and the remnants of them afterwards. But if his opinion was, that men are not dealt withall *ſecundum bona* or *mala opera, but that there are occultiores cauſæ of mens Eternall conditions*, will any ſober Arminian impute this unto us? Doe we ſay that God damnes any man but for ſinne, or that God rewards any man of ripe yeares with Salvation but by way of reward, of theire faith repentance and good-workes? When the Remonſtrants at the Hague conference propoſed their doctrine of predeſtination and reprobation, after this manner, namely, That God from eternity did ordaine to ſave believers and to damne unbelievers, (to this effect), Did any of the Contra-Remonſtrants, or any of the Synod of *Dort* except againſt the truth of this? But whereas the Remonſtrants and Arminians did acknowledge this to be the whole decree of predeſtination and reprobation: Againſt this exception was tooke both in the Hague conference, and in the Synod of *Dort*, and *Theſes* alſo by divers forraine Divines laid downe againſt it, & particularly by our *Brittayne* Divines amongſt others; All of them maintaining that there was an other decree concerning the giving of the grace of regeneration, of the grace of faith and repentance unto ſome, and denying it unto others. And this decree, we willingly maintain, proceeds not, no not in the execution thereof, according to mens workes good or evill, whatſoever be the end of any that maintaine it. The contrary, namely, that grace is given according unto workes, being a doctrine generally condemned in the Church from the yeare 415, at that time it was condemned in the Synod of *Paleſtine*, and *Pelagius* himſelfe driven to ſubcribe unto it, otherwiſe himſelf had been anathematized. But this Authour delivers it as the opinion of *Hoſuanus* concerning mens Eternall conditions, whereby I take to be meant Salvation and Damnation. And indeed as here the doctrine is expreſſed, it is more agreable with the doctrine of the Predeſtinarians, as *Sigebert* relates it, then with the doctrine either of *Auſtin* or *Calvin*: and the ſame *Sigebert* writes not that it was *Auſtins* doctrine, but that it roſe out of the miſunderſtanding of *Auſtins writings*: Yet I confeſſe that *Tyro Proſper* before *Sigebert* ſpares not to profeſſe, of that Predeſtinarian hereby, that it roſe from *Auſtin*; as Dr *Vſher* obſerveth. But this was a meere practice

of

of the Semi-Pelagians, corrupting the doctrine of *Auſtin*, the better to expoſe it to obloquy and reproach. 2. As for the ſecond, *that he was one of the woefull company of abſolute caſtawayes*. Herein the Author of this diſcourſe accommodates himſelfe to his own ſtage; Throughout *Dietricus* his relation, I find no mention of any ſuch diſtinction as of reprobates and abſolute reprobates, but an acknowledgement, *certum eſſe numerum ſalvandorum, & prædeſtinatorum vel ad vitam, vel ad mortem*; And of himſelfe, that he was *ex numero damnatorum*, but I doe not find the word *abſolute* throughout. That his life was none of the worſt, himſelfe was no competent judge: yet I confeſſe there are degrees of prophaneneſſe and hypocriſy, and the very reprobates are not equall in ſinne. And withall a morall life is eſteemed in the world in reſpect of their converſation towards men; but we know that to deny Gods truth, and to oppoſe it againſt the light of conſcience, is of an higher nature in the ſight of God, and uſually is of more fearfull conſequence. Of *Francis Spira* I find no complaints made in reſpect of his morality towards men, but he laid unto his own charge, *That he had ſinned againſt the holy Ghoſt*. Yet neither this *Hoſuanus*, nor *Spira* doe I find to have broken forth into any blaſphemy againſt Gods juſtice in reprobating them. Nay, this latter was heard ſtrangely to diſcourſe of the juſtice of God, without any murmuring againſt his power. And in our time we have heard of ſtrange examples, of ſome that have gone ſoberly on to the deſtroying of themſelves, in a very devout acknowledgement of Gods juſtice in giving them over.

3. As touching the dreadfull apprehenſions of Gods wrath, I nothing doubt, but when God gives men over to the power of Satan, they may be ſo improved by him, as to make a man weary of his life, though I find not this ſpecified in *Dietricus*, who yet relates this ſtory out of *Georgius Major*. But I read the like in *Goulartius* his collections of a deſperate man in his time dying, that ſaid (*among many other horrible ſpeeches*) *that he wiſhed to be already in Hell. And being demanded the cauſe of ſo wicked a deſire: For that* (ſaid he) *the apprehenſion of torments which doe attend me, cauſe me preſently to feele a double Hell; when I ſhall feele it at the full, I ſhall not expect it any more.* But no mention throughout of any opinion of his concerning Divine reprobation that moved him thereunto. The words here alleadged, *Diſcedo ad lacus infernales, Deo vos commendo, cujus miſericordia mihi negata eſt*. Theſe, I ſay, and the matter of theſe alone, I find in *Dietericus* his relation out of *Georgius Major* on 2 *Tym. c.* 2. *p.* 59. 6. It runs thus. "Ait in Hungaria & "multis aliis locis notiſſimum eſſe de homine quodam Calviniano, Petro Hoſuano "Rectore Scholæ Gengerinæ, qui ex deſperatione ſibi ipſi laqueo injecto vitam finivit, Anno 1562. die 22. Julii; relicto manuſcripto, in quo (præter alia) hæc "exſtitere. O me infæliciſſimum omnium, quia ſatius fuiſſet me nunquam natum. "Verum eſt certum eſſe numerum ſalvandorum, hoc ex me, ſed quid ad me? Hoc "ità neceſſariò fieri debuit. Nemo igitur argumentetur, Deus omnes vocat; longe "ſecùs ſe res habet. Calvini ſententiam de certo prædeſtinatorum numero, item "Auguſtini, quiſque teneat. De me intelligo quemlibet ante uterum matris prædeſtinatum, vel ad vitam, vel ad mortem, quod nunquam quiſquam niſi in horâ mortis cognoſcere poteſt. Ego ſum ex numero damnatorum, ergo Deo nunquam aſſcribi poſſum. Hoc certo credatis rectum eſſe quod Paulus Rom. 9. ſcribit. Miſereor cujus miſereor. Diſcedo ad lacus infernales. Deo vos commendo, cujus miſericordia mihi negata eſt. Et addit Major hæc verba, Hic eſt fructus perverſæ doctrinæ de prædeſtinatione hominum. Concerning which relation give me leave to obſerve ſomewhat.

1. Here is no ſuch thing as this Author relates, that *Hoſuanus* ſhould ſay that man by *Calvin* and *Auſtins* opinion, is not dealt withall, *ſecundum bona* or *mala opera*, (and indeed this deciphering out of *Auſtins* and *Calvins* opinion, is notoriouſly untrue;) neither as touching *occultiores cauſæ*, of mens eternall conditions, as indeed it is apparent, that in the way of a cauſe meritorious, there is no other cauſe of damnation then ſinne, and in the way of a diſpoſing cauſe no other cauſe of ſalvation then faith, repentance, and good workes; And as touching the efficient cauſe of both, none is or can be the cauſe thereof but God. But as touching the cauſe why God gives grace to one, and denyes it to another, wee willingly confeſſe there is no cauſe thereof, but the meere good pleaſure of God. In like ſort, of abſolute caſt-awayes here is no mention, no nor of *Vas formatum ad ignominiam*, nor any ſuch ſaying of himſelfe, that he was none of the worſt.

2. Here is no mention made of the cauſe moving him hereunto, as this Author

pretends, but only 'tis ſaid, that it proceeded of deſperation. And though *Major* adds as a *Coronis* his cenſure, that, *Hic eſt fructus perverſæ doctrinæ de prædeſtinatione hominum*; yet I hope his cenſure is no Oracle with us, no nor with Lutherans neither; for I find him branded by *Oſiander* in his Eccleſiaſticall Hiſtory. And though he were of *Auſtins* and *Calvins* opinion in this poynt of predeſtination, and did deſpaire, yet it followes not, that this doctrine moved him to deſpaire. Suppoſe the conceit of being a reprobate moved him hereunto; might it not move him hereunto according to the Arminian tenet, as well, and according to any tenet, provided they doe not believe that God hath as yet decreed nothing, or if he hath, that his decrees may be recalled? And then again by our Doctrine of Predeſtination it cannot be concluded of any man that he is a reprobate while he lives. Nay, this ſeems contrary to his own opinion, which was this, that *no man can know whether he be predeſtinate to life or death, till the houre of his death*; and his death was not brought upon him, but wrought by him. And as it was in his power not to have killed himſelfe, ſo was it in his power not to believe that he was a reprobate by this opinion of his. Then again, what moved him to conceive that he was a reprobate, is concealed all along. Now the conſcience of ſinne committed againſt the Holy Ghoſt, may make a man conceive he is a reprobate, of what opinion ſo ever he be concerning reprobation. And as I take it, *That famous Doctor of Germany, whom Goulartius mentioneth remaining then at Hall in Swabe, was no Calviniſt*; of whom he reports out of the Hiſtory of Germany, *That having oftentimes turned his Conſcience, ſome times toward God, ſome times toward the World, having inclined in the end to the worſer part, ſaid and confeſt publiquely, that he was undone, and fell ſo deepe into deſpaire, as he could neither receive, nor take any comfort or conſolation*, ſo as in this miſerable and wretched eſtate of his ſoule, he ſlew himſelfe moſt miſerably. It was not the doctrine of Predeſtination or Reprobation brought him unto this. And though a man hath not ſinned againſt the holy Ghoſt, yet a conceit of ſuch a ſinne may drive a man unto this; or of blaſphemies in an inferior degree, when God gives a man over unto the power of Satan, as *Gaulartius* makes mention by his own experience of another deſperate man, whom he had heard, "who being exhorted to turne from the too vehement appre-
"henſion of Gods juſtice unto his mercy, which was open unto him: He anſwered
"very coldly, you ſay true, God is God, but of his children, not for me, his mercy is
"certain for his elect, but I am a reprobate, a veſſell of wrath and curſing, and I doe
"already feele the torments of Hell: When they did exhort him to call God
"his Father, and Jeſus Chriſt his Sonne, My mouth (ſaith he) doth ſpeake it, but
"my heart hath horrour of it, I believe that he is the Father of others, but not of
"mee: When they did lay before him that he had known God, heard his word,
"and received his Sacrament; yea but (he added) I was an hypocrite, and guilty
"of many blaſphemies againſt God; And then he returned to his ordinary
"diſcourſes; I am a veſſell prepared to wrath and damnation, I am damned,
"I burne. The ſame *Goulartius* reports out of the Hiſtory of the times of a Learned man at *Lovaine*, called Maſter *Gerlach*, "Who had profited ſo well in his ſtudies,
"as he was one of the firſt amongſt the learned of that time. And that being touch-
"ed with a grievous ſickneſſe, he ſighed continually; and feeling himſelfe to draw
"neer his end, he began to diſcover the ground of his ſighes, ſpeaking ſuch fearfull
"words, as deſperate men are accuſtomed to utter; crying out and lamenting that he
"had lived very wickedly, and that he could not endure the judgement of God, for
"that he knew his ſinnes were ſo great, as he ſhould never obtain pardon, ſo as in this
"diſtreſſe he dyed, oppreſſed with grievous and horrible deſpaire. What this wicked-neſſe of his was in ſpeciall it ſeems he concealed; it might be horrible enough, though done in ſecret, yet no juſt cauſe of deſpaire, unleſſe it were the ſinne againſt the holy Ghoſt. The like is recorded of M. *Iames Latomus* one of the chiefe Doctors of the Univerſity of *Lovaine*, being one day out of countenance in a Sermon before the Emperour *Charles* the Fift, returning aſhamed and confounded from *Bruſſells* to *Lovaine*, and did ſo apprehend the diſhonour, that he fell ſuddainly into deſpaire, whereof he gave many teſtimonies in publique; the which did move his friends to keepe him cloſe in his houſe, from that time unto his laſt gaſp. Poore *Latomus* had no other ſpeech then that he was rejected of God, that he was damned, and that he hoped for no mercy nor ſalvation, as having malitiouſly made warre againſt the grace and truth of God. He dyed in this deſpaire, neither was it poſſible for any friends, or Phyſitians to make him change his opinion.

3. If

3. If this ſtory of *Hoſuanus* be a truth, I like his condition the worſe for not giving any reaſon moving him to this deſperation, and making him to conceive that he was a caſtaway. For it is apparent that by our Doctrine the way is open, (namely by faith in Chriſt) to be perſwaded that he is an elect of God, but no way open to conceive that he is a reprobate. Not any ſinne before faith, for faith in Chriſt gives ſufficient aſſurance of the pardon of all former ſinnes, nor yet want of faith, for though a man want faith to day, yet he may enjoy it to morrow, as *Palmer* told the Sheriffe that executed him, ſaying, *As it hath pleaſed God to call me to day, ſo it may pleaſe him to call you to morrow.* Leaſt of all was the conſideration of the great number of Reprobates in compariſon with the ſmall number of Gods elect, likely to be the cauſe thereof; neither is any ſuch mentioned either of *Hoſuanus* or of *Spira*, or of *Latomus*, or of *Krans*, or of any other that ever I heard or read, which is ſufficient to diſcredit this Authors diſcourſe in this place.

4. Laſtly, obſerve the abſurdity of this ſpeech, *Commendo vos Deo, cujus miſericordia mihi negata eſt:* Though he had no heart to commend himſelfe to Gods mercy, yet he takes heart to commend others thereunto, as if God though he would ſhew no mercy to him, yet for his ſake, and his prayers, and commendation ſake, he would ſhew mercy unto others.

I find a ſtory in *Oſiander* of one *Adamus Neuſerus*, delivered with a farre better grace to diſcredit *Calvins* doctrine, not in poynt of Predeſtination, but as touching *the perſon of Chriſt*, in oppoſition to the Ubiquitary Chimera of the Lutherans, as Sir *Edwin Sands* calls it; and it is this, *Neuſerus Paſtor Heilderbergenſis ex Calviniſta Arrianus, ex Arriano Mahumetanus, & Eques Turcici Imperatoris factus, & Conſtantinopoli circumciſus eſt, inq; deſperatione Turcica ad Inferos deſcendit. Ante mortem ſuam D. Stephano Gerlachio referens, qua occaſione in Arrianiſmum & Turciſmum incidiſſet, dixit, Qui vult cavere Arrianiſmum caveat Calviniſmum.* Yet *Dietericus* alleadgeth the former ſtory of *Hoſuanus*, only to requite *Lampadius*, who gave inſtance of the uncomfortable ends of certain Lutherans, as alſo to ſhew that perſonall faults or unhappineſſes, muſt not prejudice the truth of any cauſe, albeit it be maintained by them. I could in ſome part requite *Georgius Major* with a ſaying of *Auguſtus* the Elector of Saxony, concerning his Lutherans, which I find in *Melchior Adamus in vita Penceri.* This *Pencer* had been impriſoned by the Duke of Saxony, and in that ſtate had continued many yeares, yet at length being ſet free by the mediation of the Prince of *Anhalt.* When the Duke found that he continued ſtill in the ſame faith for which he was impriſoned, *Laudo* (quoth the Duke) *Doctorem Pencerum, facit quod viro bono dignum eſt, perſeverat in ſua confeſſione firmiter & conſtanter. Ego quid credam, & in quo acquieſcam incertus ſum prorſus, quod Deus novit. De die enim in diem aliquid novi mei ſacerdotes cudunt, & proferunt, & ex uno me errore in alterum pelliciunt, atq; implicant dubitationibus perpetuis.*

One ſtory more; for I am compelled unto it by the Genius of this adverſary. The day before I entred upon this Section, a Gentleman of good quality coming to this Towne, ſent unto me, deſiring to enjoy my company with him at his Inne. I had heard well of him before, both of his ſervice in the *Low Countries*, and at the Iſle of *Ree.* Amongſt other things, he fell upon diſcourſe of the good diſcipline in the *Low Countries*, eſpecially as touching the preparation of the people to the Sacrament of the Lords Supper, both by preparatory Sermons before the day comes, as alſo by going to their houſes, to know of their purpoſe to come to the Lords table; and whether any difference between them and their neighbours were any impediment thereunto. In this courſe of theirs one coming to a certain houſe, the Maſter whereof and his Wife were turned Arminians, and making the uſuall motion unto the Wife (for her husband was not within) ſhe beganne to raile upon him, and to defye him, and to profeſſe her diſdaine to come to their Communion at all. The Miniſter uſed not many words, but as ſoone as he heard whereto her ſpeech tended, departed; not long after the Maſter of the houſe coming home, and hearing the Miniſter had been there, and where abouts he beganne to raile much more then his Wife, diſdaining and indignating that the Miniſter ſhould come unto him about ſuch a buſineſſe, and calling him black Devill, with proteſtation that if he had been at home when the other came, he would have had his bloud or trodden out his guts. That night this Arminian Bedlem fell ſick, and in his weakneſſe vomited bloud, which not only came out of his mouth, but out of his noſe, eyes and eares, as it is ſaid. Hereupon he ſent for the Miniſter, who came unto him, when he came he confeſſed his fault and fury

againſt him, beſeeching him to pardon him, The Miniſter exhorted him to make his peace with God, for as for himſelfe he had not offended him, and gave him the beſt comfort he could; never the leſſe the fellow dyed. The Gentleman, that made this relation to my ſelfe and an other with me, upon the noyſe of ſo ſtrange a buiſineſſe, thought good to enquire of the truth; and comming to *Leyden* (there was this Tragedy acted) he went to his Painter, whom he meant to employ in drawing his picture, and asked him about the matter: This Painter was alſo become an Arminian, and told him, that indeed the Man had raved againſt the Miniſter in the ſtreet, but the manner of his death was nothing ſo as he had heard. After this, the ſame Gentleman paſſing over from Flaunders ſide unto *Dort*, as he was in the boat, asked the Boatmanof the truth of this report. This Boatman alſo was an arminian, and he tells him it was nothing ſo, but that the man dyed by accident, as any other man might; An other in the boat hearing this, turnes to the Gentleman, ſaying, Captaine, believe him not, for the ſtory you have heard is a certaine truth, but this Rogue (ſayeth he poynting to the Boat-man) is an Arminian, and theſe Arminians are like the Egyptians, let God ſhew never ſo many miracles and judgements upon them, yet they will not believe; I proteſt I doe nothing affect them, nor pleaſe my ſelfe in theſe and ſuch like relations, but I am driven to it, to requite the adverſary, who helpes out his hungry diſcourſe with ſuch tales as theſe.

DISCOURSE.

SECT. II.

IT leaves men in temptation: and this it doth two waies; Firſt by making the tempted uncapable of true comfort. 2. By making Miniſters unable to give true comfort. Firſt it maketh the tempted uncapable of true comfort; like a Gorgons head, it doth ſo trouble their fancies, and amaze them, eſpecially in their paroxyſmes and fits, that the ſtrongeſt arguments of comfort, applyed with as much art and cunning as can be, will not faſten upon them. With *David* they ſay in their feare, that all men are lyars, namely, all ſuch as come to comfort them in their temptation: And the reaſon is, becauſe it is an opinion incompatible with any word of comfort, that can be miniſtred to the diſtreſſed ſoule in this temptation. Gods love to mankind, Chriſts death for all mankind, and the calling of poore ſinners without exception to repentance or ſalvation, with all other grounds of conſolation, the tempted will eaſily elude with the grounds of his opinion: which that we may the better ſee, let us imagine that we heare a Miniſter and a tempted ſoule, reaſoning in this or the like manner.

Tempted.

Woe is me; I am a caſtaway: I am abſolutely rejected from Grace and glory.

Miniſter.

Diſcourage not thy ſelfe thou poore afflicted ſoule; God hath not caſt thee off. For he hateth nothing that he hath made; but bears a love to all men, and to thee amongſt the reſt.

Tempted.

God hateth no man as he is his creature, but he hateth a great many as they are involv'd in the firſt tranſgreſſion, and become guilty of *Adams* ſinne. And God hath a two-fold love, (as I have learned,) a generall love, which puts forth it ſelfe in outward and temporall bleſſings only, and with this he loved all men: And a ſpeciall love, by which he provideth everlaſting life for men, and with this he loves only a very few, which out of his alone will and pleaſure he ſingled from the reſt. Under this generall love am I, not the ſpeciall.

Miniſter.

God ſo loves all men, as that he deſires their eternall good, for the Apoſtle ſaith, he would have all to be ſaved, and he would have no man periſh, nor thee in particular.

Tempted.

All, is taken two waies: for all ſorts and conditions of men, high and low, rich and poore, bond and free, Jew and Gentile; and for all particular men in thoſe ſeverall ſorts and conditions. God would have all ſorts of men to be ſaved, but not all particular men of theſe ſorts; ſome of my Country, and my calling, &c. but not all, or mee in particular. Or if it be true that God would have all particular men to be ſaved; yet he wills it only with a revealed Will, not with a ſecret will, for with that he will have a great company to be damned abſolutely. Under this revealed will am I, not the ſecret.

Miniſter.

Chriſt came into the World to ſeeke and to ſave what was loſt, and is a propitiation not for our ſinnes only, (*id eſt*) the ſinnes of a few particular men, or the ſinnes of all ſorts of men, but for the ſinnes of the whole world; therefore he came to ſave thee, for thou waſt loſt, and to be a propitiation for thy ſinnes, for thou art part of the whole world.

Tempted

Tempted.

The World, as I have heard, is taken two waies in Scripture; largely for all mankind, and ſtrictly in a more reſtrained ſignification, for the elect, or for believers: Or if it be true that he dyed for all mankind, yet he dyed for them but after a ſort, he dyed for them all *dignitate pretii*, he did enough to have redeemed all, if God would have had it ſo: but he did not dye for all *voluntate propoſiti*, God never intended that he ſhould ſhed his bloud for all, and every man; but for a few ſelect ones only, with whom it is my lot not to be numbred.

Miniſter.

God hath founded an univerſall Covenant with men, upon the bloud of Chriſt thy Mediator, and therefore he intended it ſhould be ſhed for all men univerſally. He hath made a promiſe of ſalvation to every one that will believe, and excludes none, that doe not exclude themſelves.

Tempted.

God purpoſed his Sonne ſhould dye for all men, and that in his name an offer of remiſſion of ſinnes and ſalvation ſhould be made to every one but yet upon this condition, that they will doe that which he meanes the greateſt part of them ſhall never doe, (*id eſt*) Repent and Believe, nor I among the reſt.

Miniſter.

God hath a true meaning that all men who are called, ſhould repent and believe; that ſo they might be ſaved. as he would have all to be ſaved, ſo to come to the knowledge of the truth; and as he would have no man to periſh, ſo he would have all men to repent; and therefore he calls them in the Preaching of the word to the one, as well as to the other.

Tempted.

God hath a double call; an outward call by the Preaching of the word, an inward call by the irreſiſtible work of the ſpirit in mens hearts. The outward call is a part of Gods outward will, with that he calls every man to believe; the inward and effectuall call is a part of his ſecret will, and with that he doth not call every man to believe, but a very few only whom he hath infallibly and inevitably ordained to eternall life. And therefore by the outward will, which I enjoy among many others, I cannot be aſſured of Gods good will and meaning that I ſhall believe, repent, and be ſaved.

By this we may ſee, that no ſound comfort can be faſtned upon a poore ſoule, rooted in this opinion, when he lyes under this horrible temptation; The example of *Francis Spira* an Italian Lawyer, will give ſome farther light and proofe to this. This *Spira* about the yeare 1548, againſt his knowledge and conſcience did openly abjure his religion, and ſubſcribe to Popery; that thereby he might preſerve his life, and goods, and liberty. Not long after he fell into a deep diſtreſſe of Conſcience out of which he could never wreſtle, but ended his woefull daies in deſpaire. To comfort him came many Divines of worth and note; but againſt all the comforts that they applyed unto him, he oppoſed two things eſpecially. 1. The greatneſſe of his ſinne: It was a ſinne of a deep dye, committed with many urging and aggravating circumſtances, and therefore could not be forgiven. This argument they quickly took from him, and convinced him by the example of *Peter*, that there was nothing in his ſinne, that could make it irremiſſible. *Peter* that committed the ſame ſinne, and with more odious circumſtances, repented and was pardoned, and ſo (no doubt) might he. 2. He oppoſed his abſolute reprobation; and with that he put off all their comforts. *Peter* (ſaith he) repented and was pardoned indeed, becauſe he was elected: as for me I was utterly rejected before I was borne; and therefore I cannot poſſibly repent, or be ſaved. If any man be elected he ſhall be ſaved, though he have committed ſinnes, for number many, and haynous in degree: but if he be (*ex repudiatis*) one of the caſtawaies, *neceſſario condemnabitur*: though his ſinnes be ſmall and few. *Nihil intereſt, an multa, an pauca, an magna, an parva ſint, quando nec Dei miſericordia, nec ſanguis Chriſti quicquam ad eos pertinet.* A reprobate muſt be damned, be his ſinnes many or few, great or ſmall; becauſe Gods mercy, and Chriſts merits belong not to him. In this very ſtory, (recorded by *Cœlius Secundus*, and *Calvin*, with ſome others who lived at that time, and wrote of it to their friends;) as in a glaſſe we may ſee the diſconſolate condition of a poore ſoule, that is ſtrongly conceited, that the greateſt part of the world, are abſolute reprobates, and that he is one of them; he ſticketh ſo faſt in the mire and clay, that he can very hardly be drawne out.

TWISSE

Conſideration.

THis Section I may fitly divide into two parts. The firſt whereof is a pretty Comedy. The ſecond a Tragedy. The firſt is practiſed by this Authour in a dialogue, ſhaped by himſelfe and accordingly accomodated to his owne ſtage, as an Enterlude of his owne making. The Tragedy is related only of *Francis Spira*; and I willingly confeſſe, It is the ſtrangeſt that ever, I heard or read, of a man going on ſoberly to the utter undoing of himſelfe both body and ſoule. But the relation of it is moſt hungryly performed by this Authour as if his care were

only to ſerve his owne turne, and then cares not what becomes of the maine condition of the ſtory, which indeed is moſt remarkable: I have but touched upon it in former paſſages, but here I ſhall inſiſt upon it more at large; and the rather, becauſe it is here propoſed not more unfaithfully then impiouſly, to deface or out-face the precious truth of God concerning his abſoluteneſſe in making whom he will a veſſell of wrath. But firſt I muſt diſpatch my anſwer to the Antegredients of thoſe two parts. And let it be remembred what formerly I have delivered, that ſtill he confounds reprobation from grace, with reprobation from glory; as if we maintained the abſoluteneſſe of the one, as well as we do maintain the abſoluteneſſe of the other; which is moſt untrue. For albeit, we maintaine that God hath decreed abſolutely to beſtow grace upon ſome, (which are Gods elect,) and abſolutely to deny grace unto others, (whom we account Reprobates here upon,) not conditionally; for if grace were ordayned to be beſtowed conditionally, to wit, upon condition of ſome worke performed by man; then ſhould grace be beſtowed according unto workes, which in the phraſe of the Ancients is all one, with ſaying, that grace is beſtowed according unto merits. And this was condemned above 1200 yeares agoe in the Synod of *Paleſtine*, & *Pelagius* driven to ſubſcribe unto it, leſt otherwiſe himſelfe had bin excommunicated. But we, doe not maintain that God hath ordayned that damnation ſhall be abſolutely inflicted on any but only conditionally, to wit, in caſe they dye in ſin. Yet it became this Authors wiſdom to confound them, leaſt diſtinguiſhing them as they ought to be diſtinguiſhed, & carrying himſelfe fairly in oppoſing the abſolutenes of reprobation there alone, where alone it is maintained by his adverſaries, to wit, in the particular of reprobation from grace, he ſhould at firſt daſh manifeſt himſelfe to maintain, that grace is beſtowed not according to the good pleaſure of God, but according to the workes of men; and that upon this ground it is, that he buildeth the comfortable condition of his doctrine, concerning predeſtination, which indeed makes no difference in Gods proceedings between the elect and reprobate, but reſpects them all alike; For their power to believe and repent is their grace univerſall, which they ſay is given to all alike. So exciting grace in the miniſtry of the Word is equally made to all that heare it, whether elect or reprobate. And theſe are the kinds of grace prevenient: Then as for grace ſubſequent, that conſiſts only in Gods concurrence unto the act of faith and repentance which depends meerely upon mans will (in their opinion) and God is as ready to concurre to the working of it as well in one as in another, in caſe man will. On the other ſide it would appeare that our doctrine is cenſured as uncomfortable, only becauſe it teacheth man for the obtaining of true comfort to depend meerely upon the grace of God, and not upon his owne free-will.

Againe, obſerve how that like as *Gregory* obſerves that the ſame ſpirit of Antichriſt might be found in them that are farre diſtant in time, ſo an Arminian ſpirit ſavoreth the ſame things one with an other, and perhaps at unawars, though they in whom it is found be much diſtant in place. *Voſſius* in his laſt booke of his *Hiſtory* of the Pelagian hereſy ſayth, That our Divines doe aleadge that place of S^t *Paul* againſt their adverſaries in the poynt of predeſtination, as the head of *Meduſa*; a place indeed that clearely juſtifies Gods abſoluteneſſe both in predeſtination and reprobation: And this Authour ſayeth that our doctrine on the ſame poynt is like to *Gorgons* head: Now the Learned well know that *Gorgon* and *Meduſas* head have no difference. Now whether our doctrine be ſo uncomfortable as this Authour objects, it will appeare when we come to examine the paroxyſme and fit of temptation, eſpecially the kind of it being ſuch, as this Authour out of his fruitfull invention hath made choyce of to repreſent, as able to elude the ſtrongeſt *arguments of comfort, and they applyed with as much art and cunning as canne be*; ſuppoſing that of this art and cunning alſo, he hath given plentifull teſtimony in the ſucceeding dialogue; which is a very remarkeable paſſage of this Authours ſufficiency, eſpecially comming out of his owne mouth; Of the integrity whereof there ſeemes no cauſe to doubt, conſidering that Arminian ingenuity and modeſty whereunto he hath lately arrived.

He further addes as much weight to his former aſſertions as words can, which though they be but wind, yet with ſome, who Camelion like live by the ayre, may prove very weighty, ſaying, that this doctrine of ours is incompatable with any word of comfort (which is very much, though a word and any word be very little) *that can be miniſtred to a diſtreſſed ſoule in this temptation.* Now it is very likely that in his dialogue following

following he brings in as potent arguments of conſolation, as our doctrine will afford. The heads or placss of conſolation he reckons up, *Gods love to mankind, Chriſts death for all mankind, and the calling of poore ſinners without exception to repentance and Salvation with all other grounds of comfort*, and all arguments (he ſayeth) drawne from hence our opinion will elude and preclude all conſolation from the diſtreſſed ſoule. But give me leave to make a faire motion as touching the ſpeciall heades of conſolation here particulated. If it ſhall be found that theſe heads of conſolation doe admit a double ſenſe, one of the Arminian making, an other of our interpreting; if conſolations drawne therefrom in an Arminian ſence be eluded by our Tenet, will any diſparagement thereby ariſe to our tenet, provided we find ſtore of conſolatiō from them taken in our ſenſe, eſpecially being ready to admit any indifferent tryal concerning the ſenſe thereof, whether theirs or ours prove moſt agreeable to the word of God; But *Ecce Rhodus, ecce Saltus*, we are come to the Dialogue it ſelfe, where he undertakes to make good, that which he ſaith And here begins the Enterlude.

Tempted.

Woe is me; I am a Caſtaway; I am utterly rejected from grace and Glory.

CONSIDERATION.

Let me take liberty to ſet down what I ſhould think fit to anſwer unto ſuch a complaint, Now my Anſwer is this, Who hath revealed this unto thee? Art thou privy Councellour to the Almighty? We are taught that *ſecret things belong to the Lord our God*, Deut. 29: *but the things revealed are for us and for our Children to doe them.* Now where, and when, and how hath God revealed this his counſell unto thee, namely, concerning thy rejection from Grace, & Glory? We know no other revelations divine then are contayned in his Word: Now hath God in his word revealed unto thee more then unto me that thou art a reprobate. The word ſaith unto thee, *If thou ſhalt confeſſe with thy mouth the Lord Jeſus: and believe in thy heart that God raiſed him from the dead, thou ſhalt be ſaved*, Rom: 10. 9. Now how canſt thou make it appeare that this belongs leſſe unto thee then to any Martyr that ever was content to lay downe his life for Chriſt? Wilt thou ſay, *Thy ſinnes make thee to conceive ſo*: I anſwer, are thy ſinnes greater then were the ſinnes of *Manaſſes, who made his ſonnes paſſe through the fire to Molech, gave himſelfe to witchcraft and ſorcery, and filled Jeruſalem with bloud from corner to corner?* If his ſinns were not ſufficient to conclude that he was a Reprobate, why ſhould thy ſins be thought ſufficient to conclude that thou art a Caſt-away? Are thy ſinnes greater then *Sauls* were, *who was a Blaſphemer, a Perſecutor of the Saints of God from Citty to Citty*; Yet was he received unto mercy. Wilt thou ſay, *Thy ſinnes have been committed ſince thy calling*? Yet are they greater then was the ſinne of *Peter*, in denying Chriſt his Maſter, with execrations and oathes? And theſe ſinns were committed not only after his calling; but even within his Maſters hearing too. Yet he went out and wept bitterly. And Chriſt as ſoone as he was riſen, ſent word of his reſurrection by name to *Peter* to comfort him. Nay hath not God taught us in his word, that the bloud of Jeſus Chriſt cleanſeth us from all ſinne, 1 *John.* 1.? And how canſt thou make it appeare, that any one that ever was or is, hath greater intereſt therein then thy ſelfe? wilt thou ſay this remedy belongs unto none, but ſuch as believe and repent; but I doe not. I anſwere, in like ſort there was a time when *Paul* believed not, and when every one believed not; yet at length they believed, and ſo maiſt thou: wilt thou ſay, *But I cannot believe and repent?* I anſwer, this is the condition of all till God *takes away the ſtony heart out of their bowells, and gives them a heart of fleſh, and puts his owne ſpirit within them*; wilt thou ſay *God gives grace to others, but not to thee?* I anſwer, there was a time when God had not mercy on them, at length an houre came wherin he called them: ſo an houre may come wherin he may call thee. And thou haſt no more cauſe to conclude that he hath rejected thee, then every Child of God had before his calling, that God had rejected him: without grace neither thou canſt, nor they could believe; but grace can bring all to faith and repentance; and thou haſt no more cauſe to think that God will not bring thee to faith, then any elect had, before his calling, to think that God would not bring him to faith. Now ſeeing this grace is given in the Word, doe thou wait upon God in his owne ordinance, (which any naturall man hath power to doe; as namely, to goe heare a ſermon)

thou

thou knoweſt not how it may worke upon thee, yea though thou commeſt thither with a wicked mind. For we read of ſome that comming to take Chriſt were taken by him. And Father *Latimer* taking notice of ſome that come to Church to take a nap, yet never the leſſe (ſaith he) let them come, they may be taken napping.

Ioh. 7. 32, 45, 46.

Miniſter.

Diſcourage not thy ſelfe thou poore afflicted ſoule, God hath not caſt thee off, for he hateth nothing that he hath made, but bears a love to all men, and to thee amongſt the reſt.

CONSIDERATION.

And not only poore, but miſerable alſo is that afflicted ſoule that hath no better comforter; whether we conſider the nature of the conſolation, or the warrant of it. For firſt, hath not God made Froggs, and Toades, and Devills, as well as man; And hath an Arminian that boaſts ſo much of *ſtrongeſt arguments of comfort*, no better comfort to an afflicted ſoule, then that ſhe is Gods creature, which is the condition of a Frogge, and a Divill, and a damned ſpirit. 2. Then as touching the warrant of it; Is the booke of Wiſdome the beſt ſtore-houſe of comfort for an afflicted ſoule, a booke writen by *Philo* the Jew that living after Chriſts paſſion, reſurrection and aſcention, yet never believed in him. Againe ſpeake out and tell us what is the fruit of that love, which God beares to all men; Hath he ordained to give Salvation unto all, & to this afflicted ſoule in particular? If he hath not, but damnation rather unto ſome, and particularly to this ſoule; (for upon what ground dareſt thou ſay, or canſt aſſure he hath not:) art not thou as miſerable a comforter to her, as ever *Jobs* friends were to him? Or hath God ordained to give all men the grace of regeneration, the grace of faith and repentance; if ſo, then either abſolutely or conditionally; if abſolutely, then all muſt be regenerate, all muſt believe and repent. If conditionally, ſpeake it out, and let thy Patient know what condition that is, on performance whereof by man, God will give him faith; ſay what thou wilt, the comfortable iſſue ſhall be this, That *grace is given according to workes*; and this indeed is the only Arminian conſolation.

Tempted.

1. God hateth no man as he is his creature, but he hates a great many as they are involved in the firſt tranſgreſſion, and become guilty of *Adams* ſinne.

CONSIDERATON.

Poore ſoule, ſuffer not thy ſelfe to be inſtructed by them, that labour to deprive thee not only of the comfort of Gods grace, but of the comfort of common ſence: Doſt thou well underſtand what it is to hate a man as a ſinner, and not as a man? If hatred be no more then diſpleaſure; ſurely whatſoever be the cauſe of it, in hating thee he is diſpleaſed with thee, as thou art his creature, and that in thy proper kind of man; if withall it ſignify puniſhment, whatſoever the cauſe thereof be, ſurely he puniſheth thee as man, though not for thy natures ſake, for that is the worke of God, but for ſome corruption he finds in thee. And we ſhould prove very ſorry comforters; if on ſuch a diſtinction as this, we ſhould ground any true conſolation; which hath his courſe not only with the Devills, but even with them that are already under the torments of Hell fire. But let not the authority of the booke of Wiſdome, with thee weigh up and elevate the authority of Scriptures; nor *Philo* the Jew be preferred before S^t *Paul*, or the Prophet *Malachy*, by whom wee are taught that as God loved *Jacob* before he was borne, ſo he hated *Eſau*; and before they were borne, what difference was there betweene them? Yet this paſſage out of the booke of Wiſdome is in a Collect of the Papiſts Liturgy; I conceive a good ſence may be made thereof without any prejudice to abſolute reprobation, (for of Papiſts we are ſayd to have learnt it and are reproached for it.) And what is that good ſenſe they make of it? Take it if thou wilt from *Aquinas* 1. q: 23. art 3: ad. 1. *Dicendum quod Deus omnes homines diligit, & etiam omnes creaturas in quantum omnibus vult aliquod bonum: non tamen quodcunq; bonum vult omnibus; In quantum igitur quibusdam non vult hoc bonum, quod eſt vita æterna, dicitur eos habere odio, vel reprobare*: Now if we take this Colect from them, let us take alſo their good meaning with it; and if we can, let us make it better and not worſe. We commonly ſay, that paſſions are attributed to God not *quoad affectum*, but

but *quoad effectum*: Now the effect of hatred is either the denyall of grace, or the denyall of glory, or the inflicting of damnation; The two latter are executed only according to mens ſinnes; but the firſt, to wit, the denyall of grace, proceeds meerely according to the good pleaſure of Gods will; like as the giving of grace (as the Apoſtle (not *Philo*) ſignifies, that *God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth*; Now to ſhew mercy is to bring a man to faith. *Rom.* 11.30. And if grace be not given according to the meere pleaſure of Gods will, it muſt be given according unto workes, which is as much as to ſay in the phraſe of the ancients, according unto merits, which all along hath been condemned in the Church of God, as meere Pelagianiſme. Yet hitherto tends all the conſolation that Arminianiſme can reach forth unto thee; which is to afford thee no better conſolation then can be afforded to a Reprobate.

2. As for *Adams* tranſgreſſion, let not that affright thee, who art borne within the pale of the Church, and of Chriſtian parents; for the children of ſuch are holy. 1 *Cor.* 7. when all others are uncleane. Yet why ſhould any man find it ſtrange, that ſome of them who are guilty of eternall death, ſhould ſuffer eternall death? And this Author hath formerly confeſſed, that *Adams* ſinne hath made all his poſterity guilty of eternall death. Now albeit God hates many, whether as involved in *Adams* tranſgreſſion, or no, what matters that to thy diſcomfort, if he hate not thee. And what ground haſt thou to conceive, that thou art in the number of them whom he hates, rather then of thoſe whom he loves? He is no good Phyſitian, that lookes not into the cauſe of the deſeaſe, to remoove that; nor he any good comforter that lookes not into the cauſe of thy diſcomfort, to remoove them; It is to be thought that ſuch an one deſires rather to feed thy diſcomfort, then to cure it. Such is the practice of this comforter, otherwiſe he ſhould not apply his *arguments of comfort* (which he magnifies as the ſtrongeſt) *with as much art and cunning as can be*: But underſtand him aright, this art and cunning tends not to the furtherance of thy conſolation, but to the advantage of his owne Arminian cauſe;; and to this end, I confeſſe, he doth apply them *with as much art and cunning as he can.*

2. And God hath a two-fold love, a generall love, which puts forth it ſelfe in outward and temporall bleſſings only, and with this he loves all men. And a ſpeciall, by which he provides everlaſting life for men, and with this only he loves a very few, which out of his alone will and pleaſure he ſingled from the reſt. Under this generall love am I, not the ſpeciall.

CONSIDERATION.

1. As touching the diſtinction, hold thee to it, leaſt otherwiſe thou never proove capable of more comfort then a Reprobate is capable of. No Arminian hath the face to deny that God ſaves but a very few; And the reaſon is, becauſe very few doe believe and repent: in this we all agree. Againe, no Arminian denies that very few doe believe and repent, and finally perſevere therein. Againe, no Arminian denies faith and repentance to be the gift of God, and that hereby alone men are ſingled out from the reſt. Now the queſtion is, Whether God ſingleth out ſome men from the reſt by giving them faith and repentance according to the meere pleaſure of his will, or according to their workes? We ſay, according to the meere pleaſure of Gods will, *for he hath mercy on whom he will. Rom:* 9. 18. Arminians ſay according to mens workes; and hereupon in the iſſue comes all their conſolations to be grounded, that is upon a notorious Hereſy condemned above 1200 yeare agoe.

2. But as touching the accommodation of this diſtinction unto thy ſelfe, ſaing *thou art under Gods generall love not under his ſpeciall*: I pray the tell me what ground thou haſt for that? what one of Gods elect, while they were in the ſtate of nature, had not as greate cauſe to be as uncomfortable as thy ſelfe; and why maiſt not thou be in Gods good time in as comfortable a condition as any of them, and to ſay as *John* doth, *ſee what love the father hath ſhewed us that we ſhould be called the ſonnes of God*? doſt thou mourne for thy ſinne or no? if thou doſt not, Why ſhouldeſt thou looke to be partaker of thoſe comforts which are peculiar to them that mourne? If thou doſt, thy Saviour hath ſaid, *Bleſſed are they that mourne for they ſhall be comforted.* Doſt thou hunger and thirſt after the favour of God, and to be made partaker of the righteouſneſſe of Chriſt which alone can give thee aſſurance

of thine election? If thou doeſt not hunger and thirſt after this, why ſhouldeſt thou be caſt downe, becauſe thou haſt not this aſſurance? If thou doeſt deſire this aſſurance, and to that purpoſe haſt an hungry appetite after the righteouſneſſe of Chriſt; thy Saviour ſaith, *Bleſſed are they that hunger and thirſt after righteouſneſſe, for they ſhall be filled.* Or haſt thou a deſire to have thy ſinnes pardoned, and thy ſoule ſaved; but not any deſire that thy ſoule may be ſanctified; what comfort ſhouldeſt thou or any ſuch expect at the hands of God? Thou wouldeſt ſerve the Devill, but thou, wouldeſt not goe to hell with the Devill. But I tell thee, God hath decreed the contrary, namely, that all ſuch ſhall have this doome; *Goe ye curſed into everlaſting fire prepared for the Devill and his Angells.* Yet I will not leave thee, nor give over all hope of thee; for I am glad to heare thee confeſſe, that though thou deſireſt thy ſinne may be pardoned, and thy ſoule ſaved, yet thou haſt no deſire that thy ſoule ſhould be ſanctified; therefore anſwer me but to one thing more, and I have done with thee; Is it thy griefe and ſorrow, that thou haſt no deſire, that thy nature may be ſanctified, or is it no griefe at all unto thee? If it be no griefe unto thee, then ſtill thou takeſt delight in ſinne; and how can delight in ſinne, ſtand with the feare of Gods judgements, and if thou feareſt not God, how canſt thou breake out into ſuch complaints, *Woe is me for I am a Caſt-away*: Theſe motions uſually proceed from the terrours of God; And if thou art once acquainted with Gods terrours, in conſideration of thy ſinnefull condition; then be of good cheere, for theſe ſymptomes are commonly as the pangs of Child-birth, whereby it comes to paſſe, that a Chriſtian ſoule is at length brought forth into the world of grace. And therefore the ſpirit of bondage, to make us feare, doth prepare, and make way for the ſpirit of adoption, whereby we cry *Abba Father.* And by experience I have known ſome, being thus caſt downe, and ſtricken with feares of being caſt-awayes, when they have been demanded which condition they have thought better of, either this preſent condition of feare and terrour, or the former condition of their prophaneneſſe, when they were without all remorſe or check of conſciences; they have readily profeſſed, that this preſent condition of feare and terrour, was the better of the two. Now let us heare how well the comforter plaies his part.

Rom. 8.

Miniſter.

God ſo loves all men, as that he deſires their eternall good; for the Apoſtle ſaith, he would have all to be ſaved, and he would have no man periſh, nor thee in particular.

CONSIDERATION.

He proceeds very judiciouſly I confeſſe, by way of gradation from the Apocryphall, to the Canonicall; but at once he makes uſe both of *corruptor ſtilus*, and *adulter ſenſus*. The very words of the Apoſtle he corrupts; for the Apoſtle no where ſaith that *God would have all to be ſaved*, that God *would have none to periſh*; 'tis θέλει who will have all to be ſaved in the one; and μὴ βουλόμενον, not willing any to periſh in the other. Men would doe many things that they cannot; it is not ſo with God. And if it be not *adulter ſenſus*, to apply this to all and every one, here is comfort indeed with a witneſſe; For if God will ſave every one; and withall can ſave them, whereof there is no doubt to be made, then there are no Reprobates at all; every one is predeſtinate to ſalvation by the will, that is, by the decree of God; *And who hath reſiſted his will*, ſaith S. *Paul*. And will he not have all & every one to believe & repent? If not, then ſeeing he will have all to be ſaved, it follows that God, wil have all men to be ſaved, whether they believe or no, repent or no; But if he will have all to believe & repent, by that will whereby he will have all to be ſaved; ſeeing God can give all men faith and repentance; what followes but that all and every one ſhall believe and repent, & be ſaved, and conſequently, there are no Reprobates at all? But I know full well what their interpretation of this is, namely, that God is ready to give faith and repentance unto all, to wit, in caſe they will; but doth not God give the very will to believe and repent? Yes in caſe they will. Take this comfort then into thy boſome, and make the beſt uſe of it to perſwade thee that thou art no caſt-away; For if thou believeſt and repenteſt, all is ſafe, thou haſt as good aſſurance of thy ſalvation as Gods word can give thee. And though faith

and

and repentance be the gift of God, yet this comforter doth aſſure thee, that *if thou wilt believe thou ſhalt believe, if thou wilt repent thou ſhalt repent.* For God doth not give the grace of faith and repentance, according to the meere pleaſure of his own will, but according to mens workes; for albeit the Apoſtle ſaith, God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth; yet that is not to be underſtood of vocation, but rather of juſtification. And let it not ſtartle thee, that juſtification in Scripture phraſe, is oppoſed to condemnation, and not to obduration, but to thy comfort be it ſpoken, it muſt be oppoſed to obduration here; leaſt otherwiſe faith and repentance ſhould not be given according to mens workes, but according to the meere pleaſure of God; which is a very uncomfortable doctrine. But be thou aſſured, that if thou wilt believe and repent, thou ſhalt believe and repent, ſuch is Gods grace; and though it be as true, I confeſſe, on the other ſide, that if thou wilt not believe and repent, thou ſhalt not believe and repent; yet that is not to be accounted Gods grace, leaſt ſo we ſhould ſay, that Gods grace is as active to evill, as it is unto good. So that hereby thou maiſt ſtill perceive, that all thy comfort depends on this, that the grace of faith and repentance is given according to mens works.

Tempted.

All, is taken two waies: for all ſorts and conditions of men, and for all particular men: God would have all ſorts of men to be ſaved, but not all, or mee in particular.

2. Or if he will have all particular men to be ſaved; yet he wills it only with a revealed Will, but not with a ſecret will, for with that he will have a great company damned. Under his revealed will am I, not the ſecret.

CONSIDERATION.

1. That *All* is taken after theſe two waies in Scripture, and that in this place 1 *Tim.* 2. it is to be taken of *genera ſingulorum*, I have formerly proved, both by the circumſtances of the Text, and by the analogy of faith, for otherwiſe we ſhould trench upon Gods omnipotency and unchangeableneſſe; and laſtly by the judgement of *Auſtin*. But take the meaning aright, not that God *would*, but that God *will* have all men, that is, of all ſorts, even of Kings and Princes, ſome to be ſaved; but not all and every one.

As for the diſtinction of a revealed will, and ſecret will applyed to ſalvation, thou maiſt learne that ſomewhere of Papiſts, but not of us. For the revealed will is Gods commandement; now that which God commands is a part of his Law, ſo is not ſalvation, but rather a reward of obedience. Yet they apply this diſtinction only in reference to faith and repentance, whereunto God hath annexed ſalvation. And it is Gods revealed will that all who heare the Goſpell ſhould believe and repent *ex officio*; but it is not Gods will to give every one of them grace to believe and repent, as we find by manifeſt experience. It was Gods will in like manner to command *Abraham* to ſacrifice his ſonne, but it was not Gods determination that *Iſaack* ſhould be ſacrificed. In like ſort he commanded *Pharaoh* to let Iſrael goe, but withall he told *Moſes*, he would harden *Pharaohs* heart, that he ſhould not let them goe for a long time.

2. But in the accommodation of theſe diſtinctions unto thy ſelfe, What ground haſt thou to affirme, that God willeth not thy ſalvation in particular? If thou believeſt, Gods word aſſureth thee thou ſhalt be ſaved; if thou believeſt not, yet thou maiſt believe; and Gods word hath power to bring thee unto faith, as formerly I have diſcourſed. And as for the beſt of Gods Children who doe believe, to the great comfort of their ſoules, rejoycing with joy unſpeakable and glorious. 1 *Pet.* 1. They were ſometimes in as uncomfortable a condition as thou now art. And the rather I put thee upon this, becauſe I ſee he that takes upon him to comfort thee, doth take a courſe rather to feed thy humour, then to remove it, in as much as he never enquires into the cauſe thereof. For albeit he gave to underſtand, he would apply his argument with as much art and cunning as could be, yet it may be, that was rather with reſpect to the advantage of his own cauſe, then to thy conſolation. But let us ſee whether he mends it in the next.

Miniſter.

Chriſt came into the World to ſeeke and to ſave what was loſt; and is a propitiation, not for our ſinnes only, *i.e.* the ſinnes of a few particular men, or the ſinnes of all ſorts of men, but for the ſinnes of the whole World; therefore he came to ſave thee, for thou waſt loſt; and to be a propitiation for thy ſinnes, for thou art part of the whole World.

CONSIDERATION.

Still he continues to afford thee as much comfort as any Reprobate in the world; and if thou deſireſt no more, thou maiſt reſt ſatisfied with this; but withall I confeſſe, he affords thee as much comfort, as he can afford any of Gods elect, for he maketh elect and Reprobate all alike in receiving comfort from Gods Word. Chriſt came into the world to ſave that which was loſt, but unleſſe he came to ſave all that is loſt, it will not follow that he came to ſave thee. We know that pardon of ſinne and ſalvation is procured by Chriſt, for none but ſuch as believe; and therefore be not deceived, without faith looke for neither; by faith be aſſured of both, and that thou art one of Gods elect and no Reprobate. And obſerve well he tells thee nothing of Chriſt meriting faith and repentance; this now a dayes is plainly denyed by the Remonſtrants; and this Authour is content to ſay nothing of it; when he is put to it we know what muſt be the iſſue of it; if he ſayeth Chriſt hath merited faith and repentance for thee, the meaning is but this; Chriſt hath merited that if thou wilt believe thou ſhalt believe, if thou wilt repent, thou ſhalt repent. And that Chriſt hath merited that God ſhould beſtow faith and repentance not on whom he will according to the meere pleaſure of his will, but according to mens workes.

Cenſura Cenſuræ. p. 59.

The comfort that our doctrine miniſters unto thee, is this, If thou doſt believe in Chriſt, thou maiſt be aſſured thou art an elect of God, if thou doſt not believe, there is no cauſe why thou ſhouldeſt thinke thy ſelfe a Caſt-away: for albeit thou haſt not faith to day, yet thou maiſt have faith to morrow. Give thy ſelfe to Gods Word: and waite upon him in his ordinances, thou maiſt be ſo wrought upon as that unbeliever was, 1 *Cor.* 14. Who is there repreſented falling downe on his face, and confeſſing that God was in the Preacher of a truth. And though at firſt thou attendeſt to it, but in a carnall manner, yet God may open thy heart as he opened the heart of *Lidia*, and make thee attend unto it in a gracious manner.

Act. 16. 14.

Tempted.

The World (as I have heard) is taken two waies in Scripture, Largely for all mankind; and ſtrictly for the elect, or believers: In this latter ſenſe Chriſt dyed for the World. Or if for all, yet it was only *dignitate pretii*, not *voluntate propoſiti*; thus only for a few ſelected ones, with whom it is not my lot to be numbred.

CONSIDERATION.

Suffer not thy ſelfe to be abuſed by them, who pretending thy comfort, yet ſeeke nothing leſſe, but only the promoting of their owne cauſe. And obſerve how he takes notice of no other benefits of Chriſts death, then ſuch as belong unto men upon the condition of faith, to wit, pardon of ſinne and Salvation; in which caſe the mention of Gods elect comes in very unſeaſonably. And thus is the love of God ſet forth unto us; *ſo God loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Sonne, that whoſoever believeth in him ſhould not periſh but have everlaſting life:* And if it be not thy lot to be numbred amongſt believers, then we can give thee, by Gods Word, no aſſurance of thy Salvation. But if thou art not a believer yet, thou maiſt be in good time as formerly I have ſpoken more at large; and therefore no reaſon to think thou art a Reprobate. And if once thou doſt believe in Chriſt, our doctrine gives thee aſſurance of Juſtification, Salvation, and Election; the Arminan doctrine doth not.

As for faith and repentance, we ſay Chriſt hath merited them alſo, but to be beſtowed how? According to mens workes ſay our Arminians, though forraine Arminians profeſſe plainly that Chriſt merited not faith and regeneration for any. And if thou reliſheſt this comfort, be ſatisfied with it; we ſay faith and repentance are beſtowed abſolutely according to the meere pleaſure of Gods will, and accordingly

dingly Chriſt merited them, but not for all, for then all ſhould believe and repent and be ſaved; but only for ſome, and who can theſe be but Gods elect; whence it followeth clearly that whoſoever believes may by our doctrine be aſſured of his election, not ſo by the doctrine of Arminians; but if thou believeſt not thou art in no worſe caſe then the beſt of Gods childern have been; for there was a time when they believed not; therefore thou haſt no more cauſe to think thy ſelfe a caſt-away then they had.

Miniſter.

God hath founded an univerſall Covenant with men upon the bloud of Chriſt, and therefore he intended it ſhould be ſhed for all men univerſally; he hath made a promiſe of ſalvation to every one that will believe, and excludes none that will not believe.

CONSIDERATION.

This I confeſſe is to adminiſter as much comfort, as is adminiſtred to any Reprobate; but how can this qualify thy diſcomfort, and diſcontent, which riſeth from this conceit, that thou art a Reprobate. And the truth is, that by our Doctrine, wee were all in a miſerable caſe, if Gods Covenant of grace extended no farther then this. But hath not God promiſed to be our Lord, and our God that ſanctifyeth us, to circumciſe our hearts, and the hearts of our Children, to love the Lord our God with all our hearts: to take the ſtony heart out of our bowells, and give us an heart of fleſh, and to put his own ſpirit within us; as he ſeeth our waies, ſo to heale them, yea, to heale our back-ſlidings, to heale our rebellions. All this, this ſweet comforter takes no notice of, contenting himſelfe with ſuch a grace to be merited for him by Chriſt as this, if he will believe he ſhall believe; if he will repent he ſhall repent; if he will love God with all his heart, he ſhall love him with all his heart. Yet when a man doth believe, they are able to give him no aſſurance of his ſalvation, or of his election; becauſe they maintaine, that a man may totally and finally fall away from grace: And all becauſe their doctrine is, that Gods effectuall grace in working the act of faith and repentance, is given meerely according to mens works.

Ezek. 20.12. Deut.30.6. Ezek.36. 27, 28. Eſ. 57. 18. Hoſ. 14. 5.

Tempted.

God purpoſed that his Sonne ſhould dye for all men, and that in his name an offer of remiſſion of ſinnes, and ſalvation ſhould be made to every one, but yet upon this condition, that they will doe that which he meanes the greateſt part ſhall never doe (*i.e.* Repent and believe) nor I among the reſt.

CONSIDERATION.

How doth God meane that *the greateſt part of men ſhall never believe and repent*, by our opinion? Is it in this ſence, that they ſhall not believe and repent if they will? When was it ever knowne that any of our Divines ever wrote or taught this? We think rather it is impoſſible it ſhould be otherwiſe, & therefore ſay it is a very abſurd thing to call this [Grace] as the Arminians doe. Indeed we ſay that God doth not meane by his preventing grace to work the wills of the greateſt part of men to believe & repent: Doe not the Arminians ſay ſo too? Yes verily, and a great deale more: for they deny that he workes any mans will to believe and repent in this manner; but we ſay God purchaſeth thus to worke the wills of all his choſen ones, and when he hath wrought them, to keepe *them by his power through faith unto Salvation; and put his feare in their hearts, that they ſhall never depart a way from him. Jer* 32. 40. And upon this ground we can aſſure believers of their election which Arminians cannot; And them that believe not, keepe from diſpaire in better manner then the Arminians can, for they leave them to themſelves to believe; whereas the Scriptures ſhew that to be impoſſible: ſo that they take upon them to comfort ſuch quite againſt the haire. But we comfort them with a poſſibility of being converted unto God by repreſenting his allmighty power, whoſe voyce is able to pierce into the graves and make dead *Lazarus* heare it. This power he ſhewed in converting *Saul*, when he marched furiouſly (*Jehu* like) againſt the Church of God. Therfore be thou of good comfort, eſpecially conſidering thou art as it were under the wings of God, thou heareſt his voyce; many come out of their graves at his call; ſome at one time, ſome at another,

1 Pet. 1. Ier.32.40.

and ſo maiſt thou God knowes how ſoone; then ſhalt thou be aſſured of thine election, which by Arminianiſme thon canſt not be; in the meane time thou haſt no cauſe to conclude that thou art a Reprobate.

Miniſter.

God hath a true meaning, that all men who are called ſhould repent and believe, that ſo they might be ſaved; as he would have all to be ſaved, ſo to come to the knowledge of the truth; and as he would have no man to periſh, ſo he would have all men to repent, and therefore he calls them in the Preaching of the word to the one, as well as to the other.

CONSIDERATION.

He keepes his courſe to afford thee the beſt comfort his doctrine yeelds, which is as much as is incident to a Reprobate, and how that ſhould make thee conceive better of thy ſelfe, then as of a Reprobate, I doe not perceive, *Gods meaning is* that as many as heare the Goſpell ſhould believe and repent *ex officio*; that is, that it ſhall be their duty, for he commands it: but he hath no meaning to beſtow on all and every one the grace of faith and repentance, as appeares by experience. And if God did will they ſhould *de facto* believe and be ſaved, then either God is not able to bring them to faith and to ſave them, or elſe his will is changed. In like ſort if it were his will that all and every one ſhould know his truth, then God is not able to make all and every one know his truth, for it is apparent that all doe not; it is apparent that all have not the Goſpell; The Apoſtle ſaith, *That God will not have any of us to periſh but all to come to repentance*: he doth not ſay he *would* but he *will:* And this is true of πάντας ἡμᾶς, ſuch as the Apoſtle ſpeakes of, believers and elect. But as for others, the Scriptures plainly profeſſe, that God blinds them, hardens them; and of *Iſraell* in the wilderneſſe, *The Lord* (ſaith *Moſes*) *hath not given you an heart to perceive, nor eyes to ſee, nor eares to heare unto this day. Deut*: 29. 4. He calls all that heare the Goſpell indifferently by the Miniſtry of the Word, but he openeth not the heart of all to attend unto it, as to the Word of God, like as we read he opened the heart of *Lidia. Acts.* 16. 14.

Tempted.

God hath a double call, outward by his word, inward by the irreſiſtible work of his ſpirit; with this he doth not call every man to believe, but a very few only, whom he hath infallibly, and inevitably, ordained to eternall life, and therefore by the outward call, which I enjoy among many others, I cannot be aſſured of Gods good will and meaning, that I ſhall believe, repent, and be ſaved.

CONSIDERATION.

Our Doctrine teacheth not that God calls every one by his Word, that is an Arminian interjection. But the outward call belongs to many more then are choſen, as our Saviour ſayth, *many are called but few are choſen*; Indeed he gives faith and repentance to a very few, which no Arminian denyes; only the Queſtion is, Whether God gives faith and repentance to whom he will, or according to mens works. We ſaytis to whom he will, proceeding herein according to the meere pleaſure of his will; and not according to mens workes; which to affirme is manifeſt Pelagianiſme, and publikely condemned many hundred yeares agoe. It is true, if thou doſt not believe, Gods Word doth not aſſure thee that he will make thee believe; that were to aſſure thee of thine election before thy vocation; a moſt unreaſonable thing to be expected. But God by his word aſſures thee, that tis his meaning that without faith thou ſhalt not be ſaved. Yet there is no cauſe thou ſhouldeſt think thy ſelfe a Reprobate; for this was the condition of every one of Gods elect before their calling. It may be thou maiſt have experience of the ſame power of divine grace, to bring thee to faith alſo, and to repentance; therefore ſeeing Gods Word is the only meanes to worke faith, *waite daily at his Gates and give attendance at the poſts of his doores*; and doe not preſcribe unto him, or ſay with *Joram, Shall I wait upon the Lord any longer?* though it be long ere he calls thee, yet it may goe never a whit the worſe with thee for that, for ſometimes it falleth out that the laſt are firſt, and the firſt laſt: and the commendation that *Auſtin* makes, of the Theef's faith upon the Croſſe, is remarkeable, *De orig. animæ, lib.* 1. *cap.* 9. *Tanto pondere appenſum*

2 King. 6.

appenſum eſt, tantumq; valuit apud eum qui hæc novit appendere, quod confeſſus eſt dominum crucifixum, quantum ſi fuiſſet pro Domino crucifixus. Tunc enim fides ejus de ligno floruit, quando diſcipulorum marcuit, niſi cujus mortis terrore marcuerunt ejus reſurrectione revireſceret. Illi enim deſperaverunt de moriente, ille ſperavit in commorientem. Refugerunt illi authorem vitæ, rogavit ille conſortem pœnæ. Doluerunt illi tanquam homines mortem, credidit ille regnaturum eſſe poſt mortem, Deſeruerunt illi ſponſorem ſalutis, honoravit ille ſocium crucis. Inventa eſt in eo mensura Martyris, qui tunc in Chriſtum credidit, quando defecerunt, qui futuri erant Martyres.

2. From the Comedy I come to the Tragedy, I meane the ſtory of *Spira*. *Sleidan* ſaith of him, that *Incredibili ardore cæpit complecti puriorem doctrinam: & cum indies magis magisq; proficeret, non domi tantum apud amicos quid ſentiret de ſingulis dogmatis, verum etiam paſſim apud omnes explicabat.* Tidings hereof coming to the Popes Legat then at *Venice* *John Caſa* Arch-Biſhop of *Beneventum*, he convents *Spira*, who confeſſeth his errour before him, intreats pardon, and promiſeth obedience for time to come. The Legat not contented with this, commands him to goe home, and publiquely to revoke his errour. *Sleidan* writes no more here of but this, *Accipit ille conditionem, & licet etiam tum inciperet ipſum pœnitere facti, tamen urgentibus amicis, qui non ipſius modo, ſed conjugis etiam & liberorum & facultatum ipſius ſpem totam in eo poſitam dicerent, obtemperavit.* *Oſiander* writes that *peſſimo conſilio obſecutus, abnegando veritatem cœleſtem perrexit, eamq; publice ut hæreſin blaſphemavit & abjuravit.* The diſtreſſe of conſcience which overtooke him hereupon is notorious, the iſſue whereof was to end his woefull dayes more woefully in deſpaire. But nothing more ſtrange then his diſcourſes and meditations in the midſt of this his deſperate condition. As for the particulars following, 1: Touching the greatneſſe of his ſinne, and that he was taken off from that by the example of *Peter*, I find no ſuch thing neither in *Sleidan*, nor *Oſiander*, nor in *Goulartius*; but rather in this latter, who makes the largeſt relation thereof taken out of the diſcourſe of one *Henry Scringer*, a learned Lawyer who was then at *Padua*, who did ſee, and many times talke with this poore *Spira*; I find that which makes to the contrary, namely, that the ſinne which he laid to his owne charge was the ſinne againſt the Holy Ghoſt. And no example I truſt neither of *Peter*, nor any other was ſufficient to take him off from deſpaire in ſuch a caſe. 2. And as for the diſcourſe here ſuggeſted of his abſolute reprobation, which he oppoſed againſt their comforts miniſtred unto him, no mention thereof, neither in *Sleidan*, nor in *Oſiander*; nay *Oſiander* writes that he was wiſh'd to revoke *doctrinam Lutheranam*, and this was it which he did (as he ſayeth) blaſpheme as an hereſy, and abjure. *Goulartius* indeed relates how he conceived himſelfe to be reprobated of God, as juſtly he might in caſe he judged himſelfe to have ſinned againſt the Holy Ghoſt; And as for that which is here ſet down in Latin, of him that is a Reprobate, namely, that *neceſſario condemnabitur*, though his ſins be ſmall & few, & that *nihil intereſt multa an pauca, magna an parva ſint; quando nec Dei miſericordia, nec Chriſti ſanguis quicquam ad eos pertinet.* Neither *Sleidan*, nor *Oſiander* nor *Goulartius* makes any mention of it. And therefore I wonder not that he neither followeth *Sleidan*, nor *Oſiander* much leſſe that he followes not *Goulartius*. He cites *Cælius ſecundus* and *Calvin* as his Authours, and ſome others that wrot thereof to their friends, but names them not; as neither where it is that *Cælius ſecundus* makes mention of it, or in what booke of *Calvin* it is found. I imagined it might be in his Epiſtles; I have ſpent ſome houres in ſearching therein from the yeare 1545 to the yeare 1663, and can find nothing concerning it. Now *Goulartius* wrote ſince *Cælius ſecundus*, and *Calvin* and *Sleidan*, and his relation is large; and it ſemes he inquired in to it ſomewhat better then they that went before him. And thus he relates it out of the diſcourſe of *Henry Scringer* a Lawyer of *Padua*, who ſaw *Spira* at that time, and divers times ſpake with him.

In a ſmall towne of the territory of *Padua* called *Civitelle* there was a Learned Lawyer, and advocat, a wiſe and very rich, man and an honourable father of a family, called *Francis Spira*, who having ſayd and done divers things againſt his conſcience, to maintaine himſelfe and his charge, (obſerve by the way he delivers the cauſe only in generall concealing the ſpeciality, it being ſo ſtrang a teſtimony and evidence againſt the Romiſh Religion) being returned to his houſe, he could never reſt an houre, not a minut, nor have any eaſe of his continuall anguiſh: And even from that night he was ſo terrified and had ſuch horrour of his actions, as he held himſelfe for loſt. For (as he himſelfe did afterward confeſſe) he did ſet plainely before his eyes, all the torments, all the paines of the damned, and in his ſoule did heare the fearfull ſentences, being drawne before the judgment ſeat of Jeſus Chriſt (a fearfull

example

example to all Apoſtates;) The next day and ſo following he was not ſeene to reſume any courage, but his ſpirits were ſtrangely troubled, and the terrour tooke from him all reſt and appetite. This accident was ſo greivous to his friends, as ſome repented them much that they had beene the cauſe of ſo great an inconvenience, by their intreaties. Others, thinking it did proceed from ſome cholerick or melancholy humour, were of opinion to ſend him to *Padova* to be Phyſicked by the Learned Phyſitians, revived by honorable company, and ſetled by the coference of Learned men there, to ſome of which he was well knowne. His Wife and Children with ſome of his familiar friends did accompany him, and he was lodged in one of the chiefe houſes. *Friſimilega Bellocat* and *Craſſus* (famous Phyſitians) did viſit him, and give him Phyſicke with ſingular affection: and ſoone found that he was little ſicke in body, but grievouſly in mind, for in all other things he diſcourſed gravely, and conſtanſtly, ſo as none of his familiar friends could diſcerne that the quickneſſe of his diſcourſe was any thing impaired. Continuing ſtill in his weakneſſe, many were much troubled, and dayly his Chamber was full of People; ſome curious to ſee and heare, others were deſirous to draw him to hope in the mercies of God; I was preſent at many of his ſpeeches, with ſome men of honour and Learning. To deliver that which I could obſerve, I began firſt to note his age and his faſhion. He was about 50 yeares old, free from the violent paſſions of youth, and from the coldneſſe of old age. Nothing came out of his mouth, that was light or fooliſhly ſpoken: or that might diſcover any doting in him; although he did dayly diſcourſe of grave and important matters with the Learned, and that ſome did propound unto him high queſtions eſpecially in Divinity.

2. I will briefly relate ſame ſpeeches they had with him. During his abode at *Padua* and I will not forget that he declared with a ſetled judgment, that he did ſee the eternall vengeance of God prepared againſt the ſinne, that he had committed: (This was the true cauſe of his diſpaire, and not an ungrounded conceit of his reprobation; but the conſcience of his ſinne caſt him upon this, and made him conceive he was a Reprobate.) For that he did find in him ſelfe that thoſe things which God had given to others to rejoyce their ſpirits, all conſpired againſt him in deſpite of his horrible forfeit: (I doubt the phraſe here in the originall was not well underſtood by the Traſlatour;) For although, ſaid he, that God for a great bleſſing had promiſed to many holy men a goodly iſſue, and a great number of children, in whoſe love and obedience they may repoſe their age; yet in the midſt of his miſeries, The hands and faces of his Children were as horrible unto him as the hangmans (and indeed for the good of his children he renounced Gods truth for meere temporall reſpects.) It cannot well be expreſſed what griefe & vexation he ſeemed to receive when his children brought him meat, forcing him to eat, and threatning him when he refuſed it. He confeſſed his children did their dutyes, and yet he tooke it in ill part, ſaying, that he did not acknowledge God any more for his father, but did feare him as his adverſary armed with judgment. For he had been three weeks in this apprehenſion, when he ſpake these things, without eating or drinking, but what they forced him unto, the which he received with great difficulty, reſiſting with all his power, and ſpitting out that which they forced him to take. Some of the Aſſiſtants were of opinion to make him afraid, to make him the more apt to receive food, firſt for the ſoule, then for the body; asking him if he did not feare greater and ſharper torments after this life then thoſe he then felt. He confeſſed that he expected farre more ſharpe, and had already horror of them: yet he deſired nothing more then to be caſt headlong in to them, that he might not feare other more grevious torments. They asked him againe if he thought his ſinne ſo foule as it could not be pardoned through the bounty and infinite mercy of God? His anſwer was, that he had ſinned againſt the Holy Ghoſt, which was ſo great a ſinne, as is called a ſinne unto death; that is to ſay, ſubject to the eternall vengeance of God, and to the paines of Hell: (now judge I pray whether the example of *Peter* was ſufficient to take him off from deſperation; for will any ſay that *Peter* in denying his Maſter ſinned againſt the Holy Ghoſt;) whereof (to wit, the ſinne againſt the Holy Ghoſt) this poore wretch diſcourſed amply, learnedly, and too ſubtilly againſt him ſelfe: Learned and Godly men, which did aſſiſt him, omitted no teſtimonies that might aſſure a wounded conſcience that God is mercifull, gentle and ready to pardon. But all this could not divert him from this opinion, neither could they draw any other thing from him, then that he deſired much that he

he might returne to ſome hope of pardon. But it fares with me (ſaith he) as with criminall perſons, ſhut up in cloſe priſons, and fettered hand and foot. Sometimes they are ſaluted by their friends paſſing by, who adviſe them to breake Priſon, and to deceive their guards if they can. Such Priſoners would gladly follow their counſell, but it is a vaine deſire: Even ſo is mine, ſaid he.

3. As for the Scriptures which were cited to him, touching the love and affection of God the Father, by reaſon of his Sonne Jeſus Chriſt, he did avow them; adding, that they belonged only to them, whom Jeſus Chriſt did repute his brethren, and his members; but as for him, he had renounced that love, and willingly rejected brotherly alliance, neither was ignorant in how great tranquillity of mind they might be, who had once embraced the promiſes of ſalvation, and did wreſt them continually therein. For confirmation whereof, this his ſad diſaſter (ſaid he) was propounded for an example before all mens eyes: that if they were wiſe they ſhould not hold it light, nor happened by any chance, but to learne by his ruine, how dangerous it is, to fall any thing from that which belongs to the great glory of the Sonne of God: Adding that it was a ſlippery, and very dangerous paſſage, yea moſt fearfull to him that ſtood not carefully on his Guard. Moreover foraſmuch as ſuch evident examples, of the vengeance of Almighty God did ſeldome appeare to the eyes of men, they deſerved to be the more carefully regarded. That amongſt a great number of Reprobates in the World, his calamity was not ſingular; but his only puniſhment and ruine did ſatisfy God, a juſt Judge to admoniſh all others to have a care of themſelves. He added withall, that therein he did acknowledge the ſeverity of Gods judgement, who had choſen him to make him a ſpectacle, rather then any other, and to admoniſh all by one mans mouth, to abſtaine from all iniquity; confeſſing withall, that there was no reproach or puniſhment, which he had not deſerved, by reaſon of his foule offence. After he had diſcourſed thus ſincerely and gravely of the juſtice Divine, he ſaid they ſhould not take it ſtrange, this his long ſpeech touching the true reaſon of the will of God: for that oftentimes God doth wreſt out of the mouthes of Reprobates, moſt aſſured teſtimonies of his Majeſty, his juſtice, and his fearfull vengeance. How ſtrangely doth he plead for Gods juſtice againſt himſelfe as a Reprobate? when our Arminians are like to blaſpheame that juſtice of God againſt *Spira*, which *Spira* juſtifies againſt himſelfe, uſing a long diſcourſe upon this ſentence, and deſirous to ſhew the greatneſſe of Gods judgements. There are ſome (ſaith he) who have all things ſo wiſhfully, as they live in all delights, who notwithſtanding are regiſtred for perdition, whereof Jeſus Chriſt propounds an example in the rich man. *Luc.* 16. That God doth often propound to mankind an hope of reward to draw them to the right beliefe of his holy will, and oftimes withdrawes them from impieties, by fearfull and prodigious ſignes. And yet as impiety is naturall to men, they make not their profit of ſuch inſtructions, and think not that it concernes them: but impute it to any other thing, rather then to the wiſdome of God, to feare and reverence him: Hereupon he made a bitter invective againſt a certain Philoſopher, whom he had known above twenty years before, for that his Moroſoph had been ſo impudent to deliver in his leſſons, yea to write it, and publiſh it in Print, that all the Miracles that Chriſt had done upon the earth, might well be done by a man that were skilfull in the knowledge of naturall things. It were hard to repreſent the admiration wherewith they were ſurprized, and with what compaſſion they were moved, that came to viſit him, for the diſcourſes which they heard come from his mouth. Every man laboured to reduce this poore man, to ſome hope of his ſalvation. Among others there was one, a Reverend man for his holineſſe of life, who departed not from the Patients bed, it was the Biſhop of *Capod' Iſtria* in the Venetians Territory; (This was *Vergerius*, who afterwards renounced Popery, and became a Proteſtant:) He ceaſed not to exhort *Spira*, and ceaſed not by many teſtimonies of the holy Scriptures, to divert him from that apprehenſion; Adding that he did not think his ſpirit was altogether voyd and deſtitute, of ſome good and heavenly inſpirations, ſeeing he ſpake ſo holily and devoutly of the excellency of Chriſtian Religion.

4. Although the ſick man knew ful well that theſe admonitions proceeded

from a ſincere and true heart; yet for that he had diverſe times rejected them, he began to frowne, ſaying to the Biſhop, you believe, as I think, that I doe willingly nouriſh this obſtinacy in my mind, and that I take delight in this vehement paſſion of deſpaire: If you be of that opinion, you are deceived: I will tell you, to the end you may know my reſolution, that if I could be perſwaded that the judgement of God, might by any meanes be changed or mitigated for mee, it ſhould not grieve me to be tormented ten thouſand yeares, with the ſharpeſt paines of hell, ſo as I might have any hope of reſt after this long ſufferance. But even in that whereby you doe exhort me to gather any hope, I ſee all meanes of health and pardon taken from me. For if the teſtimonies of holy Scripture have any authority (as they have) doe you thinke that Jeſus Chriſt hath ſaid in vaine, that he which hath renounced him before men, he will renounce him before his heavenly father? Doe you not ſee that it concernes me, and that it is as it were, particularly verified in my perſon? What ſhall become of him, whom the Sonne hath diſavowed before his Father, when as you ſay, we muſt hope for no ſalvation but in Jeſus Chriſt. Thereupon he did expound certain paſſages of the Epiſtle to the Hebrewes, and of the ſecond Catholique Epiſtle of Saint *Peter*, out of which he drew terrible concluſions againſt himſelfe. Wee cannot believe with what gravity and vehemency, his words were delivered, neither was there ever heard man pleading better for himſelfe, then *Spira* did then againſt himſelfe. He did alleadge notable things of Gods juſtice, deteſting his forepaſſed life; admoniſhing all that were about him, very earneſtly, not to think that Chriſtian life was a light thing, and eaſily diſcharged. That it doth not conſiſt only in having the head Baptiſed, in reading certaine verſes and texts of the Goſpell, and to be termed an honeſt man, but it was needfull to live as the word of truth doth command him. Thereupon he repeated a Text out of Saint *Peter*, exhorting us to ſhew through holineſſe of life, certain ſignes of the love of God towards us, and of the confidence we ſhould have in him: He ſaid moreover, that he had known many who after they had taſted the ſweetneſſe of true felicity, ſuffered themſelves ſo to be carried away, as they had no longer care to performe that which belonged to a child of God.

5. He proteſted that he had ſometimes imagined, that his ſinnes had been hidden, and that he could not be puniſhed, for that Chriſt had made ſatisfaction for them: but then he knew too late, that thoſe things belonged only to the elect, and choſen of God, betwixt whoſe ſinnes, and the celeſtiall Throne, Jeſus Chriſt ſets his precious bloud, and the dignity of his obedience, as a veile and ſhadow to cover them, and doth plant them againſt the Divine vengeance, as an high and ſtrong Rampart, that ſinners repenting them, might not be oppreſt, nor drowned with the deluge and overflowings of their offences and ſinnes. As for himſelfe, ſeeing that he had renounced our Saviour Jeſus Chriſt (here was the true burthen of his ſorrowfull heart) he had, as one ſhould ſay, overthrowne this ſtrong Rampart with his own hands, ſo that after this ruine, and overflowing the deluge of waters of this vengeance, had covered and ſwallowed up his ſoule. One of his moſt familiar friends ſaid unto him, that he did hold the cauſe of this his great torment, proceeded from abundance of Melancholy humours, that did ſo trouble his braine. *Spira* remembring that he had many times refuted that opinion, and ſeeing they were to begin againe, ſaid unto the other; You may think what you pleaſe, but God in truth hath troubled my ſpirit, and deprived me of judgement; ſeeing it is impoſſible for me to have any hope of my ſalvation. Having continued in ſuch and the like ſpeeches, during his abode at *Padua*, they carried him back, to his own houſe at *Civitelle*, where he dyed in this deſpaire.

DISCOVRSE.

DISCOURSE.

SECT. III.

It makes Miniſters unable to afford true comfort to the tempted; and this it doth, becauſe it

1. Takes from them all ſolid grounds of comfort.
2. Leaves them only weake and inſufficient grounds.

1. It bereaves them of the ſolid grounds of comfort; which are theſe. 1. The univerſality of Gods love. 2. Of Chriſts death. 3. And of the covenant of grace. That Miniſter which doth explaine and apply theſe three things ſoundly, and wiſely to him that is tempted in this kind, doth that which is abundantly enough for the relieving and releaſing of him from his temptation, and he that doth not apply theſe, leaves him as he found him in the midſt of his temptation ſtill, whatſoever may be ſaid to the contrary in the hear of diſputation.

Etſi multa diſputantur durius (ſaith *Melanchthon*) *tamen neceſſe eſt in vero agone ad hanc arcem confugere, videlicet, quod de voluntate Dei indicandum ſit ex verbo expreſſo, & quod promiſſio ſit univerſalis, & quod ſit mandatum Dei æternum & immutabile audire filium & aſſentiri promiſſioni.* Though there be many things diſputed in this poynt more harſhly, yet when all is done, the univerſall promiſe of grace, and ſalvation, is a Chriſtians only Bulwarke in this temptation, and combate. *Obtemperemus igitur* (ſaith he) *ne vagentur animi quærentes electionem extra verbum, & relicto Chriſto, & omiſſo mandato de amplectenda promiſſione; ſed teneamus certa eſt indubitata fide promiſſionem gratiæ non inanem eſſe fabulam; ſed Deum vere patefeciſſe voluntatem ſuam in promiſſione, & verè præſtare quod promiſit.* Let us not therefore leave Chriſt and looke for an election out of the word, but let us judge of Gods will, in ſaving men by the promiſe, and commandement, which are both univerſall. And in another place of the ſame booke, he hath theſe words. *Sicut eſt neceſſe ſcire Evangelium promiſſionem eſſe gratuitam, ita eſt neceſſe ſcire Evangelium promiſſionem univerſalem eſſe, hanc univerſalem tenere neceſſe eſt, adverſus periculoſas imaginationes de prædeſtinatione, ne diſputemus hanc promiſſionem ad paucos quoſdam alios pertinere, non pertinere ad nos. Non enim dubium eſt, quin omnium animos hæc cogitatio exerceat.* As it is needfull to know that the promiſe of ſalvation is free, ſo it is needfull to know and hold, that it is univerſall, againſt ſome dangerous conceits of predeſtination, &c. By theſe ſpeeches we ſee clearely, what this learned man thought to be the true balme of Gilead, whereby a wounded ſoule ſhould be cured, *viz.* the univerſality of the promiſe (and of Gods love and Chriſts death too, for they all hang together, and cannot be diſjoyned.) The reaſon why theſe grounds are able to help a man in this caſe, is twofold. *Melanct. loc. com. p. 526. c. de Prædeſt.*

1. Becauſe they are directly contradictory to the temptation; a will to ſave all, a giving of Chriſt to death for all, and an offer of grace to all, cannot poſſibly ſtand with an abſolute antecedent will, and intent of caſting away the greateſt part of mankind, or indeed any one man in the world. Upon this followes the ſecond reaſon.

2. Becauſe they ſerve to convict the tempted, that he cannot be in that condition in which he ſuppoſeth himſelfe to be. For if two contradictories cannot be true, he that evinceth the truth of the one, convinceth the underſtanding of the untruth of the other: and he that makes it appeare that this contradictory, [God would have all to be ſaved, redeemed, and called to repent and believe,] is true, puts it out of doubt to the underſtanding, that the other contradictory, [God will have moſt men to be abſolutely, and inevitably damned,] muſt needs be falſe, and ſo raiſeth up that poore ſoule that was preſſed downe with an erroneous conceit and feare that it was true. In this manner did *Junius* (though not in the ſame temptation) relieve a Woman perplexed exceedingly with a ſtrong perſwaſion, that ſhee and all her Children ſhould be damned; becauſe ſhe was buſied about her Children at a certain time, when ſhe ſhould have been at Maſſe. *Junius* maketh ſhort work with her, tells her that her employment about her Children, was a duty pleaſing unto God, but the Maſſe was a meere Will-worſhip: and ſo delivering her of her errour, (upon which the temptation was built,) gives her preſent eaſe and comfort. In like manner tell a man that feares he is an abſolute reprobate, that there are no ſuch abſolute Reprobates, and that his feare is but a meere fancy, and his doubt a dreame; convince him once by contradictory grounds that there is no man in the World in that ſtate in which he thinkes himſelfe to be, and you drive out one naile by another, and expell the temptation. Theſe are the Sword of *Alexander*, which will cut aſunder the *Gordian* knot of abſolute Reprobation, and theſe are the true Nepenthes of a ſicke ſoule.

Now theſe true Grounds of hope and comfort, a Miniſter cannot make uſe of, that holds abſolute Reprobation; if he doe uſurpe them, he cannot maintaine them againſt the replyes of the tempted, unleſſe he relinquiſh his opinion; becauſe (as I have ſaid) there is a plain contradiction between them, and no man is able to maintaine two propoſitions, which ſpeake contrary things, to be both true, any more then he can make it good, that the ſame thing may have a being, and yet not have a being at the ſame time. For example, a Miniſter comes to comfort a man, that thinkes himſelfe to be an abſolute Reprobate; and how doth he ſet about it? He tells him, that God would have all to be ſaved, that Chriſt dyed for all, &c. But what right hath he to theſe grounds of comfort, holding the contrary concluſions. *viz.* That God will have a great many to be damned, and to have no part in Chriſt? Well he uſurpes them notwithſtanding, but is he able to maintaine them againſt the anſwer of the tempted, can he make a good reply? No: for thus the tempted anſwers, God would have all to be ſaved with a revealed will, and, Chriſt died for all ſufficiently, not intentionally: Or if God did intend that he ſhould dye for all, yet he intended it upon a condition, which he purpoſeth, the moſt ſhould never performe; What can the Miniſter reply upon this? If he will make a direct reply, that ſhall take away the anſwer, he muſt deny that God hath two wills contrary to each other; a ſecret will, that many ſhall be unavoydably damned, and a revealed will that all may be poſſibly ſaved; and he muſt alſo deny that God hath an intent, that Chriſt ſhould not dye for a great many; or that he intended he ſhould dye for all, upon condition they ſhould believe and repent; and yet intend that the moſt ſhould never believe and repent. But can he deny theſe things? He cannot, except he deny his own concluſion, and opinion, which is, that there are many thouſands, eternally and unavoydably rejected in Gods abſolute purpoſe, from grace and glory for ever: For that concluſion is all one, with the anſwer of the tempted, and contradictory to thoſe arguments of comfort, which he is glad to make uſe of. Abſolute reprobation therefore, bereaves that Miniſter, who believes it, of the ſolid grounds of conſolation, and ſo makes him unable to recover a poore ſoule wounded with this temptation.

TWISSE

Conſideration.

1. HEre in this Section the queſtion is, Whether our Doctrine of abſolute Reprobation, bereaves a Miniſter of the ſolid grounds of comfort? Still wee muſt remember how magnificently this Author goes on, to confound things that differ. For whereas we maintaine that God hath decreed to proceed abſolutely with men, only in the giving and denying of grace, not abſolutely in the giving of ſalvation, or inflicting of damnation. And this Author, though he ſo carrieth the matter all along, as if we maintained Gods proceeding to be abſolute herein, to wit, in granting ſalvation to ſome, and inflicting damnation upon others, yet hath he no meanes to help himſelfe herein, and caſt a ſhew of a true crimination, but by flying to Gods abſolute proceedings, in giving or denying grace. And albeit in this poynt, wholly conſiſts the Criſis of this Controverſy, yet this Author utterly declines the ſifting thereof, as ſome precipice and breake-neck unto his cauſe; to wit, Whether God gives and denyes grace according to the meere pleaſure of his will, or according to mens workes; albeit the iſſue of all his comforts comes to this, namely, that either God is not the Author of our faith, (which now adaies the Remonſtrants with open mouth profeſſe, that Chriſt merited for none,) or if to juggle with the World they pretend an acknowledgement, that God is the Author of it, yet they plainly profeſſe, that he diſpenſeth it to ſome, and denyes it to others, according to ſome good condition, or diſpoſition, he findes in the one, and which he findes not in another. But let us take into conſideration what theſe ſolid grounds of comfort are, whereof a Miniſter is bereaved by our Doctrine; Three I find here mentioned; *A treble Univerſality.* 1. *of Gods love.* 2. *Of Chriſts death.* 3. *Of the Covenant of grace.* As if univerſality now adayes were a better Character of the Arminian faith, then of the Roman Religion. I may take liberty to equivocate a little, when this Authour equivocates throughout, and that in a caſe, wherein is moſt intollerable, in a caſe of conſolation to be miniſtred to *conſcientia timorata*, as *Nider* calls it, a poore afflicted ſoule as this Authour expreſſeth it. To the diſcovery whereof I will now proceed, having ſignified in the firſt place, that all theſe conſolations are no other, but ſuch as every Reprobate is capable of, as well as the Children of God, which is ſo apparent as needs no proofe; only in the iſſue of their Tenet, the faith of them freeth a man from the conceit of being an abſolute Reprobate.

bate. So that in effect it comes to this; Thou poore afflicted ſoul, be of good comfort, for if thou wilt hearken unto me, and imbrace thoſe ſolid grounds of comfort which I will reveale unto thee, aſſure thy ſelfe they ſhall be as the Balme of Gilead unto thy ſoule; whereby thou maiſt be confident, that albeit it may be thou art a Reprobate, and that God from everlaſting hath ordained thee unto damnation, that yet certainly thou art no abſolute Reprobate, no more then *Cain*, or *Eſau*, *Saul*, or *Judas*, or the Devills were; For theſe my principles will aſſure thee that there never was, nor is, nor ſhall be any abſolute Reprobate throughout the world.

2. I come to the examining of them particularly,& to ſhew that every one of them is as it were againſt the haire. So evident are the teſtimonies of Scripture againſt them all; and they are obtruded upon a ſuperficiary and moſt moſt unſound interpretation of Scripture in ſome places. For 1. as touching the firſt, *the univerſality of Gods love*; For hereby Gods love is made indifferent unto all, and conſequently towards *Eſau* as well as to *Jacob*, whereas the Scripture profeſſeth that *God loved Jacob and hated Eſau*; and this the Apoſtle makes equivalent to the Oracle dilivered to *Rebekah* concerning them before they were borne. 2. He might as well have propoſed it, of the univerſallity of Gods mercy; whereas the Scripture expreſſely diſtinguiſheth between *veſſells of mercy & veſſells of wrath*. 3. This love is explicated by them to conſiſt in a will to ſave all. Now election is but Gods will to ſave; and the Scripture plainly teacheth, and it is confeſſed by all that I know (excepting *Cœlius Secundus* to whom this Authour it ſeemes is moſt beholding for his ſtory of *Spira*) that though *Many are called yet but few are choſen*. And whereas it is confeſſed, that the moſt part of men are Reprobates, that is, from everlaſting willed unto condemnation; yet never the leſſe they beare us in hand that all men even *Cain* and *Judas*, yea and (as I think) the Devills and all were willed by God unto Salvation. And that there is no contradiction in all this. And every poore afflicted ſoule muſt believe hand over head that all this is true (what ſpecies of contradiction ſoever be found therein which this Authour from the begining of his diſcourſe to the end hath taken no paines to cleare) leaſt otherwiſe he forfaits all hopes of comfort, upon ſuch ſoveraine grounds as are here propoſed, by faith wherein aman may be as well aſſured of his Salvation and freedome from damnation, as any Reprobate in the World. For albeit he be a Reprobate, and God ſhould reveale this unto him, yet upon theſe grounds he may be confident that he is no abſolute Reprobate. 2. I come to the Second comfortable ſuppoſition, and that is, the univerſality of Chriſts death, namely, that he died for all. Now this is oppoſite to Scripture evidence, as the former; yea and to Chriſtan reaſon, if not more: For albeit *God ſo loved the World, even the whole World, that he gave his only begotten Son that whoſoever believes in him ſhould not periſh but have Life Everlaſting*: which gives a fair light of expoſition to thoſe places where Chriſt is ſaid to have dyed for the ſins of the World, yea of the whole world, to wit, in this manner, that *whoſoever believes in him ſhal not periſh but have everlaſting life*. yet the Scripture ſpeaks as often of Chriſts death in a reſtrained ſenſe, as where it is ſaid *Chriſt gave himſelfe a ranſome for many. And that his bloud was ſhed for his Apoſtles, and for many, for the remiſſion of their ſinnes. And that Chriſt ſhould ſave Gods people from their ſinnes. And that God hath purchaſed his Church with his bloud; And Chriſt gave himſelfe for his Church. And that he is ſaviour of his body; And that he dyed for the elect*. And in the 17 of *John*, our Saviour would not pray for the World, but only for thoſe whom God had at that time given unto him; and who afterward ſhould believe in him through their word: And look for whom he prayed with excluſion of the reſt *for their ſakes he ſanctified himſelf*: Now that this is ſpoken in reference to the offering of hinſelfe up unto God, upon the croſſe, it was the joynt interpretation of all the Fathers whom *Maldonate* had read as he profeſſeth on that place, and there reckons up a multitude of them. Then againe, Chriſts death and paſſion (we know) was of a ſatisfactory nature; and therefore if he dyed for all, he ſatisfied for all the ſinnes of all men; why then are not all ſaved? Why is any damned? Is it juſt with God to torment with everlaſting fire, for thoſe ſinnes, for which he hath received ſatisfaction; and that a more ample one, then mans ſatisfaction can be, by ſuffering the tormentes of Hell fire? For therefore it ſhall never end, becauſe it ſhall never ſatisfie. Againe, how many millions were at that time dead and in hell fire; and did Chriſt ſatisfy for their ſinnes by his death upon the Croſſe, and they continue ſtill to be tormented? Againe, the obedience of Chriſt in generall, is of a meritorious nature, even meritorious of everlaſting life; Now if Chriſt hath merited everlaſting life for all and every

one, how comes it that all and every one doe not enjoy Everlaſting Life? Shall not God the Father deale with his owne Sonne according to the exigency of his merits, whether it be that they are ſo meritorious in their owne nature; or by the conſtitution of God; either meerely, or joyntly with the dignity of their nature, in reference to the dignity of the perſon who performed them, as being not only man but God, even the eternall Son of God one & the ſame God with his Father, Bleſſed for ever. Now it can be made good that all ſins of all men are fully ſatisfied for, by the death of Chriſt, & that Chriſt hath merited in better manner Everlaſting Life for all & every one, then they could have done for themſelves, although they had paſſed the whole courſe of their lives, as free from ſinne as the very elect Angells; this I confeſſe is a comfortable doctrine with a witneſſe; though God leave men to themſelves and to the power of their owne free wills to doe what they liſt. And I ſee noe reaſon, but that in the midſt of all Ryot and exceſſe, they may be as confident of their Salvation, as if they had all faith; as of certaine Lutherans it is written, as I ſaw in a letter of an Engliſh Divine writen from Rome. I make no queſtion but their anſwer will be, that albeit Chriſt hath thus ſatisfied for all ſinnes of all and every one, and merited Eternall Life for all and every one, yet the benefit of his merits and ſatisfaction by Gods Ordinance ſhall redound to none, but ſuch as believe, and repent, and perſevere therein unto death. And what comfort can herehence ariſe to an afflicted ſoule, unleſſe ſhe doe believe and repent? If ſhe doe believe and repent, our Doctrine gives aſſurance to ſuch of their election, the Arminian doth not. Here I preſume they will ſay, that every one may believe if he will, repent if he will; and may they not as well ſay, that every ſoule afflicted with deſpaire, may leave of to deſpaire if they will, and conſequently leave of to be afflicted if they will? And I confeſſe this way of conſolation hath a very ſhort cut, if the afflicted ſoul would harken unto them. Eſpecially conſidering that I doe not find, that in theſe their diſcourſes they take any notice of any ſinne to hinder this, no not ſo much as of the ſinne againſt the Holy Ghoſt, or of that ſinne which S^t *John* calleth a ſinne unto death. But I doe much doubt whether this were the manner of comfort which the Prophet *Eſay* thought himſelfe enabled for by Gods grace, when he ſayd, *The Lord God hath given me the tongue of the Learned, that I ſhould know how to ſpeake a word in ſeaſon to him that is weary: he wakeneth Morning by Morning, he wakeneth mine eare to heare as the learned.* Wherefore let me make bold in behalfe of the Patient, to move unto you a queſtion: Doth not the Scripture teach us that faith is the gift of God, that repentance is the gift of God? *Act.* 11. 18. 2 *Tim.* 2. 25, How then is it poſſible for me to believe and repent, unleſſe God give me the grace of faith and repentance? I preſume you will anſwer, that God gives faith and repentance, firſt, in as much as he gives all men power to believe and repent, And ſecondly, in as much as he concurres with them to the act of faith and repentance in caſe they will. But I pray thee tell me, is not the will to repent alſo the gift of God? And if I have not as yet the will to repent, how is it poſſible I ſhould repent? Can any man repent without a will to repent? Is not repentance chiefly the charge of the will? But you will ſay (I ſuppoſe) that even this will to repent God is ready to worke in me, if I will repent. But in caſe a man will repent, what need hath he of any Divine aſſiſtance to cauſe in him this will to repent, ſeeing he hath it already? Laſtly, doth not God give a man a power to refuſe to believe, to refuſe to repent if he will? And is he not as ready to concurre with him to any ſinfull act if he will, and to worke the very will alſo of doing it in caſe he will? And are not theſe then the gifts of God as well as others? To conclude, what think you of the gift of faith, hath Chriſt merited it for us or no? It ſeemes by your Doctrine he hath not; as when you teach that albeit Chriſt hath ſatisfied for all, merited Everlaſting life for all; yet the benefit of Chriſts obedience and death, is by the ordinance of God applyable to none, but ſuch as have faith: wherby it appears, that you do not make faith to be any of thoſe benefits, which redound unto us by the obedience of Chriſt. For though it be decent to ſay, that ſalvation as a benefit procured by Chriſts obedience, can redound to none but to ſuch as believe; yet it is very indecent to ſay, that faith it ſelfe, as a benefit of Chriſts death, ſhall by the ordinance of God redound to none but to ſuch as believe. And indeed the Remonſtrants now adaies, doe openly profeſſe, that Chriſt merited faith for none. And they are to be commended for dealing ingenuouſly, and confeſſing that, whereunto the Genius of their Tenet doth carry them. Our Arminians deale not ſo plainly; but as they pretend

Eſ. 50.4.

Eph. 2. 8.
Phil. 1. 29.

In Cenſura Cenſuræ. p. 56.

that

that faith and repentance are the gifts of God; ſo they pretend that Chriſt merited them for us, to wit, he merited univerſall grace for all and every one, whereby every man may believe if he will, and repent if he will. And how comfortable this particular is, I have already ſhewed; for it is as much as to ſay, *you may ceaſe to deſpaire if you will, you may ceaſe to be afflicted if you will.* Secondly, Chriſt merited, that God ſhould concurre to the working of faith and repentance in them, provided that they would worke it in them ſelves. Yea the very will to believe and repent, God will worke in them *modo velint.* So that ſtill the reſolution of all comfort, is into a mans owne free-will; For God gives not faith and repentance to whom he will, or according to the meere pleaſure of his will, but rather according to mens workes. And this direct Pelagianiſme, condemned ſo many hundred years agoe, is that moſt comfortable doctrine of Chriſtianity, which our Arminians doe afford. And this diſcourſe as touching the univerſality of Chriſts death, may be applyed alſo to the univerſality of Gods love, which ends in this, that all men ſhall be ſaved if they doe believe; and that every man may believe if he will; and that God is ready to worke faith and repentance in them, provided that they will be as ready to worke it in themſelves.

3. And now I come to this Authors third Topick place of conſolation, drawn from the univerſality of the Covenant of grace. Now this is as ſtrange as any of the former, or rather much more, and when the Covenant of grace is ſo much enlarged, we have cauſe to feare that it is confounded with the Covenant of Workes. And indeed if it were true, as ſome of this ſect profeſſe, namely, that there is an univerſall grace given to al for the enlivening of their wills, wherby they are enabled to will any ſpirituall good whereunto they ſhall be excited; and to believe if they will, and from the love of temporall things to convert themſelves to the keeping of Gods Commandements if they will; I ſee no reaſon but that the Law is able to give life, though the Apoſtle ſuppoſeth the contrary; and the way is as open unto man for juſtification by the workes of the Law as it was unto *Adam* in the ſtate of innocency. And if the Covenant of grace be univerſall, and ever was, for that I take to be this Authours meaning, then God was no more the God of *Abraham*, and of his ſeed, then of all the World; nether was the people of Iſrael more the Lords portion then any other Nation of the World: yet *Moſes* was ſent unto *Pharaoh* in their behalfe with this Meſſage; *Thus ſayth the Lord, Iſraell is my ſonne, my firſt borne, wherefore I ſay unto thee, Let my ſonne goe that he may ſerve mee; if thou refuſe to let him goe, Behold I will ſlay thy ſonne even thy firſt borne* Ex: 4. 22, 23. Thus God accounts them albeit they were miſerably corrupted with Idolatry; as it appeares. Ez: 20. 6. *In the day that I lift up my hand upon them, to bring them forth of the Land of Egypt;* 7. *Then ſayd I unto them, Let every one caſt away the abominations of his eies, and defile not your ſelves with the Idolls of Egypt; for I am the Lord your God.* 8. *But they rebelled againſt me, and would not heare me; for none caſt away the abominations of their eyes; neither did they forſake the Idolls of Egypt*: then I thought to *poure out mine Indignation upon them and to accompliſh my wrath againſt them in the midſt of the Land of Egypt;* 9. *But I had reſpect unto my name that it ſhould not be polluted of the Heathen.* So he proceded in deſpite of their ſinnes, to carry them out of the Land of *Egypt;* and brought them into the wilderneſſe and gave them Statutes, and Judgments, and his Sabaths: v: 10, 11, 12. But they rebelled againſt him in the Wilderneſſe, whereupon he thought againe to poure out his indignation upon them in the Wilderneſſe *to conſume them* v. 13. *But he had reſpect unto his name*, v. 14. *and his eie ſpared them and would not deſtroy them* v. 17. And againe, when their Children provoked him by rebelling againſt him, whereupon he thought of powring out his Indignation upon them v. 21. *Nevertheleſſe he withdrew his hand, and had reſpect unto his name* v. 22. Then as touching the generation of that preſent time he profeſſeth *he will rule them with a mighty hand* v. 33. And the iſſue thereof is no worſe then this, *I will cauſe you to paſſe under the rod, and bring you into the bond of the Covenant* v. 37, *And againe, marke* with what *a gratious promiſe he concludes* v. 43. *There ſhall ye remember your wayes and all the workes wherein ye have been defiled, and ye ſhall judge your ſelves worthy to be caſt of for all your evills, which you have committed* 44. *And ye ſhall know that I am the Lord, when I have reſpect unto you for my names ſake and not after your wicked waies, nor according to your corrupt worke, O yee houſe of Iſrael, ſaith the Lord God.* Here is the peculiar fruit of the Covenant of grace, to maſter their iniquities, to bring them unto repentance, and to deliver them, from the dominion of ſinne and Satan. If God performe this Grace to all and every one throughout the World, then is the Covenant of grace univerſall, and all and every one are under it, but if there be

few

few, very few, over whom ſinne hath not the dominion, then certainly very few are under the Covenant of grace. For the Apoſtle plainly ſignifyeth this, to be the fruit of the Covenant of grace; where he ſaith, *Sinne ſhall not have dominion over you, for ye are not under the Law but under grace*, Rom: 6.14. *And the like* we have, *Heb.* 8. 8. *I will make with the Houſe of Judah a new Teſtament.* 9. *Not like the Teſtament that I made with their fathers, in the day that I tooke them by the hands to lead them out of the Land of Egypt: For they continued not in my Teſtament, and I regarded them not, ſaith the Lord.* 10. *For this is the Teſtament that I will make with the Houſe of Iſraell, after thoſe dayes, ſaith the Lord, I will put my Lawes in their mind, and in their heart I will write them, and I will be their God, and they ſhall be my people.* 11. *And they ſhall not teach every man his neighbour, and every man his brother ſaying, Know the Lord: for all ſhall know me from the leaſt of them to the greateſt of them.* 12. *For I will be mercyfull unto their unrighteouſneſſe, and I will remember their ſinnes, and their iniquities no more.* According to this Covnant proceed thoſe gratious promiſes, whereof the Scriptures are full. *I have ſeen his wayes, and I will heale them.* Eſ: 57. 18. *I will heale their rebellions.* Hoſ. 14. 5. *The Lord will ſubdue our iniquities.* Mich. 7. *I will circumciſe your hearts, and the hearts of your children, to love me with all your heart, and with all your ſoule* Deut 30. 6. *I am the Lord your God which ſanctify you, &c:* And therefore theſe comforts which here are ſo much magnified, as only and fully ſufficient for the releeving of an afflicted ſoul in the hour of temptation, are but ſo many lies (to ſpeake in the Prophets phraſe) that this Author holds in his right hand; and if through the illuſions of Satan he take hold of them, they may caſt him into a dreame, like unto the dreame of an hungry man, who eateth and drinketh and maketh merry, but when he awaketh his ſoule is empty. For all theſe comforts ſo magnificently ſet forth, have no force, ſave in caſe a man believe them now, if a man believeth, our doctrine can aſſure him of Everlaſting Life; and ſo of his election, which the Arminian cannot. For we teach that which our Saviour hath taught us, *He that believeth in the Son hath Everlaſting Life*; and he *that obayeth not the Sonne ſhall not ſee life, but the wrath of God abideth upon him*: But as for the performing of faith, they leave that unto man, together with Gods concurrence. And in like ſort for the maintenance of their faith, they teach a man to put his truſt in himſelf with Gods concurrence, as if otherwiſe a mans condition were uncomfortable, and the way were open to deſperation. But what doth *Auſtin* anſwer to ſuch like diſcourſes of old, *de Predeſt: ſanct: cap:* 22. *An vero timendum eſt, ne nunc de ſe homo deſperet, quando ſpes ejus demonſtratur ponenda in Deo, non autem deſperaret ſi eam in ſe ipſo ſuperbiſſimus & infeliciſſimus poneret?* Is it to be feared, leaſt a man deſpaire, when it is proved, that a mans hope is to be placed in God, and that he is free from deſpaire, in caſe he place his hope in himſelfe, moſt proudly, and moſt unhappily?

As for that which he cites out of *Melanchon*, it is every way as much to the purpoſe as that which he cited out of *Calvin* in the firſt Section. *Melanchon* ſayeth we muſt judge of Gods will by his Word; ſo ſaith *Calvin*, his words are theſe; *Qui recte atq; ordine electionem inveſtigant qualiter in verbo continetur, eximium inde referunt conſolationis fructum.* To enquire after a mans election in the Word is the way to reape ſingular conſolation; But they that enquire after the eternall counſell of God without the Word *in exitialem abyſſum ſe ingurgitant*; they plung themſelves into a gulfe of perdition. Yet when *Melanchon* ſayeth, *multa diſputantur durius*, the comparative there is not to be rendred as this Authour renders it *more harſhly*, but rather thus, *ſomwhat harſhly*. And of *Melanchons* concurrence with *Calvin*, in the doctrine of predeſtination, as touching the ſubſtance of the doctrine, I have formerly ſhewed out of his owne Epiſtle, who profeſſeth that he differeth only *tradendi ratione* in the manner of delivering it; and of his owne, profeſſeth that they are of a popular nature, thus, *Mea ſunt παχύτερα & ad uſum accommodata*; as it were woven with a thicker thred, and fited to uſe and practiſe. No man doubts but that as *Melanchton* ſaith it is Gods *immutable commandement to heare the Son, and to aſſent to the promiſe; and the promiſe is univerſall, to wit, that, whoſoever believeth ſhall be ſaved*: Therefore *let us not ſeeke election beſides the Word*; it is a grave counſell, and well becomming *Melanchon*; and *Calvin* gives the very ſame councell, in the very Booke, Chapter, and Section laſt related by this Author. But he ſaw it fitter for his turne to repreſent *Melanchon* profeſſing as much, rather then *Calvin*. We nothing doubt but God will performe that he hath promiſed; and therefore whoſoever believeth ſhall be ſaved according to our doctrine, not ſo according to the doctrine of Arminians; who maintaine that a man may totally and finally fall away

away from faith. *Rogers* upon the Articles of the Church of England, Art. 17. Not only acknowledgeth this univerſality of Gods promiſes, according to the Tenor of that Article; but concludeth herehence *That they are not to be heard that ſay, that the number of the elect is but ſmall; and ſeeing we are uncertaine whether we be of that company or no, we will proceed in our courſe as we have begunne*; and accompts all ſuch adverſaries of this truth, touching the univerſality of Gods promiſes: and let every ſober man judge whether this Author doth not juſtify this their diſcourſe, whom he accompts adverſaries to the truth of that Article in that particular. The ſame *Rogers* in his 8 propoſition, as touching the comfortable nature of predeſtination, writs thus, *This doctrine of predeſtination is to the Godly, ful ſweet, pleaſant, and comfortable, becauſe it greatly confirmeth their faith in Chriſt, and encreaſeth their love towards God. But* (ſaith he) *to the wicked and reprobate the conſideration hereof is very ſower, unſavory, and moſt uncomfortable, as that which they think* (though very untruly and ſinfully) *cauſeth them either to deſpaire of his mercy being without faith; or not to feare his juſtice being extreamely wicked; whereas neither from the Word of God, nor any confeſſion of the Church can man gather that he is a veſſell of wrath, prepared to damnation.* What more contradictions to this Authors diſcourſe of the uncomfortable condition of predeſtination, according to our way; yet who was this Authour? was he at any time accompted an innovatour in this Church? His booke dedicated to Arch-Biſhop *Bancroft*, writing upon the Articles of the Church of England; peruſed, and by the lawfull authority of the Church of England allowed to be publick. And becauſe ſome chooſing to play at ſmall game rather then ſit out, may ſay, that he ſpeakes not a word of abſolute election, or abſolute reprobation; let his 5. Propoſition be obſerved, which is this, Of *the meere pleaſure of God, ſome men in Chriſt Jeſus are elected, and not others unto ſalvation*: this he prooves by that *Rom.* 9.11. That *the purpoſe of God might remaine according to election.* And that *Eph.* 1.5. *Who doth predeſtinate us according to the good pleaſure of his will*: And that 2 *Tim.* 1.9. *Not according to our workes, but according to his owne purpoſe and grace*: And that *Exod.* 33.19. And *Rom.* 9.15. *I will ſhew mercy to whom I will ſhew mercy*: *And as touching the other part of not chooſing others*, that of *Solomon Prov.* 16. 4. *The Lord hath made all things for his owne ſake, yea even the wicked againſt the day of evill.* And *Rom.* 9. 21. *Hath not the Potter power over the clay to make of the ſame lumpe one veſſell unto honour, and an other unto diſhonour.* And comming unto the Errours, and adverſaries of this truth. *Hereby* (ſaith he) *is diſcovered the impiety of thoſe men which think that*, 1. *Man doth make himſelfe elegible for the Kingdome of Heaven, by his owne good workes and merits; ſo teach the Papiſts.* 2. *God beheld in every man whether he would uſe his grace well, and believe the Goſpell or no, and as he ſaw man, ſo he did predeſtinate chooſe or refuſe him.* 3. *Beſides his will, there was ſome other cauſe in God, why he choſe one man, and caſt off another, but this cauſe is hidden from us.* 4. *God is partiall and unjuſt for chooſing ſome, and refuſing others; calling many and electing but few.* The other place alleadged by this Author of *Melanchon*, partly repeates the ſame matter concerning the univerſality of the promiſes, (no mention at all with him either of the univerſality of Gods love, or of the univerſality of Chriſts death, or of the univerſality of the Covenant of grace) partly oppoſeth it *to dangerous imaginations of predeſtination*: & what are theſe but ſuch as proceed without the word. For without doubt it is to be underſtood in oppoſition to that which he formerly delivered, adviſing us to *judge of the will of God by his expreſſe Word*; and all one with *ſeeking election extra verbum* formerly ſpecified: of both which *Calvin* ſpeakes more at large in that very place aleadged by this Author in the firſt Section of this laſt ſort of Arguments; And there *Calvin* commends the one as a moſt comfortable courſe, and ſets forth the danger of the other in farre more emphaticall manner then *Melanchon* doth, and therewithall diſcovereth the true Balme of Gilead, wherein it conſiſts, in the ſame manner th at *Melanchon* doth, and more fully: but it ſerved not this Authors turne to repreſent *Calvin* thus diſcourſing, though he could not be ignorant there of, if himſelfe read the place, which he alleadgeth out of *Calvin* and tooke it not upon truſt at anothers hand. By the way I obſerve he makes the univerſality of the promiſe, mentioned by *Melanchon*, all one with the univerſality of the Covenant of grace mentioned by him. As if the Covenant of grace conſiſted only in this, *Whoſoever believes ſhall be ſaved*; and accordingly you may gueſſe of his meaning as touching the univerſality of Chriſts death, namely, that the benefit thereof ſhall redound to all that believe; as good as in plaine termes to profeſſe, that Chriſt dyed not to procure and merit faith for us, which the Remonſtrants doe now adaies openly profeſſe; but I doe

not find that our Arminians hitherto dare to concurre with them therein. And in like manner the univerſality of Gods love is to be underſtood; namely, of willing ſalvation to as many as believe, not of willing grace unto them, at leaſt not of any meaning to beſtow faith and repentance upon them. Yet not any will yet ſhew themſelves ſo ingenuous as to confeſſe in plain termes, that God gives not faith and repentance to any man, but leaves that to be wrought by the power of their wills, pretending that God hath enabled all men with a power to believe. And indeed if faith and repentance be a gift, and ſpeciall gift of God; it is ſtrange that God ſhould beſtow them upon us *extra Chriſtum*, not for Chriſt ſake; And whence it followeth that thoſe gratious promiſes *of circumciſing our hearts, of ſanctifying us, of writing his law in our mind and inward parts, and his feare in our hearts; never to depart from him, of healing our wayes, our backſlidings, our rebellions; of taking away the ſtony heart out of our bowels and giving us a heart of fleſh; and cauſing us to walke in his ſtatutes, and keepe his judgements, and doe them*, are nothing belonging to the Covenant of grace in this Authors judicious conſideration. And to conclude, if all men be under the Covenant of grace, what force or ſubſtance at all is there in that promiſe which God makes unto his people of *Iſraell*, namely, *that he will cauſe them to paſſe under the rodde, and bring them unto the bond of the Covenant.* As alſo in that *Ezek.* 16. 60. *I will remember my Covenant made with thee in the dayes of thy youth, and I will confirme unto thee an everlaſting Covenant.* 61. *Then ſhalt thou remember thy wayes and be aſhamed, when thou ſhalt receive thy ſiſters, both thy elder and thy younger and I will give them unto thee for Daughters, but not by thy Covenant.* 62. *And I will eſtabliſh my Covenant with thee, and thou ſhalt know that I am the Lord.* I come to the conſideration of the reaſons *why theſe grounds are (pretended to be) able to healpe in ſuch a caſe,* 1. *Becauſe they are directly contradictory to the temptation; a will to ſave all, a givinig of Chriſt to death for all, and an offer of grace to all, cannot poſſibly ſtand with an abſolute anticedent will, and intent of caſting a way the greateſt part of mankind, or indeed any one man in the world.*

To this I anſwer. 1. Though they be contradictory to the temptation, yet ifc hey carry manifeſt evidence of notorious untruths in their foreheads, delivered as they are without explication, what true comfort ſhall an afflicted ſoule receive therehence, when by embracing them he ſhall but hould a lye in his right hand? For doe not theſe comforters themſelves acknowledge, that God hath from everlaſting decreed the damnation of the greateſt part of men? Yet they wonld have a poore afflicted ſoule believe that notwithſtanding this he wills the ſalvation of all, even of them whom he hath appointed unto wrath; it is the Apoſtles phraſe 1 *Theſſ.* 5.9. To endeavour to perſwade them of this, what is it but to make a ſickly creature to feed on fire, or digeſt Iron, as if that could ever turne into good nouriſhment. In like ſort to perſwade him that Chriſt hath made ſatisfaction for all the ſins of al mē, & merited ſalvatiō for all & every one; when, notwithſtanding Chriſts merits of their ſalvation, the greateſt part of the world ſhall not be ſaved; And notwithſtanding Chriſts ſatisfaction for their ſinne, they muſt be put to ſatisfy for them, & that by ſuffering the torments of hell fire, & that for ever. 2. Let theſe points be explicated, & then no comfort at all will appeare therehence to an afflicted ſoule in ſome caſe; As for example, when they ſhall underſtand that Gods love tends only to the ſaving of them in caſe they believe, & repent, & mortify the deeds of the fleſh, & perſevere in ſuch like gracious courſes unto death: alas what comfort is this to a ſick ſoule, when he feeles in himſelfe no power to believe, no power to repent, no power to any ſpirituall good, contrarywiſe prone to evill, either not taking delight in Gods Word, or nothing profiting by it; Will it ſuffice to out-face them herein, & tell thē they have power to believe if they will, to repent if they will, to mortify the deeds of the fleſh if they will; to crucify the affections & luſts if they will, yea to have victory over the world if they will, and to quench all the fiery darts of the Devill if they will? And withall that their wills are enlivened to will any of all theſe, yea to will all theſe, and any other ſpirituall good whereunto they ſhall be excited? Whereas the Scripture teacheth us, that men are dead in ſinne, before the time of their effectuall calling; and that ſuch was the condition of the Epheſians, before the Goſpell was Preached to them, and they converted by it; and that till they embrace the Goſpell, all men are led captive by the Divell, to doe his will. 3. What poore comfort is this to perſwade a man, that he is no abſolute Reprobate; when upon the ſame grounds, namely, that the number of Reprobates is farre greater even an

Eph. 2. 1, 2, 3.
2 Tim. 2. laſt.

hundred

hundred for one, then the number of Gods elect, he may ſtill be perplexed with doubts and feares, yea and with as ſtrong an apprehenſion that he is a Reprobate. And amongſt all the examples that I have lighted upon, of deſperation upon this ground, they have not proceeded according to this diſtinction of reprobats abſolute or not abſolute, but ſimply upon an apprehenſion that they were Reprobates, & that not upon the conſideration of the ſmall number of Gods elect, and the vaſt number of Reprobates, but upon the conſcience of ſome ſinne or other, which they conceived to be unpardonable, a ſinne unto death, a ſinne againſt the Holy Ghoſt, and that particularly conſiſting in oppoſing Gods truth, or blaſpheming it, or making warre againſt it: which I would this Author might be pleaſed well to conſider before his feet be too much faſtned in the mire, and there be no getting out of it. His ſecond reaſon followeth. 2. *Becauſe they convince the tempted that he cannot be in that condition in which he ſuppoſeth himſelfe to be, for two contradictoryes cannot be true.* This is no new reaſon at all, but a meere application of the reaſon formerly delivered. But this Author conſiders not how he marres his owne courſe of conſolation, caſting his ſpirituall patient to believe hand over head things directly contradictory, as namely, that God wills the Salvation even of thoſe whom he hath from everlaſting ordayned unto damnation; and is not his patient like to take much comfort in this ſpeculation; namely, that albeit he be one of thoſe whom God hath ordained to condemnation, yet he wills his Salvation. What a poore comfort is it to conceive that though God will have him to be damned, yet not inevitably; whereas Gods will is as effectuall in bringing contingent things to paſſe contingently, as in bringing neceſſary things to paſſe neceſſarily: ſo raine to morrow is a contingent thing, yet God can bring it to paſſe as infallibly, though in a contingent manner, as he brings to paſſe the riſing of the ſunne. What comfort to a poore afflicted ſoule, that though God wils his condemnation, yet not abſolutely but reſpectivly; (for theſe termes alone doe ſtand in proper oppoſitiō in the judgment of Arminians) to wit, that he will not damne him but for his ſinne. As for the conſolation here miniſtred, *that God would have all and every one* (for unleſſe it proceed in that ſence it is nothing to the purpoſe,) *to be ſaved, redeemed, and called to repent and believe*; this is full of colluſion: Firſt in mixing many things togeather of a different nature; For as for the two firſt, that will, they have to proceed meerly conditionally, towit, in caſe they believe and repent; manifeſtly implying, that the divine gift of faith and repentance, is no benefit of Chriſts redemption, nor any of thoſe good things which Chriſt hath merited for us. Now as for the reſt he was aſhamed to profeſſe in the ſame Tenor, that God would have all to believe and repent *but only called to believe and repent*. But ſeeing it is apparent that all are not called, I preſume *this calling* is to be underſtood alſo not abſolutely but conditionally; Now the condition thereof certainly is not faith and repentance, but ſomewhat elſe, which he expreſſeth not. And is it not requiſite the patient which is to be raiſed and releeved ſhould be acquainted with this condition, which yet is no where mentioned (as I remember) throughout this diſcourſe? But be it that God will have this poore ſoule to be ſaved and redeemed in caſe he believe and repent; Unleſſe God alſo willeth his faith and repentance, what doore of hope or conſolation is opened to the poore, ſoule yet dwelling in the valley of *Achor*? I wonder not a little what he meant to ſay only, *God we will have all to be called, to believe and repent*, and not to ſpeake home and ſay, *God will have all to believe and repent* For what? Doth he not indeed acknowledge faith & repentance to be the gifts of God; and if he doth give them, did he not from everlaſting will to give them? will you give me leave to gueſſe at the miſtery of his meaning in this? Had he ſayd, *God will have all to believe and repent*, as he ſayeth, *God will have all to be ſaved and redeemed*; like as their meaning is well knowne as touching Gods will to ſave, namely, upon condition: & that condition alſo is well knowne to be faith and repentance: In like ſort had he ſayd *God will have all to believe and repent*, he ſaw belike this would have brought upon him more trouble then he would well brooke; to wit, by demanding whether God will have all to believe ond repent abſolutely or conditionally: Not abſolutely I preſume, leaſt ſo they ſhould grant election unto faith & repentance to be abſolute; Therefore they muſt be driven to ſhew upon what condition God will have men to believe & repent, that is, upon that condition God doth beſtow faith & repentance upon men. Now they are very loath to come to this. But is it not fit that the ſoule which is to be comforted upon this ground ſhould be throughly acquainted with this condition? For it is a vain thing

to diſcourſe of a power in man to believe and repent, and to ſay it is given them by the grace of God, conſidering that the Scripture is not more pregnantly averſe from countenancing any ſuch power granted unto all; as it is cleare, it profeſſeth faith and repentance to be the gift of God, and conſequently no man can exerciſe that pretended power without a farther grace, whereby God gives faith it ſelfe, and repentance it ſelfe, and not only a power to believe, and a power to repent. Therefore it is very neceſſary for an afflicted ſoule, that is to be comforted upon this ground; to have this miſtery revealed unto her, namely, upon what condition God will give one faith and repentance. But this Author keepes himſelfe cloſe in this poynt, and budgeth not for feare, belike of diſcovering ſome miſtery of iniquity on their part. But whiles he conceales this, doth he not play the part of a proper Mountebanke, when he pretends the ſelling of Balme, and ſoveraigne oyles, when indeed he meanes only to juggle and collude with his ſpectators? And there is good reaſon why he ſhould conceale this, or rather I doubt whether he that ſhewes himſelfe on the ſtage herein, is ſufficiently acquainted with the miſtery himſelfe; For whereas they cannot endure, that God ſhould abſolutely diſpenſe the grace of Faith and repentance to whom he will, but upon a condition to be performed on mans part: Hence it manifeſtly followes, that the grace of faith and repentance is collated by God, according to mens workes, which is plain Pelagianiſme, and condemned above 1200 years agoe, in the Synod of Paleſtine, and in no Orthodoxe Synod or Councell reverſed or retracted ever ſince. Another reaſon there is of this concealement, and that is to prevent the manifeſtation of the ſtrange abſurdity of their Tenet, diſcoverable by the light of nature; For the condition of Gods working faith and repentance in us, is this, *modo nos velimus credere & reſipiſcere*; as much as to ſay, as many as will believe ſhall believe, which is as true of the moſt ſinfull act that is committed by man, that God gives it in the ſame manner. And more then this they dare not deny, but that *velle* is the gift of God, but *modo velimus*, whereby it comes to paſſe, that the act of willing is the condition of it ſelfe, and conſequently, both before and after it ſelfe. And theſe ſhamefull iſſues doe juſtly befall them, becauſe they abhorre to profeſſe, that *God cauſeth us to walke in his ſtatutes, and to keepe his judgements, and doe them.* The courſe that *Junius* took to quiet her conſcience, who thought ſhe was damned for neglecting to goe to Maſſe, by proving unto her that the Maſſe was a meere wilworſhip, was faire and reaſonable, but the courſe this Author takes to comfort an afflicted ſoule, I have ſhewed to be moſt unreaſonable. *Abſolute reprobate* hath a different ſenſe, according as it is differently applyed, If applyed unto damnation, or the denyall of glory; we utterly deny that either the one is inflicted, or glory is denyed abſolutely, but meerely upon ſuppoſition of ſinne. But applyed to grace, we willingly confeſſe, that God doth abſolutely give the grace of regeneration, the grace of faith and repentance, to whom he will, according to that of Saint *Paul*, *He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth. Rom.* 9. 18. compared with *Rom.* 11. 30. Where to ſhew mercy, is apparently to bring men unto faith; neither can it have any other ſenſe, *Rom.* 9.18. being ſet in oppoſition to hardening; and in reference to the objection riſing therehence, in the words following. Thou wilt ſay then, why doth he yet complaine, for who hath reſiſted his will: *v.*19. And while this Author denies that faith and repentance are given according to the good pleaſure of Gods will, which is to give them abſolutely; he muſt be driven to confeſſe, that they are given conditionally: and if a man will take any comfort therehence, he muſt be acquainted with the condition, which yet this Author, undertaking the office of conſolation upon this ground, doth from the firſt to the laſt conceale, as if he feared to diſcover the ſhamefull nakedneſſe of his cauſe, which I have adventured to diſplay, and whereof I deſire the indifferent reader would judge. So that indeed this diſcourſe is a new ſnare rather, to entangle a poore ſoule in ſadneſſe and heavineſſe inextricable, fowler-like, then any true office of conſolation, where ſhe may eſcape as a bird, out of the firſt ſnare of the Fowler, by breaking it and delivering her.

Indeed theſe grounds of hope and comfort, *a Miniſter cannot make uſe of, that holds abſolute Reprobation.* What ſober man would expect he ſhould: but ſuch a one is never a whit the worſe comforter for that; For as for theſe grounds, I have already diſcovered them, to be voyd of all truth, of all ſobriety. For if men be not abſolutely Reprobated from the grace of faith and of repentance, but conditionally, (For as for the denying of glory, or inflicting damnation, we utterly deny that God hath decreed

creed that they ſhall have their courſe abſolutely according to the meere pleaſure of his will, having made a Law according whereunto he purpoſeth to proceed therein) it became this Author, performing the part of a Comforter on this ground, to make knowne the condition which he utterly declineth. And with all I have ſhewed the reaſons of his carriage thus in Hugger Mugger, to wit, that their ſhamefull Tenets might not breake forth, and be brought to light, We abhorre to ſay that God gives the grace of faith and repentance according to mens workes; Wee abhorre to ſay that God workes in men the act of believing and repenting, provided they will believe and repent; or that he workes in them the *τὸ velle* of every good worke *modo velint*. But our comſolations proceed, as I have ſhewed, in this manner, If any man man doth believe and repent, we can aſſure ſuch a one by our doctrine that he is an elect of God; this Arminians by their doctrine cannot, as who maintaine that a true believer may fall away from grace and be damned; which is to hold the ſoules of the beſt children of God upon the rack of feares, and terrours, and tortures continually, and make them walke as it were upon pinacles of the Temple; for they have no aſſurance of ſtedfaſtneſſe, but in their owne wills, to keepe them from dropping into Hell fire, which burneth under them. If men doe not believe and repent; we will enquire into the cauſe of their feares & grounds of their apprehentions that they are Reprobates; and ſhew that they have no juſt cauſe for ſuch apprehenſions whether it be the conſcience of their ſinne; or want of faith that doth affright them; For as much as the holieſt mē living before their calling, had as great cauſe to be affrighted as they; yet had they thereupon conceived themſelves to be Reprobates, this had been but an erronious conceit. If perhaps it be not the conſcience of ſinne in generall, that affrights them, but rather the conſcience of ſome ſinne in ſpeciall, which they conceive to be a ſinne unto death, or a ſinne againſt the Holy Ghoſt, which they conceive to be unpardonable; we will conferre with them thereabouts, and try whether they underſtand aright the nature of that ſinne, and endeavour to ſcatter thoſe miſts of illuſions in this particular, which Satan hath raiſed, deſiring to ſwallow them up in deſperation; if it doe not prove to be a ſinne againſt the Holy Ghoſt, we will ſet them in a courſe to get the ſpirit of faith and of repentance. For albeit God alone can give them, yet ſeeing his Word is a Word of power, even a voyce that pearceth the graves; we will perſwade them to give themſelves to be wrought upon by Gods Word, and we will pray for them who yet want ſpirit to pray for themſelves. And albeit they cannot prepare themſelves in a gratious manner to the hearing of Gods Word, yet let them come; and when they are come let his Word worke; yet if forthwith we have not that comfortable experience of Gods goodneſſe towards us, let us not give over to wait at the lords gates, and to give attendance at the poſts of his doore. Give him leave to be the Maſter of his own times, let us not preſcribe unto him; We know his courſe is to call ſome at one houre of the day ſome at an other, and at the very laſt hour he calleth ſome. This is the way of conſolation that we take. We doe not take any ſuch courſe as this Author at his pleaſure obtrudes upon us, *that God would have all to be ſaved, and that Chriſt died for all*; I have allready ſet forth this Authors colluſions in his triple univerſality of Gods love, Chriſts death, and and of the Covenant of grace. We rather will exhort him to believe, and herein we will take ſuch courſe as God in his Word hath directed us unto; and we will pray unto God that his Word may be, *as the raine that cometh downe, and the ſnow from Heaven & returneth not thither, but watereth the earth, and maketh it bring forth, & budd hat it may give ſeed to the ſower, and bread to him that eateth. So his Word may be that goeth out of his mouth, it may not returne unto him voyd, but accompliſh that which he will, and proſper in the thing whe eto he ſends it, And remove all vaine grounds of apprehenſions of terrible things againſt themſelves*; What *if a great many be reprobated from grace, and ſhall never have any part in Chriſt?* it doth not follow that this afflicted ſoule is any of them; what one is there of the children of God which was not ſometimes dead in ſinne: and if pangs of childbirth goe before the delivering of a child into the world of nature, why ſhould it ſeeme ſtrange that pangs of childbirth are ſuffered before a man be brought forth in to the world of grace? And theſe feares and terrours wherwith this poore ſoule is perplexed, may be unto her as pangs of childbirth, to bring her forth into a new world. We ſay that by Gods Word we are to conceive that ye are elected upon our faith and repentance; Thus *Paul* concluded the election of the Theſſalonians. 1 *Theſſ.* 1. 3, 4. And 2 *Theſſ.* 2. 13. Thus *Melanchon* would have us ſeeke it; but by the Arminian

doctrine it is in vaine to ſeeke after it, for as much as none can find it. We acknowledge that as our Saviour ſaith, *Few are choſen*, therefore we admoniſh every one, to *ſtrive to enter in at the ſtraight gate*. This was our Saviours exhortation, delivered by way of anſwer to a queſtion made unto him by his Apoſtles, Whether there were but few that ſhould be ſaved. We teach that Chriſt hath died for the people of God, for the elect of God, for his Church, for his body, not only to make ſatisfaction for ſinne, and to procure ſalvation for them, in caſe they believe, but to procure alſo the Holy Spirit for them to make them believe and repent,&c. And this is wrought by the word, which is the ſword of the ſpirit. We take not the courſe he obtrudes upon us; We make no ſuch diſtinctions for the conſolation of the afflicted as he faignes: We deale plainly, and ſpare not to profeſſe, that albeit ſalvation is open to all that believe, and that by the ordinance of God; yet that no man is able of himſelfe to believe or repent, for as much as the Scripture teſtifies, that all are dead in ſinne in the ſtate of nature, and led captive by the Divell to doe his will; and that the very Law of God, doth ſtrengthen ſinne, ſuch being the courſe of mans corruption, that the more he is forbidden this or that, the more it provokes him to tranſgreſſe, taking occaſion by the law to work in mans heart all manner of concupiſcence; this is our courſe, to beat downe the pride of man, and beat out of him all conceit of ability to doe any good, as of himſelfe; and ſo to caſt him downe at the feet of Gods mercy. Yet God is able by his grace to quicken him; and being brought up in the Church of God, wherein is the balme of Gilead able to heale our waies be they never ſo ſinfull and that that is adminiſtred, not according to the vile workes of men, (as if they had any power to prepare them for the participation of Gods grace,) but of the meere favour and good pleaſure of God, *Who calleth* (as the Apoſtle ſpeakes 2 *Tim.* 1. 9.) *with an holy calling, not according to our own worker, but according to his own purpoſe and grace*; And that for the merits of Chriſt, who hath merited not only pardon of ſinne and ſalvation for all that believe, but faith alſo, and regeneration for all his elect; and being as we are members of Gods Church, we have no cauſe to deſpaire, but ſooner or later God may call us as continually he doth ſome or other, and we know not how ſoone our turne may come. And as for Gods purpoſe touching the performance of the condition of faith; we plainly profeſſe, That God purpoſed to give faith and repentance only to his elect, according to that, *Act.* 13.48. *As many believed, as were ordained to everlaſting life*; And *Acts* 2. laſt. *God added daily to his Church ſuch as ſhould be ſaved*. Now heare I pray their doctrine on the other ſide, which ſet out our manner of conſolation, deviſed moſt ridiculouſly at their own pleaſure, ſo to expoſe our doctrine to ſcorne. Doth God purpoſe to beſtow faith and repentance upon any other beſides his elect? This they muſt avouch if they contradict us, and that he purpoſeth to beſtow it on all and every one; but how? Not abſolutely on any, that is, not according to the meere pleaſure of his will; how then? Surely conditionally, to wit, according to mens workes; that ſo not Semi-Pelagianiſme only, but plain Pelagianiſme may be commended unto Gods Church for true Chriſtianiſme. And what is that worke in man, whereupon God workes faith or repentance in them? Surely the will to believe, the will to repent. So that if all men will believe, will repent, then in good time through Gods grace they ſhall believe, they ſhall repent; and if this be not to crowne Gods grace with a crowne of ſcornes, as Chriſt himſelfe was crowned with a Crowne of Thornes, I willingly profeſſe I know not what it is. We utterly deny that God hath two wills, one contrary to the other. We acknowledge that in Scripture phraſe Gods commandement is called his will, as, *This is the will of God even your ſanctification*, 1 *Theſſ.* 4.3. But this is not that will of God which the Apoſtle ſpeakes of, when he ſaith, *Who hath reſiſted his will*, *Rom.* 9.19, For his will of commandement is reſiſted too oft. But the will he ſpeaketh off, there is the will of Gods purpoſe and decree, whereof the *Pſalmiſt* ſpeakes, ſaying, *Whatſoever the Lord will that hath he done both in Heaven and earth*. Now ſuppoſe God command *Abraham* to ſacrifice his ſonne *Iſaack*, and yet decrees that *Iſaack* ſhall not be ſacrificed, both which are as true, as the word of God is true, yet there is no contradiction. For as much as his commandement ſignifies only Gods will, what ſhall be *Abrahams* duty to doe, not what ſhall be done by *Abraham*; On the other ſide Gods decree ſignifies what ſhall not be done by *Abraham*. Now what contradiction I pray is there betweene theſe, It is Gods *will that it ſhall be Abrahams duty to ſacrifice Iſaack*, but it is not Gods will that *Iſaack* ſhall be ſacrificed by *Abraham*; for as much as when *Abra-*

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ham comes to the poynt of ſacrificing *Iſaack*, the Lord purpoſeth to hold his hand. In like manner God commanded *Pharaoh* to let Iſrael goe; It was his will then, that it ſhould be *Pharaohs* duty to let Iſrael goe; but withall he told *Moſes* that he would harden *Pharaohs* heart, that he ſhould not let Iſrael goe; whereby it is manifeſt, that God decreed that Iſrael ſhould not be diſmiſſed by *Pharaoh* for a while, and that (as is ſignified in the Text) to make way for his judgements to be brought upon the land of Egypt, whereby God meant to glorify himſelfe, as in the ſight of *Pharaoh*, and of his Egyptians, ſo in the ſight of the children of Iſrael, and of the bordering Nations; No contradiction at all in this, no more then Gods word is found to contradict it ſelfe. And nothing but ignorance makes our adverſaries ſo bold as to impute contradiction to us in this. We grant willingly that God did intend that moſt ſhould never believe and repent; For as much as he intended to deny the gift of faith and repentance unto moſt, as it is apparent he doth; neither dares any Arminian deny it. Only they feigne, that God would give faith and repentance unto all, in caſe they would prepare themſelves; which not only includes manifeſt Pelagianiſme, but over and above ends in non-ſenſe, as I have but erſt, and often times before, made as cleare as the Sunne. Gods eternall rejection of many thouſands, which is impoſſible to be avoided, (for how is it poſſible, that what was from everlaſting, ſhould be avoyded by man or Angell, who are brought forth in time, not to have been from everlaſting?) though it be all one with the anſwers of the tempted, and is contradictory to the comforts, which this Author deviſeth out of his own braine, and propoſeth too in a moſt colluding manner, as before I have ſhewed; and withall not ſo well ſorting with the manner of comforts which he feignes, and at meere pleaſure obtrudes upon us, (which yet he cannot evacuate without betraying the ſhamefull nakedneſſe of his cauſe, when denying God to beſtow the gift of faith and repentance abſolutely on whom he will, and according to the meere pleaſure of his will, he is driven to manifeſt how he takes ſanctuary in Pelagianiſme, maintaining the grace of faith and repentance, to be conferred by God on men according to their workes; and that in a moſt unſober manner, as I have ſhewed at large;) yet notwithſtanding is this eternall decree of God concerning the rejection of man, nothing contrariant to better grounds of conſolation miniſtred by our doctrine, then any can be miniſtred by Arminians: as who doe not ſo much as undertake to miniſter better comfort to any, then ſuch as is common to them with Reprobates. But as for all thoſe that are brought up in the Church of God, who we can aſſure them that there is no cauſe (excepting guilt of that ſinne which is unto death, or which is againſt the Holy-Ghoſt) why any of them ſhould conceive themſelves to be Reprobates; nay the affliction of conſcience being the moſt ordinary meanes, whereby God doth prepare men for a comfortable tranſlation out of the ſtate of nature, into the ſtate of grace; they have cauſe to conceive comfort in this, that theſe feares and terrours may be as pangs of child-birth, to deliver their ſouls into the world of the ſons of God; and this vally of Achor, a doore of hope; & this Bethany (a houſe of ſorrow or mourning) the high-way unto the viſion of Peace; as Bethany was commonly taken by our Saviour in his way unto Jeruſalem. For concluſion, we have heard a ſtrange cracking of thornes in this, but all proves but a ſquibbe; their beſt light of conſolation, goes out in an unſavoury ſnuffe of Pelagianiſme. Let us remember, though Thunder, and Earth-quakes, and Lightning, have their courſe in the vaine imaginations of men, yet God is ſtill and ever will be, in the ſmall voyce of his word. Let us give Gods *truth*, the glory of our conſolation; As for Errour, and that dangerous errour in defacing the glory of Gods grace, let us never ſeeke any comfort therein, and let them that love it, take what comfort in it they can; I doe not envy them, but rather pitty them; I would their hearts ſerved them to have compaſſion upon them ſelves.

DISCOVRSE.

DISCOURSE.

SECT. IV.

SEcondly, it leaves a Minister weake grounds only, and insufficient to quiet the tempted, and therefore it makes him unable to comfort. His grounds that are left him are insufficient, because they cannot convince, and make it evident to the understanding of the tempted, that he is not that which he feares (*i.e.*) a Reprobate: out of temptation probabilities will uphold a mans hopes, (as they did *Manoahs* wife: *Judg.*13.22,23. If the Lord would kill us he would not have received a burnt offering at our hands, nor shewed us all these things;) because men are not so mistrustfull then: but in temptation men are very suspitious and incredulous, like *Jacob*, who would not be perswaded that *Joseph* was alive, and a great man in Egypt, till he saw the Chariots that were sent to fetch him thither, *Gen.*45.25. And like *Thomas*, who would not believe that Christ was risen till he saw the print of the nailes and speare. *John* 20.25. They will not believe any thing that is said for their comfort, till it be made so apparent, that they have nothing to say to the contrary. My selfe have known some, who in their temptations have often put their comforters to their proofes, to their protestations, nay to their oathes too, before they would believe their words of comfort. And in this temptation, men are so strongly possest with a feare of the greatest evill in the World, eternall rejection from God, that they will not easily, without manifest conviction, believe the contrary. But such grounds as these, a Minister that holds absolute reprobation hath not, he can say nothing that is able to make it appeare infallibly, and unavoydably to the tempted, that he is no absolute reprobate.

All that he can say is, Be of good comfort, you are a believer, you are a true repenting sinner; therefore no reprobate; for faith and repentance are fruits of election, and arguments of a state contrary to that which you feare. But this the tempted will deny, he will say that he is no believer, &c. And how will the Minister convince him that he is? He must prove to him by the outward acts of faith and repentance, (for they are only apparent to him,) that he doth repent and believe, but this proofe is not demonstrative, doth not convince him, because *opera virtutum simulari possunt*, the externall acts of faith, repentance or any other grace, may be counterfeited; The Devill may seeme to be an Angell of light, Wolves may goe in Sheepes cloathing; *Judas* may make the World believe by his Preaching and following Christ, that he is a true Apostle; And *Simon Magus* (though he remaine in the gall of bitternesse, and bond of iniquity,) may be thought by his receiving of Baptisme, to be a true believer; And so may any Hypocrite by some exterior act, of faith and repentance, cosen the best discerner of spirits among men, and gaine the opinion and esteeme of a true penitent and believer. Actions externally good or good in appearance, may be evill indeed for want of a good rule, a good manner, a good end, & some other good circumstances, with which an action which is good must be cloathed [*For bonum non oritur nisi ex integris.*] and so by consequence cannot certainly prove the man that doth them to be a good man, or to have the grace of faith, repentance, or any other, truly planted in his heart.

Which being so (I say) that the Minister cannot, by the eternall acts and fruits of faith and repentance, which he seeth come from him, make it evident to the tempted (for the silencing of all replies) that he is (without doubt) a true believer, and a true repentant, and consequently no reprobate. For still the tempted may say, You may be deceived in me, for you can see not a whit more in me, then hath been seen in many a Reprobate; If this be all you can say to prove me to be none, I am not satisfied, I may be a Reprobate, nay I am a Reprobate, and you are but a miserable comforter, a Physitian of no value.

Piscat. contra Shafman de praedest. Thes. 85.

This that I say *Piscator* doth ingeniously confesse, where he saith, that no comfort can possibly be instilled into the soules of Reprobates afflicted with this temptation; Whence it followes, that the greatest part of men, must beare their burthen (if they fall into this trouble) as wel as they can; the Gospell cannot afford them any sound comfort.

2. That the elect in this case may be comforted, but it must be this way, *viz.* by their feeling of the burthen of sinne, and their desire to be freed from it by Christ; which proofs (as I have said) are but only probable not infallible arguments of a mans election, and therefore unsufficient comforts.

And in the end of the same Thesis, where he saith, That a man should reason thus with himselfe, Grace is offered to some, with a mind of communicating it to them, therefore it may be that I am in that number; he implyes that the doctrine of absolute Reprobation, which teacheth this communication of grace to some few only, affords but [a *fieri potest*] a peradventure I am elected, for a poore soule to comfort himselfe withall.

TWISSE.

Conſideration.

IN the laſt place we are to conſider how truly he affirmeth that our doctrine leaveth a Miniſter none but weake grounds, and thoſe inſufficient to quiet the tempted.

And whereas he ſaith *We cannot conceive, and make it evident to the underſtanding of the tempted that he is not (that which he feares) a Reprobate*; we willingly acknowledge it. For not to be a reprobate is to be an elect. Now how can any Arminian convince and make it evident to the underſtanding (I doe not ſay of the tempted, but) of one that is a believer, and walkes on comfortablely in the wayes of Godlineſſe; is he (I ſay) *able to convince ſuch a one*, and make it evident unto him that *he is one of Gods elect?* I doe not think they dare profeſſe that they preſume they can; or make it evident to their owne underſtanding, that themſelves are of the number of Gods elect. How unreaſonable then is this courſe, to require of us to convince a man, that acknowledgeth neither faith nor repentance in him, (for this is the condition of a man tempted, as himſelfe faſhioneth it;) *and to make it evident to his underſtanding that he is an elect and no reprobate*; when himſelfe cannot convict him that believeth of this; no nor their owne conſciences neither, notwithſtanding all their confidence, that they alone are in the right way of ſalvation. Was there ever heard a more unreaſonable courſe then this? Againe, *to feare to be a reprobate, or leaſt he be a Reprobate*, is one thing, to perſwade himſelfe that he is a Reprobate, and to deſpaire thereupon, is another thing. We ſay, and that according to our Doctrine, that there is no cauſe why any man (who hath not ſinned the ſinne unto death, the ſinne againſt the Holy Ghoſt) ſhould perſwade himſelfe that he is a Reprobate and deſpaire thereupon; we doe not ſay there is no cauſe of feare. In as much as he hath no evidence of his election, there is juſt cauſe to feare; but then againe, ſeeing he neither hath nor can have any evidence of his reprobation (excepting the guilt of the ſinne againſt the Holy Ghoſt) he hath every way as good cauſe to hope. And for the comforting of ſuch a one, I would make bold to tell him that there is more hope of ſuch a one as himſelfe, then of thoſe who goe on *in the wayes of their owne heart, and in the light of their owne eyes* without all remorſe and check of conſcience, without feare or wit, not conſidering that for all theſe things God will bring them to judgment. And towards ſuch I would think it fit to uſe all meanes and motives to make them feare. The Apoſtle ſeemes to me to take the like courſe with better men then ſuch, even with ſuch as went on in a faire and comfortable profeſſion of Goſpell; namely to make them feare and ſuſpect themſelves, as when he ſaith, *Prove youre ſelves whether you are in the faith, examine your ſelves. Know ye not that Chriſt is in you except ye be Reprobates.* 2 *Cor.* 13. 5. And for good reaſon; for as *Paul* was jealous over the Corinthians with a Godly jealouſy, *for feare, leaſt as the Serpent beguilde Eve through his ſubtilty, ſo their minds ſhould be corrupt from that ſimplicity which is in Chriſt.* 2 *Cor.* 11. 2, 3. And in like manner entertained feare, leaſt when he came *he ſhould not find them ſuch as he would, and that he ſhould be found unto them ſuch as they would not &c.* 2 *Cor.* 12. In like manner I ſhould think it is good for a man to be jealous over himſelfe with a godly jealouſy, leaſt their minds ſhould be corrupt, their wayes corrupt, more then they are a ware of, and there upon give themſelves to the examining of themſelves and *to the ſearching and trying of their wayes* whereunto the Holy Ghoſt

exhorts us, *Lament.* 3. 40. And there is good comfort to be taken in ſuch a jealouſy, ſuch a feare, ſuch a courſe; For we find that the ſpirit of bondage making us to feare, is the forerunner of *the ſpirit of adoption*, whereby we cry *Abba Father*, *Rom.* 8. 15. Certainely they are in better caſe, and nearer to the Kingdome of God, then ſuch as feare not, yet is their no cauſe of deſpaire, for as much as the elect of God had no evidence of their election before their calling; Nay, after their calling they may be much afflicted with the feares and terrours of God, thinking themſelves to be in worſe caſe, then indeed they are. *David* found cauſe to pray that God would reſtore him to the joy of his Salvation; yet *Bertius* would not ſay that *David* was fallen from grace, and that *propter graves cauſas*; yet who hath written more eagarly to maintaine that Saints may fall away from grace then *Bertius*? But this Author beares before him ſuch a ſpirit of confidence, as if he would have all men ordered by his rules. When *Manoahs* Wife, *Judg.* 13. 22, 23. diſcourſeth thus, *If the Lord would kill us he would not have received a burnt offering at our hands, nor ſhewed us theſe things*; He doth obtrude upon us that *Manoahs* Wife had no faith, but only a probability of this; that is his gloſſe; yet this acceptation of a burnt offering at their hands was manifeſted by no leſſe then a miracle; and the difference between *Abels* offering and *Caines* offering is laid downe to be this, that *The Lord had reſpect to Abel, and to his offering; but unto Cain and to his offering he had no regard.* *Gen.* 4. 4, 5. And *Davids* prayer for acceptation, and finding favour at the hands of God is ſet downe in this manner, amongſt other particulars, *Let him remember all thine offerings, and turne thy burnt offerings into aſhes*, *Pſal*, 20. 3. Yet why ſhould he conceive that *Manoah* and his Wife were not in temptation, and that a very ſore one, ſtrēgthened with the expres word of God, namely, that *No man can ſee God & live*; which in theſe days was generally received amongſt thē & applyed by thē in this particular. For *Manoah* ſaid unto his Wife, we ſhall ſurely dye becauſe we have ſeen God; & could a probability to the contrary put by ſuch a temptation as this? How was the great Prophet *Eſay* exerciſed with this when he cryed out, *Woe is me, for I am undone, becauſe I am a man of polluted lipps, and dwell in the midſt of a people of polluted lipps, for mine eyes have ſeen the King and Lord of Hoſts*. What temptation hath he that thinkes himſelfe a reprobate like unto this, excepting ſtill the guilte of that ſinne which is unto death? What ground of Scripture can they repreſent to prove that they are reprobates; as thoſe Ancients had ground for this, *that they muſt dye who had ſeen God*? It is one thing to be in temptation, it is an other thing to yeeld to the temptation, and to be overcome with it; and that upon no ground, which yet this Author confounds, as a courſe very propitious for his turne, and ſuitable with the part that he acteth. As for *Jacob*, the cauſe was this, he that now enjoyed as it were, the death of *Joſeph* for many yeares; his ſonnes pretending they knew not what became of him; yet brought his Coat imbrued with bloud unto their old Father, who there upon conceived ſome evill beaſt had devoured him; and who could expect that at the firſt hearing he ſhould believe now the report of the ſame ſonnes to the contrary; eſpecially conſidering how thoſe brethren of *Joſeph* were aſtoniſhed when *Joſeph* himſelfe told them, ſaying, *I am Joſeph, doth my father yet live?* for the text ſaith, *his brethren could not anſwer him, for they were aſtoniſhed at his preſence.* And though *Iacob* at the firſt believed not the report, they made to be true, yet neither is it ſaid, or likely, that he believed it to be falſe. But the Text ſaith, *his heart failed him*, denoting a condition betweene hope and feare, as the Geneva noteth in the Margent. As for *Thomas* his incredulity, which he aſcribeth unto a temptation; he may as well aſcribe the infidelity of Turkes & Jewes unto a temptation. The perſon tempted here repreſented doth not ſay (I hope) as *Thomas* did, *Except I ſee in his hands the print of the nailes, and put my finger into the print of the nayles, and put my hand into his ſide I will not believe it.* And what power doe Arminians attribute unto temptation, doe they aſcribe more unto it, then to the operation of God which with them extends no farther then this, as touching grace, then to excite them to believe, which yet they may reſiſt if they will? And may they not alſo reſiſt the Divells temptations if they will? Eſpecially conſidering that in perſwading them that they are Reprobates the Divell proceeds upon no ground, which is not common to every one of Gods elect, when he ſaith *They will not believe any thing that is ſaid for their comfort, till it be made ſo apparent that they have nothing to ſay to the contrary.* It ſeemes this Author hath had ſome extraordinary experience of the condition of perſons tempted,

Eſay 6.

Gen. 45. 3.

v. 26.

Ioh. 20.

I had

I had thought the condition of perſons (not tempted only, but) giving way to the temptation, had been for the moſt part unreaſonable, untill it pleaſeth God to bring them to their right wits: and like as feares property is to betray the ſuccours that reaſon offereth; ſo is the Devills practice to take them off from attending that to they cannot anſwer, and holding them to their uncomfortable concluſions, in deſpight of the weakneſſe of their own premiſes, and ſtrength of contrary principles; Excepting the caſe of ſinning againſt the Holy Ghoſt, which was the caſe of *Francis Spira*, and accordingly his concluſions were moſt true as his premiſes ſtrong; and his comforters had little or nothing to ſay to the contrary. And in ſuch a caſe the only courſe to quench the fiery darts of deſperation, is to enquire diligently about the matter of fact, whether he hath committed any ſuch ſinne as he layeth to his charge; and thereupon to diſcourſe of the nature of that ſinne, which is commonly called a ſinne unto death, and not only ſo, but a ſinne againſt the Holy Ghoſt, which our Saviour pronounceth to be unpardonable; and the Apoſtle ſignifieth as much, when he ſaith that in ſuch a caſe, *there is no more ſacrifice for ſinne, but a fearfull expectation of fire.* And it may be, this Authors diſcourſe, runneth with reference to ſuch examples as this of *Spira*, but faſhioned at pleaſure to ſerve his turne, as formerly he did ſet down the ſtory out of *Cœlius Secundus* & *Calvin* as he ſaid, but without any quotation of the place where. But to enter upon a compariſon between their doctrine and ours, and that upon ſuppoſition of this rule delivered by him. I ſay firſt, that by our doctrine, we can make it ſo evidently appeare, that the tempted hath no ground at all to conceive himſelfe to be a reprobate, whatſoever his condition be, (except guiltineſſe of the ſinne againſt the Holy Ghoſt) I ſay we can make it ſo evident, that neither he, nor any Arminian, can ſay any reaſonable thing to the contrary; not denying but that they may ſay enough to the contrary in an unreaſonable manner. And my reaſon is, becauſe whatſoever his condition be, it is no other then is incident to one of Gods elect. Secondly, I ſay, as touching the Arminian doctrine, two things; The firſt is this, There is no condition of man ſo holy in this life, as whereby any man can have any aſſurance, by Arminian doctrine, that he is an elect of God, and conſequently no reprobate, much leſſe can they give any aſſurance to any man in the time of temptation (as this Author ſpeakes of it) that he is no reprobate. The Second is this, Arminians can give aſſurance to no man that he is no reprobate; for as much as all their grounds of comfort are common to the reprobate as well as to the elect: wherehence it manifeſtly followeth, that their doctrine can afford no better comfort then a reprobate is capable of. For their grounds are univerſall as they profeſſe, that is common to all, to wit, as touching the love of God, that it is common to all; as touching the death of Chriſt, that he dyed for all; as touching the Covenant of grace, that it alſo is common to all. And if this will comfort any man, namely, to be aſſured, that he is in as good a caſe as any Turke or Saracen, or any reprobate in the World, I find this Author is ready to aſſure them hereof, and rather then faile he will ſweare it, though I never heard matter of faith put to be tryed by mans Oath till now: I had thought only matters of fact, had been tryable and aſſurable by Oath, not matter of faith. Yet I will not ſpare to profeſſe, that though they ſhould ſweare either of theſe univerſalities to be true, I would no more believe them then I would believe the Divell. For the Apoſtle adviſeth, ſaying, Though *that wee or an Angell from Heaven Preach unto you otherwiſe then that which we have Preached unto you, let him be accurſed. Gal.* 1. 8. But let us examine the comfortable nature of theſe univerſalities, whether they be ſuch as a ſober man can ſay nothing to the contrary. I begin with the univerſality of Gods love; the comfort herehence proceeds thus, as I conceive; God loves all, willes all to be ſaved, therefore thou art no reprobate. Now conſider whether I may not ſoberly ſay to the contrary, that by the ſame reaſon there is no reprobate in the World, or ever was; whence it followes, that I have no more comfortable aſſurance that I am no reprobate, then I have aſſurance that there is no Reprobate at all in the World. Secondly, would you have mee believe hand over head, that God would have all to be ſaved without diſtinction; may not I ſoberly inquire, whether your meaning be, that God will have all and every one to be ſaved, whether they believe or no, whether they repent or no; or only thus, That God will have all to be ſaved in caſe they believe and repent, not otherwiſe. Now this is our doctrine, as well as yours, groun-

ded upon this Scripture, Whoſoever believeth ſhall be ſaved. Now doth this doctrine aſſure any man that he is no Reprobate, nor of the number of thoſe whom God hath rejected from ſalvation? Perhaps you will ſay, it is ſufficient to aſſure him, that he is no abſolute reprobate, and that ſo this Author is to be underſtood, though hitherto in this Section he delivered it ſimply. Admit this, Now judge I pray you, whether I may ſoberly oppoſe againſt it thus; Although I am no abſolute reprobate, yet if I am a reprobate, and may be as much aſſured of it, as that there is any reprobate in the World, what comfort can ariſe to my poore afflicted ſoule from hence. Againe conſider, that neither we who oppoſe Arminians, doe maintaine that God hath ordained to deny any man ſalvation abſolutely, but only conditionally, to wit, in caſe he dye in ſinne without faith, without repentance. But ſuppoſe I am perſwaded, that God hath rejected mee from the grace of faith and of repentance, what comfort can you Arminians adminiſter to my ſick ſoule in this caſe? For dare you deny faith and repentance to be a gift of God? So then if I conceive my ſelfe to be a reprobate from grace, will you comfort me by ſaying, that I am no abſolute reprobate from grace? Then belike God hath determined to give or deny grace, not according to the meere pleaſure of his will, but according to mens workes; And have you no better balme of Gilead to adminiſter to a ſick ſoule, then to take ſanctuary in ſuch a Doctrine as is direct and flat Pelagianiſme? In the ſame ſober manner we ſhall have ſomewhat to ſay againſt that comfort that is reached forth to an afflicted ſoule, from the univerſality of Chriſts death; Thou doubteſt thou art a reprobate, but be of good cheere, for Chriſt dyed for all and every one; as much as to ſay, thou haſt no more cauſe to believe that thou art a reprobate, then to believe that there is any reprobate in the world. Secondly, be of good cheere, for albeit thou art a reprobate, and God foreſeeing thou wilt dye in ſinne, hath from everlaſting ordained thee to condemnation, as well a *Judas* that betrayed Chriſt; yet I can aſſure thee, thou art no abſolute reprobate no more then *Judas* was. And whereas it may be thou art verily perſwaded, that he that believes and repents, and perſeveres herein, ſhall not be damned, for as much as all confeſſe, that God hath not ordained that damnation ſhall be inflicted abſolutely, according to the meere pleaſure of God, but meerely according to mens workes; but all thy feare is, leaſt thou art reprobated from grace, and that abſolutely; conſidering that God (as it ſeemes) in the giving and denying of grace proceeds meerely according to the meere pleaſure of his will, becauſe the Apoſtle ſaith, *He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth. Rom.* 9. 18. Yet be of good cheere, for I can aſſure thee, that is nothing ſo; but as there are no abſolute reprobates from glory, and unto damnation, ſo there are no abſolute reprobates from grace, but meerely conditionally it is that men are reprobated from grace, like as meerely conditionally God doth elect men unto grace: And to ſpeake in plaine termes without diſſimulation; God gives faith and repentance unto men, according as they diſpoſe themſelves thereunto, for want of which diſpoſition, he denyes it unto others. And if thou deſireſt to be more particularly informed in this miſtery for thine unſpeakable conſolation; know for certain, that if thou wilt believe and repent, thou ſhalt believe and repent. And albeit in the Synod of *Paleſtine*, *anno* 415. it was concluded, *That grace is not given according unto merits*, and *Pelagius* was driven to ſubſcribe thereto, for feare of excommunication too, in caſe he had refuſed it; yet take this comfortable myſtery along with thee; that this was but a fruit of the Predeſtinarian Hereſy; which that very yeare if thou markeſt the ſtory well, had his originall, and was brought forth into the World. And laſtly, as touching the univerſality of the Covenant of grace, that is as comfortable as the former; for all are under it, and therefore thou amongſt the reſt, and conſequently thou art no more a reprobate then any other; certainly no abſolute reprobate, for there are none ſuch; *Judas* was not, and therefore thou maiſt aſſure thy ſelfe thou art not. And indeed there are none that maintaine, that God decreed, that any man ſhould be denyed glory or damned abſolutely, but only conditionally, to wit, in caſe he finally perſevere in infidelity or impenitency: And whereas thou maiſt feare leaſt thou art abſolutely reprobated from grace, to wit, from the grace of faith and repentance; take heart and feare no colours. For albeit it be fit to confeſſe, conſidering the times that faith and repentance are the gifts of God, yet know that God doth not diſpenſe them, according to the meere pleaſure of his will, but according to mens workes, whatſoever ſome men cry out to the contrary, charging us with Pelagianiſme; but if thou art

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wiſe thou wilt take comfort in this, as in true Chriſtianiſme. As for thoſe that maintaine abſolute reprobation, none of them is able to make it appeare unto thee, that thou art no abſolute reprobate. And I willingly confeſſe, that if faith and repentance be not evidences hereof, we are not able to make it appeare, either to others that they are not, or to our ſelves that we are not Reprobates. But by the way it is manifeſt, that this Author by his grounds, can give no aſſurance of election, no not to a believer no certainty of ſalvation; and yet he pretends to be a comforter, when he leaves him in doubt whether he ſhall be ſaved or damned; yet upon this pillow Arminians ſleepe ſweetly, and preſume that others may ſleepe ſweetly alſo, that they are not abſolutely reprobates; And no marvaile; for even in the courſe of the holieſt converſation, their doctrine can adminiſter no aſſurance either of election or ſalvation. But perhaps they will ſay, though they can give no aſſurance of election abſolute by their doctrine, yet they can give aſſurance of election conditionall. But wherein I pray doth this conſiſt? Forſooth in this, that if they finally perſevere in this their holy converſation, they ſhall be ſaved. But I pray conſider, Doth not our doctrine afford the ſame aſſurance as well as theirs? It cannot be denied, but that it doth, and more then ſo; for our doctrine gives aſſurance of perſeverance in the ſtate of grace, to them that are once in the ſtate of grace; the Arminian doth not. And the Apoſtle aſſures the Theſſalonians, that upon his knowledge they were the elect of God, and that *from the worke of their faith, the labour of their love, and the patience of their hope.* 1 *Theſſ.* 1. 3. 4. And that the man of ſinne ſhall not prevaile over them. 2 *Theſſ.* 2. 13. Becauſe they are elect; whereof alſo he was aſſured (as there he ſignifies) by their ſanctification and faith.

It is true *the outward acts of faith and repentance may be counterfited*: And it is as true, that whether they be counterfeited or no, it may be diſcerned; otherwiſe why ſhould the Apoſtle be ſo bold as to profeſſe, and that by obſervation of their workes, *that he knew they were elect of God.* 1 *Theſſ.* 1. 4. The Devill may tranſforme himſelfe into an Angell of light, but yet we have a ſure Word of God, whereby to diſcerne his practiſes to corrupt either our faith, or our manners, otherwiſe we poore Creatures were but in a very evill caſe: ſo his Miniſters alſo transforme themſelves, crafty workers as they are, into Miniſters of righteouſneſſe; but S^t *Paul* diſcovered them and warned the Corinthians of them; Wolves may goe in ſheepes clothing, but our Saviour aſſures us that we ſhall know them by their fruites; none more proper fruite of a falſe Prophet then his falſe doctrine; And we have a true touch-ſtone to diſcover that, and make the Devills clawes to appeare in their proper forme and colours. And we know how ſoone *Simon Magus* diſcovered himſelfe to be *in the very gall of bitterneſſe, and bond of iniquity.* Yet I nothing doubt but we may be deceived; but moſt commonly it comes to paſſe that Hypocrites are the greateſt deceivers and coſeners of themſelves; and it is not their condition to be exerciſed with feares leaſt they be Reprobates, and to confeſſe that their faith, their repentance is counterfit. It is moſt likely they deale without Hypocriſy in this.

But when any doe lay ſuch ſinnes to their own charge, we will not take them at their word, but we will inquire upon what grounds they deliver this & we will inquire whether now they are well pleaſed with this their former Hypocriſy; If ſo, what cauſe is there, why they ſhould be diſquieted in themſelves upon the conſideration of that wherin they are well pleaſed? But if it be their ſorrow, if this cauſe heavineſſe of heart unto them; here we have a double evidence of ſome ſparkes of grace in them; Firſt in confeſſing their former Hypocriſy. Secondly in being humbled with ſorrow in the conſideration of it; Now God hath promiſed, that if we confeſſe our ſinnes, God as he is faithfull and juſt will forgive them. And if they are humbled in the conſideration of it, and tremble at the apprehenſion of Gods judgements againſt Hypocrites, they are ſo much the fitter for God to take up his habitation in their contrite heart and humble ſpirit *Eſ.* 57. 15. And *Eſ.* 63. 2. I hope there is no *miſerable conſolation in all this*; To miniſter this Phyſicke is to be a *Phiſitian* of ſome *value*. And certainly whatſoever was our former courſe, whether in the way of profaneſſe, or the way of hypocriſy, when God brings us to conſider it and to confeſſe it, and to be acquainted with his feares, aud terrours here upon, we have cauſe to conceive good hope, that God is now in a gratious way to draw them neerer unto him, who before were ſtrangers from him. Certainly we will be bold to tell them, that there is no juſt cauſe why they ſhould deſpaire.

I come to the laſt particular he inſiſteth upon; and that is *Piſcators* confeſſion; which becauſe he conceives it ſerves his turne, therefore he aſcribes unto him ingenuity in this. But what ſaith *Piſcator? That no comfort can poſſibly be inſtilled into the ſoules of Reprobates. Piſcators* words are theſe, *Reproborum anxiis animis nulla conſolatio inſtillari poteſt.* This Author addes *Poſſibly* to make it the more waighty as he thinkes. We acknowledg God to be the God of conſolation, and his ſpirit alone to be the comforter, and if God will not give them Chriſt, ſurely they can have no true conſolation in Chriſt; which yet depends meerely upon ſuppoſition of the will of God; like as none but God can give raine; and if it be his will it ſhall raine to morrow or not raine, either ſhall come to paſſe according to his will, and it is impoſſible it ſhould be otherwiſe then he willeth; yet is raine a contingent thing, and God will have it come to paſſe contingently, that is, ſo as with a poſſibility to the contrary. Now that God gives not all unto Chriſt, our Saviour profeſſeth, *John.* 17. *Thine they were and thou haſt given them unto me*; and afterwards, *for their ſakes I ſanctify my ſelfe*, This is ſpoken in reference unto the offering up of himſelf unto his Father upon the Croſſe, as *Maldonate* acknowledgeth to be the interpretation of all the Fathers, whom he he had read. He dyed we confeſſe to procure Salvation for all that believe; but did he dye to procure faith for all? If ſo, then either abſolutely or conditionally. If abſolutly, then all muſt believe and be ſaved. If conditionally, to wit, upon condition of ſome diſpoſition of man, then it followes that Chriſt hath merited that faith ſhould be conferred on men according to their workes, which is manifeſt Pelagianiſme. But what is this to the purpoſe, namely, that comfort cannot be inſtilled into the ſoules of Reprobates? The queſtion is of comforting the Tempted, not ſuppoſing them to be reprobates. For what ground have we to ſuppoſe any man to be a Reprobate, conſidering that there is no evidence hereof, but either the committing of ſinne againſt the Holy Ghoſt or finall perſeverance in infidelity or impenitency; and is it to be expected that Chriſtian doctrine ſhould afford any conſolation unto theſe? But out of the caſe of ſinne committed againſt the Holy Ghoſt there is no cauſe why any man, living in the Church of God, ſhould deſpaire, or conceive him ſelfe to be Reprobate; albeit, untill he believe in Chriſt, we can aſſure him that he is one of Gods elect; whereof the Arminian doctrine can give no aſſurance albeit men doe believe, and albeit an Angell from Heaven ſhould aſſure them that their faith is a true faith. It is true Reprobates muſt beare their burthen of diſcomfort that know themſelves to be Reprobates; but who are they? For my part I know none, nor doe I know any reaſon why any man ſhould conceive himſelfe to be of that number, unleſſe he hath ſinned againſt the Holy Ghoſt, and let them looke to that who oppoſe the truth of God, and blaſpheme it againſt their conſcience. Therefore to talke of a burthen that is to be borne by we know not whom in particular, no nor they themſelves who are of that number, is a very vaine diſcourſe.

2. As for that which *Piſcator* ſaith of the elect, it is to be underſtood only at ſuch a time as when they beginne to feele the burthen of ſinne; which is not alwaies with the firſt, nor at the ſame time in all. As for that he ſaith *of feeling the burthen of ſinne, and a deſire to be freed from it by Chriſt, that they are only probable not infallible arguments of election.* I anſwer, Firſt it is better to have probable arguments of election then none at all; neither am I privy to any probable argument of a mans election that may be attained to by the doctrine of Arminians. Secondly a man may have good ground of conſolation, though he hath not yet any infallible argument of his election; Firſt in as much as Chriſt calleth and encourageth ſuch a one to come unto him, ſaying, *Come unto me all ye that travaile, and are heavy laden.* Blind *Bartimeus* was not a little comforted when it was told him, that Chriſt called him; how much more when we heare him calling us; Secondly in as much as he doth not only bid us to come unto him, but promiſeth that he will eaſe us, and what is that but that he will comfort us. And it is no ſmall comfort to be in the way to the obtaining infallible arguments of a mans election. Laſtly, to deſire to be freed from ſinne by Chriſts, is it any leſſe then to hunger and thirſt after righteouſneſſe; And hath not our Saviour pronounced all ſuch bleſſed, and promiſed they ſhall be filled? That the grace of Salvation is communicated to ſome few is a thing with out queſtion; For if but few be choſen as our Saviour profeſſeth, undoubtedly there are but few that are ſaved. And directly our Saviour ſignifies as much, when he anſwers to the

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queſtion propoſed by his Diſciples (whether but few ſhall be ſaved) in this maner, ſtrive to enter in at the ſtreight gate &c: & for a man to conceive that it may be he is one of the number of Gods elect, is enough to keepe him from deſpaire, and from conceiving that he is a Reprobate. Secondly, this is ſpoken of him that is yet but in the way to the ſtate of grace: Whereas by the Arminian doctrine he can have no better aſurance, though he be in the ſtate of grace. Laſtly, *Piſcator* gives to underſtand that this doctrine doth afford this comfort, to wit, in the apprehenſion of a poſſibility that he is elect; he doth not ſay that it affords but this: Nay, by his doctrine he manifeſteth how the way is open to a farre better conſolation then this, to every one that groanes under the burthen of ſinne, and deſires to be freed from it by Chriſt, which he expreſſeth and concludeth in this manner, *Whoſoever feeles the burthen of his ſin deſiring to be freed from it by Chriſt, and craving the grace of God, him Chriſt will eaſe and ſave. Mat. 11. laſt. But thou feeleſt the burthen of thy ſinnes, and deſireſt to be freed from it by Chriſt, and craveſt the grace of God, &c.* For in this caſe he conceives there is a difference betweene ſuch a one and a Reprobate. For Reprobates in ſuch a caſe, feeling the burthen of their ſinnes, doe not ſeeke the grace of God, but rather fly from him as from a ſevere judge; as he ſhewes by the inſtances of *Cain* and *Judas*. And indeed untill there be in man ſome better condition wrought then in a Reprobate, what ground have we to conceive better of him then of a Reprobate, Nor that he is to be concluded to be a Reprobate, but both our judgement concering him and his judgement concerning himſelfe is to be ſuſpended; conſidering that there was a time when the beſt of Gods children were in ſuch a caſe, yet afterwards it hath appeared that even in that former uncomfortable condition, they were the very elect of God, and in like manner as comfortable may be the condition of theſe, we know not how ſoone; For God calls ſome ſooner, others latter.

ERRATA.

PAge 2. line 27. *read* affect: p.4.l.15.r.ſo alſo to regenerate himſelfe, & indeed as we are commanded to believe, ſo &c. p.10.l.20. r.that deſert.p.11.l.43.r.firſt.p.13.l.57.alleadged, acknowledging.p.15.l.36.*amica*. p:17. l. 42.but by.p:21.l.2.courſe. p:25.l:32.thee. p.26.l.1.manner. *ib.*l:*ult*. of *pœna*. p:27.l:33. Then. p:31.l. 19. have God.*ib:*l. 56.did not.p:33.l.47.in his.p:34.l.24.*propoſito*.p:35.l: 2.conceſſion. p: 37.l:7. ſo he decreed to beſtow it on whom he will.p:39.l:12.poſitions.p:40.l:33.*addicitis*.l.41.*oderit*.p:43.l:43. *Anianus*. l: 58 *præveniri*. p:45.l: 34. loath p:47.l. 53.*gratiam*.p:48.l:21.*libro*.p.51.l.34.conditionality. p:53.l:20.*diluatur*.l.53.*neq; enim*. p:56.l:26. *labitur*.p:59.l:1.peace.l:23.as that.p:62.l:19.*pejores*.l:35.*coram rudioribus*,p:63.l:5. D.*Andreæ*. l:49.ſuſpected.p:65.l: 12. beſpeake.p:66.l:39 have not.p:68.l. 23.too bright.l:54.finding out.p:70.l:44.*Saturne*.p:73.l:44.*premit*. p.75.l. 22. dele *de*. l.47.*neceſſarium fore*. p:76.l:26.*puritate tutius*,*nihil ad diſcendum veritate facilius*.p:77.l.4.or any.p:78. l:46. *conciliare*.p:80.l:12.but by.p:82.l:39.worthily.p:84.l:15.of other. *ib.*l:17.of any.p:89.l.50. or to *Beza* and his brethren accuſing Lutherans of thoſe errours.p.92.l.*ult*.*libero*. p:93.l.6,7.*facite*.p:94.l:1.neceſſarily. p:95.l:8. reſolves it.p:97.l:41.veſſells on. p:98.l:41.*à Zenone*. p:99.l.2.*ſcio*.p.108.l.20.poſit.l.32.addition. p:109.l.33. diſtinguiſh. p.110.l.30.the two.p.112.l:59.*voluiſſe*.p.117.l.7.*patientiam*. p:119.l:5.or the.p:136.l:7.then he. p:140.l.30.*& non omnipotent*. p:142.l.4.*quiddam*. l.13.*naſceretur*.l.39.Supralapſarian. p:143.l:5.ſtroake. p:147.l:52.as Lord. p.151. l: 5.more largely. p.162.l:2. conceited. p:199.l.26.this belike. p:201.l.20.filth. p.202.l.12.*patientiam*. p:244.l:51. *apoſtatarum*.p:207.l.27.definition of.p:210.l:50. it doth end in a will conditionall; p.211.l.39. poore fiſh. p: 221. l:27.by this have all the godly at all times encouraged themſelves to well doing, as we may ſee generally. *Phil*.3. 20. *Colloſſ*:1.5.*Tit*.2.12,13. and particularly, *Heb*.11. *Abraham* &c- p:223.l.31. lame poſt. p:224.l:1. good waies. p: 229l:10.abſolutely?l:59.hiſtrionicall.p.230.l:11.*quoſdam*.l.31.law of.p.233.l:1.burning of.l.14.imployed.p.234.l: 12.yet his.l:30.was it.p:236.l:52.premiſes. p.237.l.36. *vel accepta perſeverantia*. l:49.*dele* its. l.54.*ita cum*. p. 240. l:5.is there.p:242.l:21.a certain. l:22.there he gives and workes faith in that one, and not in another. p:243.l:48. *præcepta*. p.248.l.58.propoſeth this.p.249.l.9.is this. p:253.l:30.*fatum*.p.254.l.4.*morietur*. p. 256. l.14. and perſevere. l. 23. indifferent. p. 259.l.23 if they had we.p.260.l.*ult*.hereſie.p:264.l:17.*dele* them.p:270.l.37. βελόμενοι p.273.*l*:39.purpoſeth thus. p.275.l.3.*marcuerat*.p.277.l:11.did reſt.p.282.l.6.if it. l:15.from *Breame*.l.42. change of.p.287.l:57.upon what. p.291.l.34.*dele* who.p.292.l.36.externall.p.298.l.7.comforter and that all the conſolation which he miniſters is in Chriſt and if. l:30. we cannot.p.299.l.19. not that.

THE SECOND BOOK, BEING AN EXAMINATION OF

Certaine paſſages inſerted into Mr Hord's diſcourſe (formerly anſwered) by an Author that conceales his name, but was ſuppoſed to be Mr Mason Rector of Saint *Andrews Vnderſhaft* in LONDON.



OXFORD,
Printed by H. Hall *for* Th. Robinson. 1653.

TO THE READER.

THe Authour of this Treatise was perswaded to Pen the reasons of his opinion against absolute Reprobation, that he might satisfie a worthy friend of his, who required it. What satisfaction that learned Gentleman, his friend, hath received by these reasons, I know not: but sure I am, they have given good content to some others, who have read them, and doe still desire a Copie of them for their farther use. To ease whose paines in transcribing this Treatise, it doth now appeare in this forme. If any of contrary opinion, shall undertake to answer or refute it; I wish, he would set downe his opinion and reasons with that perspicuitie and modestie, that our Authour hath set downe his. Such a course of disputing will gaine more credit to himselfe and his cause, then voluminous Vagaries about impertinent things. If any shall use railing speeches, or unnecessary diversions from the cause; I shall ever interpret that to be a strong signe of a weake cause: or, at least, I shall think it to be an argument of an obstinate minde, who neither knoweth how to yeeld to the Truth, nor to defend his errour. I hope the Reader, who loveth his owne salvation, will be a more indifferent Iudge in a question, which concerneth him so nearely.

And so I leave him to God's blessing.

THE PRE-FACE.

WHen firſt I lighted upon a treatiſe intituled (*God's love to mankind*) and read a little way in it, I had reaſon to be acquainted with it; though the Authors face I had never ſeen: Upon the firſt relation of the change of his opinion in certaine controverſies, as he pretended; I was intreated to conferre with him thereupon by word of mouth: My anſwer was, that it was more fit to conferre in writing, and if he would be drawne to communicate the reaſons of his pretended change; I ſhould willingly take them into conſideration. This motion was made in the yeare 1631, being then at London; the yeare following in the month of July (as I remember) was the diſcourſe of Mr *Hord's* ſent unto me, and I was urged upon my former promiſe to make anſwer thereunto. At that time I had another buſineſſe under my hand, which I could not diſpatch in leſſe then two months ſpace or more: but I was wiſhed to take my owne time. As ſoone as I was free from my former taske, I ſet hand to this, and returned my anſwere thereunto, unto the Gentleman that ſet me on worke, about the end of Hillary terme *Anno Dom*: 1632. But obſerving the bulke of the treatiſe now in print, twice as bigge, as that in manuſcript or more. I expected a reply to my former anſwer; but upon peruſall, I found nothing leſſe, whereat I wondred not a little, having never heard of any ſuch treatiſe untill the laſt ſommer, 1635: for ſurely they had time enough to anſwer it. To helpe the credit of their cauſe in this; it ſeemed good unto them to raiſe a miſt, that their abſurd carriage might not be diſcovered, to witt: by antedating the print thereof, which yet was but newly found creeping in corners. Another deviſe there is by a large interpolation and addition, here and there foyſted into the body of the former diſcourſe, and yet not all at once, but by pathes, a great part of it being but lumber; and the adding of more teſtimonies, as if the matter were to be carried by number and not by weight, or as if the Author of them were willing to make oſtentation of the πλεονεξία, and fullneſſe of his common place booke. Only the upper way of our Divines maintayning the abſoluteneſſe of *God's decrees* is here inpugned at large, with the Authors beſt ſtrength I doubt not; which taske was omitted by Mr *Hord*: And beſides there is one Divine attribute more here mentioned, in contradiction whereunto the Doctrine of our Divines is pretended to proceed, and the proſecution hereof amongſt the reſt is here ſet downe, by way of ſuperfætation upon the former, not only that ſo the argument might be the more compleat, but alſo to caſt a colour; that this diſcourſe of Mr *Hord's* hath not as yet been anſwered. It may be it would faine have ſhewed it ſelfe unto the world in this maſculine ſhape and vigour before this time, if Doctor *Duppa* while he was *Vice-chancellour* at Oxford would have given way to the printing of it, if it be true as I have heard, that it was offered unto him to be licenced for the preſſe. Doctor *Potter* alſo of Queenes Colledge performed a freindly part to ſome body in checking the Stationers for ſelling the copies of it, forwhich courteſy, I doe account my ſelfe ſo much in his debt as that comes to; and ſhould much more, had he ſent me one of the copies, as he did noe leſſe then ſix on the ſame day to his friend Doctor *Aigleonbee*; as the Book-ſeller confeſſed to a Scholar a friend of mine. Well Mr *Hord's* treatiſe is at length come to the Preſſe, and ſhewes it ſelfe in publique without ſhame, though I thought it had been ſufficiently confounded almoſt three yeares agoe; yet this Miſtres bluſhes not, though dares not open her mouth to cleare her reputation in any one particular of that which I layd to her charge, manifeſting her to be no Daughter of God's truth, but a meere Baſtard, begotten by a carnall wit, upon a ſpecious pretence by miſerable deflowring and adulterating the word of God; *one builds a wall* as the Prophet ſpeakes, *and another daubeth that with untempered mortar*. Mr *Hord* is well knowne to be the Author of the firſt by mee formerly anſwered. But what *Maſon's* hand was uſed in the addition, that is concealed; but that may breake out into pregnant evidences before we have gone through with it.

The Prefacer at the firſt chop begins with a notorious untruth, and that in more particulars then one; for firſt, whom doth he meane by the Author of this Treatiſe? M. *Horde?* That which M. *Horde* ſent to his worthy friend is yet to be ſeen, containing not halfe ſo much as this; it was not above 30 leaves manuſcript, and that not cloſely, but written at large; And this containes 55 leaves in print. But it may bee M. *Horde* hath ſince inlarged his own diſcourſe, and ſo continues to be author of it, not in part only, but in the whole. And I confeſſe it may be, he is as much the Author of the one as of the other; if it be true as ſome have told me of the very firſt, ſent to his friend indeed, namely that it was the very ſtrength of M. *Maſon*; him I knowe of old, and ſhould be acquainted with his ſufficiency, though it was a long time ere I had ſo much as heard of his zeale for the Arminian cauſe, and after I heard ſo much, it was yet longer ere I could believe it, untill I ſaw it under his own hand: And whereas M. *Horde* comming to his ſecond convincing Argument, as he calls it, drawne from Attributes Divine, layeth downe certaine premiſes, the ſecond whereof is this; *That juſtice, mercy, truth, and holineſſe, in God are the ſame in nature with theſe vertues in men, though infinitely differing in Degrees.* I willingly confeſſe I ſtood amaz'd, and albeit I conceived it, and doe conceave it to be one of the abſurdeſt poſitions that ever dropped from the pen of a Schoole Divine; yet the adventure was ſo great in my judgement, that I was apt to imagine that it proceeded not from a vulgar ſpirit. This conceit of mine was improved by the reaſons he brings to juſtifie ſo ſtrange a Paradox: for they are plauſible & make a faire ſhew at the firſt, like the fruit of Sodom; but cruſh them once, come to the Scholaſtical diſcuſſion of them, & forthwith *In Cineres abeunt & vagam fuliginem*, they vaniſh into ſmoak and emptineſſe. A ſecond untruth is this, that he ſaith, *The Author was perſwaded by a worthy friend to pen the Reaſons of his opinion againſt abſolute reprobation*; for he was only put upon ſhewing reaſons of the change of his opinion in the controverſies of late debated between the Remonſtrants & their oppoſites, as M. *Horde* himſelfe confeſſeth in his Preface. M. *Horde* indeed is willing to drawe the matter unto the conſideration of Gods decrees, as if that were the maine * ζητούμενον moſt abſurdly, and quite contrary to the doctrine of *Auguſtine*, who ſhapes the decrees of God in conformitie to the doctrine of grace; and accordingly to certifie the *Maſſilienſes* in the doctrine of Prædeſtination, he thinks it moſt fit to begin with proving that *Faith is the gift of God*, yea the very *beginning of it*. Now he liked not to follow *Auſtins* courſe, and in the firſt place to deale upon the point of grace. And herein hee ſavours of M. *Maſons* ſpirit, for that is his courſe, as I have ſeen under his hand; yet ſuppoſe that this be the maine thing controverted, namely the qualitie of Gods decrees, whether they be abſolute or conditionall only. How doth he ſatisfie his friend, or performe the promiſe made in letting election paſſe untouched, and dealing only upon reprobation? And this I know alſo to have been M. *Maſons* genuine courſe, far worſe then the Remonſtrants in the *Synod* of *Dort*, for they made a motion, that they might deal upon reprobation in the firſt place, and then upon election, wherein notwithſtanding they were condemned in the judgement of all forraigne Divines, aſſiſtant there. But this Author and M. *Maſon* too, on my knowledge, affect to deale upon reprobation only. Yet I have alwaies been, and ſtill am glad to ſee the utmoſt of their ſtrength, or any mans ſtrength on any of the five points, and ſhould be very glad to ſee what they could ſay upon the point of free will, which is moſt congruous for them, though they meddle not at all with grace. For even on that point I ſeem to have profited more, lately by dealing with ſome Engliſh Arminians, then ever before, having alwaies acknowledged, that to be a point very obſcure, like as is the nature of originall ſinne which was one of the three points, concerning which I did not look to live ſo long, as to meet with convenient ſatisfaction. M. *Horde* (I heard) conferred with M. *Maſon*, about Election, and told him that the doctrine of our Divines therein ſeemed very comfortable to the children of God, whereunto M. *Maſon* ſhould anſwer, by granting that, but then adding, it was very prone to provoke men to looſeneſſe of life. This conceſſion was as a ſhooing horne to draw M. *Horde* on to the Remonſtranticall Tenet, nothing doubting, but in the end to take him of from entertaining ſo good an opinion of our doctrine of Election, as if it were not any ſuch comfortable condition; & teach him to magnifie the comfortable condition of the adverſaries doctrine, depending upon a threefold cord, which as the proverb ſaith, cannot eaſily be broken. 1. The univerſalitie of Gods love, 2. The univerſalitie of Chriſts redemption. 3. The univerſalitie of the Covenant of grace: Thus the comforts of the Remonſtrants are multiplied

* Thing enquired after.

and

and advanced, which in the issue comes to this, that their condition is as comfortable as any reprobates condition throughout the world, whether *Cain's* or *Ishmael's*, or *Esau's* or *Doeg's* or *Juda's*, or the Grand Senior among the Turkes, or the whole guard of his Janisaries: for God's love is towards all, Christ's redemption extends to all, and the Covenant of Grace belongs to all. And what comfortable creatures must these needes be, upon so various and comfortable considerations? And the whole Nation of the Arminians, are herein inferiour to none of them all. And though they will not be so saucie as to promise unto themselves perseverance in the state of grace; yet they will be so bold as to promise both to themselves and to all their Proselites perseverance in this estate of consolation, nothing inferiour to any Reprobates consolation in the world. But the mischiefe is, that hence it followes, that the consolation of any of God's children, whether *Abraham*, *Isaack*, *Jacob*, *David*, or *Solomon*, Prophets, Apostles, Martyrs, the blessed Virgin *Mary*, nor any other excepted, was never greater, then the consolation of the wicked'st Christian that ever lived, whether prophane or hypocritical, Provided he did believe these mysteries of Arminian godlynes; namely that God's love is towards all, Christ dyed for the redemption of all, and lastly that the Covenant of Grace belongs to all; for these are the sweet and precious flowers of consolation that grow in the gardens and writings of these Divines; to the astonishment of the world, in considering the power and efficacy of Satan: and that, even in the Church of God, so many should be given up to so strange delusions. He doth not know what satisfaction that learned Gentleman his friend hath received by these reasons, nor I neither; for I am not privy to the least satisfaction he hath received. But on the contrary, rather how he hath found the vilenesse of these Remonstranticall Tenets discovered, and the vanity of all supports used to underprop them. Sure he is, *They have given good content to others*; give we him leave to be liberall in his owne commendations: we doe not know how farre he dwells from neighbours: yet no marvaile if they give good content to many, who have been seasoned with the like speculations: I have seen a manuscript with this inscription, *A survey of the new Platforme of Predestination*; the method of it is much like to this, and it ends with a dialogue in the point of consolation; as if both Authours had dipt their pen in the same inck-pot. And now to heare and see *Demogorgon* himselfe play his part, and explicate his *Mountebanck faculty* in displaying the strength of his *Opobalsamum*; as he did of his *Catholicon*, whom the Frenchman brings in his *Satyre Mennippised*, no marvaile if they are well perswaded that no Pandora can equall that for vniversalities of graces: when in the meane time they all fall short of that *unum necessarium*, which yet like enough they are ready to forsweare, and professe they will turne * open Atheists rather then believe it: still he keeps himselfe upon the commendation of his Proselite, which cannot but reflect some sweet content upon himselfe, who is the Engineer and perhaps the Spirit that animates him and sets him on worke,

For if the man such prayses have,
What then shall he that inspires the knave.

* I have read this in one of their letters directed to a Scholler of Oxford who imparted it to me

He commends the Author for perspicuitie in writing and modesty, and he wisheth that whosoever undertakes to answer it fully will performe the like. For my part I cannot change my stile: but my desire is, I may discover their fopperies, as perspicuously as I can, and I hope nothing to faile in performance; like enough the Authour of the preface as well as the Authour of the discourse desires to be gently handled and that he calls modesty, yet when a man will have his horse to be well curried, it is not for want of love to his horse; but becaus the condition of his horse requires to be so dealt withall: I thanke God, I never projected any immodest carriage; never could any adversary move me so farre; But as an excellent footeball-player of our House, who would lay any man on his backe handsomly without hurt (and he was a Bishop's Sonne) being desired to shew any other how to doe the like; answered with protestation that he never proceeded by any rules: but as he found his opposite, so he Coped with him. In like sort, as I find my adversarie; so I deale with him for the present, as the Condition of his carriage to my seeming deserves, and if I handsomly lay his opinions on the ground without doing him any harme, methinkes I should be rather loved then hated of my very enemies for this; As for the present my Opposite seemes to have a care of my credit, for the gaining whereof he chaulkes me out a way, to wit: by writing perspicuously, and modestly, without *voluminous vagaries* about impertinent

things. This he delivers very gravely and demurely, which is in my judgment very ridiculous; and, if I doe expresse it and answer it as it deserves, I think, I should carry my selfe decently in answering him according to his ridiculous condition, and telling him that he doth not well in shewing such charity towards his adversary, which the world will be apt to interpret, as proceeding from a cowardly disposition. The Spaniards at the Fort of Brest, when Sr John *Norris* went forth in hunting of the hare, and his hounds pursued the hare into the very Fort, they tooke his hounds and hanged them up over the wall, not in spite of so renowned a Generall, but to represent their feareles condition, and that they looked for no favour at his hands. Magnanimitie, not malice moved them unto this, which magnanimitie might strike feare into their Enemies, though it did not, who tooke the Fort, though it cost them deare. I write with a purpose to expose my selfe to the censure of the world as they shall find cause; but I regard not the censures of an Adversary: especially in such a cause which *Bradwardine* Stiles, *The cause of God against Pelagius.* And truly I confesse I get something by this very phrase of my Adversaries *Voluminous vagaries* about impertinent things; which makes me conclude, that certainely both this Author, and his Interpolator have seen my answer to Mr *Hord's Treatise*, wherein I have some vagaries I confesse, to refresh my Spirit upon emergent occasions. For, being taking of from my studies to see a stranger who *desired* my companie; I was suddenly instructed in a new learning of Nine causes, who never was accquainted with above 4. before in the Universitie, and one of the nine was *finding out*, of which I made good use upon my returne; in finding out the Sophestry of the Remonstrants, in certaine Arguments of theirs. This liberty of Spirit to refresh my selfe and my Reader, it may be this Author spites: whereas I am perswaded I should take no offence on his part for the like; But it may be his gravity transports him to be of the same mind with Raynold the Fox, who having lost his owne tayle in a Ginne afterwards he endevours very composedly to perswade his fellowes to cut of their tayles also. And to that purpose suffered his wit to exuberate in representing and amplifying the incommodious condition of such a member: Railing speeches, I know no reason why any man should feare from his adversary; for such, *Hierome* hath taught me, doe defile the Railer only, not him that is railed on. And if any man be pleased to spit in my face that way, though I am naturally very melancholly, yet I am perswaded he shall find little melancholly predominant in my answering him. As for unnecessarie divisions for the cause, which he doth seriously and wisely admonish his Adversary to beware of. I willingly professe, I love to have Sea roome, and not to be confined unto straights by any sullen rules of my Adversarie; and truly I prescribe to none, but as I find him, so I frame my selfe to grapple with him, as congruously as I can. If God be on my side, why should I be afraid of any colours. Let the Divell and all his Angels of Darknesse lye in camp against me; I shall not budge: But here is danger mentioned, which I professe, I did not project, and that is the dashing of my selfe upon the rocks of my Adversaries displeasure. And his interpretation of my courses to my displeasure. For if I doe not conforme to his sullen rules of *Stoicall moralitie*, he shall ever interpret it; (I marke well the Phrase, he comes not willingly on to make harsh interpratations, but he shall doe it) as much as to say the uprightnesse of his judgment and the justice of his disposition will urge him hereunto, namely *to interpret it, As a strong signe of a weake cause*, or ar least *an Argument of an obstinate minde*; But soft and faire, who made my Adversary my Judge; by whose interpretations I am to stand or fall? How Imperiously doth he carry himselfe in this; as if he were some Bugbeare, or dreadfull Adversary doe I say? or Magistrate rather; see the poverty of my wit and of my Spirit too; the one was never so inventious of any such trick, nor the other so audacious, or immodest (if I may be so bold soe to speak) as to serve my selfe therewith, to scarre my Adversary, desparing by faire waies to overcome him, and make him yeild, or else his obstinacy knowne to the world: for who seeth not, that I have as much authoritie to threaten him with the sharpnesse of my interpretations of him; as he to threaten me not with the like austereneſse of his? I am willingly content the world may judge between us, both of the cause debated and of our carriage therein throughout, and who hath the truth on his side, and shews most learning and honesty in the maintayning of that he undertakes; I willingly confesse, the five points controverted are tender points, and the knowledge of the truth herein, meerly concerning a mans salvation; But this Author deales only upon the halfe of one of them, and that most needlesse also: And the resolution of the Doctrine of Election depends upon the

resolution

reſolution of the doctrine of Election depends upon the reſolution of an other point; namely, whether *Grace be conferred freely, or according to mens workes*; That it is conferred freely, and not according to workes; hereupon it is that *Auſtin* builds the abſoluteneſſe of predeſtination and election, wherence it followeth evidently, that as many as doe maintaine the Decree of predeſtination to be conditionall, muſt alſo in *Auſtin's* judgment maintaine that *Grace is given according unto workes*, which was of old condemned in the Synod of Palæſtine, and all along in divers Synods and Provinciall Councells againſt the Pelagians. Now if Predeſtination be abſolute and not conditionall; it followes that Reprobation alſo is abſolute and not conditionall; which conſequence I preſume, the Author of theſe additions will not deny. But as there is a great deale of craft in dawbing; ſo theſe craftie Crowders are apt to worke upon generalities and in diſtinctions: Reprobation we know is as well from Grace as from glory, and God's reprobation from glory is joyned with a purpoſe to inflict damnation. Now as touching Reprobation from grace, we readily profeſſe that God hath both ordained to deny grace unto *ſome* of his meere pleaſure; like as he hath ordained to beſtow that upon others of his meere pleaſure; and alſo of his meere pleaſure hath made ſuch a decree. And theſe Authors dare not mainifeſtly oppoſe us in this argument, leſt the ſower leaven of their Pelagian Tenet manifeſt it ſelfe to the whole world, namely in maintaining that grace is conferred according to workes: But as touching reprobation from Glory, and God's purpoſe to inflict Damnation, Theſe Juglers ſo carry the matter, as if they would make the world believe our Doctrine is, that God decreed to deny men Glory and to inflict Damnation, not for their ſinnes; but meerely, becauſe it is his pleaſure ſo to doe, a moſt unſhamefaſt crimination: For albeit that God hath made no law, according whereunto he proceeds in giving grace unto ſome, and denying it unto others, but herein proceeds meerely according unto his pleaſure, and not according to men's workes; it being manifeſt *Pelagianiſme* to affirme the contrary; yet we openly & willingly profes (And all the Chriſtian world knowes it to be true) That God hath made a law whereunto according he proceeds in the diſtribution of rewards and Puniſhments, namely theſe, *Whoſoever believeth ſhall be ſaved, whoſoever believeth not ſhall be damned*: And according to this law, God hath decreed from everlaſting to proceed in pronouncing the ſentence of Salvation and Damnation on mankind, namely to beſtow Salvation not of his meere pleaſure, without all reſpect of the workes of men, but as a reward of their faith, repentance, and good workes, and to inflict damnation not of his owne meere pleaſure without any reſpect to the workes of men, but as a due reward for their ſinnes never broken of by repentance. Only this decree thus to proceed in the execution of rewards and puniſhments, we profeſſe God hath made according to the meere pleaſure of his will, whereby it is apparent, that theſe men play the part of notable Impoſtours, when they abuſe the world's credulitie in making them believe, that we maintaine any ſuch abſurd decrees or executions of decrees, which they obtrude upon us; and to this purpoſe theſe are willing to take the benefit and advantage of *Confuſion*; for it is moſt profitable for ſome to fiſh in troubled waters, and to walke in the darke: But when the light of diſtinction comes, this madd's them to ſee their impoſtures diſcovered, and their ſophiſtications made to appeare in their proper colours. *The eye of the Adulterer* (ſaith *Job*) *waiteth for the twilight, and ſaieth, no eye ſhall ſee me, and diſguiſeth his face, They dig through houſes in the darke, which they marked for themſelves in the day, they know not the light, but the morning is even to them, as the ſhadow of death, if one know them, they are in the terrours of the ſhadow of death*; Now there is a courſe of adulterating the word of God, and deflouring his truth every way, as abominable in the ſight of God, as the deflowring of women; yea and much more abominable; In my anſwer to the former diſcourſe, as I remember, I propoſed certaine arguments to prove the abſolute nature of Reprobation. This Authour doth not accommodate himſelfe, nor his *Achates* neither to anſwer ſo much as one of them. Thus having Prefaced concerning theſe concealed Authours, and therewithall made anſwer to the Preface of this Interpolator, I come to make anſwer to the *Additions* themſelves.

THE

The Anſwer to the Additions.

M. Maſon's Additions pag: 2.

1. Some ſay that God of his meer pleaſure antecedent to all ſinne in the Creature, originall, or actuall, did decree to glorifie his Soveraigntie and Juſtice in the eternall rejection and damnation of the greateſt part of Mankind, as the end; and in their unavoidable ſinne and impenitence, as the meanes.

2. The reſt of that ſide thinking to avoid the great inconveniences, to which the ſupralapſarian way lies open, fall downe a little lower; and preſent men to God in his decree of Reprobation lying in the fall & under the *guilt* of originall ſinne, ſaying.

3 That God looking upon miſerable mankind lying in *Adam's* ſinne, did decree, the greateſt number of men (even thoſe men whom he calls to repentance and ſalvation, by the preaching of the Goſpel) to Hell torments for ever and without all remedie, for the declaration of his ſevere juſtice; This way went the Synod.

Anſwer

Let the Reader obſerve that this Authour in ſtating the opinion of our Divines alleageth no paſſages out of any of them, no nor ſo much as quotes the place of any of their writings where this doctrine is to be found in the terme wherin he delivers it, that ſo, he may take the greater libertie to ſhape their opinions according to his owne pleaſure; firſt, as touching the firſt obſerve. 1. How he ſhapes this opinion. 2, the Perſons to whom he imputes it; concerning the firſt, the Decree is ſhaped as conſiſting of two parts; The one ſets downe the end, which God intended, the other the meanes whereby this end is procured.

1. As touching the end, it is hard to ſay, by his ſhaping of it, whether the manifeſtation of God's glory be made the end, or man's damnation; and if any one conceaves hereupon, that man's Damnation is the end which God intended in the opinion of our Divines, like enough this Authour will be well enough pleaſed with it. 2. Conſider how God's Soveraingtie and Juſtice are coupled togeather, as appearing in the eternall rejection and damnation of his Creatures, as if both of them did appeare equally in each. 3. Then rejection is propoſed without diſtinction and ſpecification, that we might know whether he underſtands it of rejection from Grace, or rejection from Glorie. 4. And in the fourth place, he couples rejection with Damnation, as if both were of equall yoke; ſignifying Acts temporall; whereas rejection in the Common notion thereof is all one with reprobation, and reprobation is commonly taken for an act eternall, to witt, The eternall purpoſe of God to deny grace, permit ſinne, and inflict damnation for ſinne. 5. Damnation is here brought in as belonging to the Decree of the end; and quite left out in the Decree of the meanes: whereas by the very light of Nature it is apparent, that Juſtice vindicative is manifeſted no where more, then in the execution of puniſhment. 6. And laſtly Damnation in it ſelfe is no manifeſtation of Juſtice any more, then of Injuſtice; unleſſe it be executed as a condigne puniſhment for ſinne; yet moſt abſurdly he talks of manifeſting juſtice in man's Damnation, without ſpecifying the meritorious cauſe of Damnation; without conſideration whereof, Damnation is no manifeſtation of Juſtice, either Divine, or humane. 7. Whereas he ſets forth the Perſons damned to be the greateſt part of Man-kind, this is only to ſpeak with a full mouth, and to gull a partiall Reader, who may be well pleaſed to have his mouth filled with an emptie ſpoone: For the Scripture teacheth expreſſie. that even of them that are called but few are choſen; and clear reaſon doth manifeſt, that look how God may deale with one, in the ſame manner it is lawfull for him to deale with Millions. We love to ſpeak diſtinctly, and accordingly we ſay, that all God's decrees; are of doing ſomething for the manifeſtation of his owne Glory. I ſay of doing ſomething, for no glory of God is manifeſted in Decreeing, but in executing his Decrees; As when *Solomon* ſaith, *God hath made all things for himſelfe, even the wicked againſt the day of evill* Prov: 16:4. So then the manifeſtation of God's Glory is the end of all his actions. And accordingly if rejection here be taken for God's Decree, no glory is manifeſted herein, and too abſurd it is to account God's eternall Decrees to to be meanes for the accompliſhing of his ends: But if Rejection be taken here for a temporall Act, to witt: Of finall dereliction in ſinne, then it may be a meanes for the manifeſtation of God's glory in a certaine kind, namely, his Soveraigntie; for like as God hath mercy on whom he will, in not leaving them finally in their ſinnes; but delivering them from the power of it, by beſtowing on them the Grace of Faith and Repentance. In like manner, God hardneth whom he will, in denying the ſame Grace of

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Faith and Repentance, and ſo finally leaving them and permitting them to continue finally in their ſinnes, without breaking them of by repentance. So that God proceed's herein merely according to his pleaſure, for the manifeſtation of that Soveraingtie which he hath as a Creator over his Creatures. Even the ſame that the *Potter hath over his Clay, to make of the ſame lump one veſſell unto honour, an other unto diſhonour.* No Juſtice is manifeſted in this difference, I meane no ſuch Juſtice as proceedes in reference to the workes of men; for he doth not beſtow Grace upon men, becauſe of their good workes; nor deny grace unto them, becauſe of their evill workes; but finding men equall in the ſtate of ſinne, he beſtowes Grace upon the one to cure ſinne in them, and beſtowes it not upon others. Yet God is juſt herein in another reſpect, namely in as much as he doth no other thing in all this, but ſuch as he hath a lawfull power to doe; As for Damnation, that is clearly an Act temporall; and this the Lord inflicts on none but for their ſinnes: And like as in giving or denying grace, God manifeſted no juſtice Compenſative, but Soveraigntie, only proceeding therein merely according unto pleaſure: So in inflicting dānation & denying glory, he manifeſt's vindicative Juſtice alone, not proceeding according to mere pleaſure herein but according to mens workes, and that according to a Law which himſelfe hath given unto men, namely this, *Whoſoever continueth in ſin without repentance ſhall be damned.* 2. The ſecond part of this Decree is concerning the meanes; and the meanes he makes to be ſinne and impenitency: It is very well he tooke libertie to ſet downe their opinion without ſpecifying their words, leaſt they ſhould fly in his face, and convict him of ſhamefull ſlaunder. He that intends the end is the Authour of the meanes: this is univerſall, we ſay that the permiſſion of ſinne and of impenitencie is the meanes, and this we acknowledge to make way, as well for the manifeſtation of his mercy in pardoning ſinne, as of his Juſtice in puniſhing it; it being apparent that neither mercy in pardoning, nor Juſtice in puniſhing can have place, unleſſe ſinne be permitted to enter into the world: Over and above this ſinne is ſtiled *unavoidable* without all diſtinction, ſuch is the proper language of the Arminian Court; we ſay all ſinnes are avoydable by Grace, and that no ſinne can be avoided in an acceptable manner without Grace, and here I ſpeak not of grace reſtrayning only, but of Grace ſanctifying. Here if it pleaſed him, he might have put in Damnation alſo for ſinne, as without all doubt a principall meanes of promoting the manifeſtation of God's Juſtice; and *Thomas Aquinas* expreſly profeſſeth, that *Reprobatio includit voluntatem permittendi culpam & damnationem inferendi pro culpa.* Reprobation includes God's will to permit ſinne, and to inflict Damnation for ſinne; here is the Decree concerning meanes. And as for the end hereof, both *Aquinas* (and *Alvarez* after him) profeſſeth, that the manifeſtation of God's glory in the way of vindicative Juſtice as intended by him, as the end of all this. 2. As for the Perſons here named to take this way 1. *Calvin* though this Authour placeth him amongſt the Supralapſarians, yet *Lubbertus* doth not in his treatiſe of predeſtination, but oppoſeth *Vorſtius* in this particular; *Cornelius de Lapide*, a Jeſuite upon the 18: verſe of the 9: to the Romans, agrees with *Lubbertus* in this; *Calvin*'s owne wordes are theſe *de prædeſtinatione* pag: 710. *Cum de Prædeſtinatione ſermo habetur, inde exordiendum eſſe conſtanter ſemper docui atque hodie doceo, jure in morte relinqui omnes Reprobos, qui in Adam mortui ſunt ac damnati jure periere, qui naturâ ſunt filii iræ,* When we treate of Prædeſtination, I ever taught and to this day teach, that we ought to begin it from thence; That all Reprobates are juſtly left in death, who are dead in *Adam*, and damned, and that they juſtly periſh, who by nature are children of wrath. 2. *Lubbertus* ſhewes *Beza* alſo to concurre in the ſame. 3. *Piſcator* in a ſmall Treatiſe of the object of Predeſtination, annexed to his anſwer to *Hemnigius* of univerſall Grace, though he makes the Decree of making all men in *Adam* to different ends, and of permitting them to fall in *Adam* to precede the conſideration of the Corrupt Maſſe, as it is evident they muſt, Yet the Decrees of Election and Reprobation he ſubordinates to the foreſight of the corrupt Maſſe. 4. And as for *Zanchy*, let but his Generall definition of Predeſtination be conſidered, it will appeare that he diſtinguiſheth the particulars of the Decree of Predeſtination as *Piſcator* doth.

2. I come to the ſecond opinion; and as for the great inconveniencies which here is pretended, that the Authours thereof deſire to decline. I have anſwered hereunto upon, the Treatiſe of M. *Hord*, and ſhewed that not ſo much to decline inconveniencies have ſome embraced this way, as rather becauſe this way ſeemes to be more familiar and plaine, and chiefly becauſe the formall Notions of the particulars of the Decrees of Election and Reprobation, the one in the Generall ſeeming to be a worke of mercy, the other of Juſtice, ſeeme to ſuppoſe a conſideration of man in the ſtate of miſerie. But ſuppoſing that ſome

The Answer to the Additions.

M. Mason's Additions pag: 2.

S 1. Some say that God of his meer pleasure antecedent to all sinne in the Creature, originall, or actuall, did decree to glorifie his Soveraigntie and Justice in the eternall rejection and damnation of the greatest part of Mankind, as the end; and in their unavoidable sinne and impenitence, as the meanes.

2. The rest of that side thinking to avoid the great inconveniences, to which the supralapsarian way lies open, fall downe a little lower; and present men to God in his decree of Reprobation lying in the fall & under the *guilt* of originall sinne, saying.

3 That God looking upon miserable mankind lying in *Adam's* sinne, did decree, the greatest number of men (even those men whom he calls to repentance and salvation, by the preaching of the Gospel) to Hell torments for ever and without all remedie, for the declaration of his severe justice; This way went the Synod.

Answer

Let the Reader observe that this Authour in stating the opinion of our Divines alleageth no passages out of any of them, no nor so much as quotes the place of any of their writings where this doctrine is to be found in the terme wherin he delivers it, that so, he may take the greater libertie to shape their opinions according to his owne pleasure; first, as touching the first observe. 1. How he shapes this opinion. 2, the Persons to whom he imputes it; concerning the first, the Decree is shaped as consisting of two parts; The one sets downe the end, which God intended, the other the meanes whereby this end is procured.

1. As touching the end, it is hard to say, by his shaping of it, whether the manifestation of God's glory be made the end, or man's damnation; and if any one conceaves hereupon, that man's Damnation is the end which God intended in the opinion of our Divines, like enough this Authour will be well enough pleased with it. 2. Consider how God's Soveraingtie and Justice are coupled togeather, as appearing in the eternall rejection and damnation of his Creatures, as if both of them did appeare equally in each. 3. Then rejection is proposed without distinction and specification, that we might know whether he understands it of rejection from Grace, or rejection from Glorie. 4. And in the fourth place, he couples rejection with Damnation, as if both were of equall yoke; signifying Acts temporall; whereas rejection in the Common notion thereof is all one with reprobation, and reprobation is commonly taken for an act eternall, to witt, The eternall purpose of God to deny grace, permit sinne, and inflict damnation for sinne. 5. Damnation is here brought in as belonging to the Decree of the end; and quite left out in the Decree of the meanes: whereas by the very light of Nature it is apparent, that Justice vindicative is manifested no where more, then in the execution of punishment. 6. And lastly Damnation in it selfe is no manifestation of Justice any more, then of Injustice; unlesse it be executed as a condigne punishment for sinne; yet most absurdly he talks of manifesting justice in man's Damnation, without specifying the meritorious cause of Damnation; without consideration whereof, Damnation is no manifestation of Justice, either Divine, or humane. 7. Whereas he sets forth the Persons damned to be the greatest part of Man-kind, this is only to speak with a full mouth, and to gull a partiall Reader, who may be well pleased to have his mouth filled with an emptie spoone: For the Scripture teacheth expreslie. that even of them that are called but few are chosen; and clear reason doth manifest, that look how God may deale with one, in the same manner it is lawfull for him to deale with Millions. We love to speak distinctly, and accordingly we say, that all God's decrees; are of doing something for the manifestation of his owne Glory. I say of doing something, for no glory of God is manifested in Decreeing, but in executing his Decrees; As when *Solomon* saith, *God hath made all things for himselfe, even the wicked against the day of evill* Prov: 16:4. So then the manifestation of God's Glory is the end of all his actions. And accordingly if rejection here be taken for God's Decree, no glory is manifested herein, and too absurd it is to account God's eternall Decrees to to be meanes for the accomplishing of his ends: But if Rejection be taken here for a temporall Act, to witt: Of finall dereliction in sinne, then it may be a meanes for the manifestation of God's glory in a certaine kind, namely, his Soveraigntie; for like as God hath mercy on whom he will, in not leaving them finally in their sinnes; but delivering them from the power of it, by bestowing on them the Grace of Faith and Repentance. In like manner, God hardneth whom he will, in denying the same Grace of

Faith

Faith and Repentance, and ſo finally leaving them and permitting them to continue finally in their ſinnes, without breaking them of by repentance. So that God proceed's herein merely according to his pleaſure, for the manifeſtation of that Soveraingtie which he hath as a Creator over his Creatures. Even the ſame that the *Potter hath over his Clay, to make of the ſame lump one veſſell unto honour, an other unto diſhonour.* No Juſtice is manifeſted in this difference, I meane no ſuch Juſtice as proceedes in reference to the workes of men; for he doth not beſtow Grace upon men, becauſe of their good workes; nor deny grace unto them, becauſe of their evill workes; but finding men equall in the ſtate of ſinne, he beſtowes Grace upon the one to cure ſinne in them, and beſtowes it not upon others. Yet God is juſt herein in another reſpect, namely in as much as he doth no other thing in all this, but ſuch as he hath a lawfull power to doe; As for Damnation, that is clearly an Act temporall; and this the Lord inflicts on none but for their ſinnes: And like as in giving or denying grace, God manifeſted no juſtice Compenſative, but Soveraigntie, only proceeding therein merely according unto pleaſure: So in inflicting dānation & denying glory, he manifeſt's vindicative Juſtice alone, not proceeding according to mere pleaſure herein but according to mens workes, and that according to a Law which himſelfe hath given unto men, namely this, *Whoſoever continueth in ſin without repentance ſhall be damned.* 2. The ſecond part of this Decree is concerning the meanes; and the meanes he makes to be ſinne and impenitency: It is very well he tooke libertie to ſet downe their opinion without ſpecifying their words, leaſt they ſhould fly in his face, and convict him of ſhamefull ſlaunder. He that intends the end is the Authour of the meanes: this is univerſall, we ſay that the permiſſion of ſinne and of impenitencie is the meanes, and this we acknowledge to make way, as well for the manifeſtation of his mercy in pardoning ſinne, as of his Juſtice in puniſhing it; it being apparent that neither mercy in pardoning, nor Juſtice in puniſhing can have place; unleſſe ſinne be permitted to enter into the world: Over and above this ſinne is ſtiled *unavoidable* without all diſtinction, ſuch is the proper language of the Arminian Court; we ſay all ſinnes are avoydable by Grace, and that no ſinne can be avoided in an acceptable manner without Grace, and here I ſpeak not of grace reſtrayning only, but of Grace ſanctifying. Here if it pleaſed him, he might have put in Damnation alſo for ſinne, as without all doubt a principall meanes of promoting the manifeſtation of God's Juſtice; and *Thomas Aquinas* expreſly profeſſeth, that *Reprobatio includit voluntatem permittendi culpam & damnationem inferendi pro culpa.* Reprobation includes God's will to permit ſinne, and to inflict Damnation for ſinne; here is the Decree concerning meanes. And as for the end hereof, both *Aquinas* (and *Alvarez* after him) profeſſeth, that the manifeſtation of God's glory in the way of vindicative Juſtice as intended by him, as the end of all this. 2. As for the Perſons here named to take this way 1. *Calvin* though this Authour placeth him amongſt the Supralapſarians, yet *Lubbertus* doth not in his treatiſe of predeſtination, but oppoſeth *Vorſtius* in this particular; *Cornelius de Lapide*, a Jeſuite upon the 18: verſe of the 9: to the Romans, agrees with *Lubbertus* in this; *Calvin*'s owne wordes are theſe *de prædeſtinatione* pag: 710. *Cum de Prædeſtinatione ſermo habetur, inde exordiendum eſſe conſtanter ſemper docui atque hodie doceo, jure in morte relinqui omnes Reprobos, qui in Adam mortui ſunt ac damnati jure periere, qui naturâ ſunt filii iræ,* When we treate of Prædeſtination, I ever taught and to this day teach, that we ought to begin it from thence; That all Reprobates are juſtly left in death, who are dead in *Adam*, and damned, and that they juſtly periſh, who by nature are children of wrath. 2. *Lubbertus* ſhewes *Beza* alſo to concurre in the ſame. 3. *Piſcator* in a ſmall Treatiſe of the object of Predeſtination, annexed to his anſwer to *Hemnigius* of univerſall Grace, though he makes the Decree of making all men in *Adam* to different ends, and of permitting them to fall in *Adam* to precede the conſideration of the Corrupt Maſſe, as it is evident they muſt, Yet the Decrees of Election and Reprobation he ſubordinates to the foreſight of the corrupt Maſſe. 4. And as for *Zanchy*, let but his Generall definition of Predeſtination be conſidered, it will appeare that he diſtinguiſheth the particulars of the Decree of Predeſtination as *Piſcator* doth.

2. I come to the ſecond opinion; and as for the great inconveniencies which here is pretended, that the Authours thereof deſire to decline. I have anſwered hereunto upon, the Treatiſe of M. *Hord*, and ſhewed that not ſo much to decline inconveniencies have ſome embraced this way, as rather becauſe this way ſeemes to be more familiar and plaine, and chiefly becauſe the formall Notions of the particulars of the Decrees of Election and Reprobation, the one in the Generall ſeeming to be a worke of mercy, the other of Juſtice, ſeeme to ſuppoſe a conſideration of man in the ſtate of miſerie. But ſuppoſing that ſome

might take this way to avoid inconveniencies, yet I have ſhewed in my anſwer to *Arminius*, that none of theſe are at all avoided this way. And then againe both theſe opinions have I endeavoured to reconcile in my *Vindiciæ*, and withall ſhewed that the difference whatſoever it comes to, is but *in apice logico; in a point of logick*: both ſides concurring in the maintenance both of God's Soveraigne Prerogative over his Creatures, to make one veſſell unto honour, another unto diſhonour, by giving faith and repentance unto the one, and denying it to others; as alſo in the prerogative of Grace as only effectuall to the working of men unto faith and Repentance.

Note

2. God decrees both to Create all men in *Adam*, and to permit them all to fall in *Adam*; Theſe be the Divine Decrees concerning meanes tending to the manifeſtation of his Glory in the way of Mercy and Juſtice; except man were created, no Glory at all could be manifeſted in him; unleſſe all were ſuffered to fall in *Adam*, there were neither place for mercy, nor Juſtice: theſe are generall decrees concerning all; then there are ſpeciall degrees of difference to be joyned to theſe generall decrees; 1. The one is of raiſing ſome out of ſinne by Faith and Repentance, and beſtowing Salvation on them by way of reward for the manifeſtation of God's mercy. 2. The other is of leaving others in ſinne, and permitting them finally to perſevere therein, and inflicting Damnation for their ſinnes, the end whereof is the manifeſtation of God s Juſtice: The decree of manifeſting theſe is alone the decree of the end, all the reſt are decrees of the meanes tending to theſe ends; whereof the two firſt are generall and concerne all, whether Elect, or Reprobate, the reſt are ſpeciall, concerning either the Elect alone, or the Reprobate alone. 3. Now here is a colour caſt, as if the ſpeciall Decrees did præmiſe the two generall Decrees: But this is a mere colour, as I have ſhewed you in my *Vindiciæ*, 2. And even they that take this way, maintaine that God ordaines no man to Damnation but for ſinne, and that both actuall, as well as originall, which is utterly pretermitted by this Authour. 3. The Scripture is expreſſe that of them that are called, few are choſen. 4. It is untrue that the Synod went this way, they medled not at all with the ordering of God's decrees.

M. Maſon's Additions p. 3.

Maccovius alſo Profeſſor of Divinitie at Franekar, a violent and ſtiffe maintainer of the moſt unſavory ſpeeches which have been uttered in this Controverſie, and one that undertooke in the very Synod to make good againſt *Lubbert* his fellow Profeſſor, that *God did will ſinnes, ordaine men to ſinne, and would not at all that all men ſhould be ſaved*. And beſides this, openly and peremptorily affirmed, that except theſe things were held and maintained by them, they could not poſſibly keep their owne ground, but muſt come over to the Remonſtrants; This man was not only not cenſured, but publiquely declared in the Synod to be pure and Orthodox, and diſmiſſed only with this kind and friendly motion. *That he ſhould hereafter take heed of ſuch words as might give offence to tender eares*, and could not well downe with thoſe *who are uncapable of ſuch myſteries*.

Anſwer.

For all this the Authour quotes *Antidotũ Remonſtrantiũ pag:* 32, this booke I have not ſeen much leſſe have I it at this time in my poſſeſſion, and therefore I muſt take it all upon truſt. And ſeeing this man was declared in the Synod of Dort, (as this Authour writes) to be pure and Orthodox, it ſeemes they did not cenſure theſe ſpeeches of his as unſavorie ſpeeches, but rather juſtified them, though with acknowledgment, that they might give offence to tender eares, and could not well downe with thoſe, who were as yet uncapable of ſuch myſteries; ſo that this Authour cenſureth theſe ſpeeches of *Maccovius* for unſavory ſpeeches, without the leaſt diſproofe of them (yet is *Maccovius*, and then was, a Profeſſor of Divinity in the Univerſity of Franekar) In like ſort by conſequent he cenſureth the judgment of the Synod, as an unſavory judgment, and their approbation of *Maccovius*, as an unſavory approbation; Let the Reader judge of what Spirit this Authour is, and whether it may not be ſaid of him, as *Moſes* ſaid of *Corah* and his complices, *ye take to much upon you ye Sonnes of Aaron*: Nay what if this cenſure of his reflects upon the very Phraſes of the Holy Ghoſt? The two firſt phraſes namely, *to will ſinnes*, and *to ordaine men to ſinne*, are all one: For to ordaine men to ſinne is but to will, that ſuch men ſhall ſinne, or that there ſhall be ſuch ſinnes of men. Now the Scripture frequently juſtifies this; for the 10 Kings to give their Kingdomes to the Beaſt, what is the meaning of it, But to imploy their Regall power in ſupporting the Pope-dome? Now was not this a great ſinne? Yet the Scripture expreſſly profeſſeth that is was the will of God it ſhould be ſo. Rev: 17. 17. *For God hath put in their hearts to fullfill his will, and to doe it with one conſent, for to give their Kingdome to the Beaſt, untill the words of God be fulfilled.* As expreſſly doth Saint *Peter* teſtifie of ſome men, that *they are ordained to ſtumble at God's Word, and to be diſobedient, Chriſt is a ſtone to ſtumble at, & a Rock of offence even to them which ſtumble at the word, being diſobedient, unto the which thing they were even ordained*: and by whom could they be ordained hereunto but by God? In like ſort we know the abominable

1 *Pet.* 2. 8.

Outrages

Outrages committed by *Herod*, *Pontius Pilate*, together with the Gentiles and people of Israel, against the Holy Sonne of God (for *Judas* betraied him, the high Priests suborned witnesses against him, *Herod* with his Herodians despitefully used him, *Pilate* condemned him, the Romane Souldiers scourged him, spit in his face, buffeted him, arraied him like a King in scorne, and crowned him with a Crowne of thornes, and last of all Crucified him between two theeves) yet of all these the Holy Ghost testifies, *That in this doing against the Holy Sonne of God) they did what God had determined to be done*; The words of the Text are these, and that as delivered with one accord by the Apostles and their fellowes; for when *Peter* and *John* were let goe, they came to their fellowes and shewed all that the High Priests had said unto them, *And when they heard it, they lift up their voices to God with one accord, and said, O Lord thou art the God which hath made Heaven and earth, the sea and all things that are therein, which by the mouth of thy servant David hast said, why did the Gentiles rage and the people imagine a vaine thing; The Kings of the earth assembled, and the Rulers came together against the Lord, and against his Christ, for doubtlesse against thy Holy Son Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people of Israell gathered themselves together, to doe whatsoever thine hand and thy Counsell had determined before to be done.* Now every one knowes that to determine to be done, and to ordaine to be done, and to will to be done are all one: why doth not this Authour censure these speeches for unsavory speeches, as well as those of *Maccovius?* Why doth not he expose this Synod of the Apostles and others to the same censure? whereunto he exposeth the Synod of Dort? Nay can it be avoided, but that already he hath done so, and that these censures of his must necessarily prove the powring forth of Blasphemy against the Holy Ghost? Seeing the speeches are used by the Apostles, which he censureth for unsavorie, being uttered by *Maccovius*; Is it not apparent that whosoever renounceth those speeches, must also renounce the word of God? And shall it be a reproach to us that we cannot keep our owne ground, unlesse the Holy Ghost keepes his ground, and maintaine his owne Dialect to be savorie in spite of the vile aspersions, that this Authour or any other of his Spirit doth usually cast upon it, not sparing to terme such speeches, unsavorie speeches As for the last phrase *That God would that all men should be saved*, this is no Scripture; nay it doth imply a manifest Blasphemy, namely that God cannot save them: It is true, the Scripture saith that God willeth that all men should be saved, but what is meant by this note of universalities in Scripture, let Scripture it selfe be Judge. The Pharisees did Tithe *omne olus* as *Austine* observes, not every particular herbe, to give the Tith thereof, but every kind of herbe to give the Tenth thereof; so *Peter* saw in a vessell let downe from Heaven [illegible] not every fower footed beast in particular, but all manner of fower footed beasts, see Mat: 3. 5. It is said *all Judea went forth to John and all the region round about Jordan*, what can the meaning of this be, but that from all parts of Judea and the Region round about Jordan, of all sorts some went forth to *John* not that there was not one man left behind in all Judea, and in all the Region round about Jordan. And accordingly Saint *Austine* interpreted this place above 1200 yeares agoe, namely that God will that of all sorts, some be saved, even of Kings and Nobles some, though but few of such 1 Cor: 1. 27. Now this is not denied either by *Maccovius*, or by any other of our Divines, only they deny it to be the will of God, that all and every one shall be saved; for if this were his will, it would follow, first that God is not able to save them, which is to deny the first Article of the Creed, as *Austine* in this very particular disputed many hundred yeares agoe. Secondly it would follow, that God is changed: for certainely when he damnes men he hath no will to save them. And what is Election Divine? is it any other then the will of God ordaining unto salvation? Now who dares say that all are Elect? Hath not our Saviour expresly told us, that even of them that are called, but few are chosen? Yet might that Synod well admonish *Maccovius* to take heed of such words as might give offence to tender yeares, and be carefull to expresse the same truth in as inoffensive way as we can: And accordingly having a digression in this very Argument, in my *Vindiciæ Gratiæ* I proposed it in this manner, *Whether the holy one of Israell without any injurie to his Holy Majestie, may be said to will sinne after a certaine manner*: and I maintaine the affirmative after this manner; *Deus vult ut peccatum fiat ipso permittente, God will have sinne to come to passe by his permission*; and *Bellarmine* confesseth that, *Malum esse Deo permittente bonum est. It is good that evill should be by God's permission*, which was also the saying of *Austine* long before. And that *non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo: Not any thing comes to passe, except God Omnipotent will have it come to passe, either by suffering it, or himselfe working it*; And the eleventh Article of the Church of Ire-

and framed in the dayes of King J'ames runnes thus ; *God from all eternitie, did by his unchangable Counsell ordaine what soever in time should come to passe ; yet so as there by no violence is offered to the to the wills of the reasonable Creatures , and neither the libertie , nor the contingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather.* And *Arminius* himselfe professeth that *'Deus voluit Achabum mensuram scelerum suorum implere; God would have Achab to fill up the measure of his sinnes*, and what is it to fill up the measure of his sinnes; but to adde sinne unto sinne ? And this he delivereth without all qualification.

M. Mason's Additions pag: 3.

By these instances it appeareth, That they of the first side can easily beare one with another in this difference. And to say the truth, there is no reason why they should quarrell about circumstances , seeing they agree in the substance for which they both contend.

Answer

1 That the moving cause of Reprobation is the alone will of God, and not the sinne of man originall or actuall. 2. That the finall impenitencie and Damnation of Reprobates are necessary and unavoidable by God's absolute Decree.

The difference which this Authour takes into Consideration is about the object of Predestination ; and the difference in opinion thereabouts is usually to be observed threefold (though this Authour is pleased to take notice of a secondfold difference,) for some conceive the object of Predestination to be man-kind as yet not created; others conceive the object thereof to be man-kind created, but not yet corrupted. A third sort maintaine the object thereof to be man-kind both created and corrupted. Now D. *Junius* hath endeavoured to reconcile the three opinions , making place for each consideration in the object of predestination ; And *Piscator* after him adventured on the like reconciliation, and hath performed it with more perspicuitie and with better successe in my judgment, then *Junius*; And that according to three different acts concurring unto Predestination; The first is, saith he, God's purpose to create man-kind in *Adam* unto different ends, now this Act doth clearely require the object thereof to be man-kind not yet Created. The second Act he conceives to be God's Decree to permit all men to fall in *Adam*; Now this Act he conceives as clearly to suppose the object thereof to be man-kind created, but not corrupted. The third & last Act he conceives to be God's decree to choose some, to shew compassion on them in raising them out of sinne by faith and repentance, and of Reprobating others, leaving them as he findes them, and permitting them to finish their dayes in sinne, to the end he might manifest the glorie of his grace, in saving the one; & the glorie of his Justice in damning others. Now this third Act he supposeth manifestly to require the object thereof to be man-kind both created and corrupted: Now the Authours of these severall opinions have no reason to go together by the eares about these three opinions, but with Brotherly love to entertaine one another: First, because the difference herein is not so much in Divinitie, as in Logick and Philosophie; difference in opinion about order in intentions , being meerly Logicall, and to be composed according to the right stating of the end intended , and of the meanes conducing to the end; it being generally confessed, that the intention of the end is before the intention of meanes conducing thereunto. And that look what is first in intention, the same must be last in execution. Secondly, the Authours of these severall opinions about the object of Predestination , doe all agree in two principall points. 1. That all men, before God's eternall predestination and reprobation, are considered as equall in themselves, whether as uncreated, or as created, but not corrupted, or lastly, whether created or corrupted. 2 That God's grace only makes the difference, choosing some to worke thē to faith, & repentance, & perseverance therein; while he rejecteth others, leaving thē as he findes them, & permitting them to finish their dayes in sinne, whereby is upheld and maintained. 1. First, the prerogative of God's grace as only effectuall to the working of men unto that which is good. 2. And secondly, the prerogative of God's Soveraignitie in shewing mercy on whome he will, to bring them to Faith and true repentance, and hardning others; that is, not bestowing of grace and repentance upon them. And seeing they all agree in these momentous points of Divinitie, they have no cause to take it offensively at the hands of one another , that they differ in a point of Logick. Now I have adventured, on this argument to find out to my selfe, and give unto others some better satisfaction , then formerly hath been exhibited , and that by distinguishing Two decrees only on each part, to witt, the decree of the end, and the decree of the meanes: As for example, 1. On the part of Predestination and Election, I conceive the end to be the manifestation of God's glorious grace in the way of mercie mixt with Justice, on a certaine number of men. And the Decree of the meanes is to create them and permit them all to fall in *Adam* and to bring them forth into the world in their severall generations clothed with originall sinne; and to send Christ into the world to dye

Note

for

for them, and for Christ's sake first to bestow the grace of faith and repentance upon them, and finally to save them. 2. On the part of Reprobation I conceive the end to be the manifestation of God's glory in the way of Justice vindicative; And the decree of meanes to be partly common and partly proper; the common meanes are to create them and permit them all to fall in *Adam*, and bring them forth into the world clothed with originall sin; the speciall meanes are to leave them as he finds them, and permit them to finish their daies in sinne, and so not shewing the like grace to them, which he shewed to others. 1. So that the moving cause of Reprobation is the alone will of God, and not the sinne of man originall and actuall; like as on the other side, the moving cause of election is only the will of God, or not faith, or any good workes, whereupon this Authour is loath to manifest his opinion; This doctrine is not only approved by Doctour *Whitaker* Doctour of the Chaire in the Universitie of Cambridge, and that in his *Cygnea Cantio* a little before his death, but justified and confirmed by varietie of Testimonies both of Schoolemen, as *Lumbard*, *Aquinas*, *Bannes*, *Petrus de Alliaco*, *Gregorius*, *Arminensis*; of our owne Church and the Divines thereof, as taught by *Bucer* at Cambridge, by *Peter* Martyr at Oxon: professed by the Bishops and others, promoted by Queen *Elizabeth* and farther in the yeare of our Lord 1592: there was a famous recantation made in the Universitie of Cambridge by one *Barret* in the 37. of *Elizabeth* whereunto he was urged by the heads of houses of that Universitie. The Recantation runnes thus, *Preaching in Latine not long since in the Universitie Church, (Right worshipfull) many things slipt from me, both falsly and rashly spoken, whereby I understand the mindes of many have been grieved, to the end therefore I may satisfie the Church & the truth which I have publiquely hurt; I doe make this publique confession, both Repenting and Revoking my Errour; First I said that no man in this transitorie world is so strongly underpropt, at least by the certainty of Faith, that is (unlesse as I afterwards expounded it) by Revelation that he ought to be assured of his owne Salvation; But now I protest before God, and acknowledge in my conscience that they which are justified by faith have peace towards God that is, have reconciliation with God, and doe stand in that grace by faith therefore that they ought to be certaine and assured of their owne Salvation, even by the certainty of Faith it selfe.*

2. *Secondly, I affirmed that the faith of Peter could not faile, but that other mens faith may; for as (I then said) Our Lord prayed not for the faith of every particular man, but now being of a better and more sound judgment according to that which Christ teacheth in plaine words, Joh. 17. 20. I pray not for these alone, that is the Apostles, but for them also which shall believe in mee through their word; I acknowledge that Christ prayed for the faith of every particular believer, and that by the vertue of that prayer of Christ; every true believer is so stayd up, that his faith cannot faile.*

3. *Thirdly touching perseverance to to the end, I said that, that certainty concerning the time to come is proud, for as much as it is in his owne nature contingent of what kind the perseverance of every man is, neither did I affirme it to be proud only, but to be most wicked; but now I freely protest that the true and justifying faith, whereby the faithfull are most neare united unto Christ, is so firme as also for the time to come so certaine, that it can never be rooted up out of the mindes of the faithfull by any temptation of the flesh, the world or divell himselfe: so that he that once hath this faith shall ever have it; for by the benefit of that justifying faith Christ dwelleth in us and we in Christ, therefore it cannot but be both increased (Christ growing in us dayly) as also persevere unto the end, because God doth give constancy.*

4. *Fourthly, I affirmed that there was no distinction in faith, but in the Persons believing, in which I confesse I did erre. Now I freely acknowledge the Temporarie faith (which as Bernard witnesseth is therefore fained, (because it is temporary) it is distinguished and differeth from the saving faith, whereby sinners apprehending Christ are justified before God for ever, not in measure and degrees, but in the very thing it selfe. Moreover I adde that Saint James doth make mention of a dead faith, and Paul of a faith that worketh by love.*

5 *Fifthly, I added that forgivenesse of sinnes is an Article of faith, but not particular, neither belonging to this man or that man, that is (as I expounded it) that no true faithfull man either can or ought certainely believe that his sinnes are forgiven: But now I am of an other mind and doe freely confesse that every true faithfull man is bound by this Article of faith to believe the forgivenes of sinnes, and certainely to believe that his owne particular sinnes are freely forgiven him, neither doth it follow hereupon that, that Petition of the Lord's prayer (to wit) forgive us our trespasses is needlesse; for in that Petition we aske not only the gift but also the increase of Faith.*

6 *Sixtly, these words escaped me in my Sermon viz: As for those that are not saved, I doe*

most strongly believe, and doe freely protest, that I am so perswaded against Calvin, Peter Martyr and the rest, that sinne is the true and proper cause of Reprobation; But now being better instructed I say that the Reprobation of the Wicked is from everlasting, and that saying of Saint Austine to Simplician to be most true; viz: If sinne were the cause of Reprobation then no man should be elected, because God doth know all men to be defiled with it: And that I may speak freely, I am of the same mind and doe believe concerning the Doctrine of Election and Reprobation, as the Church of England believeth and teacheth in the booke of the Articles of faith, in the Article of Prædestination. Last of all I uttered these words rashly against Calvin, a man that hath very well deserved of the Church of God (to wit) that he durst presume to lift up himselfe above the high and Almighty God, by which words I doe confesse that I have done great injurie to that most learned and right good man, and I most humbly beseech you all to pardon this my rashnes, as also in that I have uttered many bitter words against Peter Martyr, Beza, Zanchy, Junius, and the rest of the same religion, being the lights and ornaments of our Church, calling them by the odious names of Calvinists and other slanderous termes, branding them with a most grevious marke of reproach; whom because our Church doth worthily reverence, it was not meet, that I should take away their good name from them. Doctor Fulke in like manner maintaines that *reprobation is not of workes, but of God's free will, Rom: 9: Num:* 2. His words are these, *God's election & Reprobation is most free, of his owne will, not upon the foresight of the merits of either of them; for he hath mercy on whom he will and whom he will he hardeneth vers:* 18. Yet here is to be distinguished, for the explication of the truth, That God's decree of Reprobation may be considered either as touching the Act of God reprobating and willing, or as touching the things hereby willed or Decreed; As touching the Act of God reprobating, we say as *Aquinas* saith concerning the Act of God predestinating, namely that no cause can be given thereof as from man, like as no cause can be given of God's will; God's will being eternall, but whatsoever is in man being Temporall. But as touching the things decreed or willed by Reprobation, there are either the deniall of grace, or inflicting of damnation; As touching the deniall of grace we clearely professe, that like as God of his mere will and pleasure doth shew mercy on some in bestowing the grace of faith and repentance upon them; so God of his mere will and pleasure doth harden others in denying unto them the grace of faith and repentance; and thus it is that Doctor Fulke maintaines God's election & reprobation to be most free, of his owne free will, not upon the foresight of the merits of either of the; but touching the inflicting of damnation, we maintaine that God neither doth inflict damnation, nor ever did decree to inflict damnation of his owne mere pleasure and will, but altogether for sinne, either originall or actuall: further we maintaine, that in no moment of time or nature God doth decree to damne any man before he foreseeth the sinne for which they shall be damned. 2. As touching the second we willingly grant, that by vertue of God's decree, it necessarily and unavoidably followes, that whosoever dieth in finall impenitency shall be damned, neither doe I thinke this Authour dares to avouch the contrary.

Secondly, as touching finall impenitency, wee willingly professe that upon supposition of God s decree finally to harden a man and to deny a man the grace of repentance: (It being clearely the gift of God as Scriptures testifie Act: 5. 31, and 11. 18. 2 Tim 2 25) it is impossible that such a man should repent, nevertheless both repentance is possible, and finall impenitency is avoidable simply (to wit) by grace 3. But this Authour loves not to explicate himselfe, but I suppose he secretly maintaines, that every man hath such a power, by grace, wherby he may repent if he will, concerning which Tenent of his, we nothing doubt but every man hath such a power, but we deny that such a power is grace; we say it is nature rather, and that for this reason; looke by what power a man may repent if he will, by the same power he may refuse to repent if he will: Now if this were grace, then were grace inferior to a morall vertue: for no morall vertue leaves a man indifferent to doe good or no; to doe good or evill; but inclines and disposeth the will only to that which is good; so Justice disposeth a man only to just actions, not indifferentlie to that which is just, or to that which is unjust, Tis true nevertheless a man that is just may doe an unjust Act if he will, but this is not by vertue of the habit of Justice wherewith he is qualified; But only by reason of the freedome of his will wich is naturall unto him; for justice undoubtedly inclines a man's will only to that which appeareth just, and so every morall vertue inclines the will only to a vertuous Act, not indifferently either to acts vertuous, or to acts vicious; like as on the contrary a vicious habit inclines the will of man only to acts vicious, not indifferently, to acts vicious or to acts vertuous; Secondly grace is supernaturall, it were a Monster in Divinitie to

say

ſay that ſupernaturall grace doth indifferently incline a man either to good or evill; it is impoſſible it ſhould incline a man ſave to acts ſupernaturall; now every ſupernaturall act muſt needs be gratious, it cannot be ſinfull or evill; laſtly whoſoever hath a willto repent, ſuch a one hath not only a power to repent, but actually doth repent, as touching the cheifeſt facultiein, the change whereof repentance doth conſiſt; for that is the will, and it is God that worketh in us both the will and the deed, in every kind of that which is truly good; and ſurely to have a will to repent is a good thing, if he want power, let him and us, pray for that out of that will and deſirewe have to repent, *ut quod volumus implere valeamus*, *that what we deſire to doe we may be able to doe*, and we have no cauſe to feare that God will deſpiſe ſo gratious deſires.

To theſe ſpeeches let me adde that of *Remigius* Arch-biſhop of Lyons, who, to *Rabanus* Arch-biſhop of Mentz, objecting that Saint *Auſtine* wrote a booke called *Hipognoſticon* againſt *Pelagius* and *Cœleſtius*, wherein he denied that Reprobates were properly *prædeſtinati ad interitum*, *predeſtinate to deſtruction*, anſwereth, that Saint *Auſtine* ſaid not ſo (but ſome other man) as it is ſuppoſed to purge the Church of calumnie, which ſome ill affected ones did caſt upon it; namely that it taught that God by his predeſtination did impoſe upon men a neceſſity of periſhing, and did withdraw the word (Prædeſtination) from the point of Reprobates, and gave it only to the Elect, and ſo gave great occaſion of further Errour and miſtake; In this ſpeech of his, it is cleartly implyed that it was the conſtant Doctrine of the Church then, that Reprobates lye under no neceſſitating Decree of Perdition. *M. Maſon's Additions p.* 5.

Here we find inſerted a paſſage taken out of *Remigius* Arcſh-biſhop of Lions his anſwer to *Rabanus* Arch-biſhop of Mentz, as it is to be found in the Hiſtorie of *Gotteſcalchus* written by Doctor *Uſher* Arch-biſhop of Armach, *pag.* 107. Now that diſcourſe of *Remigius* is not in anſwer to *Rabanus* Arch-biſhop of Mentz, but unto *Hincmarus* Arch-biſhop of Remes. And withall this Authour is pleaſed to geld it as he thinkes good: For whereas *Remigius* hath it thus; *quaſi Deus ſua prædeſtinatione neceſſitatem imponeret hominibus in ſuis impietatibus permanendi, & in æternum pereundi:* This Authour renders it thus; *That God by his predeſtination did impoſe upon men a neceſſity of periſhing*, leaving out altogether the former, namely of impoſing upon men a neceſſitie of periſhing in their impieties: And every ſober man may well wonder at his dealing in this, eſpecially ſeeing he hath left out that which is moſt materiall and moſt conſiderable; for neither by *Auſtin's* Doctrine nor by our Doctrine, hath God impoſed upon any a neceſſitie of periſhing, but ſuch as finally perſevere in their impieties: And will any man that is well in his wits oppoſe this? Sure I am, nor *Hincmarus*, nor any other was knowne to mee to oppoſe this in the Church of God. Neither is there any neceſſitie inherent in man, on whom it is ſaid to be impoſed, but a conſequent denomination to God s unchangeable or irreſiſtable will, to damne all ſuch as perſiſt finally in their ſinfull courſes, without breaking the off by repentance: All the queſtion is about the neceſſity of Reprobates perſiſting in their impieties, which might be objected, & as it ſeemes was objected againſt *Auſtin's* doctrine of Predeſtination, & by this Authour is objected againſt ours: now by this objection, *Remigius* cleares the Doctrine of Saint *Auſtine*, profeſſing this to be a calumnious imputation, and ſuch as needed not for the anſwering thereof, that any ſuch courſe ſhould be taken as the Authour of the booke (intuled *Hypognoſticon*) takes; (to wit) by denying that God predeſtinates any to Damnation, for this neceſſitie of perſiſting in ſinnes was not impoſed upon them by predeſtination in their opinion, who thereby underſtood no other thing then Gods decreeing of ſuch things which himſelfe purpoſed to effect in due time; as both *Remigius* manifeſted in theſe words, *pag.* 155, of the ſame booke: *Non prædeſtinat niſi quæ fuerat ipſe facturus, quæ utiq, omnia bona & juſta ſunt*; And *Auſtine* in like manner, *de bono perſeverantiæ, cap.* 17. *In ſua quæ falli mutariq, non poteſt præſcientia, opera ſua diſponere, illud omnino nec aliud quicquid eſt prædeſtinare*, ſo the Synod of Valens, Can: 3. *Prædeſtinatione autem deum ea tantum ſtatuiſſe (dicimus) quæ ipſe vel gratuitâ miſericordiâ, vel juſto judicio facturus erat. In malis verò ipſam malitiam præſciſſe quia ab ipſis eſt, non prædeſtinaſſe quia ab illo non eſt*: And that for good reaſon, becauſe, *Malum non habet cauſam efficientem, ſed deficientem*, as *Auſtine* writes *De Civit. Dei lib.* 12. *cap.* 7. But as for this neceſſitie in ſinning, this both we and they willingly profeſſe to flow from the ſinne of *Adam*, which God alone can cure in man and none other, as the ſame *Remigius* acknowledgeth *Hiſtor. Gotteſca. pag.* 3. *Anima humana & voluntas humana ſicut verè manet in morte non diligendo, ita verè transfertur de morte in vitam diligendo*: But by whom is this tranſlation wrought? that follows; *hac dilectione non fit verè liberũ arbitrium. id eſt verè libera voluntas niſi illo liberante, id eſt libertatem largiente, qui ait, ſi vos filius liberaverit, tunc verè liberi eritis, & niſi illo munere Spiritus Dei, de quo dicit Apoſtolus; ubi autem Spiritus* *Anſwer.*

Domini

Domini, ibi libertas: By this love the will is not made free, but he freeing it, who saith, if the Sonne shall make you free, then shall ye be free indeed, and not otherwise then by the gift of the Spirit of God whereof the Apostle speakes, where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty; nay I am verily perswaded that *Hincmarus* himselfe against whom *Remigius* disputeth, is more Orthodox in this argument then this Authour; for thus writes *Hincmarus*: as is to be seen in the same history of *Gottescalchus. pag.* 39. *quosdam in Massa peccati & perditionis justè deseruit, à qua prædestinatione sua (id est in gratiæ præparatione) occulto (sed non injusto) judicio nequaquam eripuit*; *Some men God justly deserted in the Masse of sinne and perdition; from which by his predestination, that is, preparation of grace, he never delivered by judgment secret, but not unjust*, whereas this Authour will have all men to be delivered from this Masse of sinne and perdition, by a certaine universall grace bestowed upon them, whereby they are put in a kind of indifferent estate to believe or not believe, repent or not repent if they will, which *Hincmarus* never acknowledged; yet this necessitie of sinning, incident to all that are brought forth into the world, *in Massa peccati & perditionis, in the Masse of originall sinne and perdition*: is not such either in their, or our opinion, as whereby they cannot but sinne; although they would abstaine from it; though this be obtruded upon us as it was upon *Remigius*: whereupon he pleades for himselfe, and such as were of his mind in the Doctrine of predestination after this manner, *pag.* 53. *Nemo ita sentit aut dicit quod Dei prædestinatio aliquem invitum faciat peccare, ut jam non propriæ voluntatis perversitate: sed Divinæ prædestinationis necessitate peccare videatur*; *No man* (saith he) *doth so think or speak, as if God's predestination made a man to sinne against his will, in such sort as he should seeme to sinne, not through the perversnesse of his owne will, but by the necessity of Divine predestination*, so say we; neither is this impotency of doing good, any where else, but in the Corruption of the will, it being a morall impotency according to that of Saint *Austine*, *Libertas sine gratia non est libertas. sed contumacia*; *Libertie without grace, is not Libertie, but wilfullnesse*, and *Remigius Histor: Gottescal*: pag. 29. *Ex quibus* (saith he) speaking of Reprobates, *Nemo potest salvari, non propter violentiam aliquam Divinæ potestatis, sed propter indomabilem & perseverantem nequitiam suæ iniquitatis*; *Not one of them can be saved, not because of any violence of Divine power, but by reason of the untameable & persevering naughtines of their owne iniquity*, &p. 144. *De Reprobis nullum salvari ullatenus existimavi, non quia non possunt homines de bono ad malũ commutari. & de malis ac pravis boni ac recti fieri, sed quia in melius mutare noluerunt, & in pessimis operibus usq; ad finẽ perseverare voluerunt*; *not only of the Reprobates doe we judge to be saved, not because they could not be changed from evill to good, & of evill & depraved become good & right, but because they would not be chãged into better. & would to the end persevere in wicked workes*; So then they could be changed but would not: But in what respect is it said they could be changed? was it in respect of the freedome of their wills without grace? Nothing lesse; see his owne words, *pag.* 34. *Si dixisset generaliter, nemo hominum sine Dei gratia libero benè uti potest Arbitrio, esset Catholicus*: *Had he said generally that no man can rightly use his free Will, without the grace of God, he had been a Catholique.* But all the question is about the manner how this grace doth worke (to wit) whether God gives men grace to believe and repent if they will, and leaves to them to performe the Act of faith and repentance; or whether God worketh the very Act of faith and repentance, not to dispute of this point out of God's word, which clearely teacheth, that, *God workes in us the will and the deed, according to his good pleasure.* Philip. 3. 13. And that *he makes us perfect to every good worke; working in us that which is pleasing in his sight through Jesus Christ*: Let us take notice of the discourse between *Hincmarus* and *Remigius* on this argument; that till the love of God comes, man is dead; his will is dead to that which is good; Now love is only given to the believers, *posse charitatem habere naturæ est hominum, charitatem autem habere gratiæ est fidelium, De prædestinatione sanctorum, cap.* 5. For thus writes *Hincmarus*, *pag.* 3. 113. *Bonum quod agimus & Dei est & nostrum, Dei per prævenientem gratiam, nostrum per subsequentẽ liberam voluntatem, The good that we doe is both God's worke and ours; of God by Grace preventing, ours by free Will following*: To this *Remigius* answers, and first he saith, *Hincmarus* discourseth after such a manner, as if a good worke were partly God's worke and partly ours: And againe as if the beginning of a good worke were God's, but the effect thereof of man's free will; although as he (*Hincmarus*) doth endeavour to temper this speech of his, by the addition of grace, not by the fulnesse of it; *gratiæ adjunctione non etiam plenitudine, by the adjunction of grace, not also by the fulnesse of it*: So he should have done saith *Remigius, cum verè totum sit Dei*; *seeing indeed the Whole is God's worke*; As the truth it selfe saith, *without me ye can do nothing*; And the Apostle; *What hast thou that*

Heb. 13. 20.

thou

that thou haſt not received? whence the bleſſed and glorious Martyr *Cyprian* hath ſo defined it, ſaying, *we muſt glory in nothing, ſeeing nothing is ours:* and concludes thus; *Bonum itaq; noſtrum totum Dei eſt, quia totum eſt ex Deo; & nihil boni noſtri, noſtrum eſt, quia nihil boni noſtri eſt ex nobis: Therefore our good workes, are holy God's, and noe good of ours is ours, becauſe it is not of us*; and to reconcile this ſeeming contradiction, in calling it our good, yet denying it to be from us, he concludes thus, *omne bonum noſtrum, & totum Dei eſt, donando; & totum noſtrum eſt, accipiendo: Every good thing of ours is wholy God's in as much as he gives it, and it becomes ours full and whole, for asmuch as we receive it.*

Fulgentius is plaine for it to, *lib.* 1. *ad Monium, pag.* 6. Theſe whome God foreſaw would dye in ſinne, he decrees ſhould live in endles puniſhment; I may take in Saint *Auſtine*, and *Proſper* alſo, who are judged to be the Patrons of the abſolute Decree, as it is ſet downe in the Sublapſarian way; even they doe many times let fall ſuch ſpeeches, as cannot fairely be reconciled with abſolute Reprobation. I will only cite *Proſper*; for Saint *Auſtine*, ſpeakes in him; he diſcourſing of ſome that fall a way, *à Sanctitate ad immunditiem, from holineſſe to uncleanneſſe*; ſaith, they that fall away from holineſſe to uncleanneſſe; lye not under a neceſſity of periſhing, becauſe they were not predeſtinate; but therefore they were not predeſtinate, becauſe they were knowne to be ſuch by voluntary prævarication. *M. Maſon's Additions p.* 6.

Not long after ſpeaking of the ſame men; he ſaith, Becauſe God foreſaw they would periſh by their owne free will; therefore, he did not by any predeſtination ſever them from the children of perdition. And againe in his anſwer to the twelvth objection, he hath theſe words. *God hath not withdrawne from any man ability to yeeld obedience, becauſe he hath not predeſtinated him; but becauſe he foreſaw he would fall from obedience; therefore he hath not predeſtinated him.*

They are I confeſſe the wordes of *Fulgentius* in the 25: chapter of his firſt booke *ad Monium*, and in the very next chapter, he doth expreſſe himſelfe in this manner on the point of predeſtination unto glory; *prædeſtinavit illos ad ſupplicium quos à ſe præſcivit voluntatis malæ vitio deceſſuros; & prædeſtinavit ad regnum quos ad ſe præſcivit miſericordiæ prævenientis auxilio redituros, & in ſe miſericordiæ ſubſequentis auxilio manſuros: He predeſtinateth thoſe untopuniſhment, whom he foreſaw to be ſuch as would depart from him through the fault of a naughty will; and he predeſtinated to the kingdome thoſe whom he foreſaw to be ſuch as would returne unto him by the help of mercy prevenient, and would perſevere in him by the helpe of grace ſubſequent;* So that upon the ſame ground he may as well deny predeſtination unto ſalvation to be abſolute in the opinion of *Fulgentius*, as predeſtination unto damnation: Now *Voſſius* in his preface to the *Pelagian Hiſtorie*, having firſt confeſſed that all Antients agreed in this, That God did not ordaine any other unto eternall ſalvation, then ſuch who by his mere gift of grace ſhould have the beginning of faith and good will, and perſevere in that which is good, as it was foreſeen by him: In the next place acknowledgeth, that *Auſtine* and *Proſper* and the Authour of the booke *de vocatione Gentium*; and *Fulgentius*, unto this common opinion of *Catholiques* did adde this; *That this præſcience Divine did flow from God's abſolute Decree to ſave them.* This I ſay *Voſſius* writes, thongh, I ſee no cauſe to regard his judgment in this Argument. His diſtinction is very well knowne of will abſolute and will conditionall; which will conditionate he examplifies thus, as when God will have ſalvation conferred upon a man in caſe he doth believe; what one of our Divines doth deny a conditionall will, in this ſenſe in reference to ſalvation? Now what one of the Antients (the Pelagians excepted) can this Authour produce; that doth affirme any ſuch will to be in God, for the beſtowing of faith upon a man? For to maintaine this, were in plaine Termes to maintaine, that it was the will of God that grace ſhould beſtowed according unto workes: But if the grace of God be beſtowed merely according to the good pleaſure of God, as Saint *Paule* ſaith; *God hath mercy on whom he will?* By this it is aparent, that this decree is abſolute, and conſequently that predeſtination is abſolute; And thus *Auſtine* coupleth together the doctrine of the beſtowing grace not according unto workes, And his Doctrine of predeſtination as inſeparable, each to be granted or denied together with the other. Becauſe this Authour pretends it to be needles to cite *Auſtine*, and ſufficient to cite *Proſper*, adding that *Auſtine* ſpeakes in him, to wit, after he was Dead; ſuch is this Authours jugling courſe with his Reader; therefore I will repreſent *Auſtine* himſelfe propoſing the objection made by the *Maſſilienſes*, againſt *Auſtin's* doctrine of predeſtination, as it was ſent unto him by *Proſper*, and then anſwering it, not leaving it unto *Proſper* to anſwer for him: See the objection, *ſed aiunt (ut ſcribitis) neminem poſſe correptionis ſtimulis excitari, ſi dicatur in conventu Eccleſiæ audientibus multis, Ita ſe habet de prædeſtinatione definita ſententia voluntatis Dei, ut alii ex vobis de infidelitate, accepta obediendi voluntate, veneritis ad fidem, vel accepta perſeverantia maneatis in fide &c. But they ſay (as ye write) that none can be ſtirred up by the Goad of correption, if it be ſaid in the Con-* *Anſwer.*

gregation in the hearing of many, such as touching predestination is the determinate sentence of the will of God, that some of you receiving an obedient will, shall come from infidelitie unto faith, or receiving perseverance shall continue in the faith: But the rest, who continue in sinfull delights, therefore you have not risen, because the succour of commiserant grace, hath not as yet raised you. But if there be any not yet called whom God hath predestinated to be elected by his grace, (or whom his grace hath predestinated to be elected) *ye shall receive the same grace, whereby to will and be Elect. And as for those that doe obey, if you are not predestinated to be Elect, the strength of obedience shall be withdrawne that you may cease to obey:* Thus farre the objection, *Austins* answer followeth thus; *When these things are saia, they ought not to to deterre us, from confessing God's grace* (*to wit*) *which is not given according unto workes, and from confessing predestination according thereunto; like as we are not terrified from confessing God's foreknowledge, if a man should discourse thereof in this manner before the people; whether now ye live well or not well, such shall ye be hereafter, as God foresees ye will be, either good, if he foresees ye will be good; or evill, if he foresees he will be evill: for what if upon the hearing hereof some give themselves to sloth, and from labour prone to lust goe after their concupiscences; shall we therefore conceive that to be false which was delivered concerning God's foreknowledge?* And so he proceeds to justifie the truth of this doctrine which was objected against him by way of Crimination, I say to justifie it as touching the substance of it, though as touching the manner of proposing it, he confesseth that to be unreasonably harsh in some particulars; and shewes how that may be proposed in a more decent manner, still holding up the same truth, Thus *Austine* was able to answere for himselfe, whilest he was living; Now let us consider how *Prosper* answers for him after he was dead. And first let us consider the objection it selfe; now it is this, *That they who are not predestinate unto life, although they live piously and righteously, it shall nothing profit them, but they shall be reserved so long untill they perish*: Now this is p ainely a part of the objection made by the *Massilienses* and they were *Galli*, * whom *Prosper* answereth, for the objection proposed to *Austine* was, that, *strength of obedience should be taken from them*; But in the objection of the *Galli*, whom *Prosper* answeres it is set dowe in a milder manner, thus, *They shall be reserved untill they perish.* Now *Austine* himselfe accomodates his answer hereunto in particular, *De bono Perseverantiæ, cap.* 22. 1 For shewing the unreasonable harshnesse in this manner of proposing it: *I wonder* (saith he) *if any weak man in a Christian people can by any meanes heare with patience that which follows; as namely when it is said unto them, yee that doe obey, if ye be predestinated to be rejected, the strength of obedience shall be withdrawne from you that you may cease to obey; For thus to speake what seemeth it to be other, then to curse or to propheſie evill after a sort*; Then he proceeds to shew the same truth may be delivered in a fairer manner, still holding up the truth of the doctrine of predestination; *If* (saith he) *a man thinke good to speake something of such as doe not persevere, and need be so to doe. What failes of the truth of this sentence if it be delivered thus? But if some doe obey, that are not predestinated unto the kingdome and to glorie; they are temporarie ones, and shall not persevere in the same obedience unto the end.* Then he proceeds to shew how the same objection may be framed against God's præscience, thus; *Etsi qui obeditis, si præsciti estis, rejiciendi obedire cessabtis; If any of you doe obey, if with all ye are foreseen to be rejected ye shall cease to obey*, whereby ye may observe, how Austine in framing the objection, leaves out the Phrase *of withdrawing the strength of obedience*, as containing a calumnious imputation, and such as *Austine* had nothing to doe with in the course of his opinion concerning predestination. Thus *Austine* hath plainely answered for himselfe, and needs noe other to answer for him, and his answer proceeds without all colour of prejudice to his owne doctrine, concerning the absoluteneſſeof predestination By this let the Reajudge of the ingenuitie of this Authour, who conceales all this from his Reader, bearing him in hand, that *Austine* speakes in *Prosper* making answere to his objection, whereas indeed there is a vast difference between *Prosper's* answer for *Austine*, and *Austin's* answer for himselfe: But like enough *Prosper* was willing to condescend to the *Galli*, * and to gratifie them with an answer, that in his judgment might be more acceptable and satisfactorie unto them; To the consideration whereof I now proceed, and therein to consider *Prosper*, not *Austin's* mind, concerning predestination, as which he hath sufficiently manifested in answer to the same objection, as I have shewed; *Therefore* (saith *Prosper*) *They are not predestinated, because they were foreseen to be such hereafter by their voluntarie prævarication*, what will follow herence? That foresight of sinnes was the cause why they were not predestinated unto life? I answere, first by denying this consequence, for it may as well follow that the Creatours love is the cause why sinnes are forgiven him, for the

* *And it is sometimes more harshly proposed by the Massilienses then by the Galli.*

the Goſpell ſaith of the woman, *Luk*:the 7. *Therefore many ſinnes are forgiven her, becauſe ſhe loved much*; ſuch illations are not alwaies cauſall, but very often merely rationall. Secondly, let it be cauſall, and that foreſight of ſinne is the cauſe of non predeſtination unto life, and accordingly of predeſtination unto damnation, yet here I have a double anſwer. Firſt it is the moſt generall opinion, that reprobation as it ſignifies a purpoſe to damne, and accordingly to exclude from heaven, preſuppoſeth the preſcience of ſinne: M. *Perkins* expreſly profeſſeth as much, and other Divines at the Synod of Dort; yet this hinders not the abſoluteneſſe of *reprobation*, which appeares in the purpoſe of God to deny grace, and that abſolutely to ſome, like as he beſtowes it upon others; I meane the grace of faith and regeneration; otherwiſe graçe ſhould be given according to workes: Now let any paſſage be produced out of *Proſper*, or any other Orthodox writer among'ſt the Antients to ſhew, that God in diſtributing theſe graces unto ſome, and denying them unto others, did not proceed abſolutely, but according unto workes; and according to this doctrine, it is well knowne that *Auſtine* ſhaped his doctrine concerning predeſtination, as it hath been ſhewed at large in the anſwer to M. *Hord*, in the firſt ſection; ſecondly that there may be a cauſe of predeſtination and reprobation, *Aquinas* doth not deny, but how? *quoad res volitas, as touching things willed*, or, *prædeſtinatione & reprobatione præpartas, by predeſtination and reprobation prepared*, and in this ſenſe *Aquinas* himſelfe confeſſeth that, foreſight of ſinne is the cauſe of reprobation, the nineth to the Romans; & ſee how he explicates himſelfe, his wordes are theſe, *Lect: 3. præſcientia peccatorum poteſt eſſe aliqua ratio reprobationis ex parte pœnæ quæ preparatur Reprobatis: in quantum ſcil: Deus proponit ſe puniturum malos propter peccata quæ à ſe ipſis habent, non à Deo. The foreſight of ſinnes may be ſome reaſon of reprobation as touching the puniſhment, which is prepared for Reprobates, in aſmuch as God decreeth to puniſh wicked men for their ſinnes, which they have of themſelves, not of God*: But of reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating, there can be noe more cauſe thereof, then there can be a cauſe of God's will as touching the act of God willing. And upon this very ground it is, that *Aquinas* profeſſeth that * *never any man was ſo mad as to affirme that there may be a cauſe given of predeſtination, as touching the act of God predeſtinating*; Let us therefore forbeare to impute any ſuch opinion to *Proſper* or any other of the Antients; which none ever was ſo mad as to maintaine in the judgment of *Aquinas*. The ſame anſwer will ſerve for the next, derived out of the ſame place in *Proſper*: As for the third *of withdrawing ſtrength of obedience*; This indeed was objected unto *Auſtine*, as if in his opinion God did ſo; wheras I have ſhewed alſo how *Auſtine* ſignifies that he had nothing to doe with that, and therefore he leaves that quite out. And indeed *Auſtin's* is cleare and expreſſe, that as many as God hath not predeſtinated, thoſe he never bring's unto wholſome and ſpirituall repentance, whereby a man is reconciled unto God in Chriſt. *Cont: Julian: Pelag: lib.* 5 *cap.*4. And conſequently he never brings them to any true obedience. The whole ſentence in *Proſper* hath no more moment then the former, and therefore admits the ſame anſwer.

* *p. q.* 23. *art:* 5. *in Corp.*

A teſtimony or two I will borrow likewiſe from ſome perſon of note, and thoſe Saint *Auſtin's* followers too, who lived about 400 yeares after Saint *Auſtin's* time. *Remigius* the great Patron of *Gotteſchalke* the zeatous preacher and publiſher of abſolute reprobation in thoſe times, in his anſwer to that epiſtle, which we ſuppoſe to be the Epiſtle of *Rabanus*; ſaying, that *God did make the nations of the world, and that he doth will that all men ſhould be ſaved*; he gives ſuch an anſwer as cannot ſtand with abſolute reprobation; This, ſaith he, is very true, becauſe God layeth on noe man a neceſſity of periſhing, as he hath laid on none a neceſſity of ſinning: And a little after he is plainer; *Thoſe whom God did fore know would live and dye in their wickedneſſes for reaſons moſt juſt, ſhould periſh, as himſelfe ſaith, Him that ſinneth againſt me, even him will I blot out of my Booke.* In the Valantine Synod aſſembled in the favour of *Gotteſchalke*, we may find theſe words; *Therefore doe the wicked periſh, not becauſe they could not, but would not be good, and by their owne fault originall or actuall, alſo, remained in the Maſſe of perdition*; And in the end of their 3. *Canon*: they pronounced *Anathema* to thoſe, that hold that men are ſo predeſtinated unto evill as they cannot be otherwiſe. *That any ſhould be* (ſaith the Councell) *predeſtinated unto evill by the power of God; ſo as he cannot be otherwiſe, we doe not only not believe, but alſo if there be any that will believe ſo great an evill, with all deteſtation we denounce them accurſed; as the Councell alſo did.*

M. Maſon's Additions p. 6. 7.

This Authour grants *Remigius* to be a Patron of abſolute reprobation: But theſe words of his, this Authour ſaith, cannot ſtand with abſolute Reprobation: *Remigius* undoubtedly thought they could; otherwiſe he muſt have renounced the Doctrine of abſolute reprobation and the Patronage thereof, which yet he did not; as this Authour acknoledgeth: Now is it enough for this Authour, to ſay that theſe words cannot ſtand with abſolute Reprobation and barely to ſay it, without proving ought? and truely I have found ſuch to be the imperious carriage of this Authour in manuſcript, now I ſee it in print; But let us endeavour to cleare *Remigius*, by proving the Contrary.

Anſwer.

indevour to cleare *Remigius*, by proving the contrary. Therefore it is well knowne that the Terme *absolute* stands in opposition to *Conditionall*. Now this distinction of will absolute and will Conditionall *Gerardus Vossius* doth accommodate in respect of the things willed of God, and gives instance of God's will of saving, which he saith is conditionall: forasmuch as God purposeth not to bestow salvation on any, but such as believe, faith being by God's *ordinance* the Condition of obtaining Salvation. In like sort Doctor *Jackson* in his book of *Providence* acknowledgeth the distinction of *voluntas antecedens*, and *consequens* is to be understood not on the part of God willing, but on the part of things willed: Now the things willed in the decree of Reprobation, are two, contrary to things willed in Election: For as in Election God doth will the conferring of grace, and the conferring of salvation; soe in Reprobation God doth will the deniall of grace and inflicting of damnation: Now *Remigius* in the passages here produced, speakes altogether of God's will to inflict damnation, and he denies that God's will is to inflict damnation on any man absolutely, but only conditionally (to wit) in case of finall perseverance in sinne, and so say we with *Remigius*: But as touching God's will to deny grace, we utterly deny that God will have grace to be denied upon a condition, for nothing can be devised to be the condition thereof, but sinne either originall or actuall. And if upon such a condition grace should be denied, it should be denied to all, seeing before grace is given, all are found to be under sinne actuall or originall, and consequently all should be Reprobates, even every mothers sonne. 2. And if to avoid this, it be said: although all be sinners, yet grace is denyed to none, but such as want a certaine particular obedience; Then upon the performing of that obedience grace should be conferred; this is as much as to say that *Grace is conferred according unto workes*; which doctrine hath ever been abominated by the Orthodox in opposition unto the Pelagians. Now the Apostle clearely makes for us in this, professing that *God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth.* Now though these passages produced out of *Remigius* carrie some shew against absolute reprobation from glorie, or unto damnation; yet have they noe colour or shew of opposing absolute reprobation from grace; As for necessitie of perishing, that is merely conditionall (to wit) in case of finall continuance in sinne without repentance; And as for necessitie of sinning, that we confesse is found in all, in state of nature, *Corvinus* confesseth it to be the doctrine of *Arminius* that, *all men naturally are cast upon a necessitie of sinning.*

Note

* *In answer to charity mistaken.*

* And Doctor *Potter* propoleth it as the doctrine of the Church of England, that, in a naturall man there is no *libertas à peccato*, *libertie from sinning*; which yet is to be understood aright, not but that it is in his power to abstaine from any particular sinfull act; for no supernaturall act is or can be sinfull, every sinfull act must needs be an act naturall; and power either to doe or to abstaine from any naturall Act, is not to be denied to any naturall man. But it is impossible that any naturall man should abstaine from any sinne, or doe any naturall good act (so commonly accounted) in a gratious manner, untill grace comes, so to season the heart of man as to love God, even to the contempt of himselfe, and out of his love to doe that good which he doth, and to abstaine from that evill, from which he abstaineth. 2. But if the question be of the manner how this necessitie of sinning is brought upon the nature of man; we say, it is not by the pleasure of God: But by the sinne of *Adam*, according to that of the Apostle, *Rom*: 5. *By one man sinne entred into the world, and death by sinne*: for man by reason of sinne was justly bereaved of the Spirit of God, and begetting children in this Condition, he begets them after his owne Image and likenesse, that is bereaved of the Spirit of God. And we hold it impossible for a man bereaved of God's Spirit, either to doe that which is good, or abstaine from doing that which is evill in a gratious manner.

2. Secondly, I come to the Synod of Valense, when they say, *the wicked not perish because they could not doe good, but because they would not.* These words may seeme to imply that even the wicked *could doe good if they would*; and truely I see noe cause to deny this: But that we may safely say with *Austine*; that, *omnes possunt Deo credere & ab amore rerum temporalium ad divina præcepta servanda se convertere, si velint*: Believe God if they will, and from the love of all things temporall convert themselves to the keeping of God's Commandements if they will; for if a man would goe to Church but cannot, because he is lame, would read in God's word, but cannot, because he is blind: These impotencies are naturall not morall: but the impotency brought upon mankind by the sinne of *Adam* is morall not naturall. Now morall impotency is found noe where but in the will, or at least is chiefly there, and secondly in the understanding also, as touching knowledge practicall; and accordingly when Scriptures testifie that they who are in the flesh cannot

please

pleaſe God, *Rom:* 8: cannot repent, *Rom:* 24: connot believe *Joh:* 12. This impotency conſiſts cheifly in the corruption of their wills, noted by the hardneſſe of heart, *Rom:* 2. 4. *Eph:* 4. 18. Againe I have already ſhewed out of *Remigius*, that a wicked man can doe that which is good, but by what meanes? (to wit) by grace, not otherwiſe. The words are theſe; *Si dixiſſet generaliter, nemo hominum ſine Dei gratia libero bene uti poteſt arbitrio eſſet Catholicus*; *had he ſaid generaly, not any man can uſe his free will without grace, he were Catholique.* And *pag.* 36: the ſame *Remigius* hath theſe words, *In infidelibus ipſum liberum arbitrium ita per Adam damnatum & perditum, in operibus mortuis liberum eſſe poteſt, in vivis non poteſt*; *free Will ſo damned and loſt in Adam, may be free in dead Workes, in living workes it cannot*: Yet *pag.* 174: thus he diſtinguiſheth, anſwerably to the paſſage alleaged by this Authour. *De reprobis nullum ſalvari ullatenus exiſtimamus, non quia non poſſunt homines de malo ad bonum commutari, ac de malis ac pravis boni ac recti fieri, ſed quia in melius mutari noluerunt, & in peſſimis operibus uſq; ad finem perſeverare voluerunt.* And *pag.* 143. *Florus* of the Church of Lyons where *Remigius* was Byſhop, ſets downe the ſame truth more at large, thus, *Habet homo poſt illam damnationem liberum arbitrium, quo voluntate propria inclinari poteſt & inclinatur ad malum, habet liberum arbitrium, quo poteſt aſſurgere ad bonum, ut autem aſſurgat ad bonum non eſt propriæ virtutis, ſed gratiæ Dei miſerantis*; *Nam & qui mortuus eſt, poteſt dici poſſe vivere, non tamen ſua virtute, ſed Dei, Ita & liberum arbitrium hominis ſemel ſauciatum, ſemel mortuum poteſt ſanari, non tamen ſua virtute ſed gratia miſerantis Dei, & ideo omnes homines admonentur, omnibus verbum prædicatur, quia habent poſſe credere, poſſe converti ad Deum: ut verbo extrinſecus admonente & intus Deo ſuſcitante, qui audiunt, reviviſcant*: *Man hath after that damnation* (to wit) ſuch as followed after *Adam's* fall) *free will, ſo that of his owne will he can be inclined and is inclined to evill, he hath free will whereby he may riſe unto a good condition: but that he doth ariſe to that good condition, is not in his owne power; but of the grace of God compaſſionating him; for of him alſo who is dead, it may be ſaid that he may live, yet not by his owne power but by the power of God. Soe man's free will alſo being once wounded, once dead may be reſtored, not by his owne power, but by God's grace pitying him and therefore al men are admoniſhed, to all the word is preached, becauſe they have this that they may believe, they may be converted unto God, that by the word outwardly admoniſhing & God inwardly raiſing, they which heare may revive.* As touching the laſt, condemning thoſe who ſay that any ſhould be ſo predeſtinated to evill by God, that they cannot be otherwiſe, this Authour would faine inſinuate into his Reader an opinion; That wicked men may change from evill to good of themſelves; But neither doth the Councill of Valens, or *Remigius* a chiefe man therein, intimate any ſuch thing; But only that it is in God's power by his grace to change them, and ſo hath changed and will change the hearts of many, namely of all his Elect, but not of one other.

That the Remonſtrants did not at that time deſire that it ſhould be talked of, among the common people, who might have ſtumbled at it, but diſputed of, among ſt the Judicious and Learned, who as the threſhing Oxen who are to beate the corne out of the Huske, are to bolt out thoſe truthes which are couched and hidden in the letter of the Scriptures. That the doctrine which is loath to abide the triall even of learned men, carrieth with it a ſhrewd ſuſpicion of falſhood, the heathen Oratour ſhall witneſſe for me; who to *Epicurus* ſeeing that he would not publiſh his opinion to the ſimple people; who might happily take offence at that, anſwereth thus. Declare thy opinion in the place of Judgment, or if thou art affraid of the aſſembly there, declare that in the Senate amongſt thoſe grave and judicious Perſons. Thou wilt never doe it, and why? but becauſe it is a fowle and diſhoneſt opinion. True religion (as *Vives* ſaith) is not a thing guilded over but gold it ſelfe: the more it is ſcraped and diſcovered, the brighter and goodlier it is; and ſo is the truth. *Vives de Verbo fidei, lib.* 1. *pag.* 16. Diſputations illuſtrate and ſet forth true opinions more then ſilence can; let us not feare therefore (ſaith he) leſt our faith when it is laid open appeare filthy to the beholders. *Id ib:* Let falſe and ſuperſtitious religions in which there is noe ſoundneſſe be afraid of this.

M. Maſon's Additions p. 8. 9. 5.

The Jew is loath to reaſon with the Chriſtian touching his law: And the Turke is forbidden to diſpute of his Alcoran, becauſe their religions are brittle like glaſſe broken with the leaſt touch, *Vives lib.* 4. *pag.* 479. But the Chriſtian who is confident of the goodneſſe of his faith feareth noe examination; but rather as much as may be, ſolliciteth and provoketh his adverſarie to the Cumbate. Truth whether it be in men or doctrines, is beſt when it is uncovered.

Anſwer. Of the five conſiderations propoſed in this diſcourſe, as it was firſt penned and tranſmitted to a friend, the fifth is changed and in the place thereof this incerted, and it concernes the third inſtance given of the Synodicall Divines in the Synod of Dort. Now it is already ſhewed in the anſwer to the former diſcourſe how immodeſtly the Authour carrieth himſelfe, in charging that Synod with unwillingneſſe to come to the triall, who juſtified their proceedings in the judgment of all the forraigne Divines there preſent, for whereas the *Remonſtrants* did once and againe profeſſe that they could not in conſcience

any longer ſtay in the Synod, vnleſſe it were provided for, that they might treate of Election and reprobation. And that after that manner which they had ſet downe in their Theſes and writings exhibited to the Synod; hereupon the Sinod to give them ſatisfaction herein ordered, that their opinion not only concerning Election, but alſo concerning reprobation ſhould be weighed and examined: ſoe far forth as they in conſcience ſhould judge to be ſufficient, for the glory of God, for the edifying and quieting of the Church and all mens conſciences; but as touching the manner of proceeding herein, it perteyned to them to conſider and ordeine as they thought good. And it became not thoſe who where cited to appear, to preſcribe unto the Sinod. This decree being read the 40 ſeſſion conteynes the altercation here abouts, betweene the Synod and them. They forſooth would preſcribe to the Synod, *de modo agendi*; The Synod muſt not unto them.

The Synod hereupon intreates the judgment of forrain divines. And they all with one conſent profeſſe that the Synod had granted the *Remonſtrants* as much libertie for the defence of their cause, as in Equitie could be granted and could well ſtand with the honour of the Synod. And therefore there is no cauſe why the decree of the Synod ſhould be altered, or why the *Remonſtrants* ſhould complaine or decline the Authority of the *Synod*; that nothing was put upon them burthen ſome to their conſciences: And therefore it was in vaine to pretend ſcruples of Conſcience, as in the Seſſion 42 there is a repreſentation made of their unreaſonable demaund; namely in the firſt place to deale upon reprobation &c: whereupon the opinion of forrain divines was required; as whether it was fit to yeild unto them in this, and to treat of reprobation before they treated of Election, who declared by concurring ſuffrages that courſe (propoſed by them) to be moſt unreaſonable: now let the reader judge how unſhamefaſt that crimination is, which this Author chargeth that Synod with, and conſequently all the the forreine divines therein aſſembled, who juſtified thoſe Synodicall proceedings with their unanimous conſent. Surely this Author hath an high opinion of himſelfe, and his owne ſufficiencies, who thinkes this Bolt of his ſoone ſhot, more worth then the concurrent verdict of all thoſe divines, Choſen as eminent perſons by their ſeverall Churches, and ſentunto that Sinod from many places of Chriſtendome. Now hee who in the progreſſe of his unſhamefaſt diſcourſe, ſpares not thus to Taxe a Synod and all the forrain Divines that aſſembled therein, no mervell if he forbeare not to charge the *Contra Remonſtrants* in the Hague conference with the ſame Crimination, though never ſo injuriouſly; Thus indeede the *Remonſtrants* in the Synod of Dort, Criminate their adverſaries as appeares in the *Synodalia Dodcacena pag:* 136. In the conference at Hague the *Contra-Remonſtrants* deprecated that they might not be put to deale on Reprobation, and more at large pag: 159. in the ſame writings; We reade how *Feſtus Hommius* one of the *Contra-Remonſtrants* in that conference at the Hague, hereupon ſtood up, *Expoſuitque paucis quod non bona fide hæc de illis dicerentur*, how unfaithfully this relation was made, *ſe libello ſupplice non fuiſſe deprecatos ne de reprobatione ageretur*; That they did not in their ſupplication intreat that no diſputation ſhould be had of reprobation, and therewithall the truth of the matter as formerly I have ſet downe in anſwear to the former diſcourſe, and as for Beza in the conferrence with *Jacobus Andreas* in the point of predeſtination: It is true at the firſt motion he declyned it, and he gives his reaſons, 1. namely that thy were not called by the prince of Mompelgard to diſpute on this Article but on another which was expreſſed in the princes letters, as *Jacobus Andreas* acknowledgeth: 2 and accordingly they had Commiſſion from their Church that ſent them, to diſpute on that whereunto they were called and not on any other. 3. and ſoe they came provided to diſpute on that which was expreſſed in the Princes letters who invited them. 4. Then againe it was in a *Lutheran* aſſembly. 5. neither would *Andeas* yeild to *Beza's* motions that the conference might be tranſacted by writing. 6. nor that which was to be delivered by them ſhould be taken by notaries. 7. Yet they offered to propoſe their doctrine on that Argument before the Prince, and to heare what *Jacobus Andreas* had to ſay againſt it and promiſed to returne him an anſwer thereunto; Thirdly, conſider it was not predeſtination alone, whereof they were unwilling at that time and in that place to conferre about, But two other Articles alſo, namely as concerning Baptiſme, and Images in Churches; why then, doth not this Author plead as well for Images in Churches, as for the conditionall nature of reprobation: as well he may upon the ſame ground? Fourthly,

what

ſottiſhneſſe poſſeſſeth this Authour to conclude, that becauſe *Beza* at ſuch a time, and in ſuch a place, and upon ſuch and ſuch tearmes, did refuſe to diſpute thereon; Therefore all that proteſſe the ſame doctrine with *Beza* doe refuſe to come to triall there abouts, and conſequently that doctrine is ſuſpectable of untruth; whereas it cannot be concluded of *Beza* ſimply that he refuſed to come to a triall, becauſe once at a certaine time and in a certaine place, and in a conference upon certaine termes he did refuſe to come to a tryall: For my part, I refuſe not to come to a triall with any of them upon any particular: But I noe way thinke fit to entertaine a conferrence here about by wordes of mouth, but rather by writing; ſo it will be more quietly carried, ſo it will be more free from aliene diſcourſe; ſo each party ſhall have time both duely to weigh the Adverſaries Argument and with due conſideration to put in his anſwer thereunto; And is it not farre more decent that the holy things of God ſhould be handled premeditately, rather then ſubitaneouſly? Fiſtly, what if *Beza* were of opinion that God hath choſen ſome unto eternall life, and paſſed by others without any reſpect had to the perſonall goodneſſe of the one, or naughtineſſe of the other, and that this is Saint *Paule's* doctrine, *Rom:* 9. This was Saint *Auſtin's* opinion alſo as *Voſſius* acknowledgeth in his hiſtorie of *Pelagian hereſies p.* 655. Now will any man thinke him well in his wits who diſcourſeth after this manner; ſurely *Auſtin's* doctrine concerning election and reprobation is ſuſpectable of untruth; Becauſe *Beza* maintaining the ſame doctrine ſome 1200 yeares after, was unwilling to come to a tryall thereabouts at a certaine time in a certaine place, namely at *Mompelgard* before the Duke of *Wirtenberg?* Laſtly, obſerve the ſtrange inconſiderations of this Authour; for the Authour of the former diſcourſe promiſed the Gentleman his friend to whom he wrote, to give him the reaſon of his change in opinion, not in this point only of reprobation, but in the other points alſo, for he perceived he was become an *Arminian:* Now whereas he gives him the reaſon of his change in one point only, declining all the reſt, doth he not manifeſt his unwillingneſſe to deale on all the other 4 points? And may not wee conclude after this Authours manner, that this betrayes no ſmall ſuſpicion, that certainely his cauſe is weak and ill grounded in all the reſt? In like manner doth this *Achates* carry himſelfe, he that helps of the other to make his taske for him. It is his uſuall courſe to deale only upon the point of reprobation, as in this place; ſo in a writing of his to a certaine Scholer, and as I have ſeen under his hand; It ſeemes he is well conceited of his ſufficiencie on this point: And truely I am very glad to ſee what he can ſay for himſelfe, even on the point of reprobation That which followes is to little purpoſe, ſave to ſhew the *plerofphorie* of his common place-book: and how eaſily it is for him to abound, not only in things neceſſary, but in things unneceſſary alſo: Therefore he tells us what *Cicero* writes of *Epicurus*, which may with a farre better grace be retorted upon himſelfe then upon *Beza*, or the *Contra-Remonſtrants* at the Hague conferrence; or the Fathers of Dort, how unfacetiouſly it is applyed unto them I have already ſhewed, and further it is well knowne both by *Calvins*, and *Beza's* writings, and by that which was done in the *Synod* of *Dort*, ſet forth to the veiwe of all the world, that they have not concealed their opinions from the world on thoſe points controverted; All that are able to read and underſtand Latine, may ſoone come accquainted with them: And M. *Hord* dealing only upon reprobation which is but a part of one of the five Articles, and forbearing to meddle with Election or any other of the five, contrary to the promiſe made by him unto his friend, doth he not hereby bewray conſciouſneſſe of his owne inſufficiencie to meddle thereon? And like enough he hath learned this wiſedome from his Abettor (and this is his courſe) who loves to deale in hugger mugger, and ſets others on worke, contented to blowe the coales; yet walkes glorioufly at the light of his owne fire, and the ſparkes that he hath kindled, vaunting (as I heare) that his peece cannot be anſwered, and in ſuch termes he commends it unto the Country.

In like manner let the indifferent Reader judge, whether, that which he produceth out of *Lodovicus Vives* be more againſt us, then againſt the Authour himſelfe that produceth it; for both *Calvin*, and *Beza* and generally our Divines have publiquely profeſſed their opinions, not on predeſtination only, but on reprobation alſo, and upon all other points controverted between us and the *Arminians*; whereas this Auhour ſculkes and pulls in his hornes as if he dared not to be ſeen on other points; only declares himſelfe upon the point of reprobation; I meane M. *Horde*; but as for the other which blowes quick-ſilver into him, he is loath to be knowne, as if his occupation were with *Bronteſq, Steropeſq, & nudus membra Pyracmon, to take paines to make thunder-bolts for Jupiter*, or for *Mercury* rather; for he is content an other ſhould be the chiefe ſpeaker. 5ly. The *Jew* he ſaith, is

loath

loath to reason with the Christian touching his law, and the Turke is forbidden to speak of his *Alcoran*; But have I shewed my selfe loath to reason with this *Brontes*, in any particular difference between us, or with any among'st them that weares a head upon his shoulders? I trust, I never shall, as long as I breath, As for this Authour, the world is witnesse how deeply guilty he is in this kind, contrary to his owne promise: But he may thanke his prompter that he deales in this, and he indeed had made noe such promise to to confine him, but out of his fox-like carriage, makes choise to deale only on this, where he hopes to meet with a favourable winde from vulgar and popular conceits, to to fill his sailes to carry him prosperously into their affections, be his *Arguments* never so weak: never so insipid. Now it is well knowne unto him, that my answer to the former discourse hath now been in the the hands of others for the space of two yeares and a halfe, and not the smallest passage thereof doe I find answered here. And this seconds conscience knoweth whether he hath not been full well acquainted with it, before this peece of his did see the light of the presse: Now because this alone might justly prove notoriously prejudiciall to the whole, see what a dog-trick hath been played, to antedate the edition thereof, as if it were printed *Anno* 1633, when it hath been but a few monthes since this hath been knowne unto the world, that the Reader may imagine if it please him, that this was printed before my answere was returned to the former discourse. And to what purpose is the discourse brought to the *Bulke*, which that hath at present, so many odde things being inserted thereunto; but to provide for their indemnitie that shall say, *This was never it answered*, whereat I wounder not a little, namely at the cunning and crafty carriage of this second, who for good reason may be accompted the first, in asmuch as he useth the other but as a stalking-horse to promote his owne game, I say I may, and doe wounder not a little at this, for he both carrieth himselfe and others boast of him, as if he were some formidable Creature, and Lyon like to affright all others that should deale with him, when in very truth all his performances savour farre more of the Fox then of the Lyon.

M. Mason's Additions p. 10.11,12,13

And it is also distastfull to all the *Greek Churches*; *Moulin* in his *Anotomy* speaking of the *Supralapsarian* doctrine; saith, if it should be so that God hath reprobated men without the consideration of sinne, or hath ordained them to sinne. Yet it is the part of a wise man to conceale these things, or not to know them rather then to utter them: because, when they are taught and defended they fill mens heads with sceuples, and give occasion to the adversaries to the defaming the true religion.

pag. 10.

The same may as truely be said of the *Sublapsarian* way, for as I have said, they are in substance all one; And Sir *Edwin Sandes* is of the same mind too; for in his most excellent booke caled *A survay of the State of Religion*, in the westerne part of the world; speaking of the deadly division between the *Lutherans* and the *Calvinists* in *Germany*, he hath these wordes; that, *though the Palsgrave and Lansgrave have with great judgment and wisedome, to slake those flames, imposed silence in that part to the Ministers of their party, hoping the Charitie and discretion of the other party would have done the like; yet it falls out otherwise; for both the Lutheran Preachers raile as bitterly against them in their pulpits as ever, and their Princes and people have them in as greate detestation; not forbearing to professe openly, that they will returne to the Papacie rather then ever admit that Sacramentary and predestinary Pestilence.* And as for the *Grecians*, we learne also by Sir *Edwin Sandes* his relation, that they doe mightilie dissent from the doctrines touching the eternall Counsells of God, which *Calvin* (as some conceive) first fully revealed or rather introduced into the Christian world, and some of his friends and followers have seconded; as thinking it very injurious to the goodnesse of God, and directly immediatly opposite to his very nature, In regard of which, on of their Bishops hath written a booke against it, which hath been sent to *Geneva* and there received.

pag. 11.

pag. 12.

And to say on thing more, besides this infamy among Christians, it is very probable that among the too many scandals given to the *Jewes* by *Christians* among whom they dwell; This doctrine is not on of the least rubs in the way of their conversion. For they thinke it a bad opinion (saith the same judicious and learned Gentleman) which some of great name have seemed to hold, that God in his everlasting and absolute pleasure should affect the extreame miserie of any of his Creatures, for the shewing of his justice and severitie in tormenting them, or that the calamitie, casting a way and damnation of some, should absolutely and necessarily redound more to his glorie then the felicitie of them all, considering that his nature is mere goodnesse and happinesse, and hath noe affinity with rigour and misery.

pag. 13.

And secondly the determination of the end doth necessarily involve the meanes that preceeds the end, as if a man before determined to damnation, he must unavoidably sinne else he could not be damned.

Answer.

As touching this paticular of M. *Moulyn*: I have addressed an answer punctually thereunto in my *Vindiciæ* amongst my degressions touching predestination, yet I am content to say something concerning the point it selfe and his judgment thereupon. Reprobation hath two parts, which this Authour most judiciously confounds, the one is God's decree to deny grace, the other is his decree to inflict damnation; As touching the first, the very execution thereof proceeds merely according to God's pleasure, howmuch more the decree it selfe, which is eternall, and cannot possibly have any precedaneous thereunto; whereas the execution is temporall, and temporall things may have somewhat precedaneous

precedaneous thereunto. Now that the execution thereof is merely according to God's good pleaſure is apparent; the execution thereof being no other then the denyall of grace; And as God of his mere pleaſure gives faith and repentance to whom he will; ſo of his mere pleaſure he denies it unto others; otherwiſe grace ſhould be conferred according unto workes, which was condemned in the Synod of *Paleſtine*, *Pelagius* himſelfe ſubſcribing thereunto above 1200 yeares agoe, and all along afterwards it was condemned in divers Synods gatherd together for ſuppreſſing of the *Pelagian Hereſie*. Now did M. *Moulin* think it noe wiſe part to publiſh this doctrine, That grace is not given according unto workes, but according to the mere pleaſure of God? Nothing leſſe; Saint *Paul* plainly profeſſing that *God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will, he hardeneth.* Come we to reprobation as it ſignifies God's decree to inflict damnation without conſideration of ſinne, our adverſaries would faine ſhape our opinions thus, and none more eager this way, then this Authour, I meane him that is thought to be the ſuggeſter at firſt, and ſince the *Interpolator* and *Promotor* of all this; But this is a moſt notorious untruth; nay how can we maintaine this, who imbrace the definition of reprobation given by *Aquinas*, where he ſaith, that *repobation includes a will to permit ſinne, and to inferre damnation for ſinne*, ſo doth M. *Perkins*, and him have I juſtified againſt *Arminius* in my *Vindiciæ*; And not any one of our Divines doth maintaine that God intends to damne any man but for ſinne, and finall perſeverance therein without repentance. And the former point concerning the firſt act of reprobation, being granted, which neither Sir *Edwin Sandes*, nor any *Lutheran* that I know, denies; the doctrine concerning this latter act of reprobation will be found to containe noe difficultie at all, foraſmuch as we utterly deny that God either doth inflict, or ever did decree to inflict damnation according to his mere pleaſure; but merely for finall continuance in ſinne without repentance. Now let every ſober Reader conſider, whether there be any harſhneſſe in all this: But as M. *Moulin* diſcourſeth here, ſo did the *Maſſilienſes* of old concerning *Auſtin's* doctrine, as which they would not have at all broached, as appeares in the Epiſtle of *Proſper*.—Yet I commend this Authour for his ingenuous confeſſion, that the ſame may be ſaid of the *Sublapſarian* way But to our prejudice he tells us that Sir *Ed: Sandes* is of the ſame mind, and therefore conſidering the excellencie of the booke, written by him, whereunto we may adde the excellencie of the diſcourſe written by this Authour; let us for the credit and tranſcendent ſufficiencie of theſe two, renounce not *Calvin* and *Beza* only, (poore Snakes as they were) but the whole *Synod* of *Dort*; and all the outlandiſh divines aſſembled there, and manifeſting their concurrance in opinion with thoſe *Synodicall Divines*, yea and *Fulke* and *Whitaker*, and the *Univerſitie* of *Cambridge* as they were then affected, when they drave *Barret* to a recantation; Yet Sir *Edwin Sandes* in the place produced, betraies not his owne judgment, but makes relation of the bitterneſſe of *Lutherans* in oppoſing *Calviniſts*: In like manner both *Jewes* and *Gentiles* did oppoſe *Chriſtians* even unto bloud, for preaching *Chriſt* crucified, which was a ſcandall to the one, fooliſhneſſe unto the other. And ſhall the truth of *Chriſtianitie* be any whit the worſe thought of for this? why then ſhall our Doctrine of predeſtination and reprobation be ſuſpected as untrue, becauſe the *Lutheran* partie, doe alſo bitterly oppoſe it? eſpecially conſidering, that we with *Auſtine* no otherwiſe maintaine predeſtination then as it depends and is grounded upon this, that grace is not given according unto workes, as *Auſtine* profeſſeth to have been his opinion, *de bono perſeverantiæ, cap.* 14. And we are ready to renounce whatſoever contradicteth this: and the *Lutherans* themſelves profeſſe concurrently with us, that grace is not given according unto workes. And by the way obſerve the *Lutheran* ſpleen is exerciſed not only againſt the predeſtinary peſtilence, (as they call it) but the Sacramentarie peſtilence alſo. That is, againſt their doctrine who oppoſe their ubiquitie and conſubſtantiation, yet in the very next page the ſame Knight affirmes, that all the *Lutherans* are not carried with the ſame ſterne humour, but they only who are called *Lutherani rigidi*, & that the greater part perhaps which are the *molles Lutherani*, are quiet enough, neither accompt they otherwiſe of the *Calviniſts*, then as of erring brethren; whom the *rigids* have (as is ſaid) threatened to excomunicate as *Schiſmatiques* and *Heretiques*.— 3 The *Grecians* are ſaid to oppoſe the doctrine of *Calvin* in the point of predeſtination; yet we know our Engliſh Divines ſubſcribed unto the ſame Doctrine in the *Synod* of *Dort*; together with all the forraigne Divines there aſſembled, and the ſumme therof is but this, that God, both in the election of ſome, and preterition of others, had noe reſpect to the perſonall goodneſſe of the one, and perſonall naughtineſſe of the other. And that this was the very doctrine of *Auſtine*, and of Saint *Paul* alſo in the opinion of *Auſtine*, *Voſſius* acknowledeth, and *Auſtine* profeſſeth

fesseth that this doctrine herein is shaped merely according to the rule so generally received in the Church of God against *Pelagians*, that *grace is not given according unto merits, de bono perseve: cap.* 15.—4. Concerning the Jewes, this doctrine of ours, this judicious (not Sir *Edwin Sandes*) thinks it probable that doth hinder their conversation: And indeed that learned Knight doth professe, that they are opposite to the doctrine here recited by this Authour, and in the same sentence he professeth them in like manner opposite to our doctrine, in maintaining that the divell and his Angells shall be cast into everlasting fire; for thus goes Sir *Edwin's* relation, *as they thinke it a bad opinion which some men seeme to hold, that God in his everlasting and absolute power should affect the extreame miserie of any of his Creatures as here it lyes, so contrarie wise, they think with Origen, that Hell in the ende shall utterly be abolished; and that the divells themselves after a long course of bitter repentance, and punishment shall find mercy at his handes, that did create them*: But as touching our difference from this in this particular; This Authour doth not expresse ought so much as probable, to hinder their conversion: as touching the former he hath; for that served his turne, this doth not, and his wit and wisedome being so nere of kinne, noe mervaile if he makes the one to performe service of love to the other But let me say something concerning the opinion it selfe here related, as in the first place; That God doth not effect the extreame misery of his creatures in his absolute pleasure, what is the doctrine opposite hereunto but this, namely that God decrees to damne no man but for sinne, and not according to his absolute pleasure? Now what one of our Divines was ever knowne to contradict this; and to affirme that God intends to damne many of his creatures not for their sinnes, but of his owne absolute pleasure? for my part I never read any that maintained this: But we generally say that God in electing some and passing by others, as touching the conferring of grace, proceeded and decreed, and that from everlasting to proceed, not according to mens workes, but according to his absolute pleasure; now this was *Austin's* judgment as well as ours; and Saint *Paul's* too, in the opinion of *Austine*, as *Vossius* acknowledgeth in the place formerly cited: And Saint *Paul* speakes plainly, when he saith, *God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth*, and as plainely in saying, That, *before the Children were borne, or had done good or evill, that election might stand not of workes but of him that calleth, it is said that the elder shall serve the younger, As it is written Jacob have I loved, and Esau have I hated, Rom*: 9. 11, 12. And I durst appeale to every sober man's conscience whether one of these Jewes in reading this would not as redily condemne Saint *Paul* himselfe, as they condemne us: As for the other part of the doctrine here proposed, namely that the damnation of some should redound more to God's glory, then the felicity of them all. I answere that it is as cleare as the light, that the glory of God in the way of vindicative justice had not at all appeared, if all had been saved, no nor the riches of his glory upon the Vessels of mercy, whom he had prepared unto glory, if God had not suffered with long patience some vessells of wrath prepared to destruction, if we believe Saint *Paul Rom:* 9 22, 23: rather then the Jewes: and it is apparent
Prrov. 16.4. that the Lord God, who made all things for himselfe, tooke this course, namely, *to make even the wicked against the day of evill*, and accordingly as *to shew mercy on whom he will*, so *to harden whom he will*, also *Rom:* 9. 18: otherwise as I have often said, grace should be conferred according to merits, that is according unto workes, which is expresly contradictory both to the word of God. 2 *Tim*: 1. 9. *Tit.* 3. 5. And to the decrees of Synods and Councells, all along against the *Pelagians*. —5. I willingly grant that the determination of the end doth necessarily involve the meanes, that not only preceed but procure the end. But I will utterly deny that sinne is the meanes of dãnation, we say rather that permission of sinne is the meanes, whence notwithstanding it followes, not that sin shall come to passe unavoidably, but rather avoidably; whether we consider the free will of man or the decree of God; for every particular sinfull act is a naturall thing, and undoubtedly man hath free will as to doe, so to abstaine from doing any particular Act: and albeit God hath determined that these particular sinfull Acts (instance the particular outrages *committed against the holy Sonne of God by Herod, Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles, and people of Israel, Acts* 5. 28.) shall come to passe by his permission; yet seeing withall he hath ordained thẽ to come to passe contingently, that followes that they shall come to passe in such a manner, as joyned with a possibility of not cõing to passe, otherwise they should come to passe, not contingently, but necessarily. But it is growne to be this Authours naturall *genius* miserably to overreach; while he keeps himselfe to his own formes inshaping the opinion of his adversaries, impatient to be beaten out of them, and to have his *veteres avias à pulmone repelli, old grandmothers vain conceits to be pulled out of*

him

Lastly this Authour shapeth us to make damnation an end intended by God, which we coceive to be a very shallow project; we know nothing but Gods owne glory that can be this end: And therefore even there where *Solomon* professeth that *God made the wicked against the day of Evill:* herewithall acknowledgeth that *God made all thinges forhimselfe.* *Pro:* 16. 4.

At length we have gotten cleare aboard to come acquainted with this Authours full discourse, and not by patches, as hitherto we have done. For here he promiseth to acquaint us with the reasons that have convinced him of the untruth of absolute Reprobation as it is carried the upper way and like a Martialist, a man at armes, he tells us they fight against it, and thus the interpolator discourseth.

The first part of the first Argument against the supralapsarians. *sect:* 1.

They are drawen *ab incommodo* from the greater evils and inconveniences, which issue from it naturally: which may be referred to two maine heads. 1 The dishonour of God. 2 The overthrow of religion and government. *M. Mason's Additions p.* 14. 15. 16.

It *dishonoureth God.* For it chargeth him deeply with two things, (no wayes agreeable to his nature.) 1 Mens Eternall torments in Hell. 2 Their sinnes on Earth.

First It chargeth him with Mens eternall torments in Hell, and maketh him to be the prime, principall, and invincible cause of the damnation of Millions of miserable soules: The prime cause, because it reporteth him to have appointed them to distruction of his owne voluntary disposition, antecedent to all deserts in them; and the Principall and invincible cause, because it maketh the Damnation of Reprobates to be necessary and unavoydable thorough Gods absolute and uncontroulable decree; and soe necessary that they can no more escape it then poore Astyanax could avoyd the breaking of his necke, whenthe Graecians tumbled him downe from the Tower of Troy.

Now this is an heavy charge, contrary to scripture, Gods nature, and sound Reason. 1 To Scripture, which makes man the Principall, nay the only cause (in opposition to God) of his owne ruine. *Thy destruction is of thy selfe O Israell, but in me is thine help. As I live saith the Lord, I will not the death of the wicked &c. Turne yee, turne yee, why will yee dye He doth not afflict willingly, nor greive the children of men.* To which speech for likenesse sake I will joyne one of Prospers. *Gods predestination is to many the cause of standing, to none of falling.* 2 It is contrary to Gods nature, who sets forth himselfe to be a *God mercifull, gracious, long suffering, abundant in goodnesse &c.* And he is acknowledged to be soe by King *David. Thou Lord art good and mercifull, and of great Kindnesse to all* them that call upon thee: And by the Prophets Joell, Jonah, and Michah. *He is gracious and mercifull, slow to anger, and of great Kindnesse.* And who saith *Micah, is a God like unto thee, that taketh away iniquity &c. He retaineth not his wrath for ever because mercy pleaseth him.* *Hos:* 13. 9. *Ezec:* 33. 11. *Lamēt:* 3. 33: *Resp: ad* 12. *Object: Vincent:*

3 'Tis contrary also to sound reason, which cannot but argue such a Decree of extreame cruelty, and consequently remove it from the father of mercyes. We cannot in reason thinke that any man in the world can so farre put off humanity and nature, as to resolve with himselfe to marry and beget Children, that after they be borne and have lived a while with him, he may hang them up by the tongues, teare thir flesh with scourges, pull it from their bones, with burning pincers, or put them to any cruell tortures, that by thus torturing them he may shew what his Authority and power is over them. Much lesse can we believe without great violence to reason, that the God of mercy can so farre forget himselfe as out of his absolute pleasure to ordaine such infinite multitudes of his Children, made after his owne image, to everlasting fire; and create them one after another, that after the end of a short life here, he might torment them without end hereafter, to shew his power and soveraingty over them. If *to destroy the righteous with the wicked,* temporally, be such a peece of injustice, that *Abraham* removeth it from God with an *Absit, wilt thou destroy the righteous with the wicked? that be farre from thee O Lord. shall not the judge of all the world doe right?* How deepely (may we thinke) would that good man have detested one single thought, that God resolveth upon the destruction of many innocent soules eternally in hell fire. *Exod:* 34. 6. *Ps:* 86. 5. *Joel:* 2. 13. *Jon:* 4 2. *Micah.* 7. 18. *Gen:* 18. 25. *Answer.*

Here this Authour carrieth himselfe like another *Ptolomeus Ceraunus;* or as if he had some cheife place in the lightning legion, not by his prayers, but by his discourse, he seemes to thunder and to lighten all along. When the Lord appeared to *Elias,* he was neither in the mighty wind, nor in the earthquake, nor in the fire, but in the still and soft voyce. I hope to prove all this to be but *Ignis fatuus;* Mountebancks use to make great ostentation and crackes, but commonly they end in meere impostures, and it is nothing strange, when men opposing the grace of God, loose their owne witts, and please themselves in the confusion of their owne senses. For when men are in love with their owne errours, they hate the light; yea the very light of nature in the distinct notice of it, would be an offence unto them. Can this Authour be ignorant of that which every meane *Sophister* knowes, that there be foure kinds of causes, Materiall, Formall, Efficient, Finall; that he should expatiate thus in speaking of a cause without all distinction? Is it strange that God should be a prime cause, and principall in execution of vengeance? Doth he not profesle saying *vengeance is mine, and I will repay?* Is he not called the *God to whom vengeance belongeth?* And are not his magistrates *his Ministers to execute vengeance* temporall here in this world? And can any sober man dout whether God be *invincible* whom the Apostle pronounceth to be *irresistable?* Againe an *Deut.* 32. 35. *Ps:* 94. 1. *Rom:* 13. 4. *Rom:* 9. 19.

efficient cauſe admits farther diſtinction; for it is either Phyſicall or Morall: Phyſicall is that which really workes or executes any thing: as every tradeſman hath his worke, which his hands doe make; ſo God hath his worke, which he executes, and his worke is *judgment* as well as *mercy*. *I am the Lord which ſhew mercy and judgment and righteouſneſſe; for in theſe things I delight, ſaith the Lord*; and he would have us when we doe *glory, glory in this, that we doe underſtand and know him* to be ſuch a God. A Morall efficient is twofold, being only of a moveing nature, to move others to doe ſomewhat; as namely either by perſwading, or by meriting or deſerving: He that perſwades moves an other to doe ſome what; he that meriteth, thereby moves another, either to reward him or puniſh him. Now to walke in the light of this diſtinction, and not to pleaſe our ſelves by walking in darkneſſe; though God be the prime, principall, and invincible cauſe of man's damnation in the kind of a cauſe efficient phyſicall (which ſhould not ſeeme ſtrange to an ordinary Chriſtian, who knowes full well that vengeance is God's peculiar worke, as *the Judge of all the world*, and that he delights in the execution thereof) yet this hinders not but that man may be the cauſe of his own damnation in the way of a meritorious cauſe, juſtly deſerving it. *Omnis pœna Deum habet Authorem, All puniſhment hath God for the Authour of it*: This is a principle ackowledged both by the *Arminians* and *Vaſquez* the Jeſuite; but never is puniſhment inflicted on any by the hands of God, ſave on thoſe who formerly have deſerved it. Conſider we farther, as touching the ſeverall kinds of cauſes formerly mentioned; if the queſtion be which is the principall, *Ariſtotle* anſwereth, that this is not confined to any one kind of them; ſomtimes the materiall cauſe, ſomtimes the formall cauſe, ſomtimes the efficient, ſomtimes the finall cauſe is the demonſtrative cauſe, the cauſe *propter quam*, the cauſe by vertue whereof the effect hath its exiſtence; but this peculiar and ſpeciall cauſe is deſcribed thus, It is that whereby ſatisfactory anſwer is made to the queſtion demanding why ſuch a thing is. Now in execution of puniſhment or condigne vengeance, this ſatisfactory anſwer is made by repreſenting the meritorious cauſe, never by repreſenting the efficient cauſe: as for example, if it be demanded why ſuch a malefactor is executed upon the gallowes; no ſober man will anſwer, becauſe the Sheriffe cõmanded it to be ſo, or becauſe the Judge would have it ſo; but becauſe he robd upon the high way, or committed ſome criminall fact or other, which is capitall by the lawes of our land, and to be puniſhed with hanging upon the gallowes. In like ſort if queſtion be made why devills or wicked men are damned, is it our doctrine to referre the cauſe hereof to the mere pleaſure of God? Doe not all confeſſe that God inflicts damnation upon thẽ merely for their ſinnes and tranſgreſſions wherein they have continued unto death without repentance? Yet we acknowledge that God could have taken them off from their ſinnes while they lived if he would, by giving them repentance, as he hath dealt with us, and that merely of his free grace. For we willingly confeſs that our ſinnes are our owne, but our faith is not, our repentance is not. When I ſay our *owne*, I meane in reſpect that they are of our ſelves; otherwiſe we acknowledge both faith and repentance to be our owne *accipiendo*, in aſmuch as we receive them; but they are God's gifts, and ſo they are his *dando*, in aſmuch as he gives them as *Remigius* ſpeaketh. Now what is become of this Authours pompous diſcourſe? Is it not the like the cracking of thornes in the fire, making a great noiſe; but the light of diſtinction, like fire, ſets an end unto it, and makes it appeare in its owne likeneſſe, and proves nothing but a ſquib. For albeit God in his decree makes the damnation of reprobates to be neceſſary and unavoidable; yet ſeeing he makes it not to fall on any but for their ſinnes, what colour of diſhonour unto God, in ordaining that *Judas* ſhall neceſſarily and unavoidably be damned for betraying the Sonne of God, and afterwards moſt deſperatly murthering himſelfe? If hereupon he could no more avoid his damnation, then *Aſtionax* could the breaking of his neck, when the Grecians tumbled him downe from the tower of Troy; will any man that is not bereaved of cõmon ſenſe make ſtrange of this? It is true God did appoint both *Judas* and all other wicked perſons, that never break off their ſinnes by repentance, unto deſtructiõ, of his own voluntary diſpoſition. For God workes all things according to the counſaile of his will, and if it pleaſed him he could annihilate them upon the freſh foot of any ſin; or after they have ſuffered the vengeance of hell fire, as many yeares in hell as they lived here in ſinne; yea and the devills in hell; as *Origen* was of opinion; and the Jewes at this day are of the ſame by Sir *Edwin Sandes* his relation; whether this Authour be of the ſame or not, I know not. And laſtly we willingly confeſſe that the decree of God was antecedent to the deſerts of men; for reprobation is as antient as election; and election was made before the foundation of the world, if we believe Saint *Paul* rather then any other, who either by

Jer. 29.

Gen: 18.25.

Eph: 1. 11.

Eph: 1.4.

word

word or deed doth manifeſt himſelfe to be of a contrary opinion. Still damnation is inflicted by God only for ſinne, and in degree anſwerable unto their ſinnes; and only becauſe of their ſinnes as a meritorious cauſe thereof; though God makes uſe of it to his owne ends and the manifeſtation of his owne glory as *Solomon* profeſſeth namely, that *God made all things for himſelfe, even the wicked againſt the day of evill.* And Saint *Paul tells, that as the Lord ſuffereth with long patience the veſſells of wrath prepared to deſtruction that he might ſhew his wrath and make his power known.* So likewiſe another reaſon hereof he ſpecifies to be this. *That he might declare the riches of his glory upon the veſſells of mercy which he hath prepared unto glory.* For when we ſhall behold the unſpeakable miſery brought upon others by reaſon of their ſinnes; how rich will God's glory appeare unto us, when we conſider that had it not been for his free grace delivering us from ſinne, we had been ſwallowed up of the ſame ſorrowes. And thus *Alvarez* writeth, diſput. III. *The glory of God's mercy in his elect, and in like manner the manifeſtation of divine juſtice on Reprobates; is truely and properly the finall cauſe why God did permit ſinnes both in Reprobates and Angells.* And he proves it out of this paſſage of Saint *Paul.* So *Aquin: 1 p. pag. 23. art. 5. Thus is the reaſon ſaith he why God hath choſen ſome and Reprobated others, that repreſentation might be made of Gods goodneſſe towards the Elect in the way of mercy pardoning them, and on the Reprobates in the way of juſtice puniſhing them.* And *Alphonſus Mendoza* a Scotiſt concurres with them in this; and we ſee they make Saint *Pauls* doctrine their foundation. And indeed albeit at the day of judgment there will be found a vaſt difference between the Elect and Reprobates, the one having departed this life in the ſtate of faith repentance, the other in infidelitie and impenitency, in ſuch ſort as God will beſtow on his elect eternall life by way of reward, and inflict eternall death on the other by way of puniſhment; yet in conferring the grace of regeneration, of faith and repentance upon the one, and denying the ſame graces unto the other, the Lord carrieth himſelfe not according to mens workes, but merely according to the pleaſure of his owne will, *ſhewing mercy on whom he will and hardning whom he will;* in which reſpect he is ſaid to make men in what condition he will; as *Rom:* 9.20. *Shall the thing formed ſay to it that formed it, why haſt thou made me thus?* Though indeed he makes but one ſort of them after a new faſhion, leaving the other in the ſtate of naturall corruption wherein he findeth them. And likewiſe is compared by the ſame Apoſtle to a *Potter, who out of the ſame lump makes one veſſell unto honour, and an other unto diſhonour.* But to returne, I have, I truſt, ſufficiently ſhewed that in all this which he hath delivered, when things are rightly underſtood, and duely conſidered, ther's nothing found alien from the holy nature of God, no more then it is repugnant to his holy nature to decree and execute vengeance, condigne vengeance, even the vengeance of damnation on men for their ſinnes; in ſuch ſort that it ſhall unavoidably overtake all thoſe that breake not off their ſinnes by repentance before their death. Nothing more agreeable to Scripture, nor to the nature of God revealed unto us in holy Scripture then this, and conſequently nothing more agreeable to Chriſtian reaſon. But as for naturall reaſon; God forbid we ſhould make that the rule of our faith, as concerning the reſurrection of the dead and the powers of the world to come, the rewards of heaven, and the torments of hell, where the worme never dieth, and the fire never goeth out. And may it not ſeeme very ſtrange, that a Chriſtian and a Divine, and one magnified by the *Arminian* party for great abilities ſhould undertake to prove this doctrine to be contrary to Scripture, to the nature of God and to ſound reaſon.

Prov: 16.4. Rom: 9. 23. Rom: 22.23. Rom: 9.18.

Well let us proceed to obſerve how well he performes what he undertakes. And here he faith, 1. *That the Scripture makes man the principall, nay the only cauſe (in oppoſition to God) of his owne ruine.* We anſwer, the Scripture makes man the only cauſe of his owne ruine, in the meritorious cauſe; *thus man's deſtruction is of himſelfe*; But this nothing hinders God from being the cauſe why vengeance, deſtruction and damnation are executed upon man, for he is the God to whom vengeance belongeth, & *he delights* as well *in ſhewing judgment*, as in *ſhewing mercy.* Indeed did we maintaine that God damnes the Reprobate whether man or Angells of his mere pleaſure, this Argument of his were ſeaſonable. We know full well that God of his free grace ſhewes mercy; but judgment only upon provocation, and herein he proceeds ſlowly too; for he is *ſlow to wrath*, and eaſie to be intreated. Yet God's afflicting is not alwaies for ſinne; neither doth it alwaies proceed in the way of puniſhment: when we ſuffer for *Chriſt* we have cauſe to rejoyce that he counts us worthy to ſuffer for his name; neither were the afflictions of *Job* brought upon him for his ſinnes, but for the tryall of his faith, and to make him an example of patience to all ſucceeding generations; and as for that of *Ezech: I will not the death of the wicked;* it

Note

is the uſuall courſe of men of this Authours ſpirit thus to render the wordes, whereas our laſt Engliſh tranſlation renders them thus, *I have noe pleaſure in the death of the wicked.* Now as a man may will that wherein he takes noe pleaſure; as a ſick-man takes a bitter potion ſometimes for the recovery of his health; ſo God may will that wherein he takes noe delight. And whether it be meant of firſt or ſecond death it cannot be denied but God wills it; *for he workes all things according to the councell of his owne will.* Then againe if we conſider the infliction of death as an execution of judgment, God not only *willeth* this, but *delights* therein alſo, as it is expreſſed. That of *Proſper* is nothing to the preſent purpoſe, we treating here of the cauſe of damnation, not of ſinning; we ſay God is *the God to whom vengeance belongeth*, not to whom ſinne belongeth. Beſides ſinne, as ſinne, hath noe *efficient* cauſe at all, but *defficient*, as *Auſtine* hath delivered many hundered yeares agoe. It is true, it is in Gods power to preſerve any man from any ſinne; it is in his power to take any man off from any ſinfull courſe by repentance, if he will; but he is bound to none, *he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth*; and in all this he is not culpable.

Eph: 1.11.

Jer. 9.24.

In the next place he tels us; It is contrary to God's nature. but what? To damne men for their ſinnes never broken off by repentance? for all our divines maintaine that God is Authour of damnation to none but ſuch; and to ſuch God is not mercyfull nor gratious, nor ſuffers them any longer, nor ſhewes any goodneſſe towards them; while they lived he did; yea *much long ſuffering and patience*, inviting them thereby to repentance; yea and by his; word alſo inviting many; but after they dye in ſinne, therewithall an end is ſett to the diſpenſation of Gods gracious proceedings with them. Much leſſe doe we deny him to *be good and mercifull and of great kindneſſe to all that call upon him.* For Gods mercy doth not exerciſe it ſelfe by neceſſity of nature, but by freedome of will; yet *he heareth the cry of Ravens and not a Sparrow falleth to the ground without the providence of our heavenly father, and the very Lyons roaring after thir prey, doe ſeeke their meat at the hands of God*: Theſe mercyes are temporall; but as for ſpirituall mercyes, for the working and cheriſhing of Sanctification theſe are not extended unto all, but to ſome only, even *to whom he will.* And accordingly the elect of God are called *veſſels of mercy.* Yet to the execution of damnation on any he proceeds not till after death, and ſtayes no longer; ſo ſlow to wrath he is towards the worſt, and no more ſlow to the beſt of them. *Who is a God like unto thee*, ſaith *Micah, that taketh away iniquity*? here this Authour out of wiſdome maketh a ſtoppe, leaving out that which followeth *and paſſing by the tranſgreſſions of the remnant of his heretage*: That reſtriction belike he did not ſo well brooke; but having leapt over that; he is content to take in that which followeth, *he retaineth not his wrath for ever, becauſe mercy pleaſeth him*: to witt, towards the remnant of his heritage, of his people. But I hope nought of this can hinder God from being the Authour of damnation to all that dye in ſinne without repentance without any prejudice to his holineſſe, though he retaineth wrath for ever againſt them.

Rom: 9.18.

Rom: 9.23.

We come to his *reaſon* which he calls *ſoũd*, ſaying that *it cannot but argue ſuch a decree of extreame cruelty.* But what decree? of that wherby he hath decreed to damne all that continue in ſinne without repentance? For to none other hath God decreed dãnation in the opinion of any of our divines. But that which he cõmends as *ſound* let us examine. We cannot in reaſon think, ſayth he, *that any man in the world can ſo far put off humanity and nature as to reſolve with himſelfe to marry & beget Children, that after they are borne and have lived a while with him, he may hang them up by the tongues, teare their fleſh with ſcourges, pull it from their bones with burning pincers, or put them to any cruell tortures, that by thus torturing them, he may ſhew what his autority and power is over thẽ. Much leſſe can we beleive that God ſhould ordaine infinite multitudes of his Children to everlaſting fire.* Is it credible that this Authour himſelfe doth not believe that very doctrine which here he impugneth. Doth he not believe that God hath *ordained infinite multitudes* of thoſe whõ he calls *Gods Childrẽ to everlaſting fire*? doth he not I ſay believe this as well as we? Doth he not believe that whoſoever dyeth in ſinne without repentance ſhall be damned? doth he not believe that God of his mere pleaſure hath made ſuch a decree? It is increedible he ſhould not be of the ſame faith in this. Are not all Gods ordinances made of his mere pleaſure? could he not both ordaine and execute the annihilation of ſinners if it pleaſed him? and that either immediatly upon the committing of ſinne, or after ſome certaine yeares enduring the puniſhment of hell fire. And as for hell fire it ſelfe, could not he qualifie or increaſe the tormenting nature thereof as he ſhould thinke good? All this I nothing doubt but he believes, unleſſe with Origen and the Jewes, he be of opinion that the fire

provided

provided for the devill and his angells is not everlasting: what madnesse then, what phrensy possesseth him so to dispute against us, as to dispute against himsefe? Vndoubtedly this Authour would have his Reader so propitious unto him, as to understand and interpret him beyond that which his owne words doe import; as namely thus, That God hath not only of his absolute pleasure made such an ordinance, that all who dye in sinne without repentance shall be damned; but rather thus; That God hath ordained that Infinite multitudes of his children shall be damned, not for their owne sinnes, but only out of his absolute pleasure. For this is generally the unshamefast carriage of men of this Authours spirit. Now what one divine of ours can he shew to have maintain'd this? Yet this is the imputation he chargeth upon us, that by our doctrine *God resolveth upon the destruction of many innocent soule, eternally in hell fire.* Yet this is a very Amphibologious expression. For when were they innocent in his meaning? when they were damned? If this be in his meaning, can he name any divine of ours that affirmes this? Or doth he meane they were innocent when God entertaind this resolution? And doth not he as well as we maintaine that there was a time, when Angels were innocent though afterwards they became devils; yet both then and from all eternity God had entertained such a resolution; For his decrees were everlasting as we say; neither hath he hitherto manifested his opinion to the contrary; whether he maintaineth such an opinion secretly in his brest, I know not; If he doth, and shames to declare it let him pull himselfe by the nose; in the passages he produceth out of *Cicero* concerning *Epicurus*, and out of *Virus* concerning such like *pag: 9.* Yet we doe not say they were *innocent* when God made his decree of Reprobation. I should shew my selfe an *Ignoramus* to say so, We say they were neither innocent nor nocent then, forasmuch as till the Creation no Creature had any beeing but God's decree of Election (and consequently of Reprobation also) had its beeing before the foundation of the world. 2 This manner of reasoning which this Authour calleth *sound*, I have found long a goe in *Castalio*, as superficiary a Divine as ever put pen to paper. And by the way observe, all the *Devills* and *Damned men* he calls *Gods Children*: this is the language of their Court. Now what one Divine of ours maintaines that any of Gods children are destinated to eternall fires? S. *Paul* tells us *We are all the sons of God by faith in Christ Jesus: and because we are sons, God hath sent the spirit of his sonne into our hearts crying Abba Father; And that us many as are led by the spirit of God. And if we are children we are also heires, even the heires of God. and heires annext with Christ.* And this distinction to witt *the children of God, and children of the Devill*, hath beene ever since the fall of man, as S *John* signifieth where he sayth. *In this are the children of God knowne, and the children of the Devill, whosoever doth not righteousnesse is not of God, neither he that loveth not his brother.* And anon after he giveth instance in *Cain* and *Abell*. Yea & our Saviour gives us to understand the same, where he saith to the Jewes, *Ye are of your father, the Devill, and the lusts of the father ye will doe.* And whereas we read that *in the dayes of Enosh men began to call upon the name of the Lord*; forthwith we read *c. 6. 2.* (For the 5. chap. comeing in betweene containes only the Genealogy of the world from Adam) of the distinction between *the sonnes of God and daughters of men*, thus, the sonnes of God saw the daughters *of men that they were fair, and they tooke, them wives of that they liked.* It it is true, *Adam* is called *the sonne of God* in reference to creation; And noe marvaile; For he was created in the state of grace: so likwise the Angells for the same reason. *When the starres of the morning praysed them, and all the Children of God rejoyced.* It is true we thus read, *Have we not all one father? hath not one God made us? Piscator* interprets these two interrogatories into one: As if God in the first place were represented as a common father unto all; but our *Geneva Divines* doe not; but the name of father in this place they referre to *Abraham*. And in not referring it unto God they have the consent of the Jewish Rabbines *Aben Ezra* and *David Kimhi*; who yet more hansomly doe referre it to their common father *Jacob*, then to *Abraham*, the Covenant of God including all the Sonnes of *Jacob*; not so all the Sonnes of *Abraham*, no nor the Sonnes of *Isaak*, but *Jacob* only. 3. Consider is it decent to conforme the courses of God with the courses of men? May not we consider in like manner against the Lord's foreknowledge, as well as against his decree, & reason thus: what man of common humanity would resolve with himselfe to marry and beget children, did he foresee their wicked courses, and what will become of them for it, namely, to be condemned to everlasting fire with the Divell and his Angells? what shall we therefore conclude that God did not foresee the wicked waies and ungodly courses of all Reprobates, that they would continue in them and die in their sinnes without all faith in Christ and true repentance towards

Eph: 1. 4,

Gal: 3. 26.
Gal: 4. 6.
Rom: 8. 14. *vers.* 17.
1 *Jo:* 3. 10.
Jo: 8. 49.
Gen: 4. 26.
Job. 37. 7.
Mat: 2. 10.

towards God? And if he did foreſee what would be the ends of them in caſe he did create them and bring them forth into the world, yet ſeeing he would nevertheleſſe create them and bring them forth into the world, one after another in their ſeverall times and ages, ſhall we brand the holy name of God, and reproach him for unnaturallneſſe, and barbarous crueltie? Rather I will ſay what meanes this Authour ſo unconſcionably to corrupt the ſtate of the queſtion, by mentioning only the ſhortneſſe of their life, and utterly concealing the wickedneſſe of their life, the only meritorious cauſe of their torments which they ſuffer, and accordingly to ſhape the ends intended by God, to be only the demonſtration of his power and Soveraingtie over them, without all mention of his juſtice; whereas we ſay that in the inflicting of damnation, the cheife glory which God manifeſts is only the glory of his juſtice, proceeding herein according to a law which himſelfe hath made (as moſt fit it is the Creatour ſhould give lawes to his creature) and the law is this, *whoſoever believeth and repenteth ſhall be ſaved, whoſoever dyeth in ſinne without repentance ſhall be damned.* Not one of our Divines (that I know) maintaines, that inflicting damnation, the Lord proceedes merely according to the good pleaſure of his will, in the communicating of faith and repentance, we willingly confeſſe the Lord proceedes merely according to the good pleaſure of his will; and it is expreſſe *Pelagianiſme* to affirme that *grace is given according unto workes.* And herein this Authour is very well content to walke in the darke and conceale his moſt corrupt opinion moſt oppoſite to the grace of God. But that damnation ſhould be inflicted without reſpect to ſinne as the meritorious cauſe thereof what one of our Divines can he produce that affirmeth? Yet thus he is pleaſed to diſguiſe our opinion (when he findes the poverty of his ſtrength to wage faire warre) and ſo expoſe it to the hatred of men; as if God ordained to damne men not for their ſinnes, but of his owne mere pleaſure. Thus of old the enemies of the Goſpell dealt with Chriſtians: for firſt they would cloath them with beare skinnes, and then ſet doggs upon them. All that he hath to ſay to excuſe his ſhameleſſe crimination (though ſo much he doth not expreſſe here) is only this, that our Divines maintaine the decree of damnation to preceed the foreſight of ſinne. Yet this is untrue of the moſt part of them, who premit both the foreſight of ſinne originall before reprobation from grace, and of ſinne actuall before the decree of damnation; I willingly confeſſe for my part, that I concurre with neither; and if I ſhould, I ſhould withall make the decree of permitting of ſinne to preceed the decree of damnation, for which I ſee no reaſon; but yet I doe not make the decree of permitting ſinne to follow the decree of damnation. I hold theſe decrees to be ſimultaneous, thus, that God at once decrees both to create men, and ſuffer them all to fall in *Adam*, and to bring them forth in their ſeverall generations into the world, and to beſtowe the grace of faith and repentance upon the one, and ſo to ſave them, and to deny the ſame grace unto others, finally permitting them in their ſinfull courſes, and ſo to damne them for ſinne; and all to manifeſt the glory of his mercy to the one, and the glory of his juſtice on the other, yea and his ſoveraingty too, but wherein? not in rewarding the one with Salvation and inflicting damnation on the other; but only in giving grace to the one, and not to the other. And all the difference between our Divines is merely in *apice Logico, a point of Logick.* To wit, as touching the right ordering of decrees, concerning ends, and meanes tending to the ends; all concurring in this, that, *God hath mercy on whom he will*, in beſtowing faith and repentance upon them, *and whom he will he hardeneth*, in denying the ſame graces unto others. Now when this Authour ſhall fairly prove that according to our opinion, *God deſtroyeth the righteous with the wicked*; then and not till then, ſhall he prove that our faith differeth from the faith of *Abraham*. What Divine of ours was ever knowne to affirme that God damneth any one that dyeth in repentance? Yet it cannot be denied but that temporall judgments befall the righteous, as well as the wicked. When the Lord ſwept away 70 thouſand with a three dayes peſtilence in the land of Iſrael; was it not poſſible thinks this Authour, that any of God's deare children ſhould periſh by that peſtilence? To be caried away into captivity by an heatheniſh nation, I ſhould thinke is a greater calamity then to dye of the peſtilence; yet
Jer. 24. thoſe who were carried away into *Babylon* with King *Jechoniah*, the Lord repreſents by the basket of good figgs; and thoſe the Lord profeſſeth that he had ſent them away into *Babylon* for their good. Were all damned will this Authour ſay, that periſhed in the flood? Saint *Peter* ſeemes to be of an other opinion, where he ſaith, *To this purpoſe was the*
1 *P.* 1. 4. 6. *Goſpell preached, alſo to the end that they might be condemned alſo to men in the fleſh, but might live according to God in the ſpirit.* Truly I doe not ſay ſo much of them that periſhed in the conſpiracy of *Corah*, when the earth opened her mouth and ſwallowed up the conſpira-

tours

tors, nor them only but their wives and children also; especially considering that *inter pontem & fontem*, mercy may be sought and mercy may be found.

Sect. 2.

Containing the first Objection with the answer thereunto devised, and my reply thereupon and an answer thereunto. M. *Mason's Additons p.* 16. 17.

But God say some is soveraigne Lord of all creatures, they are truly and properly his owne. Cannot he therefore dispose of them as he pleaseth and doe with his own what he will? *Object.*

The question is not what an almighty soveraigne power can doe to poore vassalls, but what a power that is just and good may doe. By the power of a Lord his absolute and naked power he can cast away the whole masse of mankind; for it is not repugnant to Omnipotencie or soveraingty, but by the power of a Judge, to wit, that actuall power of his, which is alwaies cloathed with goodnesse and justice, he cannot. For it is not compatible with these properties in God to appoint men to hell of his mere will and pleasure; no fault at all of theirs preexisting in his eternall mind. *Answer.*

It is not compatible with justice which is a constant will of rendring to every one his due; and that is vengeance to whom vengeance belongeth, namely to the obstinate and impenitent. *God is good*, saith Saint *Austine*, *and God is just, he may without any desert free men from punishment, because he is good; But he cannot without evill deserving condemne any man, because he is just.* In an other place also he saith, *If God be beleived to condemne any man that by sinne deserves it not, he is not to be believed to be free from injustice.* 2. Nor is it compatible with goodnesse which is an inclination in God of communicating that good which is in himselfe unto his creatures, as farre as he can without wronging his justice. And therefore if God be (as the Scripture reporteth him) good to all; it cannot be that he should of himselfe without any motive in the reasonable creature, provide for it from everlasting the greatest of all miseries, and that before he thought of making it or bestowing any good upon it.

As touching the Objection I hope this Authour will say so too. As touching the first, namely, *that he is the soveraigne Lord of all creatures*; and our Saviour Christ will say it for him, if he will not; as touching the last, namely, that *it is lawfull for him to doe what he will with his owne.* But I find noe need at all of this consideration, to make answer to his former vaine discourse: for he may see plainly that I have made noe use of these principles: but they have their place to justifie God in other courses; namely, 1. In punishing children for the sinne of their fathers in great variety of judgments temporall; as in the conflagration of *Sodome*, and in drowning of the old world. 2. In damning many Infant children of heathen men dying in originall sinne unremitted; as M. *Mason* in his lectures at *Magdalen* Hall maintained, that, *the punishment of originall sinne unremitted was eternall damnation.* And M. *Hord* confesseth as much in his preface, *Sect:* 4. 3. Yea and in making the Soule of Christ the holy Sonne of God an offering for the sinnes of others. But consider we his answer. *Reply.*

To appoint to hell, what is it but to appoint to the sufferings of the torments of hell? Now doth any of our Divines maintaine that God appoints any man to the suffering of hell torments of his mere pleasure, and not for sinne? They doe not, and therefore this Authours discourse depends upon a mere fiction devised in his own brain. 2. The distinction which here he makes is the distinction of *Arminius*, who maintained that God can doe that *per potentiam*, *by power*, which he cannot doe *per justitiam*, *by justice*, which I have disproved at large in a peculiar digression on this argument in my *Vindicie*; and not one of my reasons there brought doth this Authour once offer to answer. And this opinion of his doth manifestly imply that God hath a power to doe that which is unjust. 3. He supposeth very judiciously to his own advantage, that there is a justice in God towards his creature secluding the ordinance of his will; whereas both *Suarez* and *Vasquez* opposite in other particulars concerning God's justice, doe yet agree in this, that there is no justice in God towards his creature, but upon supposition of his will and ordinance as I have shewed. 4. He may as well say that it is not compatible with the justice of God to punish (as it signifies to inflict paineon) him who is holy. For justice is as well opposite to the punishing of an Inocent, as to the punishing of him in such a degree. And consequently God cannot in justice put an holy man to death, much lesse annihilate him; which if he saith, he shall contradict *Arminius*. 5. If it be not compatible with God's justice to inflict hell paines on any man, no fault of his preexisting in the eternall mind, then either Christ suffered not the paines of hell, or was not without fault; or lastly God was unjust in inflicting those paines upon him. 6. In the last place observe, for all this he gives us nothing but his bare word. So that if we give him leave he is like enough to dictate unto us Articles of beleife at his pleasure. *Lib.* 1 p. 2. *digres.* 4. *Vindic. l.* 1. *p.* 3. *digres.* 1.

1 By what right is *vengeance* due to the *obstinate* and *impenitent?* Is it due by any other

right then by the ordinance of God? Cannot God pardon it if it pleaſe him, yea and cure it too? And if he be pleaſed to puniſh it, cannot he puniſh it as well by annihilation of the obſtinate (ſo to ſet an end unto his ſin as to himſelfe) as by condemnation of him? That of *Auſtine* is ſpoken in reference to God's law, whereby he hath ordained that without evill deſervings he ſhall not be condemned (yet Chriſt ſuffered hell paines without any evill deſervings) In reſpect of the like law, he ſhall be unjuſt, if he he ſhould not reward them, who dye in faith and repentance, with everlaſting life. This is only in reſpect of *potentia ordinata, ſuch a power as is ordained by his will.* But as for *potentia abſoluta, power abſolute*, all confeſſe that God can annihilate the holy Angels.

2 How doth God communicate grace unto his creatures? is it not by neceſſity of nature, or freedome of will? Philoſophers were wont to argue the eternity of the world by this, that *Bonum eſt ſui communicativum, That which is good is apt to communicate it ſelfe, yea naturally and neceſſarily*: And therefore God being *optimus the beſt*, as well as *maximus the greateſt*, was moſt communicative, and that naturally and neceſſarily. If the ſame be this Authours opinion, he is as *Atheiſticall* as they: But if by freedome of will he communicates his goodneſſe, then he communicates his goodneſſe, as when he will, ſo likewiſe how he will, and to whom he will. As Saint *Paul* expreſſely profeſſeth ſaying, *God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth*, of ſuch places as theſe this Authour takes no notice, but ſo much the more *Atheologically*. Yet I am willing to take notice of what he brings, namely, that *God is good to all*; And ſo he is in doeing them good, many and ſundry waies; in maintaining their being. But he is not in ſuch ſort good to all as he is ſaid to be *good to Iſrael. For he hath not dealt ſo with any nation*, as with them. 2. 'Tis untrue that God communicates unto his creatures that good which is in himſelfe: for the good which is in himſelfe is of a more tranſcendent nature, then to be communicable unto creatures; ſuch conceits are *Manichaicall*. God is eſſentally whatſoever he is: But the goodneſſe this Authour ſpeakes of, is of an accidentall nature unto us; And is it decent and not rather abominable to transforme the eſſence of God into an accident, that ſo it might be communicated to the creature.

Note

Rom: 9. 18.

Pſ: 73. 1

Pſ: 147. 20.

3. If Gods goodneſſe incline him to communicate goodneſſe unto the creature, as farre as he can without wronging juſtice, then it inclines him to communicate holineſſe unto all to preſerve all from ſinne, to bring all to faith and to repentance, and ſo to ſave all. For how could his juſtice be wronged in this?

4. When he ſaith, tha God of himſelfe cannot without any motive in the reaſonable creature provide for it from everlaſting the greateſt of all miſeries; obſerve what an hungry propoſition this is; for will he ſay tht God can provide for any creature the greateſt miſery ſave one, though not the greateſt of all without any motive in the creature? But if he can ſo provide the greateſt ſave one, why not the greateſt of all? What colour of reaſon to put any difference in this! And if the greateſt ſave two, why not the greateſt ſave one? And ſo we may goe on till we come to the leaſt miſery, thereby to convince the unreaſonableneſſe of this aſſertion. For in cleare evidence of truth, reaſon cannnot diſcover where to make a ſtand.

5. And what is the motive he meanes, but the motive of ſinne? And what ſinne did God the Father ſee in Chriſt the Sonne, that moved him to ordaine his deare Sonne to the ſuffering of hell paines?

6. And as he alledgeth *Auſtine* to little purpoſe, ſo to the contrary what he writes *de predeſtinatione & gratia* is well known. *Si humanum genus quod creatum primitùs conſtat ex nihilo; ſine debito mortis naſceretur, & tamen ex iis Creator Omnipotens in aternum nonnullos damnare vellet interitum, quis Omnipotenti Creatori diceret, quare feciſti ſic. If mankind which is well known, at firſt to be made of nothing, were born without the debt of death and ſinne; Yet if the Almighty Creatour, would damne ſome of them to eternall deſtruction, who would ſay to the Almighty Creatour, why haſt thou done ſo?* And obſerve his reaſon, *Qui enim cum non eſſent, eſſe donaverat, quo fine eſſent habuit poteſtatem For he that gave them being when formerly they had no being had power to diſpoſe to what end they ſhould be.* There is nothing more evident by the light of nature then this. I willingly confeſſe that that this book though it goe under *Auſtin's* name, yet it is thought to be none of *Auſtin's*, and that amongſt other conſiderations, by reaſon of this very ſentence in particular, which ſeemes unto me very harſh, and contrary to *Auſtin's* doctrine in other places. But *Raynaudus* hath diſcovered at large the vanity of this reaſon, and ſhewes by variety of teſtimonies the concurrence of Antiquitie in bearing witneſſe to the ſame truth. And albeit he confeſſeth the book not to be *Auſtin's*, yet he proves that *Fulgentius* was the Authour of it, alwaies accounted to be an Orthodox Father and well known to be a follower of *Auſtin's*. Sect: 3.

Raynaud: in adit. ad lib. Intitul Valerianus Integer doctrinæ labiſq; purus.

Sect: 3.

Containing a Reply to the ſecond Objection, and Anſwere thereunto.

M. Maſon's Addit. p. 17. 18. Object. 2. Perkins lib. de predeſtin: p. 25.

It isfurther objected, that we doe and may ſlaughter our beaſts for our dayly uſe, without any cruelty and iniquity, And therefore God may as well and much more appoynt as many of us as he pleaſeth to the torment of hell, for his glory, and yet be juſt and good to notwithſtanding. For there is a greater diſproportion between God and us, then there is between us and beaſts.

Anſwer.

1 For anſwering hereunto we are firſt to premiſe thus much, namely that our ſlaughtering of Beaſts for our dayly uſe is by Gods ordinance, and appoyntment. We had not the authority of our ſelves, but God of his bounty towards us, gave it us, as we may ſee *Gen:* 9. 2, 3. Where we may obſerve, 1 That God deliv̄eth up all creatures, Beaſts, Birds, and Fiſhes into the hands of men. 2 That the end why he doth ſo, is that they might be meat for men, and conſequently they might be ſlaine. Which being ſo, our ſlaughtering of Oxen, Sheep and other creatures for our dayly uſe is to be accounted Gods doing, rather then ours. And therefore the objection ſhould be made this. God may without any breach of goodneſſe or juſtice appoint bruite creatures to be ſlaine for mans uſe, therefo e he may ordaine men to be caſt into hell torments for his owne uſe, that is for the declaration of his ſoveraingty.

2 This being premiſed I anſwer further that this compariſon holds not, For there is little *proportion* between the *Objects* compared, and leſſe between the *acts*.

1 There is but ſmall proportion between the Objects *Beaſts* and *Men* creatures of a different nature and made for a different end Beaſts are voyd of reaſon and liberty in their actions; creatures whoſe being ſvaniſh with their breath, made only for the uſe and ſervice of men upon earth But men are reaſonable and underſtanding creatures, able through the Creators bounty to diſcerne between good and evill, they are the very Image of Gods purity and eternity and were made for the ſervice of God alone upon earth, and his bleſſed and everlaſting ſociety in heaven So that albeit there be a very great diſtance between God and man, yet nothing ſo great as between God and Beaſts It followeth not therefore that if God may appoynt beaſts to be killed of his owne free pleaſure for mans uſe. he may with like equity and reaſon appoynt men of his owne will to deſtruction, for his owne uſe We read that God required of his people many thouſand beaſts for ſacrifice, but not one man The firſt borne of other creatures he challenged for burnt offerings (except they were uncleane beaſts) but the firſt borne of men were to be redeemed. Which ſheweth that he put a wide difference between the blood of men and beaſt. Beſides in the 9 of Geneſis he gives men power to kill and feed uppon all living creatures; but he ſtraightly forbids them to ſhed mans blood, and gives this reaſon of the prohibition, *Man is the Image of God*; ſo that we may well conclude, that there is but ſmall proportion betweene the Objects compared, men, and Beaſts in reſpect of this Act or killing and ſlaughtering. 2 There is farr leſſe or rather no proportion at all between the Acts compared *Killing and eternall tormenting*. A man may kill, but he cannot without barbarous, injuſtice and cruelty torment his beaſt, and prolong the life of it, that he may dayly vexe and torture it, to ſhew what power and ſoverainty he hath over it: ſo I doubt not (though there be ſome that will not grant it, but charge the Arminians with contumely againſt God for affirming it) I doubt not, I ſay, but God may kill a man of his owne free pleaſure; yea and reſolve him into nothing without any cruelty and injuſtice; becauſe in ſo doing he doth but take away what he hath given him. But he cannot without both theſe antecedently decree to keepe him alive for ever in Hell, that he may there torment him without end, to ſhew his ſoveraingty. For this is to inflict an infinite evill upon a guiltleſſe creature, to whom he had given but a finite good: And ſo is the compariſon moſt unequall too, in the acts compared, and therefore proveth juſt nothing.

Repl.

Belike as many as have not the word of God, to read this Authours acute obſervations out of *Gen:* 9. 2. 3. (For he would not ſeeme to be any of the blunter ſort) doe ſin as often as they kill a chicke to feed upon, though beaſts of prey doe as much as this comes to, and more without all ſin. 2 Yet M. *Perkins* thought it enough to take notice that commonly it is received as lawfull, without enquiring whence this authority proceeds And noe Chriſtian doubts, but our very bodyes, and ſoules and all, we have from our maker. 3 Are all beaſts for meat? Or hath not man power to ſlaughter any but for meat? Where doth the Authour find this in *Gen:* May we not kill Lyons, Beares, wolves, unleſſe we eat them forthwith, or pouder them up, that by degrees we may make meat of them? ſo of ſnakes, and Adders and all the Serpents that *Lybia* brings forth? 4 I deny that our ſlaughtering of oxen is in this reſpect, or in any reſpect to be accounted Gods doing rather then ours. For Gods appoyntment in this, is but of the nature of a permiſſion, not of a command. We may live by fruits and hearbs and Marmalads and ſucketts, or butter, milke and cheeſe, if we think good. Were it a Commandement, yet would it not follow that it is Gods worke rather then ours For he cōmands good workes and forbids evill workes. Now will this Author herehence conclude, that our good workes are rather Gods workes then ours. I trow he will not 5 Therefore wee keepe to our owne argument, and not regard his infatuation of it, and we were in a pretty caſe, if we ſhould ſuffer our adverſaries to ſhape our Arguments If they once have the grinding of our Tooles, no marvaile if they ſoone grind out all the edge of them. We ſay

it is lawfull for man to doe all this that is ſpoken of, upon our fellow creatures, and ſhall not God have as much power over us? Doth not the Apoſtle himſelfe diſpute after this manner, and make the power which God hath over us, equall to the power which the Potter hath over the worke of his own hands and over the clay alſo. *Shall the thing formed ſay to it that formed it why haſt thou made me thus? hath not the Potter power over the clay of the ſame lump to make one veſſell unto honour and another unto diſhonour?* We cannot take life from a creature without pain, deadly pain: if we have lawfull power to inflict pain upon another creature, hath not God greater power to inflict pain, yea the greateſt pain upon us, and that without all reſpect to ſinne? And that this God can doe as Lord of life and death, both *Vaſquez* the Jeſuite acknowledgeth, and *Medina* pronounceth *ex concordi Theologorum ſententiâ, by the unanimous conſent of all Divines*, as elſewhere I have ſhewed and proved by variety of demonſtration; like as *Raynaudus* confirmes it by the concurrant teſtimony of the Antients in the places formerly mentioned. 2. In the next place he comes to his anſwer, and ſaith that the compariſon holdes not. And I commend this Authours wiſdome in troubling himſelfe with no more objections, then he thought himſelfe able to Maſter. For who would not keep his ſhinns whole the beſt he can? But I wounder he comes off no better, even then, when he makes choice of ſuch adverſaries, as he thinks he can well grapple with.

1. Little proportion will ſerve turne; it is enough for us that they are all God's creatures; and ſurely there is leſſe proportion between the Creatour and the creature, then between one creature and another. Yet ſure I am, every creature that hath life is more noble then a creature without life, ſuch as a Potters veſſell is; yet look what power the Potter hath over his veſſell; the Apoſtle tells us that God hath the ſame power over his creature man. *Rom: 9. 21.* Secondly, the Authour was ſenſible of the weaknes of this bowſtring, and ſeeing it would not hold, therefore he relyes upon another, and thats his owne deforming and disfiguring our argument, drawing it from the compariſon of man's power over his fellow creatures, with God's power over us; to conclude therehence that God the Creatour hath as great power over his creature; as man by God's graunt hath power over his fellow creatures. From this due courſe of compariſon which we propoſe, this Authour drawes us to a wild compariſon of the power of God over beaſts, with the power of God over man; which is not ours, but an immodeſt and unſhamefaſt fiction of this Authour; and that grounded upon immodeſt foundations as before hath been ſhewed. Thirdly, yet why not ſo great a difference between God and man, as between God and beaſts? Is not the diſtance infinite? Is it poſſible to be leſſe, ſeeing man is but finite, and God infinte? For ſtill the perfection of man is but in the way of perfection create. But God's perfection is of a tranſcendant nature it being uncreat: which when School-men have conſidered, they have affirmed that the perfection of creatures is to be meaſured not by approximation to God who is, *ens primum, the firſt being*, but by their remotion rather *à non eſſe, from not being*; As I remember to have read long agoe in *Paulus Venetus*, and which then ſeemed to me moſt congruous, nither to this day doe I ſee any juſt cauſe to oppoſe it.

2. I come to the ſecond anſwer; And here I find this diſcourſe to breath the ſpirit of *Arminius*, as truly as if it were ſpit out of his own mouth. Now *Arminius* on this point I have anſwered at larg, as this Authour well knowes: he is content to paſſe that by, and keep himſelfe ſtill like a Sow in beanes, without raiſing any noiſe of ſolving ought hath been delivered in proofe hereof. But though he lets paſſe that wich I have delivered without anſwer, renewing only *Arminius* his objection; yet I will not let this his anſwer to his own objection paſſe without a reply.

Exam: prædeſt. Perkin: p. 41.

1. Therefore whereas he ſaith there *is no proportion between killing and eternall tormenting*. I marke his cunning carriage, he doth not ſay there *is no proportion between killing and tormenting* wich are two acts; and acts are ſomewhat capable of proportion. And ſurely if he had, killing would appeare to be the worſt of the two; ſince to kill is to torment and ſomewhat more, even to deſtroy the being of a man. Therefore the compariſon which he ſhapes is between killing and eternall tormenting; that is not between two acts, as he pretends to from the compariſon, but between one act, and the eternall duration of an other act, which is the quantity thereof in reference to time, ſuch is this Anthours jugling. Yet notwithſtanding the diſproportion of theſe things, hence it followes not, that *killing* is the more deſirable of the two; conſidering that many apain there is which man would be content to endure, rather then to looſe his life? So farre is it from being worſe, and that beyond all proportion. *Auſtine* ſomewhere profeſſing of infants pain in hell, that is *pœna mitiſſima, the mildeſt pain*, & ſuch as they had rather endure then to have no being at all.

2. But

2. But take it for an intollerable tormenting; if there be no proportion between killing and eternall tormenting; whereas there is ſome proportion between man and beaſt, then it were reaſonable for any man to deſire to be turned into a beaſt rather then to be eternally tormented: now let every reaſonable creature conſider, theſobriety of ſuch a choice. 3. If only the eternity of it makes killing to be preferred before tormenting, then it is not to be denyed, but tormenting a creature in hell fire a thouſand or ten thouſand yeares may be performed by God upon an innocent man, only eternall torment cannot. Yea and ſo ten thouſand to an hundred thouſand yeares, and ſo forwards untill it comes to be eternall, which indeed can never be; it being a thing utterly impoſſible to attaine from a beginning unto eternity by degrees. A finite added to a finite being never able to make it infinite. And therefore to maintain a thing infinite in quantitie, *Ariſtole* hath taught us that it is to maintain a multitude of infinites (and indeed an infinite of infinites.) For if the parts be but finite, it is impoſſible that the whole conſiſting of finite parts can be infinite. 4. Though man cannot without barbarous cruelty torment his beaſt, and prolong the life of it; Yet I hope this Authour will not deny this to be in the power of God, and that for the leaſt ſinne committed by man. And this was it that I propoſed in my anſwer to M. *Hord*, to ſhew the power of God in ſuch a kind, wherein it were abominable crueltie in man to exerciſe his power: like as the barbarous cruelty of *Tiberius* is ſet forth by them that write the hiſtory of his life. And the truth is, it is a very difficult point to reſolve how it can ſtand with juſtice divine thus to deale with a creature, though a ſinner. Yet I know many courſes are taken to ſolve this difficultie, and the beſt that I have met with is this in my judgment; That a man dying in ſinne, his ſinne continueth eternall (never broke off by repentance) as well as the pain, yet this upon examination is found to have its flawes, and will not ſatisfie. So that the beſt and finall reſolution is to have recourſe to God's abſolute power, as a Creatour over his creatures. And that abſolute power will make it good even over an innocent creature, as over a creature nocent. And it were very ſtrange to affirme that God hath not as much power over us as we have over our beaſts, namely to put them to pain, to doe us ſervice. Now if it be lawfull to inflict but one degree of pain upon an innocent creature, what reaſon can be given why he cannot inflict two degrees, and if ſo why not three, and ſo aſcending to the higheſt degree? Then as touching the duration of it, if he can inflict ſuch a pain for an houre, he may as well for two houres; and for a whole day: And if for a day he may as well for two daies, yea for a week; if for a week he may as well for a moneth, and if for a moneth, he may as well for two or three; if for three, as well for ſix; and if for ſix, as well for twelve; and if for a yeare, as well for two; and as well for foure, and ſo *in infinitum*; from tenns to hundreds, and from hundreds to thouſands. For no reaſon can poſſibly make evidence where we ought to make a ſtand; in ſuch ſort as that an affliction in ſuch a degree is lawfull, and immediatly after increaſing becomes unlawfull. 2. Yet conſider we ſpeak not now of decreeing, but of executing (whereas the objection proceeded concerning God's decreeing) Now between the decree and the execution, ſinne may intercede by God's permiſſion, and that neceſſarily thereupon as *Arminius* himſelfe confeſſeth. But now to the point whereon we are in preſent, we ſuppoſe the perſon to be moſt holy, even as holy as the Sonne of God; on whom notwithſtanding were inflicted, as all confeſſe, either hell paines, or that which was equivalent to hell paines. 3. Yet thiſevill thus inflicted will never come to be infinite, ſtill it continueth finite, though *in infinitum*; it being utterly impoſſible by addition to make that which is finite become infinite. 4. But were it infinite, yet this Authours caution would help us againſt the Authour himſelfe. For the good which God hath given ſuch a creature, is alſo infinite, to wit his being. How much more if God preſerve that creature from ſinne, which by *Arminius* his cofeſſion, makes a man more miſerable, then hell paines it ſelfe. Laſtly that there is ſuch an abſolute power in God *Raynaudus* juſtifies both out of the twelvth of wiſdoome. *Cum ſis juſtus, juſte omnia diſponis. Ipſum quoque qui non debet puniri condemnare externum exiſtimas à tuâ virtute.* This reading he profeſſeth to be corrupt and nothing coherent with the text; And the true reading ought to be this, *Ipſum quoque qui non debet puniri condemnas.* And ſhewes that this reading is followed by *Auſtin. q.* 53: and Saint *Grigory* 3. *Morall: cap.* 11. This alſo he juſtifies to be Orthodox by the teſtimony of the Antients. *Macarius homil.* 15. *Deus ſui juris eſt, quod vult facit. Si velit pro poteſtate & jure ſuo mittit juſtos in Gehennam, ac peccatores in regnum.* Out of *Chryſoſtomi l.* 2. *De compunctione cordis ſub finem. Si te agentem quod tibi preceptum eſt conjicii jubeat Dominus tuus in Gehennam, aliqua tibi datur contradicendi poteſtas.* Out of *Auſtine* in *Pſal.* 70 in

Note

4 Note

Auſtine

the beginning *Multum movet Dei amor & timor, Timor Dei quia juſtus eſt; Amor quia miſericors eſt. Quis enim diceret ei quid feciſti, ſi damnaret juſtum? quanta ergo miſericordia ejus eſt, ut juſtificet injuſtum?* Then he repreſents the School-men maintaining the ſame, *Ariminenſes, Camariacenſes, Medina, Secarius in cap. 7. Joſuæ à 39.* and *Lorinus* in *cap. 12. Sap: v. 12.* Yet is not *Raynaudus* of their opinion who maintaines reprobation to be before the foreſight of evill workes; nevertheleſſe he is peremptory in juſtifying this; And *Fulgentius* whom he conceives to be the Authour of that book *de prædeſt. & gratia*, which goes under *Auſtin's* name, in a little treatiſe of his intituled *Cenſura inofficioſæ cenſuræ*, which is added to his *Valerianus integræ vitæ labiſq; purus.*

M. *Maſon's Aditions p. 18.19. D. Twiſ: his Vindiciæ l. 2. p. 1. Digreſ. 1.*

Sect. 4.

But it is replyed by ſome (who will rather ſpeak unreaſonably and againſt common ſenſe then lay down the concluſions which they have undertaken to maintain) that it is more elegible to be tortured in hell then to want or looſe a being. For he that wants a being enjoyeth no good, but he that is tormented in hell, hath a being, and by conſequent ſomething that is good. If therefore God may take away a man's being that is innocent, and turne him into nothing for his pleaſure, much more may he torment him in hell.

Anſwer.

I am glad to ſee my name ſo often remembred by this Authour in his margent; for a long time I deſired to know his way by certaine evidence; for I would not ſuffer my ſelfe to be carried away with rumours; and withall I found ſome contradiction in the relations I received from different perſons, but at length I was ſo happy as to ſee it under his own hand, and there to obſerve not his judgment only, but the ſtrength of his affections alſo. Now let the Reader obſerve the cunning carriage of this Authour, and how farre off it is from all ingenuitie. For what I diſcourſe, being drawne thereunto by *Arminius* his excurſions, that this Authour obtrudes upon me, as if the defence of the cauſe I tooke in hand had drawn me thereunto, notwithſtanding that I have profeſſed the contrary. For thus I write *l. 1. pag. 1. De electione Sect: 4. pag. 127. In the canvaſing of this ſection Arminius runs out at large, ſaving that moſt of theſe things which here he heapes up are aliena*, and nothing pertinent to the preſent purpoſe; as pertaining rather to the *decree of reprobation, then to the decree of election.* And a little after I write thus; *Hence it is that Arminius expatiates and transfers his diſputation from the point of election, to the point of Reprobation too unſeaſonably: Yet Wiſely affecting the incolumity of his wavering cauſe. By that right* (ſaith he) *which God hath over his creature, he cannot ordaine any man to the ſuffering of pain without the foreſight of ſinnne. To wit that his cauſe might ſtand upright, and that this examiner might omit nothing that tends to the making of his opinion plauſible with his propitious reader, it was needfull that he ſhould make uſe of ſome ſuch tranſition, though never ſo unreaſonable, bnt ſeeing ſuch are the wiles and artifices of our Adverſaries to confound all Scholaſticall method, it ſhall not be unſeaſonable for me to weigh what he delivers as briefly as I can.* Therefore after I had refuſed *Arminius* on that point, where he denyes, that God can doe that injuſtice, which he can doe by power; after this manner I enter upon a new digreſſion concerning this point. *Hitherto have I followed Arminius in his extravagants. For M. Perkins hath not proceeded ſo farre; as to affirme that God hath power to afflict an innocent creature, neither hath his Adverſaries objected any ſuch thing unto him, as juſtly inferred from ought delivered by him.* So that all ſuch have well hardened their foreheads, who faigne that our opinion cannot well ſubſiſt without the help of ſo horrid and ſo harſh an aſſertion, to wit, *That it is better to be miſerable, then not to be at all.* It is true, ſome may conceive that though this were a truth, it were to be ſuppreſſed, rather then affirmed by reaſon of the harſhneſſe of it. Let every one conſider aright that I undertake the defence of M. *Perkins*, and it is he that hath uttered this harſh aſſertion, (namely, *That God can inflict hell paines without any demerit in the creature*) out of *Cameracenſis*: And it ſtood me upon to defend M. *Perkins* ſo farre as I had reaſon for it. Now finding the maine argument whereby *Arminius* maintaines the contrary (to that other, yet more harſh propoſition) to be moſt unſound; and even this aſſertion which ſounds moſt harſh in the eares of many, not only to be maintained by *Auſtine* himſelfe and and divres Schoole-Divines, but anſwered by many arguments, the ſolution whereof was never expedited by any; have I deſerved ſo ſharply to be cenſured for repreſenting all this in the way of juſtifying M. *Perkins*, whoſe defence I undertook againſt *Arminius*?

1. My words are theſe tranſlated, *God can annihilate the holieſt creature, which Arminius confeſſeth, how much more is it in his power to afflict an innocent creature, and that for ever, conſidering that not only according to Schoole-divines, but alſo according to Auſtine, yea according to the truth it ſelfe, it is more to be deſired to have being under*

der any pain, then to have no being at all. And afterwards I propoſe not one argument of mine own for the juſtifying of this, but only repreſent the diſcourſe of *Auſtine* hereupon, as it is analized by *Durandus* that Schoole Divine. Now why are not the School-men cenſured, *as men ſpeaking unreaſonably and againſt common ſenſe*? Nay why is not *Auſtine* cenſured as one *that had rather ſpeak unreaſonably and againſt common ſenſe, then lay downe the concluſion which he hath once undertaken to maintain*, as well as my ſelfe? Yea and much more conſidering that the diſcourſe proving this, is Saint *Auſtin's*; and had I not added on the by theſe four words *etiam ſecundum ipſam veritatem*, there had been no place at all for any cenſure to be paſt upon me. If a man finding himſelfe convicted by *Auſtin's* diſcourſe ſhall confeſſe that what he writes is true, is it equity to cenſure him as one who had rather ſpeak unreaſonably and againſt common ſenſe, then lay down the concluſions which formerly he hath undertaken to maintain. When in the mean time no cenſure is at all paſſed upon *Auſtine*, who alone is the player of the game, he that ſtands by profeſſing only in his judgment, he playes his game well.

2. If *Auſtine* hath ſpoken unreaſonably and againſt common ſenſe, how comes it to paſſe that this cenſurer hath not taken the paines to repreſent unto the world the unreaſonableneſſe of his argument? This authour ſpends his mouth frankly in cenſuring, but takes no paines to free his Reader from errour, by ſolving arguments produced by *Auſtin* for the proofe of that wich this Authour conceives to be an errour.

3. Nay he doth not ſo much as anſwer that one argument, which here is propoſed by me. An argument which the Scoole-men uſe as ſufficiently convincing the truth, as *Durandus* and *Ricardus*. Yet conſidering the unreaſonable condition of ſuch adverſaries, who take no courſe to convince or confute their oppoſites, but imperiouſly to cry them down; I have taken the paines to call to an account both *Auſtin's* arguments and others propoſed by Schoole-Divines, and to deviſe with my ſelfe what anſwer might be made unto them, ſo to performe that for my adverſaries, which they ſhew no hart to performe for themſelves, and I was borne in hand that ſuch a digreſſion of mine ſhould be extant long ere this.

4 Yet by the way I wonder not a little that one thing is pretermitted. For if I miſtake not, this very Authour is the man that heretofore hath been very full mouthed in cenſuring, not ſo much the doctrine it ſelfe, as a certain anſwer I made to an argument brought out of Scripture againſt it; namely from thoſe words of our Saviour, *It had been better for that man if he had never been born.* My anſwer was, that it was ſpoken according to the judgment of man, though indeed erroneous; and that after this manner phraſeologies of Scripture doe proceed I there ſhewed. Now this Authour hereupon ſpared not to profeſſe, that if this were true he would turne Atheiſt. I wiſht that friend of mine to whom he ſpake this, to perſwade him the next time he met with him, to enquire and conſider well whether *Maldonat* the Jeſuite doth not imbrace the ſame interpretation. And indeed if ſuch *proteſtations* would carry it, this Authour would prove a very potent and formidable adverſary, I have ſeen the like under his own hand, namely this, *As Plutarch ſaid of the old heathens who ſacrificed men that they might pacifie their gods; that it had been better with Diagoras to ſay, There is no god, then to think that God is ſuch a one that delights in the blood of men*: And hereupon he adds this Proteſtation, *I proteſt unto you I think it leſs diſhonourable to the bleſſed Trinity, to ſay with the Atheiſt, there is no god, then to feigne ſuch a God, as the decree of Reprobation maintained by the Contraremonſtrants maketh him to be.* This man I find is reſorted unto and conſulted with by the *Arminians*, as if his judgment were an oracle; and I willingly confeſſe he deſerves to be in ſome great place unto them: and no place in my judgment more fit then to be unto the, *à proteſtationibus*. Yet I doe not preſcribe but leave it to their diſcretion to prefer him as they think good: but how comes it to paſſe, that here he is ſilent in reviving the reproaches he caſt upō my anſwer to the Scripture before mentioned? Is it becauſe *Maldonat* the Jeſuite hath been ſince found by him to embrace the ſame interpretation? And he is loath to fall ſo foule in cenſuring ſuch as he is? Yet here he falls foul on me for proteſſing my approbation, not of Schoole-men but of *Auſtin's* diſcourſe. This makes me call to mind what was delivered of him ſometimes by a London Miniſter; as that he ſhould perſwade a young Divine to ſtudy *Bellarmine*; as alſo what cenſures others have paſſed upon ſome writings of his. And it hath been my hap to ſee under his own hand ſuch a counſaile as this givē to a friend of his. *Theſe things have I repreſented unto you the rather, becauſe I would give you occaſion to learne that in your younger dayes, which I have learned by late and long experience in my ſelfe, and that in theſe two things. Firſt in reading Bellarmine and other adverſaies to our Church; I have divers times*

noted

noted ſuch ſpeeches in them, as to my thinking involved contradiction, or had ſhew of abſurdity, or might either give advantage to our ſelves, or breed prejudice unto them; but when afterward I came in cooler blood to weigh the words better, and to conſider the circumſtances more narrowly. I found that I did miſtake their meaning, and that an itching deſire to find an advantage, made me to take ſhadowes for ſubſtance. And the like miſtake in my ſelfe I obſerved, when I read the fathers, or the Scriptures, ready to interpret every thing either in favour of mine own cauſe, or in prejudice of the adverſaries: And concludes ſententiouſly thus; *Nimirum ita eſt ingenium noſtrum, facile credimus, quæ nimium volumus.* If ſuch be the genius of this Authour, though he thinks not good to ſpare me for *Auſtin's* ſake, yet methinks he ſhould ſpare me for *Richardus* ſake, or at the leaſt for *Maldonat's* ſake. This calls to my remembrance an Epigramme which D. *Hoskins* my chamber-fellow in New-Colledge ſometimes made upon the fleas, (that ſore troubled him as he lay in his bed.) And the concluſion was thus;

But if ther's nothing that can ſlack
Your rage and your correction,
Yet ô remember you are black;
And ſpare me for complexion.

So we proceed.

Sect. 5.

M. *Maſon's Aditions p. 19.20.*

To the firſt part of this reply, namely, that it is more deſirable to be in hell, then to be nothing. I oppoſe three things. 1. The ſpeech of our Saviour concerning *Judas*: *Woe be to that man by whom the Sonne of man is betraied, it had been good for that man if he had never been born* Two things eſpecially are ſet forth in theſe words of our Saviour. Firſt the miſery of *Judas* the betraier of the Lord, *Woe be &c.* Secondly, the greatnes of his miſery, *It had been good &c.* It is as much as if the Lord had ſaid, *Judas* the traitour ſhall be damned, and therefore ſo woefull will his condition be, that it had been good and happy for him, if he had never received a being good in earneſt, as the Interpreters doe generally expound it, not in the opinion and eſteem of weak minded, faint-hearted-men only as ſome few underſtand it. For firſt let it be granted that Scripture ſpeaketh of things ſometimes according to men's opinions, yet without reaſon to faſten ſuch an expoſiō upon any Scripture, is to doe, as dunces doe in the Schooles, who being not able to anſwer a place in *Ariſtotle* wherewith they are charged, ſhift it off, and ſay, (*loquitur ex aliorum ſententiâ, he ſpeaks according to the opinion of others.*) 2. This ſcripture cannot in reaſon be thus expounded. Firſt becauſe it is an argument and ground by which Chriſt declareth the truth and greatneſſe of the miſery of *Judas*, *Woe to the man &c* And why woe? Becauſe it had been good &c. But it were no argument to ſhew his woefull eſtate by, to ſay that it had been good for him, that he had never been born in the opinion of men, who miſtake the caſe but not in truth. 2. becauſe this expoſition would teach and encourage men to be *Atheiſts* and *Epicures*. In the ſecond of *Wiſdome*, we read how voluptuous men doe ſtirre up one another to enjoy the good things, that are preſent, to fill them ſelves with wine and ointments, to leave ſome token of their jollity in every place and to practiſe all manner of wickedneſſe. And what is their motive? a falſe perſwaſion that their ſoules ſhall dye with their bodies; and that they ſhould have noe being after death. If this conceit would fleſh them thus in their opinions and voluptuous courſes, how freely and eagerly (may we thinke) would they purſue their carnall and ſinfull delights, if they could be but once perſwaded, that, after all their pleaſure they ſhould be in better caſe then if they had noe being? Secondly, I oppoſe common conſent. Where ſhall wee pick out a man, but will ſay (if he ſpeak from his heart) that he were better to vaniſh into a thouſand nothings, then to be caſt into hell. What is the reaſon why men are ſo afraid of hell, when they are touched to the quick with the conſcience of their ungodly lives, and the expectation of eternall vengeance, that with *Job* they curſe their birth day, and wiſh an hundred times over that they had never been, or might ceaſe to be, that ſo they might not come into the place of torments, but becauſe they judge a being there to be incomparably worſe, then no being any where? And why are men who are ſenſible of hell fire ſo ſtrongly curbed in the feare of feeling it, even from darling and beloved ſinnes, but becauſe they apprehend it to be the moſt terrible of terribles? Feare of being annihilated can never doe that, which the feare of hell doth.

Aug. Epiſt. ad Bon. 160.

Anſwer.

M. *Maſon* went great bellied with theſe choiſe conceits, and therefore he will bring them in though it be by the eares, in ſpite of his own friends: like as *Arminius* did before him, to vent a certaine argument of his, which yet had a very unhappy iſſue to the betraying of the Authours nakedneſſe moſt ſhamefully; and his argument was this, *To be happy is better thē ſimply to be; therefore to be miſerable, is worſe then ſimply not to be*; now the conſequence is moſt inconſequent. For therefore to be happy is better then ſimply to be; becauſe, *to be happy*, includes being, & addes hapines thereunto. And one good added to another good muſt needs make the whole compound better. In like manner, *If to be miſerable* doth include the evill of not being and adde another evill thereunto, the whole compound muſt needs be worſe. But to the contrary it is apparent, that, *to be miſerable* doth not include the evill of not being, but the good of being rather; and conſequently there is no juſt proportion between miſery and happineſſe, And therefore though to be happy is better then ſimply to be (as including being, and ſome good thing more) yet thence it followes not, that to be miſerable, is worſe then not to be; for as much as, *To*

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be miſerable, doth not include the evill of *not being* and adde ſome evill more to it. Now the firſt that affirmed this harſh poſition, namely, that *to be miſerable is not worſe then not to be at all*, was *Auſtin*, and he not only affirmes it, but diſputes it, and proves it by variety of arguments, not one whereof is anſwered by this Authour or by any freind that I know. And from *Auſtin* the School-men have taken it, and added this one argument to confirme it over and above thoſe of *Auſtine's*, *To turne a man into nothing is to deſtroy a man's univerſall being; but to inflict torment upon him doth deſtroy only particular being*, to wit, his being in eaſe and pleaſure. Now to have a man's particular being deſtroyed is not ſo bad, as to have a man's univerſall being deſtroyed. Now I come to conſider how this Authour carrieth himſelfe in overthrowing his own fiction. For albeit the poſition impugned by him, be no fiction (for it was the opinion of *Auſtin* and of divers School-men) yet the bringing it in here, as if it were an anſwer made by us to any of our Adverſaries objections (as this Authour doth) as if we ſtood in need o any ſuch aide, is a mere fiction. And firſt he ſtates it at pleaſure to ſerve his own turne, *of being in hell to be more deſirable*, whereas the Authour whom he oppoſeth delivers it of, *eſſe miſerum, to be miſerable*. and miſery is as well in reſpect of ſinne, as in reſpect of bodily torment. Nay it is confeſſed by *Arminius* himſelfe, *That the miſery of ſinne is greater then the miſery of torment*. So, that if it be uncouth to ſay, that to be under the torment of hell, is better then not to be at all; it ought to ſeem more uncouth to ſay, that it is better for a man to be guilty of ſin, then to have no being at al. Now I doe not find that this Authour in all his Mountebank-like amplifications, did take this into conſideration. Againe when it is ſaid, *That to be miſerable is better thē not to be*, this is to be underſtood aright, not as if *miſery* it ſelfe were deſirable, but *being* only, though with the adjunct of miſery, thus, *to have* a being though in miſery is more deſirable, then to have no being at all. And ſo if it be applyed to the miſery of *torment*, and that in hell, it ought to be taken thus, To have a being though in hell is more deſirable then to have no being at all. And it is apparent, that *in not being at all*, there is nothing at all deſirable, but in being; though under the greateſt pain there is ſomething deſirable, to wit, being. Now I conſider his reaſons.

He objecteth the ſaying of our Saviour to *Judas*. *Woe be to that man by whom the ſonne of man is betrayed, it had been good for that man if he had never been born*: and indeed *the betraying of the Sonne of God his Lord and maſter*, was a moſt facinorous act, eſpecially being committed by the way of a kiſſe, & with ſweet words ſaying *Hayle Maſter*. And School-men doe diſtinguiſh between, *the miſery of ſinne, and the miſery of pain*, in ſuch ſort that albeit they deny the latter to be worſe then *not* being, yet they doe not reaſon ſo of the former. But becauſe *Judas* was not ſo ſenſible of the miſerable condition of the one, as of the other; therefore our Saviour ſets forth the woefull condition of that ſtate whereof he, and generally all are moſt ſenſible. Whence we may well argue, that our Saviour ſpeakes in conformity to man's ſenſe and judgment, and it was not long ere the terrours of a guilty conſcience took hold of him, and he went forth and hang'd himſelfe. Yet our Saviour ſaith not, *It had been good for Judas if he had never received any being*, but only this, *If he had never been borne*. now being is not received in a man s birth but in the conception rather. And undoubtedly, if *Judas* had periſhed in his mothers womb it had been much better for him. As *Arch-byſhop Whitgift* ſometimes in the Court of high commiſſion ſaid, of one that was accuſed and convicted o ſome foule crime committed by him in the very houſe of God *That better it had been, that his neck had been broken at the firſt, then that he ſhould live to be ſo ſcandalous to the Church of God*. And yet as if our Saviours wordes were not enough for this Authour in ſaying, *It had been good for that man*; therefore he patcheth it out with a ſupplement of his own, thus, *It had been good and happy for that man, if he had never received being*. So that whereas *Ariſtotle* made happineſſe to conſiſt in an aggregation of all good things, this Authour with his divinitie thinks good to mend *Ariſtotl's* Philoſophy, by placing happineſſe in the want of every good thing very learnedly and judiciouſly. *Vulcan* who made thunder-bolts for *Jupiter*, when he was caſt out of heaven had a ſhrewd fall, and contracted ſuch lameneſſe as ſtuck by him ever after. So this Authour who forgeth thunder-bolts and arguments for others, being fallen upon oppoſition to the prerogative of God's grace and his Soveraignty over all creatures; no marvaile if his logick and philoſophy halteth; and his infirmity ſo contracted may increaſe ſo farre, as in the end to bereave him of commō ſenſe. He contents himſele as his manner is with ſaying, that Interpreters doe generally expound it as he doth; ſome few he confeſſeth underſtand it other wiſe, but moſt concurre with him, to wit, that, *it is delivered in earneſt*; what a jeſt is this as if any Interpreter was ever known to ſay, that our Savour ſpake

not in earneſt. Neither doe I know any that interpreteth the place as he ſhapes it, as if our Saviour ſpake according to the opinion of weak-minded faint-hearted men only. Not one that I know putteth any ſuch difference of men under the torments of hell. Like as the Prophet ſpeakes of the ſtouteſt, as well as the weakeſt, Can thy heart endure, or thine hands be ſtrong in the day that I have to deale with thee, or the Lord rather by the Prophet. The School-men ſuppoſe without difference, that the damned wiſh they had never been borne, or rather that they had never been. So the Saints of God in this life have broken forth into paſſionate expreſſions in the time of their extremity; *Maldonate* on this place gives inſtance in many; but the queſtion is, whether theſe proceed from the judgment of right reaſon; or erroneous rather, through the vehemēcy of paſſion, whoſe courſe is as *Aquinas* obſerves, *extinguere rationem, to extinguiſh reaſon.* And it is one of the three things as *Ariſtotle* obſerves in his bookes *De Animâ*, that hinders the mind in her judgment. The other two are, *Noſe & a Diſeaſe, Sinn & ſleep*; the third is paſſion; how much more when paſſion is ſtirred up by the ſoreſt diſeaſe of all other the torments of hell fire?

Ezech: 22. 14.

1. But if I am glad to ſee the iſſue whereto he drives his diſcourſe. For he grants that the ſcripture ſpeakes ſometimes according to men's opinions: but without reaſon to faſten ſuch an expreſſion upon any Scripture, is to doe as Dunſes doe &c. he gives no inſtance; I will ſupply the want thereof, and that out of one of thoſe dunſes a follower of *John* Duns an eminet ſchool-man, from whoſe name ſchool-men are called dunſes, whom this Authour was woont to magnifie; *Lychetus* a *Minorite* is the man, who is the firſt that I have found hitherto maintaining that God's purpoſe of election of any particular man may ceaſe; and the purpoſe of reprobating the ſame may come in the place thereof. So the purpoſe of reprobating *Judas* may come in the place thereof, and that without all change in God. This is a doctrine that now a dayes growes in requeſt *Penotus* hath taken it up without betraying from whom he had it: And *Franciſcus à ſanctâ Clarâ* after him, and ſome of our *Arminians* I find inamoured with it. Now this *Lychetus*, when he is charged with the doctrine of *Scotus* as directly oppoſite hereunto, his anſwer is in part that he ſpeakes according to the opinion of others. Now I deſire not upon better termes to contend with M. *Maſon*. For *Auſtine* hath given many reaſons to prove that ſimply and abſolutely not to be, is not a thing deſirable, above being, though joyned with never ſo great miſery of pain. And the School-men acknowledge that *Auſtine* herein delivers his judgment, and withall they concurre with him. as *Scot*, *Biel*, *Durandus*, *Maldonat*. And it is evident that to be turned into nothing, is an univerſall deſtruction of being; ſo is not inflicting of puniſhment, as both *Durandus* and *Maldonat* argue the caſe. And ſaying that not to have any being at all is better for *Judas* then to be in torment, here is ſomething affirmed of a ſubject that makes him of a better condition then otherwiſe, which hath no place, but upon ſuppoſition of a ſubjects exiſtence, & that in diſtinction from an attribute affirmed of him, which conſtitutes him in a condition of betternes, now that that which is nothing, by reaſon of being nothing, ſhould be better then ſomething, is one of the wildeſt expreſſions, I think that hath been heard of ſince the world began; And therewithall creatures began to have a being. Againe conſider, take *Gabriel* the *Arch-Angell* moſt holy as a creature, and let every ſober man judge, whether it were better for him not to be, then being holy as he is to be tormented in hell fire. I ſhould think that albeit God ſhould torment me with hell fire yet if he ſhould preſerve my ſoule from ſinne & in the love of him out of the ſenſe of his love towards me, I ſhould have infinitly more cauſe to rejoyce then to complain, how weak ſoever I am at this preſent. Thirdly, if it be better and more deſirable to have no being at all, then to be in hell fire; then this is to be uderſtood of hell fire, either without limitation of time only: or with limitation. If only it hold in reſpect of everlaſtingneſſe, then it followes it is better to be in hell fire, provided a man ſhall not everlaſtingly continue there, then to have no being at all, though it be for a thouſand yeares, not only twiſe told; but a thouſand times over and over, and that multiplied Cubically, and yet no end of multiplication of the time of tormenting. If it be better to have no being at all then to ſuffer hell torments ſo long, then it is better to have no being at all, then to ſuffer hell torments halfe ſo long: For no reaſon can be given to the contrary; In a word it will follow, that it were better to have no being, then to ſuffer hell torments one houre, or halfe an howre, or a quarter, or a minute, or halfe a minute. For no reaſon can define the bounds within which it will be better to ſuffer the paines of hell fire, then to be turned into nothing, and beyond which it will be worſe. But M. *Maſon* ſaith ſecondly. This Scripture cannot in reaſon be thus expounded: And

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he gives his reaſon for it: Becauſe it is an argument and ground by which Chriſt declareth the greatneſſe or truth of the miſery of *Judas*: and I pray let every ſober man judge, whether this be not a ſufficient amplification of that miſery, that they ſhall wiſh they had never been, or that they might be turned into nothing, rather then ſuffer ſuch torments. How many preferre death before this worlds miſery, and ſo goe on to deſtroy themſelves; will it therefore follow that death indeed, though it ſhould be an utter abolition of man, is not ſo bad as to ſuffer the miſeries of this world. The miſtake of a damned perſon wiſhing not to be, conſiſts not in conceiving his torments to be unſufferable with any content or patience, but in conceiving that by not being, he ſhould have eaſe, which is a moſt abſurd conceit, ariſing merely from diſtraction of mind throug extremity of anguiſh. So that all things rightly conſidered, here is no encouragement for men to become *Atheiſts* & *Epicures*, unleſſe this be an encouragement thereunto, that their pain ſhall be ſo extreme and unſufferable, as to make them deſire, and utter they know not what, ſuch diſtraction of mind and and perturbation of judgment ſhall ſurprize them. A falſe perſwaſion that mens ſoules ſhall die with their bodies, and that they ſhall have no being after death, urgeth every man indifferently to take his delights and pleaſures while he may; whether this delight and pleaſure be taken in courſes vicious, or in courſes vertuous, becauſe death ſets an end, as to them; ſo to their pleaſures and delights. But if their greateſt happineſſe, or miſery doth begin in joy, or ſorrow after death; and this is well known unto them: ſober reaſon doth ſuggeſt unto them to provide for the obtaining of that happineſſe, and declining that unhappineſſe, above all other, according to that Ladies reſolution in *Sophocles*, and that upon this ground Ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἀεὶ κείσομαι, *there I ſhall continue for ever*. But when he ſaith the wicked will the more eagerly purſue their carnall and ſinfull delights, becauſe after all their pleaſures they ſhall be in a better caſe, then if they had no being. I long to have the judgment of any lewd perſon throughout the world concerning this; as namely whether he takes any comfort or encouragement to ſinfull courſes from this; that albeit he ſhall be caſt with the devill and his Angells into hell fire that never goeth out. Yet this condition is a better condition, then not to have any being at all; whereas this better condition conſiſts only in this, that being is better then not being; not in this, that he hath any eaſe, or is leſſe obnoxious to torment and ſorrow, which ſhall be ſo unſufferable, as to provoke him to wiſh, that he never had any being at all. Or that forthwith he might be turned into nothing.

Secondly, I oppoſe common conſent. Where ſhall we pick out a man but will ſay (if he ſpeak from his heart) that he were better to vaniſh into a thouſand nothings, then to be caſt into hell? What is the reaſon why men are ſo afraid of hell, when they are touched to the quick with the conſcience of their ungodly lives, and the expectation of eternall vengeance, that with *Job* they curſe their birth day, and with an hundred times over, that they had never been, or might ceaſe to be, that ſo they might not come into that place of torments; becauſe they judge a being there to be incomparably worſe, then no being any where? And why are men, who are ſenſible of hell fire, ſo ſtrongly curbd and held in with feare of feeling it, even from darling and beloved ſinnes, but becauſe they apprehend it to be the moſt terrible of all terribles? feare of being annihilated can never doe that which feare of hell doth. *M. Maſon's Addit. p. 20.*

And is he well in his wits that talkes of a thouſand nothings? I looked whereto it would come with ſuch like wild diſcourſes, even to runne out of common ſenſe at laſt. Yet all this that he diſcourſeth of, for the ſubſtance of it is no other, then *Auſtine* hath taken notice of in his very argument; and ſhewes the vanity of it, and the errour of man's imagination, conceiving the condition of being nothing, to be a condition of eaſe and reſt from ſorrow & pain; againe aske the ſame men whether they would not be content to be turned into dogges, wolves, ſnakes, toades, rather then to be under the torments of hell fire; aſke againe whether they would not be contēt, to be turned into devills, ſo they might be free from the torments of hell fire. Aske the Adulterour whether he would not be content to lye with an other mans wife all his daies, rather then to ſuffer (ſhall I ſay) the torments of hell fire? Nay rather then dye poſſeſt of the joyes of heaven. Aske this Authour whether he would not be content to maintaine ſtiffly, that grace is given according to workes, and that a man is juſtified by his workes, rather then ſuffer the paines of hell fire, yea though it were againſt his own conſcience. As for me were I a damned creature, yet according to this judgment which God hath given me cōſidering that the glory of God's juſtice is manifeſted in my condemnation, though extreamity of pain would tranſport me into as wild wiſhes, as this Authour juſtifies; yet according to right reaſon I ſhould rather be content to ſuffer, then wiſh that I were turned into a bruit beaſt, or into a devill, or into nothing. I think the whole nation of ſober divines would juſtifie me *Anſwer.*

in this undoubtedly God is able to worke me or any man to this reſolution without ſin.

2. If, becauſe men through feare of hell and expectation of eternall vengeance doe with *Job* curſe their birth day once, and wiſh they had never been; therefore it is better to be nothing then to be in hell: By the ſame reaſon, becauſe they doe no other then *Job* did, it muſt follow, that it was better for *Job* to be nothing, then to be under ſuch torments. But if *Job's* deſire was an unſober and unreaſonable deſire in this, why might not their deſire be as unſober and unreaſonable alſo, proceeding not ſo much from calme reaſon, as from the ſtrength of paſſion inflamed and diſordered through extremity of torment. We know that men upon the rack doe ſometimes make confeſſions, even againſt the light of their own conſciences. And feare of evill ſometimes diſtracts as much as the ſenſe thereof; as in him who hearing the ſentence of death paſſed againſt him at *Paris*, fell into a ſweat of blood. And it was wont to be ſaid, that *pejor eſt malo timor ipſe mali. Francis Spira* in the time of his diſtraction confeſt as much of hell it ſelfe. And if one deſire, once having courſe, prove unreaſonable, why ſhould the renewing of it a thouſand times over prove leſſe unreaſonable. And let the judicious obſerve the hand of God, in ſtriking this Authour with ſuch giddineſſe even in this argument, (which he conceives of all other to be advantagious to his cauſe) ſo as at every turne to ſupplant himſelfe, and to betray the ſhamefull nakedneſſe of his diſcourſe. As firſt, in talking of a thouſand nothings. Secondly, In putting the caſe of ſome curſing their birth day, but how? as *Job* did. Now will any ſober man make the like collection of *Job's* curſing his birth day, as this Author doth from others curſing theirs. Thirdly, and laſtly in calling hell fire the terrible of all terribles. Who ſeeth not that this proceeds in reference to ſuch things, which as they are feared, ſoe they may be felt; and ſuppoſing a ſubject exiſting, as to feare it before it comes, ſo to feele it when it is come, but ſuch is not the condition of being nothing. And when he feignes us to conforme to his crude conceptions, namely to conceive annihilation to be a thinge feared, he pleaſeth himſelfe in his owne fictions. He no where finds me to ſpeake of annihilation as a thing to be feared, no more then I ſpeake of it as of a thing that is to be felt. Onely I ſay that it is a condition no way deſirable by a reaſonable creature, no more then the ſuffering of hell fire. But whereas hell fire cannot be ſuffered of any unleſſe he hath a being, here is ſomething found deſirable, to wit the continuance of being. But in the condition of being nothing, there is not found any thing to be a fit Object of mans deſire.

M. Maſon's Addit. 3. p. 20.21.

The third thing which I oppoſe is common ſenſe; which judgeth paines, when they are extreame to be worſe then death. Hence it is that *Job* being tormented in his body by the Devill curſed his birth day, magnified the condition of the dead, and wiſhed himſelfe in the grave, plainely preferring the loſſe of his being, before that miſerable being which he then had. And hence it is that men even of ſtouteſt and hardeſt ſpirits (as we ſee by dayly experience) would (if they might enjoy their option) chooſe rather to have no bodyes at all, then bodyes tormented with the ſtone or gout, or any other ſharpe and ſenſible diſeaſe. It is a knowen ſaying grounded on this judgement of ſenſe, *Præſtat ſemel quàm ſemper mori, better it is to dye once then to be allwayes dying.* This the tyrant Tiberius knew very well, and therefore he would not ſuffer thoſe, towards whom he purpoſed to exerciſe his cruelty, to be put to a ſpeedy death, but by lingring torments. And Suetonius reporteth of him in that chapter, wherein he reckoneth up his barbarous and cruell practiſes; Theſe, ſayth he, who would have dyed through the extreamity of their torment, he uſed meanes to keepe alive (*nam mortem adeo leve ſupplicium putabat*) *For he accounted death ſo light a puniſhment*; that when he heard that one Carnulius, a man appoynted to torments, had prevented him, he cryed out, *Carnulius me evaſit. Carnulius hath eſcaped mine hands.* To a priſoner entreating him to put him quickly to death he gave him this anſwer, *Nondum tecum redii in gratiam, I am not yet friends with thee*; accounting it a great kindneſſe to put him quickly to death, whom he might have tortured. Many that were called into queſtion did partly wound themſelves in their owne houſes, *ad vexationem ignominioſam vitandam, to prevent that paine and ignominy*, which they knew they ſhould endure; And partly poyſoned themſelves in the midſt of the Court, as they were going to their arraingment for the ſame cauſe. Seneca ſpeaking of one Mecænas, who was ſo afrayd of being dead, that he ſayd he would not refuſe weakeneſſe, deformity, *nec acutam crucem, no nor the ſharpeſt crucifying*, ſo that he might live ſtill in theſe extreamityes, he calleth his deſire. *Turpiſſimum votum, a baſe, and moſt ignoble*, and unnaturall wiſh, and cenſureth him for a moſt effeminate and contemptible man; becauſe in all his evills he was afrayd of that which was the end of all evills, the privation of his being. And certainly we muſt needs conceive and cenſure them to be ſtocks and ſtones, rather then fleſh and blood, who can ſo put of all feeling, and ſenſe, as to thinke a tormented being in hell, to be a lighter and leſſer evill, then no being at all.

Anſwer.

We know that death to ſuch as *Job* was, is not only better then extreame paines, but better then all the joyes of this world; by how much to be preſent with the Lord Chriſt, is better then to be abſent from him; and we know, ſayth *Paul*, to the unſpeakable comfort of all true Chriſtians, that when the earthly houſe of this our tabernacle is diſſolved we have a building of God not made with hands, but eternall in the heavens.

So

So that I wonder not a little at these wilde discourses of this Authour. When he saith that even the stoutest and hardest spirits would choose rather to have no bodyes at all, then bodyes tormented with the stone or gout, what other is this then to desire that they were impassible; would they not desire to have no soules too? and to be without sense like stocks and stones? But let every sober man judge whether this be a reasonable desire: what Christian justifies *Job* in cursing the day of his birth? What Martyr hath not rejoyced in suffering, not naturall diseases, but the cruellest torments that most cruell, and spightfull Tyrants could devise to be inflicted upon them? And even to suffer other evills by course of nature brought upon us with patience, acknowledging the hand of God therein, and submitting unto his will, justifying him as righteous in all his wayes, and holy in all his works, and condemning our selves: even this long a goe hath beene accounted for Martirdome in the judgement of Chrysostome. It is true such proverbs have had their course in most nations. Κρεισσων γὰρ ἅπαξ ἁπάντων, ἢ νοσεῖν κατὰ, *præstat semel quam semper mori.* And amongst us. *Better eye out then allwaies aking, better one dead then allwaies dying.* But shall we take this hand over head without a difference between a Christian & unchristian, and heathenish interpretation? As many as had an opinion of the immortall condition of the soule, and withall of different conditions of men in joy, or sorrow, according to the condition of their life spent in their courses vertuous, or vicious, if they were well perswaded of their life past, they might accordingly think it better for them to dye then live; And it is noe lesse desirable to them, who had no comfort in their life past. *Bradwardine* hath such a meditation. *Mallem non esse quàm te offendere, I had rather have no being at all then to offend thee*, speaking unto God. Yet in sinning against him we are matter of his glory, which we are not, when we have no being at all. Matter of his glory I say, either in pardoning sinne, or in punishing it, or both. But what sober man will justifie such a saying, I had rather have no being at all then be troubled with the stone, or gout? Is not this the proper place for patience to have its perfect worke. And if it be urged that this holds true only in evills tolerable, not in case they prove intolerable. I answer that surely the pain of stone or gout is not intolerable, nor any in the judgment of *Paul*, whose profession was this *I am able to doe all things* (his meaning is to suffer all things) *by the power of Christ that inableth me:* and when upon his prayer that the messenger of Satan might be removed from him, he received this answer from the Lord, *My grace is sufficient for thee, and my power is made perfect in thy weakenesse*, What is *Paul's* resolution hereupon, though in himselfe a very weak creature? *I will gladly therefore rejoyce in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may dwell in me. Therefore I take pleasure in infirmities, in reproaches, in necessities, in persecution, in anguish, for Christ's sake. For when I am weak then I am strong.* Doth not this extend to the very torments of hell suffered by our Saviour for our sakes. Undoubtedly, if the glory of heaven possesse the soule, though the paines of hell seize upon the body, such a one shall have more cause to rejoyce then to complain. These courses of *Tiberius* I had cause to take notice of in mine answer to M. *Hord*. For, whereas he slaundered our doctrine concerning the absoluteneſse of God's decrees, and conforming them to the cruell courses of *Tiberius*: whereupon I shewed, that if such comparisons were not odious, but allowable, we might in like manner compare God's courses in punishing sinne temporall with torment eternall, with courses of *Tiberius* here specified. And because nothing hath a greater shew of cruelty in *Tiberius* then such courses of his as these. Hence they may with the same liberty conclude, that the divine Majesty is cruell (which is a horrible thing to utter) and unjust in punishing men everlasting in hell fire, for sinnes committed by them for a very short space in the course of their lives. But let this Authour consider, were heathen Princes more exasperate against any then against Christians, or were more cruell courses taken against any then the servants of God. Yet did these Christians prevent their bloody and barbarous desires by murdering their selves? Did they not rejoyce in tribulation? Yet death they might well preferre before the sweetest life. That they might enjoy the Lord Christ And *Austine* hath long agoe in this very argument shewed, that even in destroying themselves they aimed at being at a state of freedome from sorrowes. So farre were they from affecting to have no being at all. And first, he distinguishes of the will as it signifies an appetite naturall; or as it signifies an absolute desire. As it signifies nature or appetite naturall; so by no meanes can it desire to have *no being*. All naturall desire being for rest, but nature findes no rest in its destruction: Rest of nature supposeth its being, and adds somewhat over and above thereunto, namely freedome from trouble, *unde si quis dicat vellem non esse, magis quàm miserum esse; respondebo, mentiris, quia cum miserum nolis esse tamen vis.* Thus

Bradward. lib. 2. c. nlt.

Jav, 1. 4.

Note

Durand. analizeth *Auſtin's* diſcourſe hereupon. Then he proceeds to ſhew that the deliberative appetite cannot affect not being, for the avoiding of evill, ſave only according to erroneous reaſon. All which this Authour takes no notice of, but pleaſeth himſelfe in his own confuſion. All creatures have in them, *veſtigia Dei*, ſaith *Luther*, to wit, in reſpect of their being; But man is, *Imago Dei*. Shall right reaſon ſuggeſt the deſtroying of this for pain's ſake? *Durandus* proceeds & ſhewes how according to erroneous reaſon a man may deſtroy himſelfe, by reaſon of ſome preſent miſerable condition urging him; conceiving that thereby he ſhall arrive to ſome ſecret exiſtence wherein he ſhall be free, as from the good things, ſo from the evill things of this world. *Unde Auguſtinus ubi ſupra dicit, quòd aliqui urgente miſeriâ ſeſe interimũt, eo quòd confugiunt ubi melius fore putaverint.* A ſecond manner is this, the vehemency of evill ſuffered may ſo over-cloud and trouble reaſon, as to make them conceive, that to have no being at all is better then to be in miſery, which is abſurd, ſaith he; for as much as the privation of evill is not good; but by reaſon of obtaining of the contrary good; but no ſuch good can be obtained in being nothing, howſoever men through errour of judgment may faigne it otherwiſe. In which caſe he makes choice of nothing (thinking to make choice of ſomething) and conſequently his election is erroneous, as *Auſtine* concludeth. But *Seneca* is the beſt flower in this Authours preſent diſcourſe; and the cenſure which he paſſeth upon one *Mecænas*, who, ſo he might live, would not care what torments he ſuffered. Where by the way I obſerved; that albeit this Authour repreſents the common ſenſe of heathens only in this. Yet all heathens were not of the ſame mind. Secondly, I obſerve that *Seneca* who cenſureth him did look for an immortall condition after death, which it ſeemes was no part of *Mecænas* his Creed. And upon this ground his cenſure might proceed. And indeed otherwiſe it is very ſtrange that he ſhould cenſure him for effeminatenes, in reſpect of a reſolute mind to endure tortures, which we know full well is uſually accounted *virile aliquid*, rather then *muliebre*, the part of a man, more then the part of a woman. Thirdly, I find in *Auſtine*, that this was the opinion of *Varro* and the Stoicks, that it became a man to deſtroy himſelfe, rather then to endure ſome evills, and in this doctrine of theirs, he findes ſome contradiction to another doctrine of their own, which was this, *Hanc eſſe naturæ primam quodammodo & maximam vocem, ut homo concilietur ſibi, & propterea mortem naturaliter fugiat, This is the firſt and greateſt voice of nature, that man ſhould be at one with himſelfe, and therefore naturally flieth death.* And herein *Auſtine* himſelfe acknowledgeth them to deliver a truth. Now conſider, is a man at one with himſelfe when he deſtroyes himſelfe? Is he not rather at odds with himſelfe in making a man's fortitude to be a ſelfe deſtroyer? If ſo be that deſerves to be called fortitude, as there *Auſtine* ſpeakes: Or how can the duty of preſerving a man's ſelfe, be the greateſt voice of nature, if there be found a voice of nature countermanding it, and commaunding a man to kill himſelfe? In ſuffering evills there is place for the exerciſe of patience, of true fortitude and magnanimity of mind: But in the utter deſtruction of nature there is no place for the exerciſe of any vertue: which vertue was ſo farre advanced by the Stoicks, as touching the power of it, as to be able to deſcend into *Phalaris* his Bull, as *Cicero* diſcourſeth in the laſt of his Tuſculane queſtions Yet not only great evills, for the inſufferable nature of them did urge them to deſtroy themſelves, but meaner evills moſt unreaſonably. What moved *Cato* to deſtroy himſelfe, but becauſe he would not come under *Cæſar*? His ſtout ſpirit could not endure ſubjection. Yet he read over *Plato's* diſcourſe of immortality the night before, and felt the edge of his ſword, which ſome cenſure as an argument of ſome puſillanimity. The Spaniard, who was whipt through *Paris* never changed his pace, affecting to maintaine the reputation of ſpaniſh gravity and reſoluteneſſe, though he ſmarted the more for it. And ſhall not our being in the likeneſſe and Image of God, be preferred before not being, though conjunct with any dolorous ſuffering: when this Authour will have *no being*, to be a lighter and leſſer evill then hell paines; doth he not moſt manifeſtly ſignifie that it is a burden more eaſie to be borne? Thus ere he is aware moſt contradictiouſly he ſuppoſeth that, even in not being, there is a being. For how is it poſſible that an evill can be borne, and that with more eaſe then ſome other evill, by him who hath no being at all. But let him ſtraine his wits to deviſe where firſt pain begins to be ſo great, that a man's utter deſtruction is to be preferred before it, ſeeing it is apparent that all pain is not ſuch.

The 6. Sect:

M. Maſon's Addit. p. 22. To the reaſon on which the reply is grounded, which is, *melius eſt eſſe, quàm non eſſe. It is better to be, then to have no being.* I anſwer that it is a Sophiſme or, *a fallacy a non diſtributo ad diſtributum. To be in it ſelfe is better then not to be*, but it is not univerſally true in all particulars. Againe it is true in ſome caſes, & *ex hypotheſi*,

theſi, ſi cætera ſint paria; If there be any equlity in the Adjuncts, It is ſo farre from being ſimply true, that our Saviour limiteth it, and putteth a caſe wherin it is not true but the contrary to it is true: That is the caſe of Judas of which we have ſaid ſomewhat before. *It had been good &c.* Which words St. *Hierome* expounding ſaith; it is ſimply and plainly averred by our Saviour, that it is better to have no being, then an evill being. This was the judgment too of *Job. Why died I not ſaith he, in the birth? why did the knees prevent me? and why did I ſuck the breaſts? For now ſhould I have lyen ſtill, and been quiet, and ſhould have ſlept then and been at reſt.* In which words he plainly implyeth, that he thought it better to have had no birth and being, then ſuch a pain full and miſerable being. This was alſo the opinion of *Solomon. So I returned ſaith he, and conſidered all the oppreſſions that are done under the ſunne; and behold the teares of ſuch as were oppreſſed, and they had no comforter &c. Wherefore I praiſed the dead which are already dead, more then the living which are yet alive. Yea better is he, then both they, which hath not yet been, who hath not ſeen the evill works that are done under the ſunne.* The words doe clearly ſhew that *Solomon* did think it better to be dead, and to be deprived of being, then to be oppreſſed by the mighty, and to be without comforters, that is then to have a miſerable and mournfull being.

Hierom: in Matt: c. 26. v. 24. *Job: 3. 11. 12. 13.* *Eccleſ. 4. 1. 2. 3.*

Indeed ſo *Hierome* ſaith, but that is not all he ſaith. For he labours to prevent ſuſpicion that *Judas* had ſome being before he was borne: which was the errour of *Origen*. And the words of our Saviour ſeemes to favour it as *Janſenius* obſerves. *Quibus verbis Origenianum quid ſignificare videtur, quaſi homo ille fuerit antequam naſceretur, quia nulli poteſt benè eſſe niſi ei qui fuerit.* And *Hierome* himſelfe upon *Eccleſ.* 4. 3, writes that ſome were of that opinion; namely, *Arminas noſtras antequam ad noſtra corpora iſta deſcendant verſari apud ſuperos, & tam diu beatas eſſe, quamdiu cœleſti Hieruſalem & choro perfruantur Angelico.* Neither doth *Hierome* there paſſe any cenſure upon the Authours of ſuch an opinion. Here indeed upon *Mat.* 26. 24, he ſaith, *We muſt not hereupon think that Judas had a being before he were born, becauſe a well being can agree to none but ſuch as have a being.* Which argument Hierome doth not anſwer. For when he adds, *ſed ſimpliciter dictum eſt, multo melius eſſe non ſubſiſtere quàm malè ſubſiſtere.* This rather confirmes the antecedent, namely, that it had been well for *Judas*, if he had not been; then gives any tolerable or colourable anſwer to the conſequence made therehence. And is not the authourity of *Anſtine* as good as the authourity of *Hierome* in this? *Janſenius* embraceth *Hieromes* expoſition; but *Maldonat* doth not, but at large diſputes for another interpretation, the very ſame which I delivered before I were aware of *Maldonates* expoſition. And *Janſenius* though he followes *Hierome* in expounding this place, yet he profeſſeth, that both *Euthymius* of old, and *Caietan* of late do underſtand this place in the ſame manner that *Durandus* doth, namely, *de nativitate ex utero*, of *Judas* his bringing forth into the world, diſtinguiſhing his birth from his conception, *ut ſit ſenſus*, after this meaning, *Bonum erat vel fuiſſet ei, ſi cum erat in utero matris ſuæ non fuiſſet editus in lucem, ſed mortuus tunc fuiſſet, & ſepulchrum ipſius uterus matris extitiſſet; ſi enim tunc mortuus fuiſſet, non incidiſſet in tantam & talem condemnationem, quantam & qualem natus propter immenſum perditionis ſcelus erat excepturus. It had been good for him, if being conceived in his Mothers wombe he had never been brought forth, but then had dyed, and his Mothers wombe had been his grave. For had he then dyed his condemnation had been nothing like ſo heavy, as now it is.* Let me adde here *Maldonat's* interpretation of this place which is memorable. *Of this paſſage ſome diſpute ſubtelly more then enough, how it could be better for Judas not to have been, whereas not to be is no good; to be damned is ſome good* (meaning in reſpect of being) *For he that is damned is ſomewhat and every thing that is, as it hath a being is good. Hierome ſignifies that ſome thoug h Judas had a being before he was born; and that Chriſt of purpoſe ſayd not, it were better for that man, if he had never been; but if he had never been born, to ſignifie that though he had not been born; yet he ſhould have had a beeing, and ſo to have had naturall good things without evill. I imagine that Hierome herin noted the Originiſts, whoſe opinion was that as ſoules were from the beginning created, and each according to his merrit either to remaine without a body, or to be caſt into a body as into a priſon. And indeed Origen ſo writes on this place, as he ſeemes not to be farre off from ſuch an opinion. After the ſame manner allmoſt doth Euthinius interpret this. But ſuch like phraſes of ſpeech are not to be accommodated to the ſubtillty of the Schooles. For they ſpeak proverbiall ſpeeches and vulgar, which commonly are ſomewhat hyperbollicall, as Job 3. 11. Why haſt thou brought me out of the wombe? would I had periſhed, that the eye might not ſee me, that I had been as if I had not been, from the wombe carried to the grave.* And *Jer:* 20 14, 15, and *chap:* 33. *Let the day periſh wherin I was born. For all theſe proceed not from any deliberate judgment of the mind; but by way of complaint, whoſe courſe is to amplifie evills. Chriſt therefore in like manner ſpeaks of Judas, as it was to be thought he would ſpeak of himſelfe being in torment. Now it was very credible that he would ſay; I would I had never been born, it had been better for me never to have been born, then to ſuffer theſe paines: conſidering that Job and Jeremy moſt holy men have uttered the like ſpeeches, under farre leſſe ſufferings. Adde to this that Chriſt ſaith not, It had been better that Judas had not been born*

Anſwer.

borne;

born; but that it had been better to him, to wit, in his opinion and judgment: As we ſee it befalls many ſuffering bitter evills, to preferre death before life, ſorrow & pain before judgment, whereas without doubt to live is better then to dye.

Eccleſ. 4. 1, 2, 3. In the next place this Authour ſaith, *this was alſo the opinion of Solomon. Better is he then both they, which hath not yet been;* The words, ſaith he, *do clearly ſhew that Solomon did thinke it better to be dead and deprived of being, then to be oppreſſed of the mighty, and to have no comforters, that is then to have a miſerable and mournfull being.* Surely *Solomon* was not ignorant that of them that are dead there are two conditions; ſome in the ſtate of damnation; others in the ſtate of ſalvation. To be with God in the ſtate of ſalvation, we make no queſtion but that it is a better condition, then to be living here on the earth in the greateſt happineſſe that the world can affoord. But to be dead and in the ſtate of damnation, can it enter into the heart of any ſober Chriſtian, to believe that *Solomon* ever thought ſuch a condition to be better then to live here on earth, in the moſt afflicted condition that is incident to the ſonns of men? And doth this Authour well in coupling death with deprivation of being, as if every one, or any one that is dead, were deprived of being? Surely all the dead are not deprived of all kind of living. *For God is the Father of Abraham, Iſaak, and Jacob; And he is not the God of the dead but of the living.* Againe conſider who are more oppreſſed by the men of this world then the Children of God? For as our Saviour told his diſci-

Jo: 15. 19. ples *The world will love her own, but becauſe ye are not of the world, and I have choſen you out of the world, therefore the worla hateth you. All that will live godly in Chriſt Jeſus ſhall ſuffer perſecution*, ſaith *Paul, and through manifold temptations We muſt enter into the kingdome of God.* And our Saviour forewarned his diſciples, *Ye ſhall be hated of all men for my names ſake.* Now is it credible, that this Authour ſhould beleive or conceive that ever King *Solomon* was of ſuch an opinion, as to profeſſe, that it is better for the Children of God to be deprived of being then to live in oppreſſion? Conſider farther, the words cheifly pertinent to this Authours purpoſe alleaged out of King *Solomon* are theſe, *Better then they both is he which hath not yet been.* Now I preſume this is ſpoken not of ſuch an one, who as yet hath not been; though hereafter he ſhall be. For ſuch an one may be in as great oppreſſion when his time comes, as any other is, or hath been, amongſt thoſe that have lived before him: But rather of ſuch an one as never yet hath been, nor never ſhall be. Now judg whether this can admit any ſober ſenſe, unleſſe in a vulgar phraſe, according to the intemperate expreſſions which in time of oppreſſion are uttered by men, wherein as *Maldonat* obſerves, there is allwaies ſomething hyperbolicall, and ſuch as muſt not be examined according to the ſubtilty of the Schooles. For conſider, is there but one ſuch that never yet was, nor ever ſhall be; or are there many ſuch? If many ſuch, how come they to differ, who

Tuſculan, quaeſt. 5. have nothing wherein to differ? What a vaine imagination is it to talke of particulars that never had, or ſhall have exiſtence, to aſcribe unto them a better condition then is found in them, that have not being only but life alſo? We know *Cicero* hath profeſſed & that according to the opinion of Stoicks, that a vertuous man may deſcend into *Phallaris* his Bull without any deſtruction of his happy condition. I have conſulted *Solomo Jarhi* upon this place, and he tells us what he hath ſeen in the Jewes *Midrach*, namly, that there are 974 generations which have growen old and wrinckled from the creation, who yet never were created, and belike the Authours thereof conceive that *Solomon* ſpake of one of theſe. *Rabbi Aben Ezra*, propoſeth the queſtion, how can any better condition be ſaid to be unto him, who was never created. And his anſwer is, that we muſt not wonder at ſuch a ſpeech of *Solomon*; for ſuch ſpeeches have their courſe. בעבר קצר הלשון by reaſon of the ſhortneſſe or ſtreightnes of the languages; and therefore we muſt expreſſe our ſelves figuratively, and to ſpeake hyperbollically is to ſpeake figuratively. I betake me to *Mercer* hereupon to acquaint my ſelfe with his judgment upon this place. *Hoc autem dicitur*; ſaith he, *ſemper magnitudine ærumnarum hujus vitæ conſiderata. Cæterum Chriſtus aliâ ratione habitâ beatos pronunciat, qui perſecutionem patiuntur propter juſtitiam maximè & Dei nomen; quia ſpiritualia & cœleſtia conſiderat repoſitam illis coronam gloriæ in futurum. Noſter Solomon externa tantum & præſentis vitæ incommoda pexpendit quæ vere hydra eſt. Thus he ſpeakes allwaies having his eyes fixt upon the greatneſſe of the miſeries of this life, but Chriſt in an other reſpect pronounceth them bleſſed who ſuffer perſecution for righteouſnes ſake, eſpecially and for the cauſe of God, becauſe he conſiders ſpirituall and heavenly things, the Crowne of Glory laid up for them againſt the time to come. Our Solomon conſiders only outward things and the incommodities of this life preſent, which indeed is as it were a Serpent with ſeven heads.* This is the firſt expreſſion of *Mercer* in his interpretation of this place, which is as much as to ſay, that, *Solomon* ſpeakes herein according to the judgment of a naturall man. But

Mercer

Mercer hath yet a farther reach then this, which followeth by way of instance or exemplification thus, *Si enim earum ratio habeatur ab eo qui illas perfert, mortem peroptat, aut etiam nunquam fuisse. For when he that suffers these miseries shall consider the weight & heavines of thē he wil be ready to wish he were dead, or that he had never been*; &no marvaile: For as *Maldonat* observeth, even holy men of God such as *Job* & *Jeremy*, have broken forth into such imprecations, *judicio dolore corrupto*, as he speakes, *the pain which they suffer corrupting their judgment*, this is to speake not only according to the judgment of a naturall man, but according to the judgmēt of a man himselfe that suffers such miseries. Furthermore *Mercer* taketh notice of the School-mens discourses to the contrary, *juxta Scholarum subtilitatem, according to accurate judgmment*, as *Maldonat* speaketh. *Sophisticantur nostrorum nonnulli, præstare adhuc malè esse, quàm omnino non esse. Some of ours dispute that it is better to be in* an *ill case, then to have no being at all.* Now doth *Mercer* oppose this? Nothing lesse he rather admits it, and without contradiction thereunto, proceeds in his interpretation. *Sed ut ut sit, vis malorū consideratur. But howsoever that be, the force of the evill is considered*, to wit, as before hath been shewed. 1. As in the judgment of a naturall man looking no farther then to the evills of this world. And 2ly, according to the sense & judgment of him that suffers them, *Quomodo & Christus dicebat de Judâ, melius fuerat homini illi si nunquam natus fuisset gravitatem prævidens tormentorum illius. After which manner Christ sayd of Judas, It had been better for that man if he had never been borne, foreseeing the greivousnesse of his torments.* The Antient *Greeks* and *Latines* used the like proverbe, *Optimum non nasci, aut ubi natus sis, quàm ocyssime aboleri. Græcum epigramma inquit*

Ἦν ἄρα τῶν δυοῖν ἐνὸς αἱρεῖσθαι, ἢ τὸ γενέσθαι
Μὴ ἔφυσαν, ἢ τὸ θανεῖν αὐτίκα πεπύσθαι.

The best condition was not to be borne; the next to dye soonest. Such were the conceits of naturall men in consideration of the evills of this world. And *Cicero* is full of such passages in the first of his *Tusculans* questions. In the last place I meet with a faire translation of this passage of *Solomon* in *Piscator*, who sets his translation on the other side to the translatiōns of *Junius*, & thus it runnes. *Sed beatiorē utriq; judicabam eū, qui non videt facta ista mala quæ fiunt sub sole. But more hapy then both I judged him that hath not seen the evill workes that are done under the Sun.* For albeit in the Hebrew something more there is, which is not here expressed, to wit, *which hath not been.* Yet he conceives the last words to contain the full sense of them; and therefore he interprets these words of those who have perished in their Mothers wombe, or in their infancy or childhood, not of those who never had any being, perceiving manifestly the foule absurdity of such a speech according to accurate calculation. And *Mercer* himselfe professeth that both these expressions are of the same force in *Solomon*, and so that is more plainly set downe in the latter, which is more obscurely expressed in the former, which is a very usuall course in Scripture.

To this assenteth Sir *Francis Bacon* in his Colours of good and evill; where against this Mathematicall position (as he calls it) that there is no proportion between something and nothing, and that therefore the degree of privation seemeth greater then the degree of diminution; he excepteth that it is false in sundry cases, and among the rest in this; namely, when the degree of diminution is more sensitive then the degree of privation. In this case a totall privatiō is much better then a diminution. Hence these usuall formes of speech. *Better eye out the alwaies akeing. Make or mar &c.* Some evills or paines (perhaps) either for their lightnes because they may be well endured; or for their shortnes, because they are quickly over, are lesse then resolution into nothing. And a man had better for a while indure them, then loose his being to be rid of them: because his being may afford him presently, or afterward such and so many desirable good things, as will more then recompence his paines. But when his paines are so many and violent, that they leave him no other good then a poore being, or so pinch him, that he cannot enjoy or joy in the goods that remaine, it were a thousand times better for him to have no being; and such are the paines of hell, which for their greatnesse are infinite, producing many miserable weepings and wailings & gnashing of teeth all symptomes of intolerable greifes, and for their length eternall. The worme never dieth, the fire is never quenched but the breath of the Lord as a river of brimstone doth kindle it for ever. And therefore it is incomparably better to cease to be, then to live in those torments, which cannot be equalled by any good, which a being can make us capable of, much lesse by that poore little entitative good, which is all the good the damned injoy in hell. *M. Mason's Addit. p. 22.23.24*

This Sophisticall evasion therefore and all others of the like sort notwithstanding, I doubt not, but I may safely say, that the unavoidable damnation of so many millions, cannot be absolutely and antecedently intended by God, without the greatest injustice & cruelty which may in no wise be imputed unto God. *Plutarch* speaking of the Pagans, who to pacifie the anger of their gods, did sacrifice to them men and women; it had been much better with *Diagoras* and his fellowes to deny the being of a God, then confessing a God to thinke he delights in the bloud of men. How much rather may we say it were better to be an Atheist and deny God, then to believe or report him to be a devourer of the Soules of men? The like argument is pressed by *Eusebius* against those cruell and merciles gods of the Pagans, doubtles, saith he, if there were any foot-step or sparke of goodnes in them for which they might deserve to be called good, they would be disposed to doe good, and desirous to save all men, they would love justice and take a care of men. And being such how could they delight in their slaughter &c. Yea he concludeth that they were devills or evill spirits; and not Gods or good spirits, because if they were good they would doe good; whereas those that are evill use to doe hurt. I will therefore shut up my first reason with the speech of *Prosper, God indeed is the Creator of all men, but yet of no man for this end, that he might be damned; the reason why we are created is one, and why we are damned another.*

Answer. The Authority of S. Francis Bacon is most aliene from the present purpose, according to the instance given by him, which is onely of a destruction of a member, as *Better eye out then allwayes akeing*. Yet this holdes not, save of such an akeing, as is more evill and dangerous, then the sight is beneficiall, but we speake of the universall destruction of the creature. The same appeares by the generality of the exception given, as in case *the decree of diminution be more sensible* (for so I conceive it should be, and not sensitive) *then the decree of privation*. Whereby it is manifest that he speakes of such a privation whereof the creature is sensible, though sensible with lesse smart and paine then the decree of diminnion. Otherwise if it be taken in comparison of no sense of the one, and some sense of the other, it would follow herehence that death is to be preferred before a paine: For every man is sensitive of the one, no man is sensitive of the other. I desire no fairer way to come to an issue in this particular, then that which is here proposed by this Author. He grants that *some evil & pains, either for lightnes or shortnes are lesse then resolution into nothing*. Yet with a perhaps only. As if by reason of a pain in his back, he were in doubt to resolve whether it were better for him to be turned into nothing, then to endure it. Is this man yet resolved whether it be better for him to suffer Martyrdome for Christ, then to be (I do not say resolved; for as I know no composition of nothing; so neither do I know any resolution into nothing) turned into nothing? It is not credibile: How then cões in this parenthesis of a *perhaps*, was it to set a good face upon his argumẽt? or was it because he saw the dangerous consequence of this his concession, being direct & absolute? For I find him more cunning then solid throughout like a crafty Crowder. For seing himselfe cõfesseth that some pains & Sorrows are willingly to be suffered by every reasonable man, rather then that he should be turned into nothing. Let us divide the latitude of pains & sorrows into a thousand degrees, if he think good: And then let him set down unto us at which degree it begins to make a mã more miserable, thẽ to be turned into nothing. In like manner as touching the durance of these sorrows; if he sayth that the suffering of hell pains for an hour, for a day, for a year doth not make a mã worse, thẽ to be turned into nothing. Let him define ũto us where that proportiõ of time in suffering hell begins, which makes a mã more miserable thẽ to be turned into nothing. Divers Divines maintain that Christ suffered hel pains for us: Wil this Author say that this made him more miserable thẽ to be turned into nothing? Had he suffered thẽ to this very day, what helhound wil dare to say it had been better for him to be turned into nothing? If S. Austin prayed, *Da Domine quod jubes & jube quod vis. Lord give me grace to do what thou cõmãdest, & thẽ cõmand what thou wilt.* (Pelagius spighted *Austin* for this.) May we not in like mãner pray Lord give us grace to bear what thou layest upon us, & then lay upon us what thou wilt? Nay is it not *Austins* profession that the punishẽnt of infants dying in Originall sin is *mitissima* & such as they thẽselves would not choose to be turned into nothing, to be freed frõ it? And is it not in the power of God to give a mã strength to bear the very pains of hel & that without sin? Did not Christ suffer thẽ without sin, even such sorrows as the Greek Church professed in their Liturgy to be *unknown sorrows*, as Bishop *Andrews* sometims observed in a passiõ sermõ of his? And if it be in the power of God to inable a mã to bear the pains of hel for an hour, a day, a year; is it not in his power to enable thẽ to hold out in suffering thẽ, & that without sin for the space of ten thousand years, & that in *infinitũ*? Again al this while this Author tak s no notice of the misery of sin, which *Arminius* (his wel beloved) professeth to be greater thẽ the misery of punishẽnt. And he gives his reason for it, becuse *illud bono divino, hoc humano oppositũ est. That is oppositto a divine, this to ã humane good?* Wil he say that it is better for a mã to be turned into nothing, then to rob, steale, take the nãe of God in vain, profane the Lords sabbath, to ly with another mans wife, to oppose truth against his knowledge & cõscience? If this be his opiniõ can he plead the cõmon consent of the world, or the cõmõ sense of mã for this? See by the way how he vilifies the being of mã which he calls *a poore little entitative good* God looked upon al things that he had made, *& behold they were very good*, not the least fly, or ẽmet, or worm is excepted frõ the cõmendatiõ, yet mã was made after the Image & likenes of God. In other creatures are foũd *vestigia Dei*, foot steps of God, as Martin Luther observes out of the Antients, but mã is *Imago Dei* the very Image of God; Yet this Author cals it a poor little ẽtitative good; & barely sayth it, & when he hath done, wipes his lipps frõ al sophisticatiõ, & claps that upon the back of his adversaries very authoritatively. Then the question is only of *Miseria pœnæ*, whether it makes a mã worse then annihilatiõ, not in a cõplicate condition with sin, which is the condition of the dãned. Yet thus he carrieth it to serve his turn; whereas in *Arminius* his opinion, the sinfull condition of the dãned, makes them more miserable then thir torments. But if the torments of hell in thẽselves are able to make a man in a worse condition then to be turned into nothing, then an holy Angell or Saint should choose rather to be turned into nothing, thẽ to suffer the torẽnts of hell. And the Schoole divines dispute severally of the misery of sinne, and the misery of torẽnt, & that with such different resolutions upon the point, as to maintaine, that albeit the misery of torment is not so bad as utter ãnihilation, yet the misery of sinne, is. Yet therein I willingly professe I am not of their mind. For

Observe

Exam. Præd. St. Perk. p. 103.

what?

what? are not the Children of God ſinners? Now what ſober Chriſtian will affirme, that it were better for them to be annihilated, then to be ſinners. If you ſay, therefore it is not better for God's children to be annihilated then to be ſinners; becauſe they are not only ſinners, but they are in the ſtate of grace. I proceed farther, and demand whether God's Elect before their calling, being yet in the ſtate of ſin, as *Manaſſes* and *Saul* before their vocation, were better to be annihilated, then to be as they are. What if I am a ſinner, yet while I have any being I may mourne for my ſinne, I may ſerve God, I may enjoy his favour in the pardoning of my ſinne, is not this a better condition then not to be, which is a condition conjunct as well with the deſtruction of ſanctity as of ſinne?

But the former argument, which he takes ſo much paines to enervate, he calls a ſophiſticall evaſion, and addes that ſo are all others of the like ſort, very magiſterially and reſolutely. But what thoſe others are he doth not ſo much as name. Not ſo much as one of *Auſtin's*, whoſe diſcourſe alone I propoſed on this point; together with an argument of *Durand's*, neither of all which doth he touch, yet I am the marke ſet up by him to ſhoote at, not *Durand*, not any one of the School-men, not *Auſtin* whoſe diſcourſes alone I propoſed. And as for the argument here mentioned, *melius eſt eſſe, quam non eſſe; It is better to be then to have no being, therefore it is better to be in hell torment then not to be.* This is neither argument, nor any of thoſe that I propoſed out of *Durand* and *Auſtin*. *Durand's* argument is, *To be annihilated is an univerſall deſtruction of man's nature, not only of his well being, but of being: but hell paines is the deſtruction only of his well being not of his being.* Neither is it anſwerable to the argument formerly mentioned by him *p.* 19. which was this. *He that wants a being enjoyeth no good, but he that is tormented in hell hath a being, and by conſequence ſome thing that is good.* Now this argument cometh nereſt to *Maldonats* diſcourſe upon that of our Saviour, ſpeaking of *Judas. It had been good for that man he had not been borne.* *Mat.* 26.24. Some, ſaith he, *diſpute ſubtilly more then enough, how it could be better for Judas, not to have been; whereas not to be is no good, to be damned is ſome good. For he that is damned is ſomewhat; And every thing that is, as it hath a being, is good.* And we know that man's being is no common good but a ſpeciall one, as being made after God's owne Image and likeneſſe. And looke with what judgment this Author extenuates, *being humane*, calling it a poore, little entitative good; with the ſame judgment he might extenuate Angelicall being. For even among Angells ſome have their portion in hell fire. But now he comes to his firſt propoſition, *that unavoidable damnation of ſo many millions can not be abſolutely and antecedently intended by God, without the greateſt injuſtice and cruelty.* The queſtion is of the ſuffering of hell paines, whether it be worſe then to be annihilated? This Authour runnes upon the terme damnation, which is a civill and judiciall act. Is there no difference between theſe? They that ſay Chriſt ſufferd the paines of hell, doe they ſay Chriſt was damned? Then to ſpeake with a fuller mouth he puts in the damnation of ſo many millions, whereas if the damnation of one may be intended by God without injuſtice after what manner ſoever, undoubtedly the damnation of never ſo many millions may. Then he helps himſelfe with the Epithite of *unavoidable* added to damnation, and the terme *abſolutely* affixed to God's intention, to no purpoſe that I know, but to abuſe himſelfe and others by confuſion; for feare leaſt the truth ſhould break forth to their conviction. To intend damnation *avoidable*, what is it but to intend it conditionally: And to intend damnation not abſolutely, is all one with to intend it conditionally. Now to intend the damnation of any man conditionally is with this Author as much, to intend his ſalvation as his damnation. Yet this he calls the intention of damnation. And *Bradwardine* hath long agoe maintained and demonſtated by evidence of reaſon, that there is no conditionate will of God: And this Authour will not ſay (I ſuppoſe) that God did intend that Chriſt ſhould ſuffer hell paines conditionately, or that if he did intend it abſolutely, he was unjuſt in ſo doing. Now both D. *Jackſon* expreſly confeſſeth, that the diſtinction of *will antecedent and conſequent in God*, is to be underſtood, not as *touching the act of willing, but as touching the thing willed.* And *Gerardus Voſſius* acknowledgeth that after the ſame manner muſt the conditionate will, which is aſcribed unto God, be interpreted. Now we willingly confeſſe that the thing willed and intended by God to Reprobates, namely, damnation, befalls none, but in caſe they dye in ſinne without repentance. And as already I have ſhewed not any of our Divines maintaine that God intended to damne any man but for ſinne. Only the maine point of difference between us is, as touching the conferring & denying grace, even the grace of regeneration, the grace of faith and repentance. Herein we willingly confeſſe that God carrieth himſelfe merely according to the pleaſure of his own will, according to that of the Apoſtle, *He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth.* Now on this point this Authour keeps himſelfe cloſe, and

earthes himſelfe within his own concealements, leſt he ſhould betray the bitter Leven of *Pelagianiſme*, in maintaining that *grace is conferred according unto workes*, which cannot be avoided by him, if once he comes to deale on this Argument. He thinks he hath great advantage in the point of Reprobation, and very free he is here, but declines the point of election, and point of conferring grace, which argueth a naughty diſpoſition, practiſing by indirect courſes to circumvent and ſuppreſſe the truth, rather then conferre any thing for the clearing of it: yet ſee his confuſed carriage in the very point. For when he ſpeakes of damnation avoidable and unavoidable, he takes no paines to manifeſt in what ſenſe he takes it to be avoidable; as whether by power of nature, or power of grace. Is it his meaning that any man's damnation is avoidable by grace? We deny it not. Or is it his meaning that it is avoidable by nature? we utterly deny this. But this man counts it his wiſedome not to ſpeake diſtinctly, but worke his advantage upon confuſion of things that differ; but let all ſuch take heed, leaſt utter confuſion be their end. But if it be his meaning that all men have power to avoid damnation if they will; to wit, in as much as they have power to beleive if they will, to repent if they will: I would he would deale fairely once, and come to this. The Scripture is expreſſe, *That they that are in the fleſh cannot pleaſe God, that the naturall man diſcerneth not the things of God, that they are fooliſhneſſe unto him, neither can he know them becauſe they are ſpiritually diſcerned.* That, *they cannot beleive, cannot repent.* Of the Children of Iſrael in the wilderneſſe that, *God had not given them eyes to ſee, eares to heare, nor hearts to perceive* fourty yeares. And truely we take faith and repentance to be the guift of God. And the habits of them not to be a power to beleive and repent if a man would, but an habituall and morall inclination of them to believe, to repent. And habits (as it was wont to be ſaid) *Agunt ad modum naturæ, doe worke after the manner of nature.* And it is very ſtrang that ſupernaturall grace ſhould not. And long agoe I have learnt in *Auſtin*, that to doe good, and obey God if a man will, is rather nature then grace. For the will alone is all in all as touching acts morall, good or evill; and till the will be changed, we are as farre off as ever, from performing any thing that is pleaſing in the ſight of God. This is the peculiar glory of God's grace, *To make us perfect to every good worke, and to worke in us that wich is pleaſing in his ſight through Jeſus Chriſt*, and this he doth *according to his good pleaſure.* For grace is not conferred according unto workes. That was condemned as a peſtilent doctrine long agoe in the *Synod* of *Paleſtine*, and all along in divers Councells againſt the *Pelagians*. How gladly ſhould I imbrace any delineation of this Authours opinion in the point of grace and free will, the rather, becauſe I ſeem to ſmell who he is by this which followeth. For I remember ſometime under whoſe hand I read it; namely, that, *Plutarch ſpeaking of the Pagans, who to pacifie the anger of their gods, did ſacrifice to them men and women*, ſhould ſay, *It had been much better with Diagoras and his fellowes to deny the being of a God, then confeſſing a God, to think he delights in the blood of men.* But allbeit this ſupercilious and confident profeſſor be of *Plutarch's* mind in this, I willingly profeſſe I am not. I know no naturall reaſon why he ſhould delight more or leſſe in the bloud of beaſts, then in the bloud of men. Only it pleaſed him by the bloud of Bulls and Goats to repreſent the delight he took in the ſatisfaction made in the blood of his own Sonne. We know in what errand the Lord ſent *Abraham* three dayes journey, namely, to ſacrifice his Sonne upon mount *Moriah*; had not God hindred him it had been done; *Abraham* knew no other but that it ſhould be done, when he anſwered his Sonne ſaying, *My God will provide himſelfe of a burnt offering.* *Abraham* did not break forth in this man's language, to ſay he would rather deny there was any God, then believe he delights in bloud; neither had he delighted in bloud, though *Iſaak* had been ſacrificed, but in the obedience of his ſervants. Nor had *Iſaack* received any loſſe by this. For *Abraham* knew that God was able to raiſe him from the dead. Did not *Samſon* ſacrifice himſelfe. Chriſt was content to ſhed his precious bloud for us, and we by his grace ſhall be content to ſhed our bloud for him, & that according to his good will and pleaſure. Let heathens thus diſcourſe who are nothing acquainted with the powers of the world to come; but a foule ſhame it is for Chriſtians to comply with them. But, *how much rather*, ſaith this Authour, *may we ſay it were better to be an Atheiſt, then to beleive or report him to be a devourer of the ſoules of men.* Yet I cannot be perſwaded it is better to be an *Atheiſt* then to belive even this. For I muſt not give ground to a confident *Theologue* for his bare proteſtation ſake. What is it I pray for God to be a devourer of the ſoules of men? Is it any other then to be a tormenter of of them in hell fire? Now doth not this man believe that God deals ſo with millions of ſoules? Doth not he profeſſe, that, *the breath of the Lord as a river of brimſtone doth kindle that fire?* what *out recuydance* hath poſ-

Rom. 8. 1 *Cor.* 2. 14. *Joh.* 12. *Rom.* 2 *Deut.* 29. 34. *Phil.* 1. 29. *Eph.* 2. 8. *Acts.* 18. 11. 1 *Tim.* 2 25. *Heb.* 13. 21. *Phil.* 3. 13. *Gen.* 22.

ſeſt

ſeſt the ſpirit of this *Cavaliere* that he ſhould flaunt it to the world in this manner? It ſeemes his atcheivements known ſo well to the world have puft him up, that he ſwells with the conceit of it: And 'tis enough for him now to brave it with proteſtations inſteed of arguments, wherein having known him ſo well heretofore, I cannot but wonder at the poverty of his ſpirit; he will battle ſo long upon his credit and reputation with the world, that it will crack at length; and he ptove bankrupt: So that proteſt what he will no man will truſt him for a groat. Now in that manuſcript of his, which it was my hap ſometime to have a view of, his proteſtation upon the book of that ſaying of *Plutarch* was ſomewhat different, thus. *I proteſt unto you, I think it was leſſe diſhonourable to the bleſſed Trinity to ſay with the Atheiſt there is no God, then to forme ſuch a God, as the decree of Reprobation maintained by the Contraremonſtrants, maketh him to be.* This proteſtation though it had courſe in private, yet here it is changed that it might not ſee the light of the Preſſe. For it is well known that this toucheth nearely a whole *Synod* of the Church reformed; and that countenanced by King *James* and divers worthy Divines of this Kingdome ſubſcribing to it, ſome yet living, and two of them in *Apice Epiſcopali, in Epiſcopall dignity*. Yet what is that doctrine of the *Contraremonſtrants* that he pincheth upon? It is well knowne that their generall tenet is that God ordaines no man to damnation but for ſinne; ſome difference there hath been, and is about the ordering of God's decrees, which is merely *apex Logicus*, & what my opinion is thereabouts is well known; namely that in no moment of time or reaſon doth God ordaine any man to damnation, before the conſideration of ſinne, more particularly thus; that all beſides the Elect, God hath ordained to bring them forth into the world in their corrupt maſſe, and to permit them to their ſelves, to go on in their own waies, and ſo finally to perſevere in ſinne, and laſtly to damne them for their ſinne, for the manifeſtation of the Glory of his Juſtice on them, & of the greater mercy on the veſſells of mercy, whom he hath prepared unto glory; inaſmuch as he hath of his free grace provided better for them, then for millions of others. Only as touching the grace of regeneration, of faith and of repentance; he did not only ordaine of his mere pleaſure to beſtow that on his Elect, and not on Reprobates; but in time he doth of his mere pleaſure conferre that grace on ſome; denying it to others. This doctrine is ſo diſhonourable to the *Trinity* in this Authors judgment, as that to deny there is any God at all, he thinks to be leſſe diſhonourable: A prodigious aſſertion! We have the leſſe cauſe to be moved, when he preferred the annihilation of our natures, before the ſuffering of hell paines. When he ſeemes to preferre the annihilating of the bleſſed Trinity, before the renouncing of his own vile fancies. As for that of *Euſebius*, true it is, the god's of Paynims ſought only the deſtruction of thoſe that ſerved them, and that not of their bodyes but their ſoules alſo. The true God put *Abraham* once upon the ſacrificing of his Son, for the tryall of his faith and obedience, but perceiving his obſequious readineſſe, took a courſe to reſtraine him. Of him it it is true, *He ſaveth both man and beaſt, and the eyes of all doe wait upon him, and he gives them meat in due ſeaſon, he heareth the cry of Ravens, and not a ſparrow lights upon the ground without his providence; The very Lyons roaring after their prey do ſeek their meat at (the hands of) God.* Yet if he be pleaſed to ſave our ſoules, we have reaſon to ſubmit unto him in doing what he will with our bodies, which yet one day he will raiſe, glorious bodyes, when mortality ſhall be ſwallowed up of life. We acknowledge no other end of man's creation, and of all other Divine Acts of God, but his own glory. For even there where *Solomon* profeſſeth, *God hath made even the wicked againſt the day of evill*, he withall acknowledgeth, that both them and all things, *he hath made for himſelfe*. God of his mere pleaſure created all, but of his mere pleaſure he damneth none. But every one that is damned is damned for his ſin, & that willfully committed & contumaciouſly continued by them that come to ripe yeares. For as *Auſtin* ſaith *Libertas ſine gratiâ non eſt libertas, ſed contumacia: Liberty without grace, is not liberty, but willfullneſſe or contumacy*. I come to the ſecond part of his firſt argument.

M. Maſon's Addit. p. 24. 25.

The ſecond part of the Argument. Sect. 1.

Secondly, this opinion chargeth God with mens ſinnes on earth, and makes him the Authour, not of the ſinne only that entred by *Adam* into the world, but of all other ſinnes, that have been, are, or ſhall be committed to the worlds end. No murthers, robberies, rapes, adulteries, inſurrections, treaſons, blaſphemies, perſecutions, or any other abominations whatſoever fall out at any time, or in any place, but they are the neceſſary productions of God Almightys decrees. The Scripture I am ſure teaches us another leſſon. *Thou art not a God, ſaith David that haſt pleaſure in wickedneſſe.* And the Prophet *Eſay* tells the people, that *when they did evill in the ſight of the Lord, they did chooſe the things which he would not. Let no man ſay when he is tempted I am tempted of God. For God cannot be tempted with evill, neither tempteth he any man; but every man is tempted when*

Pſal. 5. 4. Eſ. 66. 4. Jam. 1. 13. 14

he is drawen away with his own concupiſcence. And *St. John* when he had referred all the ſinnes of the world to
1 Jo: 2. 16. three heads, *the luſt of the fleſh, the luſt of the eyes, and the pride of life*; tells us that, *they are not of the Father, but of the world.* To which ſpeeches let me adde the ſpeech of *Siracides* (though not of the ſame authority.) *Say not*
Eccluſ. 15. 12. *thou it is through the Lord that I fell away; for thou oughteſt not to do the things that he hateth. Say not thou he hath cauſed me to erre; for he hath no need of the ſinfull man.*

2. Pious antiquity hath conſtantly ſayd the ſame, and preſt it with ſundry reaſons; ſome of which are theſe as follow. If God be the Authour of ſinne, then he is worſe then the Devill; becauſe the devill doth only
Proſper reſp. ad Obiect. 11. Vincent. tempt and perſwade to ſinne, and his action may be reſiſted, but God, by this opinion, doth will and procure by a powerfull and *effectuall* decree, which cannot be reſiſted. This is *Proſpers* argument, who to ſome objecting that by St. *Auſtin's* doctrine, *when Fathers defile their own Daughters, and Mothers their own Sonnes, Servants murther their maſters, & men commit any horrible villanies, it cometh to paſſe becauſe God hath ſo decreed.* Anſwereth that if this were layd to the Devills charge, he might in ſome ſort cleare himſelfe of the imputation. *Quia etſi delectatus eſt furore peccantium, probaret tamen ſe non imuliſſe tam criminum. Becauſe though he be delighted with man's ſinnes, yet he doth not, he cannot compell men to ſinne:* What a madneſſe therefore is it to impute that to God which cannot be juſtly fathered upon the Divell.

Reſp. Obi. 4. Vincent l. 1. ad Monim. c. 19. l. 2. cont. Marcion. c. 9 2. He cannot be a puniſher of ſinne: For none can juſtly puniſh thoſe offences of which they are the Authors. This is *Proſpers* argument too. It is againſt reaſon to ſay that he wich is the damner of the Devill would have any one to be the devills Servant. This reaſon *Fulgentius* uſeth likewiſe *illius rei Deus ultor eſt, cujus Author non eſt. Tertullian* alſo before them hath ſayd. *He is not to be accounted the Author of ſinne, who is the forbidder yea and the condemner of it.*

Baſil. Homil. Quod Deus non eſt &c. 3. He cannot be God, becauſe he ſhould not be juſt, nor holy, nor the Judge of the world, all properties eſſentiall to God. And this is *Baſil's* reaſon, who hath written a whole Homily againſt this wicked aſſertion. It is all one (ſaith he) to ſay that God is the Author of ſinne, and to ſay he is not God.

3 Upon theſe and the like conſiderations I may well conclude, that, the opinion which chargeth God with the ſinnes of men, is neither good nor true.

Anſwer. It is firſt layd to the charg of our Divines that by this their opinion, *they make God the Authour of ſinne; not of the firſt only that entred by Adam into the world, but of all other ſinnes, that have been, are, or ſhall be committed in the world, as murthers, robberies, rapes, adulteries, inſurrections, treaſons, blaſphemies, hereſies, perſecutions, or any other abominatiõs.* But in all theſe waſtfull diſcourſes not a word of proofe. The charge is made in the firſt place, the proofe laſt. All that he labours to prove here is, that God is not the Author of ſinne. *Bellarmine* hath beſtowed, or rather caſt away a whole book on this crimination, to him *Arminius* referrs *Perkins*, telling him that he ſhould have anſwered *Bellarmine*. I have taken ſome paines to performe that taske upon that motion of *Arminius*. I would I could receive from this Authour a reply to any materiall particular thereof, the rather becauſe I underſtand in part his Zeale for *Bellarmine* in his age, correcting the harſh exceptions he hath made againſt him in his younger dayes. And let every indifferent Reader compare this Authors diſcourſe, with that diſcourſe of *Bellarmine*, and judge indifferently what an hungry peece this is in compariſon to that of *Bellarmines*; And whether his paines had not been better beſtowed in replying upõ my anſwer thereunto, then to adde ſuch ſcraps as theſe to that full table of *Bellarmin's* proviſion; and whether theſe deſerve any anſwer, that whole diſcourſe of *Bellarmine* being refuted throughout. *Bradwardine* diſputes the queſtion, *Si & quomodo Deus vult & non vult peccatum.* I ſay he diſputes it indifferently on both ſides; and let every Schollar judge and weigh, whether it be not a very ponderous argument, and conſider well his reſolution, and where he differrs any thing from our Divines in this *Calvin* obſerving how frequent the Scripture is in teſtifying God's hand to be operative in abominable courſes, thereupon writes a Treatiſe. *De occultâ Dei providentiâ in malo*; in all which he exactly conformes himſelfe to Scripture expreſſions. And theſe and ſuch like vile Criminators may as well taxe God's word for making God the Author of ſinne, as *Calvin*; who moſt accurately conformes himſelfe to the teſtimonies of Divine Scripture. I remember to have heard a diſputation ſometimes at *Heidelberge* on this Argument, where *Copenius* the Preſident or Moderator made manifeſt, that look upon what grounds they criminated *Calvin* for making God the Authour of ſinne; upon the ſame grounds they might criminate the very word of God to make him the Author of ſinne. For *Calvine* throughout in his expreſſions conformes himſelfe to the language of the holy Ghoſt. Yet, what one of our divines can he produce, affirming that, *God takes pleaſure in ſinne. Piſcator* confeſſeth that, *God taketh no pleaſure in the death of him that dyeth*, upon that place in *Ezechiel*; how much leſſe *in wickedneſſe*. And he illuſtrates it in this manner: For albeit it cannot be denyed, but that God willeth the death of him that dyeth. *For he is the God to whom vengeance belongeth*; yet he takes no pleaſure in it. Like as a ſick-man would be content to take a bitter potion for the recovery of his health; yet he takes no pleaſure in that bitter cup. And in like manner, albeit, *God hardened Pharaoh's heart that he ſhould not let Iſrael goe*; and as the Apoſtle ſpeaks, *hardeneth whom he will.* Whereby it comes topaſſe infallibly that they doe not obey the Goſpell, as appeareth by the objection following.

Why

Why then doth he complaine. For who hath reſiſted his will? And albeit the Saints of God expoſtulate with him in this manner; *Why haſt thou cauſed us to erre from thy wayes, and hardened our hearts againſt thy feare?* Yet we know that God takes no pleaſure in diſobedience, or in the hardneſſe of any mans heart, nor can be the Authour of evill, with Sir Francis Bacons diſtinction in the booke formerly mentioned by this Authour. *Non quià non Author, ſed quià non mali.* So that albeit he hardens whom he will unto diſobedience, & in the prophet *Eſayes* phraſe *cauſeth men to erre from his wayes.* Yet the Lord himſelfe we know *is righteous in all his wayes, & holy in all his workes*, though we are not able to dive into the gulfe, and ſearch out the bottome of his judgments, and no marvaile. *For they are unſearchable*; Yet we make no queſtion but through Gods mercy convenient ſatisfaction may be found without any ſuch ſhæfull courſe of diſmembring ſcripture, and taking notice only of ſuch paſſages as repreſent Gods diſpleaſure againſt ſin & ſinners, and diſſembling all other paſſages which drave Auſtin to confeſſe, *occulto Dei judicio*, by the ſecret judgement of God, *fieri perverſitatem cordis, the perverſity of mans heart hath its courſe*, much leſſe by ſetting thē to gether by the eares. And I nothing doubt but the iſſue will be on the part of ſuch, as are of this Authours ſpirit, either wholly to deny originall ſin, or ſo to emaſculate the vigor of it, as to profeſſe that it is in the power of mā to cure it; or notwithſtāding the ſtrength of it, to beleive & repēt if he will; which though they pretēd to be wrought by a certain univerſal grace; Yet I nothing doubt but we ſhall be able to prove that ſuch a power is mere nature and no grace. Be it ſo that wicked men in their wicked courſes *do chooſe the things that God would not*, Who would thinke that this Author, who makes ſuch a floriſh ſhould content himſelfe with ſuch beggarly arguments; or that the world ſhould be ſo ſimple as to be terrifyed with ſuch ſcarcrowes? For is it not apparent that in ſcripture phraſe there is *voluntas præcepti*, a will of commandement, as well as *voluntas propoſiti*, a will ſignifying Gods purpoſe and decree? So thē though they chuſe the things that God willed not in reference to his will of commandement; yet it might be Gods will, that is his purpoſe that even ſuch ſinnes ſhould come to paſſe. For was it not the will of God that Pharaoh ſhould not let Iſrael goe for a while? Did he not harden him to this purpoſe that ſo he might make himſelfe knowne in the land of Egypt by his judgemēts? & did he not reveale this to *Moſes* to the cōfort of the childrē of Iſrael, & keepe thē from deſpaire in contēplation of the obſtinacy of Pharaoh's ſpirit, when they were aſſured that God had an hād in hardening Pharaoh to ſtād out? And doth not Bellarmine profeſſe that *malū fieri permitt ſin & Deo bonū eſt, it is good that evill ſhould cō to paſſe by Gods permiſſion?* And ſhall it be unbecōing the divine nature to will that which is good? And where is it that Bellarmine affirmeth this? even there where he oppoſeth the ſame Doctrine of ours which this Authour doth. but with more learning an 100 fold then this Authour betrayeth, and withall carryeth himſelfe with farre more ingenuity. For he takes notice of thoſe places of Scripture whereupon our Divines do build, and accommodates himſelfe to āſwer them by ſome intepretation that he thinks good to make of them, which this Authour doth not 2. But what if there be no ſuch text as this Authour builds upon? For looke what the word is, uſed in the originall *Pſ.* 5 4. the ſame is uſed *Eſ.* 66 4 Now that in *Pſ.* 5.4 This Authour renders not *that Wouldeſt not iniquity*, but *that haſt no pleaſure in iniquity*. And why then ſhall not that *Eſ.* 66. 4. be accordingly rendred thus. *They chooſe the things wherein I had no pleaſure, or Wherein I had no delight*, and not as he expreſſeth it *the things that I would not*. Hereupon I imagined our Enliſh tranſlation had thus rendred it, but conſulting that, I found the contrary. For thus they render it *They chooſe the things wherein I delighted not*. It is true the Geneva renders it thus: But doth it become him to preferre and follow the Geneva tranſlatiou before the laſt and moſt authenticall tranſlation of the Church of England? In like manner the practiſe of Geneva muſt be of authority to cry us downe in the point of the morality of the fourth commandement. Were not the man wel. knowne to be ſound at heart, his favourites might well ſuſpect him to prævaricate, in making ſo great a cry, and yet yeilding ſo little wooll. In the next place he alleadgeth that of *James. Let no man ſay when he is tempted that he is temptedof God. For God tempteth no man: But every man is tempted, when he is drawen away with his owne concupiſcence* Now *Peter* Martyr on the firſt to the Romans deales at large upon this place, and diſputes ſtrangely indiſcourſing of Gods providence in evill. I would this Authour had taken the paines to anſwer him at leaſt, that he might performe ſomewhat *tanto dignum hiatu, Worthy of the great gaping he makes.* It is true Bellarmine hath taken

Eſ. 63. 17.

Eſ. 63. 17. *Rom.* 11.

Aug: de grat: & lib: arbit.

Eſ. 66. 24.

Lib. 1. *de Amiſſ. gratia.*

Ja: 1. 13. 14.

taken him to taske after a ſort in his eigth chapter of his ſecond book *de Amiſſ. gratiæ & ſtatu peccati*. And I have replyed upon *Bellarmine* at large in my *Vindiciæ*, in that large digreſſion wherein I take *Bellarmine* to taske in that book of his, whereunto I referre the Reader. Yet to ſay ſomewhat of this place befor I paſſe. It is apparent that the Apoſtle in this place doth not ſo put off from God the workes of tempting as to caſt it upon Satan; but onely ſo as to ſhew, that whatſoever the divine providence is there about, either by the miniſtry of Satan (who is God's miniſter in hardening men to precipitate courſes (1 *Kings* the laſt), or otherwiſe, yet ſtill the ſinner is unexcuſable; for as much as he is then only tempted (*effectually*) For ſo it is to be underſtood; otherwiſe it were not true, as it appeares in the caſe of *Joſeph* tempted by his Miſtris) when *he is drawen away by his own concupiſcence*. It is true, *the luſt of the fleſh, the luſt of the eyes, and pride of life is not of the Father but of the world*, they are the members of that body of ſin which we brought with us into the world. This is propagated unto us all by naturall generation. Holy *Jacob* the Son of holy *Iſaak* a *Patriach*, & of holy *Rebeccah* a *Propheteſſe* was borne in ſin as well as *Eſau*; and *Seth* as well as *Cain*, and this ſeemeth to be called *the Image of Adam*, after his fall *Behold I was ſhapen in wickednеſſe*, ſayth *David*, *and in ſin hath my Mother conceived me. And except a man be borne againe he cannot ſee the kingdome of God*. This, though a myſtery, yet is nothing ſtrange to us, whom God in mercy hath reſerved unto theſe times of grace; But it was very ſtrange to *Nicodemus* a *Ruler in Iſrael*. This hath been the condition of man ever ſince the fall of *Adam*; and ariſing merely from the withdrawing of God's ſpirit from him, and that moſt juſtly upon their firſt ſin in taſting of the forbidden fruit. So that even this condition proceeded originally, as from the ſin of our firſt parents in the way of a meritorious cauſe, ſo from the juſt judgment of God taking his holy Spirit from him, which God was not bound to doe, as appeares by this, that by vertue of the Covenant of grace which he hath made with us in Chriſt, he doth not take his ſpirit from us, though too often we ſin againſt him. No not from *David*, notwithſtanding thoſe foule ſinnes committed by him, as appeares by his prayer unto God; that, *he would reſtore him to the joy of his ſalvation*, ſignifying thereby that he had loſt that. And that God would not take his holy Spirit from him, manifeſting hereby that ſtill he retained that. And conſidering that God proceeded with *Adam* herein in the way of judgment, *Auſtine* acknowledgeth *Concupiſcence* to be a puniſhment of ſinne, as well as ſin, and a cauſe of other ſinnes, in his fifth book againſt *Julian* the *Pelagian* cap. 3. As for that of *Siracides*, ſay not thou, *God hath cauſed me to erre*. As it is true that no man muſt caſt the blame of ſinning upon God, & think himſelfe blameleſſe: So it is as true that in conſideratiō of our own inability to ſtād of our ſelves & prones to fall (evē to fall away like water ſpilt upō the ground that cannot be recovered; containe it ſelfe it cannot, but it may eaſily be contained) the Church doth ſometimes expoſtulate with God (ſuch is the liberty and παῤῥησία which he vouchſafeth unto his Children) in an holy manner ſaying, *Wherefore haſt thou cauſed us to erre from thy waies, and hardened our hearts againſt thy feare*; Not that this he doth, *infundendo malitiam, by infuſing malice into them*, but, *non infundendo gratiam, by not infuſing ſuch grace into them, as to preſerve them from ſin* For as *Martha* ſaid unto *Jeſus*, *Lord if thou hadſt been here our brother Lazarus had not dyed*. So may we ſay if the ſtrēgth of thy grace had been operative in us, we had not ſined in this or that particular. It is true *God hath not need of the ſinfull mā*: much leſſe of his ſalvation or damnation. But if he will of mere pleaſure manifeſt his own glory, either in the way of mercy pardoning, or of juſtice puniſhing, he muſt permit ſin to enter into the world, & forbeare thāt providence whereby, as he did keep the Elect Angells, ſo he might have kept man alſo from ſinning. As for the reaſons of pious Antiquity to prove that God cannot be the Authour of ſin, they are very needeleſſe in this controverſy between us & our adverſaries, the queſtion between us not being thereabouts, but rather about the manner of God's providence. Our Adverſaries ſo denying him to be the Author of evill, as withall they deny him to be the Aurhour of any good in the actions of men. We on the contrary take care, ſo to maintaine that God is not the Author of ſinne, that withall we maintaine that he is the Author of all good, both morall and naturall, and much more ſupernaturall. Yet as I have conſidered the ſeven reaſons of *Bellarmine* to this purpoſe collected out of the Antients; ſo I am content to take into conſideration the three reaſons produced by this Author. 1. As touching the firſt to manifeſt how ſuperficiarily and abſurdly he carieth himſelfe therein, obſerve the wildneſſe of his reaſoning beſides all roles of ſobriety. *If God* (ſayth he) *be the Author of ſinne, then he is worſe then the Devill, becauſe the Devill doth only tempt and perſwade to ſinne, and his action may be reſiſted*

Col. 2.11. *Gen.*5.3. *Pſ.*51.5. *Joh.*3.11.

ſted. Let all the Univerſities of the world be judge between us of the ſhamefull irregularity of this diſcourſe. His ſyllogiſme is hypotheticall; for the firſt propoſition is hypotheticall and conditionall. Now all ſuch ſyllogiſmes by the rule of all Schooles muſt proceed either from the negation of the conſequent, to the negation of the antecedent; or from the affirmation of the antecedent, to the affirmation of the conſequent; but no ſuch proceſſe is made here. And indeed it ſhould be framed thus to inferre the propoſition undertaken to be proved. *If God be the Authour of ſin, then he is worſe then the Divell; but God is not worſe then the Divell; therefore he is not the Authour of ſin.* But this Authour diſputes after no ſuch manner. But his affection carrying him all along to caſt ſome foule aſperſion on our Doctrine in ſome particular or other, and being withall in heat of paſſion, he doth moſt ſhamefully involve and entangle himſelfe And indeed quite beſides his preſent purpoſe, he aimes only at this to prove that our doctrine concerning God's powerfull and effectuall decree, doth more make God the Authour of ſin then the Devill, which is utterly aliene from that he propoſed in this place. Yet I am willing to doe him this favour, to help a lame Dogge over the ſtile, and to expedite him in this Argument, whereof he cannot ſo dext'rouſly deliver himſelfe though quite beſides the purpoſe. Thus therefore the argument ſhould proceed according to his irregular intention. *If God doth will and procure ſins by a powerfull and effectuall decree, which cannot be reſiſted, then is God worſe then the Devill. But by the doctrine of our Divines God doth will and procure ſins by a powerfull and effectuall decree which cannot be reſiſted; therefore by the doctrine of our Divines, God is worſe then the Devill.* Thus have I endeavoured to bring this argument to ſome ſhape, which had no tolerable proportion before. Now let me ſhew the corrupt nature of it, that the Reader may diſcerne what ſpirit he breathes, that is the Authour of it in a mixture both of ignorance and abominable profanenes. And firſt I begin with the major propoſition. And here firſt let the Reader judge whether it be not this Authours opinion, that, God doth will *and procure ſin by ſome decree, though not by a powerfull and effectuall decree that cannot be reſiſted.* For otherwiſe did he acknowledge every will of God as it ſignifies his decree, to be *powerfull, and effectuall and irreſiſtable*, what need he cumber his Reader with ſuch unneceſſary Epithites, caſt in like lumber only to trouble the courſe of diſputation? Now if he grants that God doth will and decree ſin by a powerfull and effectuall decree. 1. He muſt contradict himſelfe. For formerly he cited, *Eſ.* 66. 4, to prove that men in wicked courſes, *doe chooſe the things that God would not.* 2. If God doth will it, but not by *a powerfull and effectuall, & irreſiſtable decree*, let him ſhew what that decree is, whereby he wills ſins. Now this is commonly accounted a decree conditionall; and let him ſpeak plainely then & tell us upon what condition it is that God doth will and procure ſin in the world, and I am verily perſwaded he is to ſeek what to anſwer. 3. If God doth will and decree it, it cannot be avoided, but it muſt be, by a powerfull and effectuall decree which cannot be reſiſted; ſeeing the Apoſtle ſaith plainly ſpeaking of his decree, that it *cannot be reſiſted.* Upon theſe conſiderations I am perſwaded, that this Authour doth utterly deny that God doth at all will ſin, or decree that any ſuch thing ſhall come to paſſe in the world; & that theſe attributes of *powerfull, and effectuall, & irreſiſtable*, are uſed by him not for diſtinction ſake, but meerly for amplification, that ſo he might ſpeake with a full mouth. Now having brought this Authour home to himſelfe, and delivering himſelfe and his meaning plainely, I am very willing to cope with him on this point. Yet what need I, having ſo fully diſputed the point in a certaine digreſſion in my *Vindiciæ lib.* 2. *Digrees.* 4. The title whereof is this, *Whether the holy one of Iſrael without any blot to his Majeſty may be ſaid to will ſin.* And forthwith I anſwer, that, *God may be ſaid thus farre to will ſin, in as much as he will have ſin to come to paſſe.* And for explication ſake it is added, that whereas God will have all the good things of the world, whether naturall, morall, or ſpirituall come to paſſe by his working of them: Only evill things he will have come to paſſe by his permitting them. But this Authour affects to worke upon the ignorant; and he doth not affect to trouble their braines with anſwering my reaſons, leaſt thereby he ſhould raiſe many ſpirits, and afterwards prove unable to lay them. And this diſcourſe of M. *Hord's* ſome of that ſect thought good to have it coppied out, and communicated to people in the Country, as accommodated to their capacities, and ſo more fit to promote their edificatiō in the plauſible way of *Arminian* religion: well therefore in the proofe of this tenet, namely, that God will have ſin come to paſſe by his permiſſion. I prove firſt by Scripture. *God hath put in their hearts* (that is in the hearts of the 10 Kings) *to fulfill his will.* Now marke what is the object of God's will, in the words following, *and to agree, and give their kingdōes unto the beaſt untill the words of God ſhall be fulfilled*: now by giving their Kingdomes unto the beaſt, is not to depoſe or dethrone themſelves, or to part with their Kingdomes, but only to ſubmit their regall authority to the executiō of the beaſts wrath

againſt the Saints of God. Like as in the dayes of Popery, when the Saints of God were by Popiſh Prelates condemned for hereſies, then they were delivered into the hands of the ſecular powers, the ſherifes to burne thē at a ſtake. Now this the holy Ghoſt makes the object of Gods will, and their agreement thus to execute the Popes Antichriſtian pleaſure is ſaid to be Gods worke. For God is ſaid to put it into their hearts to doe this evill of his.

1 *Pet.* 2. 8. Of diſobedient perſons the Apoſtle profeſſeth that *they are ordained to ſtūble at Gods word,*
2 *Theſ.* 2. 11. wherein undoubtedly they ſin. *Paul* likewiſe teſtified of ſome that *God ſends thē ſtrong de-*
Rom. 1. 24. *luſions, that they ſhould beleive a lye.* of others that *God gave them up to uncleanes through the luſts of their owne hearts to diſhonour their owne bodyes betweene thēſelves. And to a Reprobate mind, to do thoſe things which are not convenient.* Now let every ſober man judge whether when God blinded the eyes of the one and hardned the harts of the other, it were not his
Acts 4. 28. will, that thoſe foule things which were committed by them ſhould come to paſſe by his permiſſiō. Then conſider what the Apoſtles with one conſent teſtifie concerning thoſe abominable acts committed againſt the holy ſon of God, namely that both *Herod & Pontius Pilate with the Gentiles & people of Iſrael, were gathered together to doe what Gods hand & his coūſell had before determined to be done.* This the Apoſtles deliver to the very face of God in their prayers & holy meditatiōs. And let every Chriſtian conſider, whether if the Scripture had not made mention of this, & any one of us had uſed the like prayer & meditatiō, this Author & all that are of his ſpirit, would not have beene ready to ſpit in our faces & cry us downe for notorious blaſphemers. Yet the Apoſtles indued with the ſpirit of God feared not to be found guilty of violating the Lords holineſſe in all this. Hence I proceeded to the paſſages of the Old Teſtament for the confirmation of the ſame truth. As namely that whereas *the deſolatiō of the holy Land begun by the Aſſyrians, finiſhed by the Babylonians,* could not cōe to paſſe without many enormous ſins. Who can deny, that it was Gods will that theſe things ſhould come to paſſe, conſidering that *Aſſur* himſelf is acknowledged by God to be the *rod of his wrath and the ſtaffe of his indignation,* whom God would *ſend againſt an hypocriticall nation, & againſt the people of his wrath would he give him a charge to take the ſpoyle, & to take the prey, & to tread them downe like the mire in the ſtreets?* Hence I proceeded to ſhew how that it is Gods uſuall courſe to puniſh ſin with ſin. Now when God exerciſeth his judgments, ſhall not thoſe things juſtly be ſaid to come to paſſe by his will, which are puniſhments of foregoing ſinnes? See the judgment of God denounced againſt
Amos. 7. 16. 17. *Amaziah* the Preiſt of Bethell. *Thou ſayſt prophecy not againſt Iſrael, & drop not thy word againſt the houſe of Iſaac. Therefore thus ſaith the Lord, Thy wife ſhall be an harlot in the Cities, & thy ſons & thy daughters ſhall fall by the ſword.* And in like manner Solomon ſaith *The*
Prov. 22. 14. *mouth of a ſtrange woman is a deep pit, he that is abhorred of the Lord ſhall fall therein.* The inceſt of Abſolom defiling his fathers cōcubines in a ſhameles manner, came it not to paſſe by the will of God, whoſe word is this; *Behold I will raiſe up evill againſt thee, out of thine owne houſe, & I will take thy wives before thine eyes, & give them unto thy neighbour, & he ſhall ly with thy wives in the ſight of this ſun?* The detection of the ten tribes frō the houſe
2 *Sam.* 12. 11. of *David,* came it not to paſſe by the will of God, when God himſelfe teſtifies that it was his worke, & not his will onely? Thus ſaith the Lord the God of *Iſrael, I will rent the kingdome out of the hands of Solomon, & give ten tribes to thee,* ſpeaking to *Jeroboam;* here we have Gods will for it. And againe *the word of God came to Semaiah the man of God ſaying, ſpeak to Rehoboā the ſon of Solomon King of Judah, & unto all the houſe of Judah & Benjamin, & to the*
1 *Kings.* 11. 31. *remnant of the people, ſaying, Thus ſaith the Lord, ye ſhall not goe up, nor fight againſt your brethren, the children of Iſrael; returne every man to his houſe; for this thing is from me.* Here we have Gods word for it. Who can deny that the hardening of *Pharohs* heart, that he ſhould not let *Iſrael* go; the ſelling of *Joſeph* into Egypt by the hands of his unnaturall brethren came to paſſe by the will of God? I proceed to prove the ſame truth by evidence of reaſō. Firſt becauſe God permits ſin to come to paſſe as all confeſſe, though he could hinder it, if it pleaſed him, & that without all detriment to the free will of the creature why then doth he permit it? but becauſe he would have it come to paſſe, & accordingly *permiſſion* is reckoned up by Schoole Divines, amongſt the ſinnes of Gods will, like as alſo is Gods commandment. Now what God commandeth if it be done, it is ſaid to come to paſſe by the will of God, albeit the things that God commandeth, ſeldome; the things he permits, allwayes come to paſſe; according to the common tenet of Divines, even Voſtius & Arminius not excepted. Againe it is the common opinion of all, that therefore God permits ſin, becauſe he can and will worke good of it, which plainly ſuppoſeth that ſinne ſhall come to paſſe if God permits it, & conſequently it muſt needes be the will of God, it ſhall come to paſſe. Thirdly it is granted on both ſides that the act of ſin is Gods worke in the way of an efficient cauſe, not the outward act onely which is naturall, but the inward act of the

will

will which is morall, even this as an act is the worke of God: How can it be then but the deformity and vitiouſneſſe of the act, muſt come to paſſe God willing it, though not working it, conſidering that the deformity doth neceſſarily follow the act, in reference to the creatures working it, though not in reſpect of Gods working it? Laſtly all ſides agree that God can give effectuall grace, whereby a man ſhall be preſerved from ſin infallibly. Wherefore as often as God will not give this grace which is in his power to give, doth it not manifeſtly follow that he will not have ſuch a man preſerved frō ſin? To theſe I added the teſtimony of divers; as that of *Auſtin. Not any thing comes to paſſe, unleſſe Good will have it come to paſſe, either by ſuffering it to come to paſſe, or himſelfe working it.* If good he workes it, if evill permits it, 'tis true of each that he wills it. & *cap.* 96. *It is Good*, ſaith *Auſtin, that evill ſhould come to paſſe.* And *Bellarmine* himſelfe ſo farre ſubſcribes hereunto, as by profeſſing that *It is good that evills ſhoul come to paſſe by Gods permiſſion.* The ſame *Auſtin* confeſſeth that *The perverſity of the heart comes to paſſe by the ſecret judgment of God* And againe that *after a wonderfull and unſpeakable manner, even thoſe things which are committed againſt the will of God* (to wit againſt the will of his commandment) *do not come to paſſe beſides the will of God*; to wit the will of his purpoſe. *Anſelme* the moſt ancient of ſchoole Divines in his booke of the concord of foreknowledge with free will; *Conſidering* ſaith he, *that what God willeth cannot but be when he wills, that the will of mā ſhall not be conſtrained by any neceſſity to will or no; and withall will have an effect follow the will of man. In this caſe it muſt needs be that the will of man is free, and that alſo which God willeth ſhall come to paſſe, to wit by that will of man.* Now obſerve what in the next place he concludeth hence *In theſe caſes therefore it is true that the worke of ſin, which man will doe, muſt needs be, though man doth not will it of neceſſity.* And in his *concord of predeſtination and free will. In Good things God doth worke, both that they are, and that they are good, in evill things he workes onely that they are, not that they are evill. Hugo de ſancto Victore* 1. *De ſacr.* 4 p. 13 *When we ſay God willeth that which is good, it ſounds well; but if we ſay God willeth evill it is harſh to eares, neither doth a pious mind admit of the good God, that he willeth evill, for hereby he thinkes the meaning is that God loves and approves of that which is evill, & therefore the pious mind abhorres it, not becauſe that which is ſaid is not well ſaid, but becauſe that which is well ſaid is not well underſtood.* To theſe I adde the teſtimony of Bradwardine at large. A man reputed ſo pious in thoſe dayes, that the Kings prospe ous ſucceſſe in thoſe dayes was cheifly imputed unto his piety; who followed him in his warres in France as Preacher in the camp. In the laſt place I make anſwer to the Sophiſticall arguments of Aquinas and Durandus, and the frothy diſputation of *Valentianus*, all of them ſtanding to maintaine the contrary. Now let every ſober Chriſtian judge of this Authours propoſition, when he ſaith that *If God doth will and procure ſin &c. he is worſe then the Devill.* For I have made it evident by variety of Scripture teſtimonyes, by reaſon, and alſo with the concurrence of diverſe learned Divines; that it is Gods will that ſin ſhould come to paſſe, even the horrible outrages committed againſt the holy ſonne of God were before determined by Gods hand and counſell. Now what followes herehence by this Authours dicourſe; but that the holy Apoſtles yea and the Spirit of God do make God worſe then the Devill. So little cauſe have we to be impatient, when ſuch horrible blaſphemyes are layd to our charge, when we conſider what honourable compartners we have in theſe our ſufferings. Yet ſee the vanity of this conſequence repreſented moſt evidently; For albeit the will of Gods decree be powerfull & effectuall and irreſiſtable, and conſequently every thing decreed thereby ſhall come to paſſe powerfully, effectually, irreſiſtibly, yet this reſpects onely the generality of the things eveniency, not the manner how For onely things neceſſary ſhall by this irreſiſtible wil of God, come to paſſe neceſſarily: But as for contingent things, they by the ſame irreſiſtable will of God ſhall come to paſſe alſo; but how? not neceſſarily but contingently; that is with a poſſibility of not comming to paſſe. Now the free actions of men are one ſort of contingent things They therefore ſhall infallibly come to paſſe alſo by vertue of Gods irreſiſtible will; but how? Not neceſſarily but contingently, that is with a poſſibility of not coming to paſſe in generall as they are things contingent: And in ſpeciall they ſhall come to paſſe not contingently onely but freely alſo; that is with a free power in the Agents by whom they are acted to doe otherwiſe. Yet there is another difference according to the morall condition of theſe actions For if they are good and ſo farre as they are goood they come to paſſe by Gods working of them, but if they are evill, and ſo farre as they are evill they come to paſſe onely by Gods permitting; according to that of *Auſtin. Non aliquid ſit niſi omnipotēs fieri velit, vel ſinendo ut fiat, vel ipſe faciendo. Not any thing comes to paſſe, but God willing it either by ſuffering it* (to wit in caſe it be evill) *or himſelfe working it* (to wit in caſe it be

Enchirid. cap. 9. 5.

Cont. Julian. l. 5. *c.* 3.

be good.) And according to that eleventh Article of Religion agreed upon by the Arch-Biſhop, and Biſhops, and the reſt of the Clergy in Ireland, which is this; *God from all eternity did by his unchangeable counſell ordaine whatſoever ſhould come to paſſe in time; yet ſo as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reaſonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor the contingency of the ſecond cauſes is taken away but eſtabliſhed rather.* Farther conſider it is confeſſed by all, that God concurres in producing the act of ſinne, as an efficient cauſe thereof not morall, but naturall. And Aquinas himſelfe, though he denyes that, *Voluntas Dei eſt malorum*, Becauſe indeed as *Hugo de Sancto Victore* obſerves by the will of God is commonly underſtood in this caſe *Voluntas approbans; his will approving it, and loving it.* And ſo it is juſtly denyed that *God doth will evill things*, ſpeaking of the evill of ſinne. Yet Aquinas profeſſeth, and diſputes and proves that *Actus peccati eſt a Deo, the Act of ſinne is from God.* Like as the Act of walking is from the ſoule, though the lamenes in walking ariſeth from ſome diſeaſe in the legge. Now the Devill concurres not in this manner to any act of ſin; neither is the efficient cauſe thereof in the Kinde of a Naturall efficient, but onely Morall by tempting and perſwading. What therefore? ſhall we conclude as this Authour doth without feare or witt or honeſty, that by the confeſſion of all men God is hereby made worſe then the Devill? To what abominable courſes do the wilde witts and profane hearts of theſe men expoſe them? The greateſt works of *Satan* in moving men to ſin are comprehended under blinding and hardening of them. Now theſe operations are alſo attributed to God. And like enough he doth uſually performe them, not by the miniſtry of his holy Angells, but by the Miniſtry of *Satan* and his Angells of Darkeneſſe, as we read. 1. *Kings* 22. *v.* 21. 22. 23. *Joh:* 13. 27. *Acts* 5. 3. What then ſhall the Devill ſo farre poſſeſſe our hearts as to break forth into ſuch intolerable blaſphemyes as to conclude hereupon that God is bad, or worſe then the Devill. The providence of God I willingly confeſſe is wonderfull, and myſterious in this, like unto the Nature of God, to be adored rather then pryed into. So this providence to be dreaded rather then for ſatisfaction to every wanton and wild witt to be ſearched into. Yet all confeſſe that the Lord could hinder all this if it pleaſed him, and rebuke *Satan* and reſtraine the power, and ſtop the courſe of ſin, and prevent occaſions leading thereunto, but he will not, and why? But becauſe he knowes it becomes his allmighty power and wiſdome infinite, rather *ex malis bene facere, quàm malum eſſe non ſinere, To worke good out of evill, then not at all to ſuffer evill.* Laſtly what meanes this Authour to carry himſelfe ſo as to betray ſo ſtrange ignorance in mitigating *Satans* operation in tempting unto ſin; as if this were not ſufficient to make him the Authour of ſin. Eſpecially conſidering the reaſon that moves him hereunto, which is meerely the delight that he takes in diſhonouring God, and being a deſperate ſpirit himſelfe to make as many as he can partakers of the ſame deſperate condition. For *cupiunt perditi perdere*, ſayth Cyprian, *cum ſint ipſi pœnales, quærunt ſibi ad pœnam comites*; being damned themſelves they deſire to damne as many as they can: And being bound in chaines and kept to the judgement of the great day, they deſire to have as many companions as they can in *drinking of that cup of trembling, and ſucking the very dreggs of that cup of trembling and wringing them out.* For as the Hiſtorian obſerves. *Maligna eſt calamitas, & cum ſuo ſupplicio crucietur, acquieſcit alieno; Calamity makes a man of a ſpightfull nature, and when himſelfe is tormented, he takes content in this that others ſuffer with him.* And as the Oratour obſerves, *Nullum adverſarium magis metuas, quàm qui non poteſt vivere, poteſt occidere.* No adverſary more to be feared, then he who cannot live himſelfe, yet can kill another. This makes a coward reſolute; when he muſt needs dye, he will fight like a mad man, and kill all he can. I ſay what meanes this Authour to carry the matter hand over head, as if it were without queſtion; That he is not the Authour of ſinne; who onely is a Morall cauſe thereof. but rather he that is the naturall efficient: whereas great Divines carry it to the contrary. As namely Dominicus Soto in his firſt booke of nature and grace chap: 18. *Although* (ſayth he) *there are many that thinke it hard to explicate, how in the hatred of God, which hath an inward and indiviſible malignity, God can be the cauſe of the entity, but not of the fault: Yet this is not ſo hard to be underſtood.* Then he proceeds to ſhew how this may be. Firſt laying for his ground what it is to be the cauſe of ſinne, thus; *In morall actions he is altogether, and is judged to be the cauſe, who by a law, or help, or counſell or favour or perſwaſion moves any one either to good or evill.* Obſerve I pray the doctrine of this School-Divine directly contrary to that which this Authour ſuppoſeth without all proofe. For in the judgement of Dominicus Soto, he onely is to be accounted the cauſe

of

of another mans ſinne, who is the morall cauſe thereof, as by tempting, counſelling, perſwading thereunto, And upon this ground he proceeds to free God from being the Authour of it after this manner. *But as for God he by all theſe wayes moves his creatures to that which is good and honeſt, and none at all to evill.* Neither is the doctrine of Dominicus Soto alone; but the common doctrine of the Divines of Salamancha, as Molina confeſſeth in his diſputation 23. And albeit Molina the Jeſuite were of another opinion. Yet Vaſquius the Jeſuite profeſſeth that he was ever of the ſame minde with Dominicus Soto and the Divines of Salamancha in this; In his 129 diſputation upon the firſt part of his Summes. As for Proſper he hath no ſuch argument. But firſt obſerve the Objection whereunto he anſwereth, was made againſt the Doctrine of Auſtin; as the Authour acknowledgeth. Whence it followeth that looke how this Authour chargeth our doctrine, after the ſame manner was the doctrine of Auſtin charged above 1200 yeares agoe; let the indifferent hereby take notice of the congruity of our doctrine with the doctrine of Auſtin in this particular, and the congruity of this Authours ſpirit in charging us with the ſpirit of the Semipelagians in charging Auſtin after the ſame manner. Secondly conſider the objection there made t'is this. *Quod quando inceſtant Patres filias, & matres filios; vel quando Servi Dominos occidunt ideo fiat, quia ita Deus predeſtinavit, ut fieret. When father commit inceſt with their Daughters, and mothers with their ſonnes. Or when ſervants kill their Lords; therefore this comes to paſſe, becauſe God hath ſo predeſtinated that it ſhould come to paſſe.* Conſider, in this objection the fault of theſe abominable courſes is not layd upon thoſe that commit them, but onely upon God; as if Gods predeſtination did worke in ſuch a manner, as to compell men or women to commit ſuch and ſuch abominations. And ſo Proſper conceives the Argument to proceed, as if this were their intention. And accordingly makes anſwer. *Si Diabolo objiceretur quòd talium facinorum ipſe Author, ipſe eſſet incentor*, were it objected to the Devill that he were the Authour of ſuch ſinnes, and did inflame men to the committing of them (which indeed is the Devills courſe and not Gods) *yet I thinke*, ſayth he, *that the Devill might in ſome ſort diſburthen himſelfe of this crimination, & talium ſcelerum patratores de ipſorum voluntate vinceret, and make it appeare that their owne wills were the committers of ſuch ſinnes. Quia etſi delectatus eſt furore peccantium, probaret tamen ſe non intuliſſe vim criminum. Becauſe though he tooke pleaſure in the fury of ſinners, yet might he juſtifie that he forced no man to ſinne.* After the ſame manner proceeded the 11. objection of the Galles; *Quod per potentiam Deus homines ad peccata compellit, God by his power compells men to ſin.* And as touching the notion of predeſtination it is true the Antients uſed that onely in reference to thoſe thinges which were wrought by God. *Nihil ergo talium* (to wit of wicked actions) *negotiorum Deus predeſtinavit ut fieret.* Predeſtination being onely of ſuch things, which come to paſſe by Gods working of them. Yet the ſame Auſtin profeſſeth that ſuch things which come to paſſe by Gods permiſſion (of which kind are all manner of ſinnes) even thoſe came to paſſe God willing thē, though not by Gods predeſtinating of them. And as touching Senacherib who was ſlaine by his owne ſonnes; the Lord profeſſeth ſaying, *I will cauſe him to fall by the ſword in his owne land.* And upon Amaziah the Prieſt of Bethel the judgment was pronounced from the Lord, *Thy wife ſhall be an harlot* And whatſoever comes to paſſe it is Gods will it ſhould come to paſſe, ſayth Auſtin, how much more that which comes to paſſe in the way of judgment.

Enchirid: c. 95.

Eſa: 37. 7.

Amos. 7. 16.

2 I come to his ſecond reaſon to examine whether he carryeth himſelfe any thing more handſomly in that. *If God be the Authour of ſinne he cannot be the puniſher of ſin.* This argument is better ſhaped then the former; but forthwith he tells us that he cannot be in juſtice the puniſher of that whereof himſelfe is the Authour. Wherein are two particulars neither of which were expreſſed in his argument, the one is the application of it to the ſame ſinne whereof he was the Authour, which was not expreſſed in the Argument. And without this application the Argument is of no force. For earthly Magiſtrates are ſinners, yet the puniſhers of ſinne in others, yea of the ſame kind of ſinne. As though a Magiſtrate be a profaner of the name of God, yet he may execute the law on them who doe profane the name of God, and that juſtly. Then what is it that makes a man the Author of ſinne? It is well knowne, that though it be unlawfull for a man to permit ſinne, if it be in his power to hinder it, yet unleſſe God permit ſinne, it cannot be committed by any, *Nos certe*, ſaith *Auſtin*, *ſicos in quos nobis poteſtas eſt ante oculos noſtros perpetrare Scelera permittamus, rei cum ipſis erimus. Quam vero innumerabilia ille permitit fieri ante oculos ſuos, quæ utique ſi voluiſſet nullâ ratione permitteret. Cer-*

tainely if we ſuffer thoſe, over whom we have power, to commit ſinne, we ſhall be guilty together with them. But how innumerable are the ſinnes which he ſuffers to be committed before his eyes, which if he would, he could hinder, ſo that by no meanes they ſhould cõe to paſſe. Or is he the Authour of ſinne who is the efficient cauſe of the act of ſinne? *It is Aquinas* his doctrine, that, the act of ſinne is from God, and that in the kind of an efficient cauſe; and it is commonly received to be the firſt cauſe in the kind of efficients, ſubordinate to none, and all other ſubordinate to him. Nay more then this *Scotus* profeſſeth, and after him the *Dominicans*, that, God determineth the will to every act thereof (though ſinfull) as touching the ſubſtance thereof, but how? Surely no otherwiſe then to come to paſſe agreeably to their nature; neceſſary acts neceſſarily, free acts freely. So *Barwardine* maintaines that God neceſſitates the will of the creature; but how? To performe acts thereof freely. Suppoſe they did maintaine that God in his omnipotency did impoſe a neceſſity upon our wills, as *Suarez* imputes to our Divines that they ſo teach. Yet in this caſe *Suarez* the Jeſuite will juſtifie them, that therein they deliver nothing that either doth include contradiction, or that doth exceed God's omnipotency. Neither did I ever meet any colour of reaſon, why God might not as wholy determine the will to any free act thereof, as concurre with the will to the producing of the ſame act. And that in the concurrence of God and man to the ſame act, the firſt cauſe ſhould be in ſubordination to the ſecond; or the ſecond cauſe not in ſubordination to the firſt, is againſt all reaſon, and obnoxious to manifold contradiction, as I have ſhewed in my *Vindiciæ*. Whereas for God to move a creature to every act of his congruouſly to his nature, and ſo to determine him, is moſt agreeable to reaſon, and nothing at all obnoxious to contradiction. And yet notwithſtanding I ſee noe ſufficient reaſon to conclude theſe determinations, as touching things naturall, ſuch as is the ſubſtance of every naturall act, there being a power to performe that in a naturall Agent. Of ſupernaturall acts the caſe is different. It ſeemes to me enough, that God will have this or that evill come to paſſe by his permiſſion. For when God created the world out of nothing; what tranſient action of God can be imagined, when there was no matter at all for any ſuch tranſient action to worke upon; God's will was ſufficient to have that to exiſt which before had no being: And why may not the will of God be ſufficient for the exiſtence of the motion of each creature after it hath exiſtence? But ſuppoſing theſe determinations of the creatures wills to be neceſſary, if God will not determine them to good what will follow herence? Surely nothing but evill; unleſſe man can determine himſelfe to that which is good without God. For as for ſimple concurrence without ſubordination in working, as I ſaid before, that cannot be affirmed without palpable and groſſe contradiction, as I have proved in the digreſſion formerly mentioned, proceed we yet farther. I know nothing doth more intimately concerne God's ſecret providence in evill, then the hardning of the creature to diſobedience. Now the Scripture which is the very word of God, and the dictates of the Holy Ghoſt doth plainly and expreſſely teach, that albeit God commanded *Pharaoh* to let Iſraell goe, yet withall he hardened his heart that he ſhould not let Iſraell goe for a long time, which refuſall of his was wilfull and preſumptuous diſobedience. In like ſort as touching obedience and diſobedience to the Goſpell, the Apoſtle tells us plainly that, *God hath mercy on whom he will*, to performe the one, *and whom he will he hardeneth*, thereby expoſing them to the other. And hereupon this objection is made, *Why then doth God complaine* (to wit, of man's diſobedience) *for who hath reſiſted his will?* And we know what anſwer the Apoſtle makes hereunto. *O man who art thou that diſputeſt with God? ſhall the thing formed ſay to him that formed it, Why haſt thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power of the clay of the ſame lump to make one veſſell unto honour, another unto diſhonour?* Now will any ſober Chriſtian conclude herehence that becauſe, *God hardned Pharaoh that he ſhould not let Iſraell goe*, therefore he is the Authour of ſinne. *The Lord hath bid Shimei to curſe David.* Conſider what *Auſtine* writes upon this. *Quomodo dixerit Dominus huic homini maledicere David, quis ſapiens & intelliget? Non enim jubendo dixit, ubi obedientia laudaretur; ſed quod ejus voluntatem proprio vitio ſuo malam, in hoc peccatum judicio ſuo juſto & occulto inclinarit, ideo dictum eſt, Dixit ei Dominus.* *How ſaid the Lord to this man that he ſhould curſe David; Who is wiſe and he ſhall underſtand? For he ſaid this not by commanding Shimei ſo to doe, in which caſe his obedience had been commanded; but in as much as Shimei's will through his own vitiouſneſſe being evill, the Lord inclined it to this ſinne by his juſt and ſecret judgment.* Thus ſaith he, *The Lord uſeth the hearts of the wicked to the praiſe and benefit of the good: ſo he uſed Judas betraying Chriſt: ſo he made uſe of the Jewes crucifying Chriſt. And how great good did he procure therehence to all believers? Who alſo uſeth the Divell who is worſt of all, yet he makes beſt uſe of him to exerciſe and prove*

Note

De auxil. l. 1. c. 2. num. 7.

lib. 2. Digreſ. 7.

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the faith and piety of the godly. So he wrought in the heart of Absalom to refuse the counsell of Achitophell, and make choice of that counsell which was nothing profitable. Who may not well tremble in the contemplation of those Divine judgments, whereby the Lord workes in the hearts of wicked men whatsoever he will, yet rendring unto them according to their merits. Then he proceeds to give other instances of Scripture to manifest God's working in the hearts of men, and when he hath done, he concludes in this manner; *His & talibus testimoniis divinorum eloquiorum satis, quantum existimo, manifestatur operari Deum in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum voluntates quocunq; voluerit sive ad bona pro suâ misericordiâ, sive ad mala pro meritis eorum, judicio utiq; suo aliquando occulto, semper autem justo. By these and such like testimonies of Divine Scripture, I take it to be sufficiently manifested, that God doth worke in the hearts of men, to incline their wills whithersoever he will, either to those things that are good, of his mercy, or to such things that are evill, for their deserts, in the way of judgment, which is sometimes known, sometimes secret, but alwaies just. And all this he shewes, to be wrought by God without prejudice to the freedome of their wills.* And why should *David* pray after this manner. *Lord incline mine heart to thy testimonies, and not to covetousnesse;* If it were not in God's power to incline *the hearts of men to covetousnesse?* Yet I trust no sober Christian will conclude from this prayer of *David*, that God by executing such a power is the Author of sinne. Lastly this argument is drawne from God's justice, so is the third, which is to confound rather then to distinguish the reasons produced by him. We say that God cannot possibly be the Author of sinne, the necessity of his nature stands in opposition thereunto. For first sin hath no cause efficient but deficient only, as long agoe it hath been delivered by *Austin*. 2ly, a cause deficient or defective is either in a culpable manner, or in a manner nothing culpable. As for example, that A gent is defective culpably, that either omits the doing of that which he ought to doe; or omits to doe it after that manner which he ought to doe it: now I say it is impossible that the divine nature can be defective either of these waies, and consequently it is impossible that he should be the Author of sin, whereas he saith this is *Prosper's* argument it is untrue. He saith indeed it is against reason, *that God who damnes the Devill should will that any man should be a Servant to the Devell*: but forthwith he expounds himselfe. 1. Expounding what that cõdition is *of being the Devills servants*, whereof the objection did proceed. Now the objection was this, *That the greatest part of men were created for this, that they should doe, not the will of God, but the will of the Devill:* Now this objection saith *Prosper* proceeds from the *Pelagians*: *Qui Adæ peccatum transiisse in omnes diffitentur, who deny the sin of Adam to have passed unto all.* So that, *to doe the will not of God, but of the Divell*, is to be in the state of naturall corruption, and under the power of originall sinne, whereby they are not God's servants, but the Devills; this is not the condition of God's children in the state of Grace. Now *Prosper* shewes how originall sinne passeth over all, not by the will of God; and secondly, how it passeth over all by the will of God: Not by the will of God *instituente*; but by the will of God *judicante*: His words are these. *Hæc servitus non est institutio Dei, sed judicium This slavery of sinne which came upon all by Adam's sinne is not God's institution but his judgment.* As much as to say it came not upon a man by God's first creation, but by his judgment upon him, because of his first trangression; so that if divine judgment be the will of God; it is apparent *Prosper* is so farre from denying that slavery to have come upon all men by the just will of God, as that he expresly acknowledgeth it. It is true as *Fulgentius* saith, that, *God is not the Authour of sinne, but the revenger of it.* And it is as true that it is as just with God to punish sinne with sinne, as Scripture justifies; as St. *Austine* observes, and improveth at large divers Scriptures to this purpose, in his fifth Book against *Julian* the *Pelagian*, and third *chap. Tertullian* in saying, *he is not to be accounted the Authour of sin, who is the forbidder, yea the condemner of it*, falls directly upon the same ground that *Dominicus Soto*, with the Divines of *Salamancha*, and *Vasquez* the Jesuites, in explicating what that is which makes me to be the Authour of a morall action; as namely, by commanding, by counselling it, and perswading it; and indeed condemnation is but consequent to a law forbidding this or that. Now it is apparent that God in this respect ought to be accounted the Authour of every good action, but of none that is evill. For he commands only that wich is good, and counselleth and perswadeth thereunto, but forbiddeth and dissuadeth every thing that is evill. Of this no notice at all is taken by this Authour, neither taketh he any care to shew what that is, that maketh any agent justly to be accounted the Authour of sinne.

3 His third reason is all one with the former as drawne from God's justice and holinesse and his being Judge of the world. For it is the property of the Judge to condemne

transgressour

transgressours, whereupon his former Argument insisted, and that allso was drawne from God's justice. But I remember well what the *Poet* coupleth together when he saith,

Accessit fervor capiti numerusq; lucernis.

Honesty retaines the Creature from being the Authour of sinne not his nature, he being *peccabilis* by nature, but so is not God; It is impossible absolutely for him to be found defective any way in a culpable manner. He may withhold Grace from any man, I speak of Grace preservative from sinne. Neither is he unjust herein; for he is bound to none. At length he comes to prove the crimination laid upon his adversaries, as followeth.

Sect: 2.

M. Mason's Addit. p. 25. 26, 27. 28.

But this opinion doth so. For albeit the writers that have defended it (*Piscator* and a few more of the blunter sort excepted) have never said directly and in *terminis*, that God is the cause of sinne; yet have they delivered these things; from which it must needs follow by necessary consequence that he is so.

Comment in Jo. c. 15. v. 2.

For they say. 1. That, as the decree of Reprobation is absolute, so it is inevitable. Those poore soules which lye under it must necessarily be damned. It is saith *Marlorate* a firme and stable truth, that the man whom God in his eternall counsell hath rejected, though he doe all the works of the Saints, cannot possibly be saved.

Piscat. cont. Shalm. p. 29. Thes. 25.

2. That without sinne this decree of Reprobation cannot be justly executed. God, saith *Piscator*, did create men for this very purpose, that they might indeed fall; for otherwise he could not have attained those his principall ends. He meanes the manifestation of his justice in the condemnation of Reprobates; and of his mercy in the salvation of the Elect. *Maccovius* allso saith the same. If sinne had not been, the manifestation

Maccov. dis. 17. pag. 11.

of justice and mercy (which is as much as to say, as the damnation of Reprobates) had never been.

Zanch. l. 5. de nat. Dei c. 2. de prædest. part. 4. resp. ad post. arg: prope finem.

3. That God decreed that Reprobates must unavoidably sinne, and sinne unto death, that his eternall ordinance might be executed, and they damned. We grant saith *Zanchy*, that Reprobates are held so fast under God's almighty decree, that they cannot but sinne and perish; and a little after he saith, We doubt not therefore to confesse, that there lieth upon Reprobates by the power of their unchangable reprobation a necessity of sinning, yea of sinning to death without repentance, and consequently of perishing everlastingly. *Calvin* allso saith, that Reprobates obey not the word of God, partly through the wickednesse of their own hearts, and partly because they are raised up by the unsearchable judgment of God to illustrate his glory by

Calv. l. 3. Instit. c. 24. Sect: 14.

their damnation. I will end this with that speech of *Piscator*. Reprobates are precisely appointed to this evill, to be punished everlastingly, and to sinne: And therefore to sinne that they might be justly punished.

Pisc. resp ad dupl. Vorst part. 1. p. 220.

4. That as he hath immutably decreed that Reprobates shall live and dye in sinne. So he procures their sinnes in due time by his Almighty hand, partly by withdrawing from them grace necessary for the avoiding of sinne, and partly by moving and inclining them by his irresistable and secret working on their hearts, to sinfull actions. *Calvin* saith, that men and Devills and Reprobate-men are not only held fast in God's fetters, so as they cannot doe what they would, but are also urged and forced by God's bridle *ad obsequia præstanda, to doe as he would have thē:* & in the next chapter these are the words, that men have nothing in agitation, that they bring nothing to action, but what God by his secret direction hath ordered, is apparent by many cleare testimonies. In that Section following he saith. And surely unlesse God did worke inwardly in the

Calv. instit. l. 1. c. 17. Sect. 11.

Ibid. c. 18. Sect: 1.

minds of men, it would not be rightly said, that he takes away wisdome from the wise. In these two chapters that which he mainly driveth at, is to shew that God doth not only behave himselfe privatively in procuring the sinnes of men, but doth allso put forth powerfull and positive acts, in the bringing of thē to passe. And in the second book and fourth chapter after he had said, that God may be said to harden men by forsaking them, he putteth in another way by which God hardneth them, & that he saith commeth a great deale nearer to the propriety of Scripture phrases, namely, by stirring up their wills. God doth not only hardē men by levaing them unto themselves, but by appointing their counsells, ordering their deliberations, stirring up their wills, confirming their purposes by the Minister of his anger Satan. And this he proveth by the worke of God on *Sihon* King of the *Amorites* · and then insinuateth the end too, why God thus hardens men in their wicked courses; which is that he might destroy them. *Quia perditum Deus volebat, obstinatio cordis divina fuit ad ruinam præparatio; Because God intends his ruine he prepared him for sin by his induration.*

Instit. l. 2. c. 4. Sect: 3.

Deut: 2. 30.

The summe of all these propositions is this; God who from all eternity appointed many miserable men to endlesse and unavoidable torments, decreed, for the bringing about of their intended ruine, that they should without remedy live and dye in a state of sinne: and what he thus decreed from everlasting, he doth powerfully effect in time, so governing, over-ruling & working upon the wills of those Reprobates, that they have no liberty or ability at all in the issue, of avoiding their sinnes, but must of necessity commit them. Thus they teach; and therefore by just consequences they make God the Authour of sinne; as it will plainly appeare by these following considerations.

Answer.

Poets tell us there was a time when *Giants* on earth set themselves to fight against God in heaven; & because the place of his habitation was out of their reach, they laid mountaine upon mountaine hill upon hill, *Pelion* upon *Ossa*, that so they might make their approaches unto him, & beseige him in his own fastnes: this fable is a monumēt of the shipwrack of that truth among heathen-men, which the Lord had preserved unto his Church upon record in his holy word. For when after the great Deluge in the dayes of *Noah*, men began to be multiplied upon the face of the earth, they consulted how they might fortify themseves against the like inundation for the time to come; and thereupon encouraged thēselves saying, *Goe to let us build us a City and a town, whose top may reach unto the*

Heaven

Heaven that we may get us a name, leaſt we be ſcattered upon the whole earth. But how did the Lord deale with theſe preſumptuous adventurers? The *Poet's* faign that *Jupiter* deſtroyed them with his thunderbolts; and as for one of them *Typhoeus* by name, a proud fellow, he laid him faſt enough under the hill Ætna in Sicily, where he breaths out ſmoak & fire like the great Polan out of a Tobacco-pipe ſomewhat bigger then a good Caliver. But the Scripture tels us, how that for their ſaying, *Goe too, let us build. &c.* the Lord anſwered them with a *Come on, let us goe downe and there confound their language, that every one perceive not one anothers ſpeech.* This Author herhaps is but a Pygmie for bodily preſence, yet he may be a Gyant for his wit, and found στομαχεῖν to fight againſt God in a ſpirituall way in the oppoſing of his truth. As *Gamaliel* ſometimes adviſed the high Prieſt with his counſell to take heed, leſt *they were found even fighters againſt God.* It is true this Author no doubt perſwades himſelfe that he fights for God, in as much as he affects to free him from being the Author of ſin. But let not the ſimple Reader be deluded with ſhewes, but ſeriouſly conſider whither all this doe, which he makes about the point of Reprobation doth not clearly tend to the overthrowing of God's free grace in election: which is ſo much the more foule, becauſe he doth it underhand; as conſcious to himſelfe of his owne impotency to impugne it openly, or fearing the generall oppoſition of our Church againſt him, & therefore he practiſeth to undermine it. And this I have found to be his courſe divers years agoe in his private undertakings to draw proſelytes unto him, namely to decline the point of grace, & of election, to deale only upon Reprobation, and there to put his concurrent to begin, as if he would have a young Divine to inform a Sexagenarian, as I have ſeen under his own hand. But ſee the hand of God upon him in confounding his language, as when he ſtands for *Reprobation evitable & avoidable*, & reproacheth his adverſaries for maintaining Reprobation inevitable & unavoidable. This is the phraſe of his Schoole. For I do not remember to have met with it any where, but in him, & his diſciples: Now what man of common ſenſe doth not obſerve this phraſe to be appliable only to things that are to come; but of a contingent nature; ſo that they may be avoyded & declined; but by no means applyable to things already done, & that more then many thouſand years agoe. For what ſober man could heare with patience another diſcourſe of the avoidable nature of *Noah's* flood now in theſe daies, & to maintain that it is at this day avoidable: what fuſtian like to this? Might he not as well take liberty to diſcourſe of the Æquinoctiall paſticruſt? It was wont to be ſaid, that this alone God himſelf could not perform; namely to cauſe that which is done to be not done. As *Ariſtotle* in his *Eth.* relates a ſaying of one *Agatho* to that purpoſe. Now reprobation is confeſſed by all to be of the ſame age with election; & election was as the Apoſtle tels us, performed by God before the foundation of the world. And is not this Author then beſides himſelf, when he pleads for evitable & avoydable Reprobation. But albeit this Author makes the worſt of our opinions and expreſſions, yet I will not requite him by making the worſt of his, that were baſe & inglorious, and to be overcome. I will therefore hearken to the Apoſtles counſell where he ſaith, *Be not overcome with evill, but overcome evill with good.* I will make the beſt of his, and according to the diſtinction of God's will uſed in Schooles; as it is taken either *quoad actum volentis*, or *quoad res volitas*, *as touching the act of him that willeth, or the things willed.* So I will imagine that he ſpeaks of Reprobation, which is the will of God, not as touching the act of God Reprobating & making ſuch a decree, but as touching the thing decreed, & this thing decreed he will have to be of an avoidable nature. Now this we willingly grant, & utterly deny, that this any way hinders the abſolutenes of God's decree. We ſay with the 11 article of the Church of *Ireland*, that *God from all eternity did by his unchangeable councell ordain Whatſoever ſhould in time come to paſſe, yet ſo as hereby neither the contingency nor liberty of the ſecond cauſes is taken away, but eſtabliſhed rather.* So that whereas we ſee ſome things come to paſſe neceſſarily, ſome contingently; ſo God hath ordained that all things ſhall come to paſſe that do come to paſſe; but neceſſary things neceſſarily, contingent things contingently, that is, avoidably & with a poſſibility of not comming to paſſe. For every Univerſity Scholar knows this to be the notion of contingency, yet will not I content my ſelfe with the article of *Ireland*, for this *Aquinas* thus diſtinguiſheth. For having propoſed this queſtion, *Whether the will of God doth impoſe a neceſſity upon the things willed.* To this queſtion this Author with whom I deale would anſwer affirmatively, ſaying, it doth impoſe a neceſſity on all ſuch things, or at leaſt obtrude ſuch an opinion upon us; & himſelf undoubtedly thinks that in caſe Gods will be abſolute it muſt cauſe a neceſſity upon all things willed therby, both which are utterly untrue, & this laſt utterly denyed by *Aquinas*. For firſt, every will of God is abſolute in the judgment of *Aquinas*, which I prove

1. p. quaſt. 19. art. 8.

thus; That will which hath noe cause or reason thereof is absolute: This proposition I presume this Authour will not deny: But the will of God hath no cause in the judgment of *Aquinas* therefore every will of God is absolute by his doctrine: Yet this absolute will of God imposeth not a necessity upon all things willed by him, but only on some things. *Divina voluntas non omnibus sed quibusdam necessitatem imponit.* And in the body of that question thus he writes, *The distinction of things necessary and contingent proceeds from the distinction of God's will. For when a cause is effectuall and powerfull to worke, the effect followeth the cause, not only so farre as to be brought to passe, but also as touching the manner of its coming to passe. Therefore seing the will of God is most effectuall, it not only followeth that those things come to passe, which God will have come to passe, but that they come to passe after the same manner also, after which he will have them come to passe. Now God will have some things come to passe necessarily and some things contingently, that there may be an order in things for the perfection of the world. And therefore for the producing of some effects he hath fitted causes necessary, which cannot faile, by which effects are brought forth necessarily: And for the producing of other effects, he hath fitted causes contingent, such as may faile in working, from which effects are brought to passe contingently.* So that upon suspicion that God doth will a thing, that thing shall certainly and infallibly come to passe; but how? Not allwaies necessarily or contingently. And that certaine and infallible eveniency of things is called also necessity in the Schooles; but not *necessity simply*, but only *upon suspicion*, which may well consist with absolute contingency. But to make the point yet more cleare; Let us distinctly consider the things decreed; For they that have an evill cause delight in confusion, and feare nothing more then the light of distinction. Now the things decreed by Reprobation are either deniall of Grace, which is joyned with the permission of sinnne: Or damnation for sinne, according to that on *Aquinas, Reprobation includes the will of permitting sinne, & inflicting damnation for sinne.* Now both the permission of sinne, and damnation of God's part are his free acts; and therefore come to passe freely. But upon supposition that God will deny a man Grace, it is impossible that such a man should have grace. Secondly, secluding grace, there is noe actuall transgression for which a man is damned, but may be avoided; man having power for that naturally; though naturally he have noe power to performe every good act. The reason is because amongst good acts some are supernaturall, as the acts of the three Theologicall vertues, Faith, Hope, and Charity: But noe sinfull act is supernaturall, all such are naturall. Now it is confest on all hands that, notwithstanding man's corruption by reason of originall sinne, yet he hath still power and free will to performe any naturall act, and accordingly he hath free power to abstaine from it. So that *Judas* had free will to abstaine from betraying his Master; After he had betrayed him, he had free power to abstaine from destroying himselfe; so that as these sinnes of his for which he was damned were avoidable by him, in like manner his damnation for these sinnes was avoidable. And allbeit God had determined that *Judas* by Divine permission should betray his Master, and destroy himselfe, according to to that of *Austin, Judas electus est ad prodendum sanguinem Domini*; *Judas was ordained to betray his master.* And that of the Apostles jointly. *Of a truth against thy holy Son Jesus both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and people of Israell were gathered to doe what thy hand, and thy counsell had before determined to be done.* Act. 4. 28. Yet herehence it followes only, that it was *necessary* (to wit, upon this supposition, namely, of the Divine ordinance.) *that these things should come to passe*, namely, both *Judas* his betraying of Christ, and *Herods* mocking of him, and *Pilates* condemning him, and the peoples crying out away with him, together with their preferring of *Barrabas* a murtherer before him, and the Souldiers crucifying him. But how came it to passe? Not necessarily, but contingently, that is in this Authours phrase evitably and avoidably, inas much as it was joyned with an absolute possibility to come to passe otherwise; Nor with a possibility only but with a free power in the agents to have forborne all these contumelious carriages of theirs towards the son of God. For both *Judas* had free will to abstaine from betraying him, and *Herod* with his *Herodians* could have abstained from their contumelious handling of him, and *Pilate* from condemning him, and the Preists and people from conspiring against him; and the Souldiers from crucifying him, only they had no power to abstaine from all or any of these vile actions in an holy manner, as no man else hath power to abstaine from any evill in a gracious manner, without grace: Yea without the Grace of regeneration which alone plants in us both faith in God, and a love of God to the very contempt of our selves, and no performance of any good or abstinence from any evill, is acceptable with

1.p.19.art. 5. & quæst. 23. art. 5. Corp.

Aquin. 1. p q. 19. art. 8. concl.

1.p.q.23. art 3. in corp. Includit voluntatem permittendi aliquē cadere in culpam & inferendi damnationis pœnam pro culpam.

with God unto eternall life, unleſſe it proceed from this faith and this love. That which is here produced out of *Marlorate* is a ſtrange ſpeech, and ſuch as I never read or heard from any before: and ſuch, as whereof I can give no tolerable conſtruction. And is it fit that every extravagant paſſage that is found in any Writer of ours ſhould be brought forth to charge our doctrine with? It were a fitter ſpeech for a Papiſt who maintaining the abſoluteneſſe of Reprobation, doth withall maintaine an apoſtacy from grace, which we do not. If *Marlorate* had any ſuch opiniõ he ſings therein to himſelf, & to his own Muſes What Divine of ours maintains that God hath decreed to damne any man otherwaies then by way of puniſhment for ſin continued in unto death without repentance? Had he ſpoken of Good works morall only, it is true any hypocrite is capable of them; and none taſte deeper of Damnation then hypocrites. But as for the worke of true faith & true repentance; it is the generall profeſſion of our Divines, that as faith and the ſpirit of repentance once given, never faile, ſo they ſhall infallibly bring a man unto everlaſting life, and free him from condemnation. But any thing ſerves this Authors turn to vent his ſtomack: And I am perſwaded, there is not one more of all our Divines that he can ſhew to concurre with *Marlorat* in this. And if there were is it fit their improvident & inconſiderate expreſſions ſhould be caſt in their teeth that avouch them not, but rather conceive them to be void of all ſobriety? *Brentius apud Marloratum in illud, Joh. 15. 2. Omnem palmitem in me non ferentem fructum tollet, &c. Caterum hæc ſententia occurrit curioſitati carnis quæ ſolet argutè, magis quàm reverenter de prædeſtinatione diſſerere, & pro ſuo ingenio colligere nullum à Domino ad vitam æternam electum poſſe damnari, etiamſi peſſimè vivat. Nullum item à Domino ad ignem æternum deputatum poſſe ſalvari etiamſi optimè vivat; ſe itaque velle pro ſuâ libidine vivere. Ut ut enim ſollicitè laboret, non tamen poſſe decretum Dei infringere. Reſpondet hic Chriſtus, Omnem palmitem, &c. quod dicitur. Quid ad te de occultâ Dei prædeſtinatione? Hoc tu videris, ut tu in me maneas, & fructum feras, reliqua diſpenſationi & prudentiæ Dei committenda ſunt. Nam etiamſi videaris ad æternam ſalutem prædeſtinatus, non tamen fructum feras, abjicieris in ignem tanquam infructuoſus palmes.* He inſtances in *Saul*, then whom there was not *a better man in Iſrael*. That which is here cited out of *Marlorat* his *Expoſitio Eccleſiaſtica*, it is ſet down as in *Calvin's* Commentary: but no ſuch thing is found in *Calvin*. And it may be that is the fault of the Printers miſtaking. And *Marlorat's* own expoſition ſucceeds in a few words thus. *Quæ ideò dicuntur non ut fideles inde anſam arripiant de ſuâ ſalute dubitandi ſed ut carnalis ſecuritas & ignavia ab hominibus tollatur.* And the next ſentence whence this queſtion is taken ſeems to cohere with this, though a great *C.* as if it were *Calvin's* comes in between, and it begins thus. *Certum eſt enim decretum Dei à nemine infirmari poſſe; quia Deus non eſt ut homo qui pœnitentiam agat, & retractet ſententiam ſemel decretam.* Then followes the paſſage here alleadged, and at the heels of it theſe words: *Time igitur, & in ſolam Domini eligentis manum reſpice ut ſalutem per Dominum noſtrum Jeſum Chriſtum aſſequaris.* Undoubtedly *Marlorat* approves of *Brentius* his expoſition, otherwiſe he would not have placed it in his *Expoſitio Eccleſiaſtica*. Now *Brentius* brings in the very ſaying for which *Maldonat* is criminated, as the objection of ſome carnall perſon. Therefore when *Marlorat* ſeems to juſtifie ſuch a ſaying, it muſt be in another ſenſe; and that either of good workes in ſhew, of which *Brentius* alſo obſerved, that ſuch might have been found in *Saul*: Or of workes in diſtinction from faith. And accordingly he concludes with exhortation *feare*: that is not to be ſecure, how good ſoever his workes are; but to have an eye to God and truſt only to him, that ſo he may obtain ſalvation through Jeſus Chriſt. *Calvin in Joh. 15. 6. Areſcere dicuntur inſtar emortua ſarmenta quæ à Chriſto reſecta; ſũt quia ſicuti initiũ vigoris ab ipſo eſt ita & continuus tenor. Non quòd ex electis aliquem contingat unquam execari: ſed quia multæ hypocritæ in ſpeciem ad tempus florent & virent, qui poſtea in reddendo fructu ſpem domini fruſtrantur. They are ſaid to to wither like a branch cut off, ſuch as are cut off from Chriſt: becauſe like as the beginning of their vigour is from him, ſo alſo their continuance. Not that at any time it falleth out that any of Gods Elect is cut off, but becauſe many Hypocrites carry a faire ſhew for a time as if they were green and flouriſhing, who afterwards in rendring fruit make void the Lords Expectation.*

2. The decree of Reprobation as touching one part of it, cannot be executed without ſin; For it is a decree of inflicting damnation for ſin, ſo that there is no place for damnation, where ſinne and that as a meritorious cauſe preceeds not. I had thought this Authour needed not to runne out to *Piſcator* and *Maccovius* for proofe of this; neither *Arminius* nor the Authour is of any other opinion I am confident, then

that the decree of damnation cannot be executed on any, without the precedency of sin in the party who is to be damned. But there is another part of Reprobation For as *Aquinas* speakes, *it includes the will of permitting sin.* Now the execution of this decree, which consists in the permitting of sin, doth not require the precedency of sinne. For when God first permitted the Angels to fall, this permission of his did not require any precedency of sinne in them; nor the permission of *Adam* to fall; it cannot be said without manifest contradiction, that it did. For before the first sinne there was no sinne. *Piscator* saith that, *God created men for this very purpose that they might fall*; he saith, *hoc consilio*, which is as much as to say, *with this purpose*, not *for this purpose*; to wit, *to permit them to fall*; And God purposing this, purposed that they *should fall by his permission.* For *Arminius* confesseth that in case God permits a man to will this or that, *Necesse est ut nullo argumentorũ genere persuadeatur ad nolendum. It must needs be that no argument shall perswade him to will that, which God permits him to will.* And that it is good that evill should come to passe by God's permission, both *Austine* hath affirmed, & *Bellarmine* subscribed. And shall it not be lawfull for God to will that which is good? Undoubtedly neither justice punishing, nor mercy pardoning, can be manifested without sin, either to be punished, or pardoned, or both: neither is it credible to me that this Authour thinks otherwise. And is not the manifestatiõ of God's mercy on some, and his justice on others, the supreme end of God's providence towards mankind, and consequently by the most received rules of Schooles first intended, even before the permisson of sinne? For if the permission of sinne were first intended, then by the same rule of Schooles, it should be in the last place executed; that is, God should first manifest his mercy and justice in pardoning some, and punishing others, and afterwards suffer them to sinne; such is the learning and judgments of these Divines. And as for the foresight of sin, it is apparent, that it presupposeth God's purpose to permit it; and more then that, it presupposeth the fruition of it. Now it is well knowne, that sinne in its own nature is meerly possible. How comes it to passe, that from the condition of a thing meerly possible, it hath passed into the condition of a thing future? This cannot be done without a cause; and that cause must be eternall; for the effect was eternall. For from everlasting sinne was future; for from everlasting God knew it to be future. Now there is nothing everlasting, but God himselfe, therefore he must needs be the cause of this transition whereby a thing meerly possible in its own nature, became future. And therefore, either by his knowledge he was the cause thereof, or by his will and decree. Not by his knowledge; for that rather supposeth thẽ to be future, then makes them such. It remaines therefore that the will of God, and that alone makes every future thing to passe out of the condition of a thing meerly possible, into the condition of a thing future, and that from everlasting. Let this Authour satisfie this argument, and I will ease him of all further paines, and lay down the bucklers before him.

3. It is untrue that by our Doctrine Reprobates doe unavoidably sinne. I have already demonstrated the contrary. For as I said, *Malum semper habitat in alieno fundo*, every actuall sinne is a naturall act; a worke of grace may be supernaturall as touching the substance of the act, so is not the worke of sinne, but allwaies naturall. Now no Christian that I know affirmes that a man in the state of sin is bereaved of free will in things naturall. Nay we generally confesse, he hath free will in things morall, only as touching things spirituall he hath no freedome left therein: therefore as I said before, *Judas* might have naturally forborne to betray his Master; naturally forborne to destroy himselfe. If some object, the commonopiniõ of Divines is, that in a state of nature there is *noe libertie for sinne.* I answer; first out of *Aquinas*, that this is to be understood of sinne in generall, not of any in particular: *Licet aliquis non possit gratiam adipisci qui reprobatur à Deo, tamen quod in hoc peccatum vel illud labatur ex ejus libero arbitrio contingit. Though a man that is reprobated of God cannot obtaine Grace*, (for how should he obtaine it if God will not give it? will they say that Grace is given according unto workes?) *yet that he falls into this or that sinne, this is a contingent thing, and proceeds from his own free will.* So say I every sinfull act committed by man in the state of naturall corruption, is committed freely in such sort that he might have abstained from it, but I doe not say that he could abstain from it in a gracious manner. But whether he doth that which is good, he doth it not in a gracious manner; so that still he sinneth more or lesse, and all by reason that as yet he hath neither faith in God, nor love of God, which are the fountaines of all gracious actions, both in doing that which is good, and in abstaining from that which is evill. As for *Zanchi's* saying, *That God holds Reprobates so fast that they cannot but sinne.* This act of God is no other then his denying them grace to breake of their sinnes by repentance, and

Thom: 1. part q. 23. art. 3. ad tertium.

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to turne unto God. Now the Apoſtle profeſſeth that as, *God hath mercy on whom he will, ſo he hardeneth others*, even *whom he will*, in denying this grace unto them. And marke what objection he ſhapes hereupon, *thou wilt ſay then why doth he yet complaine?* (to wit of men's diſobedience: for of nothing elſe doth the Lord complaine.) *For who hath reſiſted his will?* Obſerve the chaines wherewith God holds them faſt irreſiſtably, to wit the chaines of obduration. Let the Authour therefore charge St. *Paul* as well as *Zanchy* for making God the Authour of ſinne, and indeed he might have abounded in paſſages out of holy Scripture alleadged to the ſame end, whereunto he alleadgeth theſe out of our Divines; yea and Papiſts too. But *Piſcator*, *Zanchy*, and *Calvine*, theſe are his proper markes to ſhoote at, ever ſince he learnt in his age to correct the errours of his youth in taking frivolous exceptions againſt *Bellarmine*. As for a neceſſity of ſinning brought upon all by the ſinne of *Adam*. *Arminius* acknowledgeth it, and this *Arminius* is acknowledged by *Corvinus* in his anſwer to *Lilenus*. Only God takes it away from his Elect at the time of their calling and regenerating, and leaves it upon the reſt; and who can ſay black to the eye for this? Will we not give him libertie to have mercy on whom he will, and harden whom he will? Then let us fly in the face of *Paul* as well as *Calvine* & *Zanchy* for ſo plainly teaching this. The hardneſſe of men's hearts is the immediate cauſe why they obey not God's word; But there is another cauſe alſo that our Saviour takes notice of, and that is this; That God doth not regenerate them, or hath not elected them. Of this our Divines may well take notice, becauſe *Moſes* before hath done the like. The Iſraelites profited neither by hearing of God's word, nor by the ſeeing of his mighty workes, I ſay by none of theſe did they profit unto repentance; and what was the reaſon hereof? Surely the hardneſſe of their hearts, as *Moſes* ſignifies, *Thou art a ſtiffe-necked people.* Yet he takes notice of another cauſe and that is this, *Yet the Lord hath not given our hearts to perceive, nor eyes to ſee, nor eares to heare unto this day.* So our Saviour in the Goſpell; *He that is of God heareth God's words, ye therefore heare them not, becauſe ye are not of God* Now to be raiſed up in *Calvin's* Phraſe, *to illuſtrate God's glory in their damnation*, is no other then to be brought forth into the world, and not to be borne of God, that is, to have the grace of regeneration denied them, and conſequently to be ſuffered to goe on in their ſinnes; and laſtly to be damned for their ſinne, to the manifeſtation of the glory of God's juſtice. *Solomon* ſaith as much, *The Lord made all things for himſelfe*, that is for the manifeſtation of his glory, *even the wicked againſt the day of evill.* And St. *Paul* Rom: 9 *by ſhewing mercy towards ſome*, ſignifies how God formes ſome after one manner, by hardening others he formes them after another manner comparing the 18. v. with the 20. And in the 21. He juſtifies God in this, and that in reference to different ends, which are the manifeſtation of his glory different waies, ſaying, *Hath not God power over the clay of the ſame lumpe to make one veſſell unto honour, and another unto diſhonour.* And verſe 22. *What if God to ſhew his wrath and to make his power known, ſuffered with long patience the veſſells of his wrath prepared to deſtruction. v. 23. And that he might declare the riches of his glory upon the veſſells of mercy which he hath prepared unto glory?* What one of our Divines expreſſeth himſelfe in this argument more fully, or more liably to carnall exceptions following the judgment of fleſh and bood, then St. *Paul* doth in this? Here by the way as touching *Piſcator*, I muſt fetch after mine anſwer in his behalfe, to that which in the entrance to this Section was delivered of him, and overſeen by me. For this Authour confeſſing that our writers have never ſaid directly in *terminis*, *that God is the cauſe of ſinne*, which introduction of his is the very ſame which *Bellarmine* uſeth, oppoſing our Divines on this very argument, *lib. 2. De amiſſione gratiæ & ſtatu peccati. cap. 4.* Afterwards by a parentheſis brings in an exception of *Piſcator*, and *ſome other of the blunter ſort*, without naming one of them. And though he name *Piſcator* yet he quotes no place; for if he had, he ſhould withall direct his Reader to the grounds whereupon *Piſcator* affirmes this, namely that, *God is the cauſe of man's fidelity*. And it is the very place formerly mentioned in theſe words. *He that is of God heareth God's words, ye therefore heare them not becauſe ye are not of God* now what reaſonable mã can deny, but that it is a ſin not to heare God's words; then doth not our Saviour plainly profeſſe, that the true cauſe hereof is, becauſe they are not of God? Now if to be of God in this place doth ſignifie God's Election, then the cauſe of their ſinnes hereby is made God's not electing of them. But if this phraſe, *To be of God*, ſignifie God's regenerating of them, as I thinke it doth, then God's not regenerating of them is made the cauſe of this their diſobedience in not hearing God's word's: and indeed the evill of ſinne hath noe efficient cauſe but deficient only, as *Auſtine* hath delivered long agoe. And God is not bound to any, either to elect him, or regenerate him; ſo

Deut. 9. 6.

Deut. 29. 3. 4.

Prov. 16. 4.

that in failing to regenerate mā, he doth not *deficere*, or *faile* in any culpable mā ner: now let every indifferent Reader judge, whether here be not, *Dignus vindice nodus* a knot worthy to be loosed; & it will require some worth of learning in him that solves it. And is it decent for this Authour to censure a man for a conclusion made by him out of the word of God, without shewing the faultinesse either of his interpretation thereof, or of his consequence framed therehence? So that this Author's wit & cunning is more to be cōmended in not specifying the place where *Piscator* delivers this doctrine, then either his learning or his honesty. He was loath to raise spirits, & afterwards to prove unable to lay them. Therefore thus I answer in behalfe of *Piscator*; though God herby me made the cause why soe heare not God's words, to wit, in as much as he doth not regenerate thē, nor give thē eies to see, nor eares to heare, & an heart to perceive according to that of *Moses*. Yet he doth not make God any culpable cause, neither indeed is he any culpable cause, while he failes to performe so gracious a worke towards thē: the reason whereof is this. He and he alone is a culpable cause, who failes in doing that which he ought to do: but God allbeit he doth not regenerate a man, yet he failes not of doing that which he ought to doe. For it is no duty of his to regenerate any man; for he is bound to none. Now to be the Authour of sinne is not only to be the cause thereof, but to be a culpable cause thereof. Undoubtedly God could preserve any man from sinne if it pleased him, and if he doth not, he is nothing faulty. Secondly I answere that in true account, God is only the cause, *why* our naturall infidelity is not healed, our corruption not cured. Like as a Physitian may be said to be the cause why such a man continues sicke in as much as he could cure him, but will not: Soe God could cure the infidelitie of all, but will not. Only here is the differenee, the Physitian may be a culpable cause, as who is bound to love his neighbour as himselfe; but God being bound to none, is no culpable cause of man's continuance in sinne, and in the hardnesse of his heart, albeit he can cure him, but will not. As for *Piscator's* saying here mentioned, *Reprobates are appointed precisely to this double evill, to be punished everlastingly, and to sinne; and therefore to sinne that they may be justly punished.* Hereing are two things charged upon *Piscator*. 1. That Reprobates are precisely appointed by God to perish everlastingly. To this I answer that noe *Arminiā* that I know denies *Reprobates to be appoinby God to everlasting damnation.* All the question is about the manner of appointing them; namely whether this appointment of God, proceeds meerly according to his meer pleasure, or upon the foresight of sinne. We say it proceeds meerly according to the good pleasure of God, and not upon the foresight of sinne preceding. And this we not only say, but prove thus. If reprobation proceed upon the foresight of sinne, then it were of men's evill workes. Now looke upon what grounds the Apostle proves, that election is not of; good workes, upon the same ground it is evident that reprobation is not of evill works: for the argumēt for the one is this. *Before Jacob & Esau were borne or had done good or evill; it was said to Rebekah the elder shall serve the younger, therfore election is not of good works.* In like manner thus I reason concerning Reprobation, *Before Jacob and Esau were borne or had done good or evill it was said to Rebekah, the elder shall serve the younger, therefore reprobation is not of evill workes.* 2. If God doth ordaine any man to damnation upon foresight of sin, then this sin foreseen is the cause of the Divine ordinance; but sin foreseen cannot be the cause why God ordained man to damnation; as I prove thus. If it be the cause then either by the necessity of nature; or by the ordinance of God; not by necessity of nature. For undoubtedly God if it pleased him could ordaine to annihilate them for their sinnes, instead of punishing them with eternall fire. Nor can it be the cause of any such decree by the free ordinance of God. For if it were, marke what intolerable absurdityes would follow, namely this, That God did ordaine that upon the foresight of sinne he would ordaine men unto damnation; whereby God's eternall ordination is made the object of God's ordination; whereas all know that the Objects of God's decrees (which are all one with his ordinations) are things temporall, not things eternall. 3. If the foresight of sinne goes before the decree of damnation, then the decree of permitting sinne goes before the decree of damning for sin; that is the permission of sinne was first in intention, and consequently it ought to be last in execution; that is, First man should be damned for sin, and not till afterwards permitted to sinne. The second thing charged upon *Piscator* is this, that, *Reprobates are precisely appointed to sin.* Now here the crimination grates not upō the manner of being appointed thereunto; otherwise a way could be opened for a progresse *in infinitum*. Now why should it be any more a fault in *Piscator* to say of some that they are appointed to sinne; then in *Peter* to say of some that they are appointed to disobedience: or in all the Apostles to professe that all the outrages committed

Deut: 29. 4.

ted by *Herod* and *Pilate*, by the Gentiles and people of Israell were such as Gods hand & his counsell had before determined to be done? or why doth *Piscator* make God to be the Authour of sinne in this, more then *Peter* and all the Apostles? And considering this man's unconscionable carriage in this, let the Reader take heed how he suffers himselfe to be gull'd by this Authour, and drawne to censure such speeches in *Piscator*, as making God the Authour of sinne, when hereby he is drawne ere he is aware to passe the like censure on the Apostles? And the holy Ghost himselfe, whose expressions are the same for substance with the expressions of *Piscator*. It is farther observable that *Piscator* saith, *That Reprobates by reason of this Divine ordination doe sinne necessarily*. I answer, *Piscator* was an excellent Scripture Divine, but noe School-divine; and therefore noe marvaile if he want the accurateness of Scholasticall expression. Yet I salve him thus. They sinne necessarily upon suspicion that God will have them to sinne by his permission; but this is noe necessity *simply* so called, but only *secundum quid*. But God decrees the manner of things comming to passe, as well as the things themselves; as before I shewed out of *Aquinas*. Soe that allbeit it must needs be, that sinne come to passe, in case God hath decreed it shall come to passe; yet if the question be, after what manner it shall come to passe, I answere, not necessarily, but contingently and freely, that is not onely with a possibility of not comming to passe, but with a free power in the creature to abstaine from that sin which is committed by him. For God ordained that every thing that doth come to passe shall come to passe agreably to the nature thereof, and accordingly moves every creature to worke agreeably to their natures. Necessary agents, necessarily, contingent agents contingently. Free agents freely. And as formerly was mentioned, every sinfull act is a naturall act; and a man hath free power even in the state of corruption either to doe, or to leave undone any naturall act. And *Piscator* in other places dealing with *Vorstius*, clearely professeth as I well remember (though the the place come not to my memory) that wicked men doe commit those things freely which are committed by them. And it is an excellent saying of *Austine*, that, *Libertas sine gratiâ non est libertas sed contumacia*, *Liberty without grace, is not liberty but wilfullnesse*; & indeed they shew too much will therein, rather then too little: and in denying liberty to them that want grace, he speakes of liberty morall, which is only unto true good, not of liberty naturall, which hath place only in the choice of meanes, and is inseparable from the nature of man: But true morality sets a mans soule in a right condition towards his right end.

Eph. 28.

Note

4. It may be this Authour could not be so inconsiderate as not to perceive that even those expressions concerning Gods decree, which he criminates in our Divines are Scripture expressions; therefore to helpe his cause here he imputes unto them, that they maintaine that God decreed this immutably; as if himselfe could be content to grant that these things are decreed by God, but not immutably. And would this Authour have the will of God to be of a mutable condition, like unto ours? I am confident he dares not professe so much; for albeit he licks his lips at a conditionall decree, yet how doth he conceive this to be mutable? For to resolve to save men upon condition of faith, and repentance, and perseverance; and damne others in case they continue in infidelity and impenitency; if accordingly none be saved but such in whom faith and repentance, and finall perseverance therein is found, none damned but such as persevere in sinne unto death; what change is there in all this? Unlesse this be it, that God did not resolve to save any particular person untill his finall perseverance was accomplished; And so God may be said in processe of time, to change from not willing to willing one man's salvation, and another man's damnation: In which case God's decree also should not be eternall, but begin in time. Againe as touching that which followes of of God decreeing that *Reprobates shall live and dye in sinne*. I answer, to decree not to regenerate Reprobates, is to decree that Reprobates shall not be regenerated, for they are not able to regenerate themselves; and to decree that they shall not be regenerated, is to decree that they shall live and dye in sinne, by God's permission, he resolving never to shew such mercies to take them of from their sinfull courses by repentance. And so long as they are not borne of God, they will not heare his words, as our Saviour testifies saying, *Yee therefore heare them not, because ye are not of God*. As for sinne procured by the hand of God, which he obtrudes upon our Divines; not one passage doth he produce for that. Yet as I remember I have read such an harsh expression in *Piscator* dealing against *Vorstius*, which at this time doth not come to my remembrance; but withall I remember that *Piscator* being charged therewith by *Vorstius* forthwith represents certaine passages of Scripture concerning Gods's providence in evill, and appeales to the judgment

Jo. 8.

ment of every sober Christian, whether to do that, which therein is attributed to God, be not to procure sin. It is apparent that Joseph acknowledgeth, that the Lord sent him into Egypt, yet was this brought to passe by the parricidiall hands of his brethren. And it is no lesse plaine that God hardened *Pharaohs* heart that he should not let Israel goe And by *Arminius* his Definition of effectuall grace, it is evident that by Gods denying it, sin doth follow infallibly. And so likewise upon Gods permission of willing this or that, he professeth that it must needs be, that by noe kind of argument shall such a one be perswaded to nill it. I come to the meanes whereby he is said to procure it. The first is, *by withdrawing grace necessary for the avoyding of sin.* Now of this he gives no instance out of any of our Divines. 2 I know no grace which this Authour accounts necessary, that any of our Divines teach to be withdrawen by God. 3 God indeed doth not determine their wills to that which is good; but this Authour doth not account any such determination necessary to the avoyding of sin. 4 Prohibition, denuntiation of judgment, dehortation and such gracious actions, God doth neither withdraw, nor withhold from the wicked, who are partakers of this grace as well as Gods children, as often as they meet in the same congregation for the hearing of Sermons.

5 An effectuall restraint from sin, I know none but the feare of God; yet this he withdrawes not from the wicked; for they never had it; nor from the children of God; only he doth not stirre it in them at all times, so often as he suffers them to sin, which yet may be to gracious ends. As 1 for the confirmation of their faith, that nothing, no not sin shall separate them from the love of God; when they shall find the goodnesse of God minding them of their errours, and bringing them to repentance. 2 As also to make them smart for their former security and wantonnesse in beholding the uncomfortable issue of it. 3 To provoke them to walke more carefully and circumspectly for the time to come, standing upon their guard, and keeping the watch of the Lord. 4. To cure their pride, according to that of Austin. *Audeo dicere, Utile est superbis in aliquod apertum manifestumq́, cadere peccatum. I am bold to speake it, It is good for a proud man to to fall into some open and manifest sin.* I come to the second stay, whereby he objects to our Divines that they maintaine that *God procures the sinnes of men*, and that is *by his moving and inclining them by his irresistable and secret workings on their hearts, to sinfull actions.* To which I answer first that not any of the passages alleadged by him out of Calvin (who alone makes *totam paginam* in this of his) makes mention of Gods *irresistable working*; or of *moving or inclining unto sinfull actions.* And let every sober man judge whether a bridle is fit to urge men to action, and not rather to restraine from action, and this is the force of the first Quotation. But this Authour through heat corrupting his imagination tooke a bridle for a spurre. His second testifies only this, that man doth nothing but what God decreed, and by his direction appointeth; and this also upon pregnant testimonies of scripture; never undertaking to shew Calvins interpretation to be false, or his accommodation of them to be incongruous. In the third he grants that God workes in the mind of men. In the 4. he saith that *God stirrs up the wills, and confirmes the purposes of wicked men for the execution of his judgment by Satan the minister of his wrath.* Where consider he doth this by *Satan*, that is he gives them over to *Satan* for this; so that 'tis *Satan* that stirres up their wills and confirmes their endeavours, by Gods permission without restraint either immediate or mediate by the ministry of his good angells; and all this is but to execute Gods judgments. And that it is just with God to punish sin with sin, both scripture testifies in divers places, and *Austin* confirmes with variety of Scripture testimonies, in his lib. 5. contra Julian: Pelag: cap. 3. The last is that God's worke it is to harden mans heart, and thereby prepare him to destruction? And let every sober reader that is not willing to be cheated both of his faith and honesty all at once, examine these places in Calvin, and the Scriptures whereby he proves that which he affirmes; and let him but aske the Authour these questions. If Calvin delivers nothing in all this but what he proves out of Scripture, why is he found fault with more then the word of God. If Scripture be mis-alleadged and mis-understood by him, why do not you confute him? 2 Though Calvin in all this makes no mention of Gods inclining wicked men to sinfull actions; yet *Austin* doth as before I have shewed, and that by variety of Scripture testimonies. And if this be to make God the Authour of sin, why hath he not so much ingenuity as to confesse at least in the close of all, that Calvin makes God the Authour of sin, no more then *Austin* doth; and neither of them more then the word of God doth, and therewithall renounce the Scriptures and turne Atheist. 3 As the Lord hardened the heart of *Pharaoh* to his destruction

tion, ſo did he the heart of *Sihon* alſo Nowſee what *Cardinall Caietan* writes upon thisvery place. *Utramq́, homines partẽ (ſpiritum & cor, hoc eſt ſuperiorem & inferiorem) male diſpoſitam à Deo intellige negativè penes dona gratuita; poſitivè autem quoad judicium, inclinationem & proſecutionem boni ſenſibilis. Ita quod Deus ſpiritum Regis durum (hoc eſt non cedentem petionibus) reddit, & non dando ei gratiam acquieſcendi, & coo operando eidem, ad affectum ſecuritatis & boni proprii, & ſimiliter roboravit cor ad affectum boni, victoriæ, & hujuſmodi. Each part of King Sihon, his ſpirit and heart, that is the upper and lower part being ill diſpoſed by God (underſtãd this negatively) as touching guifts of grace; but poſitively as touching his judgment, affection, and proſecution of a ſenſible good. So that the Lord made the Kings heart hard; that is not to yeild to the requeſt made, both by not giving grace to reſt ſatiſſied, and by cooperating with him, to the affecting of ſecurity and his own good. And in like manner he hardned his heart to the affecting of victory, and the like.* I have not heard that this my oppoſite hath been ever ready to cenſure *Caietan* for making God the Authour of all this; yet noe paſſage I am perſwaded throughout all *Calvin's* works can be found comparable unto this. Yet was *Caietan* noe Jeſuite, he need not ſpare his cenſures. *Deut:* 2. 30.

I come to the ſum of that which he hath delivered in a whole leafe. The firſt whereof is this, that we teach, That God appointed many miſerable men from all eternity to unavoidable torments Now that God appointed many ſom eternity to everlaſting torments, this Authour acknowledgeth as well as we. As for the avoidable condition of them, it is confeſſed on both ſides, that they are avoidable only by breaking off their ſinnes by repentance before their death; and by this we acknowledge them to be avoidable of all and every one, as well as they. But we ſay God doth not grant this grace to all. For he is not bound to give it to all, noe nor to any; but he vouchſafeth this grace to whom he will, and he denieth it to whom he will, and this St. *Paul* hath taught us, where he ſaith, *God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth.* The ſecond is, that we teach, *that God to bring about their intended ruine, decreed that they ſhould without remedie live & die in a ſtate of ſin.* To this I anſwer, that it is a moſt abſurd conceite, to make the tormenting of any man God's end. We have learnt of King *Solomon* that, *God made all things for himſelfe;* here is the end of his actions, the manifeſtation of his own glory And albeit, *he made the very wicked alſo againſt the day of evill;* yet the end thereof was, *for himſelfe,* as formerly ſpecified, that is for the manifeſtation of his juſt wrath, and that God hath power without any difference in the matter, to make ſome veſſells of wrath, and ſome of mercy, as he thinkes good. The Apoſtle plainely teacheth us, where he ſaith, *Hath not the Potter power over the clay of the ſame lump to make one veſſell unto honour, and another unto diſhonour.* And if any man's wicked proud heart make inſurrection againſt this truth, the Apoſtle hath taught us to ſtop his mouth with this, *ſhall the the thing formed ſay to him that formed it why haſt thou made me thus?* Shall not God have as much power over the maſſe of mankind, as the Potter hath over the clay? So that this is God's end not man's damnation, but his own glory. *Hæc loquendi ratio* ſaith *Calvin, this manner of ſpeech, finem creationis eſſe interitum æternum, the end of man's creation is his everlaſting deſtruction, nuſquam apud me occurret, ſhall never be found in my writing.* So *Beza* in his queſtions and anſwers, I ſay God hath ordained not *judicio, for judgment,* but *juſto judicio, for juſt judgment, that is to manifeſt his juſtice upon them.* Secondly, we deny that God ſuffers them to perſevere in their ſinfull courſes without giving them grace to repent, to the end that he may damne them; But with *Alvarez* every way ſtanding as much for abſolute Reprobation as *Calvin;* that God ſuffers them to ſin, and to perſevere therein, and damnes them for their ſin, to this end, namely, for the manifeſtation of the glory of his juſtice. And as for this Authour's opinion in premiſing the foreſight of ſin to the decree of damnation, I have already repreſented the manifeſt abſurdity thereof, as namely in this, that ſeing God cannot foreſee ſin, unleſſe he firſt decree to permit it, it followes that by his opinion, the decree to permit ſin muſt preceed the decree of damnation, that is ſin is firſt in intention, and then damnation. Whence it followes that if ſin be firſt in intention, it muſt be laſt in execution; and conſequently men ſhall be firſt damned for their ſin, and after that ſuffered to commit ſin; this is the glorious iſſue of the premiſes of this Authour. His third and laſt is, that by our doctrine, *God for the effecting of all this powerfully doth ſo governe and work upon the wills of Reprobates, that they have noe libertie or abilitie at all in the iſſue of avoiding their ſinnes, but muſt of neceſſitie commit them.* To this I anſwer, that no other power is requiſite for the effecting of all this; then 1. To ſuffer all men to fall in *Adam,* 2. To bring forth all men in originall ſinne, which alone deſerves damnation as Mr. *Hoord* confeſſeth, and as this Authour ſometimes read in his Lectures at Magdelen Hall. 3. Not to regenerate Reprobates, but to ſuffer them finally to perſevere in their *Rom:* 9. 21. *Cal:* opuſc: 735.

ungodly courses, without giving them grace to break off their sins by repentance .2. Yet we deny, that all power and ability is taken from Reprobates to avoid actuall sinnes: We grant willingly, neither Elect, nor Reprobate, have any power to avoid sinne originall, all of them being conceived and brought forth into the world in the corrupt masse. But as for actuall sin, not only regenerate have power to avoid that, and that in a gracious manner; but every Reprobate hath power to avoid that in a naturall manner. My reason is because though a good worke may be an act supernaturall; yet a sinfull work cannot be so, but every actuall sin is an act naturall for the ground and substance of it But every naturall & carnall man hath power freely, either to doe any act naturall or to abstaine from doing it, though when they abstaine from doing it, as from committing murther, adultery, theft, slaunder, or the like, they never abstaine from it in a gracious manner: Like as any morall good worke, they have libertie to doe, but they cannot doe it in a gracious manner. This proceeds meerly from the Spirit of regeneration; which Spirit of regeneration the Lord never bestowes upon any Reprobate.

Sect: 3.

M. Mason's Addit. p. 28. 29.

Thus they teach, and therefore by just consequence they make God the Authour of sin; as it will plainly appeare by these following considerations. 1. It is ordinary to impute sin to those who have not so great an hand in the production of it, as hath the Almighty, by the grounds of this opinion. For first, the Devill is called the Father of lies, and by the like reason of all other sinnes. And therefore he that committeth sinne, is said to be of the Devill, and to be the child of the Devill. And sin is called the the worke of the, Devill, which the Son of God appeared to loose. And why is the Devill so called, but because he doth egge and allure men by inward suggestions and outward temptations to fall into sin? This is all he doth or can doe. But God doth much more, if he necessitate. and by his decree first; and next by his powerfull and secret working in the soules of men, determine their wills irresistibly to sinen. For to determine is infinitely more then barely to perswade; for as much as sin must needs follow the determination, but not the perswasion of the will. God is therefore a truer cause of sin, by this doctrine then the Devill. 2. Wicked men are esteemed Authours of their own offences; because they plot, purpose, choose, & commit them, and are immediate Agents in the acting of them. But God by this opinion doth more; for he overruleth the projects & purposes of wicked men, and by an uncontroulable motion proceeding from an immutable decree, carrieth all their deliberations, resolutions, choices, and actions precisely that very way; so as they cannot chose but doe as they doe, whatsoever they may think to the contrary. They have indeed (*potentiam in se liberam*) a power in it selfe free to chose what they refuse, or to refuse what they chose, to determine themselves this way or that way, as liketh them best; but they have not (*Liberum usum*) a free use of this their power. God doth determine their will before it hath determined it selfe, and maketh them doe those only actions, which his omnipotent will hath determined, and not which their wills out of any absolute dominion over their own actions, have prescribed. More rightly therefore may God be called the Authour of those offences. For deeds whether good or bad are owned more truly by him that overruleth them, then by the servile instruments that only execute and doe them.

Jo: 8. 4.4. *1 Jo:* 3.8.10. *v.* 8.

3. Wicked counsellours and they who allure and advise men to sin, are accounted by God and men to be the causes of those sins to which they are the perswaders, and have been punished for those misdeeds which others through their instigations have committed. *Jezabell Ahab's* wife was reputed and punished as the murtherer of *Naboth*; because she counseled and contrived the doing of it as we may see, 1 *Kings* 21.23.25. But what is counselling to inforcing? Evill counsells may be refused, but an allmighty power cannot be resisted. God therefore that useth this (according to their doctrine) in the production of sins, is much more an Authour of them, then he that only useth the other.

Answer:

After two leaves spent, first in the charge; and secondly in proving that God is not the Authour of sin in a fumbling manner, and thirdly in representing the doctrine of our Divines at pleasure, now at length he comes to make it plainly appeare, *that by just consequence they make God the Authour of sin, as he saith, will plainly appeare by certaine considerations following:* which in few words come but to this in generall, namely, that God doth more then the Devill, or wicked counsellours in alluring and advizing others to sin, more then wicked persons in acting of their own sins. But by this discourse of his, he is as farre off as ever from proving that we make God the Authour of sin. For consider, either by doing more he understands, that God doth the same which the Devill & wicked mē do; & more: or though he does not the same, yet he doth that which is more then that. If his meaning be that God doth the same which the Devill & wicked men doe, this is notoriously untrue, considering thē as tempters, & advizers, and perswaders unto sin. For God on the contrary forbids sin, perswades to repentance, to obedience both by his word and by his spirit; and indeed the spirit workes not, but by the word which is called the sword of the spirit; All holines of life is compriſed within the compasse of ten commandements; these were given by the Lord frō mount *Sinai*, pronounced by the sound of a trūpet; to these the Lord calls his people saying, *stand in the waies and behold, and aske for the old way, which is the good way and walke therein & ye shall find rest unto your soules.* For the transgression of these the Lord expostulates with thē, *Heare ô heavens and hearken ô earth, I have nourished and brought up a people, & they have rebelled against me.* Whē they have gone astray he exhorts thē, and that most pathetically to returne by repentance, by promise of salvation, and threatning judgment if they doe not repent. *O Jerusalem wash thine heart from wickednes, that thou maist be saved*

Jer: 6.16. *Esa.* 1. *Jer:* 4. 14.

ſaved, how long ſhall thy wicked thoughts remaine within thee? I have ſeene thy adulteries, and thy neighings, the filthineſſe of thy whoredome on the hills, in the feilds, and thine abominations. Woe unto thee ô Jeruſalem, wilt thou not be made cleane? When ſhall it once be? Jer: 13. 27. And to provoak them the rather unto repentance, he repreſents himſelfe unto them as *eaſy to be intreated, as ſlow to wrath*, and one that *by his patience and long ſuffering leades them to repentance.* And to this end he gives charge to his Miniſters, namely, by repreſenting the gracious nature of God to admoniſh them of their ſinnes, to call them to repentance, to obedience. And to this purpoſe to repreſent his promiſes which he hath annexed unto godlineſſe, both the promiſes of this life, and the promiſes of a better life that is to come. Yea and his threats alſo both of judgments in the world to come, to the caſting both of body and ſoule into hell fire; and thereupon to exhort us to feare him above all others. And judgments of this world, as, famine, peſtilence, and the ſword of the enemie, *To deliver them over into the hands of beaſtly people, ſkilfull to deſtroy; To ſend Serpents, and Cockatrices among them that will not be charmed, and that ſhall ſting them; and that without all mercy.* Surely theſe are not the courſes of Satan or wicked counſellours. Therefore they doe not as God doth, neither doth God doe that which they doe and more alſo. 2. If it be ſaid that albeit the Lord doth not as the Devill doth, and wicked men doe in perſwading them to ſinne; yet he doth that which is more then this. I anſwer, that nevertheleſſe he cannot be accounted the Authour of ſinne, in caſe the doing of this alone doth conſtitute an Agent the Authour of ſinne. Now as formerly I have ſhewed this was the opinion of *Dominicus Soto*, and of the Divines of *Salamancha*: yea and *Vaſquez* the Jeſuite profeſſeth, that he was ever of that opinion. Againe if to doe more then this, be to become the Authour of ſin; both this Authour and all that are of his Spirit doe maintain as well we, that God doth that which is farre more then this. For I preſume he will not deny, but that God is he, and he alone, who doth ſupport our natures in the committing of ſin; & who maintaines our ſenſes in their vigour and quickneſſe, without which we could take noe pleaſure in ſin, and that concurres to every act of ſin, in the way of cauſe efficient, not morally, which alone makes one to become the Authour of ſin, by the judgment of Divines formerly mentioned; but phyſically and naturally, which no creature can doe, namely become a naturall coefficient cauſe to the act of another man's will. Nay which is moſt conſiderable, I preſume this Authour hath ſo much accuratenes in School-learning, as not to deny that when the Devill tempts us, or wicked counſellours doe tempt us to ſin, God concurres with them in this act, and that in the kind of a cauſe efficient phyſicall. *For in him we live and move and have our being*; what is it to have our being from him, but that he is the Authour of it in the kind of a cauſe efficient? In the ſame ſenſe doe we live in him, and in the ſame ſenſe doe we move in him. It ſtands us upon as much to maintaine this, as to maintaine that God is our Creatour. For unleſſe all things doe ſubſiſt in him, neither were all things created by him. Now this is a great deale more then to perſwade. For a weake man is able to perſwade, but noe creature is able to performe theſe parts which God doth in the act of every thing created by by him. So that hereby the Reader may evidently perceive, that the diſcourſe is as farre off as ever, from proving God by this Doctrine of ours to be the Authour of ſin, any more then he is conſtituted the Authour of ſin by the doctrine of this Interpolator. But I am content to examine the things he propoſeth particularly and ſeverely. *Act:* 17. 28.

1. *The Devill*, ſaith he, *doth only allure men by inward ſuggeſtions, and outward temptations to fall into ſinne: But God doth much more if he doe neceſſitate, and by his decree firſt; and next by his powerfull and ſecret working in the ſoules of men, determine their wills irreſiſtibly to ſinne. For to determine is infinitely more then to perſwade.* Now to this I have already anſwered by ſhewing. 1. That albeit God doth more then this, yet ſeeing he doth not this; if the doing of this alone conſtitutes one the Authour of ſin, as many great Divines have concurrently maintained; ſtill God is free from being the Authour of ſin. This Authour barely ſuppoſing, not once offering to prove the contrary. 2. Himſelfe confeſſeth that God concurres to the act of every ſinne, and that in the kind of a cauſe efficient naturall. And I may be as bold as to ſay of this, that it is infinitely more then to perſwade; like as he ſaith of God's determining the will and neceſſitating thereof. Now I proceed to a more particular examination of his diſcourſe. And here firſt I wonder not a little at this Authour's diſtinction of the Devill's inward ſuggeſtion from his outward temptations. For I confeſſe freely I know noe outward temptation of Satan, diſtinct from his inward ſuggeſtions. Outward occaſions and provocations to ſinne I know none wrought by Satan, any farther then as he in ſome caſes is God's

ungodly courses, without giving them grace to break off their sins by repentance .2. Yet we deny, that all power and ability is taken from Reprobates to avoid actuall sinnes: We grant willingly, neither Elect, nor Reprobate, have any power to avoid sinne originall, all of them being conceived and brought forth into the world in the corrupt masse. But as for actuall sin, not only regenerate have power to avoid that, and that in a gracious manner; but every Reprobate hath power to avoid that in a naturall manner. My reason is because though a good worke may be an act supernaturall; yet a sinfull work cannot be so, but every actuall sin is an act naturall for the ground and substance of it But every naturall & carnall man hath power freely, either to doe any act naturall or to abstaine from doing it, though when they abstaine from doing it, as from committing murther, aduktery, theft, slaunder, or the like, they never abstaine from it in a gracious manner: Like as any morall good worke, they have libertie to doe, but they cannot doe it in a gracious manner. This proceeds meerly from the Spirit of regeneration; which Spirit of regeneration the Lord never bestowes upon any Reprobate.

Sect: 3.

M. Mason's Addit. p. 28. 29. Thus they teach, and therefore by just consequence they make God the Authour of sin; as it will plainly appeare by these following considerations. 1. It is ordinary to impute sin to those who have not so great an hand in the production of it, as hath the Almighty, by the grounds of this opinion. For first, the Devill is called the Father of lies, and by the like reason of all other sinnes. And therefore he that committeth sinne, is said to be of the Devill, and to be the child of the Devill. And sin is called the the worke of the, Devill, which the Son of God appeared to loose. And why is the Devill so called, but because he doth egge and allure men by inward suggestions and outward temptations to fall into sin? This is all he doth or can doe. But God doth much more, if he necessitate. and by his decree first; and next by his powerfull and secret working in the soules of men, determine their wills irresistibly to sinen. For to determine is infinitely more then barely to perswade; for as much as sin must needs follow the determination, but not the perswasion of the will. God is therefore a truer cause of sin, by this doctrine then the Devill. 2. Wicked men are esteemed Authours of their own offences; because they plot, purpose, choose, & commit them, and are immediate Agents in the acting of them. But God by this opinion doth more: for he overruleth the projects & purposes of wicked men, and by an uncontroulable motion proceeding from an immutable decree, carrieth all their deliberations, resolutions, choices, and actions precisely that very way; so as they cannot chose but doe as they doe, whatsoever they may think to the contrary. They have indeed (*potentiam in se liberam*) a power in it selfe free to chose what they refuse, or to refuse what they chose, to determine themselves this way or that way, as liketh them best; but they have not (*Liberum usum*) a free use of this their power. God doth determine their will before it hath determined it selfe, and maketh them doe those only actions, which his omnipotent will hath determined, and not which their wills out of any absolute dominion over their own actions, have prescribed. More rightly therefore may God be called the Authour of those offences. For deeds whether good or bad are owned more truly by him that overruleth them, then by the servile instruments that only execute and doe them.

Jo: 8. 4.4. *1 Jo:* 3.8.10. *v.* 8.

3. Wicked counsellours and they who allure and advise men to sin, are accounted by God and men to be the causes of those sins to which they are the perswaders, and have been punished for those misdeeds which others through their instigations have committed. *Jezabell Ahab's* wife was reputed and punished as the murtherer of *Naboth*; because she counselled and contrived the doing of it as we may see, 1 *Kings* 21.23.25. But what is counselling to inforcing? Evill counsells may be refused, but an allmighty power cannot be resisted. God therefore that useth this (according to their doctrine) in the production of sins, is much more an Authour of them, then he that only useth the other.

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God's instrument, as in afflicting *Job*. For surely God hath not given over the world, or any part thereof to the goverment of Satan; this is in his own hand still; and hereby occasions and opportunities are offered from time to time for a man to advantage himselfe in sinfull courses, either in the way of profit, or satisfying his unclean lusts. And *Arminius* confesseth that *the administration of Arguments and occasions, which provoke to such an act, as cannot be committed by the creature without sinne, if not by God's intention, yet at least according to the creatures affection, and often according to the events that arise therehence.* This administration, I say *Arminius* confesseth, doth belong to the Divine providence. *And these arguments*, he saith, *are objected either to the mind* (of man,) *or to his senses outward or inward; and that either by the mediate worke of the creatures comming between, or by God's immediate action. And that the end of this Divine administration is to make tryall whether the creature will abstaine from sinne, even then, when it is provoked thereunto.* As, for the triall of *David*, was *Bathsheba* going forth to wash her selfe objected to *David*, whereupon he was inflamed with lust; *Joseph* was not, though farre more strongly sollicited by the temptations of his wanton Mistris. Secondly, to necessitate the will or determine the will are noe phrases of our Divines. The first is used only by *Bradwardine* (as at present I remember) sometimes *Arch-Bishop* elect of *Canterbury*; The other is that phrase of the *Dominicans*. Now they are of age and able to answer for themselves. Why doth not this Authour answer a chapter or two in *Bradwardine*, a chapter or two in *Alvarez*, where they dispute this and resolve the question affirmatively. Surely hereby he should performe a worke more worthy of a Scholasticall Divine, then by so hungry a discourse as this. Secondly, consider neither *Bradwardine* maintaines that God necessitates; nor *Alvarez* that God determines the will to sinne, but to every naturall act, in which kind of acts sinne is to be found: Why then should this Authour carry himselfe thus in his crimination? We know sin is meerly privative in the formall notion thereof; an obliquitie such as concerning which, *Austine* hath long agoe delivered, that it hath noe efficient cause, but deficient only. And divers waies Divines have shewed how God may be the authour of the act, yet not the Authour of the sin, and illustrated it by various similitudes. As of a man riding upon a lame horse, he makes him goe, but doth not make him halt. The sun shining upon a dung-mixton, makes it evaporate, but doth not make it stinke. The sun makes flowers to evaporate and send forth their savours as well as a dung-mixton; but that the one evaporates a sweet odour the other an unsavory, is frō the nature of things themselves on which the sun beates. In like sort the Sun by the heat thereof provokes all things to engender according to their kinds, even frogs and toades & snakes, as well as other creatures profitable for the use of man in the way of food; yea of vipers flesh good use is made in the way of physicke. And God knowes how to make good use even of the sinnes of men, and of the rage and malice of Satan. If an underwheele being out of his place, the upper wheele in a jacke or clocke will set him going in a wrong way, as well as all the rest in a right way; his motion is from the upper wheele, his irregular motion from himselfe. A good Scribe meeting with moist paper will make but sorry worke The writing is from himselfe, the blurring from the moistnesse of the paper: on this very question whether the act of sinne be from God, *Aquinas* maintaining the affirmative, illustrates it by a distinction of the halting motion of a lame legge; the motion, saith he, is from the soule, the halting is frō the imperfection of the Organ, the infirmitie of the legge. Yet this Authour carrieth it hand over head, as if to be the Authour of the action, were to be the sinne; not considering that himselfe maintaines, that God is the Authour of the action, and that in the kind of a cause efficient naturall. Thirdly, when *Bradwardine* maintaines that God necessitates the will to every good act thereof, he withall professeth that he necessitates it *ad liberum actum suum* that is to worke every act thereof, freely. Soe when *Alvarez* maintaines that God determinates the will to every act thereof, he withall maintaines that God determines the will to worke freely: and so *Aquinas*. For when he workes upon contingent causes, he moves thē to bring forth their effects contingently; like as when he workes upon necessary causes, he moves them to produce their effects necessarily. And like as to move contingent causes to produce their effects contingently, is to move them to produce their effects with a possibility to the contrary. Soe to move free causes, to produce their effects freely, is to move them to produce their effects with an active power to the contrary. But to proceed, whereas he saith, that sinne must needs follow the determination; it is as true. 1. In this Authour's judgment, that it must needs follow upon God's cōcurrence to this act. If he say that this concurrēce is necessary to every act, I answer, it is necessary to the substance of every act,

Disput. theol. pag. 108.

but

but not at all required to the ſinne; though this Authour carieth it blindfold after this manner. Secondly, ſo ſay we is determination required to the ſubſtance of every act. And God's concourſe with the creature is not coordinate, like as one man concurres with another in moving a timber logge, which is the expreſſion of the Jeſuites, thereby manifeſting the vileneſſe of their opinion, as we can demonſtrate, and that more waies then one by evident demonſtration, as I have allready ſhewed in my *Vindiciæ*. Let this Authour anſwer thoſe digreſſions if he can, I am confident he will never anſwer them while his head is hot; nor all the Rabble of the *Arminians*. We know God is the firſt cauſe, and all other are but ſecond cauſes in comparison to him. Yet we willingly confeſſe that the providence of God is wonderfull and of a myſterious nature in this; but ſuch as whereunto the Scripture gives pregnant teſtimonie, as ſcarce to any thing more. So jealous he is leaſt his providence ſhould be denied in evill, wherein indeed it is moſt wonderfull; and he takes unto himſelfe the hardning of men's hearts, and blinding of their mindes, and proſtituting them to abominable courſes, even to vile affections and thereby to puniſh ſinne with ſin, as *Rom*: 1. Therein ſaith the Apoſtle, *they received the recompence of their errour*. This hath *Auſtine* alſo by Scripture ſuggeſtion teſtified at large in his book. *De gratiâ & Libero arbitrio* in two large chap: & likewiſe in his fifth book againſt *Julian* the *Pelagian* & third *chap*: this alſo the Adverſaries have been driven to confeſſe in a ſtrange manner, as to give inſtance firſt in *Bellarmine* whoſe words are theſe. *God* ſaith he, *præſidet ipſis voluntatibus eaſq; regit & gubernat, torquet & flectit in iis inviſibiliter operando, ut licet vitio proprio malæ ſint, tamen à divinâ providentiâ ad unum potius malum quàm ad aliud, non poſitivè, ſed permiſſivè ordinentur. God is preſident over the Wills, and ſo rules and governes, wreſts & turns them, working inviſibly in them, that albeit through their own fault they are evill, yet by the divine providence they are ordered to one evill rather then to another, not poſitively but permiſſively*. What one of our Divines hath ſaid more then this comes to, or ſo much, profeſſing that God rules and governes the wills of men by his inviſible operation, ordering them to one evill rather then to another which St. *Auſtine* calles inclining them? And the Prophet *David* we know prayes, that God would *encline his heart unto his teſtimonies and not to covetouſneſſe*, arguing thereby that God hath power to incline a man's heart to covetouſneſſe. But *Bellarmine* ſaith more then this, in ſaying that, *God wreſtes and bends them, torquet & flectit*; thoſe are his words; although he ſeemes to blaſt all this in the end by ſaying that this is done *permiſſivè*, *by permiſſion*, in flat contradiction to himſelfe, whoſe expreſſe purpoſe is to ſhew that God doth not only ſuffer wicked men to performe evill acts, and to deſert the godly, but ſomewhat elſe alſo, namely, to rule and governe their wills, to wreſt and bend them by an inviſible working in them, to commit one evill rather then another. Secondly conſider their generall doctrine of *congruous grace*, ſtanding in a neceſſary conformity and correſpondency to another vile doctrine of theirs concerning the foreknowledge of God, called by them *Scientia media*. By this doctrine of theirs God foreſees in what caſe and by what motives man being moved to abſtaine from this or that ſinne, he will abſtaine from it: And againe in what caſe and after what manner being moved to abſtaine from ſinne, he will not abſtaine from it. And God makes choice at his pleaſure how to move him, whether after ſuch a manner in which caſe he foreſees he will abſtaine from ſinne; or after another manner in which caſe he foreſees he will not abſtaine. Now who is ſo blind as not to obſerve, that as often as a man ſinneth, it is the will of God, that is the decree of God he ſhall ſin, by the very groundes received by our Adverſaries. Thus much as touching my firſt anſwer concerning the neceſſary conſequence of ſinne upon God's operation to be acknowledged by our Adverſaries, according to the tenour of their own doctrine, as well as by us. 2. My ſecond anſwer is this. Albeit God determines the will to any vertuous act, morally good; whether in the way of doing ſome morall good, or in the way of abſtaining from ſome morall evill; yet unleſſe God give man ſome faith and love, as fountaines out of which every morall worke muſt proceed, that it may be acceptable with God; ſuch an one ſhall neceſſarily ſinne, though not as touching the act done, yet as touching the manner of doing; for as much as without true faith and love he can neither performe any morall good worke, nor abſtaine from any morall evill worke in a gracious manner. Now let every ſober man judge, whether God be bound to give every man faith and love, without which all is one as touching the preſerving a man from ſinne in generall, whether the will of man be determined by God, to an act morally good, or morally evill. In each of which God determines the will only to the ſubſtance of the act: So that whether God cooperates to the ſubſtance of the act or noe, and whether this cooperation be by way of determining the will or noe; ſtill there will

Lib. 2. digreſ. 7. & 9.

Note

will be a necessary consequence of sinne to every act of man, if God doth not bestow the spirit of regeneration upon him, which spirit of God we know was given to our first parents; though not under this notion of the Spirit of regeneration, and whereof they were justly bereaved upon the first sinne committed by them; And because all we have been derived from them since their fall, therefore we have received our natures from them deprived of the Spirit of God, and therein continue untill such time as it pleaseth God for Christ sake, to restore it unto us, which he doth in regenerating us. Thirdly, and lastly upon the very permission of sin, it followes necessarily that sin shall be, by the doctrine not of *Piscator* only, but of *Vorstius* and *Arminius* also; yea and of the learned amongst the Papists, as *Navarettus* and *Penottus*: And the very definition of Permission of sinne by *Arminians* justifies it; as also the Jesuites doctrine concerning *gratiâ congruâ*. For if God will not afford that grace, upon the grant whereof men will abstaine from sin, as God well knowes; but such a grace, upon the grant whereof man will abstaine from sin, which also is well known unto God; doth it not manifestly follow that such a one shall sinne, though not sinne necessarily, but contingently and freely. 2. In the next place he tells us that wicked men are esteemed Authours of their offences: Now by the way this is not so; To be a sinner is one thing, to be an Authour of sinne is another thing. And to be an Authour of sinne is in reference rather to anothers sinne, then to ones owne. And *Martinius* tells me that, *Authour est cujus autoritate & sententiâ aliquid fit, cujus testimonio ut aliquid credamus, adducimur. Qui hortatur ut fiat. Itaq; authorem & dissuasorem Cicero opponit. He is the authour by whose authority and judgment a thing is done, by whose testimonie we are induced to beleive ought; who exhorts to the doing of ought. And therefore Cicero makes Authour and disswader opposite.* But to proceed with this Authour who set the Printer on work for the edition of this peice. *Men*, he saith, *doe plot purpose, choose and commit offences, and are immediate agents in the acting of them. But God by this opinion doth more; for he overuleth the projects and purposes of wicked men, and by an uncontroulable motion, proceeding from an immutable decree, carrieth all their deliberations, resolutions, choices, and actions precisely that very way, so as they cannot choose but do, as they doe, whatsoever they may thinke to the contrary.* To which I answer, that it becomes every man to give the Divell his right, & and not make him worse then he is, nor wicked men neither. Now noe wicked man doth will or choose sinne as sinne *Nemo vult esse incontinens*, saith *Aristotle*, although they doe such things as doe sufficiently evidence their incontinent disposition. For the object of the will is only good; neither can any thing be willed by man, but, *sub ratione boni, under the shew of good*: whether this good be in the kind of profit, or in the kind of pleasure, or in the kind of honesty. So *Lucretia* when she killed her selfe, she did it for the preservation of the integrity of her mind in the opinion of the world, and that they might know that she consented not unto *Tarquinius*; but was forced by him. So then the act is it they doe or choose to doe for some motive or other, which whether it be pleasure or profit, or credit they get thereby, that makes not the act sinfull, but only that it is against some law or other, forbidding it. And this act, (all sides confesse) is the worke of God, as well as the worke of man; as *in whom* we move, like as *in him we live, and have our being*. And *Bradwardine* maintaines that of every act of the creature God is a more immediate cause then the creature it selfe, whose act it is. This he proves of the creatures conservation, of the creatures action, of the creatures motiõ; & to this he proceeds by certaine degrees. And in all this God doth not transgresse any law, as man doth too often in the performing of many a naturall act: and only in performing acts naturall is sinne committed, never in performing any act supernaturall; all such acts are in a peculiar manner the work of grace. 2. God overruleth no man's good projects or purposes, otherwise then as when accepting their intentions, he will not have them put such in execution; because perhaps he hath reserved that for another time & person. As when *David* was purposed to build God an house, & was encouraged therein by *Nathan*: yet the Lord sent *Nathan* shortly unto *David* to give him to understand, that he reserved that work for *Solomon* his Son; yet so well accepting *David's* purpose that he promised to build his house. But if God at any time overruleth the wicked projects and purposes of men, whether good or evill, let us blesse him rather for this then curse him; by cursing them that maintaine this good providence. Yet in overruling them, whether he doth it immediately, or by the ministry of his good Angells; not by working immediately upon the will, as this Authour dreameth. For that is not the way to worke agreably to the reasonable nature of man (though so he worke also by generall influence affoarded cõmon to all agents) but by representing to the understanding congruous motives to divert them from that they doe intend; whether in a gracious manner

Act: 17.

l.1.c.2.3.4.

manner, as he diverted *David* from his purpoſe to maſſacre the whole houſe of *Nabal*; or only in a naturall way, whereby he diverts wicked men from their ungodly deſignes, by repreſenting the danger thereof, to make them feare, & ſo to reſtraine them. Will the Devill himſelfe be over prone to blaſpheme God for this? yet in this alone he doth more then either the Devill or man can doe; though this be not all that he doth. For he doth cooperate to every deſigne and execution of the creature, be it never ſo abominable; which neither man, nor Angells can doe. And he hath power to give over unto Satan, and to harden any man, and that more effectully then any Devill can doe. The Devill could not ſay with truth that *He* would *harden Pharaoh's heart*, that he ſhould not let Iſrael goe. Nor when he had let them goe, *I will harden Pharaoh's heart that he ſhall follow after them*, to bring them back. The Devill could not ſay in truth, as the Lord did to *David*, *I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them to thy neighbour, and he ſhall lye with thy wives in the ſight of the ſunne.* Nor as he ſaid to *Jeroboam*, *Behold I will rent the kingdome out of the hands of Solomon, and will give ten tribes to thee.* Nay the very permiſſiō of ſin ſo as whereby it ſhall infallibly come to paſſe, is not in the power of any creature, but in God alone. And ſhall it follow, that becauſe God doth more, both as touching the act it ſelfe, and touching the ſinfull condition of it, then any creature can doe, therefore God is the Authour of ſinne? whereas when God moves a man or carrieth him on to any good morall workes, whether in doing that which is vertuous, or abſtaining from that which is vitious, this man ſhall certainely ſinne, though not in ſo great a degree, unleſſe God be pleaſed over and above to regenerate him, and to beſtow faith, and love on him, for as much as in this caſe, though he doe an act vertuous, yet ſhall he not doe it in a gracious māner. & though he doe abſtaine frōan act vitious yet he ſhall not abſtaine frō it in a gracious manner. Let this man therefore proceed, & maintaine (if he thinks good) that except God doth beſtow the ſpirit of regeneration upon all and every one throughout the world, he is the Authour of ſinne, not only when he moves them to ſuch acts which are evill, but alſo when he moves them to the doing of ſuch as are vertuous, or to the abſtaining from thoſe that are vitious. As for his phraſes noe wiſe man will regard them, but only ſuch as are content to feed on huskes for want of better food. As, when he talkes of *motion uncontroulable*, which makes a noiſe, as if men's wills would controule his motion, but cannot: whereas God as the firſt mover moves the creature moſt congruouſly unto his nature; without which motion of his the creature could not move at all. The like noyſes makes the phraſe *immutable decree*; as empty things many times give the greateſt ſound: whereas by vertue of God's immutable decree it is, that it cannot otherwiſe be; then that as neceſſary things cannot but come to paſſe neceſſarily; ſo contingent things cannot but come to paſſe contingently, and the free actions of men freely. But by the way he manifeſts how he licks his lips, at a *Mutable decree of God*, even of that God with whom, as St. *James* ſpeaketh, *there is no variableneſſe, nor ſhadow of change.* He doth acknowledge, we maintaine, *potentiam in ſe liberam*; but then he ſaith, we doe not maintaine, *liberum uſum*; a moſt abſurd diſtinction. For noe power deſerves to be ſtiled free, ſave that it is of free uſe and exerciſe. And what a prodigious thing is it to affirme, that it is not within the almighty power of God to cauſe that this or that ſhall be done by a reaſonable creature freely: this is it that *Bradwardine* propoſeth to the judgment of all to conſider, whether it be not an unreaſonable thing to deny this unto God. *God doth determine their will before it hath determined it ſelfe, and maketh them doe thoſe only actions, which his omnipotent will hath determined, and not which their wills out of any abſolute dominion over their own actions, have preſcribed.* Thus he relates the opinion of our Divines; whereas neither determining, nor neceſſitating (as I ſaid before) are the expreſſions of our Divines, but of Papiſts; yet he laies not this to the charge of Papiſt's: Noe nor to the charge of *Bellarmine*, for ſaying that God doth not only rule, and governe, but wreſt and bend them, and that to one evill rather then to an other. If Scholars of our Univerſities uſe any ſuch phraſes, it is no other then they find in uſe among School-divines. It is true indeed Jeſuites oppoſe the *Dominicans* in this. This Authour ſides with the Jeſuites, but why doth he not take to taske any one chapter in *Alvarez* on this point to anſwer, to overthrow their grounds, which are no other then the very word of God, and cleare reaſon doth juſtifie. And the ground of the Jeſuites in oppoſing, is meerely an invention of their own, concerning a certaine knowledge of God called *a middle knowledge*; a vile invention, anda palpable untruth, and controulable of manifeſt contradiction. For they ſuppoſe a thing knowable by God, as future, before God's will hath paſſed upon it to make it future, being in it's own nature meerly poſſible; and conſequently cannot paſſe out of the condition of a thing meerly poſſible, into the

condition

condition of a thing future without a cauſe. Now noe cauſe can be deviſed hereof with any colour of reaſon, but the will of God. For firſt, the cauſe hereof muſt be eternall, ſeeing the thing it ſelfe, of the cauſe whereof we diſpute, is eternall, to wit, the fruition of any thing. This I ſay was eternall, for it is known with God from all eternity. Now there is noe eternall cauſe to be found, but in God alone, therefore the cauſe why things meerly poſſible in their own nature, became future, and that from everlaſting, muſt be found in God alone. Therefore it muſt either be the will of God; or the knowledge of God that did make it future; and ſeing the knowledge of God rather ſuppoſeth them to be future, then makes them ſo; what remaines but that the will of God muſt neceſſarily be the cauſe hereof? Nay conſider whether the Jeſuites themſelves doe not manifeſt more ingenuity by farre, then this boiſterous *Theologue*, that thinks to carry all with the blaſt of his words, the reſolution of whoſe arguments generally, neither having the word of God for their ground; nor any confeſt principle of reaſon. Whereas not the greateſt Angell of God will take upon him ſuch an author tative manner of diſcourſe. For did we grant, that *God by his Allmighty will did impoſe any neceſſity upon our wills.* Yet *Suarez* confeſſeth that ſo to worke, *doth neither involve any contradiction, nor exceed the Allmighty power of God:* Whereas we are ready to prove and have already proved, that their doctrine of God's concourſe without ſubordination of the ſecond cauſes to the firſt, implies flat contradiction. We ſay the wills determination of it ſelfe is the worke of God, otherwiſe faith and love and every gracious act ſhall not be the worke of God. Againe the wills determination of it ſelfe, is no other then the wills operation; and this Authour that oppoſeth us dares not deny the wills opperation to be the worke of God. But what School divine can he produce that delivers himſelfe in ſo abſurd a manner; as to ſay that God firſt determines the will, and that afterwards the will determines it ſelfe; eſpecially ſpeaking of ſuch actions of the will as are produced by the power of nature? The wills determination of it ſelfe, we ſay, is the worke of God moving the creature agreably to the nature thereof; that is to be carried neceſſarily to that which is it's end, and appeares to be good *in genere convenientis*: and freely to the meanes, which appeare to be good, *in genere conducentis*, as fit to pronounce the end intended. All confeſſing (*Durand* excepted) that God works the act; the queſtion whether he works the act abſolutely, the will a ſecond agent ſubordinate unto God, as to it's Creatour? Or conditionally, *modo vellimus*, provided that we will it, God the firſt agent ſubordinate to the will of the creature? This Authour will have it to be wrought by God, that is conditionally, in dependance upon, and expectation of the operation of the creature, which we ſay is moſt abſurd. Firſt becauſe thus the firſt agent is made ſubordinate to the ſecond agent, which is moſt unaturall. Secondly, obſerve a manifeſt contradiction. For the queſtion is about, *actus volendi, the act of willing*, in man. Now if God produce this act upon ſuppoſition, that man produceth this act, then the ſame act is produced by God upon ſuppoſition, that it is produced by man. If it be produced by man, what need is there of God's producing it by way of ſupplement? Thirdly, by this meanes the thing is made the condition of it ſelfe. For hereby it is ſaid, this act is made upon condition that it doth exiſt; & ſo the ſelfe ſame thing ſhall be before & after it ſelfe. 4. Thus man's production of the act ſhall be noe worke of God, which holds off faith and repentance, as well as of any naturall act, in this Authours opinion. Fiftly, It is not poſſible the will can produce the act unleſſe God produceth it, If then God doth not produce it unleſſe the will doth produce it, in this caſe there ſhall be noe act produced. For if I goe not to London unleſſe you goe with me; nor you goe to London unleſſe I goe with you; here is no going at all till one faith I ſay I goe, and his reſolution carrieth the other with him if the others depend thereupon. 6 Whereas to helpe at a dead lift the Jeſuiticall doctrine of, *Scientia media, middle knowledge*, is called in after this manner; God foreſeing that at ſuch an inſtant the will of man will produce ſuch an act, if God be pleaſed to concurre; and upon this foreknowled e God reſolves to concurre. This doctrine I have already confounded by ſhewing the apparent falſity of this ſuppoſition. For ſeeing the wills producing ſuch an act at ſuch an inſtant, is a thing merly poſſible in it's own nature, & no more future then not future; It is impoſſible that this ſhould paſſe out of the condition of a thing meerly poſſible into the conditiō of a thing future without a cauſe: And noe cauſe hereof can be but the will of God, as I have often proved. It followes that the wills producing ſuch an act, depends rather upon the will of God to have it produced, then on the contrary, that Gods producing ſuch an act, dependes upon the creatur's will to produce it. As for that which followes of the abſolute dominion that the will of the creature ſhould have over it's action (I preſume he meanes independent) it founds

Suarez: de auxil. lib. 1. c. 2. num: 7.

more

more like the voice of the Devill, then of a ſober Chriſtian. Yet it is more then I know that Lucifer himſelfe challengeth any ſuch abſolute Dominion over his actions unto himſelfe; If he doth, I know noe greater ſinne that hee or the creature can be guilty of; unleſſe in caſe groſſe ignorance doth excuſe it. To deny God to be the firſt Agent is to deny his God-head; and if hee be, *primum agens*, hee muſt be *primum liberum* too, the firſt free agent. And to make our ſelves to be *prima libera*, *the firſt free agents*, what is other then to advance our ſelves into the very Throne of God's Soveraigntie; and doe wee not feare leaſt his wrath ſmoake us thence. And if all this that hee contends for were granted him, that nothing but mere neceſſitie were found in the motion of men's wills; yet *Suarez* will juſtifie us from ſpeaking contradiction, or delivering ought that exceeds the compaſſe of God's ommipotencie. And what if all the world were innocent, yet God ſhould not be unjuſt in caſting the moſt innocent creature into hell fire; as *Medina* profeſſeth, and that by the unanimous conſent of Divines, and *Vaſquez* the Jeſuite acknowledgeth this to be in the power of God as he is Lord of life and death, and in the laſt chapter of the booke, *de prædeſtinatione & gratiâ* which goes under *Auſtin's* name, there is an expreſſe paſſage to juſtifie it. And albeit that worke be not *Auſtin's*, yet it is lately juſtified to be the worke of a great follower of *Auſtin's*, and as Orthodoxe as he; namely, the worke of *Fulgentius* as *Raynaudus* the Jeſuite hath lately proved, and juſtified that paſſage alſo; together with that which is uſually brought by School-Divines to prove it out of the twelfth chapter of *Wiſedome*, and ſhewes the right reading, as followed by *Auſtin* and *Gregory*. And withall repreſents a pregnant paſſage taken out of the fifteenth Homily of *Macarius* to the ſame purpoſe. And out of *Chryſoſtome* in his 2. *De compunctione cordis*, *about the end thereof*. And out of *Auſtin* upon *Pſalme* the ſeventieth, about the beginning. And to theſe he addeth *Ariminenſis*, *Cameracenſis*, *Serarius*, and *Lorinus*, all maintaining the ſame. And this is evident by conſideration of the power, which it pleaſed the Lord to execute upon his holy Son, and our bleſſed Saviour, and by the power which he gives us over brute creatures. This I ſay, if all that he contends for were granted, ſhould rather be concluded therehence, namely, that in this caſe the creature ſhould be innocent, then that God ſhould be the Authour of ſinne; eſpecially conſidering that God performes in all this noe other thing then belongs unto him of neceſſitie; as without which his moving of the ſecond cauſes, it were impoſſible the creature ſhould worke at all, which we have made good, by ſhewing the manifeſt abſurdity of their contrary doctrine, who maintaine a bare concourſe Divine either in ſubordination unto the agency of the creature, or without ſubordinating the operation of the creature, to motion Divine. But we doe ſubordinate it, as without which the ſecond cauſe could not worke at all, and by vertue whereof it doth worke, and that freely, ſo farre forth as liberty of will is competent to a creature; but not ſo as to make the creature compeere with his Creatour. Let man be a ſecond free Agent, but let our God that made us evermore be the firſt free Agent; leaſt otherwiſe we ſhall deny him the ſame power over his creatures, *that the Potter hath over the clay of the ſame lumpe to make one veſſell unto honour and another unto diſhonour*. This power in my maker, the Lord hath given me eyes to diſcerne as taught us in his holy word, and an heart to ſubmit unto it; and to his providence in governing my will, even in the worſt actions that ever were committed by me, without any repining humour againſt his hand; though I thinke it lawfull for us in an holy manner to expoſtulate with God ſometimes in the Prophets language and ſay, *Lord why haſt thou cauſed us to erre from thy waies and hardened our hearts againſt thy feare?* Which yet I confeſſe he brings to paſſe at noe time, *infundendo malitiam*, *by infuſing any malice into me*, who naturally have more then enough of that leaven in me; but, *non infundendo gratiam*, not quickning in me that holy feare, which he hath planted in me, of which grace I confeſſe willingly, I have a great deale leſſe then I deſire, though the leaſt meaſure of it is a great deale more then I doe or can deſerve. Neither ſhall I ever learne of this Authour after his manner to blaſpheme God if at any time hee ſhall harden my heart againſt his feare. Though this Authour ſpeakes commonly with a full and foule mouth, yet his arguments are lanke and leane; and of noe ſubſtance but words. As

Raynaud: in in Vindicatio-ni.

when hee ſaith that, *God over-rules men's wills* by our opinion. Now to over-rule a man is to carry him in deſpight of his teeth. Wee ſay noe ſuch thing but that God moves every creature to worke agreably to it's nature, neceſſary things neceſſarily, contingent things contingently, free Agents freely; though nothing comes to paſſe by the free agency of any creature, but what God from all eternity, by his unchangable counſell hath determined to come to paſſe. As the eleventh Article of Ireland doth profeſſe by the unanimous conſent of the ArchBiſhop, Biſhops and Clergy of that Kingdome, when thoſe Articles were made. So I ſpeake warily and circumſpectly, the rather becauſe one Doctour *Heylin* doth in a booke intituled, *The Hiſtory of the Sabbath*, profeſſe, Chapter 8. page 259. *That, that whole booke of Articles is now called in, and in the place thereof, the Articles of the Church of Ireland confirmed by Parliament in that Kingdome. Anno* 1631. A thing I willingly confeſſe at firſt ſight ſeemed incredible unto mee; namely, that Articles of Religion agreed upon in the dayes of King *James*, ſhould be revoked in the dayes of King *Charles*; but expect to heare the truth of that relation. For the Authour thereof hath never as yet deſerved ſo much credit at my hands, as to be believed in ſuch a particular as this. But to returne, this Authours text is nothing anſwerable to the margent. For firſt, *imperare* to command, is one thing, and to over-rule is another thing: though he that doth, *imperare* command ought, is commonly accounted the Authour thereof, as a cauſe Morall, from whom comes the beginning of ſuch a worke. But utterly deny that God commands evill, and the truth is wee acknowledge noe other notion of evill then ſuch as the Apoſtle expreſſeth in calling it ἀνομία an incongruitie to the law of God, which law commands ſomethings and forbids other things. I come to his third reaſon. 3. I grant wicked counſellours and perſwaders are deſervedly accounted the Authours of ſinne: The common uſe and acception of the words as I ſhewed in anſwer to the firſt, is obſerved to denote ſuch. Therefore *Cicero* makes Authour and diſſwader oppoſite; and by law they are puniſhable in the ſame degree with the Actors. But God is noe counſellour or perſwader to any lewd courſe, but forbids it, and diſſwades it, and that with denuntiation of the greateſt judgments among trangreſſours. 2. I willingly confeſſe that councelling is farre inferiour to enforcing; yet in Scripture phraſe earneſt intreaty, or command is oftentimes expreſt by compelling as *Mat*, 14. 22. *Mark*: 6. 45. *Luk*: 14. 23. *Gala*: 6. 12, and 2. 14. 1 *Sam*: 28. 23. 2 *Chron*: 21. 11. And noe marvaile for hereby many times men are drawen full ſore againſt their wills to doe that which they would not. It is true God's power cannot be reſiſted, but neither hath any man any will to reſiſt that motion of God whereby he workes agreable to their natures, then indeed there were place for reſiſting. If the Lord carrieth on a covetous perſon, ſuch as *Achan* to covet a wedge of gold and a Babyloniſh garment, and coveting it move him accordingly to take it, and convey it away ſecretly, and hide it in his tent, what reſiſtance doth he make in all this? Or what is done in all this leſſe agreably to his covetous diſpoſition, then to the diſpoſition of Toades and Addars, when he moves them according to their nature to ſting and poyſon? So he moved the Babylonians compared to Serpents and Cockatrices to ſting a wicked people. Doe not the Scriptures plainly profeſſe that God did ſend them? Is not *Aſſur* in this reſpect called, *the Rod of God's wrath and the ſtaffe in his hand?* Was it not called the Lords indignation? Is he not compared to an axe and a ſawe, *ſhall the axe boaſt it ſelfe againſt him that heweth therewith? Or ſhall the ſaw extoll it ſelfe againſt him that moveth it?* Still he confounds the act with the ſinfulneſſe thereof, ſpeaking of God's producing ſinnes; whereas ſinne is never produced, it being only an obliquity conſequent unto the act of ſuch a worker as is ſubject to a law. And our Adverſaries confeſſe that God is the cauſe of the act; as well as we. Yet will they not hereby be driven; to profeſſe that in producing the act he produceth the ſin. As for that which he ſpeaks of *Inforcing*, we may well pitty him, that when he wants ſtrength of reaſon, he ſupplies that by phraſes. We deny that God inforceth any man's will. Nay it is the generall rule of Schooles, that, *voluntas non poteſt cogi, the will cannot be forced:* We maintaine that every act of the will, eſpecially in naturall things (ſuch as a ſinfull act muſt needs be: for only gracious acts are ſupernaturall) is not only voluntary (which is ſufficient

Jer: 8.17.

Eſ: 10. 15.

is ſufficient to preſerve it from being forced)but free alſo, by as much libertie as the creature is capable of, only we deny that the will of man is *primum liberum*, *a firſt free agent*, that is the prerogative of God alone, the firſt mover of all, and the ſupreme Agent thus: I have diſpatched my anſwer to his firſt reaſon conſiſting of three parts I come unto the ſecond.

Sect: 4.

If we could find out a King that ſhould ſo carry himſelfe in procuring the ruine and the offences of any Subjects, as (by this opinion) God doth in the affecting of the damnation and tranſgreſſions of Reprobates, we would all charge him with the ruine and ſinnes of thoſe his Subjects. Who would not abhorre, ſaith *Moulin*, a King ſpeaking thus. I will have this man hang'd, and that I may hang him juſtly, I will have him murder or ſteale. This King ſaith he ſhould not only make an innocent man miſerable, *ſed & ſceleratum*, *but wicked too*, and ſhould puniſh him for that offence (*cujus ipſe cauſa eſſet*) *of wich himſelfe was the cauſe*. It is a cleare caſe, *Tiberius*, as *Suetonius* reports, having a purpoſe to put ſome Virgins to death, becauſe it was not lawfull among the Romans to ſtrangle Virgins, cauſed them all to be deflouered by the hang-man, that ſo they might be ſtrangled. Who will not ſay that *Tiberius* was the principall Authour of the deflouring of thoſe Maides? In like manner (ſay the *Supralapſarians*) God hath a purpoſe of putting great ſtore of men to the ſecond death; but becauſe it is not lawfull for him by reaſon of his Juſtice, to put to death men innocent and without blame, he hath decreed that the Devill ſhall deflowre them, that afterwards he may damne them It followeth therefore that God is the maine cauſe of thoſe their ſinnes.

M. Maſon's Addit. 2. p. 29. 30.

Molin. Anat. c. 12. de prædeſt. pag. 37.

Sueton. vit. Tib. cap. 61.

If a King ſhould carry himſelfe as God did in *hardning Pharaoh's heart that he ſhould not let Iſrael goe*; and when he had let Iſrael goe, *to harden his heart that he ſhould follow after them*; we would acknowledge ſuch a one, not to be man but God. And then ſurely whatſoever our *Arminians* would thinke of ſuch a one, we would thinke noe otherwiſe then *Solomon* did of him of whom he profeſſed, that, *he made all things for himſelfe, even the wicked againſt the day of evill*. If God doth but permit a man to will this or that, *neceſſe eſt*, ſaith *Arminius*, *it muſt needs be, ut nullo argumentorum genere perſuadeatur ad nolendum, that noe kind of argument ſhall perſwade ſuch one to abſtaine from willing it*. And I hope *Arminius* hath as great auhourity with this Authour, as Mr. *Moulin* deſerves to have with us. Noe King hath power to diſpenſe any ſuch providence as this. St. *Paul* tells us plainly, that, *God hath ordained ſome unto wrath*; and as *he hath made of the ſame lumpe ſome veſſells unto honour*, ſo *hath he made other veſſells unto diſhonour*. *The Lord profeſſeth that he kept Abimelech from ſinning againſt him*. Thus the Lord could deale with all if it pleaſed him; Why doth he not? Is it not for the manifeſtation of his own glory? For to this purpoſe he hath made all things. And that, *he ſuffers with long patience veſſells of wrath prepared to deſtruction*. And what to doe doth he ſuffer them? But to continue and perſevere in their ſinfull courſes without repentance; the Apoſtle plainly tells us that it is, *to declare his wrath and make his power known*. This is not the voice of any Doctor of ours now a dayes, but of St. *Paul*. And ſhall Mr. *Moulin* be brought in to affront St. *Paul*? For recompence let the Jeſuits be heard to whom the nation of the *Arminians* are beholden for their principall grounds; Wherefore doth God give effectuall grace unto one and not unto another, but becauſe he hath elected the one and rejected the other? And I appeale to every ſober Chriſtian, whether the abſoluteneſſe of reprobation doth not as invincibly follow herehence as the abſoluteneſſe of Election. But touching Mr. *Moulin*, I have heard that Doctor *Ames* ſomtimes wiſhed that he had never medled in this argument. I am not of Doctor *Ames* his mind in this; though it were I thinke moſt fit every one ſhould exerciſe himſelfe in thoſe queſtions, wherein by the courſe of his ſtudies he hath been moſt converſant; ſo ſhould the Church of God enjoy, *plus dapis & rixæ multo minus, invidiæq;*. I doe admire Mr. *Moulin* in his conference with *Cayer* as alſo upon the *Euchariſt*, and on *Purgatory*, he hath my heart when I read his conſolalations to his Breathren of the Church of France; as alſo intreating of the love of God. I would willingly learne French to underſtand him only, and have along time deſired, & ſtill to get any thing that he hath written. I highly eſteem him in his *Anatomie* though I doe not like all and every paſſage; yet but few are thepaſſages wherein I differ from his opinion. I have been very ſory to obſerve how by his doctrine in the point of reprobation he overthrowes his own Orthodox Doctrine in the point of Election. I would he would anſwer *Sylveſter* who hath replied to his admirable letters written to *Monſieur Balzak*. I could be well content, were I once free, to ſupply what is wanting to *Walens* his Apologie for him againſt *Corvinus*. But to the point, the paſſage here propo-

Answer.

Gen: 20. 6.

ſed by him is I willingly confeſſe ſomewhat harſh. *I will have this man hang'd, and that I may hang him juſtly I will have him murther or ſteale.* But compare it with that of St. *Paul* formerly mentioned, *God ſuffers the veſſells of wrath prepared to deſtruction, that he may declare his wrath, and make his power known.* And that of *Eli's* children, *They obeyed not the voice of their Father, becauſe the Lord would ſlay them.* And that *Amaziah would not heare: For it was of the Lord that he might deliver them into his hands, becauſe they ſought the Gods of Edom.* And that of *Jeremiah. Doubtleſſe becauſe the wrath of the Lord was againſt Jeruſalem and Juda, till he had caſt them out of his preſence, therefore Zedekiah rebelled againſt the King of Babel.* And obſerve how neare Mr. *Moulin* is to expoſe theſe holy paſſages of Scripture, and the doctrine contained in them in like manner unto ſcorne, ere he is aware. And let him ſoberly conſider, and without any humour of complying with our Adverſaries out of a deſire to charme them who will not be charmed, to what end God doth finally permit ſome to perſevere in ſinne, and can he find any other but this, for the manifeſtation of the glory of his vindicative juſtice in their condemnation? And without any deſire to charme, I have ſhewed plainly, that God doth not permit any man to ſinne, and finally to perſevere in ſin to the end that he may damne them: But that he both permits them finally in ſin, and damnes them for their ſinne, for the declaration of his wrath and power on them; and alſo that he may declare the riches of his glory, upon the veſſells of his mercy, whom he hath prepared unto glory: If he put a difference between *permiſſion of ſinne*, and *a will that they ſhall ſinne*; I would entreate him not to ſtumble at this. For what difference between God's will to permit man to ſinne, and to will that man ſhall ſin by his permiſſion: And the tragicall acts committed on the holy Son of God by *Herod* and *Pilate*, the Gentiles and people of Iſrael, the Apoſtles ſay not they were permitted by God, but that they were predetermined by the hand and counſell of God. Mr. *Moulin's* care is to avoid harſh expreſſions; & it is a commendable care. For why ſhould we cauſleſly expoſe the truth of God to be the worſe thought of, and provoke men to ſtumble at it by unneceſſary harſhneſſe? Yet I find the Scripture it ſelfe delivered by the holy Prophets and Apoſtles is nothing ſo ſcrupulous. *Malim dicere*, ſaith Mr. *Moulin*, *I had rather ſay, Deum non decreviſſe dare alicui gratiam, quâ convertatur & credat; that God hath decreed not to give ſome one grace whereby to be converted and believe; quàm dicere eum decreviſſe ut homo ſit incredulus & impœnitens, then to ſay God hath decreed that man ſhould be incredulous and impenitent.* And he gives his reaſon thus. *Vox enim decernendi aptior eſt ad ea deſignanda, quæ Deus ſtatuit facere, quàm ea quibus ſtatuit non mederi. For to decree is fitter to denote ſuch things as God hath purpoſed to doe, then ſuch things as he hath purpoſed not to cure.* And indeed the Ancients in this ſenſe take the word *predeſtination*, to be only of ſuch things as God himſelfe purpoſed to worke; as Grace and Glory, and the damnation of impenitent ſinners. But if God decrees not to cure impenitency and infidelity in ſome; judge whether upon this ground it may not well be ſaid, that God decrees that the impenitency and infidelitie of ſome ſhall continue uncured. And Mr. *Moulin* confeſſeth that God decreed that the Jewes ſhould put Chriſt to death. His words are theſe, *Deus vetuit homicidium, idem tamen decrevit ut Judæi Chriſtum morte afficerent. God forbad murther, yet he decreed that the Jewes ſhould kill Chriſt.* Yet by the way conſider, God hath no need of the ſinne of man, that he may put him to death juſtly. For undoubtedly God could annihilate any creature that he hath made, the moſt holy Angells without any blemiſh to his juſtice. Yea by power abſolute he could caſt the moſt innocent creature into hell fire, and continue yet juſt ſtill, as formerly hath been ſhewed, and *Raynaudus* juſtifies, and repreſents variety of teſtimonies for this, not only of School-divines, one of whom profeſſeth that it is *concors omnium Theologorum ſententia*, *the common opinion of Divines*; but of the Ancient Fathers alſo. And therefore though to ſtrangle Virgins was not lawfull for *Tiberius*; yet a greater & more ſevere worke then this is lawfull for God. Neither doth God cõmand any impure courſe to any, but under pain of eternall damnatiõ forbids it. But as he hardened *Pharaoh's* heart that he ſhould not let Iſrael goe; ſo can he harden any man's heart to doe as foule a work as this. And St. *Paul* teſtifies that he *gave up the heathens to their hearts luſts, unto uncleanes, to defile their own bodies between themſelves, which turned the truth of God into a lie, & worſhipped & ſerved the creature forſaking the Creatour, who is bleſſed for ever amen For this cauſe God gave them up to vile affections; for even the women, did change the naturall uſe into that which is againſt nature. And likewiſe the men left the naturall uſe of the women, and burned in their luſts one toward another, and man with man wrought filthineſſe.* And this is noted by the Apoſtle to have been a work of judgment. For it followes, *they received in themſelves ſuch recompence of their errours as was meet.* I grant *Tiberius* was the principall

1 *Sam*: 2.25. 2 *Chron*: 25. 20. *Jer*: 52. 3. *Act*: 4.28. *Anat*: p. 23. *Anat*: p. 16. *Rom*: 1.24. v. 26. v. 27.

principall Authour of deflowring thoſe Maides. For he commanded it, and that, as I have ſhewed, makes a man the Authour of a crime, both out of School-divines, and out of Oratours; but God gave no ſuch cõmand to theſe heathens thus to defile themſelves. And this Authour doubts not, but God cooperates to the ſubſtance of every act; notwithſtanding the abſoute dominion of the will over her actions, for which he pleades. And it cannot be denied unleſſe the word of God be therewithall denied, that, *in him we move, as well as in him we live and have our being.* And though God gave noe commandement to *Abſalom* to defile his Fathers Concubines, yet he tells *David* ſaying; *I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them to thy neigbour, and he ſhall lie with thy wives in the ſight of this Sun. For thou did'ſt it ſecretly, but I will doe this thing before all Iſrael, and before the Sun.* It is utterly untrue which this Authour obtrudes upon us, as if we thought it unlawfull, *for God by reaſon of his juſtice to put to death men innocent and without blame.* Was any more innocent then the Son of God? yet he gave him to ſuffer ſomewhat more then the death for the ſins of men. Neither muſt we be gull'd with his phraſes of the Devills deflouring of men, when by him they are carried away into abominable courſes, ſo as to oppoſe Scripture & blaſpheme God, the language of the holy Ghoſt being this that all the outrages committed upon the holy Son of God by *Herod* and *Pontius Pilate*, the Gentiles and people of Iſrael, were ſuch as, *God's hand and counſell had before determined to be done.* And the like cruelties or worſe were executed upon the Saints of God by their Kings, who imploied their ſoveraigne power in executiõ of the beaſt's beheſts; yet this is called the will of God. *God hath put into their hearts to fulfill his will, and to agree to give their kingdomes to the beaſt untill the word of God be fulfilled.* And the truth is if God permit ſuch abominable courſes and hardens men's hearts, occaſion being offered they will commit them, according to the common proverbe. *He muſt needs goe whom the Devill drives.* And the very definition of the permiſſion of ſinne given by *Arminius* doth convince this, though he carrieth himſelfe very ſuperficiarily explicating God's providence in this, and the nature of obduration; which I have proſecuted at large in my *Vindiciæ*, in anſwer to *Bellarmine*, eſpecially where I treat of the obduration of *Pharaoh* chap: 11. Neither doe we make damnation the end whereunto God permits ſinne; but both permiſſon for ſinne and damnation for ſinne, we make th· meanes tending to another end, namely, the manifeſtation of God's glory in the way of juſtice vindicative, which in Scripture phraſe is called *the declaration of his wrath.* And to make God the Authour of ſinne by theſe courſes, is clearely to charge the holy Ghoſt with blaſphemie, ſeing the holy Ghoſt gives cleare teſtimony to all this in the word of God.

2 *Sam*, 12, 11 *verſ.* 12.

Lib. 2, *Digr:* 2.

Rom: 9. 22.

Sect. 5.

That God is the Authour of men's ſalvation and converſion, all ſides grant; and yet he doth noe more in the procuring them then theſe men report him to doe in the Reprobates impenitency and damnation. The ſalvation and converſion of the Elect, ſay they, he hath abſolutely and antecedently, without the foreſight of any deſerving of theirs, reſolved upon, and by irreſiſtable meanes in their ſeverall generations, draweth them to believe, repent, and indure to the end, that ſo they might be ſaved, and his abſolute decree accomplished. On the other ſide, the damnation, the ſinnes, and the finall impenitency of Reprobates, he hath of his alone will and pleaſure peremptorily decreed; this his decree he executeth in time drawing them on by his unconquerable power and providence from ſinne to ſin, till they have made up their meaſure, and in the end have inflicted on them that eternall vengeance, which he had provided for them. What difference is here in the courſe which God taketh for the converſion and ſalvation of the Elect, and the obduration and damnation of the Reprobates? And therefore what hindereth but that God (by their grounds) may as truely be ſtiled the prime cauſe and Authour of the ſinnes of the one, as of the converſion of the other?

M. Maſon's Addit. 3. *p.* 30. 31.

The Fathers thought it a plaine caſe; and therefore they did make ſinne an Object of preſcience, and not predeſtination and bent the moſt of thoſe arguments by wich they refuted this foule aſſertion, againſt an abſolute, irreſiſtable and neceſſitating decree. as I could eaſily ſhew, but that I feare to be over long. Only I will cite ſome few of thoſe Authour's words whom the learned & reverend Biſhop hath alleadged in favour and for the defence of the *Predeſtinarians*, and the maintainers of *Gottſchalk's* opinion. The Church of *Lyons* in their anſwer to the poſitions of *Johannes Scotus*, which he framed againſt *Gotteſchalke* hath theſe words, Whoſoever ſaith, that God hath laid a conſtraint, or neceſſity of ſinning upon any man, he doth manifeſtly and fearefully blaſpheme God, in as much as he maketh him, by affirming that of him, to be the very Authour of ſinne. *Remigius* Arch-Biſhop of that Church explaining the Churches opinion in that point of preſcience and predeſtination in ſeven ſeverall rules; in the fift of thoſe rules, he hath theſe words to the ſame purpoſe. God, ſaith he, by his preſcience and predeſtination, hath laid a neceſſitie of being wicked upon noe man. For if he had done this, he had been the Authour of ſinnes. And thus in my judgment doth it plainly appeare that by abſolute Reprobation, as it is taught the upper way, God is made to be the true cauſe of men's ſinnes.

Obſerve the falſe carriage of this Authour, *That God is the Authour of men's ſalvation and converſion, he ſaith, all ſides grant*; as if there were noe difference between *Arminians*, and

Anſwer.

and the Orthodox; between him and us in this. We ſay God workes faith and regeneration in us, and that for Chriſt s ſake. The Remonſtrants in their *Cenſura cenſuræ*, in expreſſe termes deny that Chriſt merited faith and regeneration for us; and judge by this indifferently, whether they make faith and regeneration to be the guift of God. Or when they doe in termes profeſſe this (as *Epicurus, verbis Deos poſuit, re ſuſtulit*) whether they doe not equivocate. Aske this Authour in what ſenſe he makes God to be the Authour of man's converſiõ, whether any otherwiſe thẽ, 1. In giving men power to believe if they will to repent if they will. 2. In perſwading unto faith & repentance. 3. In concurring with man to the act of faith & repentance. Now as touching the firſt, that mere nature & not grace,

De Gen: cont. Manich. l. 1. cap. 3. *Deo credere & ab amore rerum temporalium ad divina præcepta ſervanda ſe convertere omnes poſſint ſi velint*, ſaith *Auſtin*, *All men can, if they will, believe God, and from the love of temporall things convert themſelves to the keeping of God s commandements.* Now this is noe more, then, *poſſe fidem habere, poſſe charitatem habere, to be capable of faith of charity*, and this is, *naturæ hominum, of the nature of man*; As *Auſtin* teſtifies in another place, where he ſaith, *poſſe fidem habere, poſſe charitatem habere, naturæ eſt hominum, fidem habere, charitatem habere, gratiæ eſt fidelium. To be capable of faith and charity, is the nature of man, but to have faith and to have charity is the grace of the faithfull.* Conſider in reaſon; ſupernaturall grace is not in reaſon to be accounted inferiour to a morall vertue; but ſo it will prove, if it be but a power to be good if we will. For morall vertue doth not give a man a power only to doe good if he will, but it inclines and diſpoſeth the will unto vertuous actions. So juſtice is not an indifferency of condition leaving it to man whether he will be juſt or noe; but it makes him juſt, and ſo diſpoſoth him to juſt courſes. Againe if grace ſupernaturall doth only give power to believe if one will; this being a free power, it is indifferent as well not to believe, as to beleive; as well not to repẽt, as to repent. For liberty is alwaies to act oppoſite; whence it will follow that by vertue of ſupernaturall grace a man is diſpoſed not more to faith, then to infidelitie, not more to repentance then to hardneſſe of heart and impenitency. 4. Conſider, a man hath noe need of ſupernaturall grace to inable him to refuſe to repent, ſeing naturally he is ſufficiently diſpoſed hereunto; & neceſſarily by reaſon of that naturall corruption which is hereditary untohim. By all this it is apparent, that a power to believe wrought in a man by ſupernaturall grace, is not a free power working freely; but rather a neceſſary power working neceſſarily; like unto the condition of a morall vertue, which reſtraines man's naturall indifferency to good or evill, and diſpoſeth him only to good. And conſequently as many as maintaine no other power to be given unto man by grace, then to believe, if a man will; they deale like *Pelagians*, who called that which was meerly naturall, prevenient grace. Laſtly if God be the Authour of man's converſion, becauſe he gives him power to convert, if he will; he may as well be called the Authour of non converſion, and perſeverance in ſinne, becauſe God gives power not to convert, and to perſevere in ſinne, if he will. 2. As touching the ſecond, If God be the Authour of man's converſion, becauſe he perſwades thereunto, then certainly he is not the Authour of ſinne, becauſe he perſwades not thereunto. 3. If God be the Authour of converſion, becauſe he cooperates thereunto, then certainly he may be as well ſaid to be the Authour of every ſinfull act. For that he doth cooperate thereunto, I am very confident this Authour will not deny. Now I could earneſtly entreate the Judicious Reader to examine well this Authour's opinion in theſe particulars, and compare them with his former diſcourſe, that he may have a cleare way opened unto him to judge with what conſcience he carried himſelfe in his former diſcourſe, imputing unto us that we make God the Authour of ſin; albeit in treating of God s providence in evill, we generally have the expreſſe word of God before our eyes; and in our explication thereof doe rather qualify the ſeeming harſhneſſe thereof, then aggravate it. For undoubtedly by the tenour of his diſcourſe, looke upon what grounds he denies God to be the Authour of ſinne, he muſt withall deny God to be the Authour of faith, of repentance, of converſion; And look upon what grounds he makes God the Authour of converſion; upon the ſame grounds he muſt make God the Authour of ſinne: As in caſe to give power to believe, if we will; and to cooperate with us in the act of faith, be to make him the Authour: Or if only upon perſwading us to believe, God is ſaid to be the Authour of faith; then it followes as a ſufficient Apologie for us, that we make not God to be the Authour of ſinne; ſeing none of us conceive him to be a perſwader of any ſinfull act; but rather a diſſwader and forbidder thereof and that upon paine of eternall damnation. But on the contrary we make a vaſt difference between God's operations in ſinfull actions, and God's operations in actions gracious. As firſt, every ſinfull act is alwaies within the compaſſe of acts naturall; noe ſupernaturall

naturall act is or can be a ſinne. Now to the producing of any act of morality, every man notwithſtanding his corruption hath in him a naturall power. But there is noe naturall power in man to the performing of an act ſupernaturall. God muſt inſpire him with a new life called in Scripture, *the life of God*; and make him after a ſort *partaker of the divine natures*: and give his own Spirit to dwell in him, in ſuch ſort, that, *being crucified with Chriſt, we hence forth live no more, but Chriſt liveth in us.* Theſe ſupernaturall acts are but few according to the three *Theologicall* vertues, *Faith, Hope, & Charity*, whoſe offſprings they are; the love of God to the contempt of our ſelves hope in God to the contempt of the world, as touching the worſt it can doe unto us: and faith in God, to the quenching of the fiery darts of the devill. As for all other good acts, in the producing of them, God hath a double influence; one common as they are acts naturall, touching the ſubſtance of them; another ſpeciall as touching the gracious nature of them, proceeding from faith and love. But as touching evill acts, he hath noe influence in the producing of them, but that which is common, and to the ſubſtance of the acts; none at all as touching the evilneſſe of them, the reaſon whereof is that which was delivered by *Auſtin* long agoe. *Malũ non habet cauſam efficientem ſed deficientem, Evill hath no cauſe efficient, but deficient only.* And it is impoſſible that God ſhould be defective in a culpable manner. The creature may, the Creatour cannot: And the ground of the creatures defective condition is accounted to be this, that he was brought out of nothing, & conſequently of a fraile condition. And it is received generall as a rule in Schooles, that a creature cannot be made, *impeccabilis per naturam*, that is ſuch a one, as by nature cannot ſinne. This was delivered long agoe by *Anſelme* one of the firſt of School-divines; *In evill things God doth worke, quod ſunt, that they are; non quod mala ſunt, not that they are evill; But in good things God doth worke, Et quod ſunt, & quod bona ſunt, both that they are and that they are good.* Here this Authour ſets down our opinion concerning Election and Reprobation at his pleaſure. We ſay with *Auſtin* that, *predeſtination is the preparation of grace*, that is the Divine decree of conferring grace; And both he and all confeſſe, it is alſo the decree of conferring glory. And becauſe in making of this decree, God had reſpect unto ſome only, not to all, both men and Angells, therefore in this conſideration it is called the decree of Election, in diſtinction from the decree of reprobation. Now this grace is of a double nature; for either it is grace cuſtodient from ſinne, and the decree of granting this was the election of Angells, called in holy Scripture, *The elect Angells*; or grace healing, after men have ſinned, and the decreee of granting this is the election of men, commonly in Scripture called *God's Elect*, in reference unto this. It is farther to be obſerved that *Auſtin* grounds the Orthodoxe doctrine of predeſtination and election upon the Orthodoxe doctrine concerning grace. And the abſoluteneſſe of the one he built upon the freenes of the other, in not being given according unto men's merits. As it appeares, *de bono perſeverantiæ cap.* 15. Where having propoſed ſome exceptions of the *Maſſilienſes* made againſt his doctrine of predeſtination, comming to make anſwer thereunto, he begins thus, *Iſta cum dicuntur*, ſaith he, *ita nos à confitendâ Dei gratiâ, id eſt, quæ non ſecundum merita noſtra datur, & à confitenda ſecundum eam predeſtinatione ſanctorum deterrere non debent. When theſe things are objected, they muſt not deterre us from confeſſing God's grace, I meane ſuch a grace as is not given accordiog unto works; nor from confeſſing the predeſtination of Saints according thereunto.* Now if the abſoluteneſſe of predeſtination be grounded upon this, that, *grace is not given according unto merits*, (the ſcripture phraſe denies it to be given according unto workes But *Bellarmine* acknowledgeth that in this Argument, *merits and workes* are taken by the Ancients in one and the ſame ſenſe.) it followeth that as many as deny the abſoluteneſſe of predeſtination muſt therewithall maintaine, that, *Grace is given according to men's merits or works.* And the reaſon is evident: For if God doth not give grace according unto men's works, but of his mere pleaſure decreed to give grace unto ſome, and not upon conſideration of their works. And this is to elect abſolutely, and *antecedently without the foreſight of any deſerving*, yea of any works; though by that expreſſion which this Authour uſeth he doth ſufficienty manifeſt, that his opinion is, that God elects not only upõ the foreſight of men's workes but upon the foreſight of men's deſervings. It is farther conſiderable to prevent the reaches of ſuch crafty foxes as we have to deale with, whoſe courſe is in joyning the decree of converſion and ſalvation together, to tranſlate that which belongs unto one, unto the other moſt unreaſonably: For albeit God proceeds according to the mere pleaſure, and without all reſpect to workes, in conferring grace, and decreeth accordingly to conferre it: Yet he proceeds not merely according unto pleaſure, and without all reſpect of works in conferring glory; but according unto a Covenant which is this, *whoſoever believeth*

Eph: 4. 18. 2 *Pet:* 1. 4. *Gal:* 2. 20. *Rom:* 8. 11.

2 *Tim:* 1. 9. *Tit:* 3. 5.

leiveth shall be saved, and accordingly he bestowes the kingdome of heaven by way of re-
1 *Pet*: 1.9. ward for faith, repentance, and good workes. This hath Christ deserved at the hands of
Mat: 25. his Father that our weake performances should be thus rewarded. Lastly, it is farther to be considered that God, as he thus bestoweth salvation by way of reward of our faith, repentance &c; so from everlasting he did decree to bestowe salvation, namely, by way of reward. Not that either faith, or repentance, or good workes, any or all of these were the cause (least of all the deserving cause) of God's decree, or antecedaneous to his decree; but of his mere pleasure decreed both to give the grace of faith and repentance, and to bestow eternall life by way of a reward thereof, as may farther be proved and that clear-
Rom: 9. 11. ly divers waies. 1. By the Apostl's discourse; where he discourseth after this manner, *Before Esau and Jacob were borne, or had done good or evill, it was said that the Elder shall serve the younger; therefore election is not of workes*: But if election did proceeed upon the foresight of faith, repentance, and good workes, or any of them, then it might justly be said, that it were of faith, repentance, or good workes or of all of them; And the force of the Apostl's argument extends to conclude, that election is noe more of faith or of repentance, then of workes; not only becaus faith and repentance are workes, and so accounted in Scripture phrase, as it appeares. *Jo*: 6. 29. But cheifely becaus before men are borne; they are uncapable of faith and repentance, as of good workes. 2. If faith were a motive cause unto election, then either it were so of it's own nature, or by constitution Divine: not of it's own nature as it is apparent. If by constitution divine, mark what strange absurdities follow; namely this, that God did ordaine, that upon the foresight of faith, he would ordaine men unto salvation, whereby God's eternall ordination is made the object of his ordination, whereas the Objects of God's decrees are alwaies things temporall, never any thing that is eternall. 3. It cannot be said that God giveth salvation to the end he may give them faith, but it may farre more congruously be said, that God gives faith to the end that he may save them; therefore the intention of salvation is rather before the intention of giving faith, then the intention of giving faith is before the intention of giving salvation. Or better thus, if God foresee faith before he decrees salvation, then the intention of giving faith (without which God cannot foresee faith) is before the intention of giving salvation; and consequently the giving of faith should be the last in execution; that is men shall first be saved, and afterwards have faith bestowed upon them, to wit, in another world where they live by sight and not by faith. I come to the decree of reprobation; the Objects whereof are two, proportionable to the two objects of election or predestination. The first is *permission of sin*, the second is, *Damnation for sinne*, according to that of *Aquinas*, *Reprobatio includit voluntatem permitendi culpam & damnationem inferendi pro culpâ. Reprobation includes a will to permit sinne, and to inflict damnation for sinne.* The first object of reprobation I say is, *permission of sinne*; not *Sin* as this Authour would have it, but permission of sinne: Becaus these decrees, to wit, of permitting sinne, and inferring damnation for sinne, are decrees of meanes conducing to a certaine end. For like as in election God decreeth to bestowe faith, repentance, and obedience on some, and to reward it with everlasting life for the manifestation of his glory in the way of mercy mixt with justice: So in Reprobation he decrees to permit others to sinne, and finally to persevere therein, and to damne them for their sinne to manifest his glory in the way of vindicative justice. Now whosoever intends an end must also be the Auhour of the meanes conducing to that end. Now God, though well he may be the Authour of permission of sinne, yet he cannot be the Author of sinne: Albeit upon God's permission of sinne it followeth that sinne shall exist. Now to permit sinne is all one with denying grace, whether it be grace Custodient to preserve from it, or grace healing to pardon and cure it after it is committed. Now like as the Lord hath mercy on whom he will in pardoning their sinne, and healing it by faith and repentance: So he hardeneth whom he will by denying faith and repentance. So that as God of his mere pleasure grants the grace of faith and repentance unto some; so of his mere pleasure he denies it unto others. And so in Reprobation he decreeth of his mere pleasure to deny it. But albeit the Lord of mere pleasure proceeds in the denying of faith and repentance, whereby alone sinne is cured, and so of mere pleasure suffers some finally to persevere in sinne, yet in inflicting damnation he doth not carry himselfe of mere pleasure without all respect to men's workes; but herein he proceeds according to a law which is this, *whosoever believeth not, and repenteth not, shall be damned.* And like as God damnes noe man but for his finall perseverance in sinne. So from everlasting he did decree to damne noe man, but for his finall perseverance in sinne. So that by vertue of the Divine decree of reprobation

reprobation, ſinne and finall perſeverance therein is conſtituted the cauſe of damnation; but by noe meanes is it conſtituted the cauſe of the decree of reprobation; neither doth the foreſight of ſinne precede it. For firſt, like as upon this doctrine, that, *Grace is not given according unto workes*, the abſoluteneſſe of predeſtination is grounded in the judgment of *Auſtine* as by neceſſary conſequence iſſuing there from: In like ſort upon this, that grace is not denied according unto men's workes, as neceſſarily followeth the abſoluteneſſe of Reprobation. Secondly, looke by what reaſon the Apoſtle proves, that Election is not of good workes, namely becauſe, *before the children were borne or had done any good, it was ſaid the Elder ſhall ſerve the Yonger*; by the ſame reaſon it evidently followeth that reprobation is not of evill workes, becauſe, *before they were borne or had done good or evill, it was ſaid the Elder ſhall ſerve the Younger*, *Eſau's* reprobation being as emphatically ſignified under his ſubjection to *Jacob* his younger, as *Jacob's* election was deſigned by his dominion over *Eſau* his Elder brother. 3. If ſinne be the cauſe of the decree of Reprobation, then either of 'its own nature, or by conſtitution divine. Not by neceſſity of nature; for undoubtedly God could annihilate men for ſinne, had it pleaſed him. If by conſtitution Divine, mark what abſurdity followeth, namely this, that, *God did ordaine that upon foreſight of ſinne, he would ordaine men unto damnation.* 4. If foreſight of ſinne precedes the decree of damning them for ſin, then the decree to permit ſin much more precedes the decree to damne them for it, as without which there can be noe foreſight of ſin, and conſequently permiſſion of ſin is firſt in intention, and then damnation; and therefore it ſhould be laſt in execution; that is, men ſhould firſt be damned, and afterwards permitted to ſin, to wit, in an other world. 5. And laſtly Reprobation is the will of God; but there can be noe cauſe of God's will, as *Aquinas* hath proved; much leſſe can a temporall thing be the cauſe of God's will, which is eternall. Upon this ground it is that *Aquinas* profeſſeth, *Never any man was ſo mad, as to ſay that any thing might be the cauſe of predeſtination, as touching the act of God predeſtinating.* So may I ſay, it were a mad thing to maintaine that any thing can be the cauſe of Reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating. For the caſe is altogether alike; the will of God being alike uncapable of a cauſe in both, whereas this Authour ſaith, that, *God by our opinion doth draw men on by his unconquerable power from ſin to ſin*; 'tis mere bumbaſt. All men being borne in ſin muſt needs perſevere in ſin, unleſſe God gives grace to regenerate them. For whether they doe that which is morally good, they doe it not in a gracious manner; or whether they abſtaine from evill, they doe it not in a gracious manner. *He that is of God heareth God's Wordes, ye therefore heare them not* ſaith our Saviour, *becauſe ye are not of God.* *Arminius* acknowledgeth and *Corvinus* after him, that all men by reaſon of *Adam's* ſin are *caſt upon a neceſſitie of ſinning.* He askes what difference *is there in the courſe which God taketh for the converſion of the Elect and obduration of Reprobates*; and I have already ſhewed a vaſt difference; and here in breife I ſhew a difference; He hath mercy on the one in the regenerating them, & curing the corruption he finds in them, he ſhewes not the like grace to others, but leaves them unto themſelves; as touching the evill acts committed by the one, he concurreth as a cauſe efficient to the act which for the ſubſtance of it is naturally good For *ens & bonum convertuntur, every thing that is an entity, ſo farre is good*, but he hath no efficiency as touching the evill, as which indeed can admit no efficiencie, as *Auſtin* hath delivered of old, Man himſelfe is only a deficient cauſe of ſin, as ſin, and that in a culpable manner, which kind of deficiency is not incident to God. But to every good act he concurres two manner of waies, & that in the nature of a poſitive efficient cauſe in both, namely, to the ſubſtance of the act by influence generall, and to the goodneſſe of it by influence ſpeciall and ſupernaturall.

Jo: 8.

Corvin. defenſ. Armin. pag: 39.

Note

It is true the Fathers made ſin the object of preſcience, not of predeſtination; the reaſon was becauſe they took predeſtination to be only of ſuch things which God did effect in time; Now ſin is none of thoſe things that come to paſſe by God's effection, but only by God's permiſſion. And that ſuch was the notion of predeſtination with the Fathers, I prove firſt out of *Auſtin. In ſuâ quæ fulli mutariq; non poteſt præſcientiâ opera ſua futura diſponere, illud omnino nec aliud quidquam eſt prædeſtinare in his foreknowledge which can neither be deceived nor changed to diſpoſe his own workes, that is to predeſtinate and nothing elſe.* And ſin, not being the worke of God, no marvaile if it come not under predeſtination. Secondly, out of the Synod of *Valens*, *Prædeſtinatione autem Deum ea tantum ſtatuiſſe dicimus quæ ipſe vel gratuitâ miſericordiâ, vel juſto judicio facturus erat. We ſay that God by predeſtination ordained only ſuch things as himſelfe would work, either of his free mercy, or in juſt judgment.* Againe it is as true that they made even ſin it ſelfe the Object of God's will, witneſſe that of *Auſtin. Non aliquid fit niſi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel ſinendo*

De bono perſeveran: c. 17

Con: 3.

Enchirid.95. *ut fiat, vel ipſe faciendo. Not any thing comes to paſſe but God Allmighty willing it, either by permitting it or working it.* So the eleaventh article of the Church of Ireland; So *Arminius* *Deus voluit Achabum menſuram ſcelerum implere, God would have Ahab to fulfill the meaſure of his ſins.* So ſcripture often mentioned. And *Auſtin* gives the reaſon of it, *malum fieri* *Act:* 4. 28. *bonũ eſt, it is good that evill ſhould be.* *Bellarmine* confeſſeth as much, namely that, *Mala fi-* *Rev:* 17.17. *eri Deo permittente bonum eſt, It is good that evills ſhould come to paſſe by God's permiſſion.* And ſhall not God have liberty to will that which is good? When he ſaith of the Ancients, that, *They refuted this foule aſſertion of an abſolute, irreſiſtable and neceſſitating decree as he could eaſily ſhew, but that he feares to be overlong.* It is nothing but froth; It is not the firſt time I have had experience of ſuch like *Pyrgopolinices* eloquence of his. *Bradwardin* hath demonſtrated that the will of God is abſolute throughout ſpeaking of his decree, and none conditionall and his demonſtration is this, If there be any will of God conditionall, then the condition whereupon it proceds muſt be willed by God or no; to ſay it is not, is to acknowledge ſome things to exiſt in the world, in the producing whereof, God hath noe hand, which is generally diſclaimed; And *Durand*, who affirmes ſome ſuch thing, is oppoſed generally, and indeed his arguments are very ſleight. But if God doth will that condition; then either he wills it abſolutely or conditionally; If abſolutely, then the cauſe is gained. For then that which was firſt willed, was willed alſo abſolutely not conditionally. As for example, if God wills a man's ſalvation upon condition of faith, if withall God's will be, and that abſolutely to give him faith, it followeth that God wills that man's ſalvation, and that abſolutely. If it be anſwered that the condition is willed not abſolutely, but upon another condition; of that other condition I enquire whether God willed it or noe. If noe, then ſomething is produced in the world, in the production whereof God, hath no hand, which is very inconvenient; If you grant that he willed that alſo, I farther demand whether he willed it abſolutely or conditionally? If abſolutely then all that depended thereupon were abſolutely willed, and ſo the cauſe is obtained. If you ſay this condition was willed alſo conditionally, ſo a way is made to a progreſſion *in infinitum*, which is a thing unſufferable by the conſent of all. And as many as are put to give inſtance will forthwith manifeſt the nakednes of their cauſe. This demonſtration of *Bradwardine* I ſometimes repreſented to this very Authour in our private walking and communication, and he profeſſed it was a very ingenious argument. As for the other terme Irreſiſtable this manifeſts this Authour's meaning, that ſome will of God, ſpeaking of his decree, is of a reſiſtable nature. Whereas St. *Paul* to the contrary plainly gives us to underſtand that God's will is irreſiſtable; & the *Pſalmiſt* ſaith, *that the counſell of the Lord ſhall ſtand. And my counſell ſhall ſtand, and I will doe whatſoever I will.* And therefore his decrees are reſembled to mountaines of braſſe. As for the loſt terme *neceſſitating*. For the *Eſ.* 46. 10. Gentleman paies us in words, for want of better coine, not conſidering that words are *Zach:* 6. but winde, he would cheat his Reader by this, preſuming he would be ſo ſimple, as to believe that God by this decree of his takes away the liberty of the creature, but it doth not; nor any contingency, as the eleaventh article of Ireland doth particulate: and *Bradwardine* who peculiarly uſeth this phraſe, underſtands hereby noe other neceſſitie then upon ſuppoſition, which *Alvarez* ſhewes by generall concurrence of Shool-Divines, that it may well ſtand with abſolute contingency and liberty, it being noe other neceſſity, then that which is called, *ſecundum quid, in ſome reſpect*; And ſuch a neceſſitie *Arminius* maketh conſequent to permiſſion: & *Bradwardine* is expreſs that God neceſſitates the will to produce a free act. And he nothing differs from *Aquinas* his doctrine, where he maintaines that God's will impoſeth noe neceſſitie upon the creatures will; becauſe he ordaines both neceſſary things come to paſſe, neceſſarily, and contingent things, contingently, that is with a poſſibility to the contrary; & likewiſe free actions freely, that is with a free active power in the Agent to doe otherwiſe. But come we to the conſideration of the paſſages produced out of the Ancients. For I preſume they are the choiceſt. For though *he feared to be overlong*, and therefore could not exhibit all; yet therefore it behooved him to repreſent the beſt. And I believe he could produce more of this nature. For I have been an eye witnes of it under his hand now foure yeares agoe. And though he produce them not, I hope to doe it for him ere we part, to ſhew how little I feare his concealements, and ſomewhat of the Predeſtinarians alſo, being glad of ſuch an opportunity to diſcover the wildneſſe and precipitation of his judgment touching that which is called the predeſtinarian hereſy here touched by him.

The firſt is a paſſage taken out of the Church of Lyons, denying that God hath layed a neceſſitie of ſinning on any man. Another out of *Remigius*; both repreſented (yea & many

ny more of this nature) by that moſt reverend and moſt learned Arch-Biſhop of *Armagh* Doctor *Uſher* in his hiſtory of *Goteſchalk*, 138. and 173. To theſe I anſwer. Firſt theſe Ancients are about 850 yeares after Chriſt; yet marvailous orthodoxe conſidering thoſe times in the point of predeſtination. And let no man think that they deny a neceſſity of ſinning laid upon all by originall corruption, the conſequent of *Adam's* prevarication. If they were of any other opinion, ſhould it become us to follow them in this? Doctor *Potter* acknowledgeth it as the doctrine of the Church of England, that *libertas à peccato, liberty from ſinne*, is not incident to a naturall man; it is true he deſires to quaſh it by ſaying there is yet in man, *Libertas à neceſſitate, à liberty from neceſſitie*; but from what neceſſity? From the neceſſity of ſinning? If ſo, why ſhould he then deny a liberty from ſin; yet he never taketh any paines to cleare this from contradiction, but blindfoldly followes *Bernard*, without caring much to underſtand him. And he looks to be pardoned becauſe *Voſſius* did ſo before him. M. *Fulke*, in his anſwer to the *Rhemiſh Teſtament*, uſually diſtinguiſheth between *libertas à peccato, & libertas à coactione, liberty from ſinne, and liberty from conſtraint*; and denying all liberty from ſinne to a naturall man, yet grants unto him a liberty from coaction. I have taken ſome paines to ſhew Doctor *Potter's* ſuperficiary carriage in this, and to cleare *Bernard*; which it may be I will adde to this by the reaſon of the homogeneous nature of it. In the meane time *liberty from ſinne* is utterly denied to a naturall man, and that by the doctrine of our Church. And noe marvaile ſeeing *Arminius* himſelfe, and *Corvinus*, thoſe great patrons of natures power, doe acknowledg this, as before I mentioned; only they ſay God is ready to remove this neceſſitie of ſinning from all, and every one.

2. But the meaning of *Remigius* and the Church of Lyons is the ſame with that of *Proſper* formerly mentioned, in his anſwer to the objection of *Vincentius*, where he confeſſeth, *Hominem non redemptum Diabolo eſſe captivum, a man not redeemed is captivated by Satan*; and that, *creatura peccatrix pœnalem dominationem Diaboli merito patitur, cui (relicto vero domino) ſponte ſe vendidit. The creature ſinning deſervedly ſuffers the dominion of Satan by way of puniſhment, as to whom he ſould him ſelfe voluntarily. Hæc quippe ſervitus non inſtitutio eſt Dei ſed judicium. This ſlavery of man to Satan is not God's inſtitution but judgment*; that is God brought it upon him not of his mere pleaſure, but in the way of judgment. Like as *Auſtin* in like manner acknowledgeth, concupiſcenſe to be, not ſinne only, but the puniſhment of ſinne alſo. So *Remigius* and the Chuch of Lyons ſay; that God impoſed it not on *Adam* but man falling from God brought a neceſſitie of ſinning upon him, & upon all his race; God hereupon juſtly withdrawing his holy Spirit from him. *Aug. cont. Julian: Pela: l. 5. c. 3.*

2. Why he ſhould alleadge the firſt paſſage under the name of the Church of Lyons, I know not; The reverend Biſhop acknowledgeth *Florus* to be the Authour thereof, a Deacon of Lyons *pag.* 126. Although the ſame Reverend Biſhop acknowledgeth that other book alſo that goes under the name of the Church of Lyons now extant in the *Bibliothecâ Sanctorum Patrum*; and wherehence *Voſſius* communicateth unto us his *excerpta*, was written by the ſame *Florus pag.* 115. He had more reaſon to father his next paſſage, which he produceth out of *Remigius* upon the Church of Lyons. For albeit *Maldonat* cites the booke intituled *Liber de tribus Epiſcoporum epiſtolis* (whence this paſſage is taken under the name of *Remigius*) yet he who ſet it forth aſcribes it to the Church of Lyons, and that by the direction of the Copy, which was in the hands of *Nicholas Faber*, as appeares *Goteſchalc: hiſt*: 170. But none doe I find to aſcribe this worke of *Florus* to the Church of Lyons, though the Authour of another booke under that title, the Biſhop acknowledgeth to be *Florus*.

3. *Florus* acknowledgeth that the very Saints of God are under a neceſſity of ſin in a ſort, *p.* 149. *In Sanctis licet ſit liberum arbitrium jam Chriſti gratiâ liberatum atq; Sanctum; tamen tanta eſt illa ſanitas, ut quamdiu mortaliter vivunt ſine peccato eſſe non poſſint, & cum velint atq; deſiderent non peccare non poſſũt tamen non peccare. In the Saints of God though there be freedome of will, as freed by the grace of Chriſt, and made holy, yet this health is ſuch, that as long as they carry this mortall body about thẽ they cannot be without ſin: and though they would and deſire to be without ſin, yet they cannot be without ſin.* This I conceive is ſpoken in reſpect of the fleſh luſting againſt the Spirit; & of the *law in our members rebelling againſt the law of our mind, & leading us captive to the law of ſin.* How much more are the wicked in bondage to ſinne and Satan, as the ſame *Florus* ſheweth *pag.* 142? For whereas *Scotus* taught, that a man had not loſt his *liberty, but only the power and vigour of his liberty*. *Florus* oppoſeth him thus, *Non rectè dicit, quia nec ſentit, he ſaith not well, becauſe he thinks not well; ſed ſicut vigorem & poteſtatem libertatis, ita ipſam perdidit libertatem, ut jam ipſe ad verum bonum* *Rom: 7.*

unde cecidit liber eſſe non poſſit. As he hath loſt the vigour and power of his libertie; ſo he hath loſt libertie it ſelfe, inſomuch that unto true good, from whence he is fallen, he cannot be free; to wit, untill he be freed by the grace of Chriſt. In like māner *Remigius* diſcourſeth alſo, grā-ting free will only to evill, *p.* 36. *In infidelibus id ipſum liberū arbitriū ita per Adam damnatum & perditum, in operibus mortuis liberum eſſe poteſt, in vivis non poteſt. In infidells free will it ſelfe, ſo damned and loſt in Adam, may be free in dead workes, cannot be free in living works.* that is, is not free to produce works belonging to a ſpirituall life. So that they unanimouſly confeſſe that in reſpect of originall ſin, there is a neceſſity of ſinning, but this is rightly to be underſtood; namely thus, that true good they cannot doe, ſo that whatſoever they doe is evill, only that it is free unto them to doe this or that evill, which is moſt true. Secondly, thus farre they qualifie this neceſſitie of ſinning, that never any man is carried by the Divine providence, ſo as to ſinne whether they will or no. For albeit *Rabanus* charged them, whom he oppoſed herewith, *pag.* 53. *Si enim ſecundum ipſos qui talia ſentiunt, Dei prædeſtinatio invitum hominem facit peccare, quomodo Deus juſto judicio, damnat peccantem, cum ille non voluntate, ſed neceſſitate peccaverit. For if, according to them who thinke ſuch things, God's predeſtination makes a man to ſinne againſt his will; how doth God in his juſt judgmēt damne him that ſinneth, when he ſinned not voluntarily but neceſſarily?* Thus they criminated their adverſaries: but *Remigius* anſwers on their behalfe, who were thus falſly accuſed *Nemo ita ſentit aut dicit quod Dei predeſtinatio aliquem invitum faciat peccare, ut jam non propriæ voluntatis perverſitate, ſed divinæ prædeſtinationis neceſſitate peccare videatur. No man ſo thinks or ſpeakes, that God's predeſtination makes a man to ſinne againſt his will; ſo that a man ſhould ſeeme to ſinne, not by the perverſitie of his own will, but by the neceſſitie of divine predeſtination. But this is the worke of Divine predeſtination, that he who ſins willingly, & perſeveres willingly in his ſins, ſhall againſt his will be puniſhed.* And the truth is taking predeſtination as it ſignifies preparation of Grace, or God's decree to conferre this, rather God's not predeſtinating a man, or not giving grace, and not making him to be of God, is the cauſe why a man ſinneth, according to that of our Saviour. *He that is of God heareth God's words, ye therefore heare them not, becauſe ye are not of God.* Yet this is rightly to be underſtood. For God's not conferring regenerating grace is rather the cauſe why their naturall corruption is not cured, thē that they goe on in their ſinfull courſes: for naturally carnall men are prone enough to ſin, and in this courſe they neceſſarily continue, untill God changeth their hearts; neceſſarily I ſay, but not againſt their wills. For ſinne is as a ſweet morſell, which they roule under their tongue. This may ſuffice for anſwer unto theſe paſſages, and withall to repreſent the vanitie of this Authour's diſcourſe, endeavouring to brand our doctrine with making God the Authour of ſinne; more of this hereafter; For I am acquainted with that which he here conceales, and with certaine adjuncts thereunto, both touching the opinion of the Church of Lyons concerning falling from grace; as alſo this Authours bold adventure in two particulars in juſtifying *Voſſius*, citing the cōfeſſion of *Pelagius* as one of *Auſtin's* ſermons; as alſo defending him in the point of the predeſtinarian hereſie, which Doctor *Uſher* maintaines to be a mere fiction of the *Semipelagians* to bring *Auſtin's* doctrin thereby into diſgrace. But *Voſſius* conceives that there was indeed ſuch an hereſie, and that the Monks of *Adrumetum* were the Authours of it. And this Interpolatour takes *Voſſius* his part, and labours by certaine arguments to make it good againſt the judicious obſervations of that moſt reverend and learned Arch-Biſhop of *Armagh*. It may be I ſhall repreſent my anſwer thereunto by way of digreſſion; but firſt I muſt diſpatch my anſwer to this I have in hand.

Joh: 8.

Sect: 6.

M. Maſon's Addit. p. 31, 32, 33, 34.

Many diſtinctions are brought to free the Supralapſarian way from this crimination all which (me thinks) are noe better then mere deluſions of the ſimple and inconſiderate, and give noe true ſatisfaction to the underſtanding. There is ſay they a twofold decree.

1. Firſt an operative, by which God poſitively and efficaciouſly worketh allthings. 2. A permiſſive, by which he decreeth only to let it come to paſſe. If God ſhould worke ſinne by an operative decree, then he ſhould be the Authour of ſinne, but not if he decree by a permiſſive decree to let it come to paſſe, and this only they ſay they maintaine. It is true that God hath decreed to ſuffer ſinne; for otherwiſe there would be none. Who can bring forth that which God will abſolutely hinder? He ſuffered *Adam* to ſinne, leaving him in the hand of his own counſell, *Eccluſ.* 15. 14. He ſuffered the nations in time paſt to walke in their own waies *Act:* 14. 16. And dayly doth he ſuffer both good and bad to fall into many ſins; And this he doth, not becauſe he ſtands in need of ſinne for the ſetting forth of his glory; for he hath noe need of the ſinfull man, *Eccluſ.* 15. But partly becauſe he is (*ſummus proviſor*) ſupreme moderatour of the world, and knoweth how

to

to uſe that well which is ill done, and to bring good out of evill; and eſpecially for that reaſon which *Tertullian* preſſeth, namely, becauſe man is made by God's own gracious conſtitution, a free creature undetermined in his actions, untill he determine himſelfe; And therefore may not be hindred from ſinning by omnipotency, becauſe God uſeth not to repeale his own ordinances.

2. It is true alſo that a permiſſive decree is noe cauſe of ſinne, becauſe it is merely extrinſecall to the ſinner, and hath noe influence at all upon the ſinne. It is an antecedent only, and ſuch a one too, as being put, ſinne followeth not of neceſſitie. And therefore it is fitly contradiſtinguiſht to an operative decree. And if that ſide would in good earneſt, impute noe more in ſinfull events to divine power, then the word *Permiſſion*, imports, their maine concluſion would fall, and the controverſy between, us end. But firſt, many of them reject this diſtinction utterly, and will have God to decree ſinne (*efficaciter*) with an Energeticall and working will. Witneſſe that diſcourſe of *Beza* wherein he averreth and laboureth to prove, that God doth not only permit ſinne but will it alſo: And witneſſe *Calvin* too, who hath a whole ſection againſt it, calling it a carnall diſtinction invented by the fleſh, and (*effugium*) a mere evaſion to ſhift off this ſeeming abſurdity, that that man is made blind (*Deo volente & jubente*) by Gods will and command; who muſt ſhortly after be puniſhed for his blindnes; He calleth it alſo (*figmentum*) a fiction, and ſaith they doe (*ineptire*) play the fooles that uſe it. By many reaſons alſo doth he indeavour to lay open the weaknes of it, taxing thoſe who underſtand ſuch Scriptures as ſpeaks of God's ſmiting men with a Spirit of ſlumber and giddineſſe, of blinding their minds, infatuating and hardening their hearts &c. Of a permiſſion and ſuffering of men to be blinded, and hardned, *Nimis frivola eſt iſta ſolutio*, ſaith he, *it is too frivilous a gloſſe*. In another place he blameth thoſe that referre ſin to God's preſcience only, calling their ſpeeches (*argutiæ*) tricks and quirks which Scripture will not beare; and thoſe likewiſe that aſcribe it to God's permiſſion, and ſaith, what they bring touching the Divine permiſſion in this buſineſſe will not hold water. They that admit the word *permiſſive*, doe willingly miſtake it, and while, to keep of this blow, they uſe the word, they corrupt the meaning. For

Colloq Mompel: 2 part. p. 177. Cal: inſtit. lib. 14. c 18. Sect. 1. verſ. 2.

Id: ibid. lib. 2. c. 4. Sect. 3.

1. Permiſſion is an act of God's conſequent and judiciary will, by which he puniſheth men for abuſing their freedome, and committing ſuch ſins day by day, as they might have avoided; and to which he proceedeth (*lento gradu*) ſlowly and unwillingly, as we may ſee, *Pſal:* 81. 11. 12. *Iſrael would none of me, ſo I gave them up &c. Ezeh:* 18. 39. *Goe and ſerve every one his Idoll, ſeeing ye will not obey me &c. Rom:* 1. 21, 24. *Becauſe when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, therefore God gave them up unto their hearts luſts, to vile affections and to a Reprobate mind. Rev.* 22. 11. *He that is unjuſt let him be unjuſt ſtill.* In theſe places and many more we may ſee, that perſons left to themſelves are ſinners only; and not all ſinners, but the obſtinate and willfull, which will by noe meanes be reclaimed. But the permiſſion which they meane, is an act of God's antecedent will, exerciſed about innocent men lying under no guilt at all in God's eternall conſideration.

2. Permiſſion about whomſoever it is exerciſed, obſtinate ſinners, or men conſidered without ſinne, is no more then a not hindring of them from falling, that are able to ſtand, & ſuppoſeth a poſſibility of ſinning or not ſinning, in the parties permitted; but with them it is a withdrawing or withholding of grace needfull for the avoiding of ſin, and ſo includeth an abſolute neceſſitie of ſinning. For from the withdrawing of ſuch grace ſin muſt needs follow; as the fall of *Dagon's* houſe followed *Sampſon's* plucking away the Pillars that were neceſſary for the upholding of it. *Maccovius* in two diſputations, expounding this word (*Permiſſion*) circumſcribes it within two acts. The firſt of which is a Subſtraction of Divine aſſiſtance, neceſſary to the preventing of ſinne; And having proved it by two arguments, that none may thinke he is alone in this, he ſaith, that he is compaſſed about with a cloud of witneſſes, and produceth two. The firſt of them is our reverend and learned *Whitaker*, ſome of whoſe words alleadged by him are theſe, Permiſſion of ſinne is a privation of the aid, which being preſent, ſinne would have been hindred. The ſecond is *Pareus*, for ſaying that that helpe (which God withdrew from *Adam*) being withdrawen, *Adam* could not ſoe uſe his endowments, as to perſevere. And this doctrine, ſaith he, is defended by our men, as it appeareth out of *Pareus lib. de grat primi hominis c.* 4 *p.* 46. Their permiſſion therefore of ſinne being a ſubſtraction of neceſſary grace, is equivalent to an actuall effectuall procuring and working of it. For (*Cauſa deficiens in neceſſariis eſt efficiens*) *a deficient cauſe in things neceſſary is truely efficient*) and ſo is but a mere fig-leafe to cover the foulenеſſe of their opinion.

Colloq: Theol. diſp: 9. pag. 19.

Anſwer.

Here we have a very demure diſcourſe proceeding in a poſitive manner, proceeding from one that takes upon him to be a Maſter and dictator of ſentences; wherein there is little or nothing found that he delivers of his own; or to purpoſe that he delivers of others. Nothing of any colour of pertinency, beſides what he delivers in the laſt place touching our opinion of the nature of *permiſſion of ſin*. And I willingly confeſſe, *The divine permiſſion of ſin* is a very obſcure point, and in my judgment moſt come ſhort in the explication thereof. *Arminius* hath a large digreſſion upon this place of *Permiſſion* in generall, and of permiſſion of ſin in ſpeciall: It was the firſt peece of *Arminius*, the examination whereof I undertook only with a mind to ſearch after ſatisfaction therein. And finding noe content therein, I gave my ſelfe to enquire thereof in a poſitive manner; wherein I proceeded very farre, ſetting downe in foule papers, as they came to hand, whatſoever came into my mind thereabout, which grew into a large proportion, and then ſet my ſelfe upon preconceived grounds reaſonably well diſcurſed by me, to deale with *Arminius* ſome five Sections after the beginning of his diſcourſe on this argument, which five firſt Sections I took not into examination, untill I had diſpatched the whole. And having an occaſion to deale upon this argument when I came to the defence of M. *Perkins* his anſwer to the third crimination, whereupon I deale in the ſecond book of my *Vindicia*, I thought good to digreſſe after the ſecond Section, & to call a certaine propoſition of M. *Perkins* to account, which was this, *Quod Deus non impedit, ideo evenit, quia Deus non impedit.* It is the

third Digreſſion of the ſecond book, the title whereof is this, *Propoſitio illa Perkinſii (quod Deus non impedit, ideo evenit, quia Deus non impedit) ſub examen revocatur.* There is noe digreſſion throughout that book of mine that affords more variety of Philoſophicall and Theologicall contemplations, then that; and all about the nature of permiſſion. Firſt, in things naturall. Secondly, in things morall. And theſe firſt in good things. Secondly, in evill things. In the courſe whereof many obſcurities and difficulties doe offer themſelves to be cleared, & ſolved by diſtinction; where comming to an end, I deliver my ſelfe in this manner. *I perceive in how ſlippery an argument I exerciſe my ſelfe, too much expoſed to the calumny of adverſaries, and too apt to incurre the diſlike of good men; whereas in all my labour I aime at nothing elſe, then according to my power to explicate the myſtery of Divine providence governing all things after a wonderfull manner; And to diſſemble nothing, but repreſent all difficulties that doe occurre, that both my adverſaries may have at hand what to impugne; Our Divines wherein to take paines, either by way of explication of what yet remaines obſcure; or by confirmation of what they ſhall find to be ſound yet unſufficiently proved.* Now that Digreſſion of mine being ſo large, I wonder not a little that no one particular thereof is here called to an account by this Divine. And ſo may others too when they ſhall conſider againſt whom this man's ſtomach workes moſt. For he cannot be ignorant of my anſwer to M. *Hoord* his proſelyte, if not therein to himſelfe. Againe, the exception here in the laſt place taken againſt our doctrine of permiſſion, is exactly the ſame with *Arminius* his exception againſt Mr. *Perkins* in dealing upon the third crimination, which there I have anſwered at large, and that in ſuch manner, that I willingly profeſſe, I was utterly to ſeek at this time, of what I had there delivered; ſo that upon my conſulting the place, the things I there met with, ſeemed new unto me, in diſcovering many waies the inconſequence of *Arminius* his diſcourſe, which yet is the very ſame with this of Mr. *Maſon's*. Yet he hath not replied upon any one line of all that I delivered there, though they are above 600 in the ſecond Edition of that book. But it may be he takes that for noe better then an idle diſcourſe (yet an anſwer it is to this very exception of his) & 'tis enough for him to convince the juſtneſſe of that exception made by *Arminius*, by ſound argument. And what is that but a rule given by him, upon his own credit, without indication of the leaſt authority to confirme it; And though on the contrary I have divers and ſundry waies manifeſted the falſenes thereof: well I am not reſolved to ſuffer him to paſſe unanſwered, how idle ſoever his diſcourſe may appeare to be. Foure diſtinctions of ours he propoſeth to invade; not one of them is pretermitted by *Arminius* in his anſwer unto *Perkins*, nor any part of that his anſwer pretermitted by me. But this is written in Engliſh for the indoctrinating of the people, as I remember what was ſaid of *M. Hoord's* diſcourſe; namely, that it was fit to be coppied out, and communicated unto the Country. He ſaith theſe diſtinctions are, *deluſions of the ſimple*; when he proves it, then it will be time enough to believe it. But whereas, he ſaith, *they give noe true ſatisfaction to the underſtanding*, this is rightly to be underſtood, to wit, in reference to an *Arminian* underſtanding corrupted with the leaven of *Pelagianiſme*. Yet is he not privy to the underſtanding of all, ſo much as of all that are of his own Tenet. But ſuppoſe they doe not. The diſtinctions uſed by School-Divines to accommodate God's predeſtination with man's free will, are many and learned, but *Caietan* profeſſeth of them all that they doe not, *quietare intellectum, ſatisfie the underſtanding*; but what followes; Therefore ſaith he, *Ego captivo meum in obſequium fidei; I captivate mine unto the obedience of faith*. to wit, becauſe Scripture is evident for both: And why ſhould it ſeeme ſtrange that God's providence in governing the world ſhould be of a myſterious nature. And however this Authour may cenſure *Caietane* in this, yet *Alvarez* profeſſeth that herein, *doctiſſimè, & piiſſimè loquitur; he ſpeakes moſt learnedly and moſt piouſly*. Yet permiſſion, in the judgment of *Suarez*, is not merely a negation of prohibition, but conjunct with a poſitive operation in concurring to the act of ſinne; which *Aquinas* hath proved to be *à Deo, from God*, though the obliquity of the act be not. And the truth is, man himſelfe is not operative in ſinne, otherwiſe then as touching the ſubſtance of the act. For ſinne, as ſinne *hath noe cauſe efficient, but deficient only*, as *Auſtin* hath long agoe delivered; neither hath he been oppoſed herein by any that I know. Obſerve how with him to *hinder*, and *abſolutely to hinder* is made all one; yet *to will*, and *abſolutely to will* in God, is not all one in his opinion. I doe not find that God left *Adam* in the hand of his counſell. For he forbade him to eate of the forbidden fruit, which is ſomewhat more then to diſſwade from it. And yet to perſwade or diſſwade another, is not to leave him in the hands of his own counſell: For it is to impart unto him another counſell. Yet though we diſſwade a brother, and ſo not leave him in the hand of his own counſell; yet we ſtill

leave

leave him to his own free will. Both theſe I have inſiſted upon more at large in the ſecond book in my *Vindiciæ*, *Sect*: 2. *Digreſ.* 3. It is true God hath noe need of ſetting forth his own glory, noe more then he hath need of making the world; but the exiſtence of ſin may be and is neceſſarily required to the ſetting forth of God's glory in ſome attributes of his. For neither can the glory of God's mercy appeare in pardoning ſinne, nor the glory of his vindicative juſtice, (called in Scripture his wrath, *Rom:* 9.23.) in puniſhing ſinne, unleſſe there be ſinne to be pardoned, and ſinne to be puniſhed: Nor the glory of his power and wiſedome in working good out of evill, unleſſe God give way to the committing of Evill. And if upon God's permiſſion of ſinne, it be not neceſſary that ſinne exiſt, then it is not in the Allmighty power of God infallibly to procure the manifeſtation of his glory, either in the way of mercy pardoning it, or in the way of juſtice puniſhing it. But ſeeing theſe reaſons are not conſiderable with this ſupercilious *Theologue*, it ſhould ſeeme likely, that looke what he ſubſtitutes in the place thereof, will prove ſubſtantiall, and ſatisfie ſuch underſtandings as his own: And that he repreſents out of *Tertullian*, namely, *becauſe man is made by God a free creature.* This reaſon was repreſented by *Arminius* before him, and that out of *Tertullian*. *Arminius* his huskes are pleaſing to him. Such was the condition of the prodigall child when he forſooke his Father; the provender of Swine was acceptable to him. Yet he could not have enough of that. Is not man a free creature to performe naturall acts as well as morall; and morall good as well as evill? Nay are not the Children of God made free by Chriſt to the performance of actions ſpirituall? What therefore muſt God only permit them to performe them, and by noe meanes worke them to the performance of faith, and repentance, and all manner of obedience; yea and keep them from ſinning againſt him, as he kept *Abimelech*, *Gen:* 20? See how this Authour diſplaies himſelfe ere he was aware; and withall what the reaſon is why he affects to deale upon reprobation only, not upon election or grace leaſt his vile opinion miſerably defacing the glory of God's grace might appeare with open face in 'its proper colours. Yet it breakes forth more then he could wiſh, in ſetting down the end why God permits ſinne, to wit, becauſe men are free creatures, therefore it becomes not God to worke their wills to this or that, but only to permit them to doe what they will; if they will ſinne to permit them; if they would doe any good worke whether it be faith or repentance, or any other good worke, or to abſtaine from ſinne, to permit that alſo; whereby it is apparent that God by his opinion hath noe more hand in working a man to any good worke (excepting the act of commanding and perſwading the one, and not the other) then in working them unto evill. For becauſe they are free creatures, therefore it becomes God to leave them unto themſelves, and permit them to doe what they will, whether it be good or evill: otherwiſe God ſhould nullifie his own inſtitution in making them free Agents. Yet conſider farther how herein he contradicts the very principles of his own ſide, both *Arminians* and *Jeſuites*. For *Arminius* maintaines that God can hinder a man effectually from the committing of ſinne without any prejudice to the liberty of their wills. The like doe the *Jeſuites* maintaine in their doctrine of grace effectuall in the way of congruity, namely, that God can bring any man to faith, to obedience, to any good worke, and accordingly preſerve him from any ſinne by vertue of grace effectuall, which is ſhaped by them in ſuch a manner, as to be noe way prejudiciall to the liberty of their wills. But *Tertullians* authority hath abuſed his fancy, and expoſed him to lay open himſelfe in ſo ſhamefull a manner. Yet *Tertullian* will not ſerve his turn any more, then it doth ſerve *Arminius* his turne, as I have ſhewed in my anſwer to *Arminius lib.* 1. *part. prima de prædeſt. Sect:* 7, and that at large. Secondly, the reaſons he brings for the contradiſtinction of decree permiſſive, from decree operative, are very vaine. For 1, the decree operative is extrinſecall to the ſinner, as well as the decree permiſſive. Secondly, neither hath it any influence at all upon the ſinne (as which admits noe efficient cauſe thereof being of a mere privative nature) but upon the ſubſtance of the act, which I preſume this Authour will not deny. Thirdly, the decree permiſſive is not an antecedent only, but ſuch as being put, ſinne followes of neceſſitie, as well as upon the poſition of the decree operative; that is of neceſſitie, by ſuppoſition, not neceſſity abſolute. For as *Aquinas* hath delivered and proved, not only the things themſelves come to paſſe by vertue of God's decree, but, *modi rerum. ſeverall conditions of them.* As for example, neceſſary things, neceſſarily; contingent things, contingently; free actions, freely; And that thus the things permitted do alwaies come to paſſe, not only *Piſcator* with our Divines, as Mr. *Perkins*, Doctor *Whitaker* and *Pareus* doe avouch, but *Vorſtius* alſo and *Arminius*, as I have ſhewed in my *Vindiciæ*, *lib.* 2. *digreſ.* 3. *Arminius* his words are theſe, if God permits a man to will this or

Note

Lib: 1. *cont: Marcion.*

that

that, *necesse est, it must needs be, ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum, that no kind of argument move him to will it.* *Navarettus* the *Dominican* professeth the same, in *quæst.* 19. *pag. primâ art.* 6. *pag.* 65. *col:* 1.

1. That this destinction is rejected by our Divines this Authour brings no tollerable evidence. As for *Beza* here it is confessed, that he acknowledgeth God to permit sinne, and whereas he addes that he wills it too, it is nothing contradictory to the former. For to permit sinne (speaking of permission divine) is to will that sinne shall come to passe by
Enchirid. 95 God's permission. And *Austin* hath professed of those things that come to passe by God's permission, that they come to passe, *Deo volente, God willing them.* And the Scripture acknowledgeth as much, that the Kings in prostituting their Royall authority, to the executing the pleasure of the Beast, did herein fulfill the will of God. So that God's permissive decree is as effectuall in its kind, as the operative decree in its kind; thus farre, that like as what God meanes to worke shall come to passe; so look what God meanes to permit, that also shall come to passe. Neither doe I know any Arminian or Jesuite, that denies God's operative decree, as touching the very act of sinne, by way of concurrence in the producing of it. When *Calvin* will have the evill of sinne come to passe, *Deo volente, God willing it*, he denies not any more then *Beza* doth, that it comes to passe by God's permission of it. But *Calvin* rests not in a bare permission and no marvaile. For the Scripture saith not, that God permitted *Pharaoh* to refuse to let Israel goe, but plainly and energetically thus; *I will harden Pharaoh's heart that he shall not let Israel goe, I will harden Pharaoh's heart that he shall follow after them, I will rent the Kingdome from Solomon*; not I will permit it to be rented, and so throughout. *Bellarmine* himselfe contents not himselfe with a bare permission, but farther saith, God doth *rule and governe the wills of wicked men*; yea, *torquet & flectit, he wrests and bends them.* And *Austin* often saith, he *enclines them* unto evill. And whereas it is farther added out of *Calvin* that *a man is blind, volente & jubente Deo, God willing and commanding it.* Is it not expresse Scripture, *Es.* 6. 10. *Make the heart of this people fat, make their eares heavy, and shut their eyes.* So that *Calvin* doth but accomodate himselfe to Scripture phrase. But when we come to the explication of this either in Christian reason, or by comparing one place of Scripture with an other, we say
Es. 6. 10. that to *Make their hearts fat, their eares heavy, and to shut their eys: And to give them the*
Rom: 11. 8. *Spirit of slumber, eyes that they should not see, and eares that they should not heare*; Is no more
Deut: 29. 4 then, *not to give them hearts to perceive, nor eyes to see, nor eares to heare.* Yet where *Calvin* saith this, I cannot find, the quotation here is so disturbed; but I guesse the Authour would referre us to *lib.* 1. *Institut. cap.* 18. *prima & secunda Sect:* But I find no such thing there, but speaking of God's providence in blinding *Ahab*, thus he writes, *Vult Deus perfi-*
Sect: 1. *dum Ahab decipi; God will have perfidious Ahab to be deceived.* This is plaine out of the 1 *Kings* 22. 20. Who shall entise *Ahab* that he may goe, and fall at *Ramoth Gilead*; *operam suam offert Diabolus ad eam rem, The Divell offers his service for this*, saith *Calvin*. And doth not the Scripture expresly testifie as much? *There came forth a Spirit and stood before the*
vers. 21. *Lord, and said I will entise him; And the Lord said unto him, wherewith? And he said, I will goe out and be a false Spirit in the mouth of all his Prophets.* *Calvin* goes on, *Mittitur cum certo mandato, ut sit Spiritus mendax in ore omnium Prophetarum*; *God sends him with a certaine command to become a lying Spirit in the mouth of all Ahab's Prophets.* This also the
vers. 22. Scripture testifies as expresly, as the former; *Then the Lord said, thou shalt entise him and prevaile also; Goe forth and doe so.* Now let the indifferent judge, whether this Authour might not as well calumniate the Holy Ghost the Inditer of this Scripture, as *Calvin* who proceeds but according unto Scripture in that which he delivers. Now let every sober man judge whether hereby it doth not manifestly appeare, *Excœcari Achabum, that Ahab was blinded by the Devill, Deo volente ac jubente, the Lord willing and commanding it*; but this taken apart from the instance in reference whereunto it is delivered, a man might suspect his meaning were, that God commands a man to shut his own eyes, & blind himselfe. And judge I pray whether to say, that this whole providence of God concerning *Ahab*, was no more then permission, deserves not to be called, *figmentum, a fiction*, as indeed *Calvin* calleth it. To this he addes the joynt profession of the Apostles touching God's
Act: 4. 28. providence in crucifying of Christ; in *Absalom's* incest, the *Chaldees* bloudy execution in
Act: 2. 23. the land of *Juda*, and the *Assyrians* before them, which in Scripture is called the worke of
2 *Sam:* 16. God &c. And concludes it to be manifest, *Nugari eos & ineptire, qui in locum providentiæ*
22, & 12. 12. *Dei nudam permissionem substituunt, that they doe but toy and trifle, who in place of God's providence substitute a naked permission.* And this Authour doth but calumniate *Calvin's* expression, in rendring the word *ineptire*, by *playing the foole*. *Ineptire* in the proprietie thereof

thereof, is in this caſe to faile of fit and congruous interpretation and accommodation. And may he not juſtly taxe *thoſe who underſtand ſuch Scriptures, as ſpeake of God's ſmiting men with the Spirit of ſlumber and giddineſſe, of blinding their mindes, infatuating and hardning their hearts of a permiſſion, and ſuffering of men to be blinded and hardned?* I had thought common ſenſe might have juſtified him in this; taking *Calvin* aright, who denies not *permiſſion* in all this, but *nudam permiſſionem, naked permiſſion*; as much as to ſay theſe Scripture paſſages doe ſignifie more then permiſſion; And as I have ſaid before *Bellarmin* himſelfe doth not ſatisfie himſelfe with a naked permiſſion in ſuch like providence divine as here is mentioned. I thinke he may juſtly ſay that to explicate *excecation* and *obduration* by permiſſion is ſuch an explication as will ſatisfie no ſober man, and that ſuch a ſolution is *too frivolous*. And as for God's preſcience, it is apparent that the horrible outrages committed upon the holy Son of God, the Scripture teſtifies not to have been foreknowen only by God, but by the hand and counſell of God predetermined alſo; & more then this, eleare reaſon doth juſtifie that the ground of God's foreknowing ought, is his foredetermining of it, as I have often proved by invincible demonſtration.

2. Who miſtakes the nature of permiſſion moſt, we or this cenſurer, let the indifferent judge. It is apparent that he puts no difference between permiſſion humane, and permiſſion Divine. Sure I am *Suarez* requires to permiſſion divine a concurrence to the act, the obliquity whereof is permitted. And more then that both *Scotus* of old without queſtion, and the *Dominicans* of late, and *Bradwardine* before them maintaine this concurrence to be by way of determining the will to every act thereof. But all theſe miſtake the nature of permiſſion, if we believe this Authour upon his word wherein he carrieth himſelfe very authoritatively, no Pope like him. Yet he is ready to give his reaſon for it, though with manifeſt contradiction to himſelfe, but let us conſider it.

1. *Permiſſion is an act of God's conſequent and judiciary will, by which he puniſheth men for abuſing their freedom &c.* Moſt untrue, and manifeſtly convictable of untruth by that which himſelfe delivered but a little before in this very Section, where he ſaid, It is true that God hath decreed to ſuffer ſinne; for otherwiſe there would be none. By this it is manifeſt that whenſoever ſinne is committed, there had place God's permiſſion of ſinne, otherwiſe there would have been no ſinne, therefore permiſſion had place in the very firſt ſinne that was committed by man, and Angells. Judge Reader with what felicity he comes to cenſure and correct the miſtakes of others about permiſſion. As *Auſtin* ſometimes ſaid of one oppoſing him, *noverit ſe eſſe obduratum*; ſo mayeſt thou not ſay of this Authour in this diſcourſe of his, *noverit ſe eſſe excæcatum*, let him take notice how himſelfe is blinded? *The Lord giving Iſrael up to their own hearts luſts*; he like a reſolute Doctor will have to proceed by way of mere permiſſion. Yet the Lord ſaith not, he permitted them to their own luſts; and *Rom:* 1. 24, 26, 28. Obſerve, firſt looke what he permitted came to paſſe throughout, even to abominable courſes. Secondly, obſerve, the judgment of God is noted herein. *They received the recompence of their own errour as was meet.* What? And are God's judgments executed only by God's permiſſion, and that by the hands of them that are judged and puniſhed? Such is the accuratenes of this Authours divinity comming to correct the miſtakes of others about permiſſion. And for the proofe of all this we have this Authour's bare word without any reaſon or authority repreſented by him. As for that of *Ezechiel* not *chap:* 18. 39, but *chap:* 20. 39 *Goe and ſerve every one his Idels*; this hath the forme of a command, rather then of a permiſſion, but the Lord hereby ſignifies, that in ſerving him, while they ſerve other Gods, they doe but profane his holy name in ſerving him, and undoubtedly they provoked God more hereby, then the heathens who ſerved not him at all, but other Gods only. So that the Lord ſeemes to ſignifie, that he had rather, they ſhould not ſerve him at all, as *Revelations* 3. I would thou wer'ſt either hot or cold, but ſeeing thou art luke-warme, I will ſpue thee out of my mouth; But be it as the Authour would have it, did here God begin to permit them? their former diſobedience was it not a conſequent of God's permiſſion? For if God had not permitted their diſobedience, ſurely it had not been by the Authours diſcourſe in the beginning of this Section. As touching that *Revelations* 22. 11. I hope by the ſame rule of this politive *Theologue*, not only their continuing to be unjuſt, was by God's permiſſion, but their firſt being and beginning to be unjuſt was by God's permiſſion alſo. And ſurely if this man's word be of any credit, all ſinners were firſt permitted to ſinne, otherwiſe

Pſ: 81. 11, 12.

wiſe they had never ſinned, and not the obſtinate and willfull only. Were not the Angells innocent before their firſt ſin? was not *Adam* innocent before his firſt ſin? and did not God permit both Angells and men to ſin their firſt ſin? If not; what truth is in this authour's word, when he ſaid, *God hath decreed to ſuffer ſin? for otherwiſe there would be none.* And if he be not worthy to be believed, in this his credit is crackt, and deſerves not to be believed in ought.

2. We have been more beholding unto this Authour, ſince he came to meet with our diſtinctions, then throughout all his former diſcourſe; as I have ſhewed already in part, & ſhall diſcover more by God's helpe (not his permiſſion only) ere we part from this. He ſeemes to be conſcious of ſome thing and fearefull of giving too much advantage, as appeares by his expreſſiõ, when he ſaith that *permiſſion* (of ſin; for ſo he ſhould ſay) *ſuppoſeth a poſſibility of ſinning or not ſinning.* Now this is nothing congruous to his former expreſſions whereby it was made to ſuppoſe that, *a man is able to ſtand.* For to be able to ſtand, is to have an active power in him whereby he is able to ſtand; but to have a poſſibility of ſtanding, or not ſinning is not ſo. For though a man hath no power in himſelfe to ſtand or to abſtaine from ſinne, yet if there be a power in God to make him ſtand, and to preſerve him from falling, this is ſufficient to make good, that a man hath a poſſibility of ſtanding and abſtaining from ſinne. And we are willing to confeſſe that God is able not only to preſerve any man that ſtands from falling, but alſo to raiſe any man that is fallen; and to make him ſtand. Thus *Florus*, *Habet homo poſt illam damnationem liberum arbitrium, quo propriâ voluntate inclinari poteſt & inclinatur ad malum, habet liberum arbitrium quo poſſit aſſurgere ad bonum; Ut autem aſſurgat ad bonum, non eſt propriæ virtutis, ſed gratiæ Dei miſerantis. Nam & qui mortuus eſt dici poteſt poſſe vivere, non tamen ſuâ virtute, ſed Dei. Ita & liberum arbitrium hominis ſemel ſanciatum, ſemel mortuum poteſt ſanari, non tamen ſuâ virtutè, ſed gratiâ miſerantis Dei. Et ideo omnes homines admonentur, omnibus verbum prædicatur, quia habent poſſe credere, poſſe converti ad Deum; ut verbo extrinſecus admonente, & Deo intus ſuſcitante, qui audiunt, reviviſcant.* *After Adam's fall man hath free will, whereby of his own accord he may be and is inclined unto evill, he hath free will whereby he may ariſe unto that which is good; but to ariſe unto Good is not of his own power, but of God's grace commiſerating. For of him alſo who is dead, it may be ſaid, that he may live, yet not of his own power, but by the power of God. So the free will of men being once wounded, once dead may be healed not by 'its own power, but by the grace of God ſhewing mercy. And therefore all men are admoniſhed, the word is preached unto all, becauſe thus they have that they may believe, they may be converted unto God; to the end that by the word admoniſhing outwardly, and God ſtirring them up inwardly, they which heare may be revived.* Obſerve by the way a manifeſt incongruity in ſaying that *permiſſion* is a not *hindring them from falling, who are able to ſtand* For they who are permitted to fall, and not hindered from falling, are ſuppoſed to ſtand, and not only to be able to ſtand. It ſeemes this Authour cannot endure that *Permiſſion of ſinne*, ſhould conſiſt *in the withholding of a grace needfull, to abſtaine from ſinne.* Whence it followeth evidently that in this Authour's opinion, either God's permiſſion of ſinne is not the withholding of any grace at all; or if it be it is the withholding only of ſuch a grace, without which nevertheleſſe man may keep himſelfe from ſinne; and conſequently, though ſuch a grace be granted, yet it is indifferent for him to ſinne, as well as to abſtaine from ſinne; If it be no withholding of grace at all, it followes that like as when a man ſins it is not for want of grace: So when a man abſtaines from ſinne, it is not by vertue of any grace of God granted him thereunto; Yet the Lord tells King *Abimelech* expreſly *I kept thee from ſinning againſt me.* If he pretends that ſome grace is withheld whenſoever a man ſinneth, but will not ſay that is was neceſſary for the avoiding of ſinne it followeth that when man is permitted to ſinne, he is no more apt to ſinne, then while ſuch grace was denied him, and conſequently no more apt to abſtaine from ſinne when ſuch a grace is granted him, and conſequently in granting ſuch a grace he permits him ſtill to ſinne, as well as in denying it; and in denying he permits him to doe good, as much as in granting it; So that ſtill it is not God that keepeth a man from ſinne, as often as he abſtaineth from it, but merely the power of his own free will. Whereby it is evident that this Authour as well denies, that God is the Authour of any good, as that he is the Authour of any evill: But man is Authour of the one as well as of the other. The power of doing good he will grant is from God, neither can it be denied, but that the power of doing evill is from God. He will grant likewiſe that God

Hiſt: Gotteſch: pag. 142.

Gen: 20. 6.

God is ready to concurre to any good act if man will, and I preſume he will not deny, but that God concurres alſo to the ſubſtance of every evill act. The only difference that remaines is this; God perſwades only to good, and diſſwades only that which is evill. Now this third and laſt aſſertion we grant as well as he. Yet he layes to our charge that we make God the Authour of evill, but cares not at all how he denies God to be the Authour of any good in the actions of men, and makes noe place for any grace ſave ſuch, as is hortatory, which is performed uſually by the miniſtery of men. Yet conſider what *Bradwardine* ſometimes Arch-Biſhop of Canterbury Elect hath written in this kind before *Luther* or *Calvin* were borne. The title of the fourth chapter of his ſecond booke is this. *That free Will being tempted cannot of his own ſtrength without the helpe of God and his grace overcome any temptation.* Of the firſt this, *that free will ſtrengthned With what created grace ſoever cannot without another ſpeciall ſuccour of God overcome any temptation.* of the ſixth this, that, *That ſpeciall ſuccour of God is the unconquerable grace of God.* Of the ſeventh this; *That no man though not tempted, can by the ſtrength of his free will alone without created grace or with created grace, how great ſoever it be, Without the ſpeciall aſiſtance of God avoide any ſin:* & all theſe propoſitions he demonſtrates with variety of argument. Behold the ingenuity of this Authour; He flies in the face of *Calvin* and *Beza*, and other our Divines, for maintaining that unleſſe God by his grace keep and preſerve a man effectually from ſinning, it cannot be that he ſhould abſtaine from ſinne. *Bradwardine* maintained the ſame before any of theſe were borne yet he ſaith nothing to him, lets all his arguments alone; but upbraides us for maintaining the ſame doctrine, without giving any reaſon to convict us of our errour. Adde to this, which I have omitted, the Corolary of that ſeventh chapter in *Bradwardin* formerly mentioned is this, *That it is the Will of God, which preſerves them that are tempted from falling, and them that are not tempted, both from temptation and from ſinne.* Not one of the arguments whereby he confirmes any of theſe poſitions, doth this Authour goe about to anſwer. In like manner *Alvarez. Poſitâ permiſſione divinâ infallibiliter peccat homo; upon ſuppoſition of God's permiſſion, man ſins infallibly.* The propoſition he intends to prove in that diſputation is this, *Therefore a man is not converted becauſe he is not aided of God.* But both he and we deny that hereupon a man ſinneth neceſſarily alwaies, but only in ſome caſes. In ſome caſes it followeth, as namely a man borne in ſinne, and in the ſtate of corruption, the naturall fruits whereof are infidelity and impenitency, untill God affords a man the grace of regeneration, he cannot believe, he cannot repent. *They that are in the fleſh cannot pleaſe God. Thou after the hardneſſe of thy heart that cannot repent. Therefore they could not believe.* In which caſe God is not the cauſe of infidelity, and impenitency; but theſe proceed naturally and neceſſarily from that originall corruption wherein they are conceived and borne. God is only the naturall cauſe why this their naturall corruption continues uncured. For none can cure it but God, it being a work nothing inferior to the raiſing of them from the dead. Yet he is no culpable cauſe of this. For as much as he is not bound to any, *but he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth.* So that neceſſarily without the grace of regeneration, every man continueth in his naturall corruption, devoyd of faith, of hope, and love. Theſe being ſupernaturall, and whereunto no man can attaine with out ſupernaturall grace. In like manner, hence it followeth that no naturall man can performe any morall good act in a gracious & acceptable manner in the ſight of God, becauſe the fountaines of ſuch performances, are not found in naturall men. But they have a free power as to commit any naturall evill worke; ſo to abſtaine from it; though not in a gracious manner: Free power as to abſtaine from any vertuous act, ſo to performe it alſo, though not in a gracious manner. They may be temperate, chaſt, juſt, and the like; but their vertuous actions are not truly vertues in a Chriſtian account, becauſe they know not God, nor Chriſt, much leſſe doe they believe in him, and performe theſe vertuous actions out of their love unto him. If *Maccovius*, and *Whitaker*, and *Pareus* be of the ſame mind, and the *Dominicans* with them, and *Bradwardine* before them all; let the indifferent Reader conſider what an hungry oppoſition is made by this Authour, not offering to anſwer any one of their Arguments, nor of mine neither, in my *Vindiciæ*; Nor ſaith ought by way of reply upon any anſwer to the like argument of *Arminius*. The reſolution of all that here he delivers, determining in a rule himſelfe propoſeth, without reaſon or authority to juſtifie it. A rule as here it is applyed conteining a notorious untruth. For *cauſa deficiens* in no caſe can be *efficiens* in proper ſpeech, any more, then *cauſa efficiens* can be accounted *deficiens*, unleſſe it be underſtood in divers kinds As for example, *efficiens naturaliter* may be *deficiens moraliter*, and *deficiens moraliter* may be *efficiens naturaliter*. *An efficient cauſe naturally, may be deficient morally,*

Lib. 9. de auxil. diſp: 101 p. 803. num. 7 lin: penult:

Ro: 8.
Ro: 2.
Jo: 12.

l. 2. digreſ. 3. Criminat. 3. Sect: 2.

and ſo a cauſe deficient morally, may be efficient naturally. Leaſt of all can it have place in the preſent queſtion, which is of the cauſe of ſinne. For ſinne as ſinne, evill as evill, *non habet cauſam efficientem, ſed deficientem; hath no cauſe efficient, but deficient* only; as *Auſtin* hath long agoe determined; and it is a rule generally received and never that I know denied of any. Againe *cauſa deficiens in neceſſariis* may be culpable I confeſſe, and ſo *interpretativè* (as they ſay) may be interpreted to be as good as an efficient. As in a civill conſideration it is ſaid of the Magiſtrate, that, *Qui non vetat peccare cum poſſit, jubet. He that forbiddeth not a man to ſinne when it is in his power, or when he hath authority to forbid, 'tis as if he ſhould command the committing of that ſin.* Now this is only in ſuch a caſe, where the neceſſitie reſpects the perſon who is the deficient cauſe, as namely in caſe he be bound in duty to afford help and ſuccour to him that cannot keepe himſelfe from ſinning without the ſuccour of an other, not otherwiſe. And therefore it reacheth not to God, who is not bound to preſerve any man or creature from ſinning; Leaſt of all is he bound to regenerate a man that is borne in ſinne. *Adam* was created in all ſufficiency that the reaſonable creature was capable of, without any pronenes unto evill, but rather in a morall propenſion to that which was good; And his fall hath brought this corruption upon all mankind, even a neceſſitie of ſinning, as *Arminius* and *Corvinus* confeſſe. He wanted no power to doe that which was good, or to abſtaine from ſin, but ever ſince his fall, impotency to that which is good, & proneneſſe unto that which is evill hath been the naturall inheritance of all mankind. And as for the permiſſion of *Adam's* fall, his ſin was in a thing naturally indifferent, the holines of his nature not inclining him more to abſtain from that fruit any more, then to partake of it. Neither doe we ſay that God did withhold from *Adam* any grace that theſe our adverſaries maintaine to be neceſſary for the avoiding of that ſinne which was committed by him. How *Adam* himſelfe was brought by *Eve* to eate of that fruit is not expreſſed. As for *Eve* the temptation which Satan uſed with her, & which did prevaile is expreſſed: He allured her with the repreſentation of the powerfull nature of that, to make them as Gods knowing good and evill, & he made this ſeem credible by the very denomination which God gave unto the Tree, *the Tree of knowledge of good and evill.* It ſeemes not likely that ſhe knew who it was that ſpake unto her in the Serpent, nor that ſhe was acquainted with the fall of Angells. Then againe *the deſire of knowledge*, is no evill thing it ſelfe, or ſtands in any contradiction to the integrity of a reaſonable creature: Nay nothing more agreeable to the nature of the beſt, it brings ſuch a perfection with it. Only the errour was, in affecting it this way. God did not keep the Devill off; nor reveale unto her who it; was that ſpake unto her; much leſſe his apoſtaticall condition; leaſt of all his project to ſupplant them. Neither did he quicken that holy feare which he had inſpired into her to reſiſt it at the firſt, & to goe to her husband to acquaint him with it. She might thinke that the knowledge of good and evill might make her more fit for the ſervice of God, then unfit. All which conſidered, her will being moved to ſeek this perfection by taſting of ſuch a fruit, there was no cauſe or reaſon to hinder her from taſting it, ſave only the conſideration of God's prohibition. For the will of every reaſonable creature is naturally apt to affect that which is good, and though that good may prove evill in ſome circumſtance, yet if that circumſtance be not conſidered, the will proceeds to affect it. How long the Devill was exerciſed in this temptation we know not. Inconſideration is conceived by *Durandus* to be the originall of that ſinne of theirs; and God was not bound to maintaine this conſideration quick in her, and of the danger of ſuch a tranſgreſſion. In fine ſhe came to a will & reſolution to taſt of it; to the producing of this act, as a naturall thing, the Lord concurred, as all confeſſe, namely to the ſubſtance of the act. The queſtion is whether he concurred to the effecting of it abſolutely or conditionally? It was as true of *Adam* and *Eve*, that *in him they lived and moved and had their being*, as it is of us. We ſay God as a firſt cauſe moves every ſecond cauſe; but agreeably to their natures; Neceſſary agents to worke every thing they worke neceſſarily; Free agents to doe every thing they doe, freely. But to ſay that God made them *velle modo vellent, to will in caſe they would will*, is ſo abſurd as nothing more; The act of willing being hereby made the condition of it ſelfe, and conſequently both before and after it ſelfe. See what I have delivered concerning this in my *Vindiciæ lib.* 2. *Digr:* 3. and *Digr:* 6. of the nature of permiſſion, more at large, where unto this Authour is content to anſwer juſt nothing.

Sect: 7.

M. Maſon's Addit. p. 34. 35.

There are two things ſay they in every ill act. Firſt, the materiall part which is the ſubſtance of the action. Secondly, the formall part which is the evill or obliquitie of it. God is the Authour of the action it ſelfe, but not

not of the obliquitie and evill that cleaveth to it, as he that cauſeth a lame horſe to goe, is the cauſe of his going, but not of his lame going. And therefore it followeth not from their opinion that God is the Authour of ſinne. Firſt, all ſinnes receive not this diſtinction, becauſe of many ſins, the acts themſelves are ſinfull; as of the eating of the forbidden fruit, and *Saul's* ſparing of *Agag*, and the fat beaſts of the *Amalekites*. Secondly, It is not true that they make the decree of God only of actions, & not of their aberrations. For they make it to be the cauſe of all thoſe meanes that lead to damnation and therefore of ſinfull actions, as ſinfull, and not as bare actions. For actions deſerve damnation, not as actions but as trangreſſions of Gods law.

3. To this ſimile I ſay that the Rider or Maſter that ſhall reſolve firſt to flea his horſe, or knock him on the head, and then to make him lame, that for his halting, he may kill him, is undoubtedly the cauſe of his halting: And ſo God if he determine to caſt men into hell, and then to bring them into a ſtate of ſinne, that for their ſinnes he may bring them to ruine, we cannot conceive him to be leſſe then the Authour, as well of their ſins, as of thoſe actions to which they doe inſeperably adhere, and that out of Gods intention to deſtroy them.

This diſtinction of that which *is materiall* and that which is *formall* in ſinne is commonly uſed by *Aquinas* 1. *ſecun: q:*71. *art:*6, *in corp: Auguſtinus in definitione peccati poſuit duo, Unum quod pertinet ad ſubſtantiam actûs humani, quod eſt quaſi materiale in peccato; cum dicit dictum vel factum vel concupitum; Aliud autem quod pertinet ad rationem mali quod eſt quaſi formale in peccato cum dixit contra legem æternam.* So then the ſubſtance of the act is the materiall part in ſinne; And the oppoſition of this act to the law of God is the formall part of it, both according to *Aquinas*; and according to *Auſtin* alſo. And *q:*75. *art:*1. *corp.* He defineth ſinne to be *Actus inordinatus, an inordinate act*, and diſtinguiſheth the act from the inordination of it. *q:*79. *art:*2. He propoſeth the queſtion, whether the *act of ſin be from God?* and in the concluſion reſolves it thus, *Cum actus peccati ſit ens, neceſſariò eſt à Deo, Conſidering that the act of ſinne is a thing having being, neceſſarily it is of God.* And in the body of the Article, *Dicendum quod actus peccati & eſt ens, & eſt actus, & ex utroq; habet quod ſit à Deo; The reſolution is that the act of ſinne, is both a thing that hath being, and an act, and in each condition it hath, that it is of God.* And he proves this both by authority and by reaſon. As for the defect of this act, that *non reducitur in Deum tanquam in cauſam, ſed in liberum arbitrium, that is not charged upon God as the cauſe thereof, but on a man's free will.* And he illuſtrates it thus, *Sicut defectus claudicationis reducitur in tibiam curvam ſicut in cauſam, non autem in virtutem motivam à quâ tamen cauſatur quicquid eſt motionis in claudicatione. Like as the defect called halting is charged upon a crooked legge as the cauſe thereof, and not upon the motive faculty, though from it proceeds all the motion that is found in the halting*: Neither did I ever read any School-Divine that contradicted this diſtinction. *Mr. Maſon* doth without alleadging any authority for it. Yet he might have alleadged *Arminius* oppoſing after this manner, though before him, that I know, not any. *Answer.*

1. We ſay not only of many ſins, but of every ſinne, which hath any act therein, that the *Acts themſelves are ſinfull*, becauſe every ſuch ſinne, being actuall, it is *Actus cum defectu, an act with a defect*, that is an act defective. As *Aquinas ſpeakes* in the place immediatly before alleadged, and this defect is in reſpect of the law of God. As *Auſtin* defineth ſinne to be, *dictum, factum, concupitum contra legem Dei, A thought, word, or deed againſt the law of God.* And this is enough I thinke to denominate it ſinfull. But the argument uſed by this Authour is the very ſame which was formerly uſed by *Arminius*, and whereunto I have anſwered; *lib.*2. *de permiſſ. Sect:*21, and that after this manner. *Be it ſo that the act it ſelfe is forbidden, and conſequently the act it ſelfe is inordinate; but what will it therefore follow that theſe two are not to be diſtinguiſhed, to wit, the act, and the inordination of it? a ſtrange liberty of diſputing. A man's hand is ſometimes inordinate, as being monſtrous, either having too much, or too little; as either wanting five fingers, or having more then five: what therefore ſhall it not be lawfull for us to diſtinguiſh between the hand and the monſtroſity of the hand? 2. The Wall it ſelfe is white; what therefore ſhall we not diſtinguiſh between the wall, and the white colour of it? A man himſelfe is vertuous and vicious, ſhall this hinder us from due diſtinguiſhing between the man and his morall condition, whether vertuous or vicious; Many other arguments are repreſented by Arminius which this Authour toucheth not*; yet in the place forementioned I have ſhaken them all to peeces, ſuch is the rotten condition of them. And over & above I have proved, not that in every ſin the act is to be diſtinguiſhed from the inordination of it; but that in every ſin of commiſſion there is place for this diſtinction, and that after this manner. *Every ſinne of commiſſion, is an act inordinate; but in every inordinate act we are to diſtinguiſh between the act it ſelfe, and the inordination of it. And that the act and the inordination of it are two, I prove thus. That if they are one and the ſame then we may well ſay that the act is an inordination; but this is moſt falſe. For nothing can be affirmed or predicated of the ſame thing both in the abſtract, and concrete (God himſelfe excepted) As for example you may ſay of a wall, that it is white, you cannot ſay of it that it is Whitenes. For the Wall is in the*

predicament of substance, but Whitenes being a colour is in the predicament of quality. 2. Againe an inordination is a privation of order. But no act is formally a privation, and consequently neither can it be formally an inordination. 3. An entitie positive, & a terme privative cannot be one and the same formally, but two distinct notions. Now every act is a positive thing, but inordination is a mere privation. 4. Lastly God is confessed by all to be the cause of the act, but if the act be all one with the inordination, he should be the cause not of the act only, but of the inordination, that is of the sinfullnes also.

2. Observe his shifting carriage. It is our Tenet that *God is the Authour of the action it selfe, but not of the obliquity*: and himselfe hath expressly acknowledged this to be our tenet in the beginning of this Section Now whereas he makes shew here of proving that we make God the Authour not of the action only, but of the obliquity also, he performes no such matter; but only this, that we make the object of God's decree, not the action only, but the aberration also; but in all this there is no contradiction unto us; We willingly grant that in as much as God permits sinne, he will have sinne come to passe, by his permission, every good thing that comes to passe, he will have it come to passe by his being the Authour of it and effecting it; the evill that comes to passe, he will have come to passe also, not by his being the Authour of it and effecting it, but only by his permitting of it. So that still that of *Austin* holds good. *Non aliquid fit nisi omnipotens fieri velit. Not any thing comes to passe unlesse God will have it come to passe.* And according to the eleaventh article of religion established in the Church of Ireland, *God from all eternity did by his unchangeable counsell ordaine whatsoever in time shall come to passe*; and according to the expresse word of God testifying that the tenne Kings in giving their Kingdomes did here-
Rev: 17. 17. in doe the will of God. And that the horrible outrages committed upon the person of the holy Son of God by *Herod, Pontius Pilate, the Gentiles and people of Israel* were *by the hand and counsell of God before determined to be done* We say sinfull courses (not hand over head) but unrepented of, lead unto damnation, but not as meanes. For they are neither man's meanes; for if they were, then the end also whereunto they tend, should be intended by him; Neither are they any meanes of God: For all meanes are the workes of him that intends the end; So is not the sinne of man the worke of God, but the permission of sinne is his worke: And this is the meanes which he intends thereby to bring to passe his intended end, which yet on the part of Reprobates is not the damnation of them, but the manifestation of his glory in the way of vindicative justice, which in Scripture phrase is
Ro. 9. 23. called the Declaration of his wrath. For *God made all things for himselfe, even the wicked*
Prov: 16. 4. *against the day of evill.* And to this end he doth not only permit them both to sinne, and to persevere therein without repentance, but also to damne them for their sinne. And this worke of God namely the permission of sinne is as requisite for the manifestation of his mercy on the part of his Elect, as for the *Declaration of his wrath*, on the part of reprobates. Yet who was ever found so absurd as to say that we make the sinfull actions of men to be the meanes which God useth to bring about the salvation of his Elect. So little cause have we to make use of this distinction as the action it selfe and the sinfullnesse thereof, to shew in what sense it is a meanes which God useth whereby to bring about the damnation of man. For we utterly deny sinne to be any such meanes of God, but the permission thereof only is the meanes whereby to bring about not their damnation, as this Authour suggesteth, but the meanes (together with the damnation for sinne) whereby he bringeth to passe the declaration of his just wrath. But men of this Authours spirit; unlesse they be suffered to calumniate at pleasure; and corrupt their opposites Tenet at pleasure, they can say just nothing. It is true actions deserve damnation only as they *are transgressions of God's law*, but we deny that these transgressions are God's meanes, but only the permission of them is his meanes; and by permitting these transgressions, as also by damning for them, he brings to passe his glorious end, to wit, the declaration of his just wrath. 3ly, It is most untrue that God brings any man into a state of sinne; He brings himselfe into it most freely, God having no other hand in the sinne but as permitting it, that is as not preserving from it. Indeed if he did bring men into sinne, and they not rather bring themselves thereinto, he were the Authour of it. But it is well knowne that sinne cannot transcend the region of acts naturall. All acts supernaturall must needs be the worke of grace, and truly good; But every sinfull act is merely naturall, never supernaturall. Now never any of our Divines denyed a man liberty in his greatest corruption, unto acts naturall; the Devill himselfe hath liberty thus farre. It is true originall sinne is brought upon all by the sinne of *Adam*; For hereby the fountaine of humane nature became corrupted; but in this very sin of *Adam* we had an hand, if there be any truth in

Scripture

which teſtifies that, *In Adā we all have ſinned.* This is the doctrin which the Author ſpights, though he be more wiſe then to publiſh to the world his ſpleen againſt it: And I have ſeen under his hand where he denies originall ſinne to be *veri nominis peccatum*, *ſinne truly ſo called* And albeit *M. Hoord* makes a flouriſh in ſaying that God might juſtly damne all man-kind for the ſinne of *Adam*; and that alſo was this Authour's doctrine in the lectures which he read at Magdalen Hall; yet I have good cauſe to doubt whether this be his opinion now, and not rather the ſame with *Pelagius* his opinion, ſaving the difference which *Pelagius* did put between not entering into the Kingdome of heaven and damnation. As for all other ſins which we call actuall, they are, as I ſaid, naturall only, and not ſupernaturall; and therfore no man wants liberty, as to doe them, ſo to abſtaine from them; Only he wants a morall and Spirituall liberty to abſtaine from them in a gracious manner, according to that of *Aquinas*. *Licet aliquis non poſſit gratiam adipiſci qui reprobatur à Deo, tamen quod in hoc peccatum vel illud labatur, ex ejus libero arbitrio contingit.* *Though a man who is reprobated of God cannot obtaine grace, yet that he falleth into this or that ſinne it comes to paſſe of his own free will.* It is true alſo even in God's providence concerning acts naturall, there is a great myſtery. For as God foretold *David* that, *his neighbour ſhould lye with his wives*; and though he ſinned ſecretly, *yet the Lord would doe this openly*. So he foretold that, *upon that Altar which Jeroboam erected, a child that ſhould be borne of the houſe of David, Joſiah by name, ſhould burne the Prophets bones*. And that *Cyrus* alſo *ſhould build him a Citty and let goe his captives*: Yet who doubts, but that *Cyrus* did freely deliver the Jewes out of *Babylon*? and *Joſiah* did as freely burne the Prophets bones upon the alter in *Bethel*, as ever they did action in their lives? So *Abſalom* did as freely defile his Fathers Concubines. Then againe we deny that the damnation of any man is the end that God intends, but the manifeſtation of his own glory. And therfore though he hath made *the wicked againſt the day of evill*; yet both that, and all things he hath *made for himſelfe*. And to this tends both the permiſſion of ſinne, and the damnation of Reprobates for their ſin; And in no moment of nature, are either of theſe intended before the other, both being joyntly meanes for the procuring of another end. And if permiſſion of ſinne were firſt in intention with God, and then damnation as theſe men would have it, it followeth evidently by the moſt generally received rules of Schooles that permiſſion of ſinne ſhould be laſt in execution, that is men ſhould firſt be damned, and afterwards permitted to fall into ſinne. This is the iſſue of theſe men's Orthodoxy and accurate Divinity.

Rom. 5. 12.

Thom. 1. p. q. 23. art. 7. ad tertiũ.

2 Sam. 12. 11. 12.

1 Kin. 13. 2.

Eſ. 45. 13.

Ezra. 1.

2 King. 23. 16.

2 Sam. 16. 22.

Prov. 16. 4.

Section 8.

The will is determined to an Object two waies. 1. By compulſion againſt the bent and inclination of it. 2. By neceſſity according to the naturall deſire and liking of it. God's predeſtination ſay they, determineth the will to ſinne this laſt way, but not the firſt; It forceth no man to doe that which he would not, but carrieth him towards that which he would. When men ſin, tis true they cannot chooſe; And it is as true, they will not chooſe. It followeth not therefore from the grounds of their doctrine that God's decree is the cauſe of men's ſins, but their own wicked wills.

M. Maſon's Addit. p. 35. 36.

1. The Ancients made no diſtinction between theſe two words (*Neceſſity*) and (*Compulſion*) but uſed them in this argument promiſcuouſly; and did deny that God did neceſſitate men to ſinne, leaſt they ſhould grant him hereby to be the Authour of ſin, as I have touched before, and ſhall intimate againe afterward. Nor did the School men put any difference between them, as may appeare by the teſtimony of *M. Calvin*, who ſpeaking of the School-diſtinction of the will's threefold liberty; from neceſſity, from ſin, from Miſery, ſaith, This diſtinction I could willingly receive, but that it confoundeth neceſſitie with coaction.

2. That which neceſſitateth the will to ſinne is as truly the cauſe of ſinne, as that which forceth it, becauſe it maketh the ſinne to be inevitably committed, which otherwiſe might be avoided; and therefore if the Divine decree neceſſitate man's will to ſinne, it is as truly the cauſe of ſinne as if it did inforce it.

3. That which neceſſitates the will to ſinne, is more truly the cauſe of the ſinne, then the will is; becauſe it overruleth the will, and beareth all the ſtroke, taketh from it, 'its true liberty, by which it ſhould be Lord of it ſelfe, and diſpoſer of 'its own acts, and in reſpect of which it hath been uſually called by Philoſophers and Fathers too, Αυτεξούσιον *a power which is under the inſuperable check and controule of no Lord but it ſelfe.* It overruleth, I ſay, & maketh it become but a ſervile inſtrument, irreſiſtably ſubject to ſuperiour command and determination; And therefore is a truer cauſe of all ſuch acts and ſins, as proceed from the will ſo determined, then the will is. For when two Cauſes concurre to the producing of an effect, the one a principle overruling cauſe, the other but inſtrumentall, and wholly at the Devotion of the principall; then is the effect in all reaſon to be imputed to the principall, which by the force of 'its influxe and impreſſion produceth it, rather then to the ſubordinate and inſtrumentall which is but a mere ſervant in the production of it We ſhall find it ordinary in Scripture to aſcribe the effect to the principall Agent. It is not ye that ſpeak, ſaith Chriſt, but the Spirit of my Father that ſpeaketh in you. I laboured more abundantly then they all, yet not I, but the grace of God which was in me. And I live; yet not I, but Chriſt liveth in me ſaith St. *Paul. Gal*: 2. 20. In theſe and many other places the effect or work ſpoken of, is taken from the inſtrument

Mat: 10. 20. 1 *Co*: 15. 10.

ment, and given to the principall agent; Which being so, though man's will worke with God's decree in the commission of sinne, and willeth the sin which it doth, yet seing what the will doth, it doth by the commanding power of God's Allmighty decree, and so it doth that otherwise it cannot doe; the sin committed cannot so rightly be ascribed to man's will, the inferiour as to God's necessitating decree the superiour cause.

4. That which makes a man sinne by way of necessitie, that is with, and not against his will, is the cause of sin in a worse manner, then that which constraineth him to sinne against his will; As he which by powerfull perswasions drawes a man to stab, to hang, to poison himselfe is in a grosser manner the cause of that evill, and unnaturall action then he that by force compells him; because he maketh him to consent to his own death; And so if Gods decree doe not only make men sin; but sin willingly too; not only cause that they shall (*malè agere*) *doe evill*; but (*malè velle*) *will evill*, it hath the deeper hand in the sinne.

Answer. *God determines the will to sinne by necessitie, though not by compulsion:* this he obtrudes upon our Divines as their opinion, but quotes none, is it likely that he who quotes *Beza* to shew that in his opinion, God doth not only permit sinne, but will sinne; And *Calvin* to shew, that a man's mind is blinded, *volente & jubente Deo*; would not quote some or other of our Divines to prove that which he obtrudes upon them? If his common place booke could afford him any such quotation out of any one of them, to shew who they be, and where they say that, *God determines the will to sinne by necessity though not by compulsion.* Was there ever the like crimination made against any without naming them that say so, and the place where, and their own words? Or hath this man or any of his spirit deserved any credit to be trusted this way? The very phrase of determining in Latine is no word of course with our Divines in this argument. It is the phrase of the *Dominicans*. But doe they say that *God determines the will to sinne?* I doe not thinke he can produce one of them that expresseth himselfe so unscholastically, so absurdly. *Alvarez* saith that, *God by his effectuall decree predetermineth second causes to worke.* He saith that God doth *predetermine the will to the act of sinne, as it is an act. That the first root of contingency is the will of God.* Then to what doth God determine the will in their opinion? Is it to the act only and not to the manner of its production? Namely, to produce it voluntarily and freely? Nothing lesse though this Authour counts it his wisdome to conceale this. *God by his omnipotency doth cause, that man whose heart he moves to will and will freely.* Againe, *God's generall concourse is a divine, immediate influence into second causes whereby they are, foremoved, applyed and determined to worke every one according to the condition of its nature; The naturall cause naturally; the free cause freely; as I have professedly delivered. Disput.* 18. 23. And that in such sort *freely, as they can choose to doe otherwise if they will*, and that *in the very instant wherin they doe what they doe.* But come we to consider his answer.

De aux: disp. 22
Disp. 24.
Disp. 26.
ibid. Disp: 118. *pag.* 485.
ibid de aux: Disp 1. 1. *pag.* 490. *n.* 3.

1. Touching that which he saith of the Ancients, he gives us his bare word for it, as touching the confounding of necessitie and compulsion; yet *Bernard* I confesse willingly, in talking of *liberty from necessity*, understands by *necessity coaction.* He saith farther, that those Ancients *did deny that God did necessitate men to sinne, least they should grant thereby that God is the Authour of sinne.* But I doe not thinke he can shew this phrase of *necessitating the will* any way to be found among the Ancients, what he hath touched before I have considered, what he shall intimate hereafter, I hope I shall not let it passe unsaluted. And the truth is to *necessitate* hath such an Emphasis with it as to perswade that whatsoever a man is necessitated to do, that he doth by constraint against his will. And it is a rule commonly received that *Voluntas non potest cogi, The will cannot be forced*; which is most true, as touching *Actus eliciti, the acts of the will inward and immediate*, and not so of *actus imperati, acts outward and commanded.* But *Bradwardine* who alone useth this phrase amongst School-Divines, takes it in no such sense, but only for an effectuall operation of God upon the will moving it to worke this or that, not necessarily, but freely; which this Authour most judiciously dissembleth all along for desparing to prevaile by true and substantiall information of the understanding; *perturbandis affectibus suffuratur*; by a corrupt proposition of his Adversaries tenet, hopes to worke distast upon the Readers affections. *Bradwardines* position is this, *God can after a sort necessitate every created will to its free act, and to a free cessation, & vacation from act*: and hath a Corollary to this effect; *That some kind of necesity, and liberty are not repugnant, but may consist together.* Againe, *God doth after a sort necessitate every created will, unto every free act therefore, and to every free cessation and vacation from act that by necessity antecedent naturally.* And he addes a Corollary, *that some kind of antecedent necessity and liberty are not repugnant, and may consist together.*

Bradw, de causâ Dei l. 3. *c.* 1.
Id ibid, c. 2.

This distinction of *liberty from necessitie, liberty from sinne, liberty from misery*, I find in *Bernard*, and *Vossius* alleadgeth it only out of him, and the School-men might take it up after him. *Bernard* hath many obscure passages in the prosecuting of it, especially in reference to the two first members. Neither doth *Vossius* take any paines to cleare them from

from a manifeſt contradiction in ſhew: And no marvaile if Doctor *Potter* doth not, in ſtating the opinion of the Church of England in the point of free will, which he undertakes very magnificently in his *anſwer to charity miſtaken*; he was content to be led by his blind guid: now the ſeeming contradiction is this. If there be in a naturall man no liberty from ſinne, then is he neceſſarily carried into ſinne; and how then is there any liberty in him from neceſſitie? unleſſe *neceſſitie* be taken as all one with *conſtraint*. And *Bernard* ſometimes in that very treatiſe doth clearly expreſſe himſelfe to underſtand thereby coaction. And ſo *M. Fulkes* in his anſwer to the Rhemiſh teſtament, denying unto man liberty from ſinne, yet grants unto him a liberty from coaction. And indeed ſinne to the profane perſon is like *a ſweet morſell which he rolleth under his tongue*, as the booke of *Job* ſpeaks, he comes not conſtrained thereunto, but naturally takes delight therein; & I doubt too many there be, who though they are driven to confeſſe, that a naturall man hath no *liberty from ſinne*, yet they pleaſe themſelves with a certaine expreſſion of *Lindan's*, that *a man hath free will unto ſinne*; hoping therehence to conclude when time ſerves, that a man as he hath freedome to commit it, ſo he hath freedome to abſtaine from it, and ſo by a backe doore to draw in a Tenet quite contrary to the firſt, namely that even a naturall man hath liberty from ſinne. I am not ſure that *Lindan* did well underſtand his own expreſſion, ſo as to know how to make it good, much leſſe that they are able who licke their lips at it. But of this, and the clearing of *Bernard*, and of the difference between liberty naturall, and liberty morall I have elſe where diſcourſed at large. And *Calvin* obſerving this contradiction might well blame them that confound neceſſity, with coaction; whereby a way is opened to conclude, that becauſe a man is free from conſtraint of ſinning, therefore he is free from neceſſity of ſinning; whereas originall ſin doth neceſſarily incline him to ſinfull actions & courſes in generall; though to this kind of ſin in ſpeciall, or to this particular, in what kind ſoever, it doth not: yet by the way it is to be conſidered, that *Calvin* in ſome particulars, as namely in gracious courſes, did attribute ſo much to the efficacy of God's operation upon a man's will, as that the actions performed thereby though voluntary, yet in his opinion were not to be accounted free; & indeed they are wrought in oppoſition & as it were in ſpight of a certain principall of corruption that in part remaines in the very beſt of God's children. But we ſee no reaſon to the contrary, but that, when once God hath planted in us a principle of new life, of the life of grace, by the ſpirit of regeneration, though all the powers thereof doe incline only to that which is good, like as the powers of naturall corruption incline only unto evill, yet the particular uſe and exerciſe of thoſe is alwaies free: Like as the particular uſe and exerciſe of the powers of our corruption is allwaies free to the committing of this or that ſinne according unto emergent occaſions ſtanding in congruity to every man's particular diſpoſitiõ.

2. The Authour keepes himſelfe to the language of his own Court, but he ſhould not ſo imperiouſly put it upon his oppoſites to concurre with him in the language of *Aſhdod*. We know nothing that neceſſitates the will to ſinne, but that originall corruption, wherein every man is conceived, and which we brought with us into the world. For that makes us impatient of a yoake, like unruly Heyfers; And nothing is more burthenſome unto us in our corrupt nature, then the holy lawes of God; *The ſtatutes of Omri are not ſo, nor all the manner of the houſe of Ahab*; theſe are punctually obſerved, when God's holy ordinances are proudly deſpiſed. God moves every creature to worke agreeably to 'its nature. Neceſſary Agents neceſſarily, contingent Agents contingently, Free Agents freely. He doth not move to any ſuch act as is ſinfull, ſave only where the feare of God is not at all found, or not quickned, but the motions and ſuggeſtions of Satan entertained; nor then neither alwaies; and that not only in his own children, but even in the hearts of the wicked to reſtraine from ſinfull courſes in ſpight of Satans temptations, by injecting into their minds the conſideration either of danger, or of ſhame enſuing, ſo in a naturall way to reſtraine from the committing of ſuch an act as is ſinfull; eſpecially when he ſeeth it prejudiciall to the peace of his Church in generall, or any member thereof in particular; otherwiſe if he gives them over to Satan, and moves them agreably to his ſuggeſtions entertained by them, as being naturally well pleaſed with them, why ſhould this ſeem ſtrange to any? So that not any ſin is inevitably committed by the moſt wicked creature that lives upon the face of the earth, but he hath power enough (I doe not ſay to avoid it, an abſurd phraſe as if ſinne were a thing to be forced upon a man whether he would or no, but) to abſtaine from it, though not in a gracious manner, that being in the power of them only who have the ſpirit of regeneration dwelling in them.

3. In the ſame language he proſecutes his vile cauſe, giving manifeſt evidence to the world that it cannot be ſupported without lyes, nor embraced by any but thoſe whom God in his ſecret judgments hath given over to ſtrong illuſions to believe lyes, It is not incredible to me that ever any Papiſt or Proteſtant hath affirmed that God neceſſitates the will to ſinne; They generally acknowledge that evill hath no cauſe efficient, but deficient only: The terme of God's operation is no other then the ſubſtance of the act, which as an entity, and as an act muſt neceſſarily proceed from God, as *Aquinas* hath delivered. And albeit they maintaine that God's concurrence to the producing of the act doth worke upon the will of the creature which, from the firſt time that Divines came reſolutely unto the acknowledgment of this Divine concourſe to the act of ſin, hath alſo been received as I have ſhewed in my *Vindiciæ*. For *Peter Lombard* diſputing on either ſide about this concurrence, leaves it indifferent to the Reader to imbrace either part: Either the affirmative that God doth concurre to every act, though it be ſinfull, or the negative. Yet I ſay as many as doe maintaine the affirmative, doe ſo maintaine God's motion upon the creatures will, as to move it only agreably unto it's nature, namely to work freely not neceſſarily. Like as he moves neceſſary Agents to work neceſſarily, and contingent Agents to worke contingently. And if this Authour be ignorant hereof, which may well give him boldnes. For who ſo bold as blind Bayard? What doth he other in all this but betray his own ſhame comming to diſcourſe on ſuch an argument, as an aſſe comes to play upon an harp, as the proverbe ſpeaks. But if he be not ignorant of this, what unſhamefaſtneſſe doth he manifeſt all along, making bold only upon the ſimplicity and ignorance of his Reader to gull him, and abuſe him, and draw him along to oppoſe the free grace of God in predeſtination and regeneration, under colour of making God the Authour of ſinne in the point of reprobation; which yet he deſpaires of making good againſt us without notorious untruths, and that undoubtedly delivered againſt his own knowledge. For what Authour hath he produced to juſtifie this that any of our Divines maintaines that God neceſſitates the will of man to ſin? Not any that I know uſing this phraſe *Neceſſitate* but Papiſts, and among'ſt them none that I know but *Bradwardine* a man renowned in his time both for eminent learning, and eminent piety, as appeares by Sir *Henry Savill's* preface unto that book of his; and he no where affirming that God neceſſitates any man unto ſinne; but only to the ſubſtance of the act; & that not ſo as to make the will work neceſſarily, as the phraſe imports in a vulgar eare, and unto a popular judgment (whereupon alone this Author takes his advantage moſt unconſcionably) but agreably to 'its nature, that is contingently and freely. For were he able to produce any one of our Divines that affirmeth this, why doth he not? Is there any hing throughout this whole diſcourſe that more requires he ſhould name the man, and quote the places, where this is affirmed, then this? Yet here we find a blank; he carrieth it on magnificently upon his own bare word, which deſerves no credit at our hands; And is it poſſible to believe ſo foule a crimination without all evidence produced, unleſſe faction and partiallity hath blinded his eyes? Should he have laied to our charge that we maintaine that God neceſſitates the will to any good act, and to overrule the will therein, we ſhould utterly deny it without diſtinction. It is true he overrules the will of the fleſh, but not the will of the Spirit, the regenerate part, but moves it agreably to 'its nature, and to worke not only voluntarily but freely whatſoever it worketh. For albeit the regenerate part is like a morall vertue (though as much tranſcendent to it, as a thing ſupernaturall tranſcends a thing naturall) inclining only to that which is good; yet is it alwaies moved to this particular good rather then unto an other moſt freely. Like as a man's naturall corruption inclines a man only to evill; yet to this kind of evill or to this particular evill, rather then to that, Man is moved moſt freely. So that if we maintaine not that God workes a man to every good act, otherwiſe then freely; let the very conſcience of our enemies judge, whether we can maintaine that God neceſſitates the will either of men or of Devills unto ſinne. For it is apparent that God hath a Double influence unto a good act. One unto it as unto an act, and that is influence generall; Another unto it as unto a good and gracious act, and that we acknowledge to be an influence ſpeciall and ſupernaturall. But as touching an evill act, all ſides confeſſe that God hath but a ſingle influence thereunto and that generall, namely, as it is an act, not as it is evill. And albeit this influence which we call concurrence nnto the act, be joyned with an influence into the will of the creature to move it to the producing of the ſame act; yet this motion is no other thē whereby

the

the will is moved to worke agreably to 'its nature; that is freely. Like as all other Agents are moved by God, the firſt Agents to worke agreably to their natures, neceſſary things to worke neceſſarily, contingent things contingently. So that in all this there is no overruling of the will, no liberty taken from her; but rather ſhe is maintained and eſtabliſhed in her free condition, and moved agreably thereunto; like as in the eleaventh Article of Ireland it is expreſſed. For after it is laid downe that, *God from all eternity did by his unchangable counſell ordaine whatſoever in time ſhould come to paſſe*; It is forthwith added that, *hereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reaſonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor the contingency of the ſecond cauſes is taken away but eſtabliſhed rather*. But becauſe of another claw that here is ſubjoyned by this Authour, it is to be conſidered that the liberty of the creature is not equall unto the liberty of the Creator God himſelfe: But like as all other cauſes are but ſecond cauſes, God alone the prime cauſe; All other Agents but ſecond Agents, God alone the firſt Agent: So likewiſe all other free Agents are but ſecond free Agents, God alone *primum liberum, the firſt free Agent*. So that no liberty of the creature doth or can exempt it from the Agency of God, *In whom we live and move and have our being*: what a proud thing & preſumptuous were it for the creature to aſpire unto ſuch an exemption. Who oppoſe us in the point of free will more then Papiſts? Yet ſee how *Alvarez* diſputes againſt this vile and preſumptuous conceit, ſo much maintained by the Jeſuites, and after taken up by the Arminians, who live by their ſcraps, as if they would be content to waſh their diſhes. The Jeſuites diſcourſe thus, *That the Will may be free, ſhe muſt have the Dominion of her act*, true ſaith *Alvarez*, *debet habere 'Dominium ſui actûs, non tamen oportet quod habeat primum & abſolutum 'Dominium ſui actûs, ſhe muſt have the dominion over her act, but not the firſt and abſolute dominion of her act*. And *'Diſput.* 117, he propoſeth this queſtion, *Whether the will hath her dominion of her act, and what dominion this is*. In the reſolution whereof he propoſeth three concluſions. *Diſp.* 22. *num.* 44.

1. *The free will of man hath the dominion of her act as the next cauſe thereof. In this concluſion the 'Divines on both ſides doe concurre.* 2. *Free will created in the actuall uſe of Dominion and power which ſhe hath over her acts, depends on God as of an abſolute Lord, predeliberating, and predetermining before the foreknowledge of the creatures future cooperation what the free Will, Will doe in particular. This concluſion is held of all thoſe Divines who maintaine that God by his motion or effectuall grace, not only morally, but efficiently and phyſically doth cauſe us to worke that which is good, & it is proved*, ſaith he, *by all thoſe reaſons whereby it hath been formerly ſhewed that God by his decree & effectuall motion doth predetermine all ſecond cauſes, even ſuch as are free, to worke, preſerving their liberty and nature*. 3. *The dominion of her act is not firſt in the power of free will created, but in the power and dominion of God, eſpecially in reſpect of acts ſupernaturall. Our meaning is that all dominion & actuall uſe of dominion which the created will hath as cauſa proxima the next cauſe, or doth exerciſe over her free acts which ſhe produceth, proceedeth from God, as from the chiefeſt & firſt cauſe efficient, & ought to be reſolved into him as into the firſt Authour & firſt abſolute Lord thereof*. And the truth is the queſtion of free will, is commonly confounded though there is place of momentous diſtinction. For as for free will unto good that is merely Morall, and the reſolution thereof, is according to the reſolution in the point of originall ſinne. But free will unto actions in generall under an apperance of good, this is naturall liberty; and the reſolution thereof depends upon a right underſtanding of God's naturall providence in governing the world, and working with all creatures in their ſeverall kinds, ſuch operations as are agreable to their ſeverall conditiõs. The firſt liberty conſiſt's in diſpoſing man aright towards his end; like as morall vertues tend to this. But the ſecond liberty conſiſt's only in the right uſe of the meanes, unto what end ſoever is projected by us. The appearance of good moving herein is only, *in genere boni conducentis, in the kind of good conducing to the end propounded*; whether that end can be good or evill, right or wrong. But the appearence of good moving in the former is only, *ſummi boni, of our cheifeſt good*, the enjoying whereof will make us happy. But to returne, this Authour with whom I deale in preſent, ſtands for the will of man's abſolute dominion over her acts; as before he did expreſſe; whereas *Alvarez* profeſſeth utterly againſt this, Neither doe I blame him for contradicting *Alvarez* in this; but for carrying himſelfe like a poſitive *Theologue*, nor ſo only, but like a peremptory *Theologue* contenting himſelfe to dictate rules to others without all proofe, ſave this that otherwiſe we make God the Authour of ſinne. Yet this is not any expreſſe Argument of his neither; but he obtrudes premiſes upon us, which I thinke was never affirmed by any Divines of theſe dayes, unleſſe it be by ſome Libertines, againſt whom none that I know have diſputed more effectually then ſome of thoſe very Divines which here are traduced

by him. But obſerve the vile and abominable iſſue of this Authours doctrine in this particular, making man as he is a free creature to be the Lord of his own free act; yea and to have the abſolute dominion thereof, as formerly he did expeſſe *Sect*: 3. For ſeing the act of faith, of repentance, and the like are free acts; if liberty cannot be maintained unleſſe a man hath the abſolute dominion of his own act, hence it manifeſtly followeth, that God doth not determine the will to believe, to repent, or to any good work, yet the Scripture profeſſeth that *God is he, who makes us perfect unto every good worke, working in us that which is pleaſing in his ſight through Jeſus Chriſt.* That it is *God who worketh in us both the will and the deed according to his good pleaſure.* So that if a man ſhould live *Methuſaleh* his age, and ſpend that whole time in a gracious converſation; yet that God doth worke in him either the will or the deed of one gracious act more, it is merely of his good pleaſure; ſo little cauſe have we to preſume of perſeverance in that which is good by out own ſtrength. And againe all this God workes in us for Chriſt his ſake. Chriſt hath deſerved even this at the hands of God his father. What then is the meaning of this, that God ſhould cooperate with us to the will and the deed, provided that we will? Conſider the abſurdity of this (upon the ſuppoſall of the poſſibility of ſuch a cooperation, which yet by evident reaſon may be demonſtrated to be utterly impoſſible.) Did Chriſt merit any thing for the Angells? yet doth he not cooperate with them to every act of theirs as well as to any of ours? Nay is it poſſible that any act ſhould exiſt without God's operation? And is it reaſonable to ſubject ſuch a courſe of Divine providence to the merits of Chriſt? Thus we ſee whereunto this Authour tends in this diſcourſe of his, nameiy ſo to maintaine God to be no Authour of ſinne, as withall to maintaine that he is no Authour of that which is good, no not of faith, repentance, or any gracious act that is freely performed by any creature man or Angell: we on the other ſide deſire & endeavour ſo to carry our ſelves that while we vindicate God from being the Authour of evill, we may not therewithall deny him to be the Authour of any thing, that is good and gracious; which is this Authours courſe, as appeares manifeſtly in the iſſue. And obſerve his crafty cariage foxe like; Had he dealt upon predeſtination, and the efficacy of grace, and therein profeſſed plainly that faith and repentance being free acts, every man's will hath an abſolute dominion over them; and therefore God doth not determine the will thereunto: For that were to make God the Authour of faith and repentance; how many thouſands would have been ready to have flowen in his face, and abhorre ſuch abominable doctrine. Therefore he baulks that, and deales only upon reprobation; and here he layeth to our charge that we make God the Authour of ſinne, by neceſſitating and determining the will to ſinne (though his premiſes herein I have ſhewen to be moſt falſe) therefore he maintains that God doth not determine the will ſo much as to the act whereunto the ſinfulneſſe accrewes; both becauſe man's will is free; and becauſe ſo he ſhould be the Authour of ſinne. And if once he can make his Reader to ſwallow this, he doubts not but to take him in the point of predeſtination and grace alſo; and make him wary to take heed of maintaining that God determines or neceſſitates the will of man to any good act whether it be of faith or of repentance, and that for feare of denying man to have the abſolute dominion over his will, to worke himſelfe to faith and repentance at his pleaſure: and ſecondly, for feare of makeing God the Authour of faith and repentance and every good act; Like as by ſaying that God doth determine or neceſſitate the will to ſinne, we make him the Authour of ſinne. Behold Reader the iſſue of this man's Divinity; and whether he be not leading thee into the very chambers of death, by working thee with him to oppoſe the free grace of God, both in predeſtination and in regeneration, and the power and efficacy thereof in working thee to faith, to repentance, and to every thing that is pleaſing and acceptable unto him, & that through Jeſus Chriſt. Yet we have ſhewed a manifeſt difference between God's moving the creature unto that which is good, and moving the creature unto ſuch acts as are evill. For in evill he moves only to the ſubſtance of the act, whereof our Adverſaries themſelves acknowledge God to be the Authour, that is the efficient cauſe, and this he performes by influence generall. But as touching every good act, the Lord moveth not only to the ſubſtance of the act by influence generall, but alſo to the goodnes thereof by influence ſpeciall. He proceeds to tell us what Philoſophers teach concerning the condition of the will. And becauſe it is very abſurd for a Chriſtian to goe to ſchoole to Philoſophers to learne the condition of Divine providence; he tels us of Fathers too that maintaine the ſame as he ſaith, but he quotes neither the one, nor the other. Now I would gladly know what Father hath ever taught that God hath no power over the will of man to convert it, and *ex nolentibus volentes facere*

Heb: 13. 21.

cere, of unwilling, to make men willing, to worke men to faith, to repentance, to all kind of pious obedience. And as for God's ſecret providence in evill, how plentifull is the Scripture concerning this? *God is ſaid to have ſent Joſeph into Egypt*, though this was brought to paſſe by the parricidiall hands of his brethren; To tell *David*, that *the ſword ſhould not depart from his houſe*, though this could not be taken up or uſed, but by the free will of men; To ſend *Senacherib* againſt a diſſembling nation; and to profeſſe that this proud King in all his bloudy executions upon the people of God, was but as the axe, or the ſawe in the hand of God. The like is teſtified concerning *Nabuchodonoſor* after him. Nay the Prophet demands, *Whether there be any evill in the Citty and the Lord hath not done it*; ſpeaking of the evill of puniſhment, though wickedly executed by the hands of wicked men; that the *Lord cauſed the King of Aſſur to fall by the ſword in his own land*, though this was done by the hands of his own children. And as in violent courſes, ſo in impure courſes the Scripture as plainly teſtifies the ſecret providence of God to have place therein. And what doth *Auſtin* obſerve from the like places both in his fift book againſt *Julian* the *Pelagic*: 3, and in his book *de gratiâ & libero arbitrio*, profeſſing, *occulto Dei judicio fieri perverſitatem cordis, that the perverſity of the heart*, or will, *comes to paſſe by the ſecret judgment of God*; And the power that God hath over the wills of men *to incline them even to evill*; that is his phraſe as I have formerly ſhewed, abundantly repreſenting the places where he delivers this. He proceeds not ſo much in Scholaſticall diſcourſe, as in rhetoricall amplification, more like a Shrew vexing him ſelfe and fretting that he cannot have his will, then like a diſputer. *That which neceſſitates the will makes it become but a ſervile inſtrument, irreſiſtably ſubject to ſuperiour command and determination*; this action of command comes in moſt unſeaſonably, it denoting a morall action, commanding not only things agreable, but ſometimes contrary to the will of the perſon commanded. No ſuch thing hath place in *God's moving of the will of man* (did he move it unto ſinne, which yet is moſt falſe; for he moves it only to the ſubſtance of the act.) But why ſhould it ſeeme ſtrange that the creature ſhould be a Servant to the Creator, and his inſtrument, and a ſervile inſtrument. Yet the notion of ſervility is very aliene from the matter in hand, that having place only in proper ſpeech as touching morall obedience; that which we treat of, is rather of motions naturall, and of the ſubordination of the ſecond cauſe to the firſt, the ſecond Agent to the firſt. And was ever any ſober man known to oppoſe this with ſuch froth of words as this Authour doth? Doth this Authour himſelfe thinke it poſſible that the Creature can move it ſelfe, or performe any operation without God's concourſe? I doe not think he doth. Doe we not live in God, have we not our being in God? And what is this other then to ſay that our life and being depend on God, in the kind of a cauſe efficient? And doth not the ſame Apoſtle, and in the ſame place teſtifie, and that in the words of an heathen man (to ſhew that all ſuch did not ſo maintaine the Αὐτεξούσιον, the αὐτοδέσποτον, the ἀδέσποτον condition of the will, as to maintaine the exemption of it from influence Divine) profeſſe that in God we move alſo? And the truth is all the queſtion is about the manner of this concourſe divine; whereabouts this Authour ſpends not a word, as if he kept his breath for ſome other purpoſe then to deale on that point, which alone is controverted. The irreſiſtable ſubjection he ſpeaks of is no more then the bereaving of the will of her liberty, which is moſt untrue For proof whereof I appeale to every man that will but look upon *Alvarez*, that maintaines this divine motion of will under the notion of determining; And upon *Bradwardine*, who alone, that I know, maintaines the ſame divine motion under the notion of neceſſitating: Whereas he infers herehence that *God is a truer cauſe of all ſuch acts and ſins that proceed from the will ſo determined, then the will is*. Oftentimes he hath ſet before us ſuch Coleworts; but we have nothing but his bare word for it. And it depends merely upon this that the action of the creature is not free. Whereas both *Bradwardin* maintaines that God neceſſitates the creature to every free act of his; And *Alvarez*, that God determines the creature to worke freely. Now is it a ſober courſe hence to inferre, that the act is not free? As much as to ſay it cannot but be free, therfore it is not free. And yet we know that every one naturally is prone to ſinne, and in the beſt of God's children there is a principle that inclines to ſinne. God is confeſſed by our very oppoſites to be the true cauſe of the act; yet not at all the cauſe of the ſin by his concourſe. Only they differ from us as touching the nature of this concourſe; We ſay God concurres to the producing of the act as it becomes not an Agent only, but the firſt Agent; not a cauſe only, but the firſt cauſe; and man as a ſecond Agent, and ſecond cauſe that moveth in God as the Apoſtle teſtifies; like as he lives in God, and hath his being in God. But theſe men deviſe God, and man to move to the producing of the ſame act, as two men in lift-

ing a timber logge, moſt indecently: And to free this concurrence from chance, they ſay ſometimes that God workes this or that act in us *modo velimus*, that is, *upon condition that We Will* But when they conſider that God workes the act of willing, as well as ought elſe; & are demanded to anſwer upon what condition he workes this what condition will they deviſe of this? will he ſay, *modo velimus*, *provided that We will*? As much as to ſay, God will produce the act of willing, provided that it be produced already by us. Others ſay that God foreſeeing that the will of man, at ſuch a time will produce ſuch an act of willing in caſe God be pleaſed to concurre to the producing of it, hereupon he reſolves to concurre to the producing of it, whereby the finall reſolution is rather into the will of God, then into the will of the creature, I ſay the finall reſolution of every ſinfull act committed by the creature. Secondly here is deviſed a thing future without all ground. For whereas the act of willing (as for example in *Judas*, the act of willing to betray his Maſter, is in 'its own nature merely poſſible not future how then did it paſſe into the condition of a thing future, and that from everlaſting (For from everlaſting God knew it as a thing future) this could not be done without a cauſe? And what cauſe could there be of an eternall effect, but an eternall cauſe which is God alone: And in God nothing can be deviſed to be the cauſe thereof, but his will or decree. Therefore to avoid this they muſt be driven to conclude that all future things became future by neceſſitie of nature; if not of their own nature; yet at leaſt by the neceſſitie of God's nature, he producing them all not freely, but by neceſſitie of nature This is that Atheiſticall neceſſitie whereupon our Adverſaries are caſt, while they oppoſe ſuch a neceſſitie as depends upon God's decree ordaining all things to come to paſſe agreably to their natures, neceſſary things neceſſarily, contingent things contingently and accordingly ordaining neceſſary cauſes working neceſſarily, for the producing of the one; and contingent cauſes working contingently, for the producing of the other; as *Aquinas* diſcourſeth. 1. *pag q.* 19, in the Article whoſe title is this, *Utrum divina voluntas neceſſitatem rebus imponat*, *whether the will of God impoſeth a neceſſitie on things that come to paſſe in the world?* The reaſon this Authour brings is a mere Socyſme, ſaying the ſame over and over againe; As when he ſaith, *For when two cauſes concurre to the producing of an effect; the one principall overruling cauſe, the other but an inſtrumentall & wholly at the devotion of the principall, then is the effect in all reaſon to be imputed to the principall, which by the force of 'its influxe and impreſſion produceth it, rather then to the ſubordinate and inſtrumentall, which is but a mere ſervant in the production of it.* To which I anſwer, that which he calls overruling, I have often ſhewed how abſurdly it is imputed unto us. For how can that be called overruling which workes not the will contrary to 'its nature, but moves it only agreably to the nature thereof. As for the cauſe principall, what Scholar of any braines ever denyed God to be the cauſe principall in any action to the producing whereof he concurres? For is he not the firſt cauſe and the firſt Agent? Are not all other ſecond cauſes and ſecond Agents? But this Authour hopes his Reader will underſtand this in reference only to the ſinne, not to the naturall act under it, whereas God as touching the ſinfullneſſe of it is no Agent at all, much leſſe a prime Agent; no cauſe at all, much leſſe a prime cauſe. Then ſecondly let God never ſo effectually work any creature to the producing of an act connaturall thereunto, yet if he works the creature therunto agreably to 'its nature, that is if it be an neceſſary Agent, moves it to worke neceſſarily; if it be a contingent agent, moves it to worke contingently; if it be a free agent, moves it to worke freely; then by *Arminius* his confeſion our cauſe is gained. For God ſhall be found free from blame, and the creature void of excuſe. Now this is clearly our doctrine, and in effect the doctrine of all them, who ſay that God determines the will, as the *Dominicans*; or that God neceſſitates the will, as *Bradwardine*. For they all acknowledge hereby that God moves the creature to worke freely, in ſuch ſort that in the very act of working they might doe otherwiſe if they would. They confeſſe this providence of God is a great myſtery and not ſufficiently comprehenſible by humane reaſon. *Cajetan* profeſſeth thus much as before alleadged; and *Alvarez* maintaines it in a ſet diſputation; And ſuppoſing God's concourſe as neceſſarily required to every act of the creature, they are able to prove by evident demonſtration, that no other concourſe can be admitted, then this whereby God moves every creature and that effectually to every act thereof, but agreably to 'its nature and condition. And this is farther demonſtrated by God's fore knowledge, of things future. Another *Arminian* with whom I have had to deale in this argument, being preſſed with this reaſon drawen from God's foreknowledge and urged to ſhew how things poſſible became future & that from everlaſting (for from everlaſting they were known to God as future) had no way to helpe

him

ſelfe but by flying to the actuall exiſtence of all things in eternity. And I have good ground for ſtrong preſumption that this Authour with whom now I deale had his hand in that Pye, which was above foure yeares agoe. See the deſperate iſſue of theſe mens diſcourſes; who are drawen to take hold of ſuch a Tenet to helpe themſelves withall; which their beſt freinds the Jeſuites, the Authours of *Scientia media*, doe utterly diſclaime. And on the other ſide the *Dominicans* who embrace the actuall exiſtence of all things in eternity, are utterly repugnant to the doctrine of *Scientia media*. So that when the Jeſuites are reconciled to the *Dominicans* in the point of actuall exiſtence of all things in eternity; And the *Dominicans* to the Jeſuites in the point of *Scientia media*, then theſe men with whom I deale are like to prevaile, which I doubt will hardly be before *Elias comes*. Thirdly conſider, if when one cauſe is principall, overruling the other, the effect muſt be imputed rather to the principall then to the other. It followes evidently that when the cauſes doe equally concurre without any ſuch overruling of one the other, then the effect is equally imputable unto each, & conſequently the ſin (For ſuch is this Authour's language in this Argument) is equally imputable to both, to God as well as man; And he is to be accounted the Author of it, as well as man. I appeale to every man's ſober conſcience that is able to judge indifferently between us in this. But if to avoid this they deny that the concurrence is equall, but that God's concurrence is conditionall, to wit, in caſe the creature will, and ſo man is to be accounted the Authour of ſinne, and not God, hence it followeth, that ſeeing God's concurrence unto the act of faith and repentance is of the ſame nature in the opinion of theſe men; God is not the Authour of faith and repentance any more, then he is the Authour of ſinne, in the language of theſe diſputers. Or if they fly not to this, as I have found this Authour (as I gueſſe) to deny God's concourſe to ſtand in ſubordination to man's, then my former argument is not avoided; But a third reaſon ariſeth herehence againſt his former diſcourſe of God's concourſe, namely, that if God and man doe equally concurre unto the act of ſinne, then, as I have already ſhewed, that theyare equally guilty of ſin. So in the working of faith and repentance man is as forward as God and as much the Authour of his own faith and repentance as God is, in direct contradiction to the Apoſtle who ſaith that, *Faith is the guift of God & not of our ſelves*. We willingly grant that God is the principall agent in producing every act, whether it be naturall or ſupernaturall For *in him we move* as well as *in him we live & have our being*. But we deny ſin, as ſin, to be any act but a privation of obedience to the law of God, as the Apoſtle defines it to be 'Ανομια, Yet let us examine that which he delivers of the principall agent, & the texts produced by him, that we may not be carried away as he is with a ſuperficiary apprehenſion of things. And firſt conſider) we might plead as well for ſuch acts as this Authour calls ſins, as he doth for acts gracious by his ſuperficiary diſcourſe. For doth not *Joſeph* comforting his brethren ſay unto them in like manner. *Now then you ſent me not hither, but God*. But conſider farther in that paſſage alleadged by him out of *Mat*: 10. 20. *It is not ye that ſpeak but the ſpirit of my Father which ſpeaketh in you*. Was not this ſpeech of the Apoſtles a free action? The labour of *Paul* more abundantly then of all the reſt of the Apoſtles, was it not a free action in *Paul*? if God determined thē unto theſe actions, then freedome of will humane ſtands not in oppoſition to determination divine; and conſequently though the act be evill that is, done by man; yet may God determine the creature to the doing of that act, without any impeachment of the creatures liberty. If God did not determine the wills of his Servants but only afford a ſimultaneous concourſe to their actions, why is he called the cauſe principall, ſince it is confeſſed, God doth afford the like concourſe to every ſinfull act, as touching the ſubſtance thereof.

Note

Eph: 2. 8.

Act: 17. 26.

Note

Gen: 45. 8.

Againe he repeates the ſame, when in caſe of divine determination, he ſaith, *the ſinne cannot be ſo rightly aſcribed to man's Will the inferiour, as to God's neceſſitating decree, the ſuperiour cauſe*. To which I anſwer againe, being drawen thereunto by his *Tautologies*; by the ſame reaſon it may be inferred, that when the fire burnes any combuſtible thing, the burning is rather to be aſcribed to God the more principall cauſe, then to the fire the leſſe principall, the firſt cauſe being more principall then the ſecond and if it pleaſe God ſo to order it, the fire ſhall not burne as it appeares in the three noble children caſt into the furnace of Babylon, when they came forth there was not ſo much as the ſmell of fire upon them. Secondly I anſwer as before, by the ſame reaſon, when the concourſe unto the ſinfull act is equall, on man's part, & on God's, each ſhall equally be accounted the Authour of that ſinne, and not man more then God; Now ſuch a concourſe is maintained by this Authour. Thirdly in the working of faith and repentance; ſince by theſe mens

opinions

opinions God affords only his concourſe he ſhall be no more the Authour of man's faith and repentance then man himſelfe is. Laſtly be it granted that God is a more principall cauſe then mā in producing the act; yet there is no colour of imputing unto God the cauſality of the ſin, who hath no Agency therein, by doing what he ought not to doe, or not in that manner he ſhould doe, this is found only in the creature, who being a free Agent, otherwiſe then as originall ſinne hath impaired liberty, which I hope this Authour will not deny, is juſtly anſwerable for his own tranſgreſſion. As for example, God determined that *Cyrus* ſhould give the Jewes liberty to returne into their own land; yet this action of *Cyrus* was as free an action, as any that was performed by him throughout his life. God determined that *Joſiah* ſhould burne the Prophets bones upon the Altar at *Bethel*, yet *Joſiah* did this as freely as ought elſe. God determined that Chriſt's bones ſhould not be broken, yet the ſouldiours abſtained from the breaking of his bones with as much liberty as they had uſed, in caſe they had broken them. This divine providence we willingly confeſſe is very myſterious, and as *Cajetan* ſaith the diſtinctions uſed to accommodate it to our capacitie doe not quiet the underſtanding; therefore he thought it his duty to captivate his into the obedience of faith. And *Alvarez* in a ſolemne diſputation proves that it is incomprehenſible by the wit of man.

4. His laſt is delivered moſt perplexedly. I can make no ſenſe of it as the words lie, but I ſee his meaning. He ſuppoſeth that God by our Tenet makes a man to ſin willingly, & that he ſaith is worſe then to conſtraine a man to ſinne againſt his will. Where obſerve how this man's ſpirit is intoxicated when he delivered this. For firſt he calls that worſe which is merely impoſſible, and that by his own rules. For he holds that ſinne cannot be, except it be voluntary, ſpeaking of ſinne committed by any particular perſon. Secondly he ſuppoſeth that by our opinion God makes a man to ſinne, which is moſt untrue. For when he acknowledgeth that no ſin can be committed by man without God's concourſe; will he ſay that God by his concourſe helps a man to ſinne? He helps him to the producing of the act, not to the committing of the ſinne. And indeed be the act never ſo vertuous, if it proceed not out of the love and feare of God, it is no better then ſuch as the Heathens performed; of which *Auſtin* hath profeſſed that they were no better then *ſplendida peccata, glorious ſins:* So that if God doth not give a man theſe graces of his holy Spirit in every act that is performed by him he ſhall ſinne, and not only in acts vitious; and God is not bound to beſtow theſe graces on any.

Section 9.

M. Maſon's Addit. p. 37. 38. Sinne may be conſidered as ſinne, or as a meanes of declaring God's juſtice in mens puniſhments. God doth not predeſtiminate men to ſinne, as it is ſinne, but as a meanes of their puniſhment. He is not therefore, ſay they, the Authour of ſinne.

1. A good end cannot moralize a bad action; it remaineth evill though the end be never ſo good [*Bonum oritur ex integris.*] end, manner, yea matter too muſt be good, or elſe the action is naught. He that ſhall ſteale that he may give an almes; or commit adultery, that he may beget Children for the Church; Or oppreſſe the poore to teach them patience, Or kill a wicked man that he may doe no more hurt with his example; or doe any forbidden thing, though his end be never ſo good, he ſinneth notwithſtanding. And the reaſon is becauſe the evill of ſinne is greater then any good that can come by ſinne; foraſmuch as it is *læſio divinæ majeſtatis, a wronging of God's majeſty*; and ſo *Divino bono oppoſita*, directly prejudiciall to the good of Almighty God as much as any thing can be. This Saint *Paul* knew very well, and therefore he tells us plainely that we muſt not doe evill that good may come thereof. Whoſoever therefore willeth ſin, though for never ſo good an end, he willeth that which is truly and formally a ſinne, and conſequently God, though he will ſinne for never ſo good ends, yet willing it with ſuch a powerfull, and effectuall will, as giveth a neceſſary being to it, he becommeth Authour of that which is formally ſinne.

2. The members of this diſtinction are not oppoſite, for ſinne as ſinne, and in no other conſideration is meanes of puniſhment. If God therefore willeth it as a meanes of puniſhment, he willeth it as a ſinne; his decree it determinated at the the very formality of it.

3 This diſtinction faſtneth upon God a further aſperſion, and loadeth him with three ſpeciall indignities more.

1. Want of wiſedome and providence. His counſells muſt needs be weak if he can find out no meanes to glorifie juſtice, but by the bringing in of ſinne, which his ſoule hateth, into the world and appointing men to commit it, that ſo he may maaifeſt juſtice in the puniſhment of it.

2. Want of ſincerity and plaine dealing with men. *Tiberius* as *Suetonius* reports, having a purpoſe to put the two ſonnes of *Germanicus*, *Druſius* and *Nero*, to death uſed ſundry cunning contrivances to draw them to revile him, that reviling him they might be put to death; and herein is juſtly cenſured for great hypocriſie. And ſo if God having appointed men by his abſolute will to inevitable perdition, doe decree that they ſhall ſinne that ſo they may be damned for thoſe ſins, which he decreeth, and draweth them into; he diſſembleth, becauſe he ſlaughtereth them under pretext of juſtice for ſinne, but yet for ſuch ſins only as he hath by his eternall counſell appointed as the meanes of their ruine.

3. Want

3. Want of mercy in an high degree, as if he did ſo delight in bloud, that rather then he will not deſtroy mens ſoules, he will have them live and dye in ſinne, that he may deſtroy them, like to thoſe Pagan Princes of whom *Juſtin* Martyr *Apol:* 2, two or three leaves from the beginning ſaith, They are afraid that all ſhould be juſt leaſt they ſhould have none to punish. But this is the diſpoſition of Hang-men rather then of Good Princes: And therefore farre be thoſe foule enormities, and in particular this latter from the God of truth and Father of mercies. And thus notwithſtanding theſe diſtinctions, it is in my conceit moſt evident that the rigid and upper way makes God the Authour of mens ſins, as well as puniſhment. And ſo much for the firſt generall inconvenience, which ariſeth from this opinion, namely the diſhonour of God.

Anſwer. I willingly profeſſe I am to ſeeke what that Divine of ours is that ſaith God doth predeſtinate men to ſinne, *as a meanes of their puniſhment*. Here this Authour is ſilent, names no man, quotes no place; Like as in the former he carried himſelfe in this manner. The Ancients generally take predeſtination in no other notion, then to be of ſuch things which God himſelfe did purpoſe to bring to paſſe by his own operation, not of ſuch things as come to paſſe by God's permiſſion, Neither can I call to remembrance any Divine of ours that talkes of God's predeſtinating men unto ſinne. But the Scripture affords plentifull teſtimony of God's will, ordination, and determination, that the ſins of men come to paſſe by God's permiſſion. Was it not God's will that *Pharaoh's* heart ſhould be hardened, ſo as not to let Iſrael goe for a while, when he told *Moſes* that he would harden *Pharaoh's* heart that he ſhould not let Iſrael goe? Was it not God's appointment that *Abſolom* ſhould lye with his fathers Concubines, when he denounced this judgment againſt him, that he would give his wives unto his neighbour, who ſhould lye with them before the ſun? Was it not his will that the ten tribes ſhould revolt from *Reboboam*, when he proteſted of that buſineſſe, that it was from him? Was it not God's will that the Jews and Gentiles ſhould concurre in crucifying Chriſt when the Apoſtles profeſſe, that *both Herod & Pontius-Pilate, with the Gentiles, and people of Iſrael were gathered together to doe what God's hand and counſell had before determined to be done?* Doth not Saint *Peter* profeſſe of ſome that ſtūbled at the word being diſobedient, that *hereunto they were ordained?* And that the ten Kings in giving their Kingdomes to the beaſt did fullfill the will of God, as touching this particular? But that God ſhould will or ordaine it as a meanes of puniſhment, as if the end which God aimed at, were the puniſhment, is ſo abſurd and contradictious unto Scripture, that in my opinion it cannot well enter into any judicious Divines heart ſo to conceive. And marke how this Authour ſhuffles herein: for firſt he ſaith that ſin may be conſidered either as ſinne; or as a meanes of declaring God's juſtice in puniſhing it. And why doth he not keep himſelfe unto this? eſpecially conſidering, that not permiſſion of ſin only, but the puniſhment of ſin alſo are jointly the meanes of declaring God's juſtice. And where King *Solomon* profeſſeth that God made the very wicked againſt the day of evill, in the ſame place he manifeſteth what is the end of this; namely in ſaying that he made all things for himſelfe, that is for the manifeſtation of his own glory. And this glory is not only in the way of juſtice; but in the way of mercy alſo; which this Authour as his manner is, very judiciouſly conceales; this attribute of mercy lying not ſo open to this Authours evaſion as that of juſtice. And is it poſſible God's mercy and the demonſtration thereof ſhould have place where there is no ſin? conſidering that no other evill, or miſery, had entred into the world, had it not been for ſin, according to that of the Apoſtle, *By one man ſin entred into the world, & death by ſin.* Neither are theſe generalls the only end that God aimed at in this, but many other particulars there are, whereby the glory of God's wiſedome and power, and grace doth appeare, by occaſion of ſins entrance into the world. The horrible facts of Jewes and Gentiles cōmitted upon the perſon of the Son of God, were ſuch as whereby the Lord brought to paſſe the redemption of the world. If Chriſt had not been crucified what ſatisfaction had been made for the ſins of the world? how could he have been ſet forth as a propitiation for our ſins through faith in his blood? & yet this is not all the glory of God that breaks forth by the permiſſion of ſin. The puniſhment of one ſin by another is an admirable worke of God's providence, and that more waies then one. For God can puniſh, and doth, one man by the ſin of an other. The *Aſſyrians* and *Babylonians* committed outrages enough upon the people of God, yet hereby the Lord was juſt in puniſhing the ſins of his own people, *Senacherib* blaſphemed the God of Iſrael, the creature his Creator, moſt unnaturally, this unnaturallnes of his towards God, the Lord avenged by the unnaturalneſſe of his own children towards him: This was the worke of the Lord, as himſelfe acknowledgeth. *I will cauſe him to fall by the ſword in his own land. Man ſeeketh the face of the Ruler, but every man's judgment is of the Lord.* Many unjuſt judgments have their courſe in the world, yet *Solomon* ſaith, *every man's judgment is from the Lord.* It is juſt with him to

Act: 4. 28. 1 *Pet:* 2. 8. *Rev:* 17. 17. *Ro:* 5. *Eſa:* 10. *Habak:* 1. *Eſ:* 37. 7. *Prov:* 28.

puniſh unjuſt courſes with unjuſt courſes, and there is mercy in this; for no better way then this to bring mens former wicked courſes to their remembrance. As *Adonibezek* when the thumbs of his hands, and great toes of his feet were cut off, then he remembred his former cruelty; and how that 70 Kings had eaten bread under his Table, having the thumbes of their hands and feet cut off; And herein he acknowledged the juſt hand of God ſaying. *As I have done to others ſo hath God done to me.* And as many as will not in like manner acknowledge the juſt hand of God in like caſes, let them take heed leſt *Adonibezek* one day riſe up in judgment againſt them. Thus it is juſt with God by one ſin of the ſame man to puniſh another. For becauſe the Gentiles knowing God, glorified him not as God, but were unthankfull, turning the glory of the incorruptible God into the Image of corruptible things, therefore *the Lord gave them up unto a reprobate mind, to doe thoſe things which are not convenient. Therefore God gave thē up to vile affections. Therefore God gave them up to their hearts luſts, unto uncleanes to defile their own bodies between thēſelves.* And what were theſe *inconvenient things?* what was this *uncleanes?* Wherein conſiſted this, *defiling of their bodies between themſelves?* The text expreſſeth it thus. *For even their womē changed the naturall uſe into that which is againſt nature. And likewiſe alſo the mē left the naturall uſe of the women, & burned in their luſt one towards another, & mā with man wrought filthines.* But was there any judgment of God to be obſerved in this? The Apoſtle hath diſcovered this alſo unto us in the words immediately following thus, *And they received in thēſelves ſuch recōpence of their errour as was meet*; obſerve manifeſtly the juſt hand of God in all this. As for the manner how God brought all this to paſſe, we anſwer with *Auſtin*, whether it be *modo explicabili*, or *inexplicabili*, *by a way that may be explicated by us, or whether it be inexplicabile, the Apoſtle troubleth not himſelfe hereabout, his care was only to ſhew how great a judgmēt this was*: & this is proſecuted farther by *Auſtin* in the ſame place, ſhewing by variety of particulars, all taken out of the word of God; in the place formerly quoted. Neither is this all the glory of God that cōes to be manifeſted by the permiſſion of ſin. For he knows not only how to judge one ſin by another, but to heale one ſin by another alſo. *Audeo dicere*, ſaith *Auſtin*, *utile eſt ſuperbis in aliquod apertum manifeſtumq; cadere peccatum, that ſo they may be humbled and brought to ſobriety*, and paſſe the time of ſojourning here with greater care and feare. Now conſider in how hungry a manner this Authour ſets downe our tenet concerning God's providence in willing, and decreeing, that ſin ſhall come to paſſe in the world by his permiſſion; whē he talkes of ſin being a meanes of puniſhment, a moſt abſurd expreſſion, both in a ſiniſter ſtating of the end, puniſhment not being the end, but a meanes coordinate to an other end, to wit, the manifeſtation of God's glory, who hath *made all things for himſelfe*, that is for the ſetting forth of his own glory; as alſo in a ſiniſter ſtating the end, ſin being not a meanes (as moſt abſurdly he ſtiles it) but a meritorious cauſe of puniſhment: Like as in reference to the manifeſtation of his glory, it is not the meanes, but the materiall cauſe thereof. But the permiſſion of ſins, that and not ſin is the meanes together with the puniſhment thereof, tending to the manifeſtatiō of God's glory in the way of juſtice? 1. A good end cannot moralize a bad actiō. We grant it. But ſeeing it is impoſſible that the divine hand can doe any bad action, the end of his actions is ſufficient to juſtifie his courſes. For as *Aquinas* hath delivered; God's wiſedome is his juſtice. For he is a debtor to none but to himſelfe; and how to himſelfe? Not otherwiſe then in all things which he doth, to carry himſelfe ſo as it becōmeth himſelfe; that is to order every thing to a right end, which is only the manifeſtation of his own glory. For himſelfe is moſt lovely; and 'tis his nature to be moſt loving of that which is moſt lovely. Now to order all things aright to their congruous ends, is the part of wiſdome. And ſee how extravagant this Authour is in evey one of his inſtances. For to ſteale, to commit adultery, to oppreſſe, to kill, is to ſinne, and in willing any of theſe, a man wills his own ſinne. But the Argument we treat of, is of God's willing the ſins of others; as when God's hand and his counſell determined that thoſe things ſhould be done, which by *Herod*, *Pontius-Pilate*, the Gentiles, and people of Iſrael were committed againſt the holy Son of God; and when the Kings gave their kingdomes to the beaſt herein they are ſaid to doe the will of God and *when every mans judgment is ſaid to come frō the Lord*; not only judgmēt juſt, but even judgments unjuſt to wit, of men, yet God hath a juſt hand in plaguing others by thē; man ought not to doe evill that good may come thereof; but God's willing it to come to paſſe by his permiſſion is no evill at all; Nay it is good; nor ſo only, but the thing willed by him is good by the confeſſion of *Bellarmine*, even then when he is oppoſing us in this very argument; *Malum fieri Deo permittente bonum eſt, it is good that evill ſhould come to paſſe by God's permiſſion:* And it was avouched by *Auſtin* many hundred yeares before *Bellarmine* was

borne

Rō: 1. 28.. verſe 26. verſe 24. verſe 26. verſe 27.

Aug: contra Julian: Pelag. l. 5. cap: 3.

Lib. 5 cont. Jul. Pelag: cap 3.

Note 49 for 82 to page 100 for explicatiō

Aquin: q: 23. de volunt. Dei artic. 6.

borne. And he profeſſeth that God would never have ſuffered ſinne to have entered into the world, had he not knowne *that it appertained to his almighty goodneſſe, rather to work good out of evill, then not at all to ſuffer evill.* Compare the judgment of *Auſtin* with the judgment of this Authour, and conſider whether they differ not as much as light and darkeneſſe. And what wiſedome were it for God to permit ſinne (when it is in his power to hinder it, as this Authour acknowledgeth in the ſixt *Section*) if it be a greater evill. (and that to God, as it appeares by his expreſſion of it, *Læſio divinæ majeſtatis, the hurt of the Divine majeſty*) then the good that can come thereby can be? So that the crucifying of Chriſt was greater in the kind of evil, then the redemption of the world that came thereby, was in the kind of good. No man of common diſcretion will permit ought (if it lye in his power to hinder it) to his own diſadvantage, unleſſe he can make thereby, not only an equall advantage, but a greater. But let us farther conſider the ſuperficiary ſpeculation of this Divine, more becomming children in the Church of God then a grave and learned Divine. Sinne, he ſaith, is *Læſio Divinæ majeſtatis, the Wronging of the Divine majeſty*; but in what ſenſe I pray? Is God any thing the worſe for any man's diſobedience, and tranſgreſſion of God's law? Surely like as he is no way advantaged by our obedience, ſo is he as little diſadvantaged by our diſobedience. Yet I affect not to carry that I deliver by the authority of mine own bare word, which is this Authours courſe moſt uſually; I repreſent Scripture for it. *If thou ſinneſt, what doeſt thou againſt him; yea when thy ſins are many, what doeſt thou unto him? If thou be righteous what giveſt thou him, or what receiveth he at thy hands? Thy wickedneſſe may hurt a man as thou art, and thy righteouſneſſe may profit a Son of man.* And in reaſon, looke of what nature the benefit is that redounds from the creature unto God, of the like nature is the detrement. Now God by making the world acquires no internall perfectiō unto himſelfe, but only makes his glorious nature known, and accordingly if the world ſhould have an end, this manifeſtation ſhould ceaſe; but his glorious nature ſhould ſtill continue the ſame. And as he manifeſts his glory by the world, ſo ſome creatures he hath made intelligent, fit to take notice of his glory, and accordingly requires at their hands they ſhould acknowledge it, and that not in word only, but by their dutifull obedience; and that for the farther manifeſtation of his glory, to their good and wonderfull happineſſe, if they obey; and their extream ſorrow and miſery, if they continue rebellious againſt him. So that whereas the end of all God's actions being but the manifeſtatiō of his glory, he doth not looſe ſo much as this, by the ſins of men; For he can glorifie himſelfe in their juſt deſtruction; Nay he can manifeſt his glory another way; namely both the glory of his mercy in pardoning their contempt of his majeſty done unto him; which men, ſo proud many times they are, can hardly doe; but in ſuch a caſe prove implacable. Likewiſe of his grace in curing it, as alſo his power and wiſedome in procuring a ſtrange ſatisfaction to be made for it in a wonderfull manner, and that by his own blood; That ſo way may be made for the manifeſtation of his, not royall only, but Divine magnificence in beſtowing the kingdome of heaven upon them. So farre is he from being any way hurt by the ſins of men in any true reall account. And accordingly as he permits ſins dayly; ſo he offers his free grace dayly for the pardon of them; and to this tended the dayly ſacrifice among the Jewes, of a lamb every morning and a lambe every evening. But why then is ſinne, ſaid to be *læſio Divinæ majeſtatis?* I anſwer this is to be underſtood not of any hurt done to his majeſty in it ſelfe, but as in the minds of men, who hereby manifeſt their contempt of the divine majeſty. And they that doe contemne him would put him out of his throne if they could, & wiſh that there were no God; & the foole would faine bring his heart about to thinke ſo. But though earthly Kings may be dethroned & ſometimes have been, yet he that ſitteth in heaven laughs all them to ſcorne that riſe up againſt him. And bids the *potſheard ſtrive with his fellow potſheards, not with his maker. Who will ſet the thornes & briars againſt me in battell? I would goe through them & burne them together. For God is a conſuming fire.* It is true we muſt neither do evill that good may cōe thereof; nor permit it neither, if it lye in our power to hinder it. God neither *will doe any iniquity* nor cā doe, but yet is lawfull for him to permit evill that good may come thereof. Yea & will, or decree that evill ſhall come to paſſe by his permiſſion, as I have proved at large in a digreſſion to this purpoſe & therewithall diſcovered the Sophiſticall arguments of *Aquinas*, & *Durandus*, to the contrary, not to ſpeak of *Valentianus*; not one part of all which large digreſſiō do I find āſwered by this Author. I have often alleadged pregnant paſſages of Scripture to this purpoſe &; *Arminius* confeſſeth expreſly that God would have *Ahab* to fill up the meaſure of his ſin; which could not be done but by adding ſin unto ſin; Yet this is made the object of God's

Job: 36. 6. *verſe* 7. *verſe* 8.

Act: 20. 28.

Eſ: 45. 9.

Eſ: 27. 4. *Heb*: 12. 29. *Zeph*: 3. 5

by *Arminius*. This will of God to have ſinne come to paſſe by his permiſſion, is effectuall. For whenſoever God permits it, it comes to paſſe, as both *Arminius* and *Vorſtius* acknowledge, not *Piſcator* only: And amongſt Papiſts *Navarettus* & *Alvarez* as before I have ſhewed; Yet God hath no efficiencie in the ſinne, but only in the act whereunto ſinfulneſſe adheres; and the ſaying of *Auſtin* is well knowne. *Non aliquid fit, niſi omnipotens fieri velit*; *Not any thing comes to paſſe, but that which God will have come to paſſe*. And the eleaventh Article of Ireland is moſt expreſſe for this. I am driven to repeat the ſame things often; this Authours frequent Tautologies urge me thereunto.

2. Though the members be not oppoſite it matters not; it is ſufficient they are diſparate; the purpoſe of it being to ſhew, not that God doth not will ſin, but only to ſhew under what notion he willeth it. Yet it is falſe and abſurd to ſay that ſinne is a meanes of puniſhment. For to him it belongs to worke the meanes, who intends the end, but ſinne, as ſinne, is no worke of God; but the permiſſion of it is his worke, and his meanes, not to this end that he may puniſh it, but he doth both permit it and puniſh it for the manifeſtation of his glory in the way of juſtice, like as he doth alſo permit ſinne in others, not to pardon it; but he both permits ſinne, and pardons it to manifeſt his glory in the way of mercy.

3. I come to the conſideration of the ſpeciall indignities wherewith God is loaded by this our doctrine as this Authour pretendeth.

1. And indeed is God's wiſedome and providence ſo ſtrong, as that he is able to find meanes to glorifie his juſtice without the permitting of ſinne? (For God hath no other hand in ſinne as ſinne, but of permiſſion; to the ſubſtance of the act he cooperates as a cauſe efficient, as all confeſſe.) For of what juſtice doe we treat in this argument? Is it of juſtice remunerative, or juſtice vindicative? Was it ever heard that permiſſion of ſinne was required to make way for God's juſtice remunerative? Or is it poſſible that way can be made for the manifeſtation of Gods juſtice vindicative (in Scripture called God's wrath) unleſſe ſinne be permitted to enter? For though he hates it; yet this Authour confeſſeth that God permits it, as without whoſe permiſſion it could not enter into the world. *Sect*: 6. In the laſt place this Authour helps himſelfe with a phraſe of God's appointing men to commit it, which he obtrudes upon us thinking to make the ballance on his part the heavier, not conſidering that words are but wind. We ſay the horrible outrages committed upon our Saviour, God foredetermined to be done; And told *David* that he would give his wives unto his neighbour, who ſhould lye with them before the Sun; And that it was his will that the Kings ſhould give their Kingdome to the Beaſt; this we deliver according to God's word; whereas all this our oppoſit's diſcourſe is quite beſides the word of God; as if he would have us take his abſurd conceits in ſteed of oracles. And doth he not know that *Auſtin* ſometimes ſayd that, *Judas electus eſt ad prodendum ſanguinem Domini*, *Judas was choſen to betray his Maſter*? Or will he anſwer that he was the firſt that ſaid ſo?

Rom: 9 2 3.

2. To the ſecond I have already anſwered, and that at large in my anſwer to *M. Hoord*, in the preface and ſecond *Section*. There I have ſhewed how that it was merely devilliſh policy in *Tiberius* to move him to take this courſe, to make way for a grandchild of his own, to bring him to the imperiall throne; This moved him to ſeeke the death of *Germanicus* his two Sons, whom *Auguſtus* made him to adopt as ſucceſſours in the empire, & leſt the putting of them to death without cauſe might provoke the people to mutiny againſt him; therfore by cunning contrivances he cauſed them to be provoked to revile him, that ſo he might have ſome cauſe to juſtifie his deſtroying of them; which yet he did not by any publique execution; he was loath to come to that for feare of raiſing ſome tumult thereby; *Fame necavit*, *he famiſhed them*. Now how hath Satan poſſeſſed the heart of this unhappy Divine thus to blaſpheme the holy one of Iſrael by comparing his waies to theſe abominable courſes of *Tiberius*, not fearing leſt his tongue rot in his head while he is uttering of them? Cannot God take the life of any man from him, be he never ſo innocent, and that what way he will, even by puniſhment, if it pleaſe him? For is it not of God's mere mercy that he promiſeth, *Not to famiſh the ſoule of the righteous*? As for provoking courſes, is it not apparent by theſe our oppoſites confeſſion, that to all the provoking courſes in the world God doth concurre, and that as an efficient cauſe of every action? And accordingly he did concurre with theſe provoking courſes uſed by *Tiberius*. And did not God profeſſe that he would *provoke the Iſraelites by a fooliſh people, and by a fooliſh nation he would anger them*? How did *Shimei* provoke *David* by railing upon him; And how did *David* interpret it, The Lord, ſaith he, hath bid him to curſe *David*?

Not

Not that he gave any ſuch command in proper ſpeech, but by his ſecret providence brought this to paſſe, uſing to this purpoſe the vitious diſpoſition which he found in *Shimei*, but cauſed it not. And obſerve what *Auſtin* ſpeakes in the like caſe of his mother *Monica* exerciſed with the opprobrious ſpeeches of her ſervant, *Quid egiſti Deus meus? unde curaſti? unde ſanaſti? Nonne protuliſti durum & acutum ex alterâ animâ convitium tanquam medicinale ferrum ex occultis proviſionibus tuis, & uno ictu putredinem illam præciſiſti? My God what diddeſt thou? how diddeſt thou cure her? how recover her? Diddeſt thou not bring forth an harſh and ſharp reproch out of an others heart as a medicinall inſtrument in thy ſecret providence, and with one ſtroke pared away all that rotteneſſe?* Thus *Adonibezek* when his thumbes and great toes were cut off by his enemies, he acknowledged that God had done to him, as he had done to others. And *Solomon* teſtifies that, *every man's judgment commeth of the Lord.* If every man's judgment, then ſurely unjuſt judgments and not juſt only. And although they are unjuſt as they proceed frō man; yet are they juſt as they proceed from God. Like as the parricide of *Adramelech* & *Sharezer* committed upon their Father *Senacherib*, the Lord takes unto himſelfe when he ſaith, *I will cauſe him to fall by the ſword in his own land.* Yet what was *David* the worſe for *Shimei's* curſing; neither would he thereby be urged to requite evill for evill upon his ſubjects: the more inexcuſable were the Sons of *Germanicus* for reviling their Prince *Tiberius*, though never ſo much provoked thereunto. Neither was this fact of *Tiberius* a fruit of Hypocriſy, which is the counterfeiting of holines, jnſtice was pretended indeed not holines & that through feare. *For the wicked man is continually as one travelling with child, A ſound of feare is in his eares.* The cunning contrivances that *Tiberius* uſed are ſpecified by this Authour, but he doth not ſpecifie *the cunning contrivances that God uſeth* by our opinion, as he obtrudes upon us. Belike he was to ſeek of thē, yet we expreſſe God's providence herein by no other termes then the word of God it ſelfe doth ſuggeſt unto us; Namely of blinding the mind, of giving over to ſtrong illuſions, of hardning the heart, of giving over unto their hearts luſts, unto vile affections, unto a Reprobate mind. To all which is required no other thing then the not curing of that naturall corruption, and habituall vitious diſpoſition which is found in the wicked whether in the way of luxury, or in the way of uncharitableneſſe, and malice; or in the way of ambition & pride. And ſecondly the adminiſtration of congruous occaſions unto this their corrupt diſpoſition, which *Arminius* himſelfe confeſſeth to be the worke of God's providence in his *Theſes* of providence, and which in Scripture phraſe is ſtiled the leading into temptation; againſt which our Saviour taught his diſciples to pray. Thirdly the giving them over to the power of Satan. And laſtly God's generall concourſe in moving all creatures to worke agreably to their natures, neceſſary things neceſſarily; contingent Agents contingently; and free Agents freely. But my anſwer to this I have proſecuted at large in more ſheets then here are leaves in my anſwer to *M. Hoord.*

Eſ: 37.38.7.

Job 15.20.21

3. As for want of mercy, we willingly confeſſe according to the tenour of God's word (as this Authour delivers himſelfe without all reſpect thereunto) that God ſhewes no mercy in hardning them. For to harden in Scripture phraſe is oppoſite to God's ſhewing mercy. And as he is bound to none; ſo he profeſſeth that, *He will ſhew mercy on whom he will ſhew mercy, and will have compaſſion on whom he will have compaſſion.* And this the Apoſtle takes hold of in proſecuting the doctrine of election and concludeth from hence in part, & in part from God's hardening of *Pharaoh*, that *God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth*, by hardning meaning ſuch an operation, the conſequence whereof is alwaies diſobedience; as appeares by the objection derived therehence in the words following; *Thou wilt ſay then why doth he yet complaine?* (now he complaines only of diſobedience) *For who hath reſiſted his will?* Manifeſtly implying that when God hardens man unto diſobedience, it is his ſecret will that he ſhall diſobey. Like as when God hardned *Pharaoh* that he ſhould not let Iſrael goe; It was God's ſecret will that he ſhould not let Iſrael goe for a good while: Secret I ſay in diſtinction from the will of command, which is alwaies made knowne to them who are commanded. But it pleaſed the Lord to make this will of his knowne to *Moſes*, though it was kept ſecret from *Pharaoh*; yet afterwards he told *Pharaoh* to his face by his ſervant *Moſes* ſaying. *And indeed for this cauſe have I appointed thee to ſhew my power in thee, and to declare my name to all the world*; though *Pharaoh* believed it not as appeares by that which followeth; *yet thou exalteſt thy ſelfe againſt me, and letteſt them not goe.* But this Authour together with *M. Hoord* goeth by other rules, which his own fancy ſuggeſt's unto him, he will have God's love and mercy extended to all and every one, Chriſt's redemption to extend to all and every one; the Covenant of grace to comprehend all and every one; and

Ex: 33.19.

Rom: 9. 18.

upon these universalities he grounds his transcendent consolations; whence it comes to passe, that *Abraham* the father of the faithfull, was of no more comfortable condition, then the grand Signior among the Turkes: And the grand Siginior had as good grounds of consolatiō as *Abraham* himselfe. Yet this not shewing of mercy on the vessells of wrath prepared unto destruction tends to the greater demonstration of his mercy on the vessells ofmercy prepared unto glory: As the Apostle testifies *Ro:* 9.23. And let this Author tell Saint *Paul* if he thinks good, *That this is the disposition of hang-men rather then of good Princes.* And this is the perpetuall tenour of this Authour's discourse to conforme God's courses to the conditions of courses humane. Man is bound to shew mercy on all; God is not. God is free to pardon whom he will, man is not. *If we permit men to sinne in case we can hinder them, we shall be guilty with them, but how innumerable are the sins committed in the world, which if God would hinder could never be committed?* As *Austin* discourseth *lib.* 5. *contra Julian: Pelag: cap.* 4 In nothing did *Nero's* cruelty shew it selfe more, then in prolonging the lives of men, that he might torment them the more. What then? Shall we taxe God for crueltie in keeping mens bodies and soules alive for ever in hell fire to torment them everlastingly without end? See what a doore of blasphemy is opened against the *just God that will doe no iniquity*, by this Authour's unshamefast discourse. *Zeph:*3.5.

By this let the indifferent Reader judge of this Authour's present performance, & withall take notice of that which himselfe hath dissembled all along touching his own tener; namely that of every sinfull act committed by the creature, God is the efficient cause, as touching the substance of the act, as for the sinfulnesse thereof we hold it impossible that God can have any agency at all therein, or any culpable deficiency; forasmuch as he neither doth ought which he should not doe, or after what manner he should not, nor leaves undone ought which he should doe, or after what manner he should doe, all which are incident to the creature who is subject to a law; but not at all to the Creatour who gives lawes to others, but himselfe works according to the counsell of his own will in all things. The summe is, whatsoever we deliver as touching God's secret providence in evill, we have expresse scripture for us, nothing but pretence of carnall reason against us; which when it comes to be examined, is found subject to manifest contradiction, both as touching their feigning things future without the decree of God; And as touching their conditionall decrees, and conditionall concurrences; ours is not in any particular; The greatest shew of contradiction on our parts is in the point of necessitie and libertie; Now to cleare this, as others have taken paines, so have I in my *Vindiciæ* proving divers and sundry waies, that these two doe amically conspire, to wit, the necessitie being only upon supposition; the liberty and contingency simply so called; only it is not to be expected that there should be no difference between the liberty of the creatures, and the liberty of God the Creator; Or that the creature in her operation should be exempt from the operation of God; The second cause exempt from the motion of the first; whereunto this Authour addresseth not the least answer. As for the difference which this Authour puts between the upper way and the lower in making God the Authour of sinne, compare this with *Arminius* his profession; Namely that the same twenty reasons which he objected against the upper way, may all of them be accommodated against the lower way, all of them admitting of the same distinctions (which this Authour invades) to cleare God from being the Authour of sinne. *Lib.2.digr:*5

The second inconvenience. Section 1.

M. Mason's Addit. pag, 38. 39,40. The second inconvenience is the overthrow of true religion and good goverment among men. To this, this opinion seemeth to tend for these reasons.

1. Because it maketh sinne to be no sinne indeed, but only in opinion. We use to say necessity hath no law; creatures or actions in which necessity beares sway are without law; Lyons are not forbidden to prey, birds to fly, fishes to swimme, or any bruit creatures to doe according to their kinds, because their actions are naturall and necessary; they cannot upon any admonition doe otherwise. Among creatures indued with reason and liberty, lawes are given to none, but such as can use their principles of reason and freedome: Fooles, mad-men, and children are subject to no law, because they have no liberty. To men that can use their liberty, lawes are not given neither, but in those actions which are voluntary. No man is forbidden to be hungry, thirsty, weary, sleepy, to weepe, to laugh, to love or to hate; because these actions and affections are naturall and necessary; the will may governe them, but it cannot suppresse them.

And so, if to deale justly, to exercise charity &c. with their contraries, be absolutely, and antecedently necessary too, whether this necessity flow from a principall within, or a mover without, we are as lawlesse in these and in the other.

Now if necessity hath no law, then actions in themselves evill, if under the dominion of absolute

ute neceſſity are tranſgreſſions of no law and conſequently no ſins. For ſin is a tranſgreſſion of the law.

This that I ſay hath been ſaid long agoe. For *Juſtin* Martyr ſpeaking againſt deſtiny hath theſe words, If it be by deſtiny (that is by abſolute neceſſity; For that the Fathers doe generally call by the name of deſtiny,) that men are good or bad, they are indeed neither good nor bad. A ſpeech like to this he hath a little after. It would ſeem, if this be ſo, that vertue and vice are nothing, but things are judged to be good or bad by opinion only, which, as good reaſon teacheth, is very great injuſtice and impiety. And ſurely well might he ſay ſo. For to what purpoſe was the Son of God made man, and being man made a ſacrifice for ſinne? Why was the miniſtry of the word and Sacraments ordained? To what end are heaven and hell propounded? Why are exhortations, diſſwaſions, or any other meanes to hinder men from ſin applied, if ſin be nothing, but a mere opinion? *1 Jo: 3. 4.* *Apol: 2. a little beyond the middle.*

Chriſt, the Chriſtian faith, the word and Sacraments, and whatſoever according to the Scriptures hath been done for the applying of the pardon of ſinne, are all but mere fables, nay very impoſtures, if ſinne be nothing. And by conſequence it is no matter at all, whether men be Chriſtians, Jewes, Turkes, or Pagans, of what religion, or whether of any religion at all. Now whether tendeth this, but to the ovethrow of religion?

2. Becauſe it taketh away the conſcience of ſinne. Why ſhould men be afraid of any ſinne that pleaſeth or may profit them, if they muſt needs ſinne? Or what reaſon have they to weep and mourne when they have ſinned, ſeeing they have not ſinned truly, becauſe they ſinned neceſſarily?

The *Tragedian* ſaith, when a man ſinneth, his deſtiny muſt beare the blame. Neceſſity freeth him from all iniquity. Sins are either the faults of that irreſiſtible decree that cauſeth them, or no faults at all. If either; then ſorrow, feare, or any other act of repentance whatſoever, may as well be ſpared as ſpent. This conceit being once drunke in, religion cannot long continue; For the affections have been the ſtrongeſt planters, and are the ſureſt upholders of it in the world. *Primus in orbe Deos fecit timor.* *Fati iſta culpa eſt: Nemo fit fato nocens.*

Anſwer. I come to the conſideration of the ſecond inconvenience wherewith our doctrine is charged; And that is nothing inferiour to the former; to wit, *The overthrow of true religion and good goverment amongſt men.* With what judgment theſe are termed inconveniences I am to ſeeke, and I wonder what miſcheifes are greater then theſe inconveniences; But I come to conſider how well he makes good his charge.

1. If ſinne be no ſinne certainely the opinion muſt be erroneous that conceives it to be ſin. I had thought there had been no predication more true then that which is Identicall. We are taught that *ſinne is a trangreſſion of God's law.* That the wages of it, in the juſt judgment and decree of God is no leſſe then death even everlaſting death, both of body and ſoule; That God ſent his own Son, and made his *ſoule an offering for ſinne*; that ſo he might *ſet him forth a propitiation for our ſins, through faith in his blood.* But let us ſee this Authour's reaſon to prove his crimimination. He begins with an axiome, that, *Neceſſity hath no law*; and hereupon he doth expatiate with his inſtances too too impertinently; a courſe which *Bellarmine* takes not, whom yet I have anſwered on this very argument in my *Vindiciæ*; leaſt of all doth he offer to make any reply upon any parcell of my anſwer unto *Bellarmine*. Now this axiome is not applied to Agents unreaſonable, but only reaſonable, by them who treat thereof. As in caſe a man be driven to ſteale, to relieve naturall neceſſity; yet all confeſſe that a man is not only unexecuſable, but alſo not to be pitied, if he hath brought this neceſſity upon him; And never any ſober man that I know, demed ſtealth to be a free action, for all this. It is true Lyons are not forbidden to prey, nor fiſhes to ſwimne, nor bruit creatures to doe according to their kind. For they are unreaſonable, and conſequently not capable of command, otherwiſe then by ſpurre, or goad, or the like; nor capable of admonition, in like ſort, children afore they come to the uſe of reaſon are not capable of admonition. As neither mad men are, nor fooles, ſuch as we call naturall; But this Authour is none ſuch. For then his wit would not ſerve him for oppoſition as it doth. It is true likewiſe, that as man is made after the Image of God, not as touching his part vegetative; nor as touching his part ſenſitive; but only as touching his part reaſonable, conſiſting of an underſtanding, whereby he is enabled to know his ſuperiours, and their commands, and admonitions; and of a will whereby he is able to performe obedience both inward and outward, it having command over all parts of the body to ſet them in motion; whereupon if their Lord command them to come they come, if to goe they goe, if to doe this they doe it; As the *Centurion* ſignified, to our Saviour the readineſſe of his ſervants to doe their Maſters commands. *1 Jo: 3. 4.* *Ro: 6. 23.* *Eſ: 53. v. 2.* *Co: 5. 21.* *Ro: 3. 25.*

At length he comes to conclude that, *if to deale juſtly, to exerciſe charitie &c. with their contraries be abſolutely & antecedently neceſſary too, whether this neceſſity flow from a principle within or a mover without, we are as lawleſſe in theſe as in the other*, by theſe he meanes acts of the ſoule rationall; by *the other*, he meanes acts of the ſoule vegetative, or ſenſitive. Now we utterly deny that any of theſe are abſolutely neceſſary; Nay we deny that any thing is of abſolute neceſſity, but the being of the Divine nature; and the internall emanations thereof which conſtitute the diſtinction of perſons in the Trinity. For albeit ſome

Agents

Agents created are Agents necessary, working necessarily; yet the works which they bring forth are not of absolute necessity, because they may be hindred in their operations; either by Angells as some of them; or at least by the power of God, all of them. And as there are necessary Agents working necessarily; so there are free Agents working contingently and freely; as Angells and men. And albeit a question may be made as touching acts supernaturall, whether the creature hath any free power to performe them freely; such as are the acts of the three Theologicall vertues, faith, hope, and charity, and none other, (which yet we doe not deny, but grant upon the infusion of a supernaturall principle into our soules, which we count formally the life of grace; the cause whereof we take to be the Spirit of God given unto us, and dwelling in our hearts;) yet there deserves to be no question, but that as touching all actions of morall vertues, and of the contrary vitious actions, that there is a free power in man to performe them naturally; untill such time as by a vitious disposition, procured by a custome in vitious courses a man is habitually inclined unto evill; whereby he is made a slave to vice, and thereby hath deprived himselfe of a morall liberty unto actions vertuous. For like as a man holding a stone in his hand hath power to throw him or no, or to throw him which way he will; but as soone as he hath throwne him out of his hand; it is no longer free unto him whether he will throw it or no. In like manner before a vitious habit contracted, man hath freedome morall unto actions vertuous, but not after. This is the doctrine of *Aristotle*, and thus he illustrates it. For certainely the habit of vertue is not an indifferent power to doe an act vertuous or vitious, but it is a morall propension and inclination only to acts vertuous. So is the habit of justice a morall propension and inclination to performe only that which is just. The like may be said of every morall vertue in speciall. How much more doth supernaturall grace consist not in a power to believe, if a man will, to love God if he will, to hope and waite for the joyes of heaven if he will, and if he will to refuse to performe any of these acts; but rather an holy and heavenly habit, or weight wrought in the soule of man, moving and swaying it only to gracious acts pleasing & acceptable in the sight of God, which indeed constitutes a spirituall liberty from sinne, and makes a man become the holy servant of God, willing to receive direction from him, and delighting to be ordered by him in all our waies. On the other side with out grace a man is left in that naturall corruption wherein he was conceived & borne, which makes him a slave to sinne and a vassall to Satan led captive by him to doe his will. Yet not withstanding there remaines in every one his naturall liberty still, which consists only in the choice of meanes conducing to man's end; whereas morall vertue and grace doe order the will a right towards aright end; morall vertues according to the knowledge naturall which he hath of his right end naturall, grace according to the knowledg supernaturall, which a man hath of his right end supernaturall, which isto be rightly disposed and ordered towards God his maker; So that this naturall liberty still continueth the same; As for example, he that it vertuous so farre forth as he is vertuous, continueth still free; not as freedome signifies an indifferency to performe an act vertuous vitious, but being thereby disposed only to vertuous actions, he is free whether to exercise this or that vertuous act, according to occasiõs offered; or in the same kind of a vertuous disposition; whether he will doe this or that in particular, as to give in such a proportion, or in such a season, or to such or such persons, in all which being of a vertuous disposition he is ready to receive directions from the dictates of *recta ratio, right reason*, otherwise called wisedome. In like manner a vitious person still keeps his naturall liberty, though he hath lost his morall, and is become *Servus tot dominorum, quot vitiorum, a slave to so many Lords as there are vices in him*, as *Austin* somewhere speaketh. I say he keeps still his naturall liberty. For let him be a Robber, he still continueth free to make choice of his complices, of places wherein to lye in waite for his prey, of weapons, and the like. Let him be an impure person, still he continueth free to choose whom he will corrupt, to contrive what course he thinks best for the satisfaction of his lusts. Let him be covetuous or ambitious, still he contintinueh free to make choice of the meanes conducing to the end obtained by him. In like sort let him be regenerate, a child of God; by this spirit of regeneration he is moved only to doe those things which are pleasing to his heavenly father, but still his naturall liberty continueth the same, as whether to exercise the grace which God hath given him in one kind or in another, or in the same kind in what particular he thinks good. If he thinks good to pray, it is free to him to fall upon the confession of his sins, or upon thanksgiving, or upon supplication, & that either for blessings temporall, and the releife of his naturall necessities; or for grace, and the releife of necessities spirituall

Eth: l. 3. 5.

Eph: 2. 2.
2 Tim: 2. last.

ſpirituall; or to exerciſe himſelfe in every kind of theſe, and that in what order he thinks good. So likewiſe if he give himſelfe to meditation, and make choice of what matter he thinks good, as alſo of time and place, in all this he is free. None of all theſe diſtinctions doth this Authour take notice of, but hand over head talks of freedome to performe, either acts vicious, or vertuous; whereas the vertuous mans will, as he is vertuous, is inclined to vertuous courſes alone; and the vitious man, as he is vitious, is inclined to vitious courſes alone, and not to vertuous. And it was wont to be ſaid, that, *Habitus agunt ad modum naturæ, habit's* (whether vertuous or vitious) *they worke after the manner of nature*, that is naturally and neceſſary, as before I have declared of a morall neceſſity, which ſtill conſiſts with a naturall liberty; either in vertuous, or vitious exerciſes to make choice of particulars in reſpect of all variety of circũſtances, according as their reaſon ſuggeſts unto them in the uſe of means conducent to the end intended, whether that end be good or bad. No dominion of abſolute neceſſity in all this; Much leſſe is any man good by abſolute neceſſity but by freedome of will accuſtoming himſelfe unto good actions according to the dictates of reaſon. But a man that is dead in ſinne hath no power to regenerate himſelfe; this worke of regeneration is wrought merely by the power of God: Like as the raiſing of a man from death to life, whereunto it is often compared in holy Scripture, as alſo to creation; And by regeneration we are ſaid to be made new creatures. now as God workes this in time, ſo from everlaſting he did decree to worke it; and it was wont to be the generall Tenet of Proteſtant Divines in oppoſition unto Papiſts, that a man in his firſt converſion is merely paſſive, in which particular *Roffenſis* a Popiſh Biſhop about an hundred yeares agoe oppoſed *Martin Luther*. As for a ſinfull or a vitious act, that is alwaies an act naturall; For acts ſupernaturall can neither be vitious, nor ſinfull; but merely gracious. And all cõfeſſe that as all men have naturall power to performe any act naturall, ſo have they power alſo to abſtaine from it. Only untill a man is regenerate he cannot but ſinne; yea though he doe that which is good as touching the ſubſtance of the act, or abſtaine from that which is evill in like manner; yet can he not performe the one or abſtaine from the other in a gracious manner, *Therefore you heare not God's word*, ſaith our Saviour to the Jewes, *becauſe ye are not of God. They that are in the fleſh cannot pleaſe God*, That all men are caſt into a neceſſity of ſinning, both *Arminius* and *Corvinus* confeſſe, as formerly I have ſhewed. And Doctor *Potter* acknowledgeth it the doctrine of the Church of England, that no naturall man hath *libertatem a peccato*, though forthwith he nicks it, in ſaying they have *libertatem a neceſſitate*, not explicating it that ſo he might cleare himſelfe from contradiction, whereas Doctor *Fulke* uſually puts the diſtinction between *liberty from ſin, and liberty from coaction*, and denying the former unto a naturall man, he granteth the latter. *Jo:* 8. *Rom:* 8.

Now truely this *Theologue* taketh very profitable paines to prove that ſin is not nothing; and exuberates in the proofe hereof to the very ſolid conviction of all thoſe that imagine it to be nothing, if there be any ſuch creatures *in terra Auſtrali incognitâ*, which is not very likely; but rather in the Lunary world, or in the Joviall world which is waited upon with foure moones, as they that came lately from the diſcovery thereof, have made report unto us. But by the way, I hope he doth not juggle with us, and under colour of making ſin to be ſome thing, labour to draw us to an acknowledgment that it is ſome poſitive thing, as Doctor *Jackſon* in his laſt booke the 8th, as I take it of his *Commentaries* upon the Creed laboureth to prove with great ſtrength of affections; Like as in the ſame vigour of reſolution he profeſſeth that *whether God puniſheth ſinne neceſſarily or no it is not determinable by the wit of man*; but he is not over prodigall of his reaſons for either. We are very willing to grant that every ſin as ſin is ſomething privative, and as touching the act ſubſtrate, it is ſomething poſitive alſo; And when the Apoſtle defineth ſin by ἀνομία if in that word the firſt letter be Α στερητικὸν *A privative*, clearely the forme of ſin is made to conſiſt in privation, as much as to ſay *an incongruity to the law of God*; that is a privation of congruity thereunto. Now we are come to an end of this, let me admoniſh the Reader of the wiſedome of this Authour; All along; he ſuppoſeth that by our doctrine ſinne comes to paſſe by abſolute neceſſity, this I ſay he ſuppoſeth, he proveth it not, though we utterly deny, that any ſuch neceſſity is conſequent to our doctrine. And this himſelfe knowes full well. *Alvarez*, who maintaines that God determines the creatures will to every act thereof, even to the act of ſin, utterly denies that any abſolute neceſſity of humane acts followeth hereupon; or any neceſſity that ſtands in contradiction to humane liberty. Bradwardine alſo ſometime Arch-Biſhop of Canterbury elect maintaines, that

God necessitates the will to every act thereof, yet denies peremptorily that humane acts comes to passe by absolute necessity, or by any necessity that stands in opposition to the liberty of the creature; Only he saith that some kind of necessity, and that antecedent may well consist with the liberty of the creature. All this, this Author knows; yet takes no paines to disprove their tenet, or answer any one of their arguments; no nor to make good his own consequence, which is the only thing we deny in this present argument of his. As for the other part, namely that in case sin come to passe by absolute necessity, and without any free will in the creature, then sinne is no sinne, which no man denies; This he proves at large, or at least illustrates at large. Secondly observe he talkes of things necessarily comming to passe, not only absolutely but antecedently; whereby he seemes to grant that sins may come to passe necessarily, but not so absolutely as antecedently, and takes no paines to explicate these his distinctions. And in my judgment they have more need of explication, as they are accommodated to sins comming to passe in the world, then as they are acommodated to the eveniency of faith and repentance; Yet I imagine this word Antecedently is brought in of purpose in reference to good actions rather then in reference unto evill. And whether he will have this terme *Antecedently* to be an addition to the former terme *Absolutely*, or only of equivalent force, I know not. But it is the common course of these men to confound their Reader with termes proposed without all explication. But let us endeavour to boult out the meaning of these perplexed discourses as well as we can. Will this Authour have faith to come to passe necessarily and that absolutely, but not antecedently? Or will he have faith to come to passe necessarily, but not absolutely and antecedently? or will he have faith come to passe not necessarily at all? If not at all necessarily to what purpose doth he clog his Reader with such unnecessary complements, *of absolutely and antecedently?* If God decrees to bestow faith upon a man, doth it not necessarily follow hereupon that such a one shall believe? dares this Authour deny it? Yet we account not this absolutely necessary, but merely upon supposition. Neither doth God's decree impose necessity upon all things; as *Aquinas* hath long agoe disputed and proved; but only upon some things; that is that some Agents shall worke necessarily; other Agents contingently and freely. In a word God both decreeth things to come to passe & the manner of them also; that is that some things shall come to passe necessarily, other things contingently and freely. But God's decree, we say, is absolute not conditionall, of giving faith. And indeed all his decrees are absolute as touching the act of God willing; as *Bradwardine* hath demonstrated by cleare reason; and *Piscator* out of the word of God. But the decree of giving faith is not absolute only as touching the act of God decreeing, but as touching the thing decreed. For faith is not given by God to any upon a condition to be performed by man; For if it were, then faith should be given according unto workes, that is, grace should be conferred according to mens workes. And when I consider this Authour's compounding of these termes absolutely, and antecedently, I begin to suspect that like as then a thing comes to passe antecedently, when it comes to passe by an Antecedent decree in this Authour's language, (though most absurd.) So in his language, thē things are said to come to passe by absolute necessity, when they come to passe by an absolute decree; the decree in his opinion being sufficient to make a thing come to passe necessarily; & an absolute decree to make it come to passe absolutely necessarily. This undoubtedly is his meaning, upō which I am stūbled ere I am aware. Now let the sober Reader judge how farre these odde conceits are from all sobriety. Did not God decree to make the world, nay did he not absolutely decree this and antecedently, not conditionally and consequently? What therefore will it herehence follow that the world had it's existence necessarily, and that by the way of absolute necessity? I had thought this had been the peculiar and incommunicable perfection of God himselfe, namely to exist necessarily, and that in the way of absolute necessity. As for all other things which are but God's creatures, they have only a contingent existence derived originally from the free will of God the Creator. For this I take to be the transcendent perfection of God, *To be* most necessarily; to worke most freely; Necessity and that absolute, being the greatest perfection of being: So that *Bradwardine* conceives this to be the prime and originall perfection of God, *esse necessario*, to be necessarily. On the other side freedome in the highest kind, is the greatest perfection in operation; and God alone so workes, as without subordination to any superiour Agent; but no creature, man or Angell so workes, as without subordination to God the first Agent, the first cause, the first free worker. Now I come to the second particular of this second inconvenience. 2. And that is that *our doctrine taketh*

taketh away the conſcience of ſin; and this we willingly grant is conſequent upon the former. For if ſinne be no ſinne, there is no cauſe why any man ſhould be troubled with the conſcience of ſin. But all this being grounded upon a vile and moſt untrue imputation never yet proved, namely that we make all actions both good and evill to come to paſſe by abſolute neceſſity, there can be no more truth in the conſequent then there is in the Antecedent. We ſay that every ſinne that is, or ever was committed in the world is and ever was committed freely, not only voluntarily; much leſſe doth any ſinne come to paſſe by any abſolute neceſſity. For albeit there be ſome things that come to paſſe neceſſarily by neceſſity of nature, as proceeding from Agents naturall, working naturally and neceſſarily. Yet is no worke of nature wrought by any abſolute neceſſity. God being able to ſet an end to nature and the works thereof whenſoever it pleaſeth him; and while nature continueth according to the good pleaſure of God, he reſtraines the courſe thereof, or changeth it as he thinks good. How much leſſe doe the actions of men, not only in reſpect of God's agency, who is the firſt cauſe, but in reſpect of man's agency, a ſecond cauſe, and working deliberately and freely come to paſſe not neceſſarily, but contingently, and freely; So farre off are they from comming to paſſe by abſolute neceſſity; to exiſt by abſolute neceſſity being the incommunicable perfection of God himſelfe. But I confeſſe this Authour ſheweth ſome humanity in the proofe of it, to wit, out of the *Tragedian* very judiciouſly and learnedly. *Fati eſt iſta culpa; nemo fit fato nocens. It is the fault of fate or deſtiny, and what comes to paſſe by deſtiny is no fault of man's.* Yet *Zeno* the great Patron of Fate, finding his ſervant in a fault, when his ſervant excuſed himſelfe upon fate, ſaying it was deſtiny that he ſhould ſteale; made a ready anſwer ſaying, *Et cædo*, it was his deſtiny alſo to be puniſhed; So farre was he from juſtifying or excuſing his ſervant upon any ſuch ground, or forbearing to puniſh him. And doth not this Authour know that *Jocaſta* for all her acknowledgment of fate governing all things; yet in conſcience of her inceſtuous courſes deſtroyed her ſelfe in the ſame *Tragedian*? But conſider, indifferent Reader, whether this Authour doth not carry himſelfe, as if he were dealing with little children, and his purpoſe were not to informe them; but to abuſe and mocke them. For is that all waies the faith or opinion of the *Tragedian*, whatſoever he puts into the mouthes of this or that Actor? Doe not they repreſent the abſurd pretences of ſome, as well as the reaſonable diſcourſes of others? Then againe who are they that maintaine, *Fatum, deſtiny*? Where hath he found this maintained by any of our divines? Yet I confeſſe this Authour deales ingeniouſly in one thing, to wit, in walking ſo fairely in the ſteps of his forefathers. For thus the *Pelagians* accuſed the doctrine of *Auſtin*, not only after he was dead, as appeares by *Proſper's* Epiſtle *ad Ruffinum*; but even while he was living as appeares by *Auſtin* himſelfe; *Nec ſub nomine gratiæ fatum aſſerimus, quia nullis hominum meritis dicimus Dei gratiam antecedi: Si autem quibuſdam omnipotentis Dei voluntatem placet fati nomine nuncupari, profanas quidem verborum novitates evitamus, ſed de verbis contendere non amamus: neither doe We maintain deſtiny under the name of grace, in ſaying grace is not prevented by any merits of man. But if ſome are pleaſed to call the will Allmighty God by the name of fate (or deſtiny) We avoid the profane novelties of words but we doe not love to ſtrive about words.* Where obſerve how firſt the ſame crimination was made againſt *Auſtin's* doctrine by the *Pelagians*, which this Authour makes againſt ours. *Aug: contra duas epiſt. Pelag: ad Bonifacium.*

2. The doctrine which the *Pelagians* oppoſed in this crimination was this, *Grace is not conferr'd according unto Workes.* 3ly, *Auſtin* diſavowes all antecedency of workes to the beſtowing of grace, how much more to the decreeing of grace to be beſtowed on any, which yet is the beloved *Helena* of this Authour therefore he talkes ſo oft againſt an *Antecedent* decree. Then againe it is manifeſt that the greateſt maintainers of deſtiny and fate, did not maintaine it in any oppoſition to the free wills of men. And *Auſtin* himſelfe profeſſeth that ſuch a neceſſity as is expreſſed in theſe words, *Neceſſe eſt ut fiat, it muſt needs be that ſuch a thing ſhall come to paſſe*, containes no inconvenience, nor is any way prejudiciall to the free wills of men. His words are theſe; *Si enim neceſſitas noſtra ita dicenda eſt, quæ non eſt in noſtra poteſtate, ſed etiamſi nolumus, efficit quod poteſt, ſicut eſt neceſſitas mortis; Manifeſtum eſt voluntates noſtras, quibus recte aut perperam vivitur, ſub tali neceſſitate non eſſe, Multa enim facimus, quæ ſi nolemus, non facerimus. Si autem illa deſinitur eſſe neceſſitas, ſecundum quam dicimus neceſſe eſſe ut aliquid ita ſit vel ita fiat, neſcio cur eam timeamus, ne nobis libertatem voluntatis auferat. If that is to be accounted our neceſſity, which is not in our power, but whether We will or no, worketh as it can ſuch as is the neceſſity of death; It is apparent that our Wills whereby We live well or ill are not under the the neceſſity of fate. For we doe many things, which if we would not we ſhould not doe them.* *Auſtin: de civit Dei l. 5. cap. 10.*

But if neceſſity be defined to be ſuch a thing as when we ſay it muſt needs be that a thing be thus, or thus come to paſſe; I know not why we ſhould feare leaſt ſuch a neceſſity ſhould bereave us of free will. And this *Auſtin* delivers to meet with the vaine feares of thoſe, *who placed our wills among'ſt thoſe things which are not ſubject to neceſſity, leaſt ſo they ſhould looſe their liberty.* Obſerve this well and compare it with the preſent diſcourſe of this poſitive *Theologue*, who thinks to outface *Auſtin* with the authority of his bare word. In the words following he manifeſts that he ſpeakes all this while of neceſſity in reſpect of God's decree not ſimply, but conſidered as irreſiſtable; by the way making no bones of avouching ſome decrees of God to be reſiſtable, notwithſtanding the *Pſalmiſt's* proteſtation *Whatſoever the Lord willeth, that hath he done both in heaven and earth*; And St. *Paul's* emphaticall expreſſion of the ſame truth, ſaying, *Who hath reſiſted his will?* But this Divine is a brave fellow; and thinks to carry all with his breath. For where hath he given us any reaſon to prove that any decrees of God are of any reſiſtable condition? But let his decrees be never ſo irreſiſtable, and let that be true which *Auſtin* ſaith, that, *Non aliquid fit niſi omnipotens fieri velit*; *Not any thing comes to paſſe, unleſſe God will have it come to paſſe.* And after *Auſtin* the Church of Ireland in their Articles of religion. Yet if God will have every thing come to paſſe agreeably to the nature & condition thereof thus, neceſſary things neceſſarily, contingent things contingently, as *Aquinas* hath not only ſaid, but proved; hereby is no impeachment to the liberty of the creature, but an eſtabliſhment thereof rather, as the *Arch-Biſhops*, *Biſhops*, and Clergy of Ireland have profeſſed in the foreſaid Article; that I may ſhew ſome authority for my ſayings, as this Authour repreſents none for his, but carrieth himſelfe like a Maſter of Sentences, as if he were in his own ſufficiency of more authority and credit to be believed, then the Pope in a generall Councell: And albeit my ſelfe after many others, and ſome formerly mentioned have ſhewed in a large digreſſion to this purpoſe that neceſſity upon ſuppoſition, may well ſtand with contingency, and liberty ſimply ſo called. And in the firſt place have inſtanced in neceſſity of infallibility conſequent to God's preſcience, which though *Cicero* thought could not conſiſt with man's liberty, yet Chriſtians have alwaies been of a contrary opinion; untill the Sect of the *Socinians* aroſe; and *Arminians* are very apt to ſhew them ſo much courteſy as to beare their bookes after them. Secondly I have proved a neceſſity upon ſuppoſition of God s decree to permit ſinne. For the Lord takes upon him to be the keeper of us from ſinne, as *Gen:* 20. 6. He profeſſeth as much to *Abimilech, that he kept him from ſinning againſt God.* In caſe God will not keep a man from ſinne, what can be expected, but that he will undoubtedly ſinne without any prejudice to the liberty of his will, conſidering that of *Auſtin*; *Libertas ſine gratiâ non eſt libertas ſed contumacia, Liberty without grace, is not liberty but wilfulneſſe.* Thirdly and laſtly upon ſuppoſition of God's will; And this I prove evidently to paſſe on every thing which God foreſeeth as future conſidering that contingent things are merely poſſible in their own nature; and cannot paſſe out of the condition of things merely poſſible into the condition of things future, without a cauſe: And no other cauſe of this tranſmigration can be deviſed with any colour of reaſon or probability, ſave only the will of God. Neither doe I find that digreſſion of mine in any the leaſt part weakened, or ſo much as aſſailed by ought that this Authour hath delivered; Who ſheweth himſelfe upon the ſtage, rather to brave his oppoſites with the bare authority of his words, then with ſound argument to diſpute ought.

Art. 11:

1. *p. q.* 19. *art.* 8.

Vindic: l. 2. *digreſ.* 5.

Note

Sect: 2.

M. Maſon's Addit. p. 40. 41. 42.

Becauſe it taketh away the deſert and guilt of ſin. Offences if fatall, cannot be juſtly puniſhed. 2. The reaſon is becauſe thoſe deeds for which men are puniſhed or rewarded muſt be their own, under their own power and and ſoveraigny, but ſuch are no fatall acts or events. Neither temporally nor eternally can ſin be puniſhed, if it be abſolutely neceſſary.

Not temporally, as God himſelfe hath given us to underſtand by that law which he preſcribed the Jewes *Deut:* 22. 25. Which was that if a Maid commit uncleaneſſe by conſtraint, ſhe ſhould not be puniſhed. His reaſon was becauſe there was no cauſe of death in her; what ſhe yeilded to was through compulſion, being overborne by power; As a man that is wounded to death by his neighbour; ſo was a Virgin in that caſe a ſufferer rather then a doer. This particular law is of univerſall right: No juſt puniſhment can be inflicted for ſinne, where there is no power in the party to avoid it. The ſpeech of *Lipſius* is but a mere crotchet contrary to reaſon, (*Fatali culpæ fatalis pœna*) *fatall faults muſt have fatall puniſhments.* Did magiſtrates thinke mens offences unavoidable, they would thinke it bootleſſe, and unreaſonable to puniſh them. Nay not only ſo, but we ſee by dayly experience, that Judges following the direction of reaſon have very remiſſely puniſhed ſuch faults as have been committed through the power of the

headſtrong

headstrong & exorbitant passions. Yea we may read of some who have not thought it fit to punish such faults at all. *Valerius Maximus* telleth that *Popilius* a Roman *Prætor* sitting in Judgment on a woman who had in a bitter passion slaine her mother, because she had murthered her children (*neque damnavit, neque absolvit*) *neither cleared her nor condemned her* And *Aulus Gellius* reporteth of *Dolabella* the *Proconsul* of *Asia*, that when a woman of *Smyrna* was brought before him who had poysoned her husband and son for murthering a son of hers, which she had by a former husband; he turned her over to the *Arcopagus*, which was the gravest and most renowned judgment seat in the world; The Judges there not daring to acquit her, being stained with a double slaughter, nor yet to punish her being provokt with just greife, commanded the accuser & offender to come before them an hundred yeares after. And so neither was the womans fact justified, the lawes not allowing of it; Nor yet the woman punished because she was worthy to be pardoned. If wise magistrates have spared such offenders as have been overswayed with passions, which did but incline, not determine them to their irregular actions; they would never have punished any trespassers, if they had thought them to be such by invincible necessity. Or if offenders did thinke that their offences were their destinies, and that when they murther, steale, commit adultery, make insurrections, plot treasons, or practise any other outragious villanies, they doe them by the necessity of Gods unalterable decree; and can doe no otherwise: they would and might complaine of their punishments as unjust, as *Zenoes* servant did; when he was beaten by his master for a fault, he told him out of his own grounds that he was unjustly beaten because he was (*fato coactus peccare*) constrained to make that fault by his undeclinable fate. The *Adrumetine* Monks, misled by Saint *Austin Epist.* 105. *ad sixtum Presbyterum*, (which he calleth a booke wherein he setteth downe his opinion concerning Gods grace) did so teach grace that they denyed free will. And this Saint *Austin* confuted in his booke *De gratiâ & libero arbitrio*. And thinking the grace of God (as Saint *Austin* taught) to be such as could not stand with freedome of will, they thought that no man should be punished for his faults, but rather prayed for that God would give them grace to doe better. Against this *Austin* directed his other booke, *De corrept: & gratiâ*. In which discourse though it be grace that is still named, yet predestination is included. For as *Kimedontius* saith truely in his preface to *Luther De servo arbitrio*. Between grace and predestination there is only this difference (as Saint *Austin* teacheth *Libro de prædest. Sanctorum cap.* 10.) that predestination is a preparation of grace, and grace a bestowing of predestination. As *Zenoes* servant and these Monks did, so would all men judge; did they considerately thinke that men could not choose but offend. And what would be the resultance of such a perswasion, but an inundation of the greatest insolencies, and dissolution of all good goverment.

Answer. 3. Indeed if our doctrine make sin to be no sin, and therewithall take away the conscience of sin; it is not to be marvailed, if it take away the *desert and guilt of sinne*: For as sinne is no sinne; so likewise it is as fit that the *desert and guilt of sinne*, should *be the desert and guilt of no sinne*; and so no desert or guilt at all. This Authour to serve his own turne takes great libery of discourse in talking of offences fatall; these were called by *Austin profane novelties of words*. Yet elsewhere he professeth that if no other thing were meant hereby then the divine providence *Sententiam teneant, linguâ corrigant; let thē hold their orthodoxe meaning, but let thē correct their language* Now by providence divine is meant the will of God, working every thing that is good, and permitting every thing that is evill. And without this will of God not any thing comes to passe in the judgment of *Austin*. *Non aliquid fit* saith he, *nisi ōnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo, Not any thing comes to passe, unlesse Almighty God will have it come to passe either by suffering it, or by his own working of it*, to wit, if evill, suffering it, if good working it; but of each he professeth that God wils it. The abominable outrages committed upon the person of the holy Son of God, were such as *God's hand and God's counsell foredetermined*, that is as much as to say, *antecedently determined to be done*. And the ten Kings in giving their kingdomes to the Beast, are said herein to have agreed to *doe God's Will*. Yet this Authour dares not say, that *these actions could not be justly punished* Yet the maintainers of destiny (as I have shewed out of *Austin*) denyed that the wills of men were subject to destiny; while this Authour talkes in their language, why doth he not talke in their meaning? And if he talkes in our meaning, why doth he not talke in our language? Now *Austin* farther saith (as I have shewed out of the same place) that they who exempted the wills of men from all necessity, feared a vaine and causeless feare; professing that as to some necessity the will is not subject, such as is the necessity of death, which befalls us whether we will or no. So to some necessity it may be subject without any danger; and that necessity he expresseth to be such, as when we say, it must *needs be that such a thing come to passe*. Now such a necessity and no other is granted by us as consequent to the will of God, so that if God will give a man faith, it must needs be, such a man shall believe; if he will give repentance it must needs be, that such a man shall repent; If he will keep such a man as *Abimelech* from sinning against him, it must needs be, that such a man shall be kept from sinning against him. If God will not give a man faith, nor repentance, it must needs be, that such a man will not believe, will not repent. In like manner if God will not keepe a man from sinne, but suffer him to sinne; it needs must be that such a one shall sinne. If God harden the heart of *Pharoah*, so that he shall not let Israel goe, undoubtedly so it shall come to passe. If God put it into the hearts of the Kings to give up their kingdomes

Enchirid. c. 95. *Act:* 4. 28. *Rev:* 17. 17. *De civit. Dei l.* 5. *c.* 10. *Gen:* 20. 6.

domes to the Beaſt, they ſhall infallibly give their Kingdomes to the Beaſt. If he gives men over unto a Reprobate mind to doe things inconvenient, undoubtedly being thus proſtituted by God to their own corruption from within, and to the power of Satan from without, they ſhall doe thoſe inconvenient things, be they never ſo abominable; yet not neceſſarily, much leſſe in the way of abſolute neceſſity, (as this Authour wordeth it, affecting to ſpeake with a full mouth (which is a quality naturall to theſe *Arminians*, and runnes in a blood) but proveth nothing) but contingently and freely, not only with a poſſibility, but alſo with an active power to the contrary. And if freely, then ſurely their works are their own, proceeding from their own power and ſoveraignty, but yet not ſupreame and abſolute dominion and independent in their operation, on God their maker. God muſt have the prerogative ſtill of being the firſt mover, the firſt cauſe, the firſt Agent, the firſt free Agent; So farre off are we from maintaining that the actions of men have their being by abſolute neceſſity; that we utterly deny any thing in the world to have its exiſtence by abſolute neceſſity, ſaving God alone, as before I have ſhewed. *Sciendum*, ſaith *Durand*, *quod loquendo de neceſſitate ſimpliciter, voluntas divina nec imponit, nec imponere poteſt rebus neceſſitatem; nec res creatæ ſunt capaces talis neceſſitatis. We are to know that ſpeaking of neceſſity ſimply ſo called, the will of God neither doth impoſe, or can impoſe any ſuch neceſſity on things, neither are creatures capable of ſuch neceſſity. But if we ſpeake of ſuch neceſſity as creatures are capable of under the divine liberty, by cauſes intermediate: it is to be ſaid that all things doe not come to paſſe of neceſſity; but ſome doe, and ſome doe not. God will have ſome things come to paſſe by the mediation of cauſes neceſſary, & thoſe come to paſſe neceſſarily; Others come to paſſe by the mediation of cauſes contingent, and thoſe come to paſſe contingently; Whereby*, ſaith he, *'tis manifeſt that they ſay not well, who ſay that all things come to paſſe of neceſſity in reference to the Divine Will; becauſe, as hath been ſhewed, in reſpect of the Divine will, all things come to paſſe freely; and therefore ſpeaking abſolutely, they may not come to paſſe, although, upon ſuppoſition that they are willed, they cannot but come to paſſe; but this is only neceſſity upon ſuppoſition.*

In firſt diſt. 46. quæſt. 1.

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Artic: 11.

Ariſt. l. 3. c. 1.

Ibid.

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whatſoever *Popilius* the Roman Pretor judged of her, who ſlew her mother, provoked by her Mothers fact in murthering her children; yet let our lawes be conſulted, and the opinion of our Judges in ſuch a caſe; and whether ſuch a one were not to be condemned; and whether *Popilius* his judgment deſerves to be admitted for the correction of the lawes of our land, and working a reformation in this particular. We ſhould ſoone have a wild world, if every one being provoked by the inſolencies of others ſhould thruſt themſelves into the throne of God for the execution of vengeance; Yet none more unfit for this, then the daughter to execute God's vengeance upon the mother that bare her. Yet it was wont to be held, If I forget not, that *poteſtas patria* originally was power of life and death. But all is fiſh that comes to this Authour's net; like as her fact who poiſoned her husband and ſon for killing a ſon of hers; deſtroying two for one without all authority moſt unnaturally; and that not haſtily, but in a deliberate way by poiſoning. And doth it become Chriſtians to admire ſuch heatheniſh courſes of men nothing acquainted with the divine providence? And was this ſo doubtfull a caſe, whether ſo wicked a wretch avenging her ſelfe by poiſon ſecretly given upon her husband and ſon for the death of another ſon of hers, that the ſentencing thereof ſhould be put over untill an 100 yeares after? But what of all this? Theſe willfully affect revenge, the execution whereof belongs not to them; but it is juſt with God to puniſh ſinne with ſinne; one man's ſinne by another. As of *Senacherib* the Lord profeſſeth, that *he would cauſe him to fall by the ſword in his own land*, this was brought to paſſe by his own children falling upon him furiouſly, and as unnaturally as the actions of any of theſe. How was innocent *Naboth* uſed, and by publique ſentence condemned to be ſtoned to death, and accordingly executed by the practiſe of wicked *Jezabel*? Yet *Solomon* ſpareth not to profeſſe that *every man's judgment commeth of the Lord.* Never were more abominable courſes executed upon any, then upon the holy ſon of God: Yet theſe were all foredetermined *by the hand of God, and the counſell of God*, as the Apoſtles with one voice acknowledge. By the ſame providence was *Joſeph* ſold into Egypt, God working thereby the preſervation of them that ſold him; Thus *Sihon* was hardened, and the Canaanites, and the Egyptians with *Pharaoh* their King to their own deſtruction. Thus the Lord puniſhed *David's* foule ſinne by the murther of *Ammon* contrived by his own brother; and by the ſword of *Abſolon* riſing up againſt his own father; and by the ſword of *Shimei's* tongue curſing *David*, wherein *David* acknowledged the hand of God. Thus he puniſhed the Idolatry of the Gentiles by giving them over to vile affections, and ſo proſtituting them to abominable courſes. What outrages were committed by *Senacherib* that proud and blaſphemous wretch upon the people of God; yet is he called the *rod of God's wrath and the ſtaffe in his hand*; is ſaid to be *God's indignation.* And if God leaves any man to his corruption, and offers occaſions and temptations from without, which are naturally apt to actuate ſuch corruptions; and withall gives them over to the power of Satan; what is to be expected, but that they will breake forth into murther, as in *Senacherib's* ſons; and the Jewes crucifying the Son of God; into ſtealth ſacrilegious, as in *Achan*; into adultery and that in an inceſtuous manner as we ſee in *Abſalom*; into inſurrections, an example whereof we have in the ten Tribes revolting from *Rehoboam*; into treaſons as *Judas* betraying his own Maſter; and into all manner of outragious villanies, whereof the Scripture makes plentifull mention, and of the providence of God therein? As for God's determining to the act, that is nothing at all materiall to the point in hand, though this Authour in his crude conceits, is much intoxicated therewith; For as much as, whether the wicked are exerciſed in actions good for the ſubſtance of them; or in abſtaining from that which is evill, they never a whit the more either performe the one, or abſtaine from the other in a gracious manner; and all for want of grace ſupernaturall, which God is not bound to beſtow on any. All ſides confeſſe that Divine concourſe is neceſſary to every act, as without which the creature cannot move. For in *God we move*, as well as *in him we live, and in him we have our being.* And about this concourſe a queſtion is made, to wit, Whether God's influence be only into the act, and that upon condition, *modo nos velimus*, *provided that we will*, is as abſurd and contradictious a conceit, as can be deviſed; ſeing the greateſt queſtion is concerning the act of willing: And is it poſſible that God ſhall worke this act upon condition that it be wrought by us? why, if it be wrought by us, what need is there of God's working it? Can the ſame act be the condition of it ſelfe, and ſo both before and after it ſelfe? To avoid this precipice others fly to God's preſcience, that at ſuch an inſtant man will produce ſuch an act of will, provided that God will produce it, which is worſe then the former. For hereby each Agent's operation

Prov: 28.

Act: 4 28.

Eſ: 10.

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As of *Senacherib* the Lord profeſſeth, that *he would cauſe him to fall by the ſword in his own land*, this was brought to paſſe by his own children falling upon him furiouſly, and as unnaturally as the actions of any of theſe. How was innocent *Naboth* uſed, and by publique ſentence condemned to be ſtoned to death, and accordingly executed by the practiſe of wicked *Jezabel*? Yet *Solomon* ſpareth not to profeſſe that *every man's judgment commeth of the Lord.* Never were more abominable courſes executed upon any, then upon the holy ſon of God: Yet theſe were all foredetermined *by the hand of God, and the counſell of God*, as the Apoſtles with one voice acknowledge. By the ſame providence was *Joſeph* ſold into Egypt, God working thereby the preſervation of them that ſold him; Thus *Sihon* was hardened, and the Canaanites, and the Egyptians with *Pharaoh* their King to their own deſtruction. Thus the Lord puniſhed *David's* foule ſinne by the murther of *Ammon* contrived by his own brother; and by the ſword of *Abſolon* riſing up againſt his own father; and by the ſword of *Shimei's* tongue curſing *David*; wherein *David* acknowledged the hand of God. Thus he puniſhed the Idolatry of the Gentiles by giving them over to vile affections, and ſo proſtituting them to abominable courſes. What outrages were committed by *Senacherib* that proud and blaſphemous wretch upon the people of God; yet is he called the *rod of God's wrath and the ſtaffe in his hand*; is ſaid to be *God's indignation.* And if God leaves any man to his corruption, and offers occaſions and temptations from without, which are naturally apt to actuate ſuch corruptions; and withall gives them over to the power of Satan; what is to be expected, but that they will breake forth into murther, as in *Senacherib's* ſons; and the Jewes crucifying the Son of God; into ſtealth ſacrilegious, as in *Achan*; into adultery and that in an inceſtuous manner as we ſee in *Abſalom*; into inſurrections, an example whereof we have in the ten Tribes revolting from *Reheboam*; into treaſons as *Judas* betraying his own Maſter; and into all manner of outragious villanies, whereof the Scripture makes plentifull mention, and of the providence of God therein? As for God's determining to the act, that is nothing at all materiall to the point in hand, though this Authour in his crude conceits, is much intoxicated therewith; For as much as, whether the wicked are exerciſed in actions good for the ſubſtance of them; or in abſtaining from that which is evill, they never a whit the more either performe the one, or abſtaine from the other in a gracious manner; and all for want of grace ſupernaturall, which God is not bound to beſtow on any. All ſides confeſſe that Divine concourſe is neceſſary to every act, as without which the creature cannot move. For in *God we move*, as well as *in him we live, and in him we have our being.* And about this concourſe a queſtion is made, to wit, Whether God's influence be only into the act, and that upon condition, *modo nos velimus*, *provided that we will*, is as abſurd and contradictious a conceit, as can be deviſed; ſeing the greateſt queſtion is concerning the act of willing: And is it poſſible that God ſhall worke this act upon condition that it be wrought by us? why, if it be wrought by us, what need is there of God's working it? Can the ſame act be the condition of it ſelfe, and ſo both before and after it ſelfe? To avoid this precipice others fly to God's preſcience, that at ſuch an inſtant man will produce ſuch an act of will, provided that God will produce it, which is worſe then the former. For hereby each Agent's operation

Prov: 28.

Act: 4 28.

Eſ: 10.

tion is made the condition of the other, whence no operation at all can proceed. Then againe a thing is fained to be foreseen by God as future, which hath no cause of the futurition thereof, being in it's own nature merely possible, that is no more future indeed, then not future: And nothing but the will and decree of God can make it passe out of the condition of a thing merely possible into the condition of a thing future, as is made manifest by invincible reason. Therefore we say the influence of God necessarily required to every action, is made into the will it selfe moving it agreably to the nature thereof, to doe whatsoever it doth, not voluntarily only, but freely also; taking liberty aright and as it ought to be taken, that is in the choice of meanes tending to an end, whether that end be a man's right end or no. For it is confessed by Moralists that the motion of the will towards it's congruous end, is naturall and necessary, not free. But this brave Gentleman carrieth himselfe aloft, and superciliously despising to enter into any of these lists of argumentation; and as if the matter were *conclusum contra Manichæos*, confidently supposeth, without all proofe, that we maintaine that all humane actions come to passe by absolute necessity: Whereas to the contrary 'tis evident that nothing in the world hath it's existence by absolute necessity, saving God alone. 'Tis true, God's decree is unalterable, and whatsoever comes to passe comes to passe by his will saith *Austin*: and the Church of Ireland; By the effectuall will of God, saith *Aquinas*, as which, he makes the roote of all contingency; And therefore as necessary causes worke necessarily by the will of God; so by the same will of God doe contingent Agents worke contingently; and free Agents worke voluntarily and freely. And observe the immodesty of this Authour, he tells us what *Zeno's* servant pleaded for himselfe with his Master; but he doth not tell what *Zeno* answered him, that he conceales; it is enough for him to gull and cheate poore ignorants. *The Adrumetine Monks*, he saith, *were misled by Austin*; a vile imputation cast upon that man whose memory hath been alwaies honourable in the Church of God; and the memoriall of his opposites rots. Did *Austin* misleade them? did he draw them into errour? If they did mistake *Austin*, shall it be true therefore to say they were misled by him? How many mistake and misunderstand God's word; what then? shall we be so audacious and blasphemous, as to say they are misled by the word of God? Why may not such impudent persons proceed, and say they are misled by the holy Ghost? Then that which he saith of these Monks, as misled by *Austin*, it is a notorious untruth; *Cresconius* and *Felix* that came over to *Austin* of their own heads to complaine of some in their Monastry; laid to their charge indeed that *they so taught grace, that they denied free-will*; & that this they pretended to have learned out of *Austin's* booke written to *Sixtus* the Presbyter. But *Austin* was not hasty to believe this crimination: And therefore he saith disjunctively of that Monke of whom they complained, *Aut librum meum non intelligit, aut ipse non intelligitur; either he understands not my booke; or himselfe is not well understood by his brethren.* If the information were true, then that Brother of whom they complained mistooke *Austin*. For *Austin* doth not any where so maintaine grace, as to deny free-will. But if that Brother understood *Austin* aright in that foresaid booke of his, then he maintained no such opinion as *Cresconius* and *Felix* laid to his charge, but they rather misunderstood him. And this appeared to be most true afterwards. For *Florus* was the man whom *Cresconius* and *Felix* accused, and whom *Austin* desired of *Valentinus* the father of them, that he would send over unto him, as *Coccius* acknowledgeth, & accordingly he was sent over to *Austin*, as appeares in *Austin's* booke *De corrept. & gratiâ cap.* 1. With whom when *Austin* had conferred, he found him most orthodoxe as himselfe professeth in the chapter mentioned, and therein much rejoyced, and withall signifieth to *Valentinus* that they deserved rather to be checked who misunderstood *Florus*. And therefore when *Austin* in his Retractations comes to take notice of his booke *De gratiâ & libero arbitrio*, and the occasion of writing thereof, he sets it downe not absolutely, *because of those who so doe maintaine grace, as withall they deny free-will, but with a disjunctive addition*, thus, *or because of those who thinke when grace is maintained, there withall that free-will is denied.* The first was delivered in reference to the crimination made before him by *Cresconius*, and *Felix* against *Florus*; but the latter was according to *Austin's* suspicion at the first, which proved afterwards to be a truth, as appeares by the first chapter of *Austin's* booke *de correptione & gratiâ*; where *Florus* is justified and magnified by St. *Austin*, and his criminators condemned. And seing there were none such among the Monks of Adrumetum, as the accusants pretended, who so maintained grace, as to deny free-will; therefore that also must needs be false which followeth in this Authour, when he saith that against them also St. *Austin* wrote his other booke

booke *De correptione & gratiâ:* And the truth is the whole buſineſſe was ended and the tumult appeaſed between thoſe Adrumetine Monks, before *Florus* came over; as appeared by the relation made unto him by *Florus* concerning the amicable compoſition of all things there. And *Auſtin* in this very paſſage which this Authour grates upon, profeſſeth that he writes not againſt them; only he anſwereth ſuch an objection (For I conceive it to be no other) more fully which was made by ſome of them formerly againſt *Florus*, and the doctrine of *Auſtin* maintained by *Florus*. The relation whereof was brought unto him by the ſame *Florus*, as it ſeemes. But of this more at large in my digreſſion concerning the predeſtinarian hereſy, which I purpoſe to ſubjoine to this. *Auſtin* ſaith indeed that, *Prædeſtinatio eſt gratiæ præparatio, gratia verò ipſa donatio. Predeſtination is the preparation of grace, Grace the gift it ſelfe which was prepared*; not the beſtowing of it: How can it be? Can a gift temporall be the beſtowing of a thing eternall? What entertainment *Zeno's* ſervant found at his Maſters hands (which this Authour conceales) I have often ſhewed, who taught no ſuch doctrine as deſtiny as to free a knave from ſtripes; who as ſo great a Philoſopher had a better judgment in the nature of fate then his ſervant; and himſelfe ſo well thought of by the whole State of Athenians. Yet was not *Zeno* ſo well inſtructed in the myſtery of Divine providence, as we are by the word of God; even from the ſelling of *Joſeph* all along to the crucifying of the Son of God; & from thence to the Kings giving up their Kingdomes to the Beaſt, which ſhould come to paſſe in the latter part of the laſt times of the world. But let him make himſelfe mery with *Zeno's* ſervant, who taken in a theeviſh fact was content to helpe himſelfe with any pretence; but *Zeno* we know did not approve of his appology, but prepared a Rod for the knaves back in deſpite of that. And as for the Monks, the relation that here he makes is merely a fiction of his own braine without all ground. Thus his foundation being ruined, no marvaile if the houſe he builds thereon muſt needs totter and fall on his own pate.

This digreſſion in his late booke againſt. Coruinus pag. 174. 175. &c.

Sect: 3.

2. Nor if this be true can ſin be puniſhed eternally, or that tribunall be juſt on which the ſentence of eternall fire ſhall be denounced againſt the wicked at the laſt day. To this I have the fathers bearing witneſſe generally and plainly. *Tertullian* harh theſe words; The recompence of God and evill can with no juſtice be given to him, who is good or evill, not freely but of neceſſity. Saint *Hierome* ſaith, where neceſſity domineers, there is no place for retribution. *Epiphanius* ſaith, the ſtars which impoſe upon men a neceſſity of ſinning, may be puniſhed with better juſtice then the men themſelves. We place mens nativities under no fatall conſtellations, ſaith Saint *Auſtin*, that we may free the will by which a man liveth either well or ill, from all bands of neceſſity, becauſe of the righteous judgment of God. *Proſper* ſpeaking of the judgment of God, by which he decreed to render unto every man according to his works, ſaith, this judgment ſhould never be if men did ſinne by the will and determination of God. *Fulgentius* alſo ſaith the ſame, It is great injuſtice in God, to punish him whom he doth not find, but make an offender. This was Saint *Bernard's* opinion too; it is only a will free from compulſion and neceſſity ſaith he, which maketh a creature capable of reward & puniſhment. Out of theſe teſtimonies laid together may be collected three things.

M. Meſons Addit. p. 42. 43. 44

lib. 2. contra Maxion:

Epiph: adverſus hær: l. 1. hær. 5. num. 3.

Aug: l. 2. contra Fauſt. c. 5.

Proſp. ad object. 10. Vinc:

Fulg. l. 1. c. 1. ad Moni. c. 22.

Bern: l. de grat. & lib. arbit. p. 908.

1. That the Ancients did uſe to call a neceſſity of humane actions good or bad, by the name of deſtiny, from what externall cauſe ſoever this neceſſity did ariſe.

2. That they did uſe theſe two words (*Neceſſity*) and (*Compulſion*) promiſcuouſly; and therefore thought that neceſſity as well as compulſion did take away the wills liberty.

3. (Which is for our preſent purpoſe) that they believed and contended that the judgments of God on ſinners could not be juſt, if they were held by the Adamantine chaines of any abſolute neceſſity, under the power of their ſins.

I will therefore conclude this Argument with the words of *Epiphanius* writing of the errour of the Phariſees, who beleived the immortality of the ſoule, and the reſurrection of the dead, & yet held that all things come to paſſe by neceſſity. It is, ſaith he, a point of extreame ignorance, or madneſſe rather, for him that confeſſeth the reſurrection of the dead, and the great day appointed for the revelation of God's righteous Judgment, to ſay that there is any deſtiny, any neceſſity in mens actions. For how can the righteous Judgment of God and deſtiny comply and ſtand together? And (let me adde) how can the beleefe of this and true piety ſtand together? For where this perſwaſion that mens ſins are neceſſary, and that therefore there can be no righteous judgment, is rooted in religion will quickly be rooted out.

Epiph. l. 1. adv. hær. 16. p. 35. n. 3.

4. It tendes to religions overthrow; becauſe it makes the whole circle of man's life, but a mere deſtiny. By it all our doings are God's ordinances, all our imaginations branches of his predeſtination; and all events in Kingdomes and commonweales the neceſſary iſſues of the divine decree. All things whatſoever though they ſeem to doe ſomewhat; yet by this opinion, they doe indeed juſt nothing; the beſt lawes reſtrain not one offender, the ſweeteſt rewards promote not one vertue, the powerfull'ſt Sermons convert not one ſinner, the humbleſt devotions divert not one calamity; the ſtrongeſt endeavours in things of any nature whatſoever, effect no more then would be done without them, but the neceſſitating, overruling decree of God doth all. And if lawes doe nothing, wherefore are they made? If rules of religion doe nothing, why are they preſcribed? If the wills of men doe nothing, why are men encouraged to one thing, ſcared from another?

tion is made the condition of the other, whence no operation at all can proceed. Then againe a thing is fained to be foreſeen by God as future, which hath no cauſe of the futurition thereof, being in it's own nature merely poſſible, that is no more future indeed, then not future: And nothing but the will and decree of God can make it paſſe out of the condition of a thing merely poſſible into the condition of a thing future, as is made manifeſt by invincible reaſon. Therefore we ſay the influence of God neceſſarily required to every action, is made into the will it ſelfe moving it agreably to the nature thereof, to doe whatſoever it doth, not voluntarily only, but freely alſo; taking liberty aright and as it ought to be taken, that is in the choice of meanes tending to an end, whether that end be a man's right end or no. For it is confeſſed by Moraliſts that the motion of the will towards it's congruous end, is naturall and neceſſary, not free. But this brave Gentleman carrieth himſelfe aloft, and ſuperciliouſly deſpiſing to enter into any of theſe liſts of argumentation; and as if the matter were *concluſum contra Manichæos*, confidently ſuppoſeth, without all proofe, that we maintaine that all humane actions come to paſſe by abſolute neceſſity: Whereas to the contrary 'tis evident that nothing in the world hath it's exiſtence by abſolute neceſſity, ſaving God alone. 'Tis true, God's decree is unalterable, and whatſoever comes to paſſe comes to paſſe by his will ſaith *Auſtin*: and the Church of Ireland; By the effectuall will of God, ſaith *Aquinas*, as which, he makes the roote of all contingency; And therefore as neceſſary cauſes worke neceſſarily by the will of God; ſo by the ſame will of God doe contingent Agents worke contingently; and free Agents worke voluntarily and freely. And obſerve the immodeſty of this Authour, he tells us what *Zeno's* ſervant pleaded for himſelfe with his Maſter; but he doth not tell what *Zeno* anſwered him, that he conceales; it is enough for him to gull and cheate poore ignorants. *The Adrumetine Monks*, he ſaith, *were miſled by Auſtin*; a vile imputation caſt upon that man whoſe memory hath been alwaies honourable in the Church of God; and the memoriall of his oppoſites rots. Did *Auſtin* miſleade them? did he draw them into errour? If they did miſtake *Auſtin*, ſhall it be true therefore to ſay they were miſled by him? How many miſtake and miſunderſtand God's word; what then? ſhall we be ſo audacious and blaſphemous, as to ſay they are miſled by the word of God? Why may not ſuch impudent perſons proceed, and ſay they are miſled by the holy Ghoſt? Then that which he ſaith of theſe Monks, as miſled by *Auſtin*, it is a notorious untruth; *Creſconius* and *Felix* that came over to *Auſtin* of their own heads to complaine of ſome in their Monaſtry; laid to their charge indeed that *they ſo taught grace, that they denied free-will*; & that this they pretended to have learned out of *Auſtin's* booke written to *Sixtus* the Preſbyter. But *Auſtin* was not haſty to believe this crimination: And therefore he ſaith diſjunctively of that Monke of whom they complained, *Aut librum meum non intelligit, aut ipſe non intelligitur*; *either he underſtands not my booke; or himſelfe is not well underſtood by his brethren.* If the information were true, then that Brother of whom they complained miſtooke *Auſtin*. For *Auſtin* doth not any where ſo maintaine grace, as to deny free-will. But if that Brother underſtood *Auſtin* aright in that foreſaid booke of his, then he maintained no ſuch opinion as *Creſconius* and *Felix* laid to his charge, but they rather miſunderſtood him. And this appeared to be moſt true afterwards. For *Florus* was the man whom *Creſconius* and *Felix* accuſed, and whom *Auſtin* deſired of *Valentinus* the father of them, that he would ſend over unto him, as *Coccius* acknowledgeth, & accordingly he was ſent over to *Auſtin*, as appeares in *Auſtin's* booke *De corrept. & gratiâ cap.* 1. With whom when *Auſtin* had conferred, he found him moſt orthodoxe as himſelfe profeſſeth in the chapter mentioned, and therein much rejoyced, and withall ſignifieth to *Valentinus* that they deſerved rather to be checked who miſunderſtood *Florus*. And therefore when *Auſtin* in his Retractations comes to take notice of his booke *De gratiâ & libero arbitrio*, and the occaſion of writing thereof, he ſets it downe not abſolutely, *becauſe of thoſe who ſo doe maintaine grace, as withall they deny free-will, but with a diſjunctive addition*, thus, *or becauſe of thoſe who thinke when grace is maintained, there withall that free-will is denied.* The firſt was delivered in reference to the crimination made before him by *Creſconius*, and *Felix* againſt *Florus*; but the latter was according to *Auſtin's* ſuſpicion at the firſt, which proved afterwards to be a truth, as appeares by the firſt chapter of *Auſtin's* booke *de correptione & gratiâ*; where *Florus* is juſtified and magnified by St. *Auſtin*, and his criminators condemned. And ſeing there were none ſuch among the Monks of Adrumetum, as the accuſants pretended, who ſo maintained grace, as to deny free-will; therefore that alſo muſt needs be falſe which followeth in this Authour, when he ſaith that againſt them alſo St. *Auſtin* wrote his other

booke

booke *De correptione & gratiâ:* And the truth is the whole buiſineſſe was ended and the tumult appeaſed between thoſe Adrumetine Monks, before *Florus* came over; as appeared by the relation made unto him by *Florus* concerning the amicable compoſition of all things there. And *Auſtin* in this very paſſage which this Authour grates upon, profeſſeth that he writes not againſt them; only he anſwereth ſuch an objection (For I conceive it to be no other) more fully which was made by ſome of them formerly againſt *Florus*, and the doctrine of *Auſtin* maintained by *Florus*. The relation whereof was brought unto him by the ſame *Florus*, as it ſeemes. But of this more at large in my digreſſion concerning the predeſtinarian hereſy, which I purpoſe to ſubjoine to this. *Auſtin* ſaith indeed that, *Prædeſtinatio eſt gratiæ præparatio, gratia verò ipſa donatio. Predeſtination is the preparation of grace, Grace the gift it ſelfe which was prepared*; not the beſtowing of it: How can it be? Can a gift temporall be the beſtowing of a thing eternall? What entertainment *Zeno's* ſervant found at his Maſters hands (which this Authour conceales) I have often ſhewed, who taught no ſuch doctrine as deſtiny as to free a knave from ſtripes; who as ſo great a Philoſopher had a better judgment in the nature of fate then his ſervant; and himſelfe ſo well thought of by the whole State of Athenians. Yet was not *Zeno* ſo well inſtructed in the myſtery of Divine providence, as we are by the word of God; even from the ſelling of *Joſeph* all along to the crucifying of the Son of God; & from thence to the Kings giving up their Kingdomes to the Beaſt, which ſhould come to paſſe in the latter part of the laſt times of the world. But let him make himſelfe mery with *Zeno's* ſervant, who taken in a theeviſh fact was content to helpe himſelfe with any pretence; but *Zeno* we know did not approve of his appology, but prepared a Rod for the knaves back in deſpite of that. And as for the Monks, the relation that here he makes is merely a fiction of his own braine without all ground. Thus his foundation being ruined, no marvaile if the houſe he builds thereon muſt needs totter and fall on his own pate.

This digreſſion in his late booke againſt. Corvinius pag. 174. 175. &c.

Sect. 3.

2. Nor if this be true can ſin be puniſhed eternally, or that tribunall be juſt on which the ſentence of eternall fire ſhall be denounced againſt the wicked at the laſt day. To this I have the fathers bearing witneſſe generally and plainly. *Tertullian* hath theſe words; The recompence of God and evill can with no juſtice be given to him, who is good or evill, not freely but of neceſſity. Saint *Hierome* ſaith, where neceſſity domineers, there is no place for retribution. *Epiphanius* ſaith, the ſtars which impoſe upon men a neceſſity of ſinning, may be puniſhed with better juſtice then the men themſelves. We place mens nativities under no fatall conſtellations, ſaith Saint *Auſtin*, that we may free the will by which a man liveth either well or ill, from all bands of neceſſity, becauſe of the righteous judgment of God. *Proſper* ſpeaking of the judgment of God, by which he decreed to render unto every man according to his works, ſaith, this judgment ſhould never be if men did ſinne by the will and determination of God. *Fulgentius* alſo ſaith the ſame, It is great injuſtice in God, to punish him whom he doth not find, but make an offender. This was Saint *Bernard's* opinion too; it is only a will free from compulſion and neceſſity ſaith he, which maketh a creature capable of reward & puniſhment Out of theſe teſtimonies laid together may be collected three things.

M. Meſons Addit. p. 42. 43. 44

lib. 2. contra Maxion:

Epiph: adverſus hær: l. 1. hær. 5. num. 3.

Aug: l. 2. contra Fauſt. c. 5.

Proſp. ad object. 10. Vinc:

Fulg. l. 1. c. 1. ad Moni. c. 22.

Bern: l. de grat. & lib. arbit. p. 908.

1. That the Ancients did uſe to call a neceſſity of humane actions good or bad, by the name of deſtiny, from what externall cauſe ſoever this neceſſity did ariſe.

2. That they did uſe theſe two words (*Neceſſity*) and (*Compulſion*) promiſcuouſly; and therefore thought that neceſſity as well as compulſion did take away the wills liberty.

3. (Which is for our preſent purpoſe) that they believed and contended that the judgments of God on ſinners could not be juſt, if they were held by the Adamantine chaines of any abſolute neceſſity, under the power of their ſins.

I will therefore conclude this Argument with the words of *Epiphanius* writing of the errour of the Phariſees, who beleived the immortality of the ſoule, and the reſurrection of the dead, & yet held that all things come to paſſe by neceſſity. It is, ſaith he, a point of extreame ignorance, or madneſſe rather, for him that confeſſeth the reſurrection of the dead, and the great day appointed for the revelation of God's righteous Judgment, to ſay that there is any deſtiny, any neceſſity in mens actions For how can the righteous Judgment of God and deſtiny comply and ſtand together? And (let me adde) how can the beliefe of this and true piety ſtand together? For where this perſwaſion that mens ſins are neceſſary, and that therefore there can be no righteous judgment, is rooted in religion will quickly be rooted out.

Epiph. l. 1. adv. hær. 16. p. 35. n. 3.

4. It rendes to religions overthrow; becauſe it makes the whole circle of man's life, but a mere deſtiny. By it all our doings are God's ordinances, all our imaginations branches of his predeſtination; and all events in Kingdomes and commonweales the neceſſary iſſues of the divine decree. All things whatſoever though they ſeem to doe ſomewhat; yet by this opinion, they doe indeed juſt nothing; the beſt lawes reſtrain not one offender, the ſweeteſt rewards promote not one vertue, the powerfull'ſt Sermons convert not one ſinner, the humbleſt devotions divert not one calamity; the ſtrongeſt endeavours in things of any nature whatſoever, effect no more then would be done without them, but the neceſſitating, overruling decree of God doth all. And if lawes doe nothing, wherefore are they made? If rules of religion doe nothing, why are they preſcribed? If the wills of men doe nothing, why are men encouraged to one thing, ſcared from another?

ther? and if good endeavours and oniets doe nothing (being excited, continued, limited, controlled and every way governed by an active, abſolute, and Almighty decree, to what purpoſe are they uſed? Who ſeeth not plainly whither theſe things tend? To nothing more then to the ſubverſion of piety and pollicy, religion & lawes, ſociety and government? This did the Romans ſee full well; and therefore they banniſhed (*Mathematicos*, the teachers & abetters of deſtiny) out of Rome. Theſe and the like inconveniencies which come from the uppper way, did worke ſo with *Proſper*, as that he calls him no Catholique who is of this opinion. Whoſoever ſaith that men are urged to ſinne, and to be damned by the predeſtination of God, as by a fatall, unavoidable neceſſity, he is no Catholique.

Proſp. ad cap. Gal. Sent. 1.

They did alſo make the Arauſican counſell denounce a curſe againſt ſuch. That any are predeſtinated by the divine power to ſinne, we doe not only not believe, but with the greateſt deteſtation that we can, we denounce Anathema to ſuch (if there be any ſuch) as will believe ſo great an evill. Thus farre of my reaſons againſt the upper and more harſh and rigorous way.

Anſwer. 2. Undoubtedly if ſin cannot be puniſhed temporally, it cannot be puniſhed eternally. We have no need, I ſhould thinke of the Authority of any fathers to juſtifie this. Where doth this Authour find, that we maintaine that a man is good or evill, *not freely but by neceſſity*, that *Tertullian* is brought in as oppoſing us here? Yet we thinke this is worthy of diſtinction: For was not *Adam* made by God habitually good? *Durand*, I am ſure, maintaines that in his creation he was endued with all Morall vertues: & this we read in Scripture, that all things which God made were very good: & as other things were made very good in their kind: So I preſume man was made very good in his kind: and how this could be unleſſe he were made vertuous, I cannot conceive. So likewiſe man being brought forth in the corrupt maſſe; when afterwards he is made good either in the way of juſtification, or in the way of regeneration; theſe are no free acts of Man, but rather the free acts of God. I preſume this Authour dares not ſay that man regenerates himſelfe But as for the denomination of goodneſſe and badneſſe in man, that ariſeth from any actions of his, I willingly grant all ſuch goodneſſe or badneſſe is acquired freely, not neceſſarily.

And as *Tertullian* takes neceſſity, to wit in oppoſition unto liberty; So I preſume doth *Hierome* too; otherwiſe theſe two Fathers were yoaked together unequally in this place. Now we know no ſuch neceſſity domineering in man, as ſtands in oppoſition to liberty. Much leſſe doe we maintaine any neceſſity over the will of man, depending upon fatall conſtellations; And as *Epiphanius*, and *Auſtin* diſcourſe thus of neceſſity in reference to fatall conſtellations; So it ſeemes likely that *Hierome* and *Tertullian* did diſcourſe of neceſſity in the ſame ſenſe. *To ſinne by the will of God* in *Proſper* is to ſin *by the predeſtination of God*, as appeares both by *the Objection it ſelfe, and Proſper's anſwer thereunto throughout*. Now predeſtination in the fathers meaning is of no other things, then ſuch as God purpoſed to worke. And accordingly we anſwer that no evill in the world, as evill, comes to paſſe by God's will to worke it; but only by God's will to permit it. And it is *Auſtin's* expreſſe profeſſiõ, that *Non aliquid fit niſi omnipotens fieri velit. Not any thing comes to paſſe, unles God Almighty will have it come to paſſe*; but how? Not all after one manner, but after a different manner; ſome by working them, others by permitting them; *vel ſinendo ut fiat, vel ipſe faciendo; either by ſuffering it to come to paſſe*, in caſe it be evill, or himſelfe *working it*, in caſe it be good. *Fulgentius* juſtifies this ſenſe in his ſentence here alleadged. For *to ſinne by God's will* in *Proſper*, is all one with *being made an offender* (or made to ſinne) *by God*, in *Fulgentius*. Now we ſay God makes many a man good by regeneration; but he makes none evill; only he doth not cure that naturall or habituall vicioufneſſe, which he finds amongſt men, in all. For *He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth*; and indeed he is bound to none. St. *Bernard* clearely maintaines that there is noe liberty from ſinne in any naturall man; and conſequently every naturall man is caſt upon a neceſſity of ſinning; and therefore that *liberty from neceſſity which he grants to man*, can be no other then liberty from compulſion; And ſo Dr. *Fulke* uſually makes the diſtinction run between *Liberty from ſin, and liberty from coaction*; & denying the one he grants the other.

1. That the Antients did call that neceſſity, which ariſeth from the will of God upon the will of the creature by the name of deſtiny, This Authour brings not the leaſt colour of proofe; neither do I thinke he is able to bring any, ſave only of the Pelagians, who traduced *Auſtin's* doctrine of predeſtination by the name of deſtiny. And ſo they traduced his doctrine in denying that grace was conferred according to mens workes; whereupon it was that he built his doctrine of predeſtination, as is apparent *De bono perſeverantiæ. c.* 15.

2. In the ſecond I wonder this Author obſerves not how he contradicts himſelfe. For if they uſed theſe words *Neceſſity*, & *compulſion*; promiſcuouſly; doth it not evidently follow that they diſtinguiſhed them not? but alwaies tooke them of equivalent ſignification. But I doe not find that *Auſtin* tooke *neceſſity* of the ſame ſignification with *compulſion*; when he diſtinguiſheth

diſtinguiſheth of neceſſity; ſaying ſome neceſſity is ſuch, as whereby a thing befalls a man, whether he will or no; as the neceſſity of death, and to ſuch a neceſſity he ſaith, the will is not ſubject. Another neceſſity there is, as when we ſay, *It muſt needs be, that this, or that come to paſſe*, and he confeſſeth plainly that the will may be ſubject to ſuch a neceſſity, without danger or prejudice to the liberty thereof.

3 And well they might hold that God's *judgments were not juſt on ſinners, if they were held by any abſolute neceſſity under the power of their ſins.* We ſay that nothing hath either exiſtence, or continuance, by abſolute neceſſity, ſave God alone. But I gueſſe this Authour calls that neceſſity abſolute, which flowes from God's abſolute decree. Now if he will have God's decrees to be conditionall, it ſtands him upon to prove it, not boldly ſuppoſe it. Eſpecially ſeeing *Aquinas* hath profeſſed that never any man was ſo mad as to ſay that there is any cauſe of God's predeſtination, as touching the act of God's predeſtinating; and that there can be no cauſe hereof he proves becauſe there can be no cauſe of God's will, as touching the act of God willing, as formerly he had proved. And Doctor *Jackſon* in his booke of providence confeſſeth that the diſtinction of God's will, into a will antecedent, and a will conſequent, is not to be underſtood as touching the act of God willing; but as touching the things willed. And accordingly, ſeeing reprobation in it's kind is the will of God, as well as predeſtination in it's kind; it followeth, that as there can be no cauſe of the will of God, as touching the act of God willing; no cauſe of predeſtination, as touching the act of God predeſtinating; ſo neither can there be any cauſe of Reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating. And looke how mad a thing it is for any man to maintaine that there is ſome cauſe of predeſtination, as touching the act of God predeſtinating. So as mad a thing it muſt be every way to avouch that there is a cauſe of Reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating. And truely the Apoſtle St. *Paul* plainly manifeſts that upon what ground he proves, that Election is not of good works (namely becauſe before *Jacob* or *Eſau* were borne, or had done good or evill, it was ſaid, *The elder ſhall ſerve the younger*) upon the ſame ground we may be bold to conclude, that Reprobation is not of evill workes. And the ſame reaſon manifeſts that faith and infidelity are excluded from being the cauſes, the one of Election, the other of Reprobation; as well as good and evill workes. And both *Piſcator* by evidence of Scripture, and *Bradwardine* by evidence of reaſon have demonſtrated, that no will of God is conditionall, which is to be underſtood, as touching the act of God willing. And it may be evidently further demonſtrated thus; If any thing be the cauſe of God's will, then either by neceſſity of nature, or by the conſtitution of God; Not by neceſſity of nature, as is evident and all confeſſe, there being no colour of truth for that; beſides ſuch an opinion were moſt dangerously prejudiciall to God's ſoveraignty, and liberty. If therefore they ſay, it is by the conſtitution of God, marke I pray what an inſuperable abſurdity followeth hereupon. For ſeing God's conſtitution is his will, it followeth that God did will that *upon foreſight of this or that he would will ſuch a man's ſalvation, and ſuch a man's damnation.* And thus the act of God's will is made the Object of God's will, even the eternall act of God's will; Whereas to the contrary it is apparent, that the objects of God's will are things temporall, never any thing that is eternall. But as touching things willed, we readily grant, it may be ſaid there is a cauſe thereof as School-Divines doe generally acknowledge. And thus *Gerardus Voſſius* ſpeaks of the conditionall will, which he ſaith the Fathers doe aſcribe to God. For this is the inſtance which he gives thereof, as for example, when God ordaines to beſtow ſalvation on a man in caſe he believe; here faith is made the condition of Salvation, but not of the will of God. And in like manner we willingly grant that reprobation is conditionall, inaſmuch as God intends to inflict damnation on none, but ſuch as die in ſin without repenance. But albeit predeſtination, as touching this particular thing willed, may be ſaid to be conditionall according as the School-men explicate their meaning; and reprobation likewiſe as touching the particular of dānatiō mētioned: yet no ſuch thing cā be truely affirmed either of the one or of the other, as touching the particulars of grāting, or denying the grace of regeneratiō, which are intended alſo by the decrees of predeſtinatiō & reprobatiō. For albeit God intends not to beſtow ſalvation on any, but upon condition of faith, nor damnation on any, but upon condition of finall impenitency and infidelity. Yet God intends not to beſtow the grace of regeneration on ſome for the curing of their naturall infidelity and impenitency. Nor to leave the ſame infidelity and impenitency uncured in others, by denying the ſame grace of regeneration unto them. This I ſay God doth not

Note

intend to bring to passe upon any condition; For if he should, then grace should be conferred according unto works, which was condemned in the Synod of Palestine and all along in divers Synods, and Councells against the Pelagians. So that albeit God proceeds according to a law in bestowing salvation, and inflicting damnation; yet he proceeds according to no law, in giving or denying the grace of regeneration for the curing of our naturall corruption; but merely according to the pleasure of his will, as the Apostle testifies saying, *He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth.* And if the conferring and denying of this grace be absolute; how much more are the decrees hereof to be accounted most absolute? And consequently that one man is delivered from the power of his sins, whether originall or habituall; another is not, but still continueth under the power of them; This I say, doth, & must needs come to passe by vertue of Gods absolute decrees. Yet no absolute necessity followeth hereupon. First because no greater necessity then that which is absolute can be attributed to the existence and continuance of God himselfe. Secondly God did absolutely decree to make the world; yet no wise man was ever known to affirme that the worlds existence was, and is by absolute necessity. In like sort, God did absolutely decree, that *Josiah* should burne the Prophets bones, upon the Altar; That *Cyrus* should *build his Citty, and let goe his captives*; That *no man should desire the Israelites land, when they should come to appeare before the Lord their God thrice in the yeare*; That *God would circumcise their hearts, and the hearts of their children to love the Lord their God with all their heart, and with all their soule. To put his feare in their hearts, that they should never depart away from him; To cause them to walke in his statutes and judgments to doe them. To worke in them both the will and the deed, according to his good pleasure.* Yea *to worke in them every thing that is pleasing in his sight through Jesus Christ.* Likewise *that Absolom should defile his fathers Concubines, that the Jewes should crucify the Son of God; that some through disobedience should stumble at the word; that the Kings should give their kingdomes to the beast.* Yet these actions were done by them as freely as ever they did ought in their lives; All these things I say by Scripture evidence were decreed by God to come to passe; The good by God's effection the evill by God's permission; and decreed absolutely on their parts that did them; if not, let it be shewed upon what condition on *Absolon's* part, he should defile his fathers Concubines; upon what condition on the Jewes part, they should crucify the Son of God; upon what condition on their part, others through disobedience should stumble at God's word; And upon what condition on their part, the Kings should give their kingdomes to the beast. And if they take *Arminius* his way, let them reply upon mine answere to *Arminius*; if *Bellarmin's*, let them reply upon my answer to *Bellarmine*, that we may not trouble the world with our Tautologies: If a different way from both these, I shall be glad, to be acquainted with it, & give it such entertainement as according to my judgment it shall be found to deserve.

contraction
1 King: 13. 2
Es. 45. 13.
Ex. 34. 24.
Deut: 30. 6.
Jer: 32. 40.
Ezech: 37. 24.
Ezek. 36. 27.
Phil: 2. 13.
Heb: 13. 21.
contraction

So that with *Epiphanius*, though we are ready to concurre in denying destiny, which as before we heard out of him, was a necessity derived from the starres; yet with *Austin* we may still hold that the wills of men need not to be exempted from all necessity, to maintaine the liberty thereof, and he gives instance in such a necessity as whereby we say, *It must needs be that such a thing come to passe*, as no way prejudiciall to man's liberty. And *Arminius* confesseth, that upon supposition of God's decree it must needs be that the Souldiers should abstaine from the breaking of Christ's bones; yet I nothing doubt, but this action was as as freely performed by them, as any other. For albeit a thing must needs come to passe which God hath decreed to come to passe, yet it is indifferent to come to passe necessarily or freely; which also God determines according to the nature of the things themselves; namely that necessary things shall come to passe necessarily, and contingent things contingently. And to this purpose he hath prepared different Agents, as *Aquinas* observeth some necessary working necessarily, some contingent working contingently.

Collat: cum Junio pag: 83.

4. Still this Authour harpes upon the same string imputing unto us, that we make the whole Circle af a man's life a mere destiny; his meaning is that we take away all liberty, which is most untrue. As for destiny it is well knowne as before I have shewed that this was the usuall crimination, which the Pelagians cast upon the doctrine of St. *Austin*; and that, because he maintained that grace was not given according unto man's workes. And what was *Austin's* answer hereunto, I have shewed before: *Si cui voluntatem omnipotentis Dei Fati nomine placet nuncupari, profanas verborum novitates evitamus, sed de verbis contendere non amamus, If men please to call the will of Almighty God by the name of destiny; we avoid profane novelties of words, but we doe not*

love

love to wrangle about words. For God to worke us to faith, to repentance, to every good worke; yea to the very will and the deed, and that according to his good pleaſure (for which we have expreſſe Scripture, both in the old and new Teſtament, as earſt I ſhewed)& abſolutely to decree this is to make the whole circle of man's life, as touching good courſes, but a mere deſtiny, if we believe this Divine; whereas if this be decreed to be done conditionally, then grace muſt be conferred according to works, which is as true Pelagianiſme, as ever dropt from the mouth of *Pelagius*, & which himſelfe was ſõetimes driven to renounce, yet this Pelagianiſme is the only true divinity, if we believe this Author. Againe if *non aliquid fit niſi omnipotens fieri velit, Not any thing cões to paſſe, unleſſe God Almighty will have it come to paſſe*; whether good or evill; which was ſometimes delivered by *Auſtin*; and of late profeſſed by the Church of Ireland in the dayes of King James, *this is to make the Whole Circle of man's life a mere Deſtiny*; if this Authour be of any credit ſo farre as to make his words to be received as Oracles; yet God's word is expreſſe from the unanimous conſent of the Apoſtles, that *both Herod & Pontius-Pilate, with the Gentiles and people of Iſrael were gathered together againſt the holy Son of God to do what God's hand & God's counſell had before determined to be done*: Yet were they gathered together to doe ſuch acts, as more facinorous were never known to be done ſince the world beganne: And if we believe this Authour, all this came to paſſe by meere deſtiny: And if this be to come to paſſe by meere deſtiny, why ſhould we not believe it? Have we better or more compleate teſtimony for ought throughout the whole booke of God, then for this? All things that come to paſſe muſt needs be the iſſues of the divine decree; not only ſuch things as come to paſſe neceſſarily, by neceſſary Agents working neceſſarily; but even ſuch things alſo as come to paſſe freely, by free agents working contingently, and freely, as *Aquinas* hath proved and *Auſtin* and the Church of Ireland acknowledged, and the word of God hath juſtified, and cleare reaſon demonſtrated, for as much as otherwiſe no future thing could be foreknowne by God from everlaſting. For nothing can be from everlaſting knowne by God as future, unleſſe from everlaſting it were future. But without the decree of God paſſing upon it, no contingent thing can paſſe out of the condition of a thing merely poſſible (ſuch as it is in it's own nature) into the conditiõ of a thing future. So that whoſoever denies God's decree to paſſe upon every thing that comes to paſſe throughout the world, muſt therewithall deny the foreknowledge thereof in the mind of God; Let but this Authour avoid this one argument if he can; but he will never anſwer it while his head is hot. I conceive I have had ſufficient experience of his ſtrength already this way, and of the ſhamefull iſſue of his adventure therein. He that ſayd, *Non aliquid fit niſi omnipotens fieri velit, Not any thing comes to paſſe, unleſſe the Almighty will have it come to paſſe*, ſayd alſo that God ſo workes in every creature, as without all prejudice to their own motions. And when the Apoſtle ſaid, that *In God we move*, his meaning was not, that the creature did nothing, or moved not at all. All that followeth is of the ſame ſtampe a fardell of unſhamefaſt untruthes. Beiike when God ſaith, *I will cauſe them to walke in my ſtatutes and to doe them*, God cauſed them to doe juſt nothing. In like manner when the holy Prophet expoſtulates with God in the perſon of the Church after this manner, *Lord why haſt thou cauſed us to erre from thy waies, and hardened our hearts againſt thy feare*, the meaning is, *why haſt thou cauſed us to doe juſt nothing*. In like manner when God reſtraines offences, he doth it not by his lawes, When he promotes vertue he doth it not by rewards; when he converts ſinners he doth it not by ſermons: when thouſands were converted in one day, it was not by the miniſtry of *Peter* and his fellow Apoſtles. This Authours meaning ſeemes to be, that unleſſe man converts himſelfe, it is not done by ſermons. But ſee how he overlaſheth; whẽ carrying the matter ſo as if God's decree neceſſitated and overruled all by our opinion, yet moſt abſurdly he exempts from this divine decree man's endeavours. And who ſeeth not that to overrule is to carry the reaſonable creature on to doe contrary to his own will and judgment. For unleſſe he doth toſſe ſtrenuouſlly he can prevaile nothing with any ſober and indifferent Reader. In like ſort to neceſſitate denotes ſuch a motion whereby the creature is carried to doe a thing neceſſailry but this is not *Bradwardines* opinion, who alone amongſt Schoole-Divines, that I know, uſeth this phraſe of neceſſitating. For he ſaith that *God neceſſitates the creature to his free act*, & this neceſſity is but modall, according to that expreſſion of *Auſtin*: *neceſſe eſt ut aliquid fiat*, which *Auſtin* confeſſed 1200 years agoe to be no impeachment to man's liberty. But becauſe that phraſe *Neceſſitating*, is not only of an harſh ſound & apt to be taken in a quite contrary ſenſe to that of the Authour's; therefore other School-Divines, and generally our Divines uſe it not. And how immodeſt a courſe is

this to thinke to choake us with other mens phrases, and that in a quite contrary sense to that wherein the Authour's take it? And as if he had very substantially concluded the point, that *lawes doe nothing, rules of religion, and mens endeavours do nothing*, whereas he hath performed no part either of a Philosopher or of a Divine in all this, but of a mere trifler; he proceeds to demand why the one are made, the other prescribed; why men are encouraged to some things; and scared from the other. He might as well aske what meant King *Hezechiah* to have any care either of his foode or of taking Physicke for those 15 yeares which God told him, he had added unto his life? What meant *Paul* to tell the Master of the ship, that unlesse the Mariners were detained in the ship they could not be saved; what meant some to trust to their swimming, others to boards & broken peeces of the ship to get to land, when the Lord by his Angell had told him, that he had given him the lives of all that sailed with him? In the very daies of *Cicero* the Stoicks were acquainted with such like arguments made against their destiny, and knew how readily to answer them by distinguishing between *Fatalia and Confatalia*, as appeares in *Cicero's* book *de Fato*, and *Turnebus* his answer to *Ramus* thereupon, more at large. Therefore this Authour disputes not logically, if he did, the vileneſse of his argumentation would soone appeare according to it's proper colours; but carrieth the matter all along in Rhetoricall flourishes, as if his wit served him for that best, whereat I wonder not a little, that he should forsake that wherein his facultie lieth most, according to the reputation that goes of him, & trust to that wherein his best dexterity hath been accounted but *inficete*. If our doctrine tends *to the subversion of policy, religion and lawes, society & goverment* In the next place we expect when he will turne starke Atheist and professe as much of the word of God, seing it is manifest our doctrine cheifly is founded upon the word of God even in that which sounds most harsh unto carnall judgment; namely as touching God's secret providence in evill, this Authour not accomodating any answer to any one of those places whereupon our doctrine is grounded. And as for God's providence in working us unto holinesse, his contrary doctrine cannot stand without maintaining that Grace is given according unto mens works; which is expresly contradictory to the word of God. 2 *Tim:* 1. 9. *Tit:* 3. 5, and opposed by the church of God as the sowre leaven of Pelagianisme, from the Synod of Palestine all along. For aske this Authour wherefore God bestowes faith upon one & not upon another, & he hath nothing to answer, but either by denying plainly, that faith is the gift of God; which hitherto they are not growne so impudent as to deny expresly; though the Remonstrants in their *Censura censuræ* come so farre, as to deny that Christ merited faith and regeneration for any man; Or they must answer that the reason hereof is, because the one by some act of his or other hath prepared himselfe for the reception of divine influences, the other hath not. Or in plaine termes as one hath expressed it, that God doth worke in us *Credere to believe, modo velimus provided that we will believe.* But doth he not worke also the very act of willing? Saint *Paul* saith he doth; *yea every thing that is pleasing in his sight.* And how doth he worke in us this will? Is it upon condition, that we will? This is the absurdity whereunto they are driven, still fetching in a priority of mans act to the divine influence, working us to that which is good, yet most preposterously. For what need is there of influence divine to make us to will if of our selves we will already? And this also utterly overthrowes God's prescience of things future, which can have no true foundation besides the divine decree. As for *Mathematici* which were banished out of Rome, were those Divines, or Astrologers rather? If they subjected the event of all things to the influence of the stars, shall *Austin* be blamed or the Church of Ireland for subjecting all things to the councell of God's will, and that according to the expresse testimony of holy Scripture both as touching good and evill; only with this difference; good things to his will of working them, evill things to his will of permitting them. As for *Prosper's* saying in the last place, we make no contingent things throughout the world, much lesse the actions of men to come to passe unavoidably, no not upon supposition of God's decree; but by vertue of his decree both contingent things come to passe contingently, that is with a possibility of not comming to passe; & free things freely, that is joyned with an active power in the Agent, either to suspend his action; or to doe otherwise; as well as necessary things come to passe necessarily. This I say we avouch with *Aquinas*, and accordingly with him maintaine the root of contingency to be the effectuall will of God. Againe I have often shewed that Predestination in the phrase of the Antients is only of such things as God decreed to bring to passe by his effection; notwithstanding this, *Austin* was bold to professe, that *not any thing came to passe unlesse God would have it come*

Phil. 3. 13.
Heb. 13. 21.

to

to paſſe; but evill things only by ſuffering them; good things by working them, As for compulſion which is *Proſper's* phraſe, and which this Authour corrupts rendring it by the *urging*, which is ambiguous. We deny that man is compelled to acts ſupernaturall; much leſſe doe we grant compulſion to acts naturall; ſuch as are all ſinfull acts; yea too connaturall unto him, compared in Scripture to *ſweet morſells which they roule under their tongue*, as the booke of *Job* reſembles it. By all which we may judge indifferently both of this Authour's ſufficiencie and modeſty. *Auſtin* never ſaid that God predeſtinated any man to ſinne. For predeſtination with them (as hath been ſaid) was only of ſuch things as God determined to worke. Yet the ſame *Auſtin* confidently profeſſeth of thoſe things which come to paſſe by God's ſufferance (and theſe we all know to be evill things) that they come not to paſſe, unleſſe Almighty God will have them come to paſſe, *Enchirid. c. 95.*

Thus farre in anſwer to this Authour's additions to *M. Hoord's* diſcourſe, and concerning the upper and more harſh and rigorous way which *M. Hoord* left unproſecuted. *pag.* 49, there is a paſſage added, a citation out of *Peter*, but it is of the ſame nature with the reſt, & add's no ſtrength to the argument; and my anſwer ſatisfies it as well as the reſt.

P. 52. &c. Is inſerted a repreſentation, how the doctrine of our Divines fighteth with God's holineſſe.

Sect. 1.

It fighteth with God's holineſſe, and maketh him the principall cauſe of ſin in the greateſt number of men I know that the defender of it doth not thinke ſo. For the maine reaſon which moved the *Synod* of *Dort*, & ſome other Divines before and ſince, to bring downe predeſtination thus low, and begin their Reprobation after the fall, was, that they might maintaine a fatall and abſolute Reprobation of men, and yet avoid this imputation, as Doctor *Twiſſe* hath noted. But what they intended (for ought that I can ſee) they have not compaſſed. For it followeth evident enough, even from their concluſions too, that of all the ſins of reprobates, which are the greateſt number by many degrees God is the true and principall Authour. Two things they ſay which taken together, methinks, inferre it. 1. That God of his own will and pleaſure hath brought men into an eſtate, in which they cannot avoid ſinne, 2ly. That he leaveth the Reprobate irrecoverably in it. *M. Maſons Addit. p* 52. 53, 54 55. *Vindic: gratiæ* 1 *par:* 1. *cap.* 4. *initio.*

1. That God of his own will and pleaſure hath brought men into an eſtate in which they cannot poſſibly avoid ſinne; that is into the ſtate of originall ſinne, which conſiſts of two parts.

1. The guilt of *Adam's* tranſgreſſion. 2. The corruption of nature. In both theſe they ſay mankind is intereſſed, not through the force and efficiency of naturall generation, becauſe we all derive our nature from *Adam*, as our firſt principle; but by God's free and voluntary order and imputation. *It came not to paſſe by any naturall meanes* (ſaith *Calvin*) *that all men fell from ſalvation, by the fault of our firſt parent. That all men are held under the guilt of eternall death in the perſon of one man; it is the cleare and conſtant voice of Scripture. Now this cannot be aſcribed to any naturall cauſe it muſt therefore come from the wonderfull counſell of God. A little after he hath the ſame againe with a great an Emphaſis. How is it that ſo many nations with their children, ſhould be involved in the fall without remedy, but becauſe God would have it ſo.* As roundly doth Doctor *Twiſſe* affirme the ſame. *The guilt of originall ſinne is derived unto us only by imputation, the filth only by propagation, and both theſe only by God's free conſtitution.* A little before he hath theſe words; *The fault of our nature commeth from God's free appointment. For he doth not cut of any neceſſity but of his mere will only impute the ſinne of Adam to us.* To this purpoſe he ſpeaketh a great deale more in the ſame place. To theſe ſayings Saint *Bernard* hath the like ſpeaking of *Adam's* ſinne he ſaith, *Adam's ſinne is anothers, becauſe we knew not of it; and yet ours, becauſe it was through the juſt though ſecret judgment of God, reputed ours.* *Inſtit. l.* 3. *c.* 23. *Sect:* 7. *Vindic. grat. l.* 1. *par.* 1. *digr.* 4. *c.* 3. *propè finem.* *Bern: Serm.* 1. *Domi: infra oct. Epiphan.*

And this that they ſay is agreable to reaſon. For if we be fallen into the guilt of the firſt ſinne and the corruption of nature, only becauſe we were in *Adam's* loines when he ſinned, and derive our being from him, then theſe two things will follow.

1. That we ſtand guilty of all the ſins which *Adam* committed from his fall to his lives end. For we were vertually in his loines, as well after his fall as before; and in every paſſage and variation of his life he was ſtill a principle of mankind. But where doe we read that we are guilty of any other of his ſins? To the firſt ſin only doth the Scripture entitle that ſin and miſery, which entred into the world and invaded all mankind, as we may ſee, *Rom:* 5. 15. 16. 17 &c.

2. That children are guilty of the ſins of all their progenitours, eſpecially of their immediate parents. For they were in their loines when they ſinned, and more immediatly then in *Adam's*. But children are not guilty of their parents faults, nor obnoxious to their puniſhments, becauſe they are their children as we may ſee. *Exod:* 20. 5. where God ſaying that *he will viſit the ſins of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generation of them that hate him*; plainly implyeth that children are not ſimply charged with their fathers ſins but conditionally if they be haters of God, as their fathers were; if by imitating their wicked parents they become partakers of their ſins. In *Ezech* 18 14 *&c.* The Lord ſignifieth thus much in his Apology againſt the cavill of the Jewes For firſt he ſaith, that if a wicked man begetteth a ſon that ſeet. his fathers ſins, & doth not the like, he ſhall not die for the iniquity of his father. This implyeth that the derivation of being from the parent doth not render the child obnoxious to the puniſhment of the fathers ſin, nor conſequently to the ſinne. For the good child is not obnoxious, and yet the good child is equally in the fathers loines with the bad, and equally receiveth nature and being from him. And then the Lord tells them expreſly thus much in two propoſitions. *Ezek.* 18. 20.

1. Affirmatively

1. Affirmatively, *The soule that sinneth it shall die.* And that it may be known that he speaks exclusively, only the soule that sinneth shall dye; he delivers his mind.

2. Negatively, *The Son shall not beare the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father beare the iniquity of the Sonne, &c.*

Mat. 23. 32. 34. Our Saviour in that woefull speech of his to the Pharisees, *Fulfill ye also the measure of your fathers. Behold I send unto you Prophets. &c. them ye shall kill and crucifie, that on you may come all the righteous blood. &c.* Intimateth apparently, that the Pharisees were not inheritours of their fathers sins & punishments by birth; but by the commission and imitation of their fathers sins, they came to inherit both their sins and plagues. Miserable would our case be on whom the ends of the world are cõe, if children should be guilty of all their Ancestours prevarications. What a world of sins should we be to answer for, personall sins, parents, progenitours sins, to a thousand past generations? A thing with no reason to be imagined. This is the first thing

Answer. Whereas I am quoted here to give the reason which moved the Synod of Dort, and some other Divines to begin Reprobation after the fall, namely this, to avoid the imputation of making God the Authour of sinne. I doubt this Authour hath so long inured himselfe to leasings, that it is growne naturall unto him to deliver untruthes. For first I make no mention (in that fourth *Digres.* of mine in the matter of predestination) of the Synod of Dort; neither indeed were they the Objects of my thoughts in this particular. That *Digression* of mine is spent in answering the arguments of those who dispute against *Massa nondum condita*, and stand for *massa corrupta*, to be the object of election and reprobation. In the first chapter I make answer to *Mr. Elnathan Parre* in an English tract of his, wherein he deales upon this argument. In the second *chap:* I deale with others that make choice of the lower way; because it seemes to be the easiest way, which I expresse in the very words of Mr. Doctor *Abbats*, Bishop of Sarisbury ere he died, and I conceived that indeed this motive prevailed with most; and therefore I thought good so much the more throughly to discusse that. But doe I say they tooke this course to free God from the imputation of sinne? Nothing lesse; my words are these in the *Digression cap. 2. Quod plurimos movet, illud est, nimirum quòd in sententiâ illâ de massâ nondum conditâ, omnia sint, ut aiunt, intricata & perplexa, & infinitis difficultatibus involuta; in hac verò de massâ corruptâ predestinationi hominum præstruendâ contra clara sint omnia, & cum Scripturarum autoritate, judicioq; antiquitatis planissimè consentientia*; where I mention two reasons that moved them to take this way. 1. This, *in that opinion concerning the Masse of mankind not yet created, all passages are intricate, perplext, and intangled with infinite difficulties; but in the opinion concerning the Masse corrupt, all things are cleare.* 2. This, that in this other opinion, all things are most plainly found to agree both with the authority of Scriptures, and with the judgment of antiquity. Now after I had endeavoured to discover the insufficiency of this plea in the second and third chapter of that fourth *Digression* in the matter of predestination. In the fourth chapter I propose mine own judgment concerning the true benefit of this way in making the corrupt masse of mankind the object of election and reprobation; not the judgment of others, as this Authour carrieth the matter; but mine own judgment. For thus I beginne. *Ad extremum, vis liberè pronuntiem, quid unicè proficiatur ex hac nostrâ prædestinationis Objecti sententiæ temperatione. Dicam igitur quid sentiam. Hinc nimirum efficitur ut à lapsu primorum parentum, decreto prædestinationis subjiciendo & subordinando liberemur huic unicè provisum esse, ab istius quasi mediæ & temperatioris opinionis assertioribus mihi plusquam probabile, aut verisimile videtur, ne scilicet alias peccatum fieri statueretur, decernente Deo, tanquam medium ad fines à Deo, in prædestinatione sibi præstitutos accommodatum; unde etiam quàm author peccati constituendus sit, nullâ solidâ ratione explicari posse videtur. In the last place, will you give me leave freely to professe, what we profit by thus tempering our opinion touching the object of predestination? I will therefore deliver what I thinke.* So that herein I purpose mine own opinion only, not the opinion of others. *Herehence thus we gaine that we are freed from subjecting and subordinating man's fall unto God's decree of predestination. It seemes to me more then probable or likely, that the maintainers of this middle and temperate openion doe provide only against this inconvenience;* (that is their way doth indeed provide against this, and against no other inconvenience in my opinon) to wit, *least otherwise the sinne of Adam should be said to come to passe God willing it, as a meanes conducing to those ends which God intended in predestination; from whence it follows as it seemes, that it cannot be explicated by any solid reason that God is not made the Authour of sinne.* All which is delivered by me as my opinion, conceiving that others thinke so too; namely not that God is *hereby made the Authour and principall cause of sinne*; but that the contrary cannot be explicated by any solid reason. Now *Cajetan* confesseth as much, namely that in these mysteries, all the distinctions that are used, doe not *quietare intellectum, satisfie the understanding*

chap. 4.

derſtanding; and therefore *he doth captivate his owne into the obedience of faith.* And *Alvarez* juſtifies him in this, profeſſing herein that he ſpeakes *doctiſſimè & piiſſimè, moſt learned and holyly.* And in a peculiar diſputation he maintaines that the miſtery of Gods providence and predeſtination, ſtanding with the liberty of our wills, is incomprehenſible by us in this world. Laſtly, conſider, this is delivered only of the firſt ſinne of our firſt parents, which this authour perverts moſt ſhamefully, when he avoucheth that I ſhould acknowledge our Divines, many of them, to embrace this way to avoyd the imputation of making God the principall cauſe, not of *Adams* ſinne alone, but of ſinne in the greateſt number of men. And to confeſſe a truth, if ſinne be made the meanes for the procuring of the ends which God intends in predeſtination, undoubtedly God himſelfe ſhould be the authour of ſinne. For whoſoever intends any end, he, and none but he, muſt be authour in working the meanes which tend to this end. Therefore I ſaid, only that in this caſe, *It ſeemes* that the ſinne of *Adam* was intended by God as the meanes; Whereas in truth and upon due conſideration it appeares that not the creatures ſinne, but Gods permiſſion of the creatures ſinne, is the meanes whereby God brings to paſſe his glorious ends. Yet not the permiſſion of ſinne alone, but joyned together with the pardoning of it, and ſaving his elect in deſpight of it, is the compleat meanes (together with the procuring of Chriſts merits) for the manifeſtation of Gods glory in the way of mercy: And in like manner, not the permitting of ſinne alone, but joyned with the puniſhment of it, is the compleat meanes for the manifeſtation of Gods glory in the way of juſtice vindicative, which in Scripture phraſe is called, *the declaration of his wrath.* And whereas I ſaid that hereby it ſeemed that it could not by any ſound reaſon be manifeſted, that God was not the Authour of ſinne, by the firſt way, this Authour avoucheth of the defenders of the lower way which ſeemes moſt temperate, *that from their concluſions it followeth evidently, that of all the ſinnes of Reprobates, which are the greateſt number by many degrees, God is the true and principall Authour.* Obſerve, *this* (he ſayth) *followeth evidently from their concluſions*; and forthwith he tells us that he *thinks* ſo, or, to his thinking, it doth ſo. And why is he not the Authour of all the ſinnes of the elect alſo? whereas originall ſinne continues in them alſo, they carry about them *a body of death*, and have cauſe to complaine, of *a law in their members that rebelleth againſt the Law of their mind, and leadeth them captive to the law of ſinne.* Only there is a principle of ſpirituall life in them, that renewes their repentance dayly as their ſinnes are renewed; but they looke not to be freed from ſinne as long as they live in this world. But let us examine how well he makes good that which he affirmes of the ſinnes of the Reprobate, that God is made the Authour of them by our doctrine, of Reprobation. I find that *Cornelius a Lapide a Jeſuite* ſhapes *Calvines* doctrine of election and Reprobation, this lower way, and imputes unto him that from Reprobation, according to his doctrine, *in Reprobis manat certus & neceſſarius lapſus in peccata qualibet, A certaine and neceſſary falling into all manner of ſinnes, doth flow in Reprobates.* But not from theſe principles mentioned by this Authour, but rather from two other principles. The 1. that God deſtinated Reprobates to everlaſting puniſhment, as to their end; and unto ſinnes, as to the meanes thereof. The 2. is that man doth *nothing freely in negotio damnationis ſuæ; but that in all things he is driven of God, as a bowle by him that throwes it, as an hatchet by him that hewes with it, and as Clay is moved by the Potter, whom he cannot reſiſt.* This he imputes, to the defenders of Reprobation the lower way, and particularly to *Calvin.* This *Cornelius* denyes not, for ought I know, that by the juſt judgement of God, though executed according to his will and pleaſure, hath brought all men forth into the world in originall ſinne, or that any man can be recovered out of it whiles he lives in this world. And as for theſe two concluſions which he imputes to *Calvin*: as they are falſe in themſelves, ſo they are as falſely charged upon *Calvin. Hac lequendi ratio, nunquam apud me occurrit, finem creationis eſſe æternum interitum. Calvin* expreſly denyes, that God creates any man to this end, that he may damne him; Neither is ſinne any meanes whereby God brings a man to damnation, but the permiſſion of ſinne is Gods meanes, and that together with damning for ſinne, is the compleate meanes, whereby God brings to paſſe his end concern-

Rom. 9. 22.

Rom. 7.

Cornel: in Ep: ad Rom. c. 9. 18.

Calvin. de occult. Dei provid:

ning Reprobates, which is the manifeſtation of his glory in the way of vindicative juſtice, called his wrath upon thoſe Reprobates; and in the way of mercy upon his elect veſſells of mercy, whom he hath prepa-
Rom.9.22.23. red unto glory, as S. *Paul* plainely teacheth us. The other principle which he obtrudes upon *Calvin*, is as falſe, and as falſely layd to his charge. In good actions he grants the elect are ſo caryed to that which is good, as not freely. For he takes Liberty to conſiſt in an indifferency to do that which is good, or no; wherein I willingly confeſſe he is in an errour: but that reprobates do not that evill freely, which they do, is no where affirmed by *Calvin* that I know nor by any learned or ſober Divine. For albeit we all concurre in this with *Bernard*, that no naturall man hath *libertatem a peccato, liberty to keepe himſelfe from ſinne*: Yet that he is carryed into this or that particular ſinne, we all confeſſe it is done freely. And the reaſon is evident, drawen from the difference betweene gracious actions, and ſinfull actions. Every gracious action is ſupernaturall, either as touching the ſubſtance of the act, ſuch as are the acts of faith, hope, and love; or as touching the manner of performing them, ſuch as are all vertuous actions, which are not acceptable unto God, unleſſe they flow from the former principles, faith, hope, and love: Hereupon there is ſome colour, that ſuch are not performed freely; but there is no ſuch colour, as if man were not free in performing actions vitious; conſidering that all vitious actions are naturall actions, none of them ſupernaturall. And ſurely every naturall man as he hath power to performe any action naturall; ſo hath he power to abſtaine from it. But proceed we along with our preſent Authour.

1 The firſt doctrine, that he obtrudes upon us, is ſuch, that I little thought there had beene any difference betweene him and us thereabouts, conſiſting of two particulars. 1. The one, that God brings all men forth into the world in the corrupt maſſe, or in the ſtate of originall ſinne.

2 The other, that man, in the ſtate of originall ſinne or naturall corruption devoyd of the ſpirit of regeneration, is under the ſervitude of ſinne, hath no liberty from it. Now in theſe particulars I could not imagine that this Authour differed from us, unleſſe with *Pelagius* he entertaines an affection to deny originall ſinne. For if all men be borne in originall ſinne, ſeing it is God that *takes us out of our mothers wombe*, and by whom we are brought forth into this world, it cannot be denyed, I ſhould thinke, that God bringeth all men forth into the world, in originall ſinne. As for the ſecond, Doctor *Potter* confeſſeth it as the doctrine of the Church of England, that man in ſtate of nature *hath no liberty from ſinne*. It is true, this liberty he diſtinguiſheth from that liberty, which is called, *liberty from neceſſity*, which he grants to a naturall man; to whom he denyes the former, which cannot ſtand without contradiction. For if a man hath no liberty from ſinne he muſt needs ſinne. And therefore Doctor *Fulke* upon the Remiſh Teſtament doth uſually diſtinguiſh betweene liberty from ſinne, and liberty from coaction. And both *Arminius* and *Corvinus* confeſſe that by the ſinne of *Adam* all men are caſt upon a neceſſity of ſinning, though God be ready to deliver us from this neceſſity of ſinning upon reaſonable termes to be performed on mans part, which latter doctrine we utterly renounce as manifeſtly breathing the ſpirit of *Pelagius*, in a particular generally condemned in the Church of God, namely, *that grace is conferred according to works or merits*. This makes me conceive that this Authour carryeth himſelfe cunningly in the propoſition of this doctrine which he imputes unto us, and that he hath a reach more then every one is aware of. And indeed the phraſe he uſeth *of bringing men into an eſtate*, is very harſh, though applyed to *Adam* and *Eve* our firſt parents, much more applyed to their race and poſterity. For albeit *Adam* was created in a better ſtate, and afterwards brought into the ſtate of ſinne, and bondage of corruption: yet what ſiniſter judgement moved this Authour to impute this unto God, rather then to *Adam* himſelfe? what if God tooke his holy ſpirit from them upon their fall, whereupon they found themſelves naked and were aſhamed? was it not juſt with God to do ſo? Doth not M. Hord profeſſe, that it were juſt with God to damne all for originall ſinne, if he would; which doctrine was delivered by this Authour in his Lectures at Magdalen Hall, my ſelfe being an hearer, and a taker of notes from him, upon this very argument. But it may be this is to be accounted amongſt the errours of his youth, miſtaking *Bellarmine*, which now he is ſo wiſe to correct in his age. Who brings malefactors to the Gallowes,

Gallowes, is it the Judge or Sheriffe, and not their ſins rather? Yet this, though abſurd enough, ſatisfies him not, but withall he adds that God doth this of his own will and pleaſure which phraſe is prone to worke a perſwaſion in the Reader, that hereby is ſignified that God brought not man in this ſtate in the way of juſtice for his ſinne, but merely of his own will or pleaſure; But what Divine of ours was ever known to maintaine any ſuch prodigious aſſertion? Who can deny but that the Judge condemnes a malefactor unto death, & Sheriffe takes order to execute him. Now if queſtion be made why ſuch a man be hanged, will any wiſe man referre this to the *will and pleaſure of the Judge or Sheriffe*, and not rather to the malefactours deſerts? In like ſort it is God that condemnes a man, and inflicts eternall puniſhment upon him, but is there any colour to ſay that *he doth this of his will and pleaſure*, and not rather that he doth it in the way of juſtice provoked thereunto by mens ſinnes? Laſtly when it is ſaid that God brought him into the ſtate of corruption, who would not thinke that thereby were meant that God was the poſitive Authour of this corruption? whereas it is apparent that man himſelfe averted himſelfe voluntarily and freely from God, the unchangable good; and converted himſelfe unto the creature, which is but a changeable good; And God hereupon taking his Spirit from him and that moſt juſtly; left him where he found him, and that irrecoverably, ſave by the grace of regeneration. Yet this phraſe is more harſh applyed to the race & poſterity of *Adam*, in whoſe production he hath no other hand, then that which neceſſarily belongs nnto him, as the Authour of nature, namely, the quickning of them, and faſhioning of them in the wombe, and bringing them forth into the light of this world. If from a leprous Sire there ſprings a leprous fruit, ſhoud this ſeeme ſtrange? We all derive our nature from *Adam* fallen from God, and converted unto the creature, and bereaved of God's Spirit moſt juſtly for his tranſgreſſion; why ſhould it ſeeme ſtrange then, that our natures ſhould be no better then *Adam's* was after his fall? It is true the propagation of originall ſinne, hath alwaies been accounted of a myſterious nature, as touching the manner of it, and very ſtrange and odde conceits have been entertained hereabouts; Some ſaying that the ſoule is derived from the parents a ſtrange conceite even in Philoſophy not only in peculiar reference unto the ſoule reaſonable; but generally I find Philoſophers have entertained peculiar contemplations about *Datores formarum*, in a more generall way. Others have thought that the ſoule is defiled by the body, as a ſweet and ſoveraigne oyle may be corrupted by a naughty boxe; which is worſe then the former. no marvaile that a bodily thing ſhould corrupt that which is bodily; but that a body ſhould corrupt the ſoule, the one being corporall the other ſpirituall is beyond comprehenſion: Farre more probable or rather without queſtion that the ſoule rather corrupts the body. The poſitive inclination unto evill is that which hath troubled all and made ſome conceive that it could not proceed immediatly from God; For if ſo, then ſurely not *impura*, but *pura*. Others and particularly *Ariminenſis*, as I remember, that the corruption came from the breath of the ſerpent, others as Johannes Bacconius, that the ſoule though comming pure from God yet knit unto the body, the Lord for the ſinne of *Adam* gives it over to the power of Satan, who as an univerſall cauſe ſupplies the place of a particular cauſe in the poſitive corrupting of it. This at the firſt ſeemed unto me as very ſingular, ſo a very ſtrange adventure, and that *Baccorius* is a very rare School-man and more uſed in the *Arabian* philoſophy then all the reſt, ſave ſuch as were of his own profeſſion. And that I take to be the reaſon, why *Aquinas* diſcourſeth as he doth of *Intellectus Agens*, making it a faculty of the ſoule; and *Durand* diſcourſeth in ſuch ſort of that argument, as if he never underſtood the ſtate of the queſtion; which I take to proceed frō this that they were ſo little acquainted with *Averro's* philoſophy, wherein *Zabarell* was well ſeen. And I find him ſometimes congratulating his good fortunes in finding that this *Johannes Baconius* was in ſome particulars of his mind, he doth not ſay, he learnt it of him. But I know no School-Divine comparable to him for depth of philoſophicall ſpeculations; yet am I not of his mind in the point of originall ſinne. I willingly confeſſe it is one of the three points wherein ſometimes I perſwaded my ſelfe I never ſhould be ſatiſfied in this world. And that which moſt troubled me was the poſitive nature of it. Wherein *Cajetan* is thought to diſcourſe ſtrangely alſo, even to the palate of *Pontificians*; And *Aquinas* his definition of it, calling it, *Habitus corruptus*; hath coſt me no ſmall paines in the diſcuſſion thereof. At length I conceive there is no greate cauſe of ſo much pudder to be made about it, ſave that certaine prejudices which we lay for grounds doe caſt us there upon. The harmony of man's nature in all parts, expcep-

ing it's due subjection unto God, I willingly confesse was naturall, but whether it did *profluere ex principiis naturæ*, either *specificæ*, or *individualis*, or was caused and maintained while *Adam* stood in his integrity by the speciall hand of God's providence; as some School-men professe finding the difficultie of maintaining the former (which yet might be consequent naturally to it's due subjection unto God for ought I see yet to the contrary) I dispute not. But as for it's due subjection unto God in faith and love, and such a love as joyned with the contempt of it selfe; I have reason to conceive that this was not naturall, as flowing from the principles of nature either specificall or individuall, though this latter I heard somtimes maintained publiquely in the University, but rather wrought in man in his creation by vertue of supernaturall grace, and the holy Ghost's residence in him; which supernaturall grace, and holy Ghost's residence had been naturall unto all his posterity, had *Adam* continued in his integrity. I call it naturall in as much as it had descended unto all his posterity, after the manner of an inheritance naturall. But *Adam* by his transgression forfeited this blessed condition, not to himselfe only, but to all his posterity, being justly bereaved of the Spirit of God, and left by the Lord where he found him; *averted a bono incommutabili, and converted ad bonum commutabile* in an inordinate manner, which conversion to the creature is positive, and not evill in it selfe, but as it is joyned with aversion from God; & this makes it an inordinate conversion to the creature, not for Gods sake, that it is not out of the love of God to the contempt of himselfe, which is the character of a child of God but out of the love of himselfe to the contèpt of God, which is the charecter of a child of this this world. So that as originall righteousnes whereunto we are restored in part by the grace of regeneration, transcends all morall vertues; so originall sin transcends all morall vices & is found in the most vertuous amongst heathen men (of whom some have been very renowned in this kind, & great masters of their passions) as well as amongst the most vicious. And it is hard to resolve who have been greatest enimies to the truth of God and holinesse; and generally to the holy waies of God, whether the most vertuous or the most vitious among heathen men. I come to his second position, which he casts upon us, as dissenting therein from himselfe; and it is this, *That God leaves the Reprobates irrecoverably in it*. Now on this point I would gladly know his contrary Tener in what sense it proceeds, namely, That Reprobates are not left irrecoverably in originall sinne, or in such state wherein they cannot avoid sinne. For I cannot comprehend his meaning herein. But it was wont to be said of *Africa* that, *semper aliquid apportat novi*, *alwaies it brings forth some new monster in course of nature*. So men of this Authour's spirit are alwaies bringing forth some new monster in Divinity. For what thinks he? was ever any Reprobate recovered out of originall sin? Nay was ever any child of God recovered out of it while he lived upon the face of the earth? Or doth he thinke himselfe recovered out of it, or is it in his power to avoid it? Perhaps he will say though he cannot avoid sin originall, yet he can avoid sin actuall; and so not only the children of God may if they will, but even Reprobates also. But what? may they avoid all sinne, or some only? What one of our Divines denies that a Reprobate hath power to avoid fornication? We see heathens doe avoid it: Or stealth? For heathens doe so. Or murther? Even heathens have been found very morall and that generally. But this we say; All men in the state of nature, whether they doe good as touching the substance of the act; yet they doe it not in a gracious manner; Or whether they abstaine from that which is evill, they doe not abstaine from it in a gracious manner; nor can doe. Nay since the fall of *Adam*, who ever lived free from sinne, the Son of God only excepted? Doth not holy *Paul* professe of himselfe saying, *I doe not the good that I would, but the evill that I would not, that doe I. To will is present with me, but I find not to performe that which is good.* And if God may justly damne all for sinne originall as *Mr. Hoord* affirmes, why may not God leave all irrecoverably in it; and that justly? So that herein I find my selfe in a brake, nor can devise with my selfe in what tollerable or colourable sense he can affirme, that Reprobates are not left irrecoverably in the state of originall sinne; or in such a state, in which *they cannot avoid sinne*; I say in what sense he can deliver this different from us, I cannot devise. For we willingly grant that there is no particular actuall sinne from which a Reprobate hath not power to abstaine, though he cannot abstaine from it in a gracious manner without grace, and that grace we account the grace of regeneration; which is a supernaturall principle of gracious actions, both as touching faith in God, and the love of God, to the contempt of our selves. Now I guesse his meaning is, that no Reprobate is so left and abandoned in originall sinne, but that God gives him grace to believe if he will, to repent if he will, to love God if he will, & that a-

bove

bove all things. I gueſſe, I ſay, that this is his meaning; but I would have him expreſſe it, that I might ſee it under his hand. For till then I find noe apparent difference between him & us, as touching theſe two principles from whence he deduceth, that God is thereby made *The principall cauſe of ſin in the greateſt number of men.* And if once he deliver himſelfe fairely, and comes to this, the iſſue of the queſtion to be debated between us will be faire and cleare; namely about this their univerſall grace, *whether all men elect and Reprobate by vertue of ſupernaturall grace given unto them, have power to beleive if they will, repent if they will.* And againſt this I will diſpute after this manner. Firſt in all this there is no difference between us excepting that this power is ſaid to be *wrought in man by ſupernaturall grace.* For we ſay with *Auſtin Deo credere, & ab amore temporalium ad divina præcepta ſervanda ſe convertere, omnes poſſunt ſi velint.* *All men can believe God, if they will; and from the love of temporall things convert themſelves to the keeping of God's commandements if they will.* For all the moment of inclining a man to workes of morallity lyeth in the will of man. And therefore marke what followes in *Auſtin*, *Sed præparatur voluntas à Domino* (*ſupple ut velit*) *tantumq́ augetur munere charitatis ut poſſit.* *But the will is prepard by the Lord (to wit to make it willing) and ſo much augmented by the gift of charity as to make it able.* And I prove, that looke what I ſupply is according unto *Auſtin* interpreting that of the Apoſtle, *neq́ volentis, neq́ currentis, ſed miſerentis Dei; it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth but of God that ſheweth mercy.* For he ſhewes; that the whole *both to will and run*, is to be aſcribed unto God, *qui hominis voluntatem bonam & præparat adjuvandam, & adjuvat præparatam; who both prepares the good will of man that after he may helpe it, and helpes it being once prepared*; where plainly man's *willing* that, which is good, is made the fruit of God's *preparing* it; but becauſe there is in man a will of the fleſh, reſiſting this will of the ſpirit; therefore there is need not of grace preparing only, but of grace adjuvant and helping alſo, to enable it to doe what it hath a will unto, whence immediatly followeth, running as well as willing. And theſe two graces *præparant*, and *adjuvant*, are afterward called by the names of grace *prevenient*, and *ſubſequent*, thus; *Nolentem prævenit ut velit, volentem ſubſequitur ne fruſtra velit.* *Him that is unwilling the Lord preventeth to make him willing, and willing he followeth him that he may not will in vaine.* And that this double grace is required by reaſon of the reluctancy between the fleſh and the Spirit, I prove out of the ſame *Auſtin* writing thus, *Prima gratiâ eſt, quâ fit ut habeat homo juſtitiam ſi velit; ſecunda ergo plus poteſt, quâ etiam fit ut velit, & tantum velit tantoq́ ardore diligat, ut carnis voluntatem contraria concupiſcentem voluntate ſpiritus vincat.* *The firſt grace is that whereby it comes to paſſe that a man is righteous if he will; The ſecond grace therefore is of more power, whereby it comes to paſſe alſo that a man doth will, and that ſo reſolutely, and with ſuch fervency loveth* (compare this with that of *Auſtin de Gen: contra Manich: lib.* 1, *cap:* 3.) *that by the will of the Spirit, he overcommeth the will of the fleſh fighting againſt it.* So that a power to doe good if a man will is one thing; to will that which is good is another thing, and laſtly to be able to doe that which it wills is a third thing; yet both theſe two laſt are comprehended under *ſic velle*, which *Auſtin* calls *tantum augeri munere charitatis, to have the gift of charity ſo much increaſed in him*, as thus; *Tantum Spiritu ſancto accenditur voluntas eorum ut ideo poſſint, quia ſic velint, ideo ſic velint, quia Deus ſic operatur, ut velint.* *The will of God's children is ſo inflãed by the HolyGhoſt, that therefore they are able to do good, becauſe they have a will to it in ſuch a manner* (that is with ſuch fervency and eagernes) *therefore they have a will to it in ſuch a manner, becauſe God ſo workes, as to make them willing*; to wit, in ſuch a manner. Secondly we ſay that to believe if a man will, to repent if he will is to be accounted nature, rather then grace, which I prove thus. Supernaturall grace is not inferiour to a morall vertue, but a morall vertue doth more then leave a man indifferent to doe vertuouſly if he will; For it inclines the will to vertuous courſes only, and not vitious; Like as vice inclines the will only to vicious courſes, and not to vertuous; how much more doth ſupernaturall grace not leave a man indifferent to doe good if he will; but inclines the will only to ſuch things as are pleaſing unto God, and not to things diſpleaſing unto him. Againe to have power to believe if we will, is to have power to have faith if we will; But this *Auſtin* hath expreſſely profeſſed to belong to the nature of man, in diſtinctiõ frõ the grace of the faithfull. *Poſſe fidẽ habere, ſicut poſſe charitatẽ habere naturæ eſt hominũ; fidẽ habere, ſicut charitatẽ habere, gratiæ eſt fideliũ.* *The nature of man makes him to have power, to have faith, to have charity; but the grace of the faithfull makes a man to have faith, to have charity.* It may be objected out of the former place taken out of *Auſt: de Cor: & grat: c.* 11, that *habere juſtitiam ſi velit*, is, *gratia prima; to be righteous if he will is the firſt grace.*

Auſt de Gen: cont Manich: l. 1, *c.* 3.

Enchirid. c. 32.

Auſt: de cor: rep: & grat: c. 11.

ibid. cap. 12.

Auſt: de præ. deſt: Sanct: cap. 5.

I answer, *Austin* there speakes of the grace that *Adam* had before his fall, which was this, *posse si velit to abstaine from eating the forbidden fruit.* And this first grace is called grace in this respect, that there was in *Adam* no flesh lusting against the Spirit; So that if *Adam* had but a will to abstaine, he should have no cause to complaine as Saint *Paul* doth, *To will is present with me, but I find no meanes to performe that which is good;* Now such a *posse si velit* is not found in any man now a daies, no not in the regenerate. But all men that have a will to doe good by the grace of God, have withall a *posse secundum quid, a power in part, a weake power*; but this is not sufficient to denominate them simply able to doe that which is good; unlesse the love of God be increased in them, so as to overcome the will of the flesh lusting against the spirit, as I have represented *Austin* thus expounding it. Thirdly whether tends this, that all men have power to believe if they will, to repent if they will? But to maintaine that faith and repentance are not the gifts of God, bestowed of his free grace on whom he will; but that they are the workes of man's free will, directly contradictory to the word of God expresly professing that *faith is the gift of God, and that not of our selves.* So repentance is the gift of God; yea that it is God who worketh in us that which is *pleasing in his sight through Jesus Christ.* *Heb*: 13 21. *Yea both the will and the deed, and that of his good pleasure.* 4ly. If all reprobates have power to believe and repent if they will, and so consequently to persevere if they will; how comes it to passe that not one of them doth believe, repent, and persevere; seeing it is confest among Philosophers that such contingents as depend upon the free will of man, are equally propendent on either side to passe as often one way, as the other. But proceed we along with this Authour.

Eph: 28. *Act*: 5. & 11. 18. *2 Tim*: 2. *last*, *Phil*. 3. 13.

1. Here he grants expresly that the state he speakes of is the state of originall sin; in which state we acknowledge that man hath not *libertatem à peccato, freedome from sinne.* And Doctor *Potter* towards the end of his answer to *Charity mistaken* confesseth it to be the doctrine of the Church of England. Yet doe not we say, but that it is in the power of any man to abstaine from any particular sinne, it being but a naturall act, and a man hath free power to performe any naturall act or to abstaine from it; so farre forth as to become very vertuous, as much as any man among the heathen, many of whom have been renowned for vertuous conversation. *Calvin* in the passages here alleadged hath nothing concerning, either the guilt of *Adam's* transgression passing upon his posterity, or the corruption derived therehence unto them; but only of their *falling from eternall salvation* in the one; that *all are enthralled to eternall death* in the other; And that *Adam's* fall hath enwrapped all in eternall death in the third. My passages quoted, and related out of my *Vindiciæ* are more to the purpose: I say indeed the guilt of *Adam's* transgression is derived unto us, that is to our persons by imputation; but that very sinne of *Adam* was the sin of our natures, as *Austin* speaks. *Non modo natura facta est peccatrix, sed & genuit peccatores. Not only our humane nature became a sinner, but also begat sinners.* And accordingly it is justly imputed unto our persons, otherwise how could it be just with God to condemne any man for originall sinne; which yet is expresly acknowledged by *Mr. Hoord.* And the Apostle saith expresly, that in *Adam* all have sinned. And *Austin* gives the reason of it. *De Adamo omnes peccatum originale trahunt, quia omnes unus fuerunt. All draw originall sinne from Adam, because all were that one.* So that I have noe cause to doubt but this Authour is of the same opinion untill I find him to avouch the contrary; and so much the rather because he finds it is the opinion of *Bernard* also. And that the corruption consequent is derived to us only by propagation, I thinke it is without doubt amongst all, who concurre not with *Pelagius* in maintaining that it is derived unto us by imitation, and so only. Yet notwithstanding it cannot be denied, but that God might have caused the punishment of *Adam's* sinne to rest upon himselfe only, and immediately destroyed him and created another, and propagated mankind from him. Yea supposing his ordinance of propagating mankind from him, yet God of his mercy might have derived others from him of his mere grace indued with the holy Ghost, if it had pleased him; like as whom he justly damnes for sinne, he might have caused them to have lived one yeare or more longer, and in that time bestowed the spirit of grace upon them to break off their sins by repentance, and from grace translated into glory. As for the reasons here mentioned by *Mr. Mason* to justifie that which my selfe and others have delivered on the former point, I have noe cause to justifie, because they proceed from a false ground, supposing that the reason of this imputation of *Adam's* sinne, and propagation of his corruption unto all his posterity, is *merely* built upon this foundation that we were in *Adam's* loynes when he sinned, which is untrue.

August: de nuptiis c. 34.

1 In his firſt reaſon he doth miſerably overlaſh; for we could not be guilty of all the ſinnes which were committed by *Adam* from his fall to his lifes end, no not upon the ground whereon this Authour builds; ſo long we were not in his loynes, nor any longer then till he begat *Seth*; for from *Seth* ſprang *Noah*, and we all from him. Neither is it credible that *Adam* continued to beget children till the laſt yeare, and month, and day of his life. Indeed we no where read that we are guilty of any other of his ſinnes, beſides the firſt; The reaſon whereof ſhall be given in the next place.

2 Therefore I ſay, in anſwer unto them both, that the ground of imputing *Adams* ſinne unto his poſterity, is not onely becauſe we were in *Adams* loynes, but becauſe the firſt ſinne of *Adam* was it, that bereaved his nature of Gods image; and ſo brought corruption upon himſelfe by *an averſion from the Creator and unchangable good, and converſion unto the Creature*, wherein the Lord left him, bereaving him of his ſpirit; and this nature, by this ſinne alone ſo corrupt, is the fountaine of all our natures: Like as if *Adam* had ſtood, of the ſame fountaine of integrity we had all received incorrupt natures: ſo that the like cannot be ſaid of any other ſinne of *Adam* afterwards committed by him, nor of the ſinne of any other our progenitours ſucceding him. For as for the wicked, they have no ſuch ſpirit of God to looſe; And as for the Godly, they have indeed the ſpirit of God, but ſo as not to be taken from them by the ſinnes committed by them, any more then it was from *David* upon the committing of ſo foule ſinnes in the matter of *Uriah*; neither do any Godly parents propagate their ſtate of grace to their poſterity. And *Aquinas* is ſo bold hereupon as to profeſſe, that, *Impoſſibile eſt, quod aliqua peccata parentum proximorum, vel etiam primi parentis præter primum, per originem traducantur.* *It is impoſſible that the ſinnes of our immediate parents, or of our firſt parents, beſides the firſt, ſhould be derived unto poſterity by propagation. For, ſayth he, a man generates the ſame with himſelfe in kinde only; not in individuall. And therefore thoſe things, which pertaine to him as a particular perſon, as acts perſonall, he doth not propagate unto his children. Now to the nature of man, ſomthing may pertain naturally, ſomthing by the gift of grace. And this originall righteouſneſſe as a gift of grace was beſtowed on the whole nature of mankind in our firſt parents, which* Adam *loſt by his firſt ſinne; ſo that like as originall righteouſneſſe had beene propagated to poſterity together with the humane nature, ſo alſo the oppoſite inordination. But as for other actuall ſinnes, either of our firſt parents, or of others, they do not corrupt the nature of man*, as touching that which pertaines to nature, but as touching that which pertaines to his perſon; therefore other ſinnes are not propagated unto poſterity. And this reaſon which *Aquinas* gives, was long before given by *Anſelme*, *De conceptu virginali & originali peccato, cap.* 23. 1. 2. q. 81. art. 2. in corp.

Section. 2.

2 They ſay that God hath immutably decreed to leave the farre greateſt part of mankind in this impotent condition irrecoverablely, and to afford them no power and ability ſufficient to make them riſe out of ſinne to newneſſe of life; and this decree he executeth in time: and both theſe he doth out of his only will and pleaſure. *M. Maſon Addit. p. 55. 56, 57.*

Of this propoſition there be three branches { 1. God decreeth to leave them. 2. He doth leave them. 3. He doth both out of his alone pleaſure.

1 God, ſay they, hath decreed to leave them without ſufficient grace, and conſequently under an everlaſting neceſſity of ſinning. This is the very Helen which they fight for, the maine act of that abſolute reprobation, which with joynt conſent and endeavour they labour to maintaine.

Moſt of them caſt their reprobation into two acts; *A negative*, which is a peremptory denyall of grace and glory to ſome men lying in the fall; And a *Poſitive* which they ſay is a preordination of the men thus left, to the eternall torments of hell.

Others among them define Reprobation by an act meerely negative, and call it (*Non electionem, decretum quo ſtatuit non eo uſque miſereri.*) Thus our Divines in their ſuffrage define; and in their explication of the Definition which they give, they ſay that the proper acts of reprobation, as it ſtandeth oppoſed to election, are no other then a denyall of that ſame glory and grace, which are prepared in the decree of election for the ſonnes of God. But in this they all agree, that by the decree of reprobation, grace neceſſary for the avoyding of ſinne, is finally denyed to reprobates. And if at any time we heare them ſay, that God hath gratified Reprobates with ſome grace, (For ſo ſayth *Walæus*, reprobates are left, *under the common providence of God*, and conſequently under ſome common endowments. And our Divines in the *Synod* ſay, *Reprobates though they are not elected, yet receive many of Gods graces*;) they are to be underſtood of ſuch Graces and gifts as are inſufficient to make them avoyd ſinne, as we may ſee in theſe two cited places, and many more. Suffr: Brit: art: 1. de Repr: Theſ. 1. Walæ: Defenſ: Anat: Armin: c. de Repr. Suffr: Brit: theſ: 4. de Reprob.

2 God doth actually, according to his eternall and unchangeable decree, leave the Reprobates in their ſeverall times and generations without his grace, under a neceſſity of finall ſinne and impenitency.

This is the ſecond branch of that ſecond propoſition. And this they muſt needs ſay; For Gods decrees cannot be fruſtrated; what he purpoſed before time, without faile he doth in time. I ſhall not need therefore

fore to prove, that they ſay ſo; Nevertheleſſe to let it be ſeene how poſitively and Categorically they ſay ſo, I will give an inſtance or two. The Divines of *Geneva* at the *Synod*, among their Theſes of Reprobation, have this for one, *Thoſe whom God hath reprobated, out of the ſame will by which he hath rejected them either be calleth not at all, or being called he renewеth not throughly by the ſpirit of regeneration, ingrafteth not into Chriſt myſtically, nor juſtifieth &c.* Like to this is the ſpeech of Lubbert, who ſpeaking of reprobates ſayth; *To them either he revealeth not the way of ſalvation, or giveth not faith and regeneration; but leaveth them in ſinne and miſery.* The ſame authour ſpeaking againſt the poſition of the Remonſtrants (viz: *That God doth ſupply to all men ſufficient and neceſſary meanes of ſalvation, with an intention of ſaving them*) ſetteth downe this *Antitheſis*, *God doth not adminiſter to all men meanes needfull and ſufficient to ſalvation, and that with an intention of ſaving them.* And to this his *Antitheſis Polyander*, *Walaus*, and *Thyſeus* three other profeſſours of Divinity in the Lowcountryes did ſet their hands.

Act: Syn: Suffrag: Gener: de Reprob:

Act: Syn: Suffr. Lubbert de Reprob.

Anſwer. It is a uſuall courſe with this Authour to lay unto our charge, that God hath immutably decreed this or that; So that if we had ſaid that all this were decreed by God not immutably, but mutably, we ſhould not incurre the danger of his diſpleaſure ſo immutably, and unavoydably as we do. Now to decree not immutably, but mutably, is a phraſe that I no where meet with, but among men of this Authours ſpirit; the congruity whereof I willingly profeſſe, is ſo farre from mine underſtanding, as no phraſe more. If they would in the name of common ſenſe expound themſelves unto us, then we ſhould ſoone conſider what Anſwer we are to give in. We willingly profeſſe, that all Gods decrees are unchangeable, but of decreeing a thing unchangeably, not any of our Divines diſcourſe, that I know of. We ſay that God decreeth ſome things to come to paſſe neceſſarily, and ſome things to come to paſſe contingently; ſo doth *Aquinas*: and we underſtand his language right well, and approve his doctrine in this particular. We willingly confeſſe that as God hath choſen ſome, whom he meanes to deliver from that bondage of ſinne, and *Satan*, whereinto all are caſt by the tranſgreſſion of *Adam*. And how to deliver them? Surely by beſtowing the ſpirit of grace, and regeneration upon them, ſo to open their eyes and bring them out of darkeneſſe into light, and from the power of *Satan* unto God; In few words by beſtowing faith and repentance upon them. All others he hath from everlaſting determined not to ſhew the like grace and favour unto. For we ſee by experience that to many he gives not faith and repentance. And looke how he carryeth himſelfe towards any perſons in time, after the ſame manner he determined to carry himſelfe from everlaſting. And the Scripture expreſly tels us that even of them that are called, but few are choſen; and conſequently the number of reprobates muſt needs be farre greater, then the number of the elect. Now as many as God hath decreed to deny faith and repentance unto, we hold it impoſſibile for them, upon this ſuppoſition, to be recovered out of the bondage of ſinne and *Satan*; becauſe the Scripture in divers places expreſly tells us, that faith is the gift of God, repentance is the gift of God; and therefore to whomſoever he will not be ſo gracious, as to give faith, and repentance, we judge it a thing impoſſible upon this ſuppoſition, that any of them ſhould believe, ſhould repent. And more then this, as touching every particular here delivered, we account it ſo apparently, teſtified in holy Scripture, that we wonder not a little with what face this Authour can deny it. Nay, we verily believe that he belives all theſe as well as we. And the true point of Subſtantiall difference betweene us is conceled by him all along, which is an argument of no ingenuity; but yet I beare with him in following *Lyſanders* counſel, when the Lyons skin will not hold out, to peece it out with a fox skin; leaſt otherwiſe his *Pelagian* tenet would be diſcovered in a moſt palpable and groſſe manner. For undoubtedly he believes that faith is the gift of God; as alſo that it is impoſſible, that they ſhould believe, to whom God will not give faith. But his tenet is, that God is ready and willing to give faith to all, not abſolutely, but conditionally; to wit, in caſe they make themſelves fit for it, by performing ſomewhat on their parts. Now this is as good as in expreſſe termes to profeſſe, that *Grace is conferred according to merits, or according unto workes:* For betweene works and merits in this controverſy there is no difference, as *Bellarmine* acknowledgeth; And in the Epiſtle of Proſper to *Auſtin* they are taken promiſcuouſly, as of the ſame force and ſignification. Now this doctrine is expreſly contradictory to the word of God. *God hath ſaved us and called us with an holy calling not according to our owne workes but according to his owne purpoſe and grace.* The like we have, *Tit.* 3. 5. And in like manner this doctrine hath beene condemned in the Church of God, as the ſowre leaven of *Pelagianiſme*, from the *Synod* of *Paleſtine* above 1200 yeares agoe all along; and *Pelagius* himſelfe was driven to ſubſcribe to the *Canons* of that *Synod* of *Paleſtine*, wherein *Anathema* was pronounced upon them, that do, or ſhall maintaine, that *Grace is conferred according unto Workes.*

2. Tim. 1. 9.

1. If

If God hath decreed not to bestow faith upon a man, if he hath not decreed to bestow upon him the gift of charity, it is impossible, that any worke can be done by such a one proceeding from faith and love, and consequently such a one hath *no liberty from sinne*, and that no such liberty is found in a naturall man, in an unregenerate, is the doctrine of our Church by D. *Potters* confession, a Cathedrall Divine, I do not say by the constant doctrine of D. *Fulke* in his answer to the Rhemish Testament, and if no liberty from sinne be found in such a one, it followes that such a one remaines under a necessity of sinning, not that every sinne, whether of lying, stealing, whoring, murther, or in any other kind is necessarily committed by him; For a naturall man may be as morall as any heathen hath beene, many of whom have beene very famous and renowned in the world for their morality; But whether they are exercised in vertuous actions, or in abstaining from actions vicious, yet still they sinne, forasmuch as they neither performe the one, nor abstaine from the other in a gracious manner, out of faith and love. And therefore *Austin* was somewhere bold to stile them *Splendida peccata glorious sinnes*. For *novimus non officiis sed finibus discernendas esse virtutes, Vertues are to be discerned not by their offices, but by their ends*. The *Helen* we fight for is nothing but the word of God, and the truth manifestly contained therein; namely concerning the prerogative of his grace, as effectuall to every good worke, and most freely given to some and denyed to others, not according to mens workes, according to that of S. *Paul God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will, he hardneth*. This is a part of Gods soveraignty; And it stands all true subjects upon to maintaine the lawfull Soveraignty of their Princes; how much more doth it become the creature to stand for the lawfull prerogative and Soveraignty of his Creator, especially when he proceeds herein according to the tenour of Gods word, cleare reason and the unanimous consent of all the orthodoxe in the Church of God clearely opposing *Pelagius* herein from the *Synod* of *Palestine* 1200. yeares agoe to this day.

The difference of opinions here feigned by him about the point of Reprobation, amongst our Divines is like the feigning of a knot in a bulrush. For what is a peremptory denying of grace and glory to some men lying in the fall, other then a denyall of that grace and glory, which is prepared in *the decree of election to the sonnes of God*, though indeed neither of them make it a denyall, which is done in time, but rather Gods decree to deny it. For do not the latter Divines maintaine it to be peremptory, as well as the former? For what difference doth he devise between a flat denyall, and a peremptory denyall; and as for the latter decree belonging to reprobation here mentioned, namely *a preordination of the man thus left to the torments of hell*, do not the latter Divines acknowledge this decree to belong to Reprobation also? Only they professe that *God preordaines none to eternall torments in hell but for their sinnes actuall* as well as originall, of as many as live to ripenesse of age. Now I would faine know what Divine of ours maintaines the contrary.

1. Our Divines, in saying, Reprobation is, *Decretum quo statuit non misereri* do manifest, that not denying grace, but the decree of denying it, is Reprobation. *Walæus* speaketh of no common endowments, though that be a truth, which here is attributed unto them; else how should they be called common endowments.

2. If he decrees to leave Reprobates without grace, and consequently under that necessity of sinning into which all are cast by the sinne of *Adam*; it is nothing strange, I thinke that God should accordingly leave them therein; though in a different manner, the Lord prostituting some to their own lust's and to the power of *Satan*, more then others, and making some even by the ministery of the Gospell, *proficere ad exteriorem vitæ emendationem, quo mitius puniantur*; as *Austin* some where speaketh. If Gods decree cannot be frustrated, as here is avouched; I wonder he should charge us with teaching, that *God decreeth this, or that immutably*. For if he should change any of his decrees, they should undoubtedly be frustrated. Indeed we do not say, that God decrees Hypothetically to give grace, to wit upon condition, that men will make themselves fit for it, and for failing herein, to deny them grace. And I am very glad to observe so good correspondence in the suffrages of Protestant Divines in the *Synod* of *Dort*, and our English also with them. *M. Mason Addit. p. 57. & 58. 59.*

Sect. 3.

3. God both decreeth and executeth the leaving of men to themselves, of his alone absolute will and pleasure. This is the third branch *Suffr. Brit. art. 1. de Repr. explic. thes. 1. Orthodox*

1 That they lay for witnesse the suffrage of our English Divines. *We affirme that 't is non election is founded in the most free pleasure of God. And that no man lying in the fall is past over by the meere will of God*, is numbred by the same Divines among the heterodox positions; To this purpose also speake The *Palatinate* Ministers. The cause of Reprobation is the most free and just will of God. *Ibid. thes. 3. heterodox. Act. Synod. Palat. thes. 3. Ibid. thes. 4.*

That God paſſeth over ſome and denyeth them the grace of the Goſpell, the cauſe is the ſame free pleaſure of God.

Iudic Theol. Haſſiac. Thus the Divines of *Heſſen; God decreed to leave ſome in the full, of his own good pleaſure;* The proofe of this they fetch from the execution of this decree in time. *God doth in time leave ſome of mankind fallen, and doth not beſtow upon them meanes neceſſary to beleive &c. and this out of his moſt free pleaſure;* This they joyntly affirme and prove it by this reaſon eſpecially, All men, were lookt on as ſinners. If ſinne therefore were the cauſe, that moved God to reprobate, he ſhould have reprobated or rejected all; But he did not Reprobate all; therefore for ſinne he reprobated none, but for his owne pleaſure, in which we muſt reſt without ſeeking any other cauſe.

1. Now from theſe two things layd together, viz. 1. That God did bring men into a neceſſity of ſinning.

2. That he hath left the Reprobates under this neceſſity, it will follow that he is the Authour of the reprobates ſinnes.

1. Becauſe (*Cauſa cauſæ eſt cauſa cauſati*) *the Cauſe of a cauſe is the cauſe of its effect* (if there be a neceſſary ſubordination betweene the cauſes and the effect) whether it be a cauſe by acts negative, or poſitive. But God is the cheife or ſole cauſe (by their doctrine) of that, which is the neceſſary and immediate cauſe of the ſinnes of reprobates, namely their impotency and want of ſupernaturall grace; therefore he is (by the ſame doctrine) the true and proper cauſe of their ſinnes.

2. Becauſe *Removens prohibens, &c;* that which withdraweth and withholdeth a thing, which being preſent would hinder an event, is the cauſe of that event. As for example he that cutteth a ſtring in which a ſtone hangs, is the cauſe of the falling of that ſtone; And he that withdraweth a pillar which being put to uphold a houſe; is the true cauſe in mens account of the falling of that houſe. But God by their opinion withholdeth from reprobates that power, which being granted them, might keep thē from falling into ſinne: therefore he becometh a true morall cauſe of their ſinnes, *In whoſe power it is that a thing be not done, to him it is imputed, when it is done,* ſayth *Tertullian, In cuius manu eſt quid ne fiat, ei deputatur, cum iam fit.*

Tertul: l. 1. contr. Maccion. c. 22. It will not ſuffice to ſay that God by withholding grace from reprobates becometh only an *accidentall*, not a proper and direct cauſe of their ſinnes. For a cauſe is then only accidentall in relation to the effect, when the effect is beſide the intention and expectation of the cauſe. For example; Digging in a feild is then an accidentall cauſe of the finding a bag of gold, when that event is neither expected nor intended by the husbandman in digging; But when the event is lookt for, and aymed at, then the cauſe (though it be the cauſe only by withholding the impediment) is not accidentall. As a *Pilot* who withholdeth his care and skill from a ſhip in a ſtorme; foreſeeing that by his neglect the ſhip will be drowned; is not to be reputed an accidentall, but a direct, and proper cauſe of the loſſe of this ſhip. This being ſo it followeth that God by this act and decree of removing and detaining grace neceſſary to the avoyding of ſinne, from reprobates, not as one ignorant and careleſſe what will or ſhall follow, but knowing infallibly what miſcheife will follow, and determining preciſely that which doth follow, viz: their impenitency and damnation, becomes the proper and direct cauſe of their ſinnes.

Anſwer. That God of his meere pleaſure ſheweth mercy on ſome, and hardeneth others is the expreſſe word of God. *Therefore he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth.* Now to ſhew mercy is to give the grace of faith and obedience, as appeares by the oppoſition of it to obduration, which is ſuch as whereupon followeth diſobedience; as appeares by the objection following hereupon; *Thou wilt ſay then why doth he yet cōplaine, For who hath reſiſted his will?* Now God complaineth of nothing but diſobedience. Againe

Ro. 11. 30. to give faith, is to ſhew mercy. For to have faith is to obtaine mercy. *Heretofore ye have not believed, but now have obtained mercy through their unbeliefe.* Where to believe & to obtaine mercy are made equipollent, & of the ſame ſignification. And in reaſon, if God did deny faith, becauſe of ſome unpreparedneſſe in the creature, then God did expect that the creature ſhould firſt prepare himſelfe, and make himſelfe fit for faith, that ſo God might beſtow it upon him; & ſo grace ſhould be conferr'd according to workes; which is contradictious to expreſſe teſtimony of holy ſcripture, teſtifying that *God hath ſaved us & called us with an holy calling, not according to our workes but according to his owne purpoſe and grace;* & all along hath beene condēned in the Church of God for *Pelagianiſme.* Thus we have beene entertained with a diſcourſe containing nothing, but the opinion of our Divines, which none of us deny: Yet in the propoſing hereof he hath waſted a whole leafe and more Now he comes to his argument drawen from theſe two layd together.

1. *That God did bring men into a neceſſity of ſinning.*

2. *That he hath left the reprobates under this neceſſity.* Hence he concludes that God is the Author of the reprobates ſins; But this we utterly deny. Therefore this he undertakes to prove by two reaſons.

1. *Becauſe the cauſe of the cauſe is the cauſe of its effect, if there be a neceſſary ſubordination betweene the cauſes and the effect. But God is the cheife or ſole cauſe (by their doctrine) of that which is the neceſſary and immediate cauſe of the ſinnes of Reprobates, namely their impotency and want of ſupernaturall grace.* For anſwer whereunto I ſay, firſt begining with the minor. 1. That the want of ſupernaturall grace is not the immediate cauſe of the ſinnes of Reprobates, nor the cheife cauſe; much leſſe the ſole cauſe. And I prove it evidently. Let inſtance be given in any ſinne committed by a Reprobate; let it be the ſinne of murther, or of fornication, or of theft, or of lying! For if it were, then every reprobate ſhould be guilty of murther, of fornication, of lying, of ſtealing

ling For, *poſitâ cauſâ principali & immediatâ ponitur effectus*; Where a principall and immediate cauſe doth exiſt, there the effect muſt needs exiſt. But it is apparent, that albeit every reprobate doth want ſupernaturall grace, yet every reprobate is not guilty of murther, of fornication, lying, and ſtealing. Secondly, If the want of ſupernaturall grace were the immediate and principall cauſe of all the ſinnes of reprobates; then not only every Reprobate ſhould be guilty of committing all the ſinnes formerly mentioned; but at all times every one of theſe ſinnes ſhould be committed by them; Becauſe at all times they want ſupernaturall grace. And the truth is, every one of theſe ſinnes may be abſtained from without ſupernaturall grace, and for carnall reſpects: Only without ſupernaturall grace they cannot be abſtained from, in a gracious manner; as namely out of faith in God, and love to God. He that hath neither faith nor love cannot abſtaine from theſe vile courſes out of faith and love. In like ſort, heathen men in their generations have beene exceeding vertuous, according to the worlds account of vertue, in moderating their paſſions, and ordering their converſation aright one towards another; and all this hath beene performed by them without ſupernaturall grace. Thirdly, The immediate cauſe of all their ſinnes rather of the two, is their naturall corruption, whereby they are habitually turned away from God; and converted unto the creature in an inordinate manner. Like as the immediate cauſe *actionis læſæ, of a naturall function of the body imperfect*, is the diſeaſe or infirmity that hath ſeiſed upon ſome part of the body; And the Phyſitian who is able to cure it, and will not; is the cauſe why it continueth uncured: But no wiſe man will ſay, he is the cauſe why this or that member in a ſicke mans body doth not performe its operation as it ſhould. In like manner as touching the vicious actions of the ſoule, the want of ſupernaturall grace is the cauſe, why thoſe vicious actions continue uncured, becauſe God alone by his grace can cure them; but no ſober man that is well in his wits, ſhould ſay that is the cauſe of vicious actions; but acknowledge rather the corruption thereof to be the cauſe of theſe vicious actions. And indeed all morall philoſophy referres the cauſe of every vicious action, unto the vicious habit depraving the will, and inclining it to vicious courſes. Fourthly, Yet farther to repreſent the wildneſſe of this Authours diſcourſe. The vicious habit it ſelfe is not the ſole cauſe; no nor the principall and immediate cauſe of a vicious action in particular. For if it were, then that particular vicious action ſhould alwayes be committed by it; So that an impure perſon ſhould alwayes commit fornication; a Lyar ſhould alwayes lye; a Theife ſhould alwayes ſteale; a Murtherer ſhould alwayes commit murther. For it is a rule generally received, that *the immediate and principall cauſe being exiſtent, the effect muſt needs exiſt alſo.* And indeed albeit, *habits*, whether good or evill, *do worke after the manner of nature inclining and ſwaying the will to the accompliſhment of them*; Yet the will of man being a free, and not neceſſary Agent, proceeds not to worke, but according unto judgement and occaſions and opportunityes from without. And albeit a purſer that maintaine himſelfe by robbery hath a faire opportunity offered him to advantage himſelfe to take a purſe; yet if upon conſideration he finds himſelfe too weake to goe through with it, or that he cannot do it ſafely, he will forbeare. For albeit a vicious habit doth naturally, and neceſſarily incline him to a naughty end, yet in the choice of the meanes conducing to this end, he is free. How much more plainely doth it appeare, that the want of ſupernaturall grace is farre off from being either the ſole cauſe, or the immediate, or the principall cauſe of any ſinne committed by a Reprobate. Rather of the two the inteſtine corruption of the Reprobate is the cauſe of his ſinnes, and the want of grace is the cauſe why this corruption is not cured. Now albeit a Phyſitian may ſinne in not curing a ſicke perſon, when it lyes in his power to cure him: For we are in charity bound to do to others, as we would have others do unto us; yet God is bound to none, *I will ſhew mercy on whom I will ſhew mercy, and I will have compaſſion on whom I will have compaſſion.* Exod. 33.19.

2. Obſerve how ſluttiſhly he carryeth himſelfe in the next reaſon taken from *removens prohibens. His rule proceeds both of withdrawing and withholding a thing which being preſent would hinder an event.* But he gives inſtance only in withdrawing, as *in cutting a ſtring wherein a ſtone hangs*; which who ſo doth, is the cauſe of the falling of the ſtone; And in withdrawing a pillar upholding an houſe, which who ſo doth, is the cauſe of the fall of that houſe: which is moſt true in naturall things, yet not the immediate cauſe, that is to be referred to the nature of the ſtone, and houſe, which being heavy things do naturally move downwards. But this Authour contents not himſelfe with conforming the condition of Agents voluntary to the conditions of Agents naturall and neceſſary; but changeth his termes alſo, and puts the phraſe of withdrawing,

drawing, into the place of the former phraſe, which was withholding. Now it is true God withholds that grace from Reprobates, which he gives to his Elect; but he withdrawes and takes no inward grace from them. Yet this phraſe of withholding is very improper; For it ſignifies a forcible reſtraint of that which was going; Whereas God being Maſter of his owne grace, gives it to whom he will, and denyes it to whom he will; For he is bound to none. And is it not lawfull for him to doe what he will with his owne? But albeit he carry himſelfe very ſluttiſhly in oppoſing us, yet I willingly confeſſe he carryeth the matter very clearely in contradicting himſelfe; as when he concludeth, that *God in withholding that power* (that is that grace) *which would keep them from ſinne* (for this alone is our Tenet) *hereby becomes a true morall cauſe of their ſinne.* I ſay, herein he contradicts himſelfe very handſomely. For himſelfe confeſſeth that God could hinder any man from ſinne, but he doth not: And doth it not herehence evidently follow, that God hereby becomes the Authour of ſinne, yea of every ſinne that is committed in the world? But I ſee what he will reply by the face of his diſcourſe, namely this; He ſayth not that God by *withholding that grace which would keep him from ſinne, becomes the Authour of ſinne*; but only by withholding that grace which *might keep him from ſinne*. And indeed ſo he doth; but marke therewithall how ſluttiſhly he carryeth himſelfe in 2 particulars. 1. In deviating from his confirmity to his owne inſtances. For each inſtance given is in ſuch a thing withdrawen whereupon the event abſolutely followeth; and which not being withdrawen the contrary event not only *might be*, but *would be*; as if a ſtring holding a ſtone being not broken, the ſtone not only might be held, but would be held. So if the not beene withdrawen, not only the houſe might have beene held up, but would have pillar had been held up. But upon granting grace he doth not ſay the creature would have beene kept from ſinne, but *might have beene kept from falling into ſinne*. Now what *Legerdeimaine* is this? And could he preſume his Reader would prove ſo ſimple and Sottiſh, as not to obſerve this incongruity? 2. He deviates from our tenet. For we do not ſay, that upon granting grace ſupernaturall the creature may abſtaine from ſinne, if he will, but that hereby is wrought in him a will to abſtaine from ſinne, a deſire to do that which is pleaſing in the ſight of God, though not in ſuch perfection, as to worke out all naturall corruption that is found within us; but that ſtill there is *ſinne dwelling in us*; *ſtill there is a fleſh fighting againſt the ſpirit*; Yea, *a law in our members rebelling againſt the law of our mind, and leading us captive to the law of ſinne*. Hence proceed the manifold and dayly ſinnes even of the children of God; but Gods ſpirit is prevalent with them to renew their repentance, even for ſinnes of weakneſſe, and ſinnes of improvidence and inconſiderateneſſe; and to keep from preſumptuous ſinnes, that they may not prevaile over them; That it may not be ſaid of them, as it was of too many among the *Iſraelites*, in the wilderneſſe, *Their ſpots are not the ſpots of thy children*. Nay, which is more, conſider; *Arminius* confeſſeth that God doth hinder ſinne in ſuch a manner, as by granting ſuch a grace, whereupon they not only may, but will and do abſtaine from ſinne; but he doth not thus hinder it in all. What therefore? ſhall he be accounted the Authour of ſuch ſinnes. Yet I willingly confeſſe, *Arminius* and this Authour ſhake hands in this, that the Reprobates have ſuch a grace, as whereby they may abſtaine from ſinne, if they will. Yet holy *Paul* confeſſeth of himſelfe, even then, when he was in a better condition (I trowe) then that of Reprobates, to wit, when he wrote the Epiſtle to the Romans, ſaying, *What I would that do I not, but what I hate that do I*. And againe, *To will is preſent with me, but I find no meanes to performe that which is good: For I do not the good thing which I would, but the evill which I would not, that do I*. But we deny that a Reprobate hath ſo much as a will to do good; For ſuch a will undoutedly pleaſeth God. *But they that are in the fleſh cannot pleaſe God.*

Pſal. 19.

Deut. 32.

Rom. 7. 15, 18, 19.

Rom 6.

As for the ſolution which he feignes to himſelfe of his owne argument, by diſtinction of an accidentall cauſe, and a proper and direct cauſe; that is none of ours. This is a gambell of his owne, to delude his reader. God we ſay is the direct and proper cauſe of that ſanctification which is found in his children to the ſubduing of their luſts, an inordinate affections; and as direct and proper a cauſe of leaving their naturall corruption uncured in others: Nor ſo only but of proſtituting men unto their luſts, and giving them over to their vile affections, to committ abominable things, not affording them ſo much as a naturall reſtraint from ſuch vicious courſes, which he could, and that without any ſupernaturall grace. And by this poſtitution of them, he knowes how to pay them home for their other ungodly courſes, in ſuch ſort, as they *ſhall receive thereby ſuch recompence of their errour as is meet*; as Saint *Paul* hath told us *Rom.* 1. But this Authour takes little notice of Gods word thereby to informe himſelfe of Gods providence; but

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roves whithin the spheare of his owne imagination, and rationall discourse, (yet as corrupt as well beseemes him who opposeth the free grace of God) as if he would coyne unto us new oracles, the *devises* of his owne addle braines. And as for *Tertullians* rule, which this Authour insists upon. *In whose power it is that a thing be not done, to him it is imputed, when it is done.* Observe whether this Authour doth not make God the Authour of every sinne that is committed in the world, as well as we. For himselfe, in the 6. Sect. of the second inconvenience, confesseth that *if God had not decreed to suffer sinne, there would be none*; and addes *Who can bring forth that which God will absolutely hinder.* So then undoubtedly *it is in Gods power, that sinne be not done.* For he can hinder it; what followeth then? but that to him sinne is to be imputed, when it is done, by *Tertullians* rule, approved by this Authour, quite contrary to the judgment and doctrine of *Austin*, putting this difference betweene man and God, the creature and the Creator; that if we suffer others to sinne, when we can hinder them, *rei cum ipsis erimus*; but how many sinnes (sayth he) do we see committed in the world, which could never come to passe if God would hinder them.

Aug: cont: Jul: Pelag: l. 5. c. 4.

Shewing how our doctrine opposeth Gods mercy according to his conceit, and coming to deliver things more closely, as he sayth, and comprehending that which he hath to say under 4. particulars: The 2. whereof this; *That it was the sinne of our nature, not by generation, as I have shewed, but by Gods owne voluntary imputation.* The proofe whereof and the confirmation of it out of M. *Calvin* being set downe at large in some 13. lines or more in M. *Hords* discourse, is here utterly left out, which will be the more remarkable by comparing it with what he delivers, concerning another attribute of God here inserted; and which he pretends, also to be impugned by our doctrine, p. 54. where he seemes to sup up that which here he delivered.

pag: 63.

Num. 3. These words are inserted. *I thinke I may conclude with the words of Prosper, He which sayth that God would not have all men to be saved, but a certaine set number of predestinate persons only, he speaketh more harshly, then he should of the height of Gods unsearchable grace. Nay he speakes that which cannot stand with his infinite grace and mercy, especially to the sonnes of men.*

M. Mason Addit. p. 64. Senten: super 8. c. Gall:

The 8. *objection of the Galles* was this *That God will not have all men to be saved, but a certaine number of persons predestinate.* Now Prospers answer hereunto is very large, and it begines thus, *If about the salvation of all mankind, and calling them unto the knowledge of his truth, the will of God is maintained to be so indifferent throughout all ages, that God may be shewed to have neglected no man altogether; the unsearchable depth of Gods judgement is hereby assaulted. For why did God suffer all nations in ages past, to walke in their owne wayes When the Lord chose Jacob to himselfe, and dealt not so with every nation? And why are they now become Gods people, which before were no people of God, &c?* All this makes nothing for this Authour. The next is directly against him, not only at large; but in this very particular, wherein he alleadeth Prosper not in his answer to this 8. objection, but in his sentence proposed afterwards upon it. For what is this Authours meaning, (in citeing him to affirme, that *God not only willeth their salvation whom he hath predestinated, but all men also; or at least that such as say the contrary, do speake more harshly then we ought to speake of the depth of Gods inscrutable grace*) but to cast a colour that Prosper concurres with him; and judgeth that *God is indifferent to save all.* But the reason why he only saves some, and not others, is, because some prepare themselves for grace, and accordingly he bestowes it upon them: Others do not prepare themselves, and accordingly God doth not bestow it upon them. Now prosper directly contests against all such, as maintaine this opinion, and that in two particulars. 1. In taking upon them to give the reason of Gods judgements, and that drawen from the wills and actions of men; and which is no lesse impiety, in thinking that grace is bestowed by way of reward for good workes; Or restrayned from men by reason of their evill workes. His words translated run thus, *But Whosoever referreth the causes of Gods workes and judgements throughout to the wills and actions of men, and will have Gods dispensations varied according to the changeable condition of mans free will; such a one professeth the judgements of God to be scrutable, and his wayes such, as may be found out. And that which Paul the Doctor of the Gentiles durst not touch, this man thinkes he can unlock and make known. And that which is a fruit of no lesse impiety, the very grace of God whereby we are saved, is given by the way of reward for good workes, and denyed, or restrained for evill workes.* So that in each particular Prosper is directly contrary this Authours tenet. Now seeing the most part of men have not the grace of salvation, that is, such a grace as is of saving nature. And the reason by God doth not give

Answer.

it them, is not in consideration of their evill workes; let any other sober and judicious *Arminian* be judge, whether God can be sayd to will their salvation (in such a sense as we speake of it) when, he denyeth them the grace of salvation, and that not for their evill workes sake, but (which necessarily followeth hereupon) meerely according to the good pleasure of his will. And indeed in *Prospers* large answer to this eighth objection to the Galles, which taketh up almost a whole columne in *Austin*, this Authour finds nothing at all to fasten upon for his advantage. But yet you will say in his eighth sentence which he proposeth, it is as this authour alleadgeth: I grant it; but observe his censure well; *The inscrutable depth of Gods grace may suffice to keep us from speaking so rashly, as to say that God wills not all to be saved, but only a certaine number of persons predestinate.* Where observe, first, he counts it an harsh speech to say, that *God willeth not, that all men* 1 *Tim:* 2. *shall be saved*; the reason whereof undoutedly is this, because it is expresly contradictory to a text in Scripture. But then if we object, how can God be sayd to will their salvation whom he hath not predestinated, to whom he will not give the grace of salvation, & that not for their evill workes sake? but according to the meere pleasure of his will. Now *Prospers* answer in my judgement is this, *The depth of Gods inscrutable grace will beare* us out in it; so that we need not cast our selves upon so harsh an expression, as to deny that God will have all men to be saved, which is contradictious to the letter of Gods word. In effect it is, as if he should say; It is a secret. This I take to be *Prospers* meaning, and herein I remit my selfe to the judicious; But sure I am that *Prosper* is directly contrary to that opinion whereunto this Authour, by vertue of this sentence of his, desires to draw him. In like manner the Authour of the booke, *De vocatione Gentium*, which is commonly thought to be *Prosspers*, though *Vossius* affects to entitle it unto another upon no other ground, but because he conceits that Authour, not to be so rigorous in the doctrine of predestination, as *Prosper*. But let the judicious compare *Prosspers* cariage in this particular, with that Authours, and observe whether they do not exactly agree For that Authour holds up that text of *Paul*, *God will have all to be saved*, as *Prosper* doth, without assaying to cleare it by interpretation as *Austin* doth, and will have it goe for a secret; and withall he expresly concurres with *Prosper* in expressing first, that God doth not give grace for mens good workes sake, nor denyes it for their evill workes. For the ages wherein God so plentifully communicated his grace were no better then the former. Observe farther that *Austin* himselfe in his *Enchiridion* treating of this place of *Paul*, *God will have all to be saved*, after he 1 *Tim:* 2. hath given two interpretations thereof, the last whereof interpreting it of *genera singulorum, not singula generum*, is most generally received, as most congruous both to Scripture phrase in generall, and in speciall unto this very text of *Paul*, as *Piscator* observes, and *Vossius* against himselfe improvidently confesseth. Yet see the ingenuity of this great light in Gods Church. *If any man can give any other convenient interpretation, let him, provided we be not driven to deny the first article of Creed, whereby we confesse that God is omnipotent.* And this I conceive proceeded out of a desire to hold up the meaning of that text to the uttermost, that the very letter of it may be applyed, so we might not be driven to so foule an inconvenience, as to say that God willeth that mans salvation, which is never saved; which is as much as to say, that such a one therefore is not saved, because God cannot save him. Observe farther; in the dayes of *Hincmarus* and *Remigius*, these controversies being revived in the cause of *Gotescalk*, the church of *Lyons* writes a booke wherein it treats of the meaning of this place of *Paul*, whereof he gives fower expositions according to the antient fathers. First, That it is to be understood of *genera singulorum, not singula generum; of all sorts of men, not of all men of all sorts.* Secondly, That none is saved but by the will of God. Thirdly, That God workes in us a will or a desire that all may be saved. Fourthly, That God will have all men to be saved, if they will; Then they propose their judgement concerning these fower expositions distinguishing betweene the three, first, and the last, thus, *In the three first expositions of these words, wherein it is sayd, that God willeth all men to be saved, no absurdity is to be found, no repugnancy unto faith.* But as touching the fourth and the last; *here we are to take heed, for it gives occasion to the Pelegian pravity, in as much as it affirmes, that God, that he may save men; doth expect the wills of men:* (Now this *Pelagian pravity*, is the very substance of our Authours orthodoxy whom I deale with.) *Against this errour*, (sayth the Church of *Lyons*) *we read Definitions have beene made in the antient counsels of the fathers.* This I take out of the extracts, which *Vossius* hath made out of that booke, which goes under the name of the Church of *Lyons*, in his *Pelagian* history. *l.* 7. *c.* 4. *p.* 755, 756.

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there is an addition of some few lines in the third Sect: concerning Gods justice, but they adde noe moment at all to the rest; and therefore the answer made in that third Sect: to M. *Hord* may suffice. And in the same sect: and subsection subordinate to the second assertion, which he obtrudes upon the maintainers of the lower way; which was this, *God hath determined for the sinne of Adam to cast away the greatest part of mankind for ever*; this Interpolation is inserted. *P 65. Sect 3. subsect. P.66. & 67.*

M. Mason Addit.

This is so cleare a case that *Calvin* with some others have not stickt to say, that God may with as much justice determine men to hell the first way, as the latter. See Instit: l. 3. cap. 23. s. 7. Where against those who deny that *Adam* fell by Gods decree, he reasoneth thus; *All men are made guilty of Adams sinne by Gods absolute decree alone, Adam therefore sinned by this only decree. What lets them to grāt, that of one man, which they must grant of all men?* And a little after he saith *It is too absurd that these kind patrons of Gods justice. should thus stumble at a straw, and leap over a blocke.* God may with as much justice decree *Adams* sinne and mens damnation, out of his only will and pleasure, as out of that will and pleasure the involving of men in the guilt of the first sinne, at and their damnation for it; That is the substance of his reasoning. To the same purpose speaketh *Maccovius*; From hence we may see, sayth he, what to judge of that opinion of our adversaryes viz. That God cannot justly ordaine men to destruction without the consideration of sinne. *Let them tell me which is greater to impute to one man the sinne of another, and punish him for it with eternall death, or to ordaine simply*, without looking at sinne, *to destruction*? Surely no man will deny the first of these to be greater. *But this God may do without any wrong to iustice, much more therefore may he do the other.*

Answer.

As touching the assertion it selfe here charged upon our Divines, namely that *God hath determined for the sinne of Adame to cast away the greatest part of mankind.* I have thereunto answered at large in my consideration of M. *Hords* discourse: Yet let me adde something by way of an apt accommodation of that before delivered to cleare the ambiguous phrase of this Authour, as touching the phrase of casting away. For it may well be doubted whether by casting away (which he makes the Object of Gods determination) he meanes the act of damnation, or the act of denying grace. If the act of damnation, it is most untrue. For Reprobates are not damned for originall sinne only, but for all the actuall sinnes that have beene committed by them; And as they are, and shall be damned for them; So God from everlasting decreed they should be damned for them. Secondly, According to my *Tenet*, in noe moment of nature is Gods decree of damning reprobates, before the prescience, not of originall sinne only, but also of all their actuall sinnes. Indeed I do not make the prescience of sinne to go before the decree of damnation; Nor do I make the decree of damnation to go before the prescience of sinne, but I conceive them to be simultaneous. It is true many infants we say perish in originall sinne only, not living to be guilty of any actuall sinne of their persons; why should this seeme strange, when M. *Hord* himselfe professeth in his preface sect. 4. *That all mankind are involved in the guilt of eternall death?* If all are guilty of eternall death, then it were just with God to inflict eternall death upon all for originall sinne; How much more is it just to inflict eternall death upon some few, being guilty of it. Therefore observe the foxlike cariage of this Authour. For this former free acknowledgement of the guilt of eternall death adherent to originall sinne in M. *Hords* discourse, is quite left out in this, though there it was professed with this asseveration, *I confidently believe it.* For he well perceived, that this position utterly infatuates the strength of his discourse in this place. And I have still looked when these men will come to a plaine denyall of Originall sinne. Now if God may justly cast all mankind away for sinne originall, and that as touching the inflicting of damnation upon them for it; how much more evident is it to be just with God to cast away all mankind for originall sinne, as touching the denyall of grace unto them? Now let us proceed to that which is here inserted out of *Calvin* and *Maccovius*. Now *Calvin* sayth not *that God may with as much justice determine men to hell the first way, as the latter*; He speakes not at all of Gods decree of damnation, he speaks only of Gods decree *that Adam sua defectione periret, by his fall should be obnoxious to destruction* And he proves it by their acknowledgment, *that it was by the counsell of God, that all à salute exciderent unius parentis culpâ, should incurre the losse of salvation by the fault of one parent.* Hereupon he demands saying, *What lets them to grant that of one man, which they must grant of all men.* And a little after, *It is too absurd that these kind patrons of Gods justice should thus stick at a straw and leape over a blocke* And whereas *Calvin* sayth, as he relates him, that *All men are made guilty of Adams sinne by Gods absolute decree alone.* First, This is untrue; No where doth he say, that this came to passe by Gods absolute decree alone. If he had, I had thought this Authour would have justified him, as well as M. *Hord*, who in this very place professeth that *Originall sinne is a sinne made ours only by Gods appointment.* Indeed as M. *Hord* is now

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set forth in print, this passage is not found: but in M. *Hord's* own copy thus it ranne; M. *Mason* belike hath gelded him; Yet that of M. *Hord's* was accounted the quintessence of M. *Mason's* strength in this argument; and he took upon him the propagating of the manuscripts thereof as my selfe know in some particulars. Likewise *the involving of men in the guilt of Adam's sinne and of eternall death*, is M. *Hord's* phrase in one place, as before I have shewed out of the fourth *Section* of his preface; and that by the only decree of God, did he expresse in this place. The same argument is used by *Maccovius* applyed to purpose (so was not that of *Calvin's*. As for that saying of *Maccovius*, that God may ordaine men to destruction without respect to any sinne of his that is so ordained, is not this manifest. 1. In the case of annihilation? For doth not *Arminius* confesse that God can annihilate the holiest creature that is? 2ly, As touching the suffering of hell paines. For did not Christ suffer them by the ordinance of his Father? Or was this suffering of his for any sinne of his own? This have I proved more then once in my *Vindiciæ* to be in the power of God: And *Medina* professeth as much, and that *ex concordi omnium Theologorum sententiâ*; And *Vasquez* the Jesuite concurres with *Medina* in the same opinion. And lately *Raynaudus* in his justification of *Valerianus*; who proves this to have been the confession of many of the antient Fathers, and particularly of *Fulgentius* in that booke of his *De prædestinatione & gratiâ*, which goes under *Austin's* name. And is it not evident by M. *Hord's* acknowledgment, when he saith that men are made guilty of *Adam's* sin, and of eternall death only by God's decree? Which passage of M. *Hord's* this Authour hath razed out, and wipeth his lips, as if he had done no iniquity with his *Index expurgatorius*; not that he hath changed his opinion, as I verily thinke; but because he saw what a funestous blow it gave unto his cause in this particular: Yet is he magnified as a man unanswerable, none daring to take the bucklers against such a *Don Quixot*; But let the judicious consider this his practise well, & whether he be a man of such authority, as deserving that they should pin their faith on his sleeve, especially considering that he takes no notice of what I have answered to M. *Hord*, to reply thereupon; and that there is scarce any thing in all this which I have not answered in my *Vindiciæ*; Yet he continues to clamour still; at least by other Jack a Lents whom he sets up but answers nothing, but that which is of his own shaping, that making his own bed he may lye the more softly. But let The Reader seriously consider this, that will not be gulled and cheated of his faith, as Pope *Celestinus* was of his Popedome; and remember what *Austin* sometimes sayd, *Si lupi concilium fecerunt, ut pastoribus non responderent cur oves consilium perdiderunt, ut ad luporum spelunças accederent? If the wolves have consulted together, and resolved not to make answer to the shepheards; why have the sheep so farre lost all good counsell, as to come to the dens of wolves?*

Aug: Ep: 171.

Pag: 67. *Sub-Sect:* 2: concerning God's justice there is a passage inserted out of M. *Perkins*, but it is of no more moment then the rest. In the same *sub-section*, the three causes *why repobates cannot in justice be bound to believe*, are much changed from that they were in M. *Hord's* discourse, sent unto his freind, which Copy was sent unto me. Yet upon better consideration I find it is not so much changed, as at first sight I conceived. The order of the two first reasons is changed; only in the first here some similies of exageration are wanting, which are not wanting in the second of M. *Hord's*.

The second here is most altered. For wheras in M. *Hord's* first discourse which he tendred to a Freind of his, the reason ranne thus; *Because it is God's will they shall not believe*; To wit, in our opinion it is altered here thus, from an affirmative to a negative, *It is not God's unfeigned will they shall believe*; Yet himselfe layes the same thing to our charge in an affirmative manner *pag:* 78: *treating of God's truth sub sect:* 2: the very last words which I answer apart, all that page almost not being found in M. *Hord's* first discourse. The words are these. *Can God speak thus to Reprobates, who by his own decree shall never repent? &c.* And in this very place at length he riseth to this affirmative, thus, *It may rather be said, it is God's unfeigned will they shall not believe, because it is his will they shall want power to believe.* So that I need not to trouble my selfe with adding any farther answer to this, more then I have to M. *Hord and to that page* 78 *concerning God's truth, Sub-sect:* 3.

Pag: 69, *and Sub-sect:* 4. In dealing on God's attribute of justice; After the Authour had proposed his reasons *which moved him to thinke* that our doctrine of God's absolute decree *is repugnant to God's justice*; he proposeth our answers thereunto, which formerly were but two; but now are inlarged with the addition of a third. The first whereof is, for the forme of it, changed throughout. The comparison of the waies of God with the mysterious attributes of God is changed, not only as touching the forme, but as touch-

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ing the matter; here is no pleading for a reasonable service of God, as there was.

His making man's understanding purged from prejudice and false principles, as it was proposed there, purged from *prejudices, corrupt affections, and customes*, as it is proposed, to be the Tribunall, according to whose judgment interpretations of Scripture concerning what is just in the courses of God must be allowed or disallowed, I have sufficiently canvased there; Let the Reader be pleased to turne to it, and compare my answer to this Sub-section, and observe how little spirit he had, so much as to question against any one peece of my answer. Here he addes a reason of his former uncouth paradoxe, to wit that, *Justice in men and God are for substance but one, and the same thing, though different in degree, as the greater and lesser light.* I have sufficiently profligated this in the first Section concerning God's attributes. For this very rule he premiseth in generall to the ensuing discourse of his, most congruously; wilde premises and grounds to wild discourses.

The difference he puts between the wayes of God & the mysteries of godlinesse I have there also refuted, shewing that albeit some wayes of God's justice are agreable to the judgment of man, as these mentioned, *Es*: 5. and *Ezek*: 18, yet all are not, as there I shew at large.

And lastly because he likes rationall discourse so well, I am contented to deale with him at his own weapon, by six rationall demonstrations justifying the absoluteness of God's decrees, in answer whereunto, he is content to carry himselfe very judiciously, even as mute as a fish.

The second answer of ours which he brings in to reply upon, is inserted a new, & that I come to consider in the next place as I find it set down pag. 70. 71. 72. *M. Masons Additions.*

It is answered that these decrees are set down in Scripture to be the will of God, and therefore they must needs be just. For God's will is the rule of all righteousnesse. To this answer I have these things to reply. 1. This rule in divinity is much abused by the maintainers of absolute reprobation, and may not be admitted in their sense and meaning. For God's will is not a rule of justice to himselfe, as if things were therefore just, because he willeth and worketh them; but his justice rather is a rule of his will & workes, which are the expressions of his will He therefore maketh decrees and executeth them, because they are agreable to that justice which dwells in the Divine nature: as he maketh nothing which hath not *potentiam objectivam*, a power of being created without implying contradiction to himselfe, or any thing in him; So he willeth and doth nothing, but that which may be willed and done *salvâ justitiâ*, without wrong to his justice, St. *Hierome* speaking of the Prophet *Hoseas* taking a wife of fornication. *Hos*. 1. 2. Saith it was done *in typo, typically*, not really *quia si fiat, turpissimū est, because if it had been done indeed it had been a most foule thing.* But thou wilt answer, saith he, *Deo jubente, nihil turpe est, God commanding it nothing is dishoneſt.* Thus much we say, saith the father, that God commandeth nothing but what is honest, but he doth not by commanding dishonest things, make those things honest which are abominable, plainly giving us to see what he thought viz: that God doth not will a thing & of make it good; but willeth it because it is in it selfe good antecedently, & before the act of God's will about it. *Hieron. Procm. in Hosea.*

And thus much doth *Zanchy* (though a rigid maintainer of absolute reprobation) not obscurely confesse in his treatise *De naturâ Dei*; where he letteth fall such speeches as make God's justice antecedent to his will and therefore the rule of it, rather then a thing regulated by it. *Neither can God will any thing*, saith he, *which is not just.* And againe, *The Princes pleasure hath the strength of a law, is a Rule* saith he, *among the Canonists. But this is true where the King is just and willeth nothing but what is just.* In which words he plainly maketh the justice of the King antecedent to that will of his, which must be a law. Many more speeches he useth there to the same purpose. God's will therefore is not a rule of justice to himselfe. To whom then? To us. For by it we are first to square all our thoughts, words, and deeds. Secondly to examine them when they are spoken, and done. *Primum in aliquo genere est regula posteriorum, & supremum inferiorum.* *Zanch. l. 3. de nat. Dei c. 4. q. 9 thes*: 2.

2ly, I reply that these absolute decrees of mens inevitable salvation and damnation are no parts of Gods revealed will. The scriptures teache us no such matter. And therefore to say that they are, is but a mere begging of the question. It hath alwaies been ordinary with false teachers, to make Gods word a father to their false opinions, that they may stand the faster and winne the greater credit. The Papists ground their Transubstantiation, & the *Lutherans* their consubstantiation and ubiquity upon the Scripture, *Hoc est corpus meū, This is my body.* And the defenders of absolute reprobation doe so too. They make their cause to be Gods and entitle his word to it; because they see it is the surest way to defend it, being herein like to some contentious people, who being in law and having a bad cause which they are like to loose, they entitle the King to it, that they may the better uphold it. *Mat*: 26.

3ly Absolute Reprobation can be no part of Gods revealed will. The reason is, because it is odious to right reason, & begetteth absurdities. *For nulla veritas parit absurda, no truth begetteth absurdities.* Divers truths are revealed in Scripture, which are above, but not contrary to right reason, whether they be matters of faith or life: Faith and reason, nature and Scripture are both Gods excellent gifts. And therefore though there may be a disproportion, yet there can be no repugnancy between them. The worship which God requireth is *Cultus λογικος, a reasonable service.* And the word of God is, *γαλα λογικον & ἀδολον, milke reasonable and without guile.* *Rom* 12. 2. 1 *Pet*: 2. 2.

These things therefore, being laid together, it will appeare to be but a mere shift and evasion, when absolute reprobation is proved to be unjust, and therefore unworthy of God; to say Gods will is the rule of justice; this is part of Gods revealed will, and therefore most just, whatsoever reason may cavill, and say to the contrary.

Doth not this Authour observe the contradictious nature of this proposition *God's will is a rule of justice to himselfe*. For a rule of justice to any one is a rule to his will, to be regulated thereby; & can the will be said to be the rule of justice to the will without contradiction? The rule propounded was this, *God's will is the rule of all righteousnesse*; but the other rule is the rule corrupted by this Authour, when he talks of a will, as a rule of justice to the will. 2. But whether things are therefore just, because God wills them; or that therefore God willeth them, because they are just; undoubtedly that which here is proposed is a truth, namely that whatsoever the Scripture sets downe to be the will of God, *that must needs be just*. Neither have we any need to improve it any farther then thus. For it is well known, that our Divines in their doctrine of predestination, and reprobation doe depend on nothing so much, as the evidence of God's word; As this Author throughout this discourse of his depends on nothing lesse. And therefore he hath cast himselfe upon a strange practice in the former passage, namely to evacuate all our reasons drawn out of the word of God to confirme our doctrine, pleading that the interpretations we make of Scripture are all false, because the contrary doctrine which he maintaines, is justified before the tribunall of humane reason *purged from prejudice, and false principles, corrupt affections and customes*; Which is as much as to professe in plaine termes, that to find out the truth concerning the decrees of predestination and reprobation, we must leave the oracles of God, and hearken to the oracles of reason, provided that it be purged from prejudice and false principles; from corrupt affections and customes. Now I had thought that the spirit of God alone could purge us from such prejudice and false principles; corrupt affections and customes; And that this spirit of God worketh only by the word herein, which is called in Scripture *the sword of the spirit*; Yet this Author tells us not, where this reason thus purged is to be found; save that in generall he saith; that is just or unjust which is so esteemed in the judgment both of best and worst *that stand indifferent to the entertainment of any truth*, as is to be seen in the former reason according to M. *Hord's* discourse. Now who these best are but the Arminians in this Authours fancy; & the worst, but Anabaptists or heathens; or both I know not; Sure we are none of them *in his understanding purged from false principles and prejudice, from corrupt affections and customes*, because we doe not *stand indifferent to the entertainment of his tenets*, which he calls *Truths*. 3. Where can he shew that I have made use of any such principles to answer any argument of his against us. I doe not find that any where he can drive me to this though this be the Apostles course, as we may see *Ro: 9. Is there any injustice with God? God forbid*, how doth he prove it, but thus, because the Scripture attributes such a course to God; *I will shew mercy on whom I will shew mercy, and I will have compassion, on whome I will have compassion*. 4. But where hath he learnt to be so audacious as to say that, *Things are not therefore just because God wills them, but that his justice is rather a rule of his will and works*? Before he told us, that justice in man, and God were of the same nature; Now that justice which is the rule of our will is, *Justitia obligans*, justice binding us to doe this or that; and is Gods justice obligatory likewise to bind him? In making the world, I doe not doubt, but God did that which was just; but was there any justice in God obliging him to the making of the world? Who seeth not, what an Atheisticall concluſion followeth herehence, namely that the world was from everlasting, if not necessarily by necessity of nature; yet necessarily by obligation of justice? otherwise for an infinite space of time wherein the world was not made (which must needs have been if the world were not from everlasting) God had been and continued to be unjust. The Schooles have taught me that there is a justice of condecency consequent to all the actions of God, noe justice of obligation precedent to it. And whereas St. Paul tells us that *God works all things according to the counsell of his will*, both *Alvarez* and *Suarez* though School-Divines of opposite families, yet concurre in this that this *Counsell is, à liberâ voluntate acceptum, accepted of Gods free will*. And it is observable, that the Apostle calls it not the *Counsell of his understanding, but the counsell of his will*. And *Vasquez* and *Suarez* both Jesuites, but very opposite about the nature of justice in God; yet both concurre, that there is no justice in God towards his creature, but upon supposition of the determination of God's will. It is most true that supposing the end which God intends, the wisedome of God directs in the right use of congruous meanes; and no other justice then this his wisedome doth *Aquinas* acknowledge in the Divine nature. And great is the wisedome which God manifests in the

Eph: 6.

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goverment of this world, yet the same wisedome as great as it is doth not equall the infinite wisdome of God. But of this I have disputed more at large in my *Vindiciæ*. Where this question is discussed. *Whether the will of God be circumscribed or regulated by justice?* To no parcell whereof doe I find the least savour of an answer in this Authour. But let us examine how well he proves his own Tenet, And that is first by the authority of *Hierome* in his preface to his commentaries on *Hosea*. 2. By the authority of *Zanchy*, whereto I answer. 1. That if the interpretations of Scripture must be judged of before the Tribunall of reason *purged from prejudice and false principles, from corrupt affections and customes*; must not the opinions of such as *Hierome* and *Zanchy* be judged of before the same tribunall also? 2ly, touching *Hierome* himselfe. 1. It is true *Hierome* in that preface understands that command given *Hosea* to be only in a Type, and for the reason here mentioned; but in his Commentary he interpreteth it *secundum historiam, litterally*. Neither was the Prophet as he saith, to be blamed in this. For he was not the worse, but he made her the better. *Præsertim especially* he was not to be blamed, *because he did this not luxuriously or lustfully, or of his own will, but in obedience to the command of God*. Now let the indifferent judge whether *Hierome* be not as much for us upon the text, as for our adversary in the preface. 2. Observe that *Hierome* is nothing for him in the preface. For *Hierome* speakes there of God's will of command, but we treate of God's will as it signifies not his command given to man, but his own purpose and decree to doe this or that himselfe. Judge of the extravagancy of this Author by this, and whether his understanding be sufficiently purged from prejudice and false principles, from corrupt affections and customes; as to make the last resolution of our faith concerning the waies of God thereunto, or the understanding of such as he is, whether best or worst, or of both sizes upon a mere pretence of their indifferency for the entertainement of truths.

l. 1. part. 3. de re-prob. digr: 1.

We willingly grant with *Zanchy* that God can will nothing which is not just; Not that hereby we make any justice to precede the will of God; but because he hath a lawfull power to doe what he will; And there is a justice of condecency consequent to all his actions. It is otherwise, I confesse, with a man though the greatest of men, as wise as *Solomon*; though vessells after God's own heart, as *David*. But hence it followeth not, that because in an earthly King there is a justice antecedent to his will, therefore it is so in the King of heaven and earth. If this Authour thinke otherwise, let him know I am not yet sufficiently convicted of the purity of his understanding purged from prejudice and false principles &c. as thereinto to make the last resolution of my faith.

Yet I confesse he carrieth himselfe magnificently as if he had attained to this purgation, as when he saith, *That these absolute decrees of salvation and damnation, are not part of God's revealed will*; But where hath he proved the conditionall decrees that he stands for, are any part of God's revealed will. Where doth he find that God decreed to bestow faith and repentance upon a man, because of some good works of his, or deny it to others for failing of some good worke? As for salvation and damnation we plainly professe, that God intended not to damne any man, but for sinne, nor to bestow salvation on any man of ripe yeares, but by way of reward of his faith, repentance, obedience and good works. Doth not he begge the question all along, whē he carrieth his conditionall decrees in a confidentiary manner, without once offering to prove thē by any one place of Scripture? Here I expected he would not begge the question, when he chargeth us to begge the question most insipidly; When it is well known that our Divines are frequent in proving their doctrine out of Scripture; which if it faile of sound proofe in the judgment of his understanding purged from prejudice and false principles; yet with no modesty; whatsoever their judgment be) can he taxe them for begging the question. For to begge the question is not once to offer to prove what they say; which is this Authour's discourse all along. But to supply the place of arguments, he usually foist's in a phrase at pleasure in expressing our Tenet of God's decrees; as of *Decreeing immutably and unavoidably*; Or as here he speakes of *Damnation and salvation inevitable*; whereas we doe not use to clogge our own expressions, or our Readers apprehensions with any such bugbeares. We rather say that God decrees all things to come to passe, that do come to passe, and that agreably to their natures, as necessary things necessarily; and contingent things to come to passe contingently. And surely for doctrines of faith, I thinke every sober Christian hath cause to entitle the King to be the Authour of them, this Authour doth not so much for his: Nay the Scripture to him seemed so evidently to make for us (which I desire every wise Reader well to observe) that this drave him to such a sluttish shift, as to except against our interpretations of Scripture

pture upon noe other ground but this, that the *Doctrine* confirmed thereby is not consonant *to the understanding of men purged from prejudice and false principles, corrupt affections and customes*, in the designing of what is just, and what is unjust; And let every indifferent man judge whether this be not a desperate course, carying with it a secret acknowledgment that the Scripture indeed doth favour the way we take in the Doctrine of predestination and reprobation. And indeed the ninth to the *Romans Gerardus Vossius* calls *Gorgons* head whereby we thinke (so evident is the Apostles meaning on our side) to turne all our opposites into stones, though such vants are none of ours; but himselfe it seemes had been stupified by it, had he not timely taken hold of *Scientia media*, the Jesuites invention, and as vile an invention as ever reasonable men conceived.

3. Lastly he tells us like a resolute Sir, that *absolute reprobation can be no part of God's revealed will*; and his reason is; *because it is odious to right reason.* He doth not shew how it is contrariant to God's word; but bravely presumes that his reason is right, as if he were of the number of that synedrion whose understandings are purged *from prejudice and false principles, from corrupt affections and customes*; and ere he is aware bewraies what he meanes by reason, when he attributes hatred unto it; And I verily believe his best reason is the strength of his affection. By the way let the Reader observe, that he is as opposite to absolute election, as to absolute reprobation; only he dischargeth his right reason and the spleen thereof against absolute reprobation, not against absolute election. We may easily guesse the true notion of his right reason in this; his whole discourse favouring farre more throughout of the foxes, then of the Lyons skin. Now I have given him six reasons for the absoluteness of reprobation, because he appeales to reason purged from prejudice and false principles, and not one of them hath he answered, though they went out of my hands now full three yeares agoe. I will adventure to give him some reasons for it also out of God's word. For I desire to follow the crooked serpent which way soever he winds and turnes. Therefore thus I dispute, Predestination is absolute, therefore reprobation is absolute. For if reprobation be not absolute, but proceeds according to mens evill works, then predestination is not absolute, but proceeds according to mens good works, whether faith or other obedience; according to that of *Austin. If Esau be hated for the merit of unrighteousnesse, incipit & Jacob justitiæ merito deligi, Jacob beginnes to be beloved for the merit of his righteousnesse*; and a little before. *Si enim quia præscibat Deus futura Esaui opera mala, propterea eum prædestinavit, ut serviret minori; propterea prædestinavit & Jacob ut ei major serviret, quia futura ejus bona opera præsciebat, & falsum est jam quod ait, non ex operibus. For if therefore the Lord prædestinated Esau that he should serve the younger, because he foresaw his evill works. For the same reason he predestinated Jacob that he should rule over the Elder because he foresaw his good works; and so false is that which the Apostle saith, not of works.* Now that predestination is absolute I prove thus. It is not upon the foresight of faith, much lesse of works, therefore it is absolute. The anteceedent I prove thus; That which proceeds according to *the good pleasure of the Lord's will*, is not upon the foresight of faith; But predestination proceeds upon the good pleasure of God's will; *ergo*, The Major proposition I prove thus. This phrase, *according to the pleasure of God's will* excludes all outward causes; And no wise man will referre the cause of a man's absolution to the good pleasure of the judge, when a man's innocency is the cause of it. For that is the cause of a thing, whereby answere is made to the question, why such a thing is done; And this is the perpetuall phrase of Scripture; as, *Is it not lawfull for me to doe what I will with mine own?* And, *All these things worketh the same spirit, distributing to every man severally as he will*; and, *He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth. It pleased the father that in him should all fulnesse dwell. It is so ô father because thy good pleasure was such. It is God that worketh in you both the will and the deed according to his good, pleasure. The Lord loved you because he loved you.* Deut: 7.7. *They inherited not the land by their own sword, neither did their own arme save them, but thy right hand, and thine arme. and the light of they countenance because thou diddst favour them.*

Aug: ad Simplician. l. 1. q. 2.

Rom. 9. 11.

Eph: 1. 5.

Mat: 20. 15.
1 Co. 12. 11.
Rom: 9. 18.
Col. 1. 19.
Mat: 11. 26.
Phil: 2, 13.
Ps: 44. 3.

2. My second argument is, *Therefore God gives faith because he did predestinate them; As many believed as were ordained to everlasting life*; and *God added daily to the Church such as should be saved.* Σωζόμενοι in this place is as much as, Τεταγμένοι εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον; as appeares by the equipollency of both sentences. Now hence I inferre; Therefore God gives not faith because he hath not ordained them to everlasting life. For *if the affirmation be cause of the affirmation; the negation is cause of the negation.* And the Scripture as ordinarily subjoyneth the deniall of grace to reprobation, as the granting of grace to predestination. For as ἀπολλύμενοι, *such as perish*, is opposite to σωζόμενοι, *such as shall be saved*;

Act: 13. 48.
Act: 2. last.

And

And as the consequent of the one is said to be *Faith*; so the consequent to the other is the deniall of the same or like grace. As for example, *All they that are of God heare God's word*; so others *heare them not because they are not of God*; as Ἔκ τοῦτου, *Such as shall be saved are added to God's Church*: so in whom *is the Gospell hid? only* ἐν τοῖς ἀπολλυμένοις, *in them that perish*. Among whom doth Antichrist prevaile *by all deceivablenesse? only in them that perish*. Like as for the Elect on the contrary 'tis not possible they should be seduced. *Mat*: 24. 24, and 2 *Thes*: 2. 13 *Ioh*: 1.47. *Act*: 2. ult. & 13.48. 2 *Co*: 4.3. 2 *Thes*. 2, 10. 13

3. If predestination were upon the foresight of faith, then it should be only upon the foresight of such a faith as perseveres to the end; whence two inconveniences follow 1. That no man can be assured of his election untill his death, which is quite contrary unto Scripture. For *Paul* was assured of the election of the *Thessalonians* by observation of the *works of their faith, the labour of their love, and the patience of their hope*, 2. In this case none can be strengthened against the power of temptation by the assurance of their election; But thus we are strengthned by Christ. *Mat*: 24. 24. by St. *Paul*. *Rom*: 8.29. 2 *Thes*: 2. 13. 1 *Thes*: 3.4.

4. Election is absolute, therefore reprobation is absolute. The antecedent I prove; If it be neither of faith nor of works, then it is absolute, but it is neither of faith, nor works. Not of works, expresly; Not of faith as appeares by the same reason whereby *Paul* proves it is not of works. For the reason is this, *Before the children were borne or had done good or evill, it was said the Elder shall serve the younger; Therefore election is not of works*. Now say I we may as well conclude therehence, therefore it is not of faith; forasmuch as before they were borne, they were as uncapable of faith as of works. The consequence I prove thus; Looke by what reason St. *Paul* proves, that the election of *Jacob* was not of good works, because before they were borne 'twas said, *The Elder shall serve the younger*; by the same reason it is evident that the reprobation of *Esau* was not of evill works; the subjection of *Esau* unto his younger brother, as lively representing his reprobation, as the dominion of *Jacob* over his elder brother represents his election. *Rom*. 9, 11

5. Predestination is defined by *Austin* to be *Præparatio gratiæ, the preparation of grace*, therefore reprobation which is opposite thereunto must be the *not preparation of grace*; that is God's decree not to give grace, like as the opposite is God's decree to give grace. Now God gives grace not according to works. *For he hath mercy on whom he will* And hereupon *Austin* builds his doctrine of predestination. Now by his doctrine predestination is absolute as *Gerardus Vossius* confesseth in his preface to his history of the heresy of *Pelagius*; How can it be otherwise? For if God conferres grace not according to mens works; but according to his own purpose and grace. How much more did he decree to give it not upon any foresight of works, but of his mere pleasure. And the Scripture as clearely testifies, that as *God hath mercy on whom he will*; so *whom he will he hardneth*; that is of mere pleasure he denieth grace to some, as of mere pleasure he grants it unto others; And therefore reprobation grounded hereupon must needs be as absolute, as predestination grounded upon the other. *Aug*: de bono persever. c. 15. 2 *Tim*: 1.9. *Rom*: 9. 18.

6. Like as in Scripture phrase Faith is said to be the faith of God's elect, election is not said to be of those that are foreseen to to believe; So the worshippers of the Beast are said to be those, *Whose names are not written in the booke of life*; *They that are not written in the booke of life*, are described to be such that admire and worship the *beast*. And the not writing of mens names in the booke of life doth as significantly represent their reprobation; as the writing of mens names in heaven. *Luc*: 10 20. *Rev*: 20.12: doth represent their election. Thus as formerly I gave six reasons to justifie the absoluteness of reprobation, because he pretended the absoluteness thereof was repugnant to reason; so here I have given six more derived out of the word of God, to prove that this doctrine is the revealed will of God, to stop his empty mouth that clamoureth and only clamoureth that *it is no part of God's revealed will*. And that this doctrine is not only conformable to right reason, but by convincing arguments in right reason demonstrable I have already shewed; And that all the absurdities this Authour blatters of, they prove to be no better then the mere imagination of a vaine thing. That which here he discourseth of *a reasonable service*, comes out of it's place, it belonged to the former reason in M. *Hord's* treatise, and there I have answered it, and shewed the absurd interpretation that he makes of it. *Tit*: 1.1. *Rev*: 13.8 & 17.8.

He vaunts that he hath proved reprobation absolute to be unjust, when he hath performed no thing lesse; But making only a greate cracke, he goes out like a squib; and throughout meddles not with one argument that our Divines bring out of Scripture, or reason to justifie their doctrine concerning the absoluteness of reprobation. And it is apparent

parent that he denies the absoluteneſſe of election, as well as the absoluteneſſe of reprobation, and consequently must necessarily maintaine that grace is given according to works; whereupon it was that *Austin* grounded his doctrine concerning the absoluteneſſe of Predestination: And upon the like ground have we as good cause to ground our doctrine concerning the absoluteneſſe of reprobation, it being every way as evident, that Grace is not denied according unto works, as that it is not granted according to mens works; And the Scripture is equally as expreſſe concerning both, where it is said that as *God hath mercy on whom he will, so also whom he will he hardneth.*

Ro: 9.18.

Pag: 75.76. Treating of God's sincerity *Sub-sect:* 1. There are two passages inserted taken out of *Piscator*, before the passages alleadged out of *Zanchy* and *Bucer*. For having said that, *Now God's meaning is* (by this doctrine) *that the most of those to whom he offereth his grace and glory, shall have neither*; forthwith he gives instance in *Piscator* thus.

M. Mason's Additions, Lib. de prædest. contra Schafin. p. 74. pag. 143.

And so *Piscator* saith, Grace is not offered by God, even to those who are called with a meaning to give it, but to the Elect only, *Gratia non offertur à Deo singulis (licet vocatis) animo communicandi eam, sed solis electis.* In the same booke he hath such an other speech; *Non vult Deus reprobos credere licet lingua profitcatur se velle. Though God in words protest he would have reprobates to believe, yet indeed he will not have them.* they make God to deale with men in matters of salvation, as the Poets feigne the Gods to have dealt with poore *Tantalus*. They placed him in a cleare and goodly river up to the very chin, and under a tree which bare much sweet and pleasant fruit that did almost touch his lips, but this they did with a purpose that he should tast of neither. For when he put his mouth to the water to drinke, it waved away from him; And when he reached his hand to the fruit to have eaten of it, it withdrew it selfe presently out of his reach; so as he could neither eate nor drinke. Just so dealeth God with reprobates; (by their doctrine) He placeth them under the plentifull meanes of salvation, offereth it to them so plainly, that men would thinke they might have it when they will, & yet intendeth fully they shall never have it, withholding from them either the first grace that they cannot believe, or the second grace that they cannot persevere. Did not those gods delude *Tantalus*? yes doubtlesse. And if God doe so with reprobates, what did he but delude them, and dissemble with them in his fairest and likeliest offers of salvation that he makes them? And this doe *Zanchius* and *Bucer* grant by evident consequence, as appeareth by a speech or two of theirs, which cannot stand with their conclusion; and therefore I suppose fell unwarily from them.

Answer.

This treatise of *Piscator De prædestinatione* against *Schaffman* I have the second edition printed at Herborne *Anno* 1598. But these words according to their quotations here, are not to be found; the severall distinct passages are distinguished by numbers, which in all editions hold the same, not so the pages. Yet the latter passage quoted p. 143. I meet with in mine p. 128. According to the like difference I try whether I can find out the other, but in vaine. But yet I meet with such matter of discourse as whereunto this passage is very congruous to be there delivered if any where; yet no such thing is there delivered as *num:* 74. *Schaffman's* argument is this, *If God calls all to salvation then he will save all.* To this *Piscator* answereth, *The proposition is false; But he calls with, animo simplici atque vero, a simple mind and true. Sane* saith *Piscator*, as much as to say, I grant that; *but so as that he calls them with condition of repentance and faith; Therefore as he promiseth salvation seriously unto them that performe this condition, and therefore performes this promise. So on the contrary he doth seriously threaten death and damnation to them who doe not fulfill the condition, and performes unto him that commination. Then, though God be not capable of hypocrisy yet he doth not alwaies will that what he commands shall be alwaies performed by him to whom he gives that command; Whether by commanding he meanes to prove a man; as to prove Abraham, he commanded him to sacrifice his Son; or because to him whom he commandeth, he will not give grace to performe that command, as he deales with reprobates.* And *num:* 120. To *Schaffman's* objection which was this; *God is no hypocrite*, he answers thus; *But yet he gives not grace to all to performe what he commands the. For promiscuously he commands as well reprobates as elect to believe; as many as he calls by the preaching of the gospell; but he gives this grace to his elect alone according to that, To you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdome of heaven, but to them it is not given.* So that undoubtedly God offers grace (to wit pardon of sinne) with a purpose to communicate it to all that shall believe, according to the judgment of *Piscator*, neither doth he offer it with a purpose to communicate it to any unlesse they believe. But the grace of faith is not offered to any with a purpose to communicate it upon a condition. For then grace should be conferred according unto works, which is manifest *Pelagianisme*. As for the other which I meete with *p:* 128. *num:* 120: take it at full, and not as it is dismembred by this Authour, who cares not how he calumniates, so he might advantage his own cause. *Schaffman's* objection was, *Deus est unius & linguæ & voluntatis, God is both of the same tongue and will.* Whereto *Piscator* answers thus, *Your meaning is that God, look what he professeth with his tongue, that he willeth.*

Mat. 13.11.

But

But this (saith he) *is not alwaies true, nor in all particulars. For by his tongue that is by speech uttered, he professed that he would have Abraham to sacrifice his Son Isaac; yet he would not have him sacrificed. With his tongue he professed by his servant Jonas that he would destroy Nineveh within forty dayes, yet he would not so doe. With his tongue by the ministers of the Gospell he professeth that he would have the reprobates to whom he speaketh among his Elect, to believe the Gospell, in as much as he commands them so to doe; yet he would not have them to believe, in as much as he will not give them the grace of believing, without will no man can believe. What therefore is God an Hypocrite? Away with such a blasphemy. He alone is to be accounted an Hypocrite, who counterfeits holinesse when he has none; Such counterfeiting is not incident to God.* And let the Reader observe well the immodest cariage of this Authour. *Piscator* when he saith that *God in words professeth he will have Reprobates to believe*, he shewes withall in what respect he doth so, to wit, *quatenus mandat ut credant, in as much as he commands them to believe.* And indeed God's command is usually called God's will, and by none more then by these our opposites. But this Authour drawes this to the signification of God's will simply so called, which is the will of purpose; And to that purpose leaves out the words whereby *Piscator* explicates himselfe. Who knowes not that God commanded *Pharaoh* by his servant *Moses* to let Israel goe? this is to professe with the tongue in *Piscator's* phrase, that God would have *Pharaoh* to let Israel goe. And God's commandement is called God's will in Scripture. *This is the will of God even your sanctification.* 1 Thes: 4.3. But to speake properly it is but the signification of God's will of good pleasure (properly called the will of God) that it should be *Pharaoh's* duty to let Israel goe, but withall he revealed to *Moses* that *he would harden Pharaoh's heart, that he should not let Israel goe.* Now let the indifferent judge what this Authour hath gotten by these passages of *Piscator*, save only the displaying of his own immodest and calumniating courses. then he thinks to please his Reader with the story of *Tantalus*; wherein there is no congruity to that whereunto it is applyed, For *Tantalus a labris sitiens fugientia captat Flumina,—He was an hungred, and would faine eate but could not: He was a thirst, and would faine drinke but could not.* God deales so with no man; neither reprobate Jewes, nor Gentiles had any desire to be partakers of the mercies of God offered them in Christ. The Gospell was a scandall to the one, and foolishnesse to the other; *But to them that are called it is the power of God and wisedome of God.* And as they hunger and thirst after God's righteousnesse in his deare Son; so are they satisfied therewith, *Let him that is a thirst come and drinke of the water of life freely.* Rev: 22.17. And *Ho every one that is a thirst, come ye to the waters, and ye that have no silver, come buy and eate; come I say buy wine and milke without silver* Esa: 55.v.1. 2.3. *and without money: Wherefore doe ye lay out your silver, and not for bread? and your labour without being satisfied? Hearken diligently unto me, heare and your soules shall live; and I will make an everlasting covenant with you, even the sure mercies of David.* Here is no sending of them away empty, which thirst after these waters of life; They all shall *draw waters* Es: 12.3. *of the wells of salvation.* So that here is no such dealing with them, as the Poets feigne was their Gods dealing with *Tantalus*. My answer to that which he produceth out of *Zanchy* and *Bucer* the Reader shall find in my answer to M. *Hord*.

Pag. 76.77. In the point of threats and comminations; after these words, *We never read that threats are thundred out against us for originall sinne.* In M. *Hord's* discourse it is added, *Or for that corruption of nature which we brought with us into the world*: But this Authour leaves it quite out, with what mind let the Reader judge, and whether he can well brook that *originall sinne* should be stiled *a corruption of nature which we bring with us into the world.*

Pag. 78. In the same second sub-section after that of *Absalon's* feast, *Joab's* congy, the kisse of *Judas*, and the *Hyena's* teares &c. There is a good passage left out which followeth in M. *Hord*; and in the place thereof this, which here followeth, foysted in; Let the Reader consider with himselfe, wherefore that was left out, it seemes he was asham'd of that calumniation. But thus it followes here.

Nay the whole ministry (wherein God commandeth, offereth, chideth, entreateth, lamenteth &c.) if this be true, is but a mere impostures; a giving of words without any meaning of answerable deeds; And an impostures so much the greater, by how much the shew of kindnesse is the heartier. For how can a good thing be offered with stronger shewes of a good meaning, then when it is offered with exhortations and entreaties to accept it, with cleare demonstrations of the excellency of it, unfeigned wishes, that the parties to whom it is offered would accept it; and bitter lamentations for their folly in refusing it? With all these enforcements is Gods tender of salvation to Reprobates accompanyed, and therefore in shew most hearty and serious. In a word thus speaks God, by this doctrine, to Reprobates in the ministery. *M. Mason's Additions.*

"O ye Reprobates (once most dearely beloved of me in your father *Adam*, but now extreamly, and im-
"placably hated; and by mine eternall & uncontroulable order sealed up under invincible sinne and misery)
"amend your lives and believe in the name of mine only begotten Son. If you repent, and believe not, there
"is no remedy, you must be damned; but if you repent and believe ye shall be saved; Though your sins be as
"red as scarlet, I will make them to be as white as wooll. Thinke not that I would have you dye. For I
"sweare, as I live, I will not the death of him that dyeth. I would have no man to perish, but all to come to re-
"pentance. I beseech you therefore be reconciled. I have cryed and called unto you; I have a long time wai-
"ted upon you, that you might repent; And still am I knocking at the doores of your hearts for entrance. O
"that there were an heart in you to feare me and keep my commandements, that it might goe well with you
"for ever. What shall I doe unto you; how shall I intreate you? will you not be made cleane, when shall it once
"be? Can God speake thus to reprobates, who by his own decree, shall never repent, nor be saved, without the deepest dissimulation?

Answer. Judge indifferent Reader whether ever more passion were shewed with lesse common sense. For let the enforcements be never so great and serious in the ministry of the word, under which all the expressions here mentioned are comprehended, yet is it possible, that men can yeild unto them obedience by faith and repentance, unlesse God gives faith and repentance? For doth not the Scripture clearely testifie that faith is the gift of God. *Eph:* 2. 8. *To you it is given both to believe in him, & to suffer for him:* that it is *the worke of grace.* Act. *Phil:* 1. 29. 18. 27. *What hast thou that thou hast not received?* And doth not the Apostle accordingly *1 Col.* 4. 7. *pray* on the behalfe of the Ephesians, not for peace only, but for *faith and love* also from *Eph:* 6. 23. God the father and our Lord Jesus Christ? Is not repentance also the gift of God? *Him* *Act:* 5. 31. *God raised to be a Princea nd a Saviour to give repentance unto Israel & forgivenesse of sins.* *Act:* 11. 18. *Then hath God also unto the Gentiles given repentance unto life.* *If so be God may give them* *2 Tim:* 2. *last* *repentance.* What then? Shall this Authour's not Logick, but Rhetoricke whereinto his Logick is transform'd to the wonder of all that know him in the University, like some *Medusa's* head, turne us into stones, and in spight of Scripture evidence drive us to deny, that either faith, or repentance, is the gift of God? For if it be the gift of God, is not somewhat else required to the working of faith in us over and above all these enforcements? Not one *Arminian* hitherto have I found daring to deny that faith is the gift of God: Yet ever since I read them in their *Censura Censuræ* to deny that *Christ hath merited faith and regeneration for us*, I looked when they would come to deale seriously and sincerely; And if they have any such meaning, clearely to professe as much, namely that faith is not the gift of God. But if this Authour's meaning be that God gives it to all that have it, and is also ready to give it to them that have it not, provided, that they will doe their own part, seing he chargeth us to make God's waies void of truth and syncerity, how comes it to passe that this Authour carrieth himselfe so subdolously & shewes so little sincerity and cleareneſse in dealing plainly, & telling us that this is his meaning? Is it becaus we are ready to conclude upon him that he is as errand a *Pelagian*, as ever was, in maintaining that grace is conferred according to works? Why doth he carry himselfe and his opinions in huggar muggar if he be of that mind, and doth not plainly shew himselfe to be a *Pelagian*, and prove to the world that *Pelagianismus est verus Christianismus, Pelagianisme is true Christianity?* and in the next place oppose *Paul* also in saying that *God saved us and called us with an holy calling not according to our works, but accor-* *2 Tim:* 1. 9. *ding to his own purpose and grace;* and that *he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he* *Ro.* 9, 18. *hardneth?*

2ly, Consider further the strange infatuation of this Author, more waies then one. For 1, inquire of him, whether after all this worke of the ministery performed by him unto reprobates, he thinks not himselfe bound to pray unto God for a blessing upon his labours, whereby it may become effectuall unto them, and that upon this ground, becaus *Paul may plant, and Apollo may water, but God is he who gives the encrease.* And let him expresse what the encrease is, which he beggeth at the hand of God, whether it be not the performance of those duties whereunto he hath exhorted them in the most emphaticall manner, that the word of God doth afford any example of. And if no more be required for the working of man's will to that which is good (having as this Authour supposeth a power to performe obedience if they will) then these enforcements which he so much amplifies; whereto tend his prayers after all these enforcements are used? is it that God will afford his concourse to the act? Why is this a worke of grace? Doth not God afford this to the most sinfull act that is, without all prayers? And is it decent to maintaine that God of himselfe is forward enough to afford concourse to such acts as are evill, be they never so abominable; but to concurre with us to that which is good, he stands off and must be entreated and sollicited by our prayers earnest and fervent,

otherwise

otherwise he will be slacke to concurre to that which is good, though nothing slack to concurre to that which is evill? Nay is it possible that man should will ought, or doe ought, and God not concurre with him, to the producing both of the will and the deed? Now I had thought prayers tended to the procuring of works of grace, such as concourse is not, as which is performed of God 1. To sinfull acts, as well as to pious acts. 2. And that necessarily upon supposition that the reasonable creature doth ought. Consider farther, if his prayers tend only to the procuring of God's concurrence, and this concurrence is upon supposition of mans concurrence; let the indifferent, I say, consider the genius of this man's prayers. For albeit the forme of them runnes thus, that God will convert his hearers to faith, to repentance, and to work in them that which is pleasing in his sight through Jesus Christ; yea to worke in them both the will, and the deed, according to his good pleasure, to circumcise their hearts, to love the Lord their God with all their hearts, & with all their souls, to heal their backslidings; yea as he seeth all their waies, so to heale them, to cause them to walke in his statutes, and to keep his judgments, and to doe them; yea to put his feare in their hearts, that they may never depart away from him. (For thus he must pray, if he pray in faith built upon God's promises, we having speciall promises for all these particulars;) yet his meaning is no more then this, that as many of his Auditors as he findes willing to doe ought of this, that God will concurre with them to make them willing; And as many as doe performe it, he will concurre to the performance of it; as for those that are unwilling, he will not pray that God will make them willing, though that hath been ever the Lords course towards some, as *Austin* often professeth. And as for that prayer of *Austin*, '*Da Domine quod jubes & jube quid vis, Lord give me to doe what thou commandest, and then command what thou wilt.* Like enough he spights it as much as ever *Pelagius* did. But if any are forward to hate & to despite God's word, or the professours of his truth, he will not pray unto God to concurre with them thereunto. For he knowes God's forwardnesse to concurre to the performance of every abominable act without his prayers; Nay in despite of any prayers to the contrary: And doth he not thinke it in vaine for the holiest man that ever was to pray for this? 3. Againe observe he saith that by our doctrine the whole ministery is *a mere imposture*, & why? because it is in shew hearty and serious, but in truth nothing so. But what moves him to say this, doth not God procure hereby the conversion & salvation of millions? yea of many of those who have crucified the Son of God; who have persecuted his Church? Do we not believe that a time shall come wherin the Jews shall be cõverted in spight of all their former obstinacy, & in despight of all their blasphemies powred forth against the Son of God? But he will say, that grace is shewed only to the Elect by our opinion. But here let every indifferẽt person judg between us of the equity of this his discourse. *The whole ministery is a mere imposture; because all the inforcements wherewith the tender of salvation unto Reprobates is accompanied is in shew most hearty & serious, but indeed nothing so.* For what? have the elect of God no part in the ministery? Or dares he say that by our doctrin these inforcements are nothing hearty & serious to them? Thou wilt say the Authour's meaning is, that the whole ministery is a mere imposture towards reprobates; but he saith not so, but thus, *The whole ministery is a mere imposture*; and afterwards in giving his reason for it, he pleads, that inforcements in shew hearty & serious made to reprobates are nothing so; & hence he concludes that the whole ministery is a mere imposture without any distinctiõ of persons, to whom it is a mere imposture 4. Yet I willingly confesse that it is foul enough, that God's courses should be courses of imposture towards any even towards reprobates. But how doth he prove, that God takes any such course with reprobates? To whom hath God sent his word & vouchsafed the ministery hereof according to all the enforcements mẽtioned accompanying his tender of salvation unto them? is it not unto his Church? *What is the preferment of the Jew above the Gentile? much every way*, saith *Paul, cheifly because unto thẽ were committed the Oracles of God.* And was the Church of Jewes, a Church of reprobates, Were they not the City of God, but the city of the Devill? If these enforcements had been used to the Ninivites, there had been some colour for such an imputation; but seing the ministery of God's word in all these enforcements is used to the people of God, his pretious people, chosen out of the world to put his name among'st them; shall this ministery be so carryed, as concerning reprobates? All that he hath to say for this is no other, but that a great part, or the most part of the people to whom he sends his prophets are reprobates. Be it so, but how doth he prove that God intends this ministery; for the salvation of reprobates; or that he intends it at all for them? If God commands them, as he commanded *Jeremiah* saying, *Goe & cry in the eares of Jerusalem, Thus saith the Lord*; they must doe so without difference. For they are not able to put a difference between the Elect and Reprobate, to know who are the one, and who are the other. *Austin* was willing to pray for all, but yet he professeth,

that if they knew who they were, whō God had ordained unto damnation, they would pray no more for them, then for the Devill himself; so that either the Prophets were not of *Austin's* mind, or else that they thought that their ministery in God's purpose and appointment tended to the salvatiō only of Gods elect: But because they knew not, who they are, therefore they prayed for all, and used their ministeriall enforcements indifferently towards all. But like enough this Authour will deny, that the Prophets were of *Austin's* mind; Therefore I will prove they were in this; The Prophets were undoubtedly of St. *Paul's* mind; but St. *Paul* was of St. *Austin's* mind in this therefore the Prophets also were of St. *Austin's* mind. Now that St. *Paul* was of St. *Austin's* mind, and that his ministery, though performed towards all, yet was intended for the salvation only of God's elect, I prove thus, *Though I be free from all men, yet have I made my selfe a servant unto all men that I might winne the more.* Observe, he doth not say that he might winne all; Againe, *I became all things to all men that I might save some.* Who are these some at whose salvation he aimes? I answer they are God's elect, and none but they; and this I prove out of those words of his where he saith, *Therefore I suffer all things for the elects sake that they might also obtaine salvation which is in Christ Jesus with eternall glory.* Now if his sufferings were for their sakes, undoubtedly his whole ministery was for their sakes; for this alone brought his sufferings upon him. *The holy Ghost witnesseth in every City saying, that bonds and afflictions abide me; But I passe not at all, neither is my life deare unto my selfe, so that I may fulfill my course with joy and the ministration that I have received to testifie the Gospell of the grace of God.* 5. But be it, that God intends it for Reprobates also, yet not for their salvation; But first to take away excuse from them, as to this purpose he sent *Ezechiel. Son of man I send thee to a rebellious nation For they are impudent children; I doe send thee unto them, and thou shalt say unto them, Thus saith the Lord God; but surely they will not heare neither indeed will they cease; for they are a rebellious house, yet shall they know that there hath been a Prophet among them.* Or otherwise as *Austin* hath observed, *ut proficiant ad exteriorem vitæ emendationem, quo mitius puniantur, that they may profit to an outward amendment of their lives, that their punishment may be the lesse.* And consider whether in all this he doth not openly invade, not so much our doctrine, as the manifest evidence of God's word. For it is apparent that God gives commands to those whose hearts he means to harden, that they shall not obey those commands, though those commands were not made in a cold manner but with strongest enforcements. *Thou shalt say to Praraoh, thus saith the Lord, Israel is my son, even my first borne, wherefore I say to thee, let my son goe that he may serve me. If thou refuse to let him goe, behold I will slay thy son, even, thy first borne.* Yet before this he told *Moses* saying, *I will harden his heart, and he shall not let the people goe.* And after this, *The Lord hardned the heart of Pharaoh, and he hearkned not unto them, as the Lord had said to Moses.* And hereupon the Lord deales with him in the way of greater enforcement then before. For the *Lord said unto Moses, Rise up early in the morning, and stand before Pharaoh and tell him, Thus saith the Lord God of the Hebrews, let my people goe that they may serve me, For I will at this time send all mine plagues upon thine heart, and upon thy servants, and upon thy people, that thou maiest know that there is none like me in all the earth. For now will I stretch out mine hand, that I may smite thee, and thy people with pestilence, and thou shalt perish from the earth. And indeed for this cause have I appointed thee to shew my power in thee, & to declare my name thoroughout all the world; Yet thou exaltest thy selfe against my people, and lettest thē not goe. Behold to morrow this time I will cause to raine, a mighty great hayle, such as was not in Egypt since the foundation of it was laid.* And *The lord said unto Moses, Goe to Pharaoh; for I have hardned his heart, and the heart of his servants, that I might worke these my miracles in the middest of his realme.* Here we have plaine enforcements & those of great power used by the Lord, yet still the Lord continues to harden *Pharaoh's* heart, and professeth as much, not fearing the censure of any vile wretch to cast upon him the imputation of imposture throughout the whole course of his ministery. And the truth is all the learned concurre in distinguishing between, *Voluntas præcepti, & voluntas propositi*; and count it absurd to inferre the purpose of God, or his will to have such a thing done from his commanding it, though this command be joyned with exhortation, expostulations, wishes, or whatsoever other emphaticall expressions; all which the learned conclude under *Præceptum*, as a signe of God's will: And the Pelagians of old urged it no farther then as God's precept backt with what exhortations and enforcements soever, thence to conclude that man had power to yeild obedience, but not to conclude, it was God's will it should come to passe; and to impute desires unto God in proper speech, which never are accomplished, what an unscholasticall course is it? even as much as to deny him to be God, and to bereave him of his blessed condition, by frustrating him of his desires: Whereas the time shall come, that the Elect of God shall be so blessed, as to have no desire of theirs in vaine. Neither doth the objectour introduced by St. *Paul*

Aug: de civit: Dei lib. 21. c: 24. si Ecclesia nosset qui prædestinati sint ire in æternum ignem cum diabolo tam pro iis non magis oraret quam pro diabolo

1 *Co:* 9. 19. vers: 22.

2 *Tim:* 2. 10.

Act: 20. 23, 24.

Ezek: 2. 3. 4. 5.

Ex: 4. 22. 23. v. 21.

Ex: 9. 12.

v: 13.

v: 14. 15. 16.

Ex: 10. 1.

breake forth into any such blasphemy, as to charge God with any impoſture in hard- Ro. 9. 19.
ning whom he will; when nevertheleſſe the miniſtery of the word hath courſe with them as well as with any other; but rather propoſeth it as a thing unreaſonable, that God ſhould complaine of mens diſobedince, when himſelfe hath hardned their hearts, whereby it comes to paſſe that it cannot be that they ſhould obey God as they ought. *For who hath reſiſted his will.* Yet we know what anſwer the Apoſtle maketh to ſtop the mouthes of all ſuch, as call God to an account for his procedings. *But ô man who art thou who diſputeſt with God? Shall the thing formed ſay to him that formed it, why haſt thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay of the ſame lumpe, to make one veſſell unto honour and another unto diſhonour?* And wilt not thou allow as much power unto God, over thee, or over the matter whereof thou waſt made, as the Potter hath power over the clay? Proud man thinks himſelfe able enough to believe, to repent. Now God by his paſſionate expreſſions in the Prophets diſcovereth the vanity of this proud conceit, and laboureth by their little profiting by all theſe patheticall moving courſes to manifeſt the ſtrength of man's corruption; And when they will not learne and receive this inſtruction by his workes; he tells them the plaine truth of it to their faces. *Ye have* Deut. 29. 2.
ſeen all that the Lord did before your eyes in the land of Egypt, to Pharaoh and all his ſervants, and unto all his land. The great temptations which thine eyes have ſeen, thoſe great verſ. 3.
miracles and wonders: Yet the Lord hath not given you an heart to perceive, nor eyes to ſee, nor eares to heare unto this day. Is this the courſe of impoſture, when he tells them to their faces, that albeit he commands them, exhorts them, expoſtulates with them, and expreſſes formes of deſire of their obedience in his word; yet except God gives them an heart, they cannot perceive; except God gives them eyes, they cannot ſee; except the Lord gives them eares they cannot heare: What can be more plaine dealing then this? Like as our Saviour no leſſe plainly told the Jewes to their face; *He that is of God heareth God's words; ye therefore heare them not, becauſe ye are not of God;* Yet was he earneſt and patheticall enough in exhorting them to repentance by the miniſtery of *John* the Baptiſt; by his own miniſtery. *Jeruſalem, Jeruſalem that killeſt the Prophets, and ſtoneſt them which are ſent unto thee; how often would I have gathered thy children together as an hen gathereth her chicken under her wings, and ye would not. Behold your habitation is left unto you deſolate. For I ſay unto you ye ſhall not ſee me henceforth, till that ye ſay, Bleſſed is he that commeth in the name of the Lord.* I come to this Author's Proſopopey; for the truth is his Rhetorick ſurmounts his Logicke, whereat I wonder not a little.

O ye Reprobates, once moſt dearely beloved in your father Adam. But where hath he found in any of our Divines that Reprobates were at all beloved in our father *Adam*? We all hold Reprobation to be as antient as election, which St. *Paul* teſtifies to have been before the foundation of the world. And to ordaine to damnation I ſhould think is to hate rather then to love; and this ordination divine was from everlaſting. And the Scripture hath taught us that the divine nature is without variableneſſe or ſhadow of change. He ſpeakes in the language of his own Court, when he talkes of *ſealing up* Eph. 4. 30.
under invincible ſinne and miſery. The Scripture ſpeaks of ſealing unto the day of 1 Pet. 1. 5.
redemption by God's holy ſpirit which gives them aſſurance, *that they are kept by the* 2 Tim. 4. 18.
power of God through faith unto ſalvation; That God will deliver them from every evill work, & preſerve them to his heavenly kinngdome. But no ſuch ſpirit is given to Reprobates to aſſure them of their damnation, ſo to ſeale them up *under invincible ſin & miſery.* They are under the power of Satan; but he hath neither power nor authority to aſſure them of their damnation. And albeit this Authour faſhions a diſcourſe to reprobates, as if they were a ſect well known; Yet we are ſo farre from knowing who they are, that they are (in our opinion) neither known to themſelves, nor known to Satan, no nor to God's holy Angells, unleſſe he reveale it unto them. If we ſhould have any cauſe to addreſſe our ſelves to Reprobates (which kind of caſe and occaſion is incomprehenſible by me) we ſhould deſcribe them no otherwiſe then thus; *O ye who are not only for the preſent under the power of Satan* (and ſo are all God's elect before the time of regeneration) but will continue vaſſalls unto him, even unto death, going on from ſinne, to ſinne and never breaking them off by repentance, but continuing to deſpiſe the goodneſſe of God leading thereunto. Now this being only in reference to the time to come; I cannot ſpeake to any in preſent under this forme abſolutely, but hypothetically. For none are Reprobates to us, but ſuch who finally perſevere in impenitency; Therefore I cannot exhort them to amend their lives under the ſtile of Reprobates, but as ſuch, who although they are under the power of ſinne and

Satan, may for ought I know belong to God's election, and in good time come out of the snare of Satan; And because the ministry of the word is the only meanes whereby God brings men unto repentance, and that by instruction, admonition and exhortation; therefore I doe instruct them in the knowledge of God that made them after his own Image; and how this image of God came to be defaced in them, to wit, by the sinne of our first parents, and how hereupon we became to be shapen in sinne, and borne in sinne, and therewithall children of wrath, and such as deserve to be made the generation of God's curse; then I represent unto them the mercy of God towards man in giving us his Son to beare our sins in his body upon the tree, and suffer a shamefull and bitter death upon the crosse for them; and that for this his Son's sake he offers unto us the pardon of all our sins upon our repentance, and faith in Christ, and thereupon I exhort them unto repentance: We farther say that God takes no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, but takes pleasure in a man's repentance. We doe not say, neither doth the word of God say, that he willeth not the death of him that dyeth. For undoubtedly he willeth the damnation of all them that dye in their sins without repentance. We doe not say that *God would have no man to perish, but all come to repentance.* Neither doth the Scripture say any such thing; For that were to deny God's omnipotency. For seing many there be that perish; if this were contrary to God's will, then God's will should be resistible, and we should be driven to deny the first Article of our Creed; As *Austine* hath long agoe
2 *Pet:* 1. 1. argued the case. But indeed *Peter* writing to them, *who had obtained like pretious faith with*
1 *Pet:* 1. 23. *the Apostles themselves*; and such as were *Elect unto sanctification of the spirit*; *and were begotten againe to a lively hope by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead*; to them he writes saying, The Lord of that promise is not slack, but is patient towards us (not to us *Reprobates*; God forbid that we should so corrupt the interpretation of his words; but rather to us *Elect*, to us called, to us begotten of God) *not willing any to perish* (to wit of us) *but all come to repentance*, to wit all of us, whensoever through our frailty we turne out of the good wayes of the Lord. God cries unto you by us, and calls upon you by us; and hath along time shewed great patience, and long suffering, and hereby led you unto repentance; & by his word stands knocking at the doores of your hearts, and calling upon you to open unto him. And the more to move you, he is pleased to expresse himself in the affections of a weake man, who is not able to accomplish his desires, *O that there were an heart in you to feare me and keep my commandements*; and with great passionatnesse cryeth out unto you, *What shall I doe unto you, how shall I intreat you?* As if he were to seek what course to take, and willing to use every provocation to excite you and stirre you up,
Esa: 1. sometimes by gracious promises, as *Come and let us reason together, though thy sins were*
Jer: 13. 27. *as scarlet &c.* Sometimes by threatnings, *Woe unto thee ô Jerusalem, wilt thou not be made cleane, when shall it once be.* And withall he gives us to understand, & requires us to preach as much unto you also, even to acquaint you with the whole counsell of God, & tell you,
Act: 13. 48. that *as many as are ordained unto eternall life*, as many *as to whom the arme of the Lord is revealed*;
Es: 53. 1. as many as *are of God*, they obey this calling, they believe, they heare God's words,
Jo: 8. 27. and turne unto him by true repentance sooner or later; They that doe not, it is because
Deut: 5. 29. *they are not of God.* And albeit those words are the words of *Moses*, *O that there were an heart in you to feare me*! speaking to them in the name of the Lord; yet the same *Moses*
Deut: 29. 4. tells the same people plainly that *The Lord had not given them an heart to perceive, nor eyes to see, nor eares to heare unto that Day.* And albeit the Lord professeth in like manner by
Es: 48. 18. his Prophet *Esay*, *O that thou hadst hearkned unto my commandements, then had thy prosperity been as the flood, and thy righteousnesse as the waves of the sea.* Yet this very disobedience of theirs was consequent to the Lord's obduration of them, as appeares *Es:* 6. 9. *Goe say unto this people ye shall heare indeed, but ye shall not understand; ye shall plainly see & not perceive. Make the heart of this people fat, make their eares heavy and shut their eyes; least they see with their eyes, and heare with their eares, and convert, and he heale them. Then said the Lord how long?* (should this obduration continue) *And he answered untill the Cityes be wasted without inhabitant, and the houses without man, and the land be utterly desolate; And the Lord have removed men farre away, and there be a great desolation in the midst of the land*; Yet I dare not say of any of you, that ye are Reprobates. For God may open your eyes before you dye to see your sins, and touch your hearts that ye may bewaile them. And whensoever this blessed condition doth befall you, I will stirre you up to give God the glory of it, who alone it is, that worketh in us that, which *is pleasing in his sight*;
Heb: 13. 21. Yea *both the will and the deed according to his good pleasure.* If he never workes any such
Phil: 2. 13. thing in you, the more inexcusable are you, who presuming of your own power to believe

lieve, to repent; yet are nothing moved with such passionate expressions, unto repentance. If you doe believe there is such impotency in you to good, and that it must needs continue in you, while God continueth to harden you by denying his grace, and thereupon ye except against God's course in complaining of their disobedience, whom he hath hardned saying *Why then doth he complaine; For Who hath resisted his will?* I put all such over to St. *Paul* to receive answer from him *Rom:*9.20.21.22. As touching this Author's conclusion; Dares he himselfe say that by God's decree Reprobates shall ever repent or be saved? What then is his meaning? why doth he not expresse himselfe in this particular; but most unshamefastly earthes himselfe like a foxe, unwilling to bring his vile opinion to the light, which I take to be no other then this, that God's decree of giving faith is not absolute but conditionall; namely to give faith to as many, as shall prepare themselves for it; And to deny it to none, but such as faile to prepare for it; as much as in plaine termes to professe that *Grace is given according unto workes*, The very filth of Pelagianisme: Yet hath he no where discovered wherein this preparation consists; that he keeps to himselfe, and to his own Muses.

*P.*80. I find another addition to the third Sub-section in these words.

To offer salvation under a condition not possible is in circumstance a great deale worse. For it is a deniall under colour of the contrary; a deniall joyned with a scoffe and derision; as was that of the Jebusites, who told *David* that he should not enter into the fort of Sion, *except he took away the blind and the lame.* Their meaning was they would never deliver it up unto him; and because they thought it impossible for him to take away the blind and the lame, they told him if he did so, then they would yeeld it up. It was an Ironicall & scoffing denyall of his demand. If the King should make an unrepealable law that no German should be made a Citizen of London or free Denizon of the kingdome, & then make a decree to give some bountifull gratuities, but to the Citizens of London, or to the subjects of the kingdome only, & to none but them; And yet for all this should command it to be proclaimed, that he will give them to the Germans upon condition they will be made free men of London, or be incorporated into the Kingdome; would not any man say that the King in this case did dissemble and delude the poore Dutchmen? And if any should say there would be no dissembling in it; For if they would become Citizens or subjects, they should have the promised gratuities, a man might truely answer, that therefore the King doth counterfeit and cousen them, because he makes a tender of them upon a condition not possible by his own decree. In like manner if God have made a decree, that such men shall never believe, and yet offer them heaven upon condition, they will believe, it may most truly be sayd that God doth not only deny them heaven, but deny it with a bitter derision, which is farre from that candor and goodnesse that dwelleth in him. *M. Mason's Additions.* 2 *Sam.* 5. 6.

M. *Hord's* discourse at the first went no farther then to prove, that *In substance it is all one to offer a curtesie under a condition not possible, and not to offer it at all.* Here this Author addes that *it is in circumstance a greate deale worse.* For he saith *it is a deniall joyned with a scoffe and derision, as was that of the Jebusites.* In my answer to the former part in M. *Hord* I have shewed that the reason why *Salvation is proposed in scripture to be obtaind upon a condition to be performed by man*, is because God intends to save those, whom he doth save after a manner a greable to their reasonable natures; Namely by instruction, in a law of works, in a law of faith, by admonition and exhortation strengthned with promises to the obedient, with threatnings to the disobedient. And albeit men are not able to performe this obedience of themselves, being disabled by that naturall corruption, which they have drawn from the Loynes of our father, in whom our natures received a mortall blow, through his disobedience, and became disabled to performe any thing acceptable in the sight of God (*for they that are in the flesh cannot please God*) therefore the Lord is ready according to the covenant of grace to circumcise the hearts of some, namely of his Elect, *To love the Lord with all their hearts, and With all their soules, to put his spirit within them, to cause them to Walke in his statutes, to keepe his judgments and doe them.* It is true this offer of salvation is proposed to all within the Church, whether Elect or Reprobate; and no marvaile. For the Ministers of God's word are not acqnainted with the counsells of God, as touching the election or reprobation of any man in particular: therefore they preach unto all, but knowing full well that this their ministery shall be effectuall only to God's elect, as touching their salvation. Therefore as *they indure all things for the elect sake.* So for the elects sake it is that they preach the whole counsell of God, according as the Lord himselfe instructed *Paul* saying, *Feare not, but speak & hold not thy peace; for I am with thee, and none shall lay hold on thee for to hurt thee. For I have much people in this City.* Who are this people but the Elect of God. Yet God makes this use of preaching his word to all, that hereby excuse is taken from the. For hereby it is made known unto them *That a Prophet hath been among them.* As for the point of derision. First this Authour prescribes unto God very demurely, that he must not deride him. Yet will he thinke it lawfull

167 *Answer.* 2 *Sam:*5.6. *Act:* 18.9. *Ezech:* 2. 5.

full for himselfe to mocke a dogge offering to give somewhat unto him, when he meanes nothing lesse; but man is growen so proud that he will take it in scorne to be mocked of any, yea of God himselfe, little thinking that he may well deserve to be derided and mocked. Yet the Scripture may teach us this, and that God will mocke some, and therein deale with them according to their works; *Because I have called and ye refused; I have stretched out mine hand and none would regard: But ye have despised all my counsell, and would none of my correction, I will also laugh at your destruction, and mocke when your feare commeth.* Secondly I answer that man naturally is presumptuous of his own strength to believe, to repent; and shall God then be censured for mocking him, when he calls upon him to believe, to repent? *Dicere solet humana superbia si scissem, fecissem*, sayth *Austin*, *This is the course of man's pride to say had I known it, I had done it.* If they are sensible of this impotency, can they not say with *Austin*, *Da Domine quod jubes, & jube quod vis; Lord give what thou biddest, and then bid what thou wilt?* Againe if God commands nothing, but what he hath power to command, as namely to believe what he saith, and to doe what he injoynes; why should this be censured mockery in reference to man's disability to performe it, when this disability is brought upon him by the sinne of *Adam*, in whom we all were, and in him we have all sinned? And which is more; what meanes this Authour to carry the matter thus hand over head, as to talke of an impossible condition without all distinction? Dares he say, that faith and repentance are possible by power of nature? Or doth any of us deny it to be possible by grace? If this be so it followeth that all the question between us should be drawen to this issue; whether God gives the grace of faith and repentance unto all; Yet indeed the truth herein deserves to be put out of all question, it being apparent that, *Fides non est omnium, all men doe not believe.* Nay it is called in Scripture *the Faith of God's elect*: So that the question is about the nature of that grace, without which faith and repentance cannot be performed. Why doth not this Authour expresse his meaning in this, and clearly professe what that grace is whereby the conditions of faith & repentance are made conditions possible? His subdolous carriage throughout in concealing his Tenet is sufficient to disparage his cause with all that are indifferent and judicious. The Scripture plainly professeth that faith is the gift of God, repentance is the gift of God; But as he carrieth the matter nothing lesse appeares, then that this is his opinion: Yet I know he dares not in plaine termes oppose the cleare evidence of Scripture in this. Now if faith be the gift of God, & withall he gives it without difference to all the all must believe, which is notoriously & palpably untrue. If he gives it only to some, the all the rest are mocked by God according to this Authour's discourse; as often as he saith unto them believe, and ye shall be saved. And to whom he saith this, to them he saith also, *Oh that there were such an heart in them to feare me &c.* If he saith, he gives faith absolutely to none, but conditionally, and upon the same condition he is ready to give to all; this is clearely to confesse that the grace of God is given according to man's workes. Againe *'tis God that worketh in us both the will and the deed, and that according to his good pleasure*, if according to his good pleasure, How can it be said that it is according to the preparation of the creature? Then what condition can be devised whereupon God workes in us the will? If he say the grace which God gives to all, and whereby to believe, to repent is made a thing possible unto all (For thus we must proceed groaping after his meaning, he affecting nothing more then to sculke and earth himselfe in his concealements) I answer first; The Scripture makes no mention of any such power given to any; but to the contrary professeth of all persons unregenerate, that *they cannot please God*; that *They cannot discerne the things of God*, 1 Co: 2.14: that *They cannot believe*, that *They cannot repent* Ro: 24: that *they are not subject to the law of God nor can be.* 2ly. The Scripture plainly saith that faith is the gift of God, repentance is the gift of God; It doth not say that the power to believe if they will is the gift of God. If he saith by faith is meant such a power, whereby a man may believe if he will, I prove the contrary; then *all men should have faith.* For in this mans opinion, all men are indued with this power: But the Apostle plainly saith that, *All men have not faith.* Againe faith is described to be, *The faith of God's Elect*; but a power to believe if we will, this Authour makes common to the Elect with Reprobates. Moreover if to give power to believe if a man will, be to give him faith, then in as much as God gives power to sinne if he will, he may be said as well, that God gives sinne. Adde to this that *to have power to believe, if one will*; is rather nature then grace. For it is no more then *posse fidem habere*; and this is the nature of man as *Austin* testifies. *Posse fidem habere naturæ est hominum, fidem habere gratiæ est fidelium*; *'Tis the nature of man that he may have faith, but it is of the grace of the faithfull, that a man hath faith.*

Prov: 1.24.25. 26.

Aug. de grat. & lib. arbitr. cap. 2.

Ro: 5.

2 Thes: 3 Tit: 1.1.

Phil: 2.13.

Ro: 8. Jo: 12.40.

Tit: 1. 1.

Aug. de praedest. Sanctorum c. 5.

And

And indeed if faith given us of God, did only inable us to believe, if we will; it were farre inferiour to a morall vertue, which doth not give man power to be vertuous, if he will; or to performe a vertuous act if he will: but makes him vertuous, and diſpoſeth the will to vertuous acts only, and leaves him not indifferent, whether he will performe vertuous acts, or no. To returne then, if no other grace be required to free God from mocking and deriding his creature; ſurely we are as free as our adverſaries from making God to deride and mocke his creature. For we are ready to grant that all men may believe if they will, repent if they will with *Auſtin l. 1. de Gen: cont: Man: cap: 3. & De ſpiritu & literâ ad Marcellin. cap: 32. & De prædeſt. in: Sanct: cap: 5.* And our reaſon is this. Not to be able to doe that which a man will doe, is impotency merely naturall; but the impotency that we ſpeake of, which is hereditary to all mankind by reaſon of the fall, is impotency morall, and reſident in the will of man. For who doubts but that the will to believe, is to believe? For *credimus ſi volumus:* So the will to repent is to repent. For repentance in the root thereof is nothing elſe but the change of the will. And *Pelagius* of three things propoſed. *Poſſe, Velle, & Agere*; he willingly granted the firſt, to wit, *Poſſe bonum*, to be from God; but he denied the other two to be the works of God; but of our free wills; which if he had acknowledged to be the workes of God, as well as the firſt *Auſtin* tells him that, ab *Apoſtolicâ doctrinâ abhorrere non videretur*; *he ſhould not ſeeme to vary from the doctrine of the Apoſtles.* And for ought I ſee this Authour goes not one ſtep beyond *Pelagius.* He acknowledgeth that God doth perſwade and exhort to believe; ſo did *Pelagius.* ibid. cap. 10. He ſaith alſo that God doth concurre to the act; but ſo he doth in his opinion to every ſinfull act; ſo that this is but a generall concourſe: and what Pelagian was ever known to deny, but that God might have as great an hand in any good act, as in any naturall act? Now ſince we acknowledge all this as well as he; what colour hath he to impute unto us, that we by our doctrine ſo faſhion God's providence, as to make him deride and mock miſerable people. Though the Jebuſites did mock *David*, as this Authour gives his word for it (though I doe not find that *Rabbi David Kimhi*, or *Piſcator* count it any deriſion, but a plaine repreſentation of their confidence, that *David* was never able to take it, ſuch was the ſtrength of the tower, that the weakeſt, even the blind and the lame were ſufficient to defend it.) Though withall *Kimhi* acquaints us with a ſtrange ſtory out of the Jews *Daraſhe*, of a Covenant made between *Abraham* and King *Abimelech*, and that concerning not him alone, but his Son and his Nephew, to ſuffer them quietly to enjoy their own; And that the Nephew of that *Abimelech* was alive at that time when *David* came to beſiege that fort; And that therein the Jebuſites had erected two Images, the one blind to repreſent *Iſaack*, who in his old age was blind; and the other lame repreſenting *Jacob*, who by wreſtling with God became lame, and in the mouthes of theſe Images was kept the Covenant which was made between *Abraham* and *Abimelech.* The inſtance he gives of a proclamation which takes up the greateſt part of this ſupplement (as a great part of this Authour's diſcourſe, is ſpent in ſuch inſicete repreſentations) is moſt incongruous, not only to the matter whereunto it is applyed, but to the parts of it ſelfe. 1. To the matter whereunto it is applyed. For it is propoſed in ſuch a caſe, as men could not obtaine a certaine incorporation, though they much deſired it. Now ſuch a thing is not incident to Reprobates, namely that they cannot believe though they would For had they a will to believe, undoubtedly that would be accepted of God. Then. 2 it is incongruous to the parts of the Simile it ſelfe. For incorporation only is precluded unto Germans by the unrepealable law, he feignes without common underſtanding. For undoubtedly all lawes of men are repealable by the ſame authority, whereby they are made. And afterwards the condition of obtaining certaine bountifull gratuities, by vertue of the foreſaid incorporation, is propoſed moſt undecently, not of their being incorporated into that ſociety, but of their will to be incorporated. Now it is apparent that by the caſe feigned their incorporation only is precluded nnto them, not their will to be incorporated. In the accommodation he ſaith, *God hath made a decree* (by our doctrin) *that ſuch men ſhall never believe.* Now what one of our Divines can he produce to juſtifie this? We ſay God hath decreed not to give them grace to work them unto faith, but to leave them unto themſelves. And is not this Authour of the ſame opinion? Nay doth he not extend it farther then we doe, even to the Elect, as well as Reprobates? We ſay not ſo, but that his elect he doth not leave unto themſelves to worke out their faith if they can, but workes them by his grace and holy Spirit thereunto. Himſelfe ſeemes to be conſcious of the falſhood of this his imputation dealing upon the point of God's juſtice. Sub-ſect. 2. For having there propoſed three cauſes why

Aug: de gratia Chriſti, cap. 6.

why Reprobates *cannot justly be bound to believe*; The second of them was this in M. *Hord's* discourse, *Because it is impossible that they should believe; because God hath decreed they shall have no power to believe till their dying day.* This reason is changed in this Authour's refining of that discourse (as indeed all these reasons are changed by him more or lesse without replying upon ought that I have answered thereunto, but only putting out, or putting in at his pleasure, to cast a shew that the former discourse of M. *Hord's* is not answered; such is his subdolous cariage to undermine that truth, which he is not able to oppose in a faire manner with any sound reason; least of all by evidence of Scripture, that flying in his face at every turne; and therefore his best wisdome is to shut his eyes against it.) And here he sayth not in representing his second reason, that *God hath decreed they shall have no power to believe, to their dying day*; but thus rather; *Because it is not God's unfeigned will they shall believe.* But now againe in this supplement of his, he returnes to the first, and saith that by our doctrine, *God hath made a decree that such men shall never believe. Quo teneam vultus mutantem Protea nodo.* But I confesse it is an honour to God's truth, that it cannot be opposed, but in so vile a manner. Yet I have already shewed, that we deny not unto reprobates *a power to believe if they will.* We deny not the ministery of the word unto them, exhorting them to believe. We deny not but that whosoever hath a will to believe, or doth believe, God must necessarily concurre to the producing of that will, and that act of his. All this we grant, which is the uttermost whereunto this Authour comes; but over and above we say, that God doth not only give his elect a power to believe if they will, and perswade them to believe; but that also he works them to believe, and not only concurres with them in producing gracious acts, but makes them to concurre with him also; this is the grace, and this alone that he denies to reprobates.

Pag. 85. Treating of the use and end of God's gifts, the Authour hath an addition of some seven lines concerning the Lord's supper, but nothing at all to purpose.

Pag. 87. Of the fift Section next following; The passages out of the suffrages of our *Brittain* Divines in the Synod of Dort quoted by M. *Hord*, here they are expressed, namely *that there are certaine internall workes preparing a man to justification, which by the power of the word and Spirit are wrought in the hearts of men not yet justified, such as are the knowledge of God's will, and sense of sinne, feare of punishment.* Now I have shewed that these our Brittish Divines goe much farther; and yet in their fift Article and fourth position, they professe of all such as are none of Gods Elect, that *it is manifest they never really and truly attaine that change and renovation of the mind and affections, which accompanieth justification; nay nor that which doth immediately prepare, and dispose unto justification.* And therefore the preparation that this Authour speaks of as out of them, must needs be a remote preparation. And withall they adde, that *They never seriously repent, they are never affected with hearty sorrow for offending God, for sinning, neither doe they come to any humble contrition of heart, nor conceive a firme resolution not to offend any more.* Now let every sober person judge, whether God proceeding no farther with them then this, can be said to intend their conversion and salvation. The other position of theirs is this, *Those whom God by his word and Spirit affecteth after this manner, those he truly and seriously calleth and inviteth unto conversion.* I make no question, but whom God calleth, he calleth seriously, and whom he inviteth unto conversion, that is as I take it, unto repentance, he inviteth truly & seriously thereunto. But that God intendeth either their conversion or salvation, I utterly deny. For did he intend it, undoubtedly he would worke it; For certainly this is in his power. Faith is his gift, and repentance is his gift, and perseverance in both is his gift. And unlesse he gives faith and repentance we hold it impossible that any man should believe or repent. And what a monster is it in Divinity to maintaine, that God's intentions are frustrated, which cannot be maintained without denying God's omnipotency? For no man's intentions are frustrated, but because it lyeth not in his power to bring to passe the things intended by him.

Pag. 88. In the next section following is inserted a sentence of *Prosper* which no man denies. It is this *They that have despised God's inviting will, shall feele his revenging will*, but it is rightly to be understood, namely of *despising his inviting will all along*; and finally; Otherwise if they break of their contempt by repentance, there is mercy enough in store with God to pardon them, and his revengefull hand shall not be felt by them.

Pag. 89. And seventh section, concerning the use and end of God's gifts; divers passages of our Divines are mentioned, shewing the end of God's providence in affording his word unto reprobates. As first out of *Calvin, Behold he directs his voice unto them that they may be the more deafe; He kindles a light, but that they may be made more blind; He giveth*

Instit. l. 3. c. 24. num. 13.

them

them a remedie; that they might not be healed. Now *Calvin* herein points to that of *Esay. Goe and say to the children of Israel, hearing heare but understand not, seeing, see but perceive not. Make the heart of this people fat* (or obstinate) *and make their eares heavy, and shut their eyes; least they see with their eyes, and heare with their eares, and understand with their hearts, & convert and be healed* And *Calvin* doth but relate what the Lord saith to *Esay: Ecce vocem ad eos dirigit. Behold* (by this place of the prophet *Esay*) *to what end* the Lord sends his prophet to speake unto them. Now if *Calvin* doth herein misinterpret that place of the prophet *Esay*, it became this Author to except against his interpretation, and discover the unsoundnes of it; But taking no such course, and consequently by his silence (being an adversary) justifying his interpretation; while he reproacheth *Calvin* in this particular, he reproacheth the Holy Ghost, whose words he represents delivered unto his prophet. *Esay.* 6. 9.

The next passage is taken out of *Beza* in his Prælud. on the 9. to the *Rom:* p. 434. where he sayth *It ought not to seem absurd, that God unto Reprobates, living in his Church, doth offer grace in his word and Sacraments. For he doth it not to this end, that they may be saved, but that they may have lesse excuse then others, and at length be more greviously punished.* And indeed why should this seeme aliene from the course of Gods providence revealed in his word, testifying that *the invisible things of God*, to wit *his eternall power and Godhead are made manifest by his works, to the ena, men might be without excuse.* And what this excuse is. *S. Austin* tells us saying, *It is spoken of such an excuse, as men in their pride are wont to pretend saying, Si scissem fecissem; had I knowne it, I would have done it.* And *Eze:* 2. 5. The Lord manifests the same end of his sending *Ezech:* unto the Jewes. For he told him, *They would not heare. For they were a rebellious house*, yet saith he, *they shall know that there hath beene a prophet among them.* And let every indifferent man judge whether the very place in *John.* (*If I had not come and spoken unto them, they should not have had sin, but now have they noe cloak for their sin,*) doth not justifye that conclusion which *Maccovius* drawes therehence, namely that *Therefore God sent his son unto them, that by the contempt and hatred of his sonne they might procure unto themselves the greater damnation.* For he professeth that by his comming and speaking unto them, all excuse was taken from them. And let every one judge whether contempt in such a manner doth not procure greater damnation. And old *Simeon* professeth that Christ should be set up, as to the rising of some; so to the falling of others: And long before the Lord professeth that he should be as a net, and a snare to both houses of *Israel.* Yet I am not of *Maccovius* his mind in saying, that God proposeth his word unto *Reprobates* to noe other end, but this: But certainly he proposeth it not unto them to the end that they should be saved by it. And let every sober man judge whether it be not better to ascribe such intentions unto the divine nature as are fulfilled, rather then such as are not fullfilled. *Rom:* 1. 20 *Aug: de grat: & lib. arbit c. 2.* *Jo:* 15. 22. *Es:* 8, 18.

P. 94. Where he layes to our charge that our doctrine *hinders piety and godly life Sect:* 2. he hath this passage inserted.

It is absolutely decreed that Devills shall be damned; were it not a fruitlesse thing in them by prayers teares and endeavours to seeke to alter it? It is also simply decreed that the soule of man shall be immortall: Is it not a labour in vaine for any man to use meanes that his soule may be annihilated? It is ordained that the sun shall rule the Day and the Moone the Night: that the one shall finish his proper course in a yeare, the other in a month: Would not a mans endeavour to make an alteration in these things be unprofitable and ridiculous. *Addit.*

Answer:

Although that which I have said upon this Section in answer to M *Hord* be sufficient to shew the absurditie of this Authors discourse, yet I think good to accommodate what there I have delivered to this also, especially to the particular instance of Divells. And first it is a thing worthy our consideration that he saith. *It is absolutely decreed that Divels shall be damned*, Now if this be true, then the divine decree concerning the damnation of Divells is an absolute decree, now this decree is not temporall but eternall. Now if the eternall decree of God concerning the damnation of Divells be absolute, why should not Gods eternall decree of the damnation of men be absolute also: let him mumble upon this argument and acquaint us with his answer thereunto when he thinks good. When he discourseth of the fruitlesse nature *of the Divells prayers and teares* and endeavours to alter this decree, he seemes to me to suppose that the Divells are not bereaved of their free-will *to pray*, and which were more then wonderfull in their state of innocencie, *to shed teares and to performe holy endeavours*; and if this were true it were unreasonable for us to deny that *Arminians* had the like power left unto them. But if

they have no such freedome of will, what totter tooke this Author to discourse of the fruitlesse exercise of such a power. Would he not think our braine were crackt, if wee should tell him how fruitlesse his course would be to clamber up into the world of the Moone, seeing it is as possible for him to be Lunatick here, as well as there. Yet if the Divells have any such freedome of will left them whereby they may attaine to holynesse, their endeavours that way though fruitlesse in respect of the altering of Gods decree, yet surely would not be fruitlesse in another respect. For better it were by farre, I should think for them to repent and submit to the will of God in suffering Hell paines, then to blaspheme in suffering them. But be it so, that not only Gods decree be absolute concerning their damnation; but that their first sinne did put them quite out of the way, and is to them as death to men. Yet such is not the condition of men. And albeit the decree of damnation both of Divells and men be absolute, yet neither the one nor the other was decreed to be brought upon them absolutely, but upon the Angells, in case they kept not their owne habitation: upon men in case they did not only sinne, but finally persevere in sinne without repentance. Though in this respect there is no place for the repentance of Angells, yet place there is for the repentance of men, and by repentance to avoid the wrath to come. And lastly, the Divell knowes his condition to be irrecoverable, No man on earth knowes his estate to be so. For albeit according to our doctrine a man may be assured of his election: yet by our doctrine no man can be assured of his reprobation. Adde this hereunto, Although a man did know he were reprobated to damnation, yet not knowing to what degree and measure of damnation he is ordained, there is place to use his best endeavours in the way of civilitie and morality, that his damnation may be the lesse. In case he did know this also, yet place still remaines to be as morall as he can. For damnation joyned with a condition of better morallity, is better then damnation joyned with a condition of lesse morality. This may suffice as an answer to the other instances, which are farre more wild then the first: as touching the immortality of the soule which he saith is simply decreed; and it is decreed to be immortall without any course to be taken by man to promote the immortality thereof: But doe any of our Divines maintaine that God hath decreed our salvation in such sort, as to be brought to passe without any course to be taken by men of ripe yeares to promote their salvation? What proportion is there beetween immortality & salvation. God intends salvation to no man of ripe yeares, but by way of reward of faith, repentance, obedience and good works. Doth God bestow immortality upon the soule by way of reward? Was not the soule of man immortall assoone as it was created? Is such the salvation of Gods elect? And what giddinesse possest the spirit of this Author when he discourseth *of the vaine labour of any man, that should use meanes that his soule should be annihilated*? Supposing that such meanes there are, and may be used, by the forme of his speech, when he sayth, that it is labour in vaine for any man to use such meanes. As for that which followeth of the Sun and Moone. An instance of the same nature hath been given in this very Section and an answer thereunto accommodated in my refutation of M *Hords* discourse, which this Author could not be ignorant of, as appeares by his altering and changing it almost throughout, yet takes no notice thereof to reply thereunto, but keeps himselfe as still as a sow in beanes, thinking it his safest course to be silent. The truth is, God (we say) bestowing salvation and inflicting damnation proceeds according to a law, which he hath given unto man: but not so in the giving or denying grace, not so in shewing mercy on some and hardning others, but according to the meere pleasure of his will. It were farre more congruous to accommodate the instances he gives to the divine proceedings in this particular. But here he dares not budge, least his Pelagian spirit should bee manifested to all the world, in maintaining that not only in conferring salvation, and inflicting damnation, he proceeds according to mens works, but also in giving and denying grace.

P.96. Two lines are inserted a little above the Latine verses, but of no moment distinct from the rest.

P.97. Section the 4. of the crimination last save one, where he saith that *three things are usually answered to vindicate our opinion from this crimination*, but he conceales who they be, that thus answer: yet would not be thought to feigne it. And the first of these is this *That many of them which believe and defend this doctrine are holy and good men, &c.* Now here comes in that which he inserts.

The

The like defence to this did the Epicures of old make in favour of their sensuall and swinish doctrine, which was, that happinesse consisted in pleasure. They said that many of their Sect were honest men, and so much *Tully* granted to be true; but with exception still against their doctrine. I *take*, saith he *Epicurus himselfe to be an honest man, yea and many Epicures have been and are faithfull in freindship, square and constant men in all conditions of life, ordering themselves and their lives, not by pleasure, but by duty* But saith he, *this proceeded not from the principles of their opinion, but frō their own vertuous inclinations; & the force of honesty by their so doing appeared to be more prevailing in them, then the force of pleasure, which they pleaded for.* A little after he hath words to the same purpose; *As other mens doctrines are esteemed to be better then their deeds; so these mens deeds seem to me to be better then their doctrine.* Like to this answer of *Tully* to the defenders of *Epicurisme*, will I shape mine. *Addit.* *Cic. de finibus 2. p. 107.*

I nothing doubt, but this Authour pleased himselfe well in this comparison, and others likewise of his own sect. For like lettice, like lips; yet all this is carried with a shew of charity, in acknowledging the holinesse forsooth, and goodnesse of their oposites; but it ends in this comparison, right *Epicurus* like, whose morality (forsooth) was pleaded to countenance *his sensuall and swinish doctrine.* But whatsoever our lifes be, for testimony whereof we nothing desire to be beholding to the charity of our opposites; Yet surely our doctrin concerning the absolutenes both of election, grounded upon no other foundation then this, that *Grace is not conferred according unto workes*, as *Austin* testifies; and of reprobation grounded accordingly upon no other foundation then this, that grace is not denied according unto workes; shall be found no swinish doctrine, but the very truth of God. And let them that oppose it looke well to their waies, least they be not found goatish together with their doctrine at the day of judgment. But how comes this Authour to be so stupid in reading *Cicero*, and so little understanding him; as in these words to conceive, that he professeth himselfe to have a good opinion of *Epicurus*? I confesse I marked it the more diligently, because I remember well the comparison that *Plutarch* makes between the vertuous gloriation of *Epaminondas* his mother, and the vile gloriation of *Epicurus* his mother, professing she never saw an happier day, then when she saw her Son *Epicurus* generating, *cum Cyzezena meretriculâ, operis cum Polyæno divisis*; unlesse this were the morality of her Son, wherein shee gloried that he was not so jealous, but that he could admit a corrivall in the satisfaction of his filthy lusts. And indeed I had also observed other where, that he was a very temperate man, but to this end, that he might take the greater pleasure in the flesh, his senses being the more quick, when they were not clogged and overcome with surfeit. But come we to *Cicero* his judgment. He takes notice that *Epicurus* was commended as *Comis in amicitiis tuendis, a man of a faire nature in maintaining freindship; yet* (saith he) *though these things were true* (*for I affirme nothing*) *he was not acute enough.* I think this is spoken in reference to his doctrine nothing answerable to this commendation of him. For *he measured freindship by profit*, as in that very book *Cicero* relateth. Then he takes notice of another commendation given of him, in these words, *At multis se probavit, he approved himselfe to many; Et quidem jure fortasse, and truly for good cause perhaps.* This is *Cicero* his confession with a *perhaps.* But observe what he brings in upon the back of this; *Sed tamen non gravissimum est testimonium multitudinis; but the testimony of the multitude* (*the many*) *is not most weighty*, or most considerable. *For in every art or study, or any science, or in vertue it selfe, every thing that is best, is most rare.* Then follow the words which this Authour alleadgeth not, *Ac mihi quidem videtur, quòd ipse vir bonus fuit. And to me truly it seemes that he was a good man;* This had been to contradict himselfe, having formerly said, *Nihil affirmo, I affirme nothing*; he takes into consideration what others said of him, but as for him, he would say nothing of him neither in commendation, nor vituperation. But his words runne thus, *Ac mihi quidem, quòd & ipse bonus vir fuit, & multi epicurei fuerunt, & hodie sunt, & in amicitiis fideles* (For it seemes indeed that he and *Polyænus cum Cyzizenâ meretriculâ* were very faithfull one to the other) *& in omni vita constantes & graves, nec voluptate sed consilio officia moderantes; hoc videtur*, (here comes in *videtur* and not till now) *major vis honestatis & minor voluptatis.* He still affirmes nothing of the life of *Epicurus*, but taking that which others affirmed of him, and admitting it, saith *hoc videtur major vis honestatis & minor voluptatis:* this testimony of others concerning these particulars did argue more force of honesty, & lesse of pleasure. *Ita enim vivunt quidam, ut eorū vita probetur, refellatur oratio. For so some doe live, that their life is approved, but their opinions condemned.* And on this point only (to wit concerning his opinion) had *Cicero* to deale with *Epicurus* at this time; *Atque ut cæteri existimantur dicere melius, quàm facere: Sic hi mihi videntur facere melius, quàm dicere. And as others are thought to speak better then they live; So these seeme to me to live better then they speake.* By these he meanes not *Epicu-* *Answ.* *Aug. de bono persever. 15.*

rus, or *Epicureans*, but *those some*, of whom he spake immediatly before. And whether this be not the true meaning of *Cicero*, I appeale to the judgment of every sober man, that shall consider his words. And to requite this Authour, and pay him in his own coyne; I will not tell him what one of his own Sect hath given forth concerning one that preached in a great place, namely that his Auditory should professe, that the Authour must needs be an *Arminian*, he preached so honest a sermon; Though on the contrary I have heard of a greate *Arminian* of Cambridge, that he should professe to a friend of his, comming to him to conferre with him, and take him off from his opinion, if it might be, saying in the close that it was not for the honesty of their conversation who maintained the same, that he was of the same mind; and gave his reason for it out of his own experience, which I will not mention. But I will make bold to represent what I have read of the *Pelagians*, to answer this Authour, and so to recompence him in the way of charity. For *Chrysostome* placeth *Pelagius inter viros piè ac sanctè magnaq, cum tolerantiâ viventes, amongst men living piously and holily, and with great patience*; as *Vossius observes cap: 3. hist: Pelag:* and *Claudius Menardus* before him in his notes upon *Austin's* book against *Julian* the *Pelagian*. *Austin* in his 106 epistle acknowledgeth *Paulinus* to have loved him as *the servant of God*. And in his retractions he professeth saying, *Pelagii ipsius nomen non sine laude posui, quia vita ejus à multis prædicabatur: I made mention of Pelagius his name not without commendation; for as much as his life was magnified by many*. And in his third booke *De peccat: meritis & remiss: c: 1.* he sayth, the report that went of him was as of an holy man, and one that had profited much in Christianity. I find likewise good commendations given of *Cœlestius* also and *Julian* the *Pelagian*: And I make no question but an honest and pious man may be sowred with the leaven of *Pelagianisme*, in that way of *Arminianisme* ere he is aware, but God may take them off from it ere they dye: Though the eager oppossers of God's truth this way, even by such as were termed *Semipelagians*, *Prosper* spares not to call *Vasa iræ, vessells of wrath*, in his Epistle to *Ruffinus*; And the exiled Bishops of Africa in their Synodicall Epistle, stile them no better then *Vasa iræ, vessels of wrath*. And upon the conclusion of the Synod of Palestine what tumults were raised, and what abominable acts were committed by the party of *Pelagius*, is set down in part both by *Austin*, in the end of his booke *De gestis Pelagii*, and in a certaine epistle of *Innocentius* Pope of Rome.

August: retract. lib 2. cap. 33.

To conclude; *Leviathan* God's enemy is represented in Scripture, as a crooked Serpent. It pleased King *James* to stile *Arminius* sometimes the enemy of God. And *Austin* I am sure stiles the *Pelagians*, *Inimici gratiæ Dei; The enemies of God's grace*. And no marvaile if they cary themselves like crooked Serpents, turning and winding for their advantage. I have laboured to find out the *Meanders* of this Authour, which I little suspected at the first, and to meet with him every where, and encounter him in his greatest fastnesse: And let the indifferent judge whether every where he be not found to hold a lye in his right hand. I would to God his eyes were opened, that he might see how he forsakes his own mercies, by forsaking *the fountaine of living waters, to digge unto himselfe pits, even broken pits that can hold no water*. While he looks to be saved by no other grace inherent, then such as whereby he hath power to believe if he will, repent if he will. A lamentable condition, that a man of understanding, and knowledge, and good morality should be thus blinded, nothing perceiving that this is mere nature, and not grace. But what infatuation hath seazed upon the Christian world, when such discourses are magnified as sound and excellent; yea rare peeces, and unanswerable? Let us give God the glory of keeping us in our right wits and senses; otherwise even Flyes with us shall goe for Elephants, and the very illusions of Satan shall be advanced, as strange performances, not only of sober speculations; when they are equally estranged both from soundnesse and sobriety; such as all along looke a squint upon God's word; yet seldome take notice thereof, or are conformed thereunto; but rather proceed in manifest opposition thereunto, and withall are found clearly devoid of all sound reason, though thereof *Pelagians* have alwaies vaunted most, but these vaunts are but wind, and prove no more substantiall, then the imagination of a vaine thing.

FINIS.

AN ANSWER

An Answer to a Letter of *D. H.* concerning Gods Decrees definite or indefinite; By Dr. TWISSE.

SIR,

YOur Letter hath two parts, the one concerning the decree of God, especially in comparison between a decree indefinite and definite; the other concerning the election of Angels: Of both in order.

I.

Concerning the first, I will endeavour to satisfie you my way; and if that succeeds not, to gratifie you your own way.

My conceit of a decree indefinite, proposed *digress. 3. cap. 6.* you preferre as more suitable to my manner of ordering Gods decrees. Three reasons there I proposed why I durst not imbrace that conceit.

1. The first was, because it seems to be of a more imperfect nature then is fit to be attributed to God.

To this is answered, that we need not to attribute any such decree to God, but onely to resolve a definite decree of God into two conceits, according to our apprehension, whereof the one is indefinite, the other definite; As in Gods purpose to make *Peter* and *Paul* vessels of mercy, there are included two conceits in our apprehension; the one indefinite, to wit, to make some vessels of mercy; the other definite, to wit, that *Peter* and *Paul* shall be two of them. You seem to approve of this.

Now I have cause to doubt of the soundnesse of this, for these reasons, 1. If no such decree can be attributed to God, then in vain doe we discourse of the priority thereof before other decrees of God, which indeed are attributed to him, and that decently. And indeed all the decrees whereof we dispute are truely attributed unto God, though they have not that distinction one from another in God as the like decrees are distinguished in man. And an indefinite decree, relishing of imperfection, both in that respect cannot be decently attributed unto God, as also because it doth imply an indefinite and confuse knowledge in God. 2. The priority of decrees in God, is onely *secundum rationem*, and this *Durand* expounds most clearly in this manner, *quando ratio unius sumitur ab altero*, in 1. dist. 41. q. 2. so *ratio mediorum sumitur à ratione finis*. But *ratio decreti definiti non sumitur a ratione decreti indefiniti*. Because God intends such an end, therefore God doth appoint such and such means: but it cannot be said, that, because God doth intend to make some indefinitely to be vessels of mercy, therefore he doth intend that *Peter* and *Paul* shall be two of them.

2. My two other objections are these, Indefinites are before definites onely in such sort as *communia* are *priora specialibus*, and this is onely *prioritate naturæ generantis, non intendentis*; and we speak of priority in intention, not in the way of generation. And again, that which is first in the way of generation, is last in intention; and therefore this makes rather against it, than for it.

To this you answer, that rather on the contrary *Universalia* are *priora singularibus, non tam natura generante, quam intendente*. For *Homo prius intenditur quam Socrates: Non enim species est propter Individuum, sed Individuum propter speciem*. Or, if this be not true *in universalibus physicis*, yet is it *in politicis sive aggregatis*, which have a more resemblance to our present matter.

To this I answer, 1. The comparison we speak of between a decree indefinite and definite, is not the same with a comparison between the species and the singular; but only as between singulars and singulars; singulars indefinitely proposed as *aliqui*, and singulars proposed definitely, as *Hic & ille*, Peter and Paul. Now though *individuum* be *propter speciem*, as that which nature intends principally; and *individua* for the maintenance of the *species*: yet is it not so congruous to say, that particulars definite are for particulars indefinite, &c. The instance I gave in reducing it to a comparison between *generalia* and *specialia*, was to bring it, as neere as I could, to such a State wherein the evidence of truth might plead for it selfe. As indeed it is manifest, that *generalia* are onely *priora specialibus quoad naturam generantem. specialia priora generalibus quoad naturam intendentem*; which I delivered out of the remembrance of my old Philosophy, as a thing which I conceived to be without question. *Zabarell de methodis lib. 1. cap. 6. Ordo naturæ non unus est, sed multiplex, vel saltem duplex: Non solum*

 enim

enim ſimplicia ſunt naturâ priora compoſitis, ſed etiam compoſita ſimplicibus, ut ex Ariſtotele colligimus, in cap. 1. lib. 2. de partibus animalium: ſi namque ordinem naturæ intelligamus habita ratione generationis naturæ, elementa ſunt priora miſto, miſtum animali, animal homine; quod ſi per ordinem naturæ intelligamus ordinem perfectionis ſeu ordinem ſcopi & intentionis naturæ, homo eſt naturâ prior animali, animal miſto, & miſtum elementis. But I confeſſe the caſe is different between a ſpecies and the particulars thereof, whether we conſider nature particular, or nature univerſall: For, as for nature particular, though it intends and works onely for a particular like it ſelfe; yet, whereas particulars may be infinite, and it is found to have no power to produce one particular rather then another; this conſideration hath puzled many in enquiring how it comes to paſſe that this particular agent brings forth this particular effect at ſuch a time; whereas he was indifferent to have brought forth any one particular of many thouſands in that kind. And, after *Suarez* in his Metaphyſicks hath tryed many waies hereabouts, at length reſolves upon *Ariminenſis* his invention, who reduceth it to the determination of Gods will: and this conceit, after *Suarez*, is embraced with great approbation by *Hurtado de Mendoza*. Which becauſe it concerneth a manner of Gods concourſe, and that a very ſtrange one, as they expound it; I have taken occaſion to conſider it in a peculiar digreſſion. So that in that caſe the particular produced is not intended by nature at all (as being indifferent to any) but left to be determined by the will of God. And as for nature univerſall, whoſe end is the maintenance of the univerſe in the ſeverall kinds of the parts thereof; it likewiſe, ſo there be particulars ſucceeding whereby the *ſpecies rerum* are maintained, regards not at all, whether theſe particulars be produced or others. But theſe intentions are not anſwerable to the intentions of God, which are altogether of particulars, whereupon mans underſtanding works in drawing therehence unities ſpecificall and genericall, according to that of *Ariſtotle*, *Animal aut nihil eſt aut poſterius eſt.* And *Navarrettus*, writing of divine concourſe; *ſupponendum eſt id quod ſolent Logici & Metaphyſici dicere de unitate univerſali quæ non eſt unitas poſitiva ſed negativa: Non enim univerſale eſt poſitive unum in multis ſed cum reperiatur plurificatum in multis, & non magis determinatum ad unum quam ad alterum, habet in ſe quandam indifferentiam, non quidem poſitivam reſpectu multorum, atque adeo non habet unitatem poſitivam; ſed negative ſe habet ad illa multa, & conſequenter, eſt unum negative in multis, hoc eſt, habet unitatem quæ non magis reperitur in uno inferiorum quam in altero.* But yet the caſe I ſay in preſent conſiſts not in compariſon between a ſpecies and the ſingulars thereof, but between particulars and particulars; either as indefinitely conſidered under the notion of *aliqui*, or definitely under the notions of *Hic & ille*.

But you think *in univerſalibus Politicis*, as in the gathering of an Army, or erecting of a Colledge, the truth you ſpeak of is more apparent, and the reſemblance more congruous to the matter in hand. Let us conſider them. A certain number of Souldiers for compleating of an army I confeſſe is intended firſt, afterwards a choyce of perſons: ſo the maintenance of a certain number of Schollars is intended firſt, and afterwards they proceed to the election of Schollers. Here is *totum per aggregationem*, but it is by aggregation of parts in a certain kind, which is of greateſt conſideration, to wit, of parts ſucceeding one another, as a river is ſaid to be one by ſucceſſion of parts which never return. All which parts are impoſſible to be ſubject to the conſideration of the Founder or Generall, becauſe the Colledge continueth long after the Founder is dead, and ſo may the Army alſo, one Generall ſucceeding another by the appointment of the State. A more proper reſemblance is found in a man purpoſing to diſtribute a ſumme of money to a certain number of perſons: as, put the caſe, twenty pound to forty perſons, as a Gentleman hath dealt with our town. The choyce of ſuch perſons as are moſt neceſſitous he leaveth to ſome perſons of truſt. Now, if the Gentleman himſelfe knew of himſelfe every perſon in the Town, and their neceſſitous condition; from the firſt undoubtedly he would appoint, not a certain number indefinitely to receive it, but aſſigne rather ſuch perſons particularly on whom it ſhould be beſtowed. And in like ſort a Generall were it in his power to leavy whom he liſt, and withall knew for certain every mans ſufficiency, he would from the firſt reſolve upon and deſigne, not onely ſuch a number, but ſuch particular perſons alſo for that ſervice: And, that in the ordinary courſe it is otherwiſe, this proceeds from ſuch an imperfection as is not incident unto God. And laſt of all, both the Generall and the Founder have reſpect to fitneſſe in them whom they chooſe, which it is not in their

power

power to procure. But God hath power to provide himſelfe both of fitneſſe and of perſons alſo to that ſervice whereto he is pleaſed to deſigne them. Yet *Didacus Alvarez* ſeems to acknowledge ſuch an indefinite decree, and he is *gravis author* I confeſſe: And he plainly profeſſeth, that *permiſſio peccati propter quod quis damnatur eſt effectus reprobationis*. Whence it manifeſtly followeth, Firſt, that the reprobation of Infants as many as die in originall ſinne in their infancy, cannot premiſe the foreſight of originall ſinne, becauſe they undergoe condemnation onely for originall ſinne. Secondly, that no mans Reprobation can premiſe originall ſinne, becauſe every man that undergoes condemnation, undergoes it not for actuall ſinnes onely, but originall alſo: yet this tenet of his he delivereth not *obiter*, but maintaines it eagerly by argument. As for this of an indefinite degree, he toucheth onely by the way, without ſo much as explication of his meaning therein. And again in that diſcourſe of his he hath ſome other ſtrange conceits, as I have ſhewed in my firſt digreſſion upon election: in the peruſing whereof at this time it ſeems, you are. As for *Beza*, that which I there delivered is meerly by collection: but what his opinion was, may appeare by his own expreſſion, *De prædeſtinatione, in 9. ad Rom.* in theſe words, *Denique verbum iſtud [Faciendi] & nomen [Luti] ac [Maſſæ] adhuc informis, manifeſte mihi quidem videtur declarare, Deum in hac ſimilitudine nobis proponi, de humano toto genere in primo illo homine, protoplaſto propterea vocato, condendo ſtatuentem; unde Singuli homines ad finem uſque ſeculorum propagarentur, eo jam tum conſilio, ut in unis quidem, quos jam tum in libro vitæ ſuis temporibus naſcituros, eligendos, vocandos, creditutos, juſtificandos, glorificandos deſcribebat, ad ſalutis decus per gratiam in Chriſto evehendis: in aliis vero per contrarios gradus in æterni exitii dedecus juſte præcipitandis, gloriam ſuam patefaceret.* In like ſort *Piſcator* in his diſputation *de objecto prædeſtinationis*, defines predeſtination thus, *Prædeſtinatio eſt æternum Dei decretum quo conſtituit condere homines ad diverſos fines ſpeciales, nempe alios ad fruendum ſalute æterna, aliis vero ad ſentiendum cruciatus æternos, ſeu ad æternum exitium: itemque conſtituit permittere, ut iſti omnes, integri conditi, in peccatum laberentur; idque propterea, ut quos conditurus erat ad ſalutem ſervaret ex miſericordia; quos vero ad exitium, puniret ex juſtitia: & denique conſtituit ex lapſis illos quos conditurus erat ad ſalutem, ſervaret ex miſericordia, quos vero ad exitium, puniret ex juſtitia:* (all which cannot be underſtood but of perſons definite) *& denique conſtituit ex lapſis illos quos ad ſalutem conditurus erat, eligere ad hoc, ut eos ex miſericordia ſervaret; quos vero ad exitium, reprobare ad hoc, ut eos ex juſtitia puniret:* (this likewiſe cannot be underſtood but of perſons definite) *atque ita omnibus iſtis modis gloriam tum miſericordiæ ſuæ parcentis, tum juſtitiæ punientis, tum vero imprimis poteſtatis ſuæ ſummæ patefacere.* And by theſe paſſages appeares the errour of my conſtruction both of *Beza* and *Piſcators* meaning; for it was grounded upon ſuppoſall that election in them both ſignified an internall act in God, the very decree of God, which is eternall: But here it appeares they took Election for an externall and temporall act, and yet diſtinct from vocation: of which opinion of *Piſcator* I have conſidered *digreſſ. 2. de prædeſtinatione.* And here it appeares that *Beza* had entertained ſome ſuch conceit, as when he ſaith *naſcituros, eligendos, vocandos, creditutos, juſtificandos*, &c. And indeed I well remember him to diſtinguiſh between *electio & decretum eligendi.*

Yet now, to gratifie you your own way: I am content to leave that which I have ſaid in that *Digreſſ. 3.* of an indefinite decree as it lieth; and to propoſe the reaſons alledged againſt it onely by way of diſputation, not by way of aſſertion, and leave it indifferent unto the Reader to judge as he ſhall think moſt agreeably. And to confeſſe a truth unto you, it is but lately I came to this order; following the rigorous Tenet before as ſeemeth moſt conſonant to reaſon, though harſh to mens affections; and being but lately fallen upon it, I am apt to conceive, that ſomething may be wanting to the full clearing of the truth in this point; a way whereunto I hope I have opened: yet if you ſhall think it inconvenient, I ſhall be content to pretermit it wholly, and leave out all my digreſſions of this argument, or any other. II.

II.

Now touching Angels, I pray let not ought that I have written make you ſorry for ought that you have delivered touching the election of Angels: And doe not you conceive of me amiſſe, as if I did conceive you to harbour any ill opinion thereabouts: For I profeſſe I doe not, neither have you given me any cauſe; yet from nine yeeres of

age I have known you. The first time I wrote of that, I onely said, *it seemed strange unto me*; my reason was, because I never knew any, either by writing or otherwise, Protestant, or Papist, sound in maintaining mans election by grace, but that in like sort he maintained the election of Angels to be of grace. And whereas you professed otherwise onely as an opponent: I conceived you did it but as my selfe or any other Schollar will doe, to try the uttermost of anothers strength with whom we dispute.

But when the second time you wrote hereon, you professed to doubt whether *Arminius* acknowledged any election at all of Angels; that seemed to me as strange, because I am perswaded that no Arminian or Lutheran denieth the election of Angels: though like enough they are apt to fashion it according to their opinion of the election of men. As for the construction of that place in *Timothy* touching the *elect Angels*, I could not ascertain my selfe in what sense it might be conceived to proceed without acknowledging their election, and I was loath to divine at random. Now as you expresse your selfe herein more particularly; so will I particularly make answer.

First, I grant that a conditionall decree is no election. But seeing it is impossible but God should foresee, on whose part the condition would be performed, and on whose part not; herehence it followeth, that God must accordingly Elect the one, and Reprobate the other: and so there must be acknowledged even an election of Angels after their manner. Like as the Arminians, beside that conditionall predestination of men you speake of, doe acknowledge a precise election of some upon foresight of their obedience, and reprobation of the other upon foresight of their disobedience.

Touching the exposition of that, 1 *Tim.* 5. 21. I have consulted *Hemingius*, a man as erroneous in the point of election as any Lutheran; yet he interpreteth the place thus, *Hos Electos ad discrimen Reproborum vocat.* I grant it denotes the dignity of their persons, but still in respect of choice: as when we say a choice Book, a choice Jewell, as much as to say, which a man would make choice of, and preferre before many: so the *Elect Angels* are so called in respect of choice, which choice to my understanding can have no congruous reference, but to the choice of God.

It is true we have, nothing like, such Scripture evidence touching the election and reprobation of Angels, as of Men. But whereas in these points both Scripture evidence and light of Christian reason doe concurre; so the light of Christian reason doth make it as evident on the part of Angels, as on the part of man; namely, that nothing can possibly be the cause of Gods will or predestination *quoad actum volentis*, or *prædestinantis*. And *Aquinas*, as you have heard, professeth, *That never any man was so mad as to professe, that any thing without God could be the cause of predestination, quoad actum prædestinantis*; and herein you your selfe agree.

Now touching *Austin*; I am glad you have lighted upon him. I doubt not but he shall perswade you in this point, though I could not. And first I will accommodate an answer to your allegations; Secondly, I will endeavour to shew clearly his opinion in this point.

De corrept. & gratia. cap. 10. Your first allegation is, *Cæteri autem per ipsum liberum arbitrium in veritate steterunt*; but your selfe perceive it might be answered, that this might be delivered *inclusa gratia speciali.* And it may be proved that this phrase of speech doth not exclude speciall grace: for in the same Chapter it is afterwards said of man thus, *In quo statu recto ac sine vitio, si per ipsum liberum arbitrium manere voluisset.* Here you must not exclude speciall grace in this case; For *si manere voluisset*, undoubtedly this will of his had been wrought by speciall grace, as *Austin* manifesteth in the chapter following: For he distinguisheth of two graces or two adjutories, the one was, *ut posset permanere si vellet*, the other was, *ut vellet quod potuit*; his words are these, *est in nobis per hanc Dei gratiam, in bono recipiendo & perseveranter tenendo, non solum posse quod volumus, verum etiam velle quod possumus: Quod non fuit in homine primo, unum enim horum in illo fuit, alterum non fuit. Namque ut reciperet bonum, gratiâ non egebat, quia nondum perdiderat: ut autem in eo permaneret, egebat adjutorio gratiæ, sine quo id omnino non posset: & acceperat posse si vellet, sed non habuit velle quod posset: nam si habuisset perseveraſſet.* But you bring a second place to prove that Angels could have stood by their free-will, secluding speciall grace, and that is this, *Credimus Dominum Deum — sic ordinasse*

Cap. 11.

An-

Angelorum & hominum vitam ut in ea prius oſtenderet quid poſſet eorum liberum arbitrium, deinde quid poſſet ſuæ gratiæ beneficium, juſtitiæque judicium. I grant the Angels had power to ſtand if they would, and power to fall if they would; and this power was manifeſted in the ſtanding of the one, and in the fall of the other. But herehence it followeth not, that therefore the act of ſtanding was not of Gods grace. But you will ſay the benefit of grace was afterwards manifeſted: And I anſwer, that grace was the grace of confirmation, oppoſite to the Obduration of the evill Angels; which grace of confirmation, though it were manifeſted after the obedience of the good Angels, conſiſting in aſſurance that they ſhall never fall; yet herehence it followeth not, that their ſtanding was not by grace, though that grace whereby they ſtood was different from that grace whereby they were confirmed: for before their obedience, ſo they ſtood, as that withall they might fall; but ſince their obedience they now ſo ſtand, that they cannot fall.

Now for *Auſtins* opinion hereabouts, it is plaine enough from other places. *De civ. dei, lib. 12. cap 9. aut minorem acceperunt amoris divini gratiam, quam illi qui in eadem perſtiterunt, aut ſi utrique boni æqualiter creati ſunt, iſtis mala voluntate cadentibus, illi amplius adjuti ad eam beatitudinis plenitudinem pervenerunt.* So that he doth manifeſtly acknowledge, that the good Angells had ſuch an *adjutorium* which the wicked had not: whereupon *Leonardus Coquæus*, neither Jeſuit nor Dominican, but an Auguſtinian, commenting, writes in this manner: *ea ratione intelligitur majus beneficium collatum Angelis bonis quam malis, etſi enim gratiam æqualem habitualem ab initio ſint conſecuti, ita tamen efficax fuit motio divina et auxilium dei ſpeciale in Angelis ſanctis, ut in Deum toti converterentur, perſiſterent in bono, et beatitudinem eandem aſſequerentur; non ex vi libertatis arbitrii certe factum eſt, ut ita differenter afficerentur, et quod gratia fuerit efficax in his et non in iſtis, Deo maxime tribuendum; et ex duobus hominibus æqualiter affectis, ſi unus ſalvetur, alius vero damnetur, intelligo ſemper majus auxilium gratiæ collatum ei qui fit ſalvus, idque cum Auguſtino hoc loco, & paſſim, ubi de hac materia diſputat, neque totum id refero in libertatem arbitrii, quod unus velit conſentire et reſpondere gratiæ, alius non; facit enim etiam ut velimus, et conſentiamus: neque infallibilem illam noſtram conſenſionem puto tantum ex infallibili præſcientia Dei; imo ſi per impoſſibile ſecludamus omnem præſcientiam dei, ipſa gratia ex ſe infallibiliter movet hominem vel etiam Angelum, ut, licet non neceſſitate coactionis, neceſſitate tamen immutabilitatis efficax ex ſe ſit, et gratia dei magis in uno quam in altero; et quod unus convertatur, alius non, quod uni detur auxilium efficax, in alio ſit quidem ſufficiens, minime tamen conſequatur ſuum effectum, myſterium eſſe ubique docet Auguſtinus, at ſi poſita æquali gratia qua unus converteretur, alius non, id ex ſolo conſenſu vel diſſenſu liberi arbitrii penderet, nullum certe myſterium ineſſe mihi videretur. Neque hic reddit Auguſtinus cauſam cur ex Angelis alij ſalvati fuerint, alij minime, quod hos deus præſcierit ſalvandos vel cooperaturos ſuæ gratiæ, alios minime cooperaturos; ſed quia qui ſalvati ſunt, vel majorem acceperunt divini amoris gratiam, vel certe ſi æqualiter boni creati ſunt, id eſt, in æquali gratia, illi amplius adjuti fuerint: adeo ut negotium ſalutis Angelorum benorum in majus auxilium gratiæ referat; ut, quod alij cadant et non reſpondeant gratiæ divinæ, eique non cooperentur; id quidem aſcribendum ſit libero horum arbitrio: quod vero in aliis gratia ſit efficax, adeoque illi cooperentur, ipſi deo potiſſimum tribuendum ſit.* Than which I never found a more illuſtrious teſtimony for the prerogative of Gods grace in, and ſoveraignty over his creatures in any Thomiſt or Dominican, that at this day hath maintained the *cauſe of God*, (as *Bradwardine* calls it) againſt the Jeſuits. Neither did I ever take notice of the place before, but by occaſion of this preſent ſearch to give you ſatisfaction concerning the opinion of *Auſtin*; onely reſted contented with that which I ſuppoſed to be the common opinion of all, that the caſe is the ſame as touching the operation of Gods grace both in Angells and men, and Chriſt in Scripture is accounted the head of Angells as well as of men. But that whole Chapter in *Auſtin, lib. 12. de civit. dei. cap. 9*, is worth any mans reading, where he diſputes the caſe at large, where he hath another ſentence more illuſtrious then the former, thus; *et cum id egit eorum voluntas bona ut non ad ſeipſos, qui minus erant, ſed ad illum qui ſummus eſt, converteretur* (hence is taken I gueſſe that conceit of Maſter *Hookers*, that the fall of Angells was the converting the contemplation of their minde from God upon themſelves) *eique adhærentes magis eſſent, ejuſque participatione ſapienter beateque viverent, quid aliud oſtenditur niſi voluntatem quamlibet bonam, inopem fuiſſe in ſolo deſiderio remanſuram* (*inopem remanſuram*, a pretty phraſe unable to remaine) *niſi ille*

qui

qui bonam naturam ex nihilo sui capacem fecerat, ex seipso faceret implendo meliorem, prius faciens excitando avidiorem. If you get any thing by my conference I am glad, I assure you I get by yours, both touching the clearing of *Austins* opinion hereabouts, and others concurrence also, wherein I doe much rejoyce; and the rather, because, as you may observe, I have hitherto proceeded thereupon, rather by supposition than of confirmation. Another place to this purpose I finde alleadged out of his *Enchirid. cap.* 100. *Hæc sunt magna opera domini exquisita in omnes voluntates ejus; et tam sapienter exquisita, ut cum Angelica et humana natura peccasset, id est, non quod ille, sed quod voluit ipsa, feciſſet, etiam per eandem creaturæ voluntatem (qua factum est quod creator voluit) impleret ipse quod voluit, bene utens et malis tanquam summe bonus, ad eorum damnationem quos juste prædestinavit ad pœnam, et ad eorum salutem quos benigne prædestinavit ad gratiam.* But this hath but a touch, and that subject to ambiguous interpretation, the other is more full and cleare. I come unto the Theses.

You desire I would shew you in a word where your errour is in these, but you may remember what one professed sometimes, namely that *ad quæstionem longam od rat responsionem brevem*, yet I will endeavour to satisfie you in this also first, and afterwards so to satisfie as I may satisfie my selfe also.

First therefore, my briefe satisfaction as it were in a word shall consist in two points.

1. You have but nine Theses, and the eighth is as a succinct recapitulation of all that went before, and the conclusion there mentioned is no more than that which every one grants, namely this; that God did decree first to produce that subject, and afterward to worke such an effect thereupon: And indeed it is an ordinary course to confound the order of execution with the order of intention. *Zanchius* his definition of prædestination I doe exceedingly approve of, answerable to this of yours, for thus it lyeth, *Generalis, hoc est, omnium hominum prædestinatio est æternum &c. Dei decretum, quo apud se ab æterno decrevit, primum quidem omnes homines tum creare ad sui imaginem justos, tum ut in peccatum a Satana tentati suo libero arbitrio labe entur, permittere: deinde horum alios liberare, et liberatos spiritu suo comitari, et tandem æterna vita donare; alios tum indurare, tum æterno exitio perdere; idque ut in illis divina bonitas et misericordia, in istis autem divina potentia et justitia declaretur, atque ita in omnibus deus glorificetur.* Where, if you marke it well, you shall find he makes no order between the decrees of creation, permission of sin, liberation and salvation on the one side, of induration and damnation on the other side, but onely between creation it selfe and permission of sin, and liberation it selfe and salvation on the one side, and dereliction and damnation on the other side, all which he considers as meanes, and in the last place notes the end of all to be the patefaction of Gods glory in goodnesse and mercy on the one side, and of his power and justice on the other.

2. Againe, in your first Thesis containing the maine body of your tenet, you will have the foresight of the subject, or occasion, whereupon any thing is decreed absolutely to be wrought, alwayes to goe before the decree it selfe, as well as the decree of the end goeth before the decree of the meanes. The irregularity whereof as touching God (though as touching mans decrees I confesse it is right that you speake) I will shew as briefly as I can before I answer your reason brought for confirmation of it.

1. If the foresight of the subject and occasion goes before the decree of working upon the subject; then much more must the decree of making the subject, as also of making or permitting the occasion, goe before the decree of working upon the subject, and upon such an occasion, (for no subject whereupon God workes can be without Gods making, but it is nothing so with man, who findes subjects whereupon to worke rather than makes them) Now this is a thing impossible. For,

1. First, nothing is first in intention but the end, and 'tis not possible that the subject or occasion should be the end whereunto God workes upon the subject thus or thus:

2. Secondly, that which is first in intention is last in execution. And therefore if the making of the subject, and permitting of the occasion whereupon God meanes to worke, were first in intention, it should be last in execution, that is, God should first worke upon the subject before he had made the subject, or permitted the occasion whereupon he workes.

But yet I confeſſe if you have a reaſon for what you ſay, unleſſe you may receive ſome ſatisfactory anſwer unto that reaſon of yours, it will be a very hard matter to ſatisfie you; Therefore I come to the conſideration of your reaſon, which is this.

The foreſight of a thing is nothing but the conſideration of it *tanquam reipſa & certo futurum.*

But whoſo will reſolve abſolutely to work ſuch an effect upon ſuch a definite ſubject, or to make ſuch an uſe of ſuch a particular event, muſt conſider that ſubject and that event *tanquam reipſa futurum*: for elſe his decree will be but conditionall. To this, I anſwer,

1. Firſt, according to their opinion, that are accounted the moſt rigid interpreters of predeſtination.

1. Your propoſition is moſt ſound.

2. As for your aſſumption, which you ſuppoſe to be true, they ſuppoſe to be utterly untrue; as directly contrary to the moſt generall rules touching the order of things in intention, and execution: And *Alphonſus Mendoza* takes upon him to prove at large, that the ſupernaturals of *Peter* and *Paul* were intended before their naturals.

2. The onely reaſon (ſaving the plauſibility of the propoſition it ſelfe) to juſtifie it, ſeems to be this, God cannot worke upon a ſubject, unleſſe the ſubject firſt be, and that occaſion alſo whereupon he works; therefore God cannot intend to work upon a ſubject unleſſe firſt he intend to produce that ſubject, and permit (at leaſt) the occaſion whereupon he intends to work. As much as to ſay, becauſe I cannot ride to London without a horſe, therefore I cannot intend to ride to London, unleſſe firſt I intend to get me a horſe. Whence it manifeſtly followeth, that in execution I muſt firſt ride to London, and afterward get me an horſe to that purpoſe. And the confounding of the order of execution with the order of intention, ſeems to be the cauſe why this propoſition of yours ſeems to be ſo plauſible.

2. Now I will anſwer your propoſition, according to my own Tenet in ordering Gods decrees, which is likely to give you better ſatisfaction in the way of your own apprehenſion. Now I grant your propoſition; acknowledging that in this caſe ſo it falls out, that he muſt needs conſider the ſubject as *reipſa & certo futurum*. But how, *non tanquam præcedaneum* (whereto your diſcourſe tends) but *tanquam conjunctum*; the reaſon is, becauſe I make the decrees of creation, permiſſion of ſin, and raying out of ſin, not *ſubordinata*, but *coordinata & conjuncta*. So I ſay in like manner, God doth joyntly decree to give both grace and glory; I do not ſay God doth decree joyntly to give them, but he joyntly decreeth to give both grace and glory. And ſo *Auſtin* defines predeſtination to be *præparationem gratiæ & gloriæ*. So that in the ſame moment that he decreeth glory, he conſiders grace not as *præcedaneum in intentione*, but *conjunctum*. So on the other ſide God doth joyntly decree finall dereliction of ſome in ſin and damnation for ſin, as *Aquinas* profeſſeth of reprobation, that it includes *voluntatem permittendi culpam, & damnationem inferendi pro culpa*: ſo that in the ſame moment that he decreeth damnation, he conſidereth their finall impenitency *non tanquam quiddam antecedaneum*, but *tanquam conjunctum*. And judge you what force this hath to qualifie the harſhneſſe of Tenets hereabouts, and what diſadvantage to our oppoſites the Arminians, who upon the ſubordination of theſe decrees cry out upon our Tenets and expoſe them to obloquie, ſaying that we maintaine that God doth firſt decree to damne men, and then to this purpoſe he expoſeth them to ſinne thoſe ſinnes for which they are damned. And herewith they charge the Authors of *Maſſa corrupta* for the object of election and reprobation, aſwell as the Authors of *Maſſa nondum condita*, or *condita*, but *nondum corrupta*. And the twenty reaſons which Arminius hath given againſt the Authors of *Maſſa nondum condita*; he profeſſeth that with little difference they may be accommodated againſt the Fautors of *Maſſa corrupta*. All which notwithſtanding, I have conſidered, and I hope refuted alſo, both the one way againſt *Arminius*, and the other way againſt *Corvinus*, in a Digreſſion by it ſelfe, which containes a whole quire of paper, one of them; but that is in my anſwer to *Corvinus*, which is not yet perfected. Doctor *Jackſon* my ancient friend, partly by his traditionary writings that paſſe in hugger-mugger from hand to hand, four pieces whereof as many as I could come by, I have anſwered; and partly by his treatiſe of divine eſſence, withdrawing my ſtudies another away: yet an anſwer to that I hope to finiſh by Whitſontide; and then to return: For in the ſecond part which is newly come forth I finde little conſiderable ſave ſome few chapters touching contingency:

My

My greateſt buſineſſe about him is to underſtand his language. Now to draw to an end; as your firſt Theſis is an acknowledgement of the eternity of Gods decrees; ſo the ſecond, of their unity both in time and nature, God willing all things *uno & eodem actu*. Now judge I pray whether of the two opinions is moſt ſuitable hereunto; that which makes the decrees of God before ſpoken of, *coordinata & conjuncta*, or that which makes ſuch a concatenation of them by conſequents after conſequents: as for example, Gods decree of raiſing men out of ſin preſuppoſeth the foreſight of ſin; the foreſight of ſinne preſuppoſeth the decree to permit ſin; the decree to permit ſinne ſuppoſeth the foreſight of the futurition of the creature; and the foreſight thereof ſuppoſeth the decree of creation: eſpecially conſidering *Aquinas* his argument, whereby he proves that *prædeſtinatio Chriſti* cannot be the cauſe *prædeſtinationis noſtræ*, to wit, becauſe God by one and the ſame act predeſtinates both Chriſt and us. And withall conſidering that *prærequiſitum* will as much hinder the unity of Gods decrees as *Cauſa*. I had thought to have gone over your Theſes more exactly, but ſeeing the length already ſpun out, I reſolve to be the briefer.

3. Whereas in your third, you conceive the order of Gods decrees is to be underſtood ἀνθρωποπαθῶς: I judge rather *Durands* inſtruction to be more ſound, before mentiotioned; to wit, that there is onely *prioritas* amongſt them *ſecundum rationem*; and that he expounds thus, *quando ratio unius ſumitur a ratione alterius*, as *ratio mediorum ſumitur a ratione finis*. And priority in intention is onely of the end in reſpect of means tending thereto, as you rightly conceive it in your fourth Theſis.

5. Of the fifth I have already ſpoken enough, wherein I have laboured partly to diſcover the errour of your argumentation, and yet withall ſo as to give you ſatisfaction in your own way.

6. The ſixth containes onely an inference upon the former, and the inference is not ſuitable; for your aſſumption in the former Theſes did but contend, that God muſt conſider it; here you inferre, that he muſt preſuppoſe it; But it followeth not: For to conſider it, 'tis ſufficient that it is *conjunctum*; But to preſuppoſe it is to maintain that it is *antecedaneum*.

Beſides it is as much peccant againſt the order, between the end and the means, as the former, whereof I have ſpoken ſufficiently.

7. Of the ſeventh, your reaſon (you confeſſe) is the ſame as before, to wit, in the fifth, which I have already conſidered. Neither is there any neceſſity why one ſhould be before the other: they may, nay muſt be both together intended; For conſider, if the pardoning or curing of ſinne be in intention after the permitting of ſinne, then it ſhould be before it in execution, which were as much as to ſay, that God muſt firſt pardon and cure ſinne, before he can permit ſinne. This is plainly irregular; that irregularity which you conceive on the contrary is onely in ſhew, and riſing meerly from confounding intention with execution. Better to ſay, God doth firſt intend to cure ſinne, and then intends to permit it; (for herehence followeth a due order in execution, to wit, firſt ſinne is permitted, and after cured) then to ſay, God firſt intends to permit ſinne, and after to cure it; for herehence proceeds a moſt prepoſterous order in execution, namely, that firſt ſinne ſhall be cured, and then the being of ſinne permitted. And indeed when men ſay, God doth firſt intend to permit ſinne, and then to cure it, it ſeems their meaning is onely this, not that God doth firſt intend, &c. but that God doth intend firſt to permit ſinne, and then to cure it, which is moſt true.

8. Like as in your eighth Theſis you doe expreſſe it ere you are aware, and no otherwiſe.

9. And as in your eighth, ſo in your ninth, you do expreſſe it moſt congruouſly thus, we may conceive God decreeth to permit the occaſion firſt, and afterwards to make that uſe of it which he intends: which I ſay is moſt congruous, conſtituting this priority onely in execution, not in intention.

I come to your concluſions drawn from the premiſes.

1. *Gods decree to manifeſt the glory of his power and goodneſſe* ad extra, *is before his decree to create mankind, becauſe that is a decree* de fine, *this* de medio.

Reſp. 1. Though this be a truth, yet it is not the whole truth; for it ſeems by power and goodneſſe you underſtand onely that power and goodneſſe which was ſhewed in his creation; but this was not the laſt end: For this end was obtained the very firſt moment of *Adams* creation, after which *Adam* lived above 900 yeeres, and all mankind

kind ſince, many thouſands, and every one knowes, the laſt end of a mans worke is of chiefeſt conſideration, when he ſets himſelfe to make his worke, neither doth it become the wiſdome of man to carry himſelfe otherwiſe: as *Beza* profeſſeth, ſaying, *Statuere deum prius ordine cauſarum decreviſſe hominem condere, quam quid eo condito faceret deliberaret:* (here is the point, marke it well) is ſuch a thing as *quo nihil abſurdius dici poteſt, quum finis in omnis ſapientis artificis mente præcedat ipſius operis aggreſſionem, ut certiſſimum ſit dei de humano genere decretum, creationem et ipſius creationis fines omnes anteceſſiſſe*; wherein he diſtinguiſheth betweene *finis creationis* and *finis hominis creati.* And as the creation manifeſted his power and goodneſſe in making man out of nothing, ſo man by this almighty power thus made, was made, and intended to be made, to a certaine end; which cannot be imagined to have been in any other kind than to be either a veſſell of mercy, or of wrath.

And when *Solomon* ſaith, *God made the wicked againſt the day of evill*, and withall ſignifieth that even this alſo was *for himſelfe*, that is, for the manifeſtation of his glory, this cannot be in the way of that power and goodneſſe you ſpeake of, but ſomething elſe; even the making of him a veſſell wherein one day ſhall ſhine the glory of God in the way of juſtice and ſoveraigne power over his creatures.

2. And therefore it cannot be as you conclude in the ſecond place, that *Gods decree to create mankind is before his decree to manifeſt his mercy or juſtice in mankind.* For though that be a decree to produce a ſubject, yet conſidering that this is the decree touching the end whereto he makes him: in all reaſon the decree of the end whereto a ſubject is made is before the decree of making the ſubject to that end. And we have an expreſſe teſtimony of the Holy Ghoſt for this, namely, that as God *created all things for himſelfe*, ſo he created *the wicked againſt the day of evill* for himſelfe.

But by the way, I obſerve how you miſtake the opinion of your oppoſites; as when you ſay, that this decree of manifeſting Gods mercy or juſtice, is a decree of working an effect in that ſubject, for this is utterly untrue; This were to make the decree of ſalvation of the one, and of damnation of the other to be before the decree of creation. And although ſome ſuch thing may be conceived out of a ſuperficiall apprehenſion of it, as propoſed by *Beza* and *Piſcator*; yet both in true account of that opinion in generall, and miſtaking of it in ſpeciall, no ſuch thing is avouched. Nay, whereas your ſelfe maintaine, that the decree of damnation is before the decree of permiſſion of finall impenitency (a point no way congruous to your Tenet about *maſſa corrupta*) you have often read in my writings, that I account the decree of damnation in no moment of time to precede the decree of permiſſion of finall impenitency.

Then the caſe of Angells is utterly againſt this; unleſſe you maintaine the one to be elected upon the foreſight of their obedience, the other reprobated upon the foreſight of their diſobedience: which I am perſwaded you ſhall not find any Orthodox Divine in the point of mans election, to maintaine.

3. *Concluſio tertia. Gods decree to permit ſinne is before his decree to manifeſt either his mercy in pardoning ſinne, or his juſtice in puniſhing ſinne, becauſe that is a decree,* de eventu; *this a doing of ſomething by occaſion of that event.*

Reſp. 1. To your reaſon here mentioned I have anſwered before.

2. There is no priority or poſteriority in intention, but onely in reſpect of *finis* and *media ad finem.*

3. It is untrue, that the former decree is a decree of an event, and the latter of doing ſomething by occaſion of this event. For what? is Gods permiſſion, the event you meane? If ſo; then Gods working grace may be accounted an event alſo, and ſo Gods decree of ſalvation upon his working grace ſhall follow upon his decree of working grace, which is manifeſtly Arminianiſme. Is the ſinne permitted the event? Firſt, why ſhould you call it an event? is it becauſe you conceive it to fall out beſides Gods intention? *Arminius* himſelfe profeſſeth the contrary. The articles of Ireland profeſſe, that *God from eternity did by his unchangeable counſell ordaine whatſoever in time ſhould come to paſſe*, your ſelfe acknowledge, that Gods decree of permitting ſinne, is a decree *de eventu*: your ſelfe acknowledge, that God did foreſee that man would ſinne in caſe he did permit him to ſinne; which is as much as to ſay it is: God did intend that ſinne ſhould come to paſſe by his permiſſion: which is the new and expreſſe profeſſion of *Auſtin* where he ſaith, *Non ergo aliquid fit niſi omnipotens fieri velit, vel ſinendo ut fiat, vel ipſe faciendo:* ſo that whether things come to paſſe *Deo faciente*

ciente as good things, or *Deo ſinente*, as evill things; ſtill they came to paſſe *Deo volente* as *Auſtin* profeſſeth. Now this ſinne is apparently the cauſe of the damnation of many thouſands; for as much as many thouſand infants are damned onely for ſinne originall; And therefore like as upon this ſin exiſtent, God doth not take an occaſion onely, but a cauſe of damning many thouſands; ſo if the decree of permitting this, be preſuppoſed before the decree of damnation, you may ſay as well, that God upon the foreſight of this ſinne, doth not onely take occaſion, but a cauſe alſo, of decreeing their damnation. And this may be applyed to the reprobation, not onely of infants, but of all that are damned, foraſmuch as all that are damned, are damned for originall ſinne, onely here is the difference, ſuch reprobates as dye in their infancy, are damned onely for originall ſinne, but others are damned not only for originall ſinne, but for their actuall ſinnes alſo.

Againe it is manifeſt, that the decree of permitting ſinne originall, is no more a decree *de eventu*, and Gods decree to manifeſt his mercy in pardoning it, is a decree of *doing ſomething by occaſion of that event*: than Gods decree of permitting all actuall ſinnes of his elect, from the firſt to the laſt, is a decree *de eventu*, and Gods decree to manifeſt his mercy in pardoning actuall ſinnes, is a decree of working ſomething by occaſion of that event; and I cannot but wonder, this being againe and againe put to your conſideration, that you doe not take notice of the equipollency of theſe: whence it manifeſtly followeth, that the decree of pardoning ſinnes ſhall preſuppoſe *maſſam corruptam*, as well with actuall ſinnes, as ſinnes originall.

Againe, if Gods decree of ſhewing juſtice in puniſhing ſinne, is but a decree of *taking occaſion of doing ſomething*: then Gods decree of damnation for mens actuall ſinnes, is but a decree of taking occaſion of doing ſomething; and conſequently, by what reaſon the decree of puniſhing ſinne, preſuppoſeth the decree of permitting ſinne originall, by the ſame reaſon, the decree of damnation, ſhall preſuppoſe the decree of permitting not onely ſinne originall; but all actuall ſinnes alſo.

By the ſame reaſon the decree of ſalvation, is but a decree of doing ſomething upon the occaſion of faith, repentance, and good workes. For if ſinne deſerve not to be accounted a cauſe moving God to reſolve to puniſh a man with damnation, but rather an event, by occaſion whereof he reſolves to puniſh with damnation: much leſſe ſhall faith, repentance, and good workes be accounted a cauſe moving God to decree to ſave any man, but onely an event, by occaſion whereof, God doth decree ſome mens ſalvation.

Yet looke by what reaſon the decree of puniſhing with damnation doth preſuppoſe the decree of permitting ſinne, by occaſion of which event puniſhment by damnation is decreed, by the ſame reaſon the decree of ſalvation, doth preſuppoſe the decree of giving faith, repentance, and good workes, by occaſion of which events, ſalvation is decreed; for why ſhould not faith, and good workes be accounted an occaſion of the decree of ſalvation, as well as ſinnes are the occaſion of the decree of damnation.

4. The fourth concluſion is this; *Gods decree to produce the perſon of* Peter, *is before his decree to manifeſt his mercy in* Peter, *by the reaſon aforeſaid*, Theſ. 8.

Reſp. That eighth Theſis aforeſaid made no mention of priority in decree or intention, but onely of priority in execution, by vertue of Gods decree: for the words of that eighth Theſis are theſe; *God decreeth firſt to produce that ſubject, and afterwards to worke ſuch an effect thereupon.* Not that God did *firſt decree* to produce the ſubject: but onely that God did decree *firſt to produce* the ſubject: manifeſting hereby, that your intent is, onely to reaſon from the order of execution, and therehence to inferre the like order in intention, which is the ordinary courſe of Arminians at this day. And you ſignifie your meaning to be this, in that eighth Theſis, though in the iſſue you faile of right accommodating it; for your words are theſe, *If any decree be concerning the working of a certaine effect in ſuch a ſubject as cannot poſſibly exiſt without the producing of that ſubject, then we may ſuppoſe, that he doth firſt decree,* (thus you would ſay, though indeed you ſay otherwiſe) *to produce that ſubject, and afterwards to worke ſuch an effect thereupon*, which in plaine tearmes is to argue thus; The permiſſion of *Adams* ſinne preſuppoſeth the creation of *Adam*, therefore the decree of per*mit* to create *Adams* ſinne, preſuppoſeth the decree of *Adams* creation: Now this is the ver*y* high way to Arminianiſme, and Pelagianiſme in the higheſt decree, as I ſhewed you in my firſt; the evidence whereof, as it ſeemes, drave you to acknowledge it, and to deviſe ſome other courſe, for maintenance of the Tenet of *maſſa*

Reſp.

corrupta,

corrupta: yet throughout, all the reason you give, is resolved into this: for as there I said, herehence it will follow in like manner, that because damnation presupposeth all actuall sinnes, therefore the decree of damnation presupposeth the decree of permitting of all actuall sinnes, and consequently, the foresight of them. In like manner, because salvation presupposeth all manner of good workes in men of ripe yeeres, therefore the decree of salvation, presupposeth the decree of giving effectuall grace, for the performing of all manner of good workes, and the foresight of them, which is direct Pelagianisme in the highest degree. And these considerations perswade me better than heretofore, that the maintainers of *massa corrupta* for the object of predestination, must be cast upon the maintenance of Arminianisme, and Pelagianisme in the highest degree, whether they will or no.

5 *Conclusio quinta*: *Gods decree to permit* Peter *to sinne in* Adam, *is before his decree to manifest his mercy in* Peter *by occasion of this sinne*, ex Thes. 9.

Resp. 1. Your *Thesis Nona* I have already answered.

2. Gods decree to permit *Peter* to sinne in *Adam*, is no more before his decree to manifest his mercy by occasion of that sinne, than Gods decree to permit *Peters* personall sinnes all his life long, is before his decree to manifest his mercy in pardoning them. And what place you make for these decrees whether in election, or out of election, you have no where shewed.

3. God doth manifest his mercy by occasion of *Peters* sinnes both originall, and actuall, not onely in the way of pardoning sinne, but in the way of saving his person, in despight of sinne, whence it followeth by the course of your argumentation, that the decree of permitting all *Peters* sinnes throughout the whole course of his life, precedes the decree of manifesting Gods mercy in his salvation.

4. And because Gods decree of saving *Peter*, is a decree of doing somewhat by occasion of *Peters* faith, and repentance, and good workes, it followeth by your manner of reasoning, that the decree of saving *Peter*, presupposeth the decree of giving *Peter* faith, and repentance, and good workes.

6. *Conclusio sexta*: *Gods decree to produce the person of* Judas, *is before his decree of manifesting his justice in Judas his person.* Thes. 8.

Resp. This is all one with *Conclusio quarta*, and admits the same refutation.

7. *Conclusio septima*: *Gods decree to permit* Judas *to sinne in* Adam, *is before his decree to manifest his justice in* Judas, *by occasion of that sinne.*

Resp. 1. This is all one with *conclusio quinta*, and admits the same answer:

2. Why doe you say by occeasion of that sinne, and not by reason of that sinne? perhaps you will say, because that sinne is not the cause of *Judas* his damnation (for I cannot devise any other reason) but this is not sound, for that sinne is the meritorious cause of *Judas* his damnation: For though he be damned for actuall sinnes, yet is he damned for originall also? Againe, many thousand infants are damned onely for originall sinne.

3. May you not as well say, that Gods decree to permit *Judas* his personall sinnes, is before his decree to manifest his justice in *Judas* by occasion of those sinnes? and consider I pray how little agreeable that is to your Tenet.

4. And if the decree of permitting *Judas* his personall sinnes, be before Gods decree of punishing him with damnation, why should not the decree of giving faith, and repentance, and good workes, be before Gods decree of rewarding with salvation?

8. *Conclusio octava*: *Gods decree to manifest his mercy in* Peter, *or to make* Peter *a vessell of mercy*, (which is properly *decretum electionis*) *is before his decree to call* Peter, *to give him faith, and repentance, &c. because that is a decree* de fine, *this* de medio.

Resp. 1. I doe not dislike the order of these decrees: but I say there is no congruity between them, such as should be between the ends, and the meanes. For there is no shew of mercy expressed in giving faith and repentance; but onely implyed, in as much as both faith and repentance implies, a state of misery preceding; the permission whereof alone hath congruous reference to the shewing of mercy, as the meanes stand in congruity to the end. Faith and repentance and good workes are means tending to another end, namely, to the manifesting of Gods remunerative justice: for as much as God meanes to bestow salvation on men of ripe yeares by way of reward of their faith, repentance and good workes. And it is without all contradiction, that in *Peter* and every elect, appeares, not onely Gods mercy, but his justice also, and

that in the higheſt degree, both in the pardoning of their ſinnes, and ſaving of their ſoules for the merits of Chriſt Jeſus. And God hath ordained his ſonne to give ſalvation. *Iob.* 17.2.

2. And I wonder not a little, that you ſhould ſubordinate any *Medium* tending to the demonſtration of Gods mercy, rather than the permiſſion of miſery.

3. Eſpecially conſidering, that God when he purpoſed to ſhew mercy on *Peter*, he purpoſed to ſhew mercy on him.

1. In pardoning not onely his ſinne originall, but all his actuall ſinnes alſo.
2. In ſaving him not onely in deſpight of ſinne originall, but in deſpight of all his actuall ſinnes alſo.

Neither have you any way to avoid this, but by ſaying, that God made *Peter* a double veſſell of mercy, and that by two decrees, which I thinke was never heard of ſince the world began.

9. *Concluſio Nona; Gods decree to manifeſt his juſtice in* Judas, *or to make* Judas *a veſſell of wrath* (which is properly the decree of reprobation) *is before his decree to deny* Judas *faith and repentance, &c. by the ſame reaſon.*

Reſp. Here againe you erre marvelouſly, in making a *Medium* moſt incongruous to the end intended. To deny faith and repentance, what is it more, than not to give it, and by faith you meane, I doubt not, faith in Chriſt crucified &c. But it is cleare, that God gave no ſuch faith and repentance unto the elect Angells; yet farre be it from us to thinke, that this was a *medium* tending to any end of reprobation.

2. The truth is, nothing but permiſſion of ſinne is a congruous meanes to the manifeſting of Gods juſtice. For ſhould God afflict a man or any creature, that is not a ſinner (as *Medina* maintaines *ex communi omnium theologorum ſententia*, he can, and that in the higheſt degree) this ſhall not be in the way of Juſtice vindicative, nor as *Judex*, but as *Dominus vitæ et mortis*; like as man hath power to afflict inferiour creatures, and that in ſuch a manner, *non quo illis ſit mitius, ſed quo nobis ſalubrius.*

3. Gods juſtice in *Judas* is manifeſted no way more, than in his damnation, and that for actuall ſinne, as well as originall; and in many thouſand infants onely for originall ſinne; and to make the permiſſion of actuall ſinne onely, ſubordinate to the decree of manifeſting Gods juſtice, and not the permiſſion of ſinne originall, is very ſtrange. And *Alvarez* that *gravis Author* profeſſeth generally, that *permiſſio peccati propter quod quis damnatur*, is *effectus Reprobationis*; and therefore cannot be premiſed before it. And every man that is damned, is damned for originall, as well as actuall ſinnes, and many thouſand infants onely for originall.

As touching the order of decrees ſubjoyned: Had you proceeded thus, God intended firſt to create, then to permit ſinne, then to raiſe ſome, and finally derelinquiſh others, and laſtly to ſave ſome, and damne others, and that to the manifeſtation of his glory in the way of mercy on the one, and juſtice on the other; it had been exactly agreeable to *Zanchius* his definition of predeſtination. And your ſelfe fall upon ſuch a courſe, ere you are aware, in divers of your Theſes, as I have ſhewed.

2. The firſt being apparently a decree, as concerning the end God aimes at; all the decrees enſuing, ſhould be decrees *de mediis*, tending either to that end, immediatly or mediatly, which you have not explicated, neither indeed are they capable of any ſuch explication: Nay rather you have already manifeſted your meaning to be, that the end there ſpecified, is onely the end of creation; not ſo much as the end of the things created, much leſſe of the things intended by the ſubſequent degrees: yet it is ſet in the firſt place, as though all the things intended in the decrees following, tended to the end mentioned in this decree, beſides all congruity.

3. As touching the foreſight of God interpoſed; The firſt is myſterious, as would manifeſtly appeare, if the ground of it were opened.

You thinke that Angells were left to themſelves, yet did not God foreſee that hereupon they would fall, nor that hereupon they would not fall; but that ſome would fall, and others not fall: which *Auſtin*, as I have ſhewed, profeſſeth aroſe from hence; that they which ſtood, had ſuch an *adjutorium*, as they which fell had not: which if it be true, man alſo, had he received the like *adjutorium*, had not fallen.

But be it as you will, enquire to what end God ſuffered him to fall, eſpecially this fall of his proving fatall to thouſands; I ſay *this* fall only; it was fatall to all reprobates, though not onely this fall: for all reprobates are damned for originall ſinne, though not for that onely. The ſecond foreſight is not rightly expreſſed; God cannot

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be ſaid to foreſee what he can doe: for onely things to come are ſaid to be foreſeen, things preſent are not: but Gods power whereby he can doe this, or that, is from everlaſting preſent with him.

Now becauſe you ſee that this order of yours is utterly oppoſite to that maxime, *Quod prius eſt intentione, poſterius eſt executione*; you anſwer, that that maxime holds onely in reſpect of *finis & media ad finem*; and therein you ſay right: But whereas therewithall you imply, that there is another order in intention than between *finis & media*, herein you innovate Philoſophy, and bring in an order in intentions, that was never admitted in any Schooles. I am ſure in *Aquinas* you found no other priority admittable, but between *finis & media*. And *Durand* acknowledgeth this priority in Gods intentions, to be onely *ſecundum rationem*, and that is, *quando ratio unius ſumitur ab altero*. But where no ſuch priority is found, why ſhould we admit of any priority at all in the decrees of God? yet if you, or any man elſe can make good this new Philoſophy, by any reaſon, I ſhall be ready to yield unto it.

As for the laſt, give me leave to ſay unto you in *Homers* language Πολλὸν ἐπὶ φόρτον, ἐγκὶ ὀλίγον. If ever it became you to retract ought, I am perſwaded it well becommeth you to retract this: you were as good to ſay, God did permit *Adams* ſinne to no end, for you ſpecifie none, and the circumſtances of qualification ſtands you in no ſtead: you may as well ſay of all the ſinnes committed in the world, that God doth permit them to no end, for you ſpecifie none, and the circumſtances of qualification ſtands you in no ſtead: you may as well ſay of all the ſinnes committed in the world, that God doth permit them to no end; yet from *Auſtins* daies it hath been acknowledged, that God doth both puniſh ſinne with ſinne, and that by ſinne men are brought ſometimes to reformation: *Audeo dicere* (ſaith Auſtin) *utile eſt ſuperbis in aliquod apertum manifeſtumque cadere peccatum*. Were the permiſſion of ſinnes concurring to the crucifying of Chriſt Jeſus to no end? yet never was the permiſſion of any ſinne of greater conſequent, than the permiſſion of *Adams* ſinne; as whereby the whole race of mankind was corrupted, and way made for that great work, wonderfull both to men and Angels, in the redemption of the world, by the incarnation of the Sonne of God, and his paſſion upon the croſſe. God created even the wicked againſt the day of evill, and that for Gods own ſake, as *Solomon* teſtifieth: and did he not as well permit him to become wicked, for Gods own ſake, and his glories ſake? *Auſtin* of old hath acknowledged, that even *malum eſſe bonum eſt*, and *Bellarmine* after him, *Bonum eſt malum eſſe Deo permittente. Nec dubitandum eſt, Deum facere bene*, ſaith Auſtin Enchirid. 96. *Etiam ſinendo fieri quæcunque fiunt male: Non enim hoc niſi juſto judicio finit.* And ſeeing the permiſſion of *Adams* ſinne could not be *juſto judicio*, in reſpect of any ſinne precedent (for it was the firſt) therefore it muſt be *juſto judicio*, in reſpect of ſome good end intended to be conſequent. The very ſinne of *David* with *Bathſheba*, and againſt *Vriah*, *Arminius* acknowledgeth to have been permitted by God to excellent ends, particular and definite, *quo diligentius ſeipſum obſervare, peccatum ſuum exemplo aliorum deflere, egregium humilitatis, reſipiſcentiæque ſpecimen, & exemplar præſtaret, & glorioſius ex peccato reſurgeret* Exam. prædeſt. pag. 166. 167. Nay, your ſelfe have acknowledged out of *Auſtin*, the ends of God in this, when you alledged out of *lib. de corrept. & gratia, cap.* 10. this paſſage; *credimus Deum ſic ordinaſſe Angelorum & hominum vitam, ut in ea prius oſtenderet quid poſſet eorum liberum arbitrium; deinde quid poſſet ſuæ gratiæ beneficium, juſtitiæque judicium*. Apply this to man, firſt he ſhewed what his free will could do; wherein? but in his fall; Secondly, *quid poſſet gratiæ beneficium juſtitiæque judicium*: how was this ſhewed, but in the raiſing of ſome, and derelinquiſhing others? As for the circumſtances wherewith you charm this ſtrange ſaying, they ſerve you in no ſtead: man is in doubt what end to reſolve on, upon the event or non-event of ſomething, becauſe he knowes not whether it will fall out or no: ſo if God were to ſeek, whether upon his permiſſion of *Adam* to ſinne, he would ſinne or no; he might be uncertain what to intend. But you ſuppoſe, that before God decreed to permit him to ſinne, he knew he would ſinne if he were permitted. And as for the diſtinction of particular and generall, it cannot be accommodated to ends; for ends intended are onely particulars, for they are intended to be produced, and ſuch things are onely ſingulars: like as by ſingular means they are produced, and *actiones verſantur* onely *circa ſingularia*. Again, it is untrue, that Gods decree was negative: For, as *Auſtin* ſaith, *Enchirid. cap.* 100. *Non utique nolens finit ſed volens*: And *actus volendi* is poſitive in God. And again, *Cap.* 95. *Non ergo fit aliquid, niſi omnipotens fieri velit, vel ſinendo*

ſinendo ut fiat, vel ipſe faciendo. Your ſelfe, ere you are aware, draw neer to the truth, which breakes forth as loath to be ſuppreſſed; As when you ſay, a man ſuffers an houſe to fall, becauſe he can diſpoſe of it many waies being fallen, to his own behoofe. Apply this to God concerning the fall of *Adam*, permitted by him. So ſaith *Auſtin*, ***Nec ſineret bonus fieri male, niſi omnipotens etiam de malo facere poſſet bene.*** Here is the generall, ***de malo facere poſſe bene.*** What are the ſpecials in the paſſage by your ſelfe alledged, they are two, ***ut oſtenderet gratiæ beneficium, juſtitiæque judicium.*** Now conſider I pray, ***poſſe de malo facere bene*** is not ***cauſa adæquata***, why God ſhould permit ***fieri male.*** But onely ***velle de malo facere bene.*** For this power of his extends to infinite particular ſinnes, which he doth not permit. And ***Auſtin*** acknowledgeth both, not onely the ***poſſe*** as you doe, when he ſaith, ***niſi poſſet de malo facere bene*** : But the ***velle*** alſo, and that according to the ſpecials of ***gratiæ beneficium, juſtitiæque judicium***; As appeares in the paſſage alledged by you. For he ſaith, ***Deum ſic ordinaſſe hominum vitam, (non quia poſſet oſtendere, ſed) ut oſtenderet quid poſſet gratiæ beneficium, juſtitiæque judicium.*** So that he plainly manifeſts, that the cauſe moving God ſo to deale with Angels and men, was not his power to ſhew, but his will and reſolution to ſhew both the power of his grace and of his juſtice: which applied to men, is ſhewed in raiſing ſome after they are fallen, and derelinquiſhing others. I conclude as ***Abigal*** ſaid to ***David***, Hereafter it ſhall be no griefe unto you, nor offence of mind, that I have been a means to keep thee from running a dangerous courſe in the way of life: So hereafter it may be no regret unto you, that Gods providence hath brought you to this conference, whereby to preſerve you from running dangerous courſes in the way of faith.

You in your Letter acknowledge reprobation abſolute, which is utterly contradictory to your opinion, ſeeing you premiſe before it, the conſideration of that ſinne, for which men are damned: For you premiſe the conſideration of ſinne originall; And many thouſand infants are damned onely for that, and all that are damned are damned for that, though not onely for that.

An

An Answer to a Discourse of *D. H.* about predestination; By Dr. TWISSE.

1. THe reasons why our Divines fall upon the corrupt masse, as the object of predestination, is not onely that which you alledge (*viz.* because commiseration and dereliction presuppose the corrupt masse, &c.) but also, and much more rather, as I conceive, because the very last end of predestination being, as you acknowledg, the manifestation of Gods glory *per modum misericordiæ parcentis* in some, *per modum justitiæ punientis* in others, could not be intended without presupposition of sinne. For neither could God possibly intend to spare any, nor justly intend to punish any, if he had not considered them as in a state of sinne. *H.*

Resp. The question is, whether Gods intention (that is, his decree) to spare or punish, presupposeth sinne. You thinke it doth, and that it cannot possibly be otherwise: I thinke it doth not, nor can possibly be so, that any thing in man can be prerequired to the decrees of God, yet I proposed the onely speciall arguments that ever I observed in sixteen yeares study in these points and answered them. You perceiving the inconsequence of that argument, as it seemes, perswade your selfe there is another argument of more force than that: But marke I pray with what issue; In foregoing the proofe I proposed and answered, you instead thereof bring no proofe at all, but rely upon this proposition (God could not possibly intend to spare any, nor justly intend to punish any, if he had not considered them as in a state of sinne) without all proofe, as evident of it selfe. And if you marke it well, you shall find, that this proposition, is the same proposition in effect, the best proofe whereof that I found, I laboured to overthrow, by shewing the inconsequence thereof divers wayes. And seeing you rely finally hereupon without proofe, you begge the question, and instead of giving a new reason, you give none at all. And the truth is, I find many apt to be carried away with the plausible shew of this proposition, and either looke not at all farther for any proofe thereof, or if they doe, they proceed no farther than thus. The manifestation of mercy in sparing, and justice in punishing, presupposeth sinne; therefore the decree (or intention) of manifesting Gods mercy in sparing, and justice in punishing, presupposeth sinne, which was in effect the same consequence or enthymeme, which I proposed to answer, as you may easily perceive if you marke it well: for commiseration and manifestation of mercy are all one. Now because this proposition is such a witch to bewitch mens fancies to entertaine it, I will endeavour to discover the vanity of it, and that in the very decrees of men, all which are temporall, whereas Gods decrees were eternall. T.

The decree of shewing mercy in pardoning sinne doth no more presuppose sinne, than the decree of shewing the power of balme in curing a green wound, doth presuppose the wound, or the decree of shewing the power of a cordiall against poyson, doth presuppose the empoysoning of a mans body; or the decree of advancing a subject by way of reward, doth presuppose his service: or the decree of a Patron; to present his sonne to a benefice, doth presuppose his fitnesse for it, or the decree of *Solomon* to bring *Shimei* his gray haires unto the grave in bloud, did presuppose the offence for which this was brought to passe; but rather from these decrees and intentions, each Author in his kind proceedeth to bring to passe every thing that is required to the accomplishment of that end which he requires; As I prove by instance in every particular. 1. I have knowne one, that to shew the power of his balme, hath wounded his owne flesh, and pouring his balme into it, hath cured it in the space of twenty foure houres. Aske wherefore he wounded his flesh, every one seeth, that both he wounded it, and healed it with his balme, to make the vertue of his balme knowne: So that his intention of manifesting the vertue of his balme, did not presuppose the wound but drew after it, both the making of the wound, and the pouring of balme into it, as the meanes tending to the demonstration of the power of the balme. 2. So we have knowne another to take poyson, and afterward his cordiall against it, both the one, and the other, joyntly tending to the manifestation of the vertue of his cordiall. 3. A King intending to promote a favourite, but withall to doe it without envy of the Nobility, may resolve to doe it by way of reward, which purpose presupposeth not good service, but rather hereupon he will

will imploy him in ſervice, as in ſome honourable Embaſſage, or in the Warres, to the end that he may have occaſion to advance him upon his ſervice, without envy of the Nobles. 4. A Patron having a young ſonne, may entertaine a reſolution to beſtow a living upon him when time ſerves; This intention doth not preſuppoſe his fitneſſe, (without which he cannot be admitted) but becauſe he hath a purpoſe to preferre him thereunto, therefore he will take order to bring him up like a Schollar, and ſend him to the Univerſity to make him fit. 5. Laſt of all, *Solomon* you know upon *Davids* admonition on his death bed, entertained an intention to bring *Shimei* to his grave in bloud, yet not for his curſing of *David*, but for a new tranſgreſſion; therefore he takes a courſe to enſnare him, and bids him to build him an houſe in *Jeruſalem*, and not to paſſe over the Brooke *Kidron* upon paine of death. Now it was not indeed in *Solomons* power effectually to enſnare him, and ſo certainely to bring upon him the execution of death: But this is in the power of God; For let him but expoſe any creature unto temptation, and derelinquiſh him therein, without giving him his grace to ſupport him, that creature ſhall certainely fall into ſinne, otherwiſe if any creature can keepe himſelfe from ſinne without Gods grace, then Gods grace ſhall not have the prerogative of being the cauſe of every good action; But this prerogative of Gods grace muſt and by Gods grace ſhall be maintained unto the end. And upon this foundation the prerogative of his ſoveraigne power alſo over his creatures in diſpoſing of them as he thinkes good, and making ſome veſſells of mercy and ſome of wrath, which *Arminius* himſelfe profeſſeth he dares not deny to be in the power of God, to wit, to make veſſells of mercy and veſſells of wrath, and that *ex maſſa nondum condita*, in his Analyſis of the ninth to the Romans.

But I proceed to the forme of your Syllogiſme.

H. 1. The reaſon (you ſay) may be laid downe Syllogiſtically thus:

1. God could not intend to pardon any without ſuppoſition of that, which is neceſſarily required to make them capable of pardon: But ſinne is neceſſarily required to make them capable of pardon; therefore God could not intend to pardon any without ſuppoſition of ſinne.

2. God could not intend to puniſh any without conſideration of that, which is in juſtice required to make them puniſhable: But ſinne is required in juſtice to make any perſon puniſhable; therefore God could not intend to puniſh any without conſideration of ſinne.

T. *Reſp.* 1. In both Syllogiſmes the Minor we grant, the Major we deny, as being in effect the very ſame propoſition which is in queſtion; and all the evidence it carryeth with it conſiſteth in the parts which have a ſhew of an Enthymeme thus:

1. Sinne is neceſſarily prerequired to the pardoning of ſinne, therefore it is neceſſarily prerequired to the decree of pardoning ſinne.

2. Sinne in juſtice is prerequired unto puniſhing, *Ergo* 'tis in juſtice prerequired to the decree of puniſhing.

Now this is the very proofe which formerly I laboured to diſprove, by ſhewing the inconſequence thereof, yet the propoſition whereon you rely, either muſt depend upon this proofe, or upon none at all. But I will proceed with you a little farther upon theſe Syllogiſmes you propoſe.

2. Sinne (you ſay, and that truly) is neceſſarily required to make men capable of pardon. And this generall truth brancheth it ſelfe into two ſpecialls:

1. Sinne originall is neceſſarily required to make men capable of pardon for ſinne originall.

2. Sinne actuall is neceſſarily required to make men capable of pardon for ſinne actuall.

Now becauſe God doth intend to pardon all the ſinnes of his elect, not only originall but actuall, committed throughout the whole courſe of his life, it followeth that God could not intend to pardon theſe actuall ſinnes without the preſuppoſition of them.

3. By the ſame reaſon of yours I diſpute thus:

1. God could not intend to beſtow ſalvation upon any man by way of reward without ſuppoſition of that which is neceſſarily required to make him capable of reward. But the obedience of faith, repentance, and good workes, is neceſſarily required to make a man capable of reward, *Ergo*, God could not intend to beſtow ſalvation on any man by way of reward, without ſuppoſition of faith, repentance and good workes.

2. As

2. As God cannot intend to puniſh any without conſideration of that, which in juſtice is required to make him puniſhable: ſo God cannot intend to puniſh any in ſuch a degree, without that which is required in juſtice to make him puniſhable in ſuch a degree. Now not onely ſinne originall, but all actuall ſinnes of every Reprobate, together with their finall impenitency therein, is required in juſtice to make every one of them puniſhable in ſuch a degree; *Ergo*, could not God intend to puniſh any Reprobate in ſuch a degree, without conſideration of all their actuall ſins.

And as mens actuall ſinnes are the meritorious cauſes of their damnation: ſo the conſideration of them ſhall be the meritorious cauſe of their reprobation, or at leaſt, of that decree whereby God doth decree to inflict damnation upon them in ſuch a degree.

And by juſt proportion of reaſon, like as faith, repentance, and good workes are the diſpoſing cauſes unto ſalvation, ſo the conſideration of faith, repentance, and good workes ſhall be the diſpoſing cauſes of their election unto ſalvation: But you proceed, and I am content to go along with you.

3. And this reaſon, eſpecially for the latter part of it, which concernes the manifeſtation of Gods glory *per modum juſtitiæ punientis*, may be farther confirmed thus: That which tends not to Gods glory ſimply, but onely upon ſuppoſition [*if ſinne be*] could not be intended by him ſimply, but onely upon that ſuppoſition. For ſo farre and no farther doth God intend any thing, as it makes for his glory: But to puniſh men, or any other creatures, is a thing that tends not to Gods glory ſimply, but onely upon ſuppoſition (if ſinne be) *Ergo*, it could not be intended by God ſimply but onely upon that ſuppoſition. H.

Reſp. You need not have mentioned the tending of this to Gods glory: your argument is in force, and greater force without it. For I hold, that to puniſh without ſuppoſition of ſinne implyeth contradiction: *pœna* being properly oppoſed to *præmium*, and as reward formally hath a reſpect to obedience going before, ſo hath puniſhment unto ſinne. T.

1. Now firſt to follow you in your owne courſe, I reaſon thus; That which tends to Gods glory not ſimply, but onely upon ſuppoſition of obedience in faith, repentance, and good workes, cannot be intended by him ſimply, but upon that ſuppoſition; but to reward with ſalvation, and everlaſting life, tends not to Gods glory ſimply, but onely upon ſuppoſition of faith, repentance and good workes. *Ergo*, it could ot be intended by God ſimply, but onely upon faith and repentance.

2. But to your *Major* I anſwer; No man ſaith, that God doth intend to puniſh any man but for ſinne. Now hereupon many (not onely Arminians, but ſome Orthodox alſo) are apt to be deceived, and to thinke, that theſe words, *but for ſinne*, are to be referred to the Antecedent removed, which is Gods intention. But it is not ſo, thoſe words are onely to be referred to the Antecedent next before, which is to puniſh. And I prove it thus: When any man ſaith, God intends to puniſh man for his ſinne, the meaning can be no other, than if he had ſaid, God doth intend, that puniſhment ſhall be inflicted on man for his ſinne; where it is manifeſt, that ſinne is noted onely as going before the puniſhment, not as going before Gods intention. But as ſoone as this confuſion of ſenſe is opened by diſtinction, then they flye to this kind of argument, ſinne goeth before the execution of puniſhment, therefore the conſideration of ſinne goeth before the intention of puniſhment, which is the argument I formerly propoſed, and the inconſequence whereof I preſume you doe manifeſtly perceive.

Now to that which followeth:

4. Although the reaſon which you alledge on our behalfe be inconſequent, as you have framed it: yet I ſuppoſe it may be reduced to a true Syllogiſme thus: H.

The decree of liberation from ſinne, preſuppoſeth ſinne: election is the decree of liberation from ſinne, *Ergo*, election preſuppoſeth ſinne. If you deny the Major, I prove it thus:

That which preſuppoſeth ſinners, preſuppoſeth ſinne. The decree of liberation from ſinne, preſuppoſeth ſinners: *Ergo*, the decree of liberation from ſinne, preſuppoſeth ſinne; you will perhaps yet deny the Minor; but I prove it thus: The decree of liberation from ſinne, preſuppoſeth ſome that have need to be delivered, for elſe it were vaine, and to no purpoſe: Onely ſinners have need to be delivered from ſinne: *Ergo*, the decree of liberation from ſinne preſuppoſeth ſinners.

The like argument, and in the like forme, may be framed touch ing the decree of

dereliction in ſinne: Or if you take reprobation for the decree of damnation, it may be ſaid thus:

The decree of damnation, preſuppoſeth ſome perſons juſtly damnable, for otherwiſe it were either an unjuſt, or at leaſt and unwiſe an indeliberate decree. But onely ſinners are juſtly damnable. *Ergo*, the decree of damnation preſuppoſeth ſinners, and conſequently ſinne. For *peccatum* is *de formali ratione peccatoris qua peccator eſt*, as you know.

T. *Reſp.* Every one indeed knowes that *peccatum* is *de formali ratione peccatoris*, and hereupon it is manifeſt that the ſecond Syllogiſme gives no mite of proofe unto the firſt. For ſeeing *formalis ratio* of any thing, cannot be ſeparated from the thing it ſelfe, and conſequently neither *peccatum* from *peccator*; you may eaſily perceive, that when we deny that the decree of liberation from ſinne preſuppoſeth ſinne, we muſt therewithall neceſſarily deny, that it preſuppoſeth ſinners.

Your third Syllogiſme addeth as little force unto the former, being meerly *identica probatio*: For every man knoweth, that to be a ſinner, and to have need to be delivered from ſinne is all one, in ſuch ſort as whatſoever is denyed of a ſinner, muſt be denyed of him that hath need to be delivered from ſinne, for aſmuch as every ſinner hath need to be delivered from ſinne. Thus while you decline that proofe, which in my obſervation, alone hath courſe, and the implication whereof in the Major propoſition is all the evidence of it; you fall upon no ſound proofe at all. The truth is, if you obſerve, you may perceive your Major propoſition involves this Enthymeme.

Liberation from ſinne preſuppoſeth ſinne, ſinners ſuch as have need to be delivered from ſinne, *Ergo*, the decree of liberation from ſinne, preſuppoſeth both ſinne and ſinners, and ſuch as need to be delivered from ſinne.

Of any other force of proofe that you give, I am not conſcious.

2. If the argument formed touching the decree of dereliction in ſinne, be of the like forme, it will admit no doubt the ſame anſwer.

3. The Major of the laſt Syllogiſme, hath a clauſe annexed unto it, as a reaſon of it, thus, *elſe it were in vaine and to no purpoſe*. If this reaſon pleaſed you, you might have relyed upon it, in the firſt Syllogiſme of the three, whereas now you may perceive, they containe no proofe but identicall. 2. Your courſe of argumentation tends to prove, that it is impoſſible it ſhould be otherwiſe than you conceive, which is more than to ſay, it were otherwiſe onely vaine, and to no purpoſe. Thirdly I anſwer that which is vaine, and to no purpoſe, is either to no end, or to no good end: But the decree of liberation from ſinne, whether it preſuppoſe ſinne, as you ſay, or not preſuppoſe ſinne, as I ſay, ſtill it tends to the ſame end, and that a good end, to wit, the manifeſtation of Gods mercy.

But I erre, your meaning ſeemeth to be this, it is vaine in reſpect that it cannot obtaine the end it aimes at, unleſſe it preſuppoſe ſinne. But how doe you prove that Gods decree of liberation from ſinne, cannot take effect, except it preſuppoſe ſinne? you have no meanes to prove it but this:

Liberation from ſinne cannot take effect without it preſuppoſe ſinne, *Ergo*, the decree of liberation from ſinne cannot take effect without it preſuppoſe ſinne. And while you decline this way of proofe, you light upon no proofe at all.

4. Touching your laſt Syllogiſme, I deny your Major, that is, I deny that the decree of damnation preſuppoſeth perſons juſtly damnable. Then you ſay it is unjuſt; but I deny this conſequence, and though you bring no farther reaſon for your affirmation, yet will I prove my negation thus:

The decree of damnation for finall perſeverance in ſin, no man will ſay, to be unjuſt: But God decrees to damne no man but for finall perſeverance in ſinne, *Ergo*, Gods decree of damnation is not unjuſt. Here I ſuppoſe you will reply, that if God decreeth to damne no man but for finall perſeverance in ſinne, then it followeth, that the decree of damnation preſuppoſeth not onely ſinne in generall, but finall perſeverance; and ſo you may thinke my opinion more diſſolute than yours, and your opinion more rigid than mine. And I doubt not, but ſo it will appeare in the end, eſpecially in the point of election; but yet not for any force in this conſequence.

Wherefore I anſwer, that this conſequence is very unſound, though it hath deceived many, and though the uſuall courſe is, to content themſelves with propoſing it, without all proofe, thinking it needeth no proofe; yet will I eaſily diſprove it, and ſhew the vanity of it, as already I have done the like. Now I pray what is the meaning of this, God doth not decree to damne any man but for finall perſeverance in

ſin

ſinne? hath it any other meaning than this, God doth not intend, that damnation ſhall be afflicted on any man, but for his finall perſeverance in ſinne goeth before damnation; *Ergo*, the conſideration of finall perſeverance in ſinne goeth before the decree of damnation. The inconſequence whereof I have formerly ſhewed, neither doe I finde any exception you make againſt my courſe in diſcovering it. And by the way give me leave to tell you, what I ſeeme to have found in the courſe of my ſtudies in theſe points: Arminianiſme and Pelagianiſme is one of the unlearnedſt hereſies that ever was, depending meerly either upon principles, which they eſtabliſh to themſelves at pleaſure without all ground, or upon conſequences, moſt inconſequent; yet both their principles, and their conſequences are very plauſible at firſt ſight to judgement, and the Tenets themſelves, moſt apt to bewitch carnall affections. And if the Trumpets in the Revelation doe containe a prediction of hereſies growing upon the Church, as moſt have thought, (though now adayes it begins otherwiſe to come about) and the ſtarre called wormewood, as a ſtarre ſignifieth ſome plauſible Hereſie, as Piſcator conjecttureth; I ſee none ſo fit as the Pelagian Hereſie to be notified hereby, though as bitter as wormewood in oppoſing the grace of God; in maintaining the prerogative whereof, how can it be but he ſhould be zealous, that hath taſted of it, and of Gods goodneſſe in making him a veſſell of mercy, when he might have made him a veſſell of wrath. But you proceed.

5. Whereas you argue, that if election preſuppoſe originall ſinne, it preſuppoſeth actuall ſinnes alſo. I anſwer, it followes not: For though God hath decreed to free his elect from all their actuall ſinnes, as well as from their originall, yet he hath not done it by one and the ſame decree: But firſt he hath reſolved to free them from that generall curſe, and malediction, whereto they were obnoxious in *Adam*, and this is included in their very election; afterward he hath reſolved to purge them alſo from all their actuall ſinnes, which they ſhall commit by the effectuall application of Chriſts merit, and this is by another decree conſequent upon their election, being one of his decrees *de mediis*. H.

Reſp. Herein you carry your ſelfe like a right Schollar, in making way out though it be a new way. As if the decree of freeing from Originall ſinne, were a different decree from the decree of freeing from ſinnes actuall, and before it. And albeit the actuall ſinnes of Gods elect are many and much different, ſome committed before their calling, and for many yeares, ſome committed after their calling, throughout the whole courſe of their lives, yet you can be content to make the decree of God in freeing from all theſe, to be but one decree; onely the decrees of freeing from actuall, and from originall ſinnes muſt be different decrees. T.

1. When you ſay, firſt he hath reſolved to free them from originall ſinne, and afterwards he hath reſolved to purge them from actuall ſinnes, I doubt your meaning is no more but this, God hath reſolved firſt to free them from originall ſinne, and afterwards to purge them from actuall ſinnes. And my reaſon is, becauſe many times I have obſerved ſpeeches to runne thus, when the meaning hath beene but ſo as I have expreſſed. But I will manifeſt, that in the execution, freeing from malediction in *Adam*, and purging from actuall ſinnes goe together: much leſſe can they differ in intention; which I prove thus: No man is delivered from the malediction, whereto he was obnoxious in *Adam*, but by faith in Chriſt, he is therewithall freed from all his actuall ſinnes committed before his calling: Therefore ſeeing they are at once freed from malediction in *Adam*, and from many actuall ſinnes, it followeth that God did intend at once thus to free them; and how could this be done by different decrees, one going before another?

2. Now I will prove, that God did at once intend to free from all ſins, both actuall and originall, though he did not intend, that this ſhould be done at once; Foraſmuch as actuall ſinnes are committed ſucceſſively, one a long time after another.

God intending to give faith and repentance to his elect, did therewithall intend to free them from all their ſinnes, for theſe are the onely meanes whereby we are freed from ſinne. But God did at once intend to give faith and repentance to his elect: *Ergo*. He did at once intend, to free them from all their ſinnes.

Againſt this argument, the greateſt colour of exception is from the conſideration of actuall ſins, that have their courſe after their calling. But this again is as eaſily removed by conſideration, that as ſins have their courſe, ſo faith and repentance have their courſe; and God intended at once to give his elect faith and repentance, and finall

perſeverance in both, though perſeverance cannot be had at once, that being againſt the nature of it.

3. Whereas you ſay onely of actuall ſins, that we are purged from them by the effectuall application of Chriſts merits; I hope your meaning is not, to exclude the purgation of originall ſin, and liberation from malediction in *Adam* from the effect of Chriſts merits. The blood of Jeſus Chriſt cleanſeth us from all ſin. And *David* repented of his originall ſin, as well as of his actuall, and ſo doe we. And when in reſpect of *the law of his members, leading him captive to the law of ſinne*, the Apoſtle cries out, *wretched man that I am, who ſhall deliver me, &c.* Immediately he comforteth himſelfe in this manner, *I thank my God through Jeſus Chriſt.*

4. When you ſay, that Gods decree of purging us from actuall ſins, is one of the decrees *de mediis*, you doe not tell us what you call that other decree, whereby God decreeth to free us from that generall curſe and malediction whereto we were obnoxious in *Adam*. But by the difference you put, you leave us to interpret it, of Gods decree *de fine*: Now there is no ſuch proportion, or diſproportion between theſe decrees, that the decree of freeing from originall ſin, or from the malediction in *Adam*, ſhould be *decretum de fine*, and the decree of purging from actuall ſins, ſhould be *decretum de mediis.*

1. For the end of Gods actions is meerely his own glory, according to that, *Prov. 16.4. God made all things for himſelfe*, and that *Rom. 11.4.* laſt, *from him and for him are all things.* The freeing from ſin Originall &c. may be a means to this, it cannot be the end which God intends.

2. If ſalvation be conſidered as the end which God intends, as commonly Divines conſider it, (though this courſe of conſideration hath been the mother of great perturbation, in the ordering of Gods decrees) yet freedom from ſin originall, is rather a means to this: Therefore not to be accounted the object of Gods decrees concerning the end. Again, who doubts, but that the freeing from ſin originall, is as well a means of ſalvation, as the purging from ſins actuall. Therefore the decree thereof is to be reckoned amongſt the number of the decrees *de mediis.*

3. Yet will not this ſuffice, to make the decree of freeing from ſin originall, to be different from the decree of purging from ſins actuall, as this is accounted a decree *de mediis*: unleſſe the freeing from ſin originall be the end, and the purging from ſins actuall a means tending to that end. For priority and poſteriority in intention, hath no place, but by reaſon of mutuall reſpect between the end and the means tending to that end. But in no congruity can it be ſaid, that the purging us from ſins actuall is a means to free us from ſins originall, or from that malediction, whereto we were obnoxious in *Adam*.

4. If freeing from originall ſin be firſt in Gods intention, and afterwards the purging of us from ſins actuall; it followeth, that the freeing from originall ſin ſhall be laſt in execution, ſo that God ſhall firſt free us from actuall ſins, and then proceed to free us from originall ſin. I proceed to the next.

H. 6. In like manner we ſay of the Reprobate: It is one decree whereby God reſolves to leave them in the State of originall ſin, another whereby he doth reſolve to leave them in their actuall ſins alſo; And although this latter doth follow alwaies upon the former, yet the former is onely properly called reprobation. Wherefore it followeth not, that if the decree of reprobation ſuppoſeth originall ſin, it ſuppoſeth actuall alſo.

T. *Reſp.* 1. The anſwer unto the former may in every particular be accommodated unto this.

2. Theſe you ſpeak of are not different, but one decree, and the ſame: As I prove thus; Gods decree to leave them in the ſtate of originall ſin, is all one with Gods decree finally to deny them faith and repentance: And Gods decree finally to deny them faith and repentance is all one with Gods decree to leave them in their actuall ſin. Alſo Reprobation, as it ſignifieth Gods decree of leaving in the ſtate of ſin, was never conceived to be other, then the decree of denying them faith and repentance unto the end: which whether it be not a decree of leaving them in actuall ſins as well as originall, let any man judge. For God by this decree of finall dereliction, did not onely decree that they ſhould be left in their ſins before they come to the uſe of reaſon, but in their ſins committed after alſo, in their youth, in their middle age, in their old age: otherwiſe it could be no decree of finall dereliction.

H. 7. Although God doth actually damne men as well for their actuall ſins, as for their origi-

originall : yet the foreſight of originall ſin, being enough to ſalve Gods juſtice in the decree of damnation, we are not compelled to grant any more, as antecedent to that decree, but may take in the reſt, as conſequent rather.

Reſp. As God doth actually damn men aſwel for their actual ſins, as for their originall; ſo undoubtedly God did from everlaſting decree to damn them for their actuall ſins as wel as for their originall. For when God doth actually damn them for their actuall ſins, then undoubtedly he doth will to condemne them, otherwiſe he ſhould damne them againſt his will: Now the will of God, being an eternall action, is eternall; therefore from everlaſting he did will to damne them for actuall ſinnes: For his will to damne them, and his decree to damne them is all one. Now I think you doe not make two decrees of damnation of the ſame men, one for their originall, another for their actuall ſins: Therefore in the ſame moment that he decreed to damne for ſin originall, he did decree to damne for actuall alſo. T.

2. If the foreſight of ſinne be required to ſalve Gods juſtice in the decree of damnation of men of ripe yeeres; the foreſight of originall ſinne will not ſerve the turn: For ſeeing God doth not intend the damnation of man indefinitely, in reſpect of the degrees thereof, but definitely, that is, according to the very degree in which he will inflict damnation; It is manifeſt, that foreſight of originall ſinne cannot ſalve Gods juſtice. For to intend damnation in ſuch a degree as is due onely to ſins actuall, upon foreſight onely of ſinne originall, is as unjuſt, as to intend damnation upon no foreſight of ſinne at all: For even in this caſe you allow, that as ſome degrees intended are due to ſinne originall, upon foreſight whereof alone, they are intended; ſo again ſome degrees intended, are due onely to actuall ſinnes, upon no foreſight whereof in your opinion they are intended.

3. It is very ſtrange, that you ſhould maintaine, Gods courſe is juſtified in decreeing to damne upon foreſight of originall ſinne, and not upon the foreſight of actuall ſins: whereas damnation for originall ſinne onely, is ſo farre from being juſtifiable in the ſight of fleſh and blood, as that it is indeed the ſecond degree of the greateſt abſoluteneſſe of Gods power, that ever was or ſhall be ſhewed in this world, or in the world to come.

1. The firſt degree and greateſt, was the crucifying of the ſame God for others ſins, being without all ſin of his own.
2. The ſecond is the damnation of Infants, for the ſin of *Adam*; which *Adam* himſelfe, notwithſtanding, we believe to be ſaved.

4. I pray conſider the difference betwixt your opinion and minde; you maintaine that God decreed to damne all reprobates before the foreſight of any of their actuall ſinnes: I no way like this Tenet, but maintaine, that in the ſame moment, that God decrees to damne any Reprobate, he decrees to damne him for all his actuall ſins, aſwell as originall ſinne, and finall perſeverance in them; And that in the ſame moment he foreſaw all their ſins: not that the foreſight of their ſinnes is antecedent or ſubſequent to, but concomitant or conjunct with his decree of their damnation, in the ſame moment, not of time onely, but of nature alſo.

Undoubtedly actuall ſinnes are more apt to juſtifie God in damning any man, than ſinne originall; yet you maintaine that God decrees to damne a man, without the foreſight of that, which doth more juſtifie God in damning any man; onely you deny, that he can decree to damne any man, without the foreſight of that, which doth leſſe juſtifie God in the actuall damnation of any one.

You will have the foreſight of mans actuall ſins to follow the decree of damnation, which I dare not avouch, not onely becauſe it is harſh to mens affections, but becauſe it is repugnant in my judgement to manifeſt reaſon; onely I deny the foreſight of all ſinnes to be antecedent to this decree: I ſay, it is neither antecedent to it, which is the diſſolute opinion, nor ſubſequent after it, which is the rigid opinion, and each of them equally untrue; but it is conjunct or concomitant to it, in the ſame moment of nature: both theſe degrees being the decrees *de mediis*, and ſo making up one formall compleat decree *de mediis ad eundem finem tendentibus*, which is the manifeſtation of Gods glory in the way of juſtice; as I have ſhewed at large in my third digreſſion, amongſt thoſe which I heare are lately brought into your hands. But I wonder not a little what you are fallen upon in the next place.

8. As touching the election and reprobation of Angells I have nothing to ſay, becauſe the Scripture ſaith nothing. It is true, that it could not be made *ex communi* H.

massa corrupta, because there was none such; But why it might not be out of the foresight of their personall obedience or disobedience, I know no great matter to object. Nor will it follow, that if they were elected upon such considerations, we must be so too: for our case is wholly different, as the Scripture denyeth that of us.

T. *Resp.* Hitherto you have discoursed as it were out of the mouth of our Divines; who yet as I have shewed in my eighth Digression, are for the most part nothing for this opinion which you propose, being rightly understood. But in this point not one is for you; nor ever could I observe any of our Divines that maintained not the election of Angells, to be of as free grace as the election of men, or the reprobation of Angells, to be of as free Soveraignty and absoluteness in the denyall of grace, as the reprobation of men.

Arminius never durst professe this which you doe; but still puts it off as a matter he hath nothing to doe withall, treating onely of the predestination of men: which he would never have done, had he any hope to make good that opinion, which you seeme more to incline unto, than to the contrary.

But though you see no great matter to object against it, yet others doe, that hold it absolutely impossible to be otherwise; namely impossible, that any thing in the creature should be the cause of the will of God *quoad actum volentis*; or of predestination, *quoad actum prædestinantis*, Insomuch that *Aquinas* professeth, *never any man was so mad, as to maintaine that there could be any cause of the will of God.* p. 1. q. 23. Art. 5. in Corp. *Cum prædestinatio includat voluntatem, sic inquirenda est ratio prædestinationis, sicut inquiritur ratio divinæ voluntatis: Dictum est autem suprà, quod non est assignare causam divinæ voluntatis ex parte actus volendi: sed potest assignari ratio ex parte volitorum, &c. Deus vult esse aliquid propter aliud. Nullus ergo fuit ita insanæ mentis, qui diceret merita esse causam Divinæ prædestinationis ex parte actus prædestinantis, sed hoc sub quæstione vertitur; utrum ex parte effectus prædestinatio habeat aliquam causam: Et hoc est quærere, utrum Deus præordinaverit se daturum effectum prædestinationis alicui propter aliquam causam.*

And whereas *Suarius* hath laboured to helpe himselfe with a shifting distinction, betweene *causa* and *ratio*; as if there might be *ratio voluntatis divinæ* from without it, though not *causa*: and finding these tearmes promiscuously used by *Aquinas* in his summes, flyeth out to his booke *contra Gentes*, and *Ferrariensis* thereupon, to get hold of somewhat therehence for his advantage; yet I have endeavoured to beat that fox out of his holes, in my third Digression upon election.

2. Are they not called in Scripture the elect Angells? Now marke *Austins* discourse; If upon the foresight of mans obedience God elect any man, it shall not be said, *Non vos me elegistis, sed ego vos elegi*; but on the contrary rather, *vos me elegistis non ego elegi vos.* For if election of Angells followed upon their obedience, they did first choose God, that is, choose to obey him, before God did choose them, that is, choose to save them.

3. If Angells were elected upon their obedience, then either by necessity of nature this came to passe, or by the free constitution of God; It cannot be said, by necessity of nature, *Ergo* by his free constitution, whence it followeth, that God did ordaine, that upon the obedience of Angells he would ordaine them to eternall life. Now judge you whether one decree of God can possibly be the object of another decree, all decrees of God being eternall; and the objects of Gods decrees being meerely temporall: as appeares in the decree of creation, preservation, redemption, vocation, justification, sanctification, salvation.

4. No good act can be wrought but by God, and by his grace; it is he that workes in us both the will and the deed of his good pleasure; Doe you not thinke it is so in Angells also? otherwise what cause have they to give God thankes for their election, as namely, if it sprang from their obedience.

But suppose you deny this; yet all confesse no naturall action can be wrought (much lesse gratious) without Gods concourse, as the efficient cause thereof. Now consider, doth God concurre *modo nos velimus*, which is *Suarius* his devise? consider I pray you, the contradiction included in this Tenet: God is the cause working not onely *to perficere*, but also *to velle*, as they confesse: Now is it possible, that God concurreth *ad velle modo nos velimus?* can the same thing be the condition of it selfe? It may as well be before it selfe. Againe, supposing we doe *velle*, it is not possible by the power of God, that we should not *velle*: for *factum infectum reddere nec Deus quidem*

potest

poteſt. But this I have farther proſecuted in a Digreſſion by it ſelfe, proving that God doth determine the will to every act thereof, and ſhewing the great concurrence herein, (and upon what grounds) of ſchoole Divines, from *Albertus Magnus* his dayes downwards. But I proceed with you.

9. To that which you ſay concerning infants, I thinke I may anſwer, that although there were no other thing that made way to their ſalvation, or damnation, but onely the fall of *Adam*; yet it followeth not, that God decreed to permit *Adams* fall, as a *Medium* tending thereunto. For what if he decreed to ſave or damne ſome *ſine mediis*, ſuppoſing them in a ſtate immediately capable of ſalvation or damnation, as by *Adams* fall, and their originall ſinne contracted hereupon, they were? yet I adde farther, concerning infants that are ſaved; there is ſomewhat elſe decreed to make way to their ſalvation, beſides *Adams* fall: namely an application of Chriſts merit to them in baptiſme, or otherwiſe. And for thoſe that are damned; ſince their originall ſinne makes them immediately juſtly damnable, it was enough for God to decree to leave them in the ſtate they were, and ſo to damne them; there being no other remedy to bring to paſſe his end in the matter. H.

Reſp. In generall obſerve I pray you the diſproportion of your Tenet concerning Infants, and others. T.

God doth not decree to damne Infants (as you ſay) but upon the foreſight of all the ſinne, for which they are damned; but God doth decree to damne all others, not upon the foreſight of all their ſinnes for which they are damned, nor upon the foreſight of thoſe ſinnes for which they are chiefly damned, and which doe juſtifie God moſt in their damnation; but onely upon the foreſight of originall ſinne, for which leaſt of all they are damned, and which doth leaſt of all juſtifie God in their damnation.

But I come to the particular ſcanning of the parts.

1. You utterly miſtake my wordes; I ſaid not, the fall of *Adam* was the onely way, or any way, for the ſalvation of Infants: But this I ſaid, and ſay; the fall of *Adam* was the onely way of manifeſtation of Gods mercy in the ſalvation of Infants: For mercy ſuppoſeth miſery, and the miſery of Infants is onely in reſpect of ſinne originall, not at all in reſpect of ſinnes actuall, wherein they are nothing culpable. Now to the manifeſtation of Gods mercy in their ſalvation, the permiſſion of *Adams* fall, and their fall in *Adam*, was a *Medium*: and I prove it thus, if God did permit *Adam* to ſinne, and theſe Infants in *Adam*, to this end, namely to the manifeſtation of his mercy in their ſalvation; then this permiſſion of *Adams* fall, and their fall in *Adam*, was a *Medium* tending to the manifeſtation of his mercy in their ſalvation: But God did permit *Adam* to fall, and theſe Infants in *Adam*, to this very end. *Ergo.* I prove the *Minor* thus; he did permit *Adam* to fall, and theſe Infants in *Adam*, to the manifeſtation of his own glory in them: But no glory of God is more conveniently manifeſted in the permiſſion of *Adams* fall, and theſe Infants in *Adam*, than the glory of his mercy in the pardoning of their ſinnes, and ſaving their ſoules in deſpight of ſinne: Therefore this is to be accounted the end as much as any.

2. I nothing doubt, but that infants are ſaved *ſine mediis*; I ſpake not of the *Media* of their ſalvation, but of the manifeſtation of Gods mercy in their ſalvation: I make no queſtion, but that they are ſaved, by the merits of Chriſt, whether they have the ordinary meanes of applying Chriſt unto them, or no.

3. Touching reprobate Infants, I prove the permiſſion of *Adams* fall, and their fall in *Adam*, was a *Medium*, tending to the manifeſtation of Gods juſtice in their damnation. For if God did permit *Adam* to fall, and them in *Adam*, to this end, namely, to the manifeſtation of his juſtice in their damnation, then this permiſſion was a *Medium* tending thereto. But to this end God did permit *Adams* fall, and their fall in *Adam*: which I prove thus; He did permit it for the manifeſtation of his own glory, as to this end he doth all things. But no glory of God is ſo conveniently manifeſted hereby, as the glory of his juſtice in their damnation; unleſſe you will ſay with *Alphonſus Mendoza*, and *Didacus Alvarez*, that rather the manifeſtation of Gods glorious grace towards his elect, in conſideration that he could have made them veſſells of wrath as well as others, is the cauſe, why God doth not ſave all, but permits a multitude to ſinne, after much different courſes, and dannes them for ſinne.

4. Since their originall ſinne (you ſay) they are juſtly damnable; But I pray conſider, how came they to be thus juſtly damnable? was it onely by the will of *Adam*?

was

was it not by the will of God alſo? That the firſt ſinne of *Adam* alone, and no other, is imputed to his poſterity; how could this come to paſſe but by the will of God. 2. That the ſinne of *Adam* becomes fatall to all his poſterity, and not ſo the ſinne of any man elſe, to his poſterity, how is this, but by the will of God? 3. Could not God have derived a child from *Adam* in the ſtate of his innocency, if he had ſo thought good? 4. How come we to be borne in originall ſinne, but by the will of God, who could have deſtroyed *Adam* after his ſinne, and made another Author of generation of mankind. In all this, appeares the will of God, and forceth us to acknowledge the power of God over his creatures, to diſpoſe of them as he thinkes good. But along to the reſt.

H. 10. Although we ſay, the fall of *Adam* was conſidered in the decree of Gods election: yet we doe not ſay, it was preintended; (neither indeed can God properly be ſaid to intend any thing which he permits onely;) wherefore it followeth not, upon our opinion, that the fall of *Adam* was the end of mans ſalvation, and damnation, or that it was to be in execution after it: For the reſpect of *Media* and *Finis* is, where things are intended onely. But you will ſay, God intended the permiſſion of the fall, though not the fall it ſelfe, and if that were firſt in his intention, the ſame conſequents follow. I anſwer, it was one thing to conſider *Adams* fall as a thing that would be, if it were not hindered, another thing to reſolve poſitively to permit it. And though perhaps God did both, yet we make the former act onely, to have beene precedent to his election, not the latter.

T. ***Reſp.*** **1.** I ſpake nothing of Gods intention that *Adam* ſhould fall, but onely of Gods intention to permit him to fall; and ſhewed, that if the permiſſion of *Adams* fall, was firſt in intention, and then mans damnation, it will manifeſtly follow, that in execution it ſhall be laſt; that is, God ſhall firſt damne men for ſinne, and afterwards permit *Adam* to fall into ſinne, and all in *Adam*. To this you ſay, that it is one thing to conſider *Adams* fall as a thing that would be, if it were not hindered; another thing to reſolve poſitively to permit it. But this anſwer is to no purpoſe. For my argument doth not depend upon the confuſion of theſe things, which you ſay doe differ, and therein ſay truly my argument depends upon a principle, that is *totâ Academiâ notiſſimum*, and juſtified alſo by all experience, that what is firſt in intention is laſt in execution.

2. But what ſay you? doe you not make the permiſſion of *Adams* fall precedent to election and reprobation? why then let us ſhake hands; for the caſe is cleare, that then the foreſight of *Adams* fall, neither could be precedent to election: For the foreſight of *Adams* fall in no moment of time before Gods reſolution to permit it: For though God foreſaw that *Adam* would fall, if God permitted him, yet could he not foreſee, that he would fall abſolutely, untill God were reſolved to permit him.

3. Some things you touch by the way, I may not omit, you ſay nothing can properly be ſaid to be intended, which he permits onely. This is very worthy of conſideration, what think you of *Adams* eating of the forbidden fruit? did God intend that or no? Perhaps you will ſay, that God may be ſaid to intend that, becauſe he did only permit that as evill, but concurred to the effecting of it, as a naturall action. But then conſider, how was it poſſible, that God ſhould intend that this act ſhould come to paſſe and not the evill of it, whereas the evill, conſidering Gods interdict, was inſeparable from it. I ſhould anſwer it thus; As touching the ſubſtance of the act, God intended it ſhould come to paſſe, and it came to paſſe by Gods effection; for ſo God intended it ſhould come to paſſe, to wit, by his effection: But as touching the evill of the action God intended it ſhould come to paſſe, and it came to paſſe, but onely by Gods permiſſion: for ſo onely he intended it ſhould come to paſſe, to wit, by his permiſſion.

Hereupon you may flye out, and deny that God did intend ſo much as the act it ſelfe of eating the forbidden fruit.

But I pray why might not God intend and determine, that that act ſhould come to paſſe, aſwell as the Jewes crucifying of Chriſt? yet what ſay the Apoſtles with one mouth, both *Herod*, &c. why not aſwell as the Kings giving their Kingdomes unto the beaſt? yet it is expreſſely ſaid, that God put it into their hearts to doe his will even in this, to wit, giving their Kingdomes unto the beaſt.

In a word, I have a Digreſſion to this purpoſe, in the ſecond booke, *Digreſ.* 4. The title is this, *An ſanctus Iſraelis*, &c. It is the onely point wherein I oppoſe *Aquinas*, and *Aquinas* herein oppoſeth himſelfe manifeſtly againſt *Auſtin*, as there I ſhew.

11. In

11. In your laying downe the order of Gods decrees, I would gladly underſtand one thing. Whether you make his firſt decree *de fine*, to have been definite or indefinite? I meane, whether he reſolved at firſt, to declare his mercy upon ſuch and ſuch perſons as *Peter*, *Judas*, &c. or indefinitely upon ſome onely? If you make it indefinite, it may be, ſuch a decree might paſſe upon *Maſſa nondum condita*. But that is not the decree of election. If you make it definite, me thinkes your arguments before alleadged are ſtrong——againſt it. H.

Reſp. Your diſtinction is good of a decree definite and indefinite; in the ſame tearms you ſhall finde it diſputed of, in the third Digreſſion of thoſe that are come to your hands: and ſound labouring to hold up a decree indefinite, but all in vaine. The truth is *Maſſa nondum condita* is not to be taken poſitively, but privately rather as it denies creation and corruption precedent to Gods predeſtination, foraſmuch as all theſe decrees of creation, of permiſſion of *Adams* fall, of liberation finall from ſins by faith and repentance, and laſtly of ſalvation, are but one formall complete decree *de mediis*, tending to one compleate end, which is the manifeſtation of Gods glory in the way of mercy mixt with juſtice: On the other ſide, all theſe decrees, to wit, of creation, of permiſſion of *Adams* fall, of finall dereliction in ſin, and laſtly of condemnation for ſin, doe make up but one compleat decree *de mediis*, tending to one end, which is the manifeſtation of Gods glory in the way of juſtice. As for the ſtrength of your arguments, alleadged againſt this opinion, I remit to every indifferent mans judgement to conſider thereof. T.

As touching the firſt arguments you propoſe, I could gratifie you thus farre, that the decrees you ſpeake of, doe conſuppoſe ſin, but not preſuppoſe ſinne. Foraſmuch as my Tenet is, that in the ſame moment with thoſe decrees, God doth conſider their ſin, but not in any moment before it. This I ſay my Tenet alloweth me to grant, but I cannot acknowledge that any of your arguments prove thus much.

But then againe, I maintaine that theſe decrees conſuppoſe other ſinnes, aſwell as originall; yea the decree of damnation conſuppoſeth in the ſame moment all their actuall ſins, yea even finall impenitency; foraſmuch as God decreeth to damne no man of ripe yeares, but for all the ſins that ever he ſhall commit, and finall impenitency in them: whereas you maintaine that God firſt decrees to damne them, and then foreſeeth the actuall ſins of theirs, for which they ſhall be damned.

FINIS.

Addenda & Corrigenda.

PAg 1.lin.24 read *parts*.p.2.l.30 r.*rectifie* ib:l.56 r.*were of*.p.4 l:33 r.*diversions from*.l 54 dele,*not*.p.7 l. 36 *is intended* p 9 l.35 *πᾶν τετράποδον*.p.10 l. 16 *twofold*.p.11 l. 10 *and not*. p.15 l.4 *wholy God's,because they are wholy from God*,p.16 l.30 *first shewing*.l.50 *this objection*.l.ult *creatures love*.p.17 l.43 *world healthfull* l.47 *he decreed should perish*,p.24 l.3 *judicious author*.l 4 *conversion*.l.17 *affect*. p. 27 l.49 *kind of a meritorious*.p 29l.21 *Vines*.l 32 *they are the sons of God*.l.45 *praised me*. *l*.54 *we discourse*.p. 30 l.23 *of men*.l.50 *to the dead*.ib *according to men*.p.32 *l*.10 del.*not*.l 19 *very philosophically takes*.l.56 *to some* p.34 l.28 *over man his*.l.59 *that it is*.p.35 l.8.*from ten* l.53 *puniri*.p.36 l.33 *unseasonable*.l.36 *refuted*.p.37 l.48 *unto them*.p.39 l.4 *friend of his* l 45 *at the font*.p.40 l. 16. dele *if*. *l*.18 *exposition*.l.24 *Judas may cease*.*and the purpose of electing Judas may &c*:l.35 *and in saying*.p.41 *l*.40 *of being* l.45 *in this*.p:43 l.20 *tesse evident,that death was not desireable*.l.51 *designes*.*l*.54 *at a being in a state*,l. 56 *deliberative desire*. *l* 60 *esse nolis*.p.45 *l*.48 *all soules*, p. 53 *they are*. p. 46 l. 2 *paine corrupting their*.p 47 l.2 *præoptat*.*l*.23 *Μνᾶσων* p.48 *l*.5,6 *degree l*.8 *degree of diminution*.*l* 10 *any paine*.p.49.l.18 *my argument*.p.50.l.7 *in this l*.22 *will*.p.51.l.22 *the corrupt*.p 53 l.33.*permittente Deo*.p55 l.1:*But God by this opinion doth will and procure it by a powerfull and effectuall decree,which cannot be resisted* p.56 l.5 *this will*.*l* 53 *signes of* p.57 l 8 *God*:p.59 *l*. 9 *of* Thomas,p.60 l 16 *as holily*.p.61 l.45 *is just*.p.62.l.4 *restraines*.ib *l*.14 *good works*.*l*.22 *that thereforeGod*.l.28.*double evill*. l.48 *for it by*.p.63 l.5 *Potzn*.p.64 l.7 *efficacy of*.l 16 *supposition*,*l*.18 *necessarily but either necessarily or &c*. l.19 *supposition*.*l*. 24 *of* Aquinas. l. 26 *on Gods*.Marg:*pro culpa*.p.65.l.34 *quotation*.l.45 *to feare*.l.48.*emortui sarmenti quia Christo resecti sunt*; l.49 *multi*.p.66 l.7 *saith not* l.12 *nill that*.l.25 *futurition*.l.47 *from sin*.l. 56 *or whither he abstaine from that which is evill, he doeth not abstaine from it in a gracious manner*;p.67 l.12 *this of*. *l*.24 *you hearts*.*l*.51 *mans infidelity*. p.68 l.57.*manner of appointing hereunto,for if they be at all appointed hereunto,undoubtedly they are precisely appointed thereunto*.p.69 l.12 *supposition*. p.70.l.28 *second way*.p.73 l.24 *as we*.l.44 *severally*.p.74 l.46 *author of the Sin*. l. 48 del. *good*. p. 76.l.13 *will not*.p.78.l.3 *futurition*.l. 29 *procure*.l.30 *as a second*.p:80 l.12 *of England*.l. 22 *but we* l.31 *against*.*l*.38 *if he should worke them contrary to their natures then &c*.p.81.l.7 *effecting*.p.83 l.29 *of sin*.p.84 l.24 *acts*.p.85 l.1 *any naturall act*.l.50 *mere pleasure as the Apostle professeth that God hath mercy on whom he will;it is evident that God of his mere pleasure &c*.p.86 l.18 *as uncapable*.p.89 l.59 *nec recte*.p:93 l.30 *will doe* p.94 l.2 *nill it*.p.97 l.36 *the cause* l.54.*my answer*.p.100 l.44 *with their*.p 102 l.56 *and that* p.104 l.4 *Credible*.p 105 l 2 *agent*.p.118 l.41 *or vitious*.p.121 l.41 *will of*.p.127 l.14 *of destiny*.p.134 l.44 *assertoribus*.*l*.47 *quin author* l.50 *I propose*.p. 140 l.21 *so as to come to passe*.p 146 l. 22 *pillar had not*.l. 23 del. *pillar had*.p.147 l ult. *why God* p·151 l.38 *&so*.p.157 l.7 *without which*.p.164 l.56 *it may*.p.186 l.47 *decrees*.p.193 l.2 *wherein 'tis manifest that finall perseverance in sin goeth before*.l.3 *But if you further proceed to make it good according to your usuall course thus; finall perseverance in sin goeth before damnation*.*Ergo &c* p:195 l.35 *mine*.l.54 *decrees*.p.198 l.36 *is in*,p. 1991 10 *and some*.l.11, *privatively*.

A VIND

A VINDICATION OF Dr. TWISSE FROM THE EXCEPTIONS OF Mr JOHN GOODWIN IN HIS Redemption Redeemed.

BY
HENRY IEANES, Minister of Gods Word in *Chedzoy*.



OXFORD,
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EXCELLENCIES
OF THE
D. LAW
OF
VINDICATION

TO THE

Reverend and Learned

Mr IOHN GOODWIN.

SIR,

I Have assumed so much boldnesse, as to examine some passages that you have in your Booke (entituled *Redemption Redeemed*) against D. *Twisse*: wherein I believe that you your selfe will acknowledg, that I have carried my selfe as a fair adversary, as an adversary only unto your opinions, and not unto your person, which I love & honour, as in other respects so for the good and great gifts and parts God hath bestowed on you. Many of my friends have earnestly disswaded me from this vindicatiō assuring me that I must expect from you insteed of a reply, nothing but a libell. But for my part, I shall hope and pray unto the Almighty for better things of you. However I am not hereby deterred from entring into the lists with you, neither shall I deprecate your utmost severity in rationall argumentation, for the discovery of any thing, that you conceive to be weake and unsound in this my discourse. You may perhaps think and say that so small a trifle is unworthy a diversion from your more serious employments; but for that, I am contented that the learned Reader judge betwixt us. Indeed I had long ere this finished an answer unto your whole Book; but that there was a generall, and (as I think) a just expectation, that some in the University of *Cambridge*, who dissented from you, would comply with your faire invitation of them, to declare themselves in some worthy and satisfactory answer to the particulars propounded in your Book: But upon their long silence (which I can neither excuse, nor will I accuse (as being altogether ignorant of the causes thereof) I renewed my thoughts of setting about this worke, and intended in the interim, to have annexed to this piece of D. *Twisse*, a Table referring unto such passages in this, and other of his Books, as doe in great part satisfy whatsoever you have delivered, in your forementioned Treatise, in opposition unto the absoluteness of Divine Reprobation: But from these resolutions I was quite taken off, by certain information, that the Learned M. *Kendall* (heretofore Fellow of *Exeter* Colledge in the University of *Oxford*) hath undertaken you. But I detaine you and the reader too long with Prefacing, I shall therefore presently without more adoe addresse my selfe unto the encounter with you.

In three places you except againſt D. *Twiſſe*. I ſhall conſider them ſeverally.

To begin with the firſt.

Mr GOODWIN p. 25. 26. c. 2. §. 20.

Dr Twiſſe. *IT is indeed the judgement of ſome Learned men, that the purpoſe or intent of God to permit, or ſuffer ſuch, or ſuch a thing to be done, or ſuch or ſuch an accident to come to paſſe, ſuppoſeth a neceſſity (at leaſt a ſyllogiſticall or conſequentiall neceſſity) of the coming of it to paſſe. But that the truth lieth on the other ſide of the way, appears by the light of this conſideration. If whatſoever God hath decreed, or intendeth, to permit to come to paſſe in any caſe, upon any termes, or any ſuppoſition whatſoever, ſhould by vertue of ſuch an intention or decree, neceſſarily come to paſſe, then all things poſſible to be, (or at leaſt ten thouſand things more than ever ſhall be) muſt be, yea, and this neceſſarily. For (doubtleſſe God hath decreed, and intendeth, to leave naturall cauſes, generally, to their naturall and proper operations, and productions; yea and voluntary cauſes alſo, under a power, and at liberty to act ten thouſand things more, then ever they will doe, or ſhall doe. For example; God intendeth, and hath decreed, to permit, that fire ſhall burne, what combuſtible matter ſoever it ſhall take hold of, or that ſhall be caſt into it, that one ſparke of it falling into a barrell of dried Gunpowder, ſhould ſuddainly fire it, &c. But it doth not follow from hence, that therefore every thing that is combuſtible in the world, ſhall be burnt with fire; or that every barrell of dry Gun-powder ſhall be blown up with ſparkes of fire falling into them. So (in the inſtance formerly mentioned) God had decreed to permit* the Lords of Keilah *to deliver up* David *into* Sauls *hand, in caſe he had*
1 Sam. 23. 12. *ſtayed in their Citty, till* Sauls *coming to demand him: this is evident from the Text. But it did not follow from this permiſſive decree of God, that therefore theſe* Lords *muſt neceſſarily deliuer up* David *into* Sauls *hand: for we know they did it not. So likewiſe, God hath decreed to permit any man to deſtroy the life of another whom he meets with (I meane, in reſpect of a naturall power to doe the execution) but it followeth not from hence, that therefore every man muſt neceſſarily murther, or deſtroy the life of his Brother, that cometh in his way. So that evident it is, that no decree of God whatſoeuer, which is ſimply and purely permiſſive, doth import any neceſſity at all of the perpetration, or coming to paſſe, of the thing ſo decreed. God permitted*
Gen. 2. 16, 17 Adam *to* eate of every tree in the garden of Eden (the tree of knowledge of good and evill only excepted) *& therefore certainly had decreed, or intended this permiſſion: yet was not* Adam *any waies neceſſitated by any vertue or influence of this decree upon him, to* eate of every *of theſe* trees; *nor is it in the leaſt degree credible, that ever he did* eate of every *of them, nor yet of any one of them, but only that, which was prohibited unto him, his ejection out of this garden following ſo ſuddainly after this patent, or permiſſion granted unto him. The reaſon why no decree of God, that is purely and barely permiſſive, either induceth or ſuppoſeth any neceſſity of the coming to paſſe, of what is only ſo decreed, is this. Firſt, becauſe no ſuch decree doth any waies intereſſe God to any manner of interpoſall, either by his wiſdome, power, or providence in what kind ſoever, towards the effecting or bringing to paſſe of what is ſo decreed. So that ſuch events, which are no otherwiſe de-*

creed

creed by God, then thus, are in the ſame poſture of contingency, in the ſame poſsibility of being, or not being, wherein they would have been, had there been no ſuch decree at all concerning them. Secondly, neither doth any ſuch decree in God, ſuppoſe a futurity of ſuch a concurrence of cauſes ſimply requiſite and neceſſary for the bringing of things, ſo decreed, to paſſe, which will actually bring them to paſſe. Though God hath decreed, that a ſparke, or coale of fire falling, i.e. *in caſe it ſhall fall into a barrell of Gun-powder, ſhall fire it, yet it doth not follow from hence, that he hath decreed, that any ſuch ſparke or coale, ſhall fall into it, without which notwithſtanding the effect decreed,* viz. *the firing of this powder, will not come to paſſe. Or if he ſaid, that God hath decreed that ſuch a ſparke, or coale, ſhall fall into the ſaid barrell of powder, now is not the decree barely permiſsive, but operative and aſſertive, and ſuch which engageth the decreer to interpoſe effectually for the bringing of the thing decreed to paſſe. But ſuch decrees as this, in matters of that nature we deny to be in God.*

IEANES.

Dr *Twiſſe* doth grant, that Gods permiſſion in a *complicate notion*, as it takes in other acts of Gods providence, doth inferre the things permitted: And what he ſaith of Gods actuall permiſſion in time, is applyable unto his permiſſive decrees before all time; for as his workings are agreeable unto his effective, ſo his permiſſions are ſuitable unto his permiſsive decrees. But now that he any where affirmeth, that the decrees of God, which are ſimply, purely, and barely permiſsive, or that the bare, ſingle, and ſole permiſsion of God, doe import any neceſsity at all of the perpetration, or coming to paſſe, of what is only ſo decreed, and permitted, I utterly deny. And if you had been ſo well verſed in D. *Twiſſe*, as it was fit for him, that undertakes a refutation of him, you would never have charged him with that, which he, in a whole digreſsion, profeſſedly impugneth; for which, you may ſee, how he is taxed (though very modeſtly) by M. *Rutherford*, in a Scholaſticall diſputation of his, *De Divinâ providentiâ cap.*8. D. *Twiſſe* in the third Digreſsion of the ſecond Book of his *Vindiciæ &c.* examineth that propoſition of *Perkins: Quod Deus non impedit, ideo evenit, quia Deus non impedit.* That which God doth not hinder, doth therefore come to paſſe, becauſe God doth not hinder it, (*i.*) becauſe he doth permit it: where he not only profeſſeth his diſlike of it, but alſo refutes it. This Section then might very well have been ſpared; for in it you fight but with your own ſhadow, and doe not at all oppoſe the opinion of D. *Twiſſe*, who fully accords with you in this particular; That Gods ſimple and ſole permiſsions, and conſequently his decrees, that are ſimply, purely, and barely permiſsive, are not illative of thoſe things which are only ſo decreed, and permitted.

See the Second Book of this Treatiſe, from pag. 90. unto pag. 99.

To cleare this I ſhall give you an abſtract of this Digreſsion.

He examineth the truth of this propoſition. 1. In the matter, or object of an act naturall. 2. In the matter, or object of an act morall, good or bad.

1. Firſt, as concerning *naturall* actions, he hinteth a diſtinction, between a *proper* permiſsion of them, and a permiſsion of them *improperly*

ſo called; *that* is oppoſed unto a *naturall, reall*, or *Phyſicall* reſtraint, *this* unto a *morall* reſtraint, which is by way of diſſwaſion.

Firſt then if we take permiſſion *properly*, as it is oppoſed, unto a *naturall, reall*, and *Phyſicall* reſtraint, and denoteth a ſuſpenſion thereof, D. *Twiſſe* is ſo farre from affirming, that they come to paſſe, upon Gods ſingle, ſole, and bare permiſſion, as that he maketh Gods poſitive effection (whether by way of predetermination, or concurrence, he leaves to be diſcuſſed in another place) requiſite unto the exiſtence of them, without which they never can exiſt; for God is the principall and immediate cauſe of all beings and entities, and therefore of all naturall actions.

Actio Dei Phyſica ſive naturalis ea eſt, quâ concurrit cum omnibus cauſis ſecundis ad actus ſuos, ſive influendo duntaxat in actus ipſarum, quod placet Arminio, Jeſuitarum veſtigiis inſiſtenti; ſive movendo cauſas ſecundas ad agendum, quod nobis verisimilius videtur, quemadmodum & inter Pontificios Dominicanis, quæ quidem controverſia non eſt hujus loci, ſed ſuo loco repetenda. Hujus concurſus divini ratione, nobis videtur abſurde dici rem aliquam ideo evenire quia Deus non impediat. Omnis enim res, omnis actus, omnis entitas, ideo fit, quia Deus vult ut fiat, non permittendo ſed efficiendo, idq; principaliter. Etenim Deus eſt cauſa principalis, & immediata uniuſcujuſq; entitatis, juxta omnes fere Scholaſticos, Arminio etiam conſentiente, pag. 177. Nec Arminianis, quod ſciam, hactenus reluctantibus. Abſurde autem dicitur, Deum permittere id fieri, quod facit ut fiat, idq; principaliter ipſum efficiendo. Neq; hic opus eſt recurrere ad permiſſionem, cum omnes in rebus naturalibus agnoſcant, & amplectantur Dei efficientiam principalem & immediatam. *Vind. lib.2.pag.* 131.

And againe afterwards.

Quare ad actiones naturales quod attinet, quatenus permiſſio notat ſuſpenſionem actionis naturalis, ſic Deus non verſatur circa eaſdem dum fiunt, ſed poſitivè facit. pag. 132.

Secondly, if we take permiſsion as it is oppoſed unto, and denoteth a ſuſpenſion of, a reſtraint *improperly* ſo called, a *morall reſtraint* by way of diſſwaſion; ſo D. *Twiſſe* is expreſſe in deniall of any neceſsity to be inferred, from ſuch a permiſsion of the comming to paſſe, of what is ſo permitted. *Ad actiones naturales quod attinet, quatenus permiſſio notat ſuſpenſionem actionis moralis in ſuadendo aut diſſuadendo poſitæ, ſic non ſequitur, quicquid permititur illud fit. Neq; enim quod ſuadetur quocunq; modo, & quantumvis efficaciter, neceſſe eſt, ut fiat, nec quod diſſuadetur quocunq; modo quantumvis efficaciter, neceſſe eſt, ut non fiat; Ergo multo minus ex eo quod permititur aliquid fieri, vel non fieri, ſequitur neceſsario oportere illud fieri vel non fieri.*

Secondly, from naturall actions he proceedes on to *morall*, and he begineth with good and gracious actions; in which he reſolveth that naturall permiſsion, *hoc eſt, non in genere morali ſed Phyſico*, can have no place, for (ſaith he) this would ſuppoſe, that the creature can be carryed unto actions truly good, without any ſpeciall ſupply or aſsiſtance of Gods ſpirit and grace, which we deny can be in the ſtate of nature entire and pure, how much leſſe is it poſsible in the ſtate of nature corrupted: whence alſo (ſaith he) it would follow, that God doth not antecedently worke and cauſe every act truly good, and that by a ſpeciall ſupply, aid, or aſsiſtance.

As for Gods permiſsion of good actions in *genere morali*, he referreth to what he hath ſpoken touching the like permiſsion of naturall actions, only he addeth, that God allwayes concurreth unto an act truly good by a ſpeciall aſsiſtance & that both as a Phyſicall and Morrall agent: wherefore (ſaith he) in this gracious adminiſtration of things there is no place at all for permiſsion, as it is oppoſed unto *effection* or farthering; for God worketh, cauſeth, and promoteth every good worke in his children; although permiſsion may have roome there, as it ſimply ſignifieth *non-hindrance*, for queſtionleſſe God doth not hinder the

the good workes of his people, which he himſelfe cauſeth and worketh. Thus you ſee, that by D. *Twiſſe* his opinion, good workes doe not follow upon Gods bare, ſingle, and ſole permiſsion, for they cannot be performed without the powerfull operation of Gods holy ſpirit, which worketh in us both the will and the deed.

Laſtly, as touching evill or ſinfull actions, in them divine permiſſion challengeth a proper and peculiar place, both as permiſſion is oppoſed unto *efficiency*, as alſo unto *reſtraint*.

Firſt, as 'tis oppoſed unto *efficiency*, for the obliquity of them being a privation, is not capable of an efficient cauſe.

Secondly, as 'tis oppoſed unto *reſtraint*, for God doth not hinder ſinfull actions many times, though it be alwaies in his power.

But now if we ſpeake of the permiſsion of ſinfull actions, in *genere morali*, or *ſuaſorio*; ſo all unanimouſly affirme, that God perſwadeth or exhorteth none unto evill: for if God ſhould interpoſe his authority, by commanding, adviſing, or exhorting, whatſoever ſhould be done hereupon, would be lawfully done.

But though God himſelfe doth not exhort or perſwade unto ſinne, yet he gives way many times, and that juſtly, unto the temptations of Satan, and his inſtruments; nay, he himſelfe by his providence, layes before men outward objects and occaſions, ſuitable unto their inward corruptions; as a goodly Babyloniſh garment, two hundred ſheckles of ſilver, and a wedge of Gold of fifty ſheckles weight, before the covetous eyes of *Achan*: beautifull and naked *Bathſheba* before the luſtfull eyes of *David*. Next he ſuffereth thoſe corruptions, that is, either he doth not cure them by his renewing grace, or he doth not bridle them by his reſtraining grace, but lets them have their full ſwinge, without check or controll: In his children he doth not actuate and rouze their graces, but lets them lye as it were in a deep ſleepe, &c. Beſides, he concurreth unto thoſe motions of the ſoule, (as touching the entity of them) unto which men are ſtirred, by view of objects, that are agreeable unto either their unſubdued or unbridled luſts. From the complication of all theſe, a particular obduration, and ſinfull action followeth, ſo that you take in alſo, the concourſe of God, ſo farre as concernes the ſubſtance, or matter of ſuch a ſinfull action. Now from this variety of providences going before a ſinfull action, D. *Twiſſe* drawes this following concluſion. *Ex quibus manifeſtum videtur, ex ſolâ permiſſione nequaquam conſequi, quod fiat aliquid; & proinde etiam minus verum videtur illud Perkinſei, Quicquid Deus non impedit; ideo fit, quia Deus non impedit.* From which it ſeems manifeſt, that it in no waies followeth, that a thing cometh to paſſe upon Gods ſole permiſsion, and therefore that of *Perkins* ſeemes not to be true, whatſoever God doth not hinder therefore cometh to paſſe, becauſe God doth not hinder it.

In the next place he bringeth in, and anſwereth objections.

Firſt, This is the opinion not only of *Perkins* but of *Piſcator* alſo.

Secondly, our adverſaries (by name *Vorſtius* and *Arminius*) grant it, and their conceſsion ſhould be embraced, as making much for the defence of our opinion.

Thirdly, there is a reaſon, which at the firſt bluſh ſeems convincing, unto which not only *Vorſtius*, but alſo *Piſcator* yeeldeth, and 'tis drawn from the nature of Relatives: For, ſeeing permiſsion and the thing permitted are Relatives, it ſeems neceſſary, that they exiſt together: upon ſuppoſall then of the permiſsion of the coming to paſſe of ſuch a thing

it ſeems neceſſary, that that which is ſo permitted, doe come to paſſe. Unto theſe he diſpatcheth an anſwer ſeverally, in the ſame order as they were propounded.

Firſt, as for our Divines, he acknowledgeth, that they have ſo thought, but truth is to be preferred before any teſtimony; *Amicus Socrates, Amicus Plato, magis amica veritas*: For 'tis but reaſon that we ſhould have regard unto, and care of, only truth, that ſo we may (with the Apoſtle) ſay, we can doe nothing againſt the truth, but for the truth.

Secondly, he ſheweth, how that for the exiſtence of a thing, *Piſcator* doth not acquieſce in Gods ſole permiſsion, but flyeth unto Gods government, and that ſo powerfull, as that it bowes, bends, and turnes the wills of men whither he pleaſeth.

Veruntamen & hoc etiam advertendum eſt; cum contra *Piſcatorem* in hunc modum diſputaret *Vorſtius*, Permiſſio in eo, cui permiſſio fit, nihil omnino novi per ſe cauſat aut efficit, ſed tantum vires & facultates ſemel illi datas, ab alienâ lætione turas præſtat, & liberum iſtarum exercitium eidem relinquit: imo nihil prorſus extra ipſum permittentem efficit, niſi quod actionem hujus impedientem cohibet, aut potius retinet, & quaſi ſuſpendit. Eſt enim ipſa per ſe tantum decretum non impediendi: hoc eſt, foris non agendi. Quomodo autem is, qui non agit, eo ipſo quod non agit, aliquid extra ſe cauſet, vel alteri neceſſitatem agendi offerat? Aut quomodo is qui neceſſitatem hanc alteri offert, eo ipſo nihil agere, ſed alterius tantum actionem permittere, ſive non impedire, ſine contradictione dici poſſit? Videas jam quomodo ad iſta *Vorſtiana* reſpondeat *Piſcator*, in marginalibus ſuis annotationibus. At ego (*inquit*) non dico quod Deus tantùm permittat ea quæ permittit: Sed dico quod illa ipſa etiam gubernat; *Reſponſ. ad Amic. Collat. Vorſtii* p. 231. Idem p. 131. Explicat quid ſibi velit, cum ait, Deum gubernare. Denotant (*inquit*) illa effectionem quandam Dei quoad peccata, ſed non denotant effectionem talem, quâ Deus ipſe efficiat peccata, quatenus habent rationem peccatorum, ſeu quatenus ſunt peccata, ſed denotant gubernationem Dei, quâ ut Creator voluntates humanas flectit quocunq; voluerit. Ex his manifeſtum eſt, *Piſcatorem* ſolâ permiſſione Dei minime acquieviſſe, ad hoc ut aliquid conſequeretur fieri dicatur, ſed ad gubernationem Dei confugiſſe; & ejuſmodi gubernationem qua voluntates humanas flectit quocunq; voluerit.

As for the conceſſions of *Arminius* and *Vorſtius*, ſeeing they are erroneous, a patronage of our opinion drawn from them is not to be valued ſo much, as to be built upon. *Verum tanti non eſt hujuſmodi patrocinium, ut erroneis quantumvis propitiis innitamur aſſertionibus.*

As for the reaſon, that is of no force or ſtrength, for we may as well conclude, that becauſe God did from eternall will or decree to create the World, therefore the World from eternall was created; or becauſe God from eternall foreknew that the World ſhould be, therefore the World did exiſt from eternall: for there is no leſſe relation, between the willing of a thing, and the thing willed; the decree of a thing, and the thing decreed; the foreknowledge of a thing, and the thing foreknowne; than there is, between the permiſſion of a thing, and the thing permitted. And there is between them as a relation, ſo alſo a reciprocation: whereupon it followeth, that if God willeth or decreeth a thing, it is willed or decreed; if he foreknowes a thing, it is foreknown; if he permits a thing it is permitted: but as it doth not follow, a thing is willed or decreed, therefore 'tis actually exiſtent; a thing is foreknown, therefore it is; In like manner it doth not follow, a thing is permitted, therefore it is actually: and indeed if Gods meere permiſſion did inferre the exiſtence of a thing upon this ground, becauſe permiſſion and the thing permitted are relatives, it would hold as well concerning the permiſsion of man, as God; But 'tis manifeſt, that it followeth not upon mans permiſsion, that whatſoever he permitteth, cometh to paſſe.

But it may be objected, it is neceſſary that whatſoever is willed by God, doe at ſome time or other, come to paſſe, therefore we may ſay the ſame of what is permitted by God.

He denyeth the conſequence, and he giveth this reaſon for his denyall, becauſe Gods permiſsion is not ſo effectuall unto the exiſtence of a thing, as

as his volition; and yet he acknowledgeth, that this kind of conſequence is true in naturall cauſes, but this is not in regard only of permiſſion, but from the determination of a naturall cauſe to worke, unleſſe it be hindered: as concerning rationall and free agents, this conſequence, a thing is permitted to come to paſſe, therefore it doth come to paſſe, is of no force at all.

Ad rationem vero quod attinet, eam nullius eſſe pretii conſtanter affirmamus. Nam pari rationis efficacia concludi poſſet, quia Deus voluit ab æterno, ſive decrevit mundum creare, ergo mundus ab æterno creatus eſt, vel quia Deus ab æterno mundum futurum præſcivit, ergo mundus ab æterno extitit. Etenim relatio nihilo minus intercedit inter volitionem & rem volitam, decretum & rem decretam, præſcientiam & rem præſcitam, quam inter permiſſionem & rem permiſſam; Unde quamvis ſequatur, Deus voluit mundum ab æterno, ergo ab æterno mundus eſt volitus; Deus ſcivit mundum ab æterno, ergo mundus ab æterno eſt ſcitus; Deus permiſit aut permittit actum fieri, ergo actus eſt aut fuit permiſſus. Attamen inde nequaquam ſequetur; ergo quod volitum eſt, exiſtebat, quum primum volitum erat; aut quod permiſſum eſt, exiſtebat, quum primum permiſſum eſt. Dices, atqui quod volitum eſt a Deo, neceſſe eſt ut aliquando ſit; ergo & quod permiſſum, ſimiliter neceſſe erit, ut ſit. Imo, inquam, nequaquam ſequitur. Neq; enim par eſt utrobiq; ratio, ſed valde diſpar; quod & cuilibet manifeſtum eſt. neq; enim permiſſio tam efficax eſt ad exiſtentiam rei, quam volitio. Nec tamen diffiteor hoc genus conſequentiæ procedere in cauſis naturalibus, ſed non ex ſolâ vi permiſſionis, ſed ex determinatione cauſæ naturalis ad agendum niſi impediatur. De cauſis vero rationalibus & libere agentibus, nunquam obtinet hoc genus conſequentiæ, permittitur aliquid fieri, ergo fit. At, inquies, ſunt relata; & relata ſunt ſimul naturâ. Agnoſco eſſe relata, & quatenus ſunt relata converti ad conſequentiam. Poſitâ ergo permiſſione rei, neceſſe eſt ut res ſit permiſſa; perinde arq; poſitâ volitione rei neceſſe eſt, ut res ſit volita; item poſitâ præſcientia rei, neceſſe eſt ut res ſit præſcita. Sed quemadmodum non ſequitur, res eſt volita, ergo eſt; aut res eſt præſcita, ergo eſt; perinde etiam non ſequitur, res eſt permiſſa, ergo eſt. Quemadmodum nec ſola præſcientia, aut volitio rei ſufficit ad hoc, ut res exiſtat; ita etiam neq; ſola permiſſio rei ſufficit ad hoc, ut res extra cauſas ſuas conſtituatur. Hæc tamen ratio, fateor, impoſuit Piſcatori, pag. 231. *Ad Amic. Collat. Vorſtii.* Ubi ſic diſſerit; ubi autem permiſſio eſt, ibi etiam eſt factum quod permittitur. Quomodo enim dici poteſt permitti illud, quod non fit? Certe pari ratione dici poteſt, permitti illud quod non fit; quemadmodum dici poteſt, volitum eſſe quod tamen non fit; licet ad exiſtentiam rei, multo efficacior ſit volitio, quam permiſſio. Imo quomodo non dici poſſit, permitti aliquid quamvis non fiat, cùm permittere nihil aliud ſit, quam neq; facere ut aliquid fiat, neq; ne fiat impedire. Pergit Piſcator, quippe, inquiens, hæc ſunt relata, & proinde ſimul natura. Quum igitur Deus decrevit permittere peccata, neceſſe eſt ut illa fiant. At jam oſtendimus, ex eo quod relata ſint, hoc tantum ſequi, poſitâ permiſſione, rem eſſe permiſſam; ſic & poſitâ volitione rei, ſequitur rem eſſe volitam; & poſitâ præſcientiâ rei, ſequitur rem eſſe præſcitam; at hinc minime ſequitur propterea rem actualem aliquam exiſtentiam ſortiri: ita etiam, licet poſitâ permiſſione, res merito dicatur eſſe permiſſa, at hinc non ſequitur propterea rem eſſe ſimpliciter, & extra cauſas ſuas actualiter conſtitui; Quod ſi hæc conſecutio legitima eſſet, quod contendit Piſcator, non modo ex permiſſione Dei, ſequeretur rem e veſtigio exiſtere; ſed & ex quavis cujuſvis hominis permiſſione; atqui manifeſtum eſt (nec Piſcator credo reſiſteret) ex hominis permiſſione nequaquam ſequi, quicquid permititur fieri, mox exiſtere.

The laſt and principall objection is concerning the permiſſion of ſinne in particular; without grace ſinne cannot be avoyded, and the permiſſion of ſinne ſtands in the denyall of grace: it is cleare therefore that upon the permiſſion of ſinne, ſinne neceſſarily enſueth.

Firſt, he anſwereth, this in no-wiſe followeth from the nature of permiſſion in generall (as ſome Divines, have thought) but from a peculiar manner of Gods permiſſion, ſtanding in a conſtant denyall of grace without which ſinne can be ſhunned by none.

Secondly he diſtinguiſheth of a twofold conſideration of ſinne, *indefinite* or *definite*, and that either in regard of ſorts and kinds, or elſe particular actions.

Firſt, he grants, that upon the permiſſion of ſinne, that is, the denyall of grace, ſinne followeth *indefinitely*, and in generall; ſo that as long as God with-holds his grace, a man ſinnes, either in doing what is forbidden, or elſe in doing what is commanded in a wrong way or manner. He alſo ſinnes in omitting what is commanded, or in abſtaining from what is forbidden in an unholy, and ungratious way or manner. And this he exemplifieth both in the unregenerate and regenerate.

Firſt, whiles God denies to, or withholds from, an unregenerate man, his habituall grace, or grace of regeneration; whileſt he ſuffereth his ſpirituall diſeaſes to goe uncured, his corruptions unſubdued, and unmortified, ſo long he cannot but ſinne in all his *rationall and deliberate*, both actions and omiſsions.

Firſt,

Firſt, all his actions are ſinnes of commiſſion, either a doing of what is forbidden, or a ſinfull performance of what is commanded, not out of right principles, nor for the due and requiſite end.

Secondly all his omiſſions are ſinfull, for they are either of what is injoyned, or elſe if they be of what is prohibited, they are not ſanctified, proceeding from the love of God, and directed unto the glory of God above all.

Next as for the regenerate, if God deny unto, or withhold from them, never ſo little a while, his actuall grace, the actuall ſupply, and aſſiſtance of his ſpirit, they ſinne in whatſoever they performe, or forbeare; And indeed it is no wonder, that upon Gods ſuſpending the aide of his actuall grace, the regenerate breake out into ſinne, in whom there is a fleſh alwaies luſting againſt the ſpirit, whoſe graces are imperfect, and corruptions naturall, and therefore active, upon removeall of impediments; For ſinne in *Adam* followed upon the ſole ſuſpenſion of actuall aſſiſtance to will that good, unto which he had an habituall fitneſſe; and yet in him propenſion unto good was perfect, without any mixture of inclination unto evill.

Secondly, he denyeth, that upon the bare permiſſion of ſinne, ſinne followeth *definitely*, either for ſorts and kinds, or particular actions. But here firſt, he implyeth an exception of *generall*, and *comprehenſive* ſinnes, that either lye at the root of, or are concomitant unto every ſinne, as inordinate ſelfe-love &c. *Fortè dici poteſt, ex carentiâ juſtitiæ originalis, ſequi neceſſario, ut creatura feratur in amorem ſui inordinatè, adeo ut quicquid operatur, illud faciat propter ſe, non autem propter Deum.*

Secondly he deſireth, chiefly to be underſtood concerning the *imperate* or *externall actions* of ſin, and ſuch actions of the will, as are of *efficacy*, purpoſes, reſolutions, &c. For upon Gods permiſſion, that is, not curing, or healing, not ſubduing of particular ſinfull habits. *v. g.* Covetouſneſſe, luxury, there doe neceſſarily follow ſuch ſinfull actions of the will, as are ſtiled uſually to be of *complacency*, that doe, *quoad ſpecificationem*, for their ſort and kind, anſwer ſuch habits, to wit, velleities, deſires, wouldings, and wiſhings, likeings, approbations, &c. A covetous man whileſt under the reigne of covetouſneſſe, cannot but love, like, and covet after things which he judgeth to be gainfull; a luxurious voluptuary cannot but love, approve, and long after things which he knoweth to be pleaſant and delightfull unto his ſenſes. *Omnino videtur Deum non poſſe impedire, ne avarus velit & concupiſcat ea, quæ videntur utilia; vel libidinoſus ea, quæ titillant tanquam jucunda: nam velle & concupiſcere, nihil aliud eſt, quam deſiderare; at avarus quà avarus neceſſario talia deſiderat & concupiſcit, aliàs non eſſet avarus, & libidinoſus quà libidinoſus talia deſiderat, aliàs minime dicendus eſſet libidinoſus. Lib. 2. part. 2. pag. 15.* For habits work *ad modum naturæ* neceſſarily. A covetous perſon, as covetous, neceſſarily deſireth and coveteth things profitable; a luſtfull or uncleane perſon neceſſarily deſireth ſuch objects and actions as are uncleane, &c. And yet of theſe too, we cannot ſay that they follow meerely upon his permiſſion, ſecluding his concourſe.

Theſe limitations premiſed; let us returne to conſider what he denyeth, to wit, that upon the bare permiſſion of ſinne, ſinne doth not follow *definitely* for ſorts or kinds, or particular actions. *Sine gratiâ* (ſaith he) *abſtineri poteſt a peccato definite quoad certam ſpeciem, vel etiam in individuo conſideratam.* There is no particular ſinne, eſpecially of commiſsion, but may be abſtained from without grace: And therefore upon the meere

meere and bare denyall or with-holding of grace, this or that particular ſinne doth not follow.

For firſt, thoſe that are deſtitute of habituall grace, the grace of regeneration, may yet be free from diverſe particular ſinfull habits. *v. g.* Covetouſneſſe, Luxury, &c.

Secondly, in thoſe that have ſuch particular ſinfull habits; thoſe habits are not actuated, eſpecially by outward actions, upon Gods *bare* and *ſingle permiſſion*, his ſole denyall of grace. This he proves by reaſon and Scripture.

Firſt by reaſon, becauſe the ſubject of an actuall ſinne of commiſsion, is a *naturall act*, and unto the performance of a naturall act, Gods bare permiſſion is not ſufficient. *Malum (quod dicitur) ſemper habitat in alieno fundo; & peccatum omne quod in commiſſione verſatur, ſemper habet actum aliquem naturalem ſubſtratum; adeo ut ejuſmodi peccatum aliquod nunquam exeat in actum ex ſolâ negatione gratiæ, niſi etiam aliqua alia rerum adminiſtratio fiat, ſecundum quam actus aliquis naturalis patretur, quæ ſit propria materia talis deformitatis.*

Secondly by Scripture, in which Gods wonderfull providence working and proſtituting men unto ſinne, is never ſet forth unto us, by a *ſole* and *ſingle permiſsion*: But he is ſaid, ſometimes to *give men up unto vile affections, unto a reprobate mind, unto ſtrong deluſions, to ſend an evill ſpirit between men, to put a lying ſpirit in their mouthes, to mingle a perverſe ſpirit in them, &c. He told David, that he would take away his concubines, and give them unto his Sonne Abſolon; He told Jeroboam, that he would rent the Kingdome out of the hands of Solomon, and give ten tribes unto Jeroboam*, which was done by their defection, and revolt from the houſe of Judah. Now they who think that all theſe things might be diſpatched, and accompliſhed by Gods *ſole* and *ſingle permiſsion*, take I confeſſe (ſaith he) a ſhort cut, but they ſend away the Reader, that is deſirous to find out the truth, empty and voyd of all ſatisfaction. Upon this he concludes, that as often as any thing comes to paſſe according to Gods permiſſion, ſo often Gods permiſſion is not ſolitary or ſingle, but hath another government of things, another adminiſtration of divine providence, accompanying it; which he explaineth at large touching ſinne: unto the performance of this or that particular ſinfull action, there are required a leading into temptation, an affording of objects, occaſions, and opportunities, a letting looſe of Satan, the concourſe of God by way of previous motion unto the matter, or ſubject of the action, a removeall of all impediments, whether holy and gratious, or elſe but meerely naturall. The explanation of all which, you may there ſee at large in this digreſsion.

Out of this he inferreth a diſtinction of permiſsion, into *efficacious* and *unefficacious*, and concludes that the permiſsion of ſinne is not ſo much *efficacious* of it ſelfe, as in regard of that either obduration, or exceca-tion, or both, concerning either temporall, or ſpirituall good things, with which it is conjoyned. *Hinc conſtare poterit permiſsionem peccati particularis commodè dividendam eſſe, in permiſsionem efficacem & inefficacem, & permiſsionem efficacem non tam ex ſeſe efficacem eſſe, quam pro ratione ejus, cum quâ ſemper conjuncta eſt, obdurationis, excæcationis, aut utriuſq;, ſive quoad bona ſpiritualia, ſive quoad bona temporalia.*

But I ſhall trouble neither the Reader, nor you, with tranſcribing any more out of this digreſsion. And indeed this is enough to ſatisfy him,

and convince you, that you have wronged D. *Twiſſe*, in pinning upon him ſuch an opinion, which he oppoſeth with farre greater ſtrength of argument, then you your ſelfe. This is ſufficient to anſwer this whole ſection; But I ſhall examine whatſoever is conſiderable in it.

The propoſition you charge upon D. *Twiſſe* is this, *That the purpoſe or intent of God, to permit, or ſuffer ſuch or ſuch a thing to be done, or ſuch or ſuch an accident to come to paſſe, ſuppoſeth a neceſſity (at leaſt a ſyllogiſticall or conſequentiall neceſſity) of the coming of it to paſſe.*

He that is acquainted with the workes of D. *Twiſſe*, knoweth, that this propoſition is to be underſtood. 1. Concerning only the permiſſion of evill. 2. Concerning not only Gods act, the permiſſion of evill, but alſo the being of evill by Gods permiſſion. 3. Concerning not a ſingle, ſole, and bare permiſſion, but an efficacious permiſſion, that hath ſeverall acts of Gods providence accompanying it.

Firſt, it is to be underſtood only concerning the *permiſſion of evill*, and that as touching the *Formall*, the pravity or obliquity of it, which being a privation is uncapable of being an object of an effective decree. This I might cleare from moſt of thoſe places, wherein this diſtinction between an *effective* and *permiſſive decree* is propounded; but I ſhall ſpare to name them at this preſent, and content my ſelfe, with the alleadging of one place, where he expreſſely puts this limitation upon the propoſition we ſpeake of, *De Scientiâ Mediâ. pag.*133. *col.*2. *Non pauci ſunt, non modo ex noſtris, ſed & ex Theologis nobis oppoſitis, tam Pontificiis, quam Arminianis, qui putant, infallibiter futurum eſſe, quicquid &c. Deus permittere decreverit; hoc eſt autem, duntaxat in genere mali. Nam quæ fiunt bona, ea fieri decrevit Deus non tam ipſo permittente, quam faciente, in quocunq; genere bona fuerint, ſive in genere boni moralis, ſive naturalis ſive ſupernaturalis; ſumma, ſive in genere entis bonum fuit, ſive in genere moris.* And by this it is apparent, that your inſtance in Gods decree to permit fire to burne combuſtible matter, is altogether impertinent, for that is *quid bonum in genere entis.*

Secondly, he makes Gods permiſſive decree to be, not only concerning Gods act, the permiſsion of evill, but alſo the being of evill by his permiſsion; ſo that not only the permiſsion of evill is the object of his will, but the being of it alſo. *Sententia Perkinſei noſtrorumq; Theologorum eſt, lapſum Adami eveniſſe voluntate Dei tranſeunte, non duntaxat in ſuam permiſſionem, ſed etiam in rem permiſſam, hoc eſt, Deum voluiſſe, ut Adamus laberetur, ipſo permittente. Vindic.l.*2. *part.*1.*pag.*127. What he ſpeaks of Gods will, to permit *Adams* fall, may be accommodated to his permiſsive will or decree, of any other ſinne.

Laſtly, that he ſpeakes of not a bare, but efficacious permiſsion, ſo termed, not *Formally*, but by way of *concomitancy*, the Digreſsion which I have abbreviated is a proofe of undeniable evidence; And I am ſo confident of your ingenuity, as that I doubt not, but you will acknowledge as much: and therefore your objection, which runnes only concerning a decree that is *ſimply, barely, and purely permiſſive*, is nothing at all to the purpoſe.

Well then, take this propoſition, (*the purpoſe or intent of God, to permit or ſuffer, ſuch or ſuch a thing to be done, inferreth a neceſſity of the coming of it to paſſe*) in the ſenſe and meaning of D. *Twiſſe*, to wit, concerning an efficacious permiſsion of evill; and if you can accommodate your objection unto it, I will confeſſe that you can work a miracle in Logick.

M. *Goodwin.*

MR GOODWIN.

BVt that the truth lyeth on the other ſide of the way, appears by the light of this conſideration, If whatſoever God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to paſſe, in any caſe, upon any termes, or any ſuppoſition whatſoever, ſhould by vertue of ſuch an intention or decree neceſſarily come to paſſe, then all things poſſible to be; or at leaſt, ten thouſand things more, than ever ſhall be, muſt be, yea and this neceſſarily,

IEANES.

IF you ſupply the propoſitions that are wanting, and make this a compleate Syllogiſme, it will be in *ſecundo modo Syllogiſmi connexi, qui tollit conſequens, ut tollat antecedens.* And then your concluſion, if your Syllogiſme be true for forme, will be, *Therefore whatſoever God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to paſſe in any caſe, upon any termes, or any ſuppoſition whatſoever, ſhall not by vertue of ſuch an intention or decree neceſſarily come to paſſe.* And then if in your Syllogiſme there be not committed that fallacy, which is called *Ignoratio elenchi*, never Syllogiſme framed in this world, was ſicke of this diſeaſe; for the concluſion you inferre, is no-wiſe oppoſite unto any thing in D. *Twiſſe*. Can you (dare you) ſay, that D. *Twiſſe* any where affirmeth, that whatſoever God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to paſſe, in any caſe upon any termes, or any ſuppoſition whatſoever, ſhall by vertue of ſuch an intention or decree, neceſſarily come to paſſe? Conſult all his bookes that are extant, whether in Latine or Engliſh; and if you can prove any ſuch paſſage to be in them, either in expreſſe termes, or by juſt conſequence, I will acknowledge that I have wronged you, in as ſhamefull and publicke a manner as you will preſcribe: and if you cannot make good, that D. *Twiſſe* hath ſaid any ſuch thing, it will be very agreeable unto juſtice, that you make a retraction of your miſtake.

The palpable groſſeneſſe of the injury that you doe D. *Twiſſe*, will the better appeare, if you compare the concluſion which you father upon him, with the example you bring a little after. *God intendeth, and hath decreed to permit, that fire ſhall burne what combuſtible matter ſoever it ſhall take hold off, or that ſhall be caſt into it, that one ſparke of it, falling into a barrell of dry Gun-powder, ſhould ſuddainly fire it; but it doth not follow from hence, that therefore every thing that is combuſtible in the World, ſhall be burnt with fire, or that every barrell of dryed Gun-powder, ſhall be blown up with ſparkes of fire falling into them.* Here you make as if the permiſſive decree D. *Twiſſe* ſpeakes of, were concerning Gods permiſsion of things to come to paſſe, not *abſolutely* but *conditionally*, in *ſuch a caſe, upon ſuch termes, upon ſuch a ſuppoſition*; and as if he affirmed, that whatſoever God hath decreed to permit to come to paſſe, only conditionally, ſhould by vertue of ſuch a decree come to paſſe abſolutely, and neceſſarily. This is one of the abſurdeſt aſſertions

that ever dropt from the pen of a rationall man, and in D. *Twiſſe* there is nothing ſounding like it: you doe very ill therefore (that I ſay no more) to aſperſe him with it. Nay D. *Twiſſe* is ſo farre from making a bare, *permiſſive* * *conditionall decree*, to be illative of the abſolute exiſtence of whatſoever God hath decreed to permit to come to paſſe conditionally, as that he denyeth any ſuch inference to be made from an effective conditionall decree. Though it were very ſtrange (ſaith he againſt *Cotton* pag. 97.) that any thing ſhould not be accompliſhed which God doth will abſolutely, yet ſurely, it is nothing ſtrange, that that ſhould not be accompliſhed, which God doth will to come to paſſe only upon a condition, for the condition failing, there is no reaſon why we ſhould expect the accompliſhment thereof: How often doth he tell you, that for God to decree the ſalvation of all men, only conditionally, in caſe they believe and repent, is no more to decree their ſalvation, than their damnation; for as he hath purpoſed ſalvation to men upon condition of faith, and repentance; ſo on the other ſide, it is as undoubtedly true, that God hath ordained, that whoſoever, coming to ripe yeares, ſhall not believe and repent, ſhall be damned: and as to decree the ſalvation of all men only conditionally, is no more to decree their ſalvation than their damnation; ſo to decree to permit a thing to come to paſſe only conditionally, *in ſuch a caſe, upon ſuch termes, upon ſuch a ſuppoſition*, is no more to decree the permiſſion of it, than the not permiſſion of it to come to paſſe: what is ſaid of *conditionall propoſitions*, is true of *conditionall purpoſes*, both *effective* and *permiſſive*, *Nihil ponunt in eſſe*, ſc. *abſolute & ſimpliciter*, & ἀνυποθέτως.

* So called in regard of its object.

To goe one ſtep farther, D. *Twiſſe* is very unlikely to conclude from Gods decree, barely to permit a thing to come to paſſe conditionally, in ſuch a caſe, upon ſuch termes, or upon ſuch a ſuppoſition, that therefore the thing ſo decreed, ſhall abſolutely come to paſſe, becauſe if we ſpeake of poſitive things, he is clearely and conſtantly of the opinion, that we cannot ſay truly, that they ſhall come to paſſe, ſo much as conditionally in ſuch a caſe, upon ſuch termes, &c. Unleſſe God decree not barely to permit, but to worke and effect the thing conditionated, upon ſuppoſall of ſuch conditions, *De Scientiâ Mediâ*. p. 430. *Ad eundem modum concedimus omnem enunciationem conditionatam de futuris conditionatis eſſe neceſſariam, modo Deus decreverit, poſitâ tali conditione, rem ipſam conditionatam effectam dare: quod niſi ponamus Deum decreviſſe, prorſus præter omnem Analogiam differit Suarez; dum prophetiarum comminantium & promittentium eandem rationem eſſe vult, atq; propoſitionum de futuris contingentibus conditionatarum qualiumcunq;, quas etiam prophetias appellat Suarez.* Now if he will not allow us to make any inference of the conditionall futurition of poſitive things, from a decree that is barely permiſſive, and conditionall, it would be very ſtrange, if he himſelfe ſhould make ſuch a permiſſive conditionall decree, to be illative of the abſolute futurition of whatſoever is ſo decreed.

And thus have I done with your concluſion, which I affirme not to be oppoſite unto any propoſition in D. *Twiſſe* his Bookes, and I hope you will pardon me, if I preſume ſo farre, as to challenge you to prove the contrary.

In the next place, I ſhall make bold, to queſtion the truth of the conſequence of your *Major* propoſition, which is this, *If whatſoever God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to paſſe, in any caſe, upon any termes, or any ſuppoſition whatſoever, ſhould by vertue of ſuch an intention or decree neceſſarily*

neceſſarily come to paſſe, then all things poſſible to be, &c. muſt be, yea, and this neceſſarily. And the reaſon why I queſtion it, is becauſe I much doubt, whether God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to paſſe conditionally, in ſome caſe, upon ſome termes, or upon ſome ſuppoſition or other, all things whatſoever, that are poſſible, all things (I ſay) that are poſsible, (whether unto all *naturall* or *neceſſary*, or elſe all *free* and *rationall* agents) that is not only ſuch as doe exiſt, have exiſted, or ſhall exiſt for the future, but alſo all that are in any poſsibility of exiſtence, whoſe exiſtence implyeth no contradiction.

And that your ſatisfaction unto this, may be the fuller and diſtincter, I ſhall branch it into ſome particulars, which I ſhall entreat you to cleare up unto me.

Firſt, there are many things that are meerely poſsible, numberleſſe millions of men and Angells, which have not, never had, never ſhall have actuall exiſtence: and unto theſe there is poſsible, as great a variety of both actions and ſufferings, which that God hath decreed to permit to come to paſſe conditionally, in ſome caſe, upon ſome termes, upon ſome ſuppoſition or other, is not (I confeſſe) within the compaſſe of my Creed; but yet I ſhall be willing to be inſtructed by you, provided that you prove what you undertake to teach me.

Now that I am not much to be blamed for making a doubt of this, will (I hope) be confeſſed by you, if you pleaſe to conſider.

Firſt, that *Didacus Alvarez* (a very learned man) holds it to be the more probable opinion that there are not in God conditionall decrees, concerning all future conditionall contingents, which may be framed by our underſtandings in infinite combinations, as well concerning things actually exiſtent, as alſo things poſsible, but only in compariſon of thoſe future conditionalls, which are revealed by God, Chriſt, or the Prophets, &c. And he inſinuates this reaſon out of *Ledeſma*, becauſe other conditionall decrees would be in vaine, impertinent, and no waies conducing unto Gods providence, and government of the World: which reaſon is as well applyable unto conditionall permiſsive, as conditionall effective decrees. *Reſp. &c. pag. 63. & 143.*

M. *Rutherford* (I know) argueth ſomewhat againſt this, but I believe you will not plow with his Heifer.

Secondly, that D. *Twiſſe* not only affirmeth but proveth, that things meerely poſsible, are not the object of Gods decree, in his Book againſt *Iackſon* p. 283. 333. & 394. *Looke we* (ſaith he) *upon the decrees of men, the wiſeſt of men, were they ever known to decree that a thing may be done? But rather ſuppoſing many things may be done, they make choyce to decree the doing of ſuch courſes, as ſeeme moſt convenient: things are poſſible without any reference to the decrees of God, but only in reference to his power. That is poſſible unto God, which he can doe, or which he hath power to cauſe, that it be brought to paſſe; As for example, before the World was made, it was poſsible that the World ſhould be made; was this by vertue of Gods decree? Did God decree it to be poſſible? If he did, ſeeing his decrees are free, it followeth that he might have choſen whether the World ſhould have been poſſible or no.* His arguments are applyable unto Gods permiſsive as well as effective decrees, unto his conditionall, as well as abſolute decrees. From *agents meerely poſſible*, paſſe we on unto ſuch as doe exiſt in ſome difference of time or other, and unto them ſome things are poſsible only in regard of an *obedientiall power*, ſome things are poſsible in regard of a *naturall power*.

Firſt ſome things are poſſible, and that unto all ſorts of ſecond agents, only in regard of an *obedientiall power*; thus 'tis poſsible for ten thouſand Aſſes beſides *Balaam's* to ſpeake, for ten thouſand peices of iron (beſides that mentioned 2 *Kings* 6.) to ſwimme; 'tis poſsible for wine to be made of ten thouſand pots of water *&c.* Beſides thoſe ſixe we read of *Iohn.* 2. It is poſsible of ſtones to have children raiſed up unto *Abraham.* Now that God hath decreed to permit all things thus poſsible to come to paſſe conditionally, in ſome caſe, is as I take it falſe, and I ſhall give you my reaſon out of D. *Twiſſe his Digreſſion, De naturâ permiſsionis. lib.* 2. *part.* 2. *pag.* 16. *col.* 2. *Irrationalia dicuntur permitti, quoties ſinuntur ferri ſecundùm naturam ſuam, quemadmodum cum lapis ſinitur ferri deorſum; ignis ſinitur graſſari in domos hominum: itaq; circa agentia naturalia dum verſatur permiſsio, palam eſt præſupponi, non modo propenſionem, ſed & determinationem ad agendum; non ſic, quoties verſatur circa agentia rationalia; nam & rationales ſubſtantiæ, quando permittuntur agere, ſinuntur etiam ferri ſecundum naturam ſuam; aut alia eſſet ratio permiſsionis rerum rationalium, quam irrationalium, quod minime videtur.* Irrationall agents are ſaid to be permitted as often as they are ſuffered to be carryed according to their natures; as when a ſtone is ſuffered to move downeward, fire to rage upon the howſes of men: So alſo rationall ſubſtances when they are permitted to act, they are ſuffered to be moved, or carryed agreeably unto their natures, *quoties permittuntur ſibi pro domeſticæ inclinationis ratione quà libet feruntur, ib. pag.* 11. *c.*1. or otherwiſe the nature of the permiſsion of things rationall and irrationall, would differ in regard of *forme*, where as the difference between them is only in reſpect of the *matter* about which each is converſant, as he ſheweth preſently after the words quoted.

Againe of thoſe things which are poſsible unto all ſorts and kinds of agents, there are ſome which God hath abſolutely decreed to *effect*, or bring to paſſe by his *operation*, ſome which he hath abſolutely decreed to *hinder or reſtraine*. Now whatſoever God worketh or effecteth, he doth not permit, as permiſſion is oppoſed unto *effection*, and therefore it cannot be the object of a bare permiſsive decree, but of an operative or effective. Secondly, what he hindereth or reſtraineth either *immediately* by himſelfe, or *mediately* by ſecond cauſes, he cannot be at all ſaid to permit, and therefore he never decreed to permit it; more briefely, God cannot be ſaid to decree the bare and naked permiſsion of that whoſe effection or working he hath decreed; he cannot be ſaid to decree the permiſsion of that, whoſe hinderance or reſtraint he hath intended, but of things poſsible, he hath decreed the effection of ſome, the reſtraint and hinderance of others: and therefore there are many things poſſible, which he hath not decreed barely to permit.

I but perhaps you will ſay, that though whatſoever God hath abſolutely decreed to effect or hinder, he hath not decreed to permit to come to paſſe abſolutely, yet he hath decreed it ſhall come to paſſe conditionally, *in ſuch caſes, upon ſuch termes, and upon ſuch a ſuppoſition.* But this is ſpoken *gratis*, and therefore I doe beſeech you to evidence it by dint of argument, unto which if convincing, I hope I ſhall ſubmit.

But I imagine I ſee a back-doore, at which you intend to runne away, and ſave your ſelfe the labour of medling with that worke, which I have here cut out for you, and that is the clauſe which you have added by way of Parentheſis in your conſequent (*or at leaſt ten thouſand things more*

more than ever ſhall be (Here your conſequent hath two propoſitions in it, one univerſall, *then all things poſſible muſt be, yea and this neceſſarily*; another particular, *at leaſt ten thouſand things more than ever ſhall be, muſt be, and this neceſſarily*. And theſe two propoſitions are propounded in a disjunctive manner, ſo that if the firſt be routed and miſcarry, the other may ſerve as a reſerve to fly unto, this is the ſhift of a diffident and fearfull diſputant, that knowes not well what to ſay or hold: and therefore beneath that *aeumen*, which I may juſtly expect from a man of your great Wit and Learning: how commendable it is, will appeare, if you take your conſequent by it ſelfe, and ſever it from the antecedent, and then parralell it with others of the like nature which no man can deny to be abſurd and ridiculous; as all men are white, or at leaſt ten thouſand times more then are blacke: all men are unregenerate, or at leaſt more then are regenerate: all men are healthy and ſound, or at leaſt more then are ſick.

But you pretend unto a proofe of the conſequence of your Major, we will heare what you ſay.

Mr GOODWIN.

For doubtleſſe God hath decreed, and intendeth to leave naturall cauſes generally, to their naturall and proper operations and productions, yea and voluntary cauſes alſo, under a power, and at liberty to act ten thouſand things more, than ever they will doe or ſhall doe.

IEANES.

YOur Major is, *If whatſoever God hath decreed or intendeth to permit to come to paſſe, in any caſe, upon any termes, or any ſuppoſition whatſoever, ſhould by vertue of ſuch an intention or decree, neceſſarily come to paſſe, then all things poſſible to be, or at leaſt ten thouſand things more than ever ſhall be, muſt be, yea and this neceſſarily*. Now how the conſequence hereof is proved by this your propoſition (I confeſſe) paſſeth my skill. The readieſt way to examine the conſequence in a connexe Syllogiſme, is to reduce it unto a Categoricall, and the way of that, every ordinary Logick will informe you is, by giving a reaſon of the conſequence by a Categoricall propoſition, and placing it in the roome of the Major in your Categoricall Syllogiſme. Now take the proofe that you bring of the conſequence, or ſequell of your major propoſition, (*for doubtleſſe God hath decreed, and intendeth to leave naturall cauſes generally, to their naturall, and proper operations, and productions, yea and voluntary cauſes alſo, under a power, and at liberty, to act ten thouſand times more then ever they will doe or ſhall doe*) and let it be placed in the roome of your major, and then in what Moode and Figure will you inferre your concluſion, *viz. Whatſoever God hath decreed, or intendeth to come to paſſe, in any caſe, upon any termes, or any ſuppoſition whatſoever, ſhall not by vertue of ſuch an intention or decree neceſſarily come to paſſe.*

And

And thus you see how weakely you impugne that proposition which is only of your owne setting up.

But let us look upon this passage in it selfe, setting aside the reference it carryeth of a proofe unto the foregoing words, if you understand Gods leaving of naturall causes unto their naturall and proper operations, &c. And so also his leaving voluntary causes under a power, and at liberty to act ten thousand things more then ever they will doe or shall doe, so as to make it exclusive of that influence which is by way of previous motion of second causes themselves, whether naturall or voluntary unto all their operations, why your *doubtlesse* will not carry it, as long as the arguments, by which D. *Twisse lib.* 2. *Digres.* 7. proves, that God moves all second causes unto their operations, remaine unanswered by you, and you bring no proofe to the contrary, but your bare word.

Mr GOODWIN.

So likewise God hath decreed, to permit any man to destroy the life of another whom he meets with (I meane in respect of a naturall power, to doe the execution) but it followeth not from hence, that therefore every man must necessarily murder or destroy the life of his brother that cometh in his way.

IEANES.

UNto this I oppose these following arguments. First, God withholds many bloody minded men from actuall murder, as well as he did *Abimelech* from committing adultery, and unto him cannot be permitted the doing of a thing, who is restrayned therefrom; for permission and restraint are opposed *privatively*, and therefore cannot be found in the same subject at once, in regard of the same action.

Secondly, permission of the sin of murder essentially implyeth, a withholding of grace effectuall and necessary, for the avoydance of the sinne of murder: but God doth not withhold from every man that grace, which is effectuall and necessary for avoydance of the sinne of murder; And therefore he doth not permit every man to commit it.

Thirdly, permission of outward and imperate acts (as well as restraint, unto which it is privatively opposed) supposeth a propension or inclination unto them, a purpose or desire of them in the agents unto whom they are permitted: but there is not in every man a propension or inclination, a purpose or desire to murder every one that commeth in his way; Therfore God doth not permit every mā to murther every one that cometh in his way. The Major is a principle with *Arminius* in his *Tractate de permissione; in personâ cui permittitur, duo ponenda, actus istius respectu, Primo, vires sufficientes ad actum præstandum, intellige, nisi impediatur: Secundo, propensio ad actum producendum, citra hanc enim frustrà permittitur actus, citra illas omnino non permittitur; nam necessario ad actus præstationem*

ſtationem requiruntur: utut adſint illæ, niſi propendeat perſona, cui permittitur actus, ad actum ipſum, nullo fine & in vagum permittitur. Imo nec recte dici poteſt, quod alicui actus permittatur, qui actus illius præſtandi affectu nullo tenetur.

But this Teſtimony perhaps may be of ſmall authority with you, however his reaſon deſerves your conſideration. D. *Twiſſe* indeed diſſents from him, as touching the permiſſion of the *elicite acts of the will*, but fully agreeth with him, as concerning the outward and *imperate* acts thereof, Heare his owne words. *Circa irrationalia agentia ſi verſetur permiſſio, præſupponit, fateor, ejuſmodi propenſionem &c. Agentia vero rationalia quoties concernit permiſſio, eadem ratio erit quoad actus ipſorum imperatos: Neq; enim proprie dicitur quis aut permitti, aut impediri, ne faciat aliquid exterius, niſi præſupponatur hoc ipſum velle, & intendere actu interno aut elicito: ex quo commode dicitur vel permitti facere quod intendebat, vel ne faciat quod volebat impediri, hactenus itaque agnoſco propenſionem quandam ad agendum præcedaneam eſſe permiſſioni.*

Unto what *Arminius* and D. *Twiſſe* ſay, I ſhall adde this reaſon of mine own. Permiſsion and reſtraint are oppoſed privatively, and therefore as *Ariſtotle* hath taught us: l. Categ. Cap. 10.S. 11. *Sunt circa idem, Nulli rei competit privatio, cui non poſſit etiam competere habitus*: And therefore we call not any thing deafe, blind, or dumbe, but what is capable of hearing, ſight and ſpeech. In like manner no outward action can properly be permitted unto a man, but what he may be hindered and reſtrayned from: but now a man cannot be hindered, or reſtrayned from the performance of an outward action, unto which he hath no propenſion or inclination, of which he hath no purpoſe or deſire, no more than he can be conſtrayned unto that, from which he is not averſe, therefore neither can ſuch an action be permitted unto him, if we take permiſsion *properly*, (as *Bannes* ſaith) as it is not *nuda negatio, ſed privatio.*

By this time the Reader, I ſuppoſe, is ſatisfied, that God doth not permit every man to murther or deſtroy the life of every one that cometh in his way; and therefore conſequently, he hath not decreed or intended any ſuch permiſſion. As for the limitation which you bring to qualify your aſſertion, it nothing mends the matter: for I have prooved the aſſertion to be falſe in it ſelfe, by arguments, that feare not the light of your tryall or examination: and falſe aſſertions cannot be made good by any limitations whatſoever; ſo much I learned when I was a Boy from *Keckerm. Syſtem. Log. lib.* 2. *cap.* 4. *Quicquid ſubjecto limitativè tribuitur, id verè tribuitur.* But ſuppoſe this aſſertion were juſtifiable, by ſome limitation or other, yet not by this, which you bring; becauſe this naturall power to doe the execution, (as you ſpeake) is *inſufficient* to denominate the permiſſion of murther; becauſe 'tis *conſiſtent* with the oppoſite of ſuch a permiſſion, reſtraint from murther, &c.

Firſt, becauſe 'tis *inſufficient* to denominate the permiſſion of murther: A naturall power to performe an action is eſſentially requiſite unto the permiſſion thereof, but it is not only the eſſentiall requiſite thereunto, and therefore an inſufficient ground for the affirmation of it. If it be lawfull to affirme a predicate of a ſubject in reſpect of the preſence of one eſſentiall requiſite unto the ſaid predicate, when there are wanting any other things eſſentially required thereunto alſo, as abſurd propoſitions as are imagineable, will be hence juſtified: As that

beasts and plants are men, and Men beasts; for of beasts and plants there are affirmed diverse things, which doe agree unto man essentially; and so on the other side, diverse things are predicated of men essentially, which are also essentiall unto beasts and plants.

Secondly, a naturall power to destroy the life of another, is *consistent* with the opposite of such a permission, to wit, restraint from the murther of him: a power to produce an act may be hindered *majoris aut æqualis saltem potentiæ oppositione*, saith your *Arminius*, by opposall of a greater, or at least an equall power: though a man have not only a power, but a will, a desire, and purpose to take away the life of another, yet he may be restrained, not only by feare of punishment, dictates of a naturall conscience within, but also by opposition of a greater or equall power without. Now permission and restraint are privatively opposed, and therefore we cannot say, that an action is permitted in regard of that which is common unto both permisision and restraint, and may be found, as well when an action is restrained, as when it is permitted. If I should say that a blind man sees, in respect of the first naturall power of seeing; that a deafe man hears, in respect of the first naturall power of hearing; you would say that my limitation were absurd and ridiculous: because this naturall first power of seeing is found both in the blind and the seeing; and we may say the same of the first power of hearing. Yet this limitation is as justifiable as yours; for the naturall power you speake of, to doe the execution, is found as well in the restraint, as in the permission of murther

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Mr GOODWIN.

GOD *permitted Adam to eate of every tree in the Garden of Eden (the tree of knowledge of Good and evill only excepted*, Gen. 2. 16, 17.) *and therefore certainly had decreed, or intended, this permission: yet was not Adam any waies necessitated by any vertue, or influence of this decree upon him, to eate of every one of these trees; nor is it in the least degree credible, that ever he did eate of every of them, nor yet of any one of them, but only that which was prohibited unto him, his ejection out of this Garden following so suddainly after this patent, or permission granted unto him.*

IEANES.

THE permission spoken of, *Gen.* 2.16. was *Morall* or *Legall*, *in genere officii*, not *naturall* or *Physicall*, *in genere facti*, and therefore nothing at all to the purpose.

Mr GOODWIN.

NEither doth any *such decree in God, suppose a futurity of such a concurrence of causes, simply requisite and necessary, for the bringing of*

of things, ſo decreed, to paſſe, which will actually bring them to paſſe: though God hath decreed that a ſparke, or coale of fire, falling i. e. *in caſe it ſhall fall, into a barrell of Gunpowder, ſhall fire it, yet it doth not follow from hence, that he hath decreed, that any ſuch ſparke, or coale ſhall fall into it; without which notwithſtanding the effect decreed,* viz. *the firing of this Powder will not come to paſſe.*

IEANES.

FIrſt, *Arminius* tells you, that the abſence of one neceſſary cauſe is ſufficient to denominate a reſtraint. *Ad productionem effecti requiritur cauſa integra, ſufficiente ad ejus impedimentum unius cauſæ neceſſariæ abſentiâ.* And if this be true, then permiſſion doth imply a concurrence of cauſes ſimply requiſite and neceſſary, for the bringing of things ſo permitted to paſſe, which will actually bring them to paſſe if they be not hindered; and conſequently a permiſſive decree doth, though not ſuppoſe (that's not our language) yet, inferre the futurity of ſuch a preſence of all requiſite and neceſſary cauſes.

Beſides Secondly, *Scheibler Met. lib. 1. c. 14. t. 2. p. 2. n. 44.* out of *Zabarell* acquaints us, how reſtraint is ſometimes taken privatively, *pro privatione actionis inferendæ*, and abſence not only of one requiſite and neceſſary cauſe, but alſo of one neceſſary condition is ſufficient to denominate ſuch a reſtraint: *Sic diſtantia loci* (ſaith he) *impedit ne ignis calefaciat aliquod corpus, non quaſi diſtantia illa habeat efficientiam, vel influxum aliquem, ſed ſolum diſtantia illa dicit privationem actionis in igne, & paſſionis in calefactibili.* In regard of this acception of reſtraint, fire cannot be ſaid to be permitted to burne combuſtible matter, unleſſe there be an approximation of the fire unto the ſaid combuſtible matter, for diſtance of place hinders the fire from burning: diſtance of place between fire and a barrell of Gunpowder, doth hinder the fire from firing or blowing up that barrell of Gunpowder, if you take hinderance or reſtraint in ſuch a ſence as *Scheibler* ſpeakes of: Anſwerably unto which fire cannot be ſaid to be permitted to fire or blow up ſuch a barrell of Gunpowder, between which, and it, there is ſuch a diſtance.

Mr GOODWIN.

OR if it be ſaid, that God hath decreed, that ſuch a ſparke or coale, ſhall fall into the ſaid barrell of Gunpowder, now is not the decree barely permiſſive, but operative and aſſertive, and ſuch which ingageth the decreer to interpoſe effectually, for the bringing of the thing decreed to paſſe. But ſuch decrees as this, in matters of that nature, we deny to be in God.

IEANES.

IF By matters of that nature you meane, in ſuch contingent things as the falling of a Sparke or Coale into a Barrell of Gunpowder; why, Doctor *Twiſſe* hath an argu-

ment which he takes to be unanſwerable, clearly evincing, that whatſoever thing comes to paſſe, that is good with a tranſcendentall goodneſſe, or Metaphyſicall, God hath decreed it by an operative or effective decree. You have it in his examination of M. *Cottons* Treatiſe &c. p. 68, 69. As alſo in his Conſideration of that Scoffing Pamphlet of *Tilenus*, *viz.* the Doctrine of the Synod of *Dort* and *Arles* reduced to the practiſe. p. 18, 19. *Nay I ſay more*, (ſaith he) *that every thing, which cometh to paſſe, in the revolution of times, was decreed by God; which I proove by ſuch an argument, for anſwer whereunto, I challeng the whole nations of both Arminans and Ieſuites. It cannot be denied, but God foreſaw from everlaſting, whatſoever in time ſhould come to paſſe, therefore every thing was future from everlaſting, otherwiſe God could not foreſee it as future. Now let us ſoberly enquire, how theſe things which we call future, came to be future, being in their own nature meerely poſſible, and indifferent, as well not at all to be future, as to be future. Of this tranſmigration of things, out of the condition of things meerely poſsible (ſuch as they were of themſelves) into the condition of things future, there muſt needs be ſome outward cauſe. Now I demand, what was the cauſe of this tranſmigration? And ſeeing nothing, without the nature of God, could be the cauſe hereof (for this tranſmigration was from everlaſting, but nothing without God was everlaſting) therefore ſomething within the nature of God muſt be found fit to be the cauſe hereof.*

And what may that be? Not the knowledge of God, for that rather preſuppoſeth things future, and ſo knowable in the kind of things future, than makes them future: therefore it remaines, that the meere decree and will of God, is that which makes them future. If to ſhift off this, it be ſaid, that the eſſence of God is the cauſe hereof; I farther demand, whether the eſſence of God be the cauſe hereof, as working neceſſarily, or as working freely; If as working neceſſarily, then the moſt contingent things became future by neceſſity of the Divine nature, and conſequently he produceth whatſoever he produceth by neceſſity of nature, which is Atheiſticall: therefore it remaines, that the Eſſence of God hath made them future, by working freely, and conſequently, the meere will and decree of God is the cauſe of the futurition of all things.

He ſpeakes indeed of Gods will and decree indefinitely, but that thereunder he comprehends an operative or effective decree, is undeniable. But the force of this reaſon, you may think eaſily to evade, by your deniall of Gods fore-knowledge: your reaſons for which denyall, I ſhall in the next place proceed to examine.

Mr GOODWIN, pag. 29. cap. 3. Sect. 2.

Quid eſt præſcientia niſi ſcientia futurorum? Quid autem futurum eſt Deo, qui omnia ſuper graditur tempora? Si enim in ſcientia res ipſas habet, non ſunt ei futuræ, ſed præſentes; ac per hoc non jam præſcientia, ſed tantum ſcientia dici poteſt. Aug. lib. 2. ad Simpl. vide plura, ib.

THat *Preſcience or fore-knowledge are not formally or properly in God, is the conſtant aſſertion, both of ancient and moderne Divinity The learned Aſſertours of the Proteſtant cauſe are at perfect agreement with their Adverſaries the Schoolemen, and Papiſts, in this. Nor is it any wonder at all, that there ſhould be peace, and a concurrence of Judgement about ſuch a poynt as this; even between thoſe, who have many Irons of*

contention

contention otherwiſe in the fire, conſidering how obvious, and neere at hand, the truth herein is. For 1. *If foreknowledge were Properly and formally in God, then might Predeſtination, Election, Reprobation, and many other things be properly and formally in him alſo; in as much as theſe are, in the letter and propriety of them, as competible unto him as foreknowledge. Nor can there be any reaſon given for a difference. But unpoſſible it is that there ſhould be any Plurality of things whatſoever, in their diſtinct and proper natures, and formalities, in God, the infinite ſimplicity of his nature and being, with open mouth gainſaying it.* 2*ly If foreknowledge were properly, or formally in God, there ſhould be ſomewhat in him corruptible, or changeable. For that which is ſuppoſed to be ſuch a fore-knowledge in him to day, by the morrow, ſuppoſe the thing, or event fore-known, ſhould in the interim actually come to paſſe, muſt needs ceaſe, and be changed; in as much as there can be no fore-knowledge of things that are preſent, the adequate and appropriate object of this knowledge (in the Propriety of it) being* res futura *ſomewhat that is to come. Thirdly (and laſtly) there is nothing in the Creature univocally and formally the ſame, with any thing which is in God. The reaſon is; becauſe then, there muſt either be ſomewhat finite in God, or ſomewhat infinite in the Creature: both which are unpoſſible. But if Præſcience or fore-knowledge, being properly and formally in the Creature, ſhould be properly and formally alſo in God, there ſhould be ſomewhat in the Creature, univocally and formally the ſame, with ſomewhat, which is in God. Therefore certainly there is no fore-knowledge, properly ſo called, in God.*

Nec zelus, nec ira, nec pœnitentia, nec proprie miſericordia, nec præſcientia eſſe poteſt in Deo. Greg. Moral. l. 2. c. 23.

Quid eſt præſcientia niſi ſcientia futurorum? Aug. l. 2. ad Simpl. q. 2.

IEANES.

DIverſe Heathen Philoſophers I have found cenſured for denying of Gods Preſcience or foreknowledge, as *Cicero* by *Auſtin lib.* 5. *De Civ. Dei cap.* 9. *Seneca* by *Aureolus* 1. *diſtin.* 38. *Ariſtotle* by *Vaſquez* and others. But that Chriſtian Divines either ancient or moderne, (unleſſe you will appropriate that name unto Socinians) are ſo unanimous in impugning of Gods foreknowledge, is great newes unto me, and not only unto me, but unto all others, I believe, that have read any thing in either ancient, or Moderne Divinity. *Hierome* in his third book *Adverſus Pelagianos*, teacheth (as *Franciſcus Amicus* informes me) that he who takes away *Preſcience* from God, takes away the Godhead: *Eum qui a Deo præſcientiam tollit, divinitatem tollere.* As for *Auſtin*, whom you quote in the Margent againſt this Preſcience of God; let any one read that place but now quoted. *Lib.* 5. *De Civ. Dei. cap.* 9. and he muſt needs confeſſe, that he is a zealous Aſſertor of Gods foreknowledge againſt *Cicero*, who oppoſeth it in favour of the liberty of mans will. And ſo ſaith *Auſtin. Dum vult facere homines liberos, facit ſacrilegos: multò ſunt autem tolerabiliores* (ſaith he) *qui vel ſydera fata conſtituunt, quam iſte, qui tollit præſcientiam futurorum. Nam & confiteri eſſe Deum, & negare præſcium futurorum, apertiſſima inſania eſt.* They who make the ſtarres the fates of men, are more tolerable then he, who taketh away the foreknowledge of things to come. For to confeſſe that there is a God, & to deny him to be foreknowing of things future, is a moſt open madnes. And againe in the ſame place. *Sed quoquomodo ſe habent tortuoſiſſimæ concertationes, & diſputationes Philoſophorum; nos ut confitemur ſummum, &*

verum Deum, ita voluntatem, ſummamq; poteſtatem ac præſcientiam ejus confitemur. Afterwards again. *Religioſus autẽ animus utrumq; eligit, utrumq; confitetur, & fide pietatis utrũq; confirmat*; that is, both the liberty of the will, & Gods preſcience. *Quod verò Cicero negat ordinem omnium cauſarum eſſe certiſſimum, & Dei præſcientiæ notiſſimum, plus eum, quam Stoici, deteſtamur. Aut enim Deum eſſe negat, &c. Aut ſi eſſe confitetur Deũ, quem negat præſcium futurorum, etiam ſic dicit nihil aliud, quàm ille, dixit inſipiens in corde ſuo, non eſt Deus. Qui enim non eſt præſcius omnium futurorum, non eſt utiq; Deus.* To confeſſe that there is a God, and to deny his foreknowledge, is to ſay with the foole in his heart, that there is no God: For he, who doth not foreknow things to come, is not God. Other teſtimonies you may ſee quoted in *Suarez lib.* 1. *De ſcientiâ futurorum contingentium abſolutâ. cap.* 2. Out of other places of *Auſtin*, as alſo out of *Fulgentius*, and *Anſelme*. But I may very well ſpare this labour of citing the Ancients, ſeeing M. *Hord*, or M. *Maſon* (I know not well which) tells us that the Fathers did generally make ſinne an object of Gods preſcience, and therefore they maintained, That there was preſcience in God. As for the Schoolemen they in their Commentaries upon *Aquinas. Sum.* 1. *p. Q.* 14. *Art.* 13. And on *Lombard lib.* 1. *diſt.* 38. 39. doe generally reſolve, *nemine contradicente*, (that I know) That Gods foreknowledge of things to come, is a point certaine *de fide*. And amongſt thoſe that are called *Proteſtants*, I know none that oppoſe it, ſave the *Socinians*; againſt whom, in this particular, you may read *Stagman Photinianis: diſp.* 13. And *Johannes Junius in refutat: prælect. Fauſti Socini, cap.* 8. 9. 10. 11. The Arminians, however now ſome of them walke in the cloudes, and will not ſpeake out, yet at firſt the Ringleaders did not ſtick to profeſſe, that election was upon foreſight of perſeverance in faith, and reprobation upon foreknowledge of perſeverance in infidelity and impenitency. D. *Twiſſe* tells us, That Gods foreknowledge of things future, is a point aſſented unto by, and uncontroverted amongſt all Chriſtians; *De Scientia Media, p.* 245. *Extra controverſiam eſt apud Chriſtianos omnes, futura omnia, quantumvis contingentia, Deo nota fuiſſe, idq; ab æterno; neque mirum, cum nihil poſitivum aut ſit, aut futurum ſit in rerum naturâ, cujus productionem non operetur ipſe Deus, idque in genere cauſæ efficientis, conſequentérq; cujus productionem non ab æterno decreverit, quâ de re nulla fere inter Chriſtianos hodie, ſaltem eruditiores, viget Controverſia.* And hereupon it is that he cenſureth the proofes brought by *Suarez* for the confirmation of it, to be needleſſe. *Pergit Suarez in confirmatione ejus, de quo Chriſtianus nullus dubitat. ibidem.* And againe in his book againſt M. *Cotton p.* 69. he ſaith, *That for men with Cicero to deny, that God foreknowes things to come, is to turne Atheiſt.*

But againſt this cloud of witneſſes I foreſee that you will take ſanctuary in thoſe two termes, *Formally* and *Properly*, though none ſave Atheiſts, and Socinians deny the *Preſcience* of God; yet notwithſtanding this, it is, ſay you, *the conſtant aſſertion both of Ancient and moderne Divinity, That Preſcience or foreknowledge are not Formally or Properly in God.* To make this good, you only quote *Auſtin* in your Margent and *Gregory*, unto whoſe ſayings alleadged by you, every Schooleman almoſt, that diſſenteth from the Dominicans about the preſence of things in eternity, gives an anſwer, of which if you be ignorant, you muſt needs be a very great ſtranger to Schoole Divinity. You tell us next, *that the Learned aſſertors of the Proteſtant cauſe are at perfect agreement with their adverſaries the Schoolemen, and Papiſts in this aſſertion, That preſcience or foreknowledge*

are not properly, or formally in God. This is a thing which thoſe, that diſſent from you, would in all likelyhood queſtion, and yet you bring not ſo much as one inſtance out of either Proteſtant or Papiſt to make it good. That there is ſuch a peace and concurrence of judgement about this, between Proteſtants and Papiſts, I never read or heard of before. And if you can prove it by an induction, I will confeſſe my ignorance. If any ſuch unwary paſſages, as you here ſpeake of, have dropt from the pennes of either Proteſtants or Papiſts, I ſuppoſe they are to be qualified, and underſtood in the like manner, that *Suarez* underſtands, and qualifieth the ſpeech of thoſe, who deny knowledge to be *properly* and *formally* in God.

Ne in æquivoco laboremus, ſupponendum eſt quid nomine ſcientiæ ſignificetur: non enim intelligimus qualitatem aliquam, vel habitum, aut actum propriè factum, ſeu elicitum à potentiâ, neq; etiam cognitionem per diſcurſum comparatam, aut aliam ſimilem imperfectionem includentem: in quâ ſignificatione videntur accepiſſe ſcientiam, qui dixerunt non eſſe proprie in Deo, ſed per Metaphoram vel cauſalitatem illi attribui, id eſt, quia cauſat in nobis ſcientiam. Hos enim non eſt veriſimile intellexiſſe Deum ita carere ſcientiâ, ut ſit prorſus ſtolidus: nam cum faterentur Deum eſſe fontem omnis ſcientiæ creatæ, non eſt veriſimile credidiſſe Deum eſſe omnino inſcium. Igitur, quia putarunt ſcientiam includere imperfectionem, ideo formaliter & proprie in Deo eſſe negarunt. Illæ autem imperfectiones quaſi materiales ſunt, inventæ in ſcientia humanâ, vel Angelicâ, non vero pertinent ad rationem formalem ſcientiæ, ut ſic, quæ hic abſtractiſſimè ſumitur, præſcindendo à creata, & increata, & ſolum ſignificat claram & evidentem ac perfectam cognitionem, ſeu perceptionem veritatis, ſeu objecti ſcibilis, ſive illa perceptio fiat per qualitatem, ſive per ſubſtantiam, ſive cum effectione, & receptione, ſive abiq; his imperfectionibus. *Metaph. Diſp.* 30. *Sect.* 15. *num.* 2.

They take (ſaith he) knowledge as ſignifying a quality or habit produced by ſome power or knowledge, gained or gotten by way of diſcourſe or inference, or including ſome ſuch like imperfection. In like manner if any either Proteſtants, or Papiſts, have denyed foreknowledge to be *properly* and *formally* in God, they are to be underſtood concerning ſuch a foreknowledge, as is found in men, in whom 'tis cloathed with many imperfections, from which 'tis abſtracted, as it is aſcribed unto God. But I ſhall take a more particular and diſtinct notice of theſe two termes *Formally* and *Properly* in reference unto the attribution of foreknowledge unto God.

And firſt let us enquire whether foreknowledge can formally be aſcribed unto God.

The terme *Formally* may be oppoſed unto either *Eminently*, or *Extrinſecall denominations.*

Firſt unto *Eminently.* Perfections are either *ſecundum quid*, *in certo genere*, after a ſort, in ſuch a kind, or elſe ſimply ſuch.

The former doe ſo eſſentially imply ſome imperfection, limitation, or compoſition, as that they cannot poſſibly be abſtracted therefrom, and therefore are aſcribed unto God only *eminently* or *vertually.*

But now the latter doe include no imperfection, or repugnancy with, or oppoſition unto any greater, or equall perfection. And theſe perfections are aſcribed unto God *Formally*, as you may ſee proved by *Suarez Met. Diſp:* 30. *Sect.* 1. *num.* 8. 9. *De perfectionibus ergo ſimpliciter dicendum eſt, omnes eſſe in Deo formaliter, quia in ſuo formali conceptu nullam imperfectionem, ſed puram perfectionem involvunt, neque inter ſe repugnantiam includunt, unde ſic illas habere, id eſt, formaliter, melius eſt, quam aliquâ earum carere, & ideo de ratione Entis ſumme perfecti in totâ latitudine Entis eſt, ut has omnes perfectiones formaliter includat. Adde in his perfectionibus non poſſe cogitari altiorem modum continendi illas, quam formaliter, quia intra ſuam formalem rationem, nec limitationem, nec imperfectionem includunt, neque altior gradus Entis excogitari poteſt, quam ille, ad quem hæ formales perfectiones pertinent, qualia ſunt vivere, ſapere & alia hujuſmodi.*

Now

Now *foreknowledge* is to be ranked amongſt the perfections of this latter ſort; becauſe it may be ſequeſtred or abſtracted from all thoſe imperfections, as it is found in Men or Angells. You think indeed that it will neceſſarily inferre mutability, but that is an imputation from which I will anon eaſily free it. Beſides, a perfection ſimply ſuch, is defined by *Anſelme in Monolog. cap.* 14. *Quæ in unoquoq; eſt melior ipſa quam non ipſa*; that is, as *Scotus* expounds it in 1. *diſt.* 8. *q.* 1. *Ad.* 1. *quolibet ſuo incompoſſibili.* Now the light of nature evidenceth that the knowledge of things to come is better, and a more noble attribution then any thing whatſoever is repugnant unto ſuch foreknowledge, and therefore this foreknowledge (in ſuch an abſtract notion as we ſpeake of) may *formally* be aſcribed unto God.

Reſpondeo, verum eſſe nullam perfectionem

But now this I would have to be underſtood as *Suarez* ſpeakes of ſuch kind of perfections in generall.

creatam, ſecundum adæquatam rationem quam habet in creaturâ, eſſe in Deo formaliter, ſed eminenter tantum: non eſt enim in Deo ſapientia creata, nam ut ſic eſt accidens, & finita perfectio, & idem eſt de cæteris ſimilibus. Dicitur ergo Deus quaſdam ex his perfectionibus continere formaliter, quia ſecundum eas habet aliquam formalem convenientiam cum creaturâ, ratione cujus illa perfectio ſecundum idem nomen, & eandem rationem, ſeu conceptum formalem attribuitur Deo & creaturæ, ſalvâ analogiâ, quæ inter Deum & creaturam ſemper intercedit. Quando vero non eſt talis convenientia, nec formalis denominatio, ſed ſola efficacitas divinæ virtutis, tunc dicimus intercedere convenientiam eminentialem. Atq; ita in Deo nulla perfectio eſt formaliter niſi vel ſecundum proprium conceptum Dei, vel ſaltem ſecundum conceptum abſtrahentem a Deo, & creaturis. *Metaph. Diſp.* 30. *Sect.* 1. *num.* 12.

And againe afterwards.

Recte, &c. Intelligitur eſſe longe diverſum modum vivendi divinæ & creatæ ſubſtantiæ: & quod de divinis attributis poſitivis ſuperius diximus, in hoc manifeſtiſſimum eſſe ſecundum modum, quo ſunt in creaturis, non eſſe in Deo formaliter, ſed eminenter. Eſſe autem in Deo formaliter ſecundum modum altiorem, qui omnem imperfectionem creaturarum excludat. *Diſp.* 30. *Sect.* 14. *num.* 7.

They are not in God *formally* in ſuch a ſenſe, or after ſuch a manner, as they are in the Creatures, but they are in him *formally*, in a higher way and manner, which excludes all imperfections whatſoever of the Creatures.

Secondly, *formall attributions* may be oppoſed unto *extrinſecall denominations.* Now the word *foreknowledge*, ſignifieth ſomething that agreeth unto God *formally*, and ſomething that is aſcribed unto him only by *extrinſecall denomination.*

For the underſtanding of which we muſt obſerve, that it is one and the ſame undivided knowledge, by which God without any the leaſt alteration, underſtands things whileſt future, when preſent, when paſt, and this I affirme to be aſcribed unto God *formally*, becauſe 'tis in him, and that by way of reall identity with his Eſſence, and all his other attributes.

But now this knowledge undergoes ſeverall appellations, which are attributed unto it by *extrinſecall denomination*, from the various condition of the things known, ſo long as the things themſelves are to come, it is called Fore-knowledge, when they come, co-knowledge, after they are gone and paſt, after-knowledge: D. *Twiſſe* againſt *Jackſon* pag. 313, 314. I deny not then, but that the *formall denomination* of *foreknowledge* is *extrinſecall.* Gods knowledge is ſo denominated in regard of its preexiſtence unto the thing known: but that which is affirmed of a thing only by way of *extrinſecall denomination*, may be aſcribed thereunto *properly*, which brings me unto a ſecond Quære.

Whether *Foreknowledge* is, or may be aſcribed unto God properly?

The

The learned Assertors of the Protestant cause, you say, are at perfect agreement with their adversaries the Papists in this, That prescience, or foreknowledge, are *not formally or properly* in God. You will not deny D. *Twisse* to be a learned Protestant, and how he dissents from this assertion which you father upon all Protestants, you may read in his book against Doctor *Jackson* p.316. *The question only was* (saith he) *whether foreknowledge might be properly attributed unto God, in respect of things to come: now I see no reason* (saith he) *but it may, as well as it is attributed unto man.* Amongst the Papists *Suarez* comes behind few moderne Schoolemen, and whether he thinks foreknowledge not to be properly in God, let his own words informe you. *Lib.*1. *De Scientia futurorum absolutè* cap. 7. *In omni etiam proprietate certissimum est scientiam Dei, sicut & Deum ipsum, duratione antecedere omnium rerum creatarum existentiam.* But *Suarez* is not herein singular. For the Schoolemen generally in their Commentaries upon *Aquinas*, and *Lombard* in the places but now quoted, having propounded this Question, *An in Deo sit scientia futurorum &c.* Resolve it affirmatively: And as at other times, so especially in determinations, and resolutions of questions, that Rule hath place: *Analogum per se positum stat pro famosiori analogato*; if a word have two significations, one proper, another improper or Metaphoricall, and it be put by it selfe without any thing to determine, or limit it unto the improper acception thereof, it must be taken properly. This to be the meaning of that rule *Scheibler* instructed me, when I was a Puny in Philosophy. *Met. lib.*2. *cap.* 6. *num.* 17. *Respondeo, illam propositionem, Analogum per se positum, hoc est, sine aliquo addito, stat pro famosiori, valere solum de analogo proportionis, hoc est, quod de uno prædicatur propriè, de alio impropriè, per similitudinem, vel metaphoram, id positum sine addito significat suum principale analogatum, veluti cum de risu loquor, intelligo eum de risu hominis, non de risu prati.* Austin *in lib.* 5. *de Civit. Dei. cap.* 9. Censures the denyall of Gods foreknowledge as a madnesse, as a blasphemous, and Atheisticall speech &c. And this he would never have done, if he had thought as you, that foreknowledge is not properly in God: For that which is ascribed unto God only improperly, *metaphorically*, & by an Anthropopathy, as hands, eyes, eares, repentance, griefe, &c. may without madnes, blasphemy, or Atheisme, be denyed of God in propriety of speech.

How have the Schoolemen toyl'd themselves, and puzled their readers, about the reconciliation of Gods foreknowledge of future Contingents, with the liberty of mans will, and the contingency of things? This was a poynt that *Armachanus* studied for twenty years space*. Now had those men been so well read in ancient and Moderne Divinity as you, they would have eased themselves of this labour. For you assure us, that it is the constant assertion both of ancient and Moderne Divinity, that prescience or foreknowledge are not properly in God. That this was reputed in the daies of *Jeffery Chawcer*, a difficult, nice, and controverted matter, which no one but an *Austin* or a *Bradwardine* could throughly discusse, or bolt unto the branne, appears by the verses of the said *Chawcer*, related by Sr *Henry Savill*, in his Epistle prefixed to *Bradwardine*, which I shall here insert.

* Twisse *de Scientia Media.* pag. 402. 403.

But what that God afore wote, must needs bee,
After the opinion of Certain Clerkis.
Witnesse of him that any Clerke is,
That in Schoole is great altercation
In this matter, and great disputation,

And hath been of an hundred thouſand men.
But I ne cannot boult it to the bren,
As can the holy Doctor S. Auſtin,
Or Boece, *or the Biſhop* Bradwardin.
Whether that Gods worthy foreweting
Straineth me needly to doe a thing,
(Needly clepe I ſimple neceſſity)
Or if the free choyce be granted me
To doe the ſame thing, or doe it nought,
Though God forewot it or it was wrought.
Or if his weting ſtraineth never a dele
But by neceſſite conditionele.
I will not have to done of ſuch matere.

Had you lived in thoſe times, you could eaſily have put an end to all this great altercation; provided that they would have received that which you take here for a principle, that fore-knowledge is not properly in God. For if this be ſo, then all diſputation concerning the reconciling of Gods fore-knowledge with liberty and contingency is frivolous, and to no purpoſe.

What anxious diſputes have been amongſt the Schoolemen for many hundred yeares continuance touching the manner or the ground of Gods foreknowing future contingents? *Bonaventure* maintained that God did foreknow future contingents by the Idea's of them in his mind. *Aquinas* made the ground of Gods foreknowing them to be their *preſence or exiſtence in eternity*. *Scotus* his opinion was, that God foreknows them by ſeeing the determination of his own will touching their coming to paſſe. Other grounds of Gods foreknowledge of future contingents are aſſigned by others, which you may find mentioned almoſt in every Schooleman. *Bellarm. l.* 4. *de grat: & libero Arbitrio*, and before him *Occam* and *Arimmenſis* were of an opinion, that the way, or manner of Gods foreknowing future contingents, is a povnt that is incomprehenſible, & unexpreſſible in this life. Were you called to be an Umpier between theſe great Schoolemen in this thorny, and knotty Queſtion, you, inſtead of unlooſing or untying this *Gordian* knot, would like another *Alexander* have cut it in pieces, and have told them that they diſputed like a company of *Buzzards* concerning the ground or manner of that which may in propriety of ſpeech be denied of God. Your opinion you ſee doth not ſo fully accord with ancient and Moderne Divinity, as you pretend, & how diſſonant it is from the truth will ſoon be manifeſted, by bringing it unto the rule of Theologicall truth, the Scriptures, in which the infallible prediction of things to come, doe clearly and abundantly witneſſe, that foreknowledge is properly in God: for prediction preſuppoſeth preſcience, it being utterly impoſſible to foretell infallibly what one doth not foreknow certainly. Hereupon it was that *Tertullian* ſaid *Deum, quot fecit Prophetas, tot habere teſtes præſcientiæ ſuæ lib.* 2. *contra Marcion. c.* 5. That God hath ſo many witneſſes of his preſcience, as he hath made Prophets. This infallible prediction of things to come is ſo proper & peculiar unto God, as that thereby he diſtinguiſheth himſelfe from all falſe Gods. *Eſay* 41. 21, 22, 23. *Produce your cauſe, ſaith the Lord* (unto the Idolls of the Gentiles) *bring forth your ſtrong reaſons ſaith the King of Jacob; let them bring forth & ſhew us what ſhall happen. Let thē ſhew the former things what they be, that we may conſider them, and know the latter end of them or declare us things for to come: ſhew the things that are to come hereafter, that we may know that yee*

are

are Gods. He that is God can ſhew the things that are to come hereafter, and therefore he foreknowes them; for that cannot be foretold, which is not foreknown. And that without a Metaphor, or any other Trope.

From Scripture goe we to naturall reaſon, and that will prove, that foreknowledge agrees *properly* unto God. Arguments of this ſort may be drawn, Firſt from the nature of foreknowledge. Secondly from ſeverall attributes of God. Thirdly from his actuall providence or efficiency.

Firſt, from the nature of foreknowledge. Foreknowledge is a knowledge of things before their exiſtence. And in God there is a knowledge of things before their exiſtence. *Thou underſtandeſt* (ſaith *David*) *my thoughts a farre off*. *Pſal.* 139. 2. This argument you may find in D. *Twiſſe* againſt *Jackſon*. p. 314. Till things doe coexiſt with God, his knowledge of them, ſaith he, is foreknowledge of them, as well as ours. For it is before them, and only before them; for it is neither with them, nor after them. Not with them, for then they ſhould coexiſt with God, and that from all eternity, which is moſt untrue; for if they did coexiſt with God, then they did exiſt, and that from all eternity, which is moſt untrue. much leſſe is it after them, for if ſo, then their coexiſtence with God were paſt: but we ſuppoſe it to be to come. And impoſſible it is that the ſame things ſhould at once be both paſt, and alſo to come. You have it alſo in *Suarez* in the place before quoted. *In omni etiam proprietate certiſſimum eſt ſcientiam Dei, ſicut & Deum ipſum duratione antecedere omnium rerum creatarum exiſtentiam*. It is moſt certain that the knowledge of God, as well as God himſelfe, doth properly or in all propriety of ſpeech antecede in duration the exiſtence of all created things whatſoever, and therefore it is properly foreknowledge. Unto *Suarez* who is no enemy unto Arminianiſme, I ſhall adde D. *Jackſon* a profeſſed Arminian arguing after the like manner in his *Treatiſe of the Divine eſſence and Attributes* Sect. 2. Cap. 8. p. 105. *If God* (ſaith he) *as all grant, be before all worlds, his knowledge being coeternall to his being, muſt needs be before all worlds*. And *Auſtin* himſelfe grants a *ſcientia* a ſcience, or knowledge in God moſt infallible, of all things that have been, are, or ſhall be, before they are, were, or could be; for they could not be coeternall to him, who is before all worlds, the beginning of the World it ſelfe, and of all things in it. Now all knowledge of things not yet preſent, but to come, is foreknowledge: to determine or decree things future, is to predetermine or fore-decree them. And ſeeing God from eternity hath both known, and decreed the things that then were not, he is ſaid; to have foreknown and fore-decreed them.

Secondly, Arguments proving foreknowledge to be properly in God may be taken from Gods Attributes; from his infinite perfection, from his infinite happineſſe, or bleſſedneſſe, from his unchangeableneſſe.

Firſt, from his infinite perfection: He is of all beings the beſt, and moſt perfect. *Deus optimus maximus* was a title that the ancient Romans by the light of nature gave him. Nothing then can ſo much as be imagined to be better then God. But 'tis better to know things to come, then to be ignorant of them, And therefore we muſt either deny that there is a God, or elſe aſcribe unto him the knowledge of things to come. This is Doctor *Twiſſe* his argument *De ſcientiâ mediâ pag.* 246. *Verum, ſi Deus is ſit, quo nihil melius excogitari poteſt, & melius ſit cognoſcere futura, & quicquid cognoſcibile eſt, quam ignorare; videtur hinc ſequi, aut Deum prorſus negandum eſſe, aut ſcientiam futurorum contingentium ei tribuendam.*

Secondly, from his infinite bleſſedneſſe or happineſſe, which is ſuch as that he hath all things deſireable. But if he ſhould not have knowne things to come he ſhould be without a perfection, deſireable by every intelligent or rationall nature. This was *Bradwardines* argument: *Si Deus quædam vera neſciret, poſſet deſiderare & velle ſcire illa; omnis enim rationalis natura naturaliter ſcire deſiderat, quare & cum per partem proximam habeat voluntatem univerſaliter efficacem, poſſet illa ſcire & non novitèr; quia tunc non ſemper eſſet actualiſſimus, ſcientiſſimus, perfectiſſimus, beatiſſimus, & immutabilis penitus, contra tertiam partem & ſextam: neceſſario ergo æternaliter omnia vera nõvit.*

Thirdly, from his unchangeableneſſe, which is affirmable of all his other Attributes, and conſequently of his knowledge. But now his knowledge if it were not of things whileſt they were to come, it would by actuall exiſtence of them be enlarged, and ſo changed. This argument is urged by *Durand, Cumel, Rada, Suarez*, and others. God knowes things whiles preſent, for otherwiſe he ſhould be ignorant of that which men and Angells know, therefore he knew them whiles future, otherwiſe by the preſence of them, ſomething *de novo* ſhould accrue unto Gods knowledge, which cannot be without a change.

Conſtat (*ſaith* Durand) quod Deus cognoſcit contingens dum eſt præſens, putà Socratem currere, alioquin ego cognoſcerem illud quod Deus ignoraret: ſi ergo non cognoſcebat hoc prius quando fuit futurum, ſequeretur quod aliquid accreviſſet ſuæ ſcientiæ quod eſt impoſſibile. *In* 1. *lib. Diſtinct.* 38. *Q.* 3.

Suarez alſo argueth to the ſame purpoſe.

Præterea declaratur hoc modo; quia vel Deus ſcit hæc contingentia, quando ponuntur in eſſe, vel non: Hoc poſterius nemo dicit, quia angelus, vel homo hoc cognoſcit, ſaltem quando ſunt præſentia: Ergo multo magis Deus: ſi autem nunc illa cognoſcit, Ergo & antea, quia ſcientia Dei augeri non poteſt, Ita ut aliquid novum ſub illam cadat, tum propter immutabilitatem, tum etiam quia paulatim diſcere, quocunq; modo fiat, magna imperfectio eſt; Confirmatur, quia ſi Deus in tempore aliquid de novo inciperet velle, imperfectionem in illo indicaret: Ergo multò magis ſi aliquid de novo ſcire inciperet. *Lib.* 1. *De Scientia futurorum contingentium abſoluta. cap.* 2.

The laſt ſort of arguments which I ſhall mention, are drawn from Gods actuall providence or efficiency. God is the cauſe of all things, *Of him* (ſaith the Apoſtle) *are all things, Rom.* 11. 36. Now he is the cauſe of all things by his knowledge, and by his will.

Firſt by his knowledge, and that practicall, which is reſembled unto that of an Artificer, who hath a foreknowledge of what artificiall workes he reſolves upon; for he hath ſamplers and patterns of them in his mind.

Cognitio divini intellectus (ſaith *Aquinas*) cõparatur ad res alias, ſicut cognitio artificis ad artificiata, cum per ſuam ſcientiam ſit cauſa rerum. Artifex autem ſuæ artis cognitiõne etiam ea quæ nondum ſunt artificiata cognoſcit, formæ enim artis ex ejus ſcientiâ effluunt in exteriorem materiam ad artificiatorum conſtitutionem: unde nihil prohibet in ſcientia artificis eſſe formas, quæ nondum exterius prodierunt: ſic igitur nihil prohibet, Deum, eorum quæ non ſunt, notitiam habere. *lib.* 1. *contra gentes. cap.* 66. Deus eſt cauſa omnium rerum & futurorum contingentium, & liberorum (*ſaith Cumel*) in primam partem Summ. *Q.* 14. *Art.* 13. *Diſp.* 1. Per ſuam ſcientiam practicam, ergo prius ſcit & cognoſcit futura contingentia & libera quam producantur & fiant; ſicut artifex prius habet ideam artificiati & cognoſcit rem producendam & efficiendam, quam efficiat & producat poſtea ad extra in tempore; igitur Deus qui artifex eſt univerſorum futurorum contingentium prius cognoſcit futura contingentia, quam illa in tempore fiant.

Rada propounds this argument very briefely.

Deus omnia operatur ad extra, ut artifex verò rem, antequam illam efficiat, præcognoſcit: aliter enim irrationabiliter operabitur. *Parte prima. Controv.* xxx. *pag.* 487.

Secondly, the will of God is the cauſe of all things, as is demonſtrated by *Bradwardine* and by *Aquinas* and ſuch as Comment upon him, *in prim. part.* Q. 19. *Art.* 4. Now the will of God is unchangeable from within and

and irreſiſtible from without, and therefore in it all things future may be certainly and infallibly foreknowne. *Eradwardine* (from *Eſay.* 46. 10. *Declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, ſaying, my Counſell ſhall ſtand*) inferres the infallibility of Gods prediction from the firmeneſſe, immutability, and unreſiſtibleneſſe of his will. The Prophet ſignifies, ſaith he, that he can therefore declare the things that are not done, becauſe his Counſell ſhall ſtand, and he will doe all his pleaſure: *Quaſi velit innuere, quod per hoc annuntiet, vel annuntiare poſſit ab exordio noviſſimum, quia omne ſuum conſilium & voluntas immutabiliter ſtabit, & fiet. De cauſa Dei. lib.* 1. *cap.* 218. *pag.* 224. This argument *Cumel* inforceth by compariſon with mans foreknowledge of things in their cauſes. A Mathematician can foreknow an Eclipſe of the Sunne or Moone in its cauſe, and therefore much more can God foreknow all future contingents in the determination of his own will.

Effectus poteſt evidenter cognoſci antequam in tempore producatur in ſua cauſâ, ſicut Eclipſis evidenter cognoſcitur in ſua cauſâ, antequam ſit, a Mathematico, & ab Aſtrologo: ſed Deus per ſeipſum & per propriam voluntatem eſt cauſa omnium Entium contingentium, & liberorum, & prædefinit illa futura contingentia & libera. Ergo Deus per ſeipſum & per propriam ſcientiam, quam habet, cognoſcit futura contingentia & libera.

As for the teſtimonies you bring in the Margent, they and diverſe others are alleadged generally by the *Dominicans*, to prove the exiſtence of things in Eternity, and it is very ſtrange unto me that you take no notice of the common anſwers that are uſually given unto them. The place out of *Gregory* is miſquoted, but that might be an eſcape of the Printer; in my booke it is, *Moral. lib.* 20. *cap.* 25. And a little after he gives the reaſon why preſcience is not properly in God. *Præſcire dicitur qui unamquamque rem, antequam veniat, videt: Et id quod futurum eſt, priuſquam præſens fiat, prævidet: Deus ergo quomodo eſt præſcius dum nulla niſi quæ futura ſunt, præſciantur? Et ſcimus quia Deo futurum nihil eſt, ante cujus oculos præterita nulla ſunt: præſentia non tranſeunt, futura non veniunt: Quippe quia omne quod nobis fuit & erit, in ejus proſpectu præſto eſt: Et omne quod præſens eſt, ſcire poteſt potius quam præſcire.* The ground upon which both *Auſtin* and *Gregory* deny foreknowledge to be in God is, becauſe nothing is future but all things are preſent unto God.

Unto all theſe and diverſe other Teſtimonies which occurre in the Dominicans, I ſhall rehearſe the anſwers of ſeverall men.

Firſt, *Rada, Par. prim. controv. trigeſ. Art.* 2. *pag.* 493. *Ad omnes authoritates unica ſolutione fit ſatis. Dico enim quod non intelligunt ſancti, omnia eſſe Deo ſecundum rem præſentia ſed ſecundum eſſe objectivum & cognitum: omnia enim in ſeipſo videt & intuetur.*

Secondly, *Suarez* gives the ſame anſwer, but he explaines himſelfe more fully: The Fathers (ſaith he) ſpeake by way of exaggeration to declare the perfection and exactneſſe of that knowledge which God hath of things to come, for he knowes them ſo diſtinctly, and accurately, with all their circumſtances, as if they did exiſt actually preſent. This knowledge of them therefore is not ſo much abſtractive as intuitive, not ſo much preſcience as ſcience.

Patres per quandam exaggerationem locuti ſunt ut declararent perfectionem ſcientiæ, quam Deus habet de futuris; nam illa tam clarè & diſtinctè cum omnibus circumſtantiis intuetur, ac ſi præſentia actu jam exiſterent: ideoq; ſcientia illa non eſt abſtractiva, ſed propriſſima intuitio. Ad hoc ergo ſignificandum dixerunt illam non tam eſſe dicendam præſcientiam, quam ſcientiam. Nam more humano loquendo, quæ præſciuntur, non ita clarè & diſtinctè cognoſcuntur. Nam Aſtrologus qui præcit futuram eſſe Eclipſin, non apprehendit & cognoſcit illum effectum diſtinctè prout in re futurus eſt cum omnibus conditionibus & circumſtantiis ejus: & ideo non habet de illo ſcientiam intuitivam, ſed abſtractivam. At vero Deus tam diſtinctè intuetur futurum antequam ſit, ſicut quando eſt, tamq; veram ſcientiam intuitivam illius habet.

Quocirca in eo ſenſu in quo illi patres voluerunt illam ſcientiam propriè appellare præſcientiam; Illa particula *Præ* non ſolum excludit realem exiſtentiam, ſed etiam præſentiam objectivam exactam, & omnimodam effectus ſic cogniti.

Thirdly, D. *Twiſſe De ſcientia media pag.* 390. gives the ſame anſwer that *Bradwardine* did unto the like ſayings out of *Boetius* and *Anſelme* above 200 yeares agoe, to wit, That all things are preſent unto God *in eſſe volito* as decreed by him, *ſunt ei præſentia, id eſt per ſuam inſuperabilem & immutabilem voluntatem, præſentialiter determinata, & decreta certitudinaliter ut fiant futura.* And this you may ſee how he cleares both out of *Auſtin*, and *Gregory*.

Fourthly, *Becanus* gives another anſwer which I take to be the more ſatisfying: And 'tis, that the ſcope of both *Auſtin*, and *Gregory* is to ſhew, That there is not ſuch a preſcience or fore knowledge in God, as there is in us, *viz* imperfect, and conjecturall. &c.

Reſpondeo, ſcopus Auguſtini eſt oſtendere non eſſe talem præſcientiam in Deo, qualis in nobis eſt. Nos enim imperfectè, & quaſi per coniecturas præſcimus futura: at præſentia clare & perfectè cognoſcimus. Deus autem tam perfectè cognoſcit futura, quam præſentia. Hic patet diſcrimen inter nos & Deum. 1. Quia noſtra cognitio perficitur ex præſentia rerum: non autem Dei cognitio. 2. Quia res futuræ ſunt Deo præſentes per præſentiam perfectam nobis per imperfectam 3. Quia nos eandem rem bis cognoſcimus: ſemel imperfectè, quando futura eſt, & ſemel perfectè, quando præſens eſt. At Deus ſemel tantum, quia cognitio Dei eſt æque perfecta, ſive res futura, ſive præſens ſit. Nec aliud vult Gregorius; uterq; negat præſcientiam in Deo, qualis in nobis eſt. *Sum. Theolog. Scolaſt. part.* 1. *Tom.* 1. *cap.* 10. *queſt.* 10.

From your Teſtimonies I come to the examination of your Reaſons.

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NOR is it any wonder at all, that there ſhould be peace, and a concurrence of judgement about ſuch a poynt as this, even between thoſe who have many Irons of contention otherwiſe in the fire, conſidering how obvious and neere at hand the truth herein is. For 1. *if foreknowledge were properly and formally in God, then might Predeſtination, Election, Reprobation, and many other things, be properly and formally in him alſo; in as much as theſe are in the Letter and propriety of them, as competible unto him as foreknowledge. Nor can there be any reaſon given for a difference. But unpoſſible it is, that there ſhould be any plurality of things whatſoever, in their diſtinct and proper natures, and formalities, in God, the infinite ſimplicity of his Nature and being, with open mouth gainſaying it:*

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YOur Argument with open mouth gainſayeth that which no body will affirme, but is mute in the proofe of that which only will be called for, to wit, That whatſoever is *properly* and *formally* aſcribed unto God, is *really* diſtinguiſhed from Gods Eſſence, and his other attributes. If you think I doe you any wrong by this cenſure, reduce your Argument unto Categoricall Syllogiſmes, and make the beſt of it you can.

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Mr GOODWIN.

SEcondly, if foreknowledge were properly *or* formally *in God, there should be somewhat in him corruptible, or changeable. For that which is supposed to be such a foreknowledge in him to day, by the morrow, suppose the thing or event foreknown, should in the interim actually come to passe, must needs cease, and be changed, in as much as there can be no foreknowledge of things that are present, the adequate and appropriate object of this knowledge (in the propriety of it) being* res futura, *somewhat that is to come.*

IEANES.

SEverall answers unto this trite and bafled argument you may read in Schoolemen commenting in *primam partem summæ. Q.* 14. *Art.* 15. I will not trouble you with the rehearsall of them, but shall only propound that which I take to be most plaine and obvious unto even an ordinary capacity. We must distinguish betwixt Gods knowledge considered *in it selfe*, and the *extrinsecall denominations* thereof. Gods knowledge *in it selfe* is not changed by any variation of its objects, which are one while future, and then present, and anon after past and gone, but 'tis one and the same knowledge without any the least alteration (*ex parte Dei cognoscentis*) by which he knowes things whiles future, when present, when past; for he knowes and sees them *in esse volito pro certo aut tali tempore*, as decreed to exist at such a time. And to know a thing as decreed to exist at such a time, is to know that it shall be future untill that time come; that it shall be present as soone as that time comes, and as long as it lasts; that it shall be past as soone as that time is gone and ceaseth to be: *Quare licet aliter atq; aliter cognoscat res futuras & præsentes ex parte rerum cognitarum, non tamen aliter atq; aliter ex parte cognoscentis. Nam videre aliquid apud Deum in esse volito pro certo tempore, est & videre illud futurum esse, donec tempus illud advenerit, & præsens esse cum primum advenerit, & præteritum esse simulatque tempus illud elapsum fuerit.* D. Twisse *De Scientiâ Mediâ. pag.* 389. And againe, pag. 26. *Præsertim cum sub notione ista,* esse voliti *pro certo tempore, cæteræ notiones quales sunt esse præsens, esse præteritum, esse futurum, mirabiliter uniantur, & amicissime conspirent; quippe cum esse volitum apud Deum pro certo tempore sit & esse futurum, donec illud tempus advenerit; & esse præsens simulatque advenerit & quamdiu duraverit; & denique esse præteritum, quam primum tempus illud esse desierit.* So then you see these various considerations of the objects of Gods knowledge in regard of futurition, presence, preterition, are admirably united *in esse volito pro certo tempore*, and therefore can be no prejudice unto the immutability of his knowledge; whence it is become a proverbe in Schoole Divinity, that God *non aliter novit facta, quam fienda.* But though Gods knowledge be in it selfe immutable, notwithstanding the succession that is in the coexistence of objects with it, as a rock in a river, stands unmoveable, notwithstanding the succession in the waters that glide by it, yet this is no hinderance, but that there may be and is a change in the *extrinsecall denominations* of Gods

Gods knowledge from the variation of the objects thereof; ſo long as theſe objects are to come, Gods knowledge of them is termed foreknowledge; when they actually exiſt, then it looſeth the denomination of foreknowledge, and may be called co-knowledge; and ſo when they are paſt and ceaſe to be, it may be called after-knowledge. Now a change of theſe *extrinſecall denominations* doe not import any change in Gods knowledge in it ſelfe, becauſe as *Vaſquez* tells us, *Vera mutatio non accidit niſi per veram receptionem, aut amiſſionem formæ realis in ipſa re exiſtentis.* A reall change is by a true and reall either receipt, or loſſe of a reall forme exiſting in a thing it ſelfe.

Mr GOODWIN.

THirdly (and laſtly) there is nothing in the creature univocally and formally *the ſame with any thing which is in God. The reaſon is, becauſe then there muſt either be ſomewhat finite in God, or ſomewhat infinite in the creature: both which are impoſſible. But if preſcience or foreknowledge (being properly and formally in the creature) ſhall be properly and formally alſo in God, there ſhould be ſomewhat in the Creature* univocally *and* formally *the ſame, with ſomewhat which is in God. Therefore certainly there is no foreknowledge, properly ſo called, in God.*

IEANES.

THe Minor of this Argument reduced into forme, which you place firſt, will be denied by the Scotiſts; The Major which you put in the ſecond place, will be denied generally by the Thomiſts.

As for the Minor of this Argument put in the firſt place, *There is nothing in the Creature univocally and formally the ſame with any thing which is in God.* This the Scotiſts deny, as you may ſee in *Scotus* himſelfe *lib.* 1. *Diſtinct.*3.*Q.*1. *Diſtinct.*8. *Q.*3. *Rada part.* 1. *Controver.*21. *Faber Faventinus Philoſoph. Natural. Theorem.*95. And they bring ſuch ſubtill reaſons as you will confeſſe, when you reade them, to be worthy of an anſwer. As for your reaſon, they are not within Gun-ſhot of it. For theſe attributes which they affirme to be in the Creature univocally the ſame with thoſe in God, are to be underſtood *quoad communes non proprias rationes, quoad conceptum convenientiæ non diſcrepantiæ,* In ſuch a notion and conſideration as is abſtracted from finite and infinite, and ſo more generall then either God or the creature. *Conceptus communis* (ſaith *Scotus*) *eſt ex ſe formaliter neuter reſpectu eorum quibus eſt communis:* But the objective conceipt of theſe attributes, which denominate God and the creature, is common unto God and the creature, and therefore *formally* neither finite nor infinite, but abſtracting from both. But perhaps my dulneſſe cannot pierce into the depth of this argument. You may doe well for my conviction to improve it unto the utmoſt, and yet, if I be not miſtaken, the uttermoſt that you can prove thereby is, that which will not be denyed unto you by the Scotiſts, to wit, that nothing, no not *Ens*, of all predicates one of the moſt abſtract and tranſcendentall, can be affirmed

of

of God and the creature *univocally*, in regard of a *physicall* univocation. *Rada part.* 1. *Controv.* 21. *Art.* 1. *pag.* 328. 333. and that these attributes which denominate God and the creature are predicated equivocally; if we speake of a * *Physicall* equivocation, it is manifest.

* Whereas our Author p. 125. Of the first book of this Treatise affirmeth, that every thing in common attributed to God and man, is much more equivocall then the word *Canis* attributed to a Starre, to a Fish, to a foure-footed creature on the earth, if he be to be understood in regard not of this Physicall, but of a Logicall equivocation. I must needs confesse, that I dissent from him for reasons that I shall presently specify.

First, because the objective conceipt of them, as denominating both God and the Creature is one and the same, only by the abstraction of the understanding, and not *Physically* or *a parte rei*. This you have yeelded unto by *Scotus* in answer unto the objection of *Henricus*, that *Primo diversa in nullo conveniunt, sed Deus est primò diversus a quacunq; creatura &c.* Unto this *Scotus* answers *lib.* 1. *distinct.* 8. *Q.* 3. *Deus & Creatura non sunt primò diversa in conceptibus; tamen sunt primò diversa in realitate, quia in nullâ realitate conveniunt. Et quomodo esse possit conceptus communis sine convenientiâ in re vel in realitate, in sequenti dicetur. Deus & Creatura* (saith *Rada* a famous Scotist) *sunt primò diversa subjectivè, quia scilicet in nullâ realitate per differentias contrahibili conveniunt, sed non sunt primò diversa objectivè & quoad intellectum, sicut nec decem prædicamenta, quia Ens de eis prædicatur in quid. part.* 1. *controver.* 21. *Art.* 2. *pag.* 214.

Secondly, *Physically and a parte rei*, there is a greater distance between God and the creature, then there is between any creatures; for 'tis an infinite distance. This is all which is proved by that reason of *Bannes* in 1. *par. Thom. Q.* 13. *Art.* 5. That all created perfections in comparison of uncreated, are but painted and umbratick, the best of created beings in comparison of God are but shadowes and pictures, *Esay* 40. 17. *All nations before him are as nothing, and they are counted to him lesse then nothing. Omnis perfectio creata comparatione ad increatam perfectionem, est quasi depicta & umbratica, Ergo &c.*

The major of your Syllogisme put into forme, and placed in the second place, to wit, (*If prescience or foreknowledge being properly and formally in the creature, should be properly and formally also in God, there should be somewhat in the creature univocally & formally the same with somewhat that is in God*) will generally be denied by Thomists, who will acquaint you with a middle kind of predication, betwixt *equivocall* and *univocall*, to wit, *analogicall*, according unto which they affirme those attributes to be predicated, which denominate both God and the creature. In 1. *part. Thom. Q.* 13. *Art.* 5. They instance in *Ens*, which is properly and formally predicated of God and the creature, and yet neither *univocally* nor *equivocally* but *analogically, analogiâ quæ est per attributionem intrinsecam*, and not only *analogia proportionis*, as laughter is affirmed of a man and a green or flourishing meadow; nor yet only *analogia attributionis quæ fit per extrinsecam denominationem*, as when health is predicated of a sensitive creature in the first place, as the subject in which it is seated, and of meats, drinkes, medicaments, urines, secondarily, in reference unto, and by extrinsecall denomination from that health which is in a sensitive creature, unto which they are referred either as causes or tokens of it: see *Suarez, Scheibler, Mori-sanus, Logic: Mexic.*

To make this matter more plaine, I shall distinguish of a twofold acception of *Univocall*; one *Logicall*, the other *Metaphysicall*.

First *Logicall*, in which 'tis adequately opposed unto *equivocall*, and so every predicate is *univocall*, that is, not purely, & meerly *equivocall*, which

imparts only its name, and not any common ſignification thereof. Predicates thus *Univocall*, are ſaid to be *Logically univocall*, becauſe this kind of univocation is ſufficient as to Logicall ends and purpoſes, as for the framing a contradiction, and to be the middle terme in a demonſtration.

Secondly, there is a *Metaphyſicall* acception of *Univocall*, in which 'tis inadequately oppoſed unto *Equivocall*, that is, partly unto *Equivocall*, and partly unto *Analogicall*. An *Equivocall* predicate only imparts its name, and not any common ſignification thereof. An *Analogicall* predicate imparts both its name and ſignification unto the things of which it is predicated, but unequally, in regard of that inequality, which is of eſſentiall dependency, *ſecundum prius & poſterius*, as they ſay; ſo *Ens* is predicated of *ſubſtance*, and *Accident*; *analogically* of *ſubſtance* in the firſt place, and primarily, as its principall analogate; of *Accident* in the ſecond place, with attribution, order, or reference unto, and dependance upon ſubſtance.

Theſe things thus premiſed, I lay downe theſe two concluſions, againſt which whatſoever you object I ſhall be ready to anſwer.

The firſt concluſion, Diverſe attributes, which denominate God, and the Creature, are predicated of them *univocally* in a *Logicall* acception of *Univocall*, as it is adequately oppoſed unto *Equivocall*; that is, they are not predicated of God, and the Creature, meerely and purely *Equivocally*.

For firſt, not only the bare words, but a common and abſtracted ſignification of them is found both in God and the Creature, I might inſtance in *Ens*, ſubſtance, goodneſſe, wiſdome, juſtice, &c.

Secondly, becauſe otherwiſe nothing can be known, or demonſtrated of God by, or from the creatures, but ſtill there would be the *fallacy of equivocation*, *Ex cognitione unius æquivocati nihil poteſt cognoſci alterius:* And this is as well againſt the Philoſopher, who proveth many things demonſtratively of God; as againſt the Apoſtle *Rom.* 1. 20. ſaying, *The inviſible things of him from the creation of the World are clearely ſeen, being underſtood by the things that are made, even his eternall power, and Godhead, ſo that they are without excuſe.* This is a reaſon given by *Aquinas. p.* 1. *q.* 13. *art.* 5. *Nomina quæ dicuntur de Deo & creaturis, non dicuntur purè æquivocè, ut aliqui dixerunt. Quia ſecundum hoc ex creaturis nil poſſit cognoſci de Deo, nec demonſtrari, ſed ſemper incideret fallacia æquivocationis, & hoc eſt tam contra Philoſophum* 8. *Phyſ.* 12. *Metaph. qui multa demonſtrative de Deo probat, quam etiam contra Apoſtolum dicentem. Roman.* 1. *Inviſibilia Dei, per ea quæ facta ſunt, intellecta conſpiciuntur.*

This is all that the Scotiſts can prove by their arguments, which they bring to prove the Univocation of *Ens*, as predicated of God and the creature; and this they fully and ſtrongly prove. And indeed if the matter be well looked into, the contention here between the Thomiſts and the Scotiſts, is a meere ſtrife of words, *de modo loquendi.*

The ſecond concluſion, No attribute whatſoever denominating God and the creature, is predicated of them *univocally*, as *Univocall* is oppoſed unto *Analogicall:* for thoſe attibutes which doe agree unto God moſt properly, are predicated of God, & the creature unequally, in poynt of eſſential order; of God primarily, & independently, of the creature ſecondarily, & dependently, with relation unto God. In God they are by his *Eſſence*, in the creatures but *by participation.* This I might exemplify by inſtancing in that which is under debate, infallible knowledge of things to come, that are contingent, is affirmed of God chiefly, & in the firſt place; of the creature only dependently upon, & derivedly frō God: whereupon an infallible, underived, & independent foreknowledge of future contingents is in-

communi-

communicable unto any creature. *Iames* 4.14. *You know not*, ſaith *Iames*, *what ſhall be on the morrow.*

Before I take my leave of this ſection, I ſhall deſire you, that whereas I affirme, that what words are attributable unto God *properly*, *dicuntur de Deo prius quam de creaturis*, you would be pleaſed to underſtand it in regard of the things, or perfections ſignified by thoſe words, and not barely in regard of their impoſition. This limitation *Aquinas* puts unto the Queſtion. *p.* 1. *Q.* 13. *art.*6. *Nomina, quæ proprie de Deo prædicantur, quantum ad rem ſignificatam per prius dicuntur de Deo, quàm de creaturis, quia a Deo hujuſmodi perfectiones in creaturas manant; ſed quantum ad impoſitionem nominis per prius a nobis imponuntur creaturis, quas prius cognoſcimus, unde & modum ſignificandi habent.*

Mr GOODWIN pag. 29,30. cap. 3. Sect. 3.

IF it be objected, that this argument lieth as ſtrong againſt the propriety of knowledge, as of foreknowledge in God; in as much as foreknowledge is every whit as Properly *and* Formally *in the Creature, as knowledge; I anſwer*

True it is, there is no knowledge neither in God, according to the preciſe and formall notion of knowledge, *or in ſuch a ſenſe, wherein it is found in men. And this the firſt and laſt of the three reaſons mentioned doe infallibly demonſtrate. Knowledge in the creature is a principle or habit,* really *and* eſſentially *diſtinct from the ſubject, or ſoule, wherein it reſideth: yea and is capable of augmentation and diminution therein, and of ſeparation from it: Whereas that which is called* knowledge *in God, neither differs* really *or* eſſentially *from his nature, or from himſelfe, but is* really *one and the ſame thing with him (as will farther appeare in the following Chapter) nor is it either capable of growth, or of decay, or of ſeparation. Only in this reſpect, knowledge of the two, is more properly attributable unto God, then foreknowledge,* viz. *becauſe foreknowledge in the proper notion, or formall conception of it, includes or ſuppoſeth a liableneſſe to a change or expiration (*viz. *upon the comming to paſſe of the thing foreknown; which muſt of neceſſity come to paſſe in time) whereas knowledge imports nothing, but what may be permanent and perpetuall, and ſo is (of the two) more appropriable unto him, who changeth not.*

IEANES.

HEre you plainly flinch from that which is likely to be controverted between us: for you have not ſo much as the ſhadow of an argument to prove, that knowledge is not in God, according to the preciſe and formall notion of knowledge: but you ſpend a whole Section in the proofe of that, wherein you are ſure to meet with no adverſary at all, *viz.* that there is no knowledge in God in ſuch a ſenſe, wherein it is found in men; why Sir, the conceſſion of this will no waies advantage you, or prejudice us: 'tis the firſt part of your diſjunctive propoſition that calls for proofe, in which, why you are ſo ſilent, I cannot gueſſe, unleſſe it be, that you are conſcious of the falſehood of it, & therefore dar'd not to propound it Categorically, but only diſjunctively; & the truth of diſjunctive propoſitions is ſalved, if but one part of thē be true. So thē per-

haps you thought, how ever the World went you would be safe and secure, as having two strings unto your bow. I will say no more of this, but that it is very unlike M. *Goodwin*, thus to decline the combate, and runne unto the maintenance of a fort, where you could not reasonably expect so much as one assaylant. If you be pleased to returne into the field againe, and come up roundly to a charge, I meane a proofe of that which you have not yet so much as offered, or pretended to prove, *viz.* That there is no knowledge in God according to the precise and formall notion of knowledge, I shall be willing and ready to encounter you, and I doe hope that by Gods assistance I shall be able to stand the shock of all your Argumentation.

Mr GOODWIN pag. 105, 106. Cap. 6. Sect. 14.

IT is the sence of one of the greatest Patrons of the adverse cause, that the precept, or injunction of God, is not properly the will of God; * *because (saith he) he doth not hereby so much signify what himselfe willeth to be done, as what is our duty to doe. I confesse that no signification whatsoever, whether of what a man willeth, or decreeth to be done, or of what is the duty of another to doe, can properly be said to be the will of the signifier: but yet that will, wherewith, or out of which, God willeth or commandeth us to doe, that which is our duty to doe, is as properly his will, as that whereby he willeth, or decreeth things to be done. My will, or desire, that my Child should obey me, or, that he should prosper in the world, is as properly my will, as that, whereby I will or purpose, to shew the respects of a father unto him in providing for him; being as proper, naturall, and direct an act of that principle or faculty of willing within me, whereby* I will *the latter, as that act it selfe of this faculty, wherein I will the latter, is. For the Principle or faculty within me of willing, how numerous or different soever the acts of willing, which I exert by vertue of this faculty, may be, is but one and the same. And this faculty being naturall, there can be no such difference between the acts proceeding from it, which should make some to be more proper, and others lesse; though some may be better, and others worse, But this difference can have no place in the acts of the will of God. Therefore if the precept, or preceptive will of God, be not properly his will; neither can any other will of his, or any other act of his will, be properly such. If so, then that will of God, or act of will in God, whereby he willeth or injoyneth faith and repentance, and consequently, salvation, unto all men, is as properly his will as that whereby he willeth the salvation of any man. Therefore if there be any secret or unrevealed will in God, whereby he willeth the destruction of any man, at the same time when he willeth the salvation of All men, (be it with what kind of will soever) these two wills must needs enter-feere, and contradict the one the other. Nor will that distinction of the late mentioned Author salve a consistency between them, wherein he distinguisheth, between the* Decree *of God, and* the thing decreed *by him; affirming, that the thing which God decreeth, may be repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the thing which he commandeth; though the decree it selfe cannot be repugnant to the Command* [a]. *The vanity of this distinction cleerely appeareth upon this common ground,* viz. *that* Acts are differenced and distinguished by their Objects. *Therefore if the object of Gods decreeing will, or the thing decreed by him, be contrary to the thing preceptively willed, or commanded by him, unpossible it is but that the two*

acts

* Mandatum Dei non est voluntas Dei proprie dicta; quia illo non ram significet quid ipse vult fieri, quam quid nostri officii sit facere. *D. Twisse. Vindiciis Gratiæ &c. p.* 171.

[a] Rem a Deo decreram cum re a Deo mandata, pugnare posse dicimus; decretum vero Dei cum mandato pugnare posse non dicimus. *Twisse ubi supra.*

acts of his will, by the one of which he is ſuppoſed to will the one, and by the other, the other, ſhould digladiate, and one fight againſt the other. Therefore certainly there is no ſuch paire, or combination of wills in God, as the diſtinction of voluntas ſigni, *and* beneplaciti (*as applyed in the queſtion in hand*) *doth ſuppoſe. It is unpoſſible that I ſhould inwardly and ſeriouſly will, or deſire, the death of my Child, and yet at the ſame time ſeriouſly alſo will and injoyne the Phyſitian to doe the beſt to recover him.*

IEANES.

D*Twiſſe* is not ſingular herein, diverſe great Schoolemen, *Aquinas*, *Durand*, *Cajetan*, *Bannes*, *Gregory de Valentia*, and many others, ſay the ſame of not only Gods command, but all other ſignes of the will of his purpoſe or good pleaſure. The words of ſome few of them, ſhall for the ſatisfaction of the reader be inſerted in the Margent; and the rather, becauſe you in the 16 Section of this Chapter, tell us, that the Schoolemen were the firſt coyners of this diſtinction of Gods will in *Voluntatem ſigni, & voluntatem beneplaciti*: and how their interpretation thereof, holds intelligence (*as you ſpeake*) with that ſenſe of *D. Twiſſe* which you here impugne, the Reader may ſee *Vindic. Lib.* 1. *pag.* 173, 174.

Dicendum quod in Deo quædam dicuntur proprie & quædam ſecundum Metaphoram, cum autem aliquæ paſſiones humanæ in divinam prædicationem metaphorice aſſumuntur, hoc fit ſecundum ſimilitudinem effectus, unde illud quod eſt ſignum talis paſſionis in nobis, in Deo nomine illius paſſionis Metaphorice ſignificatur; ſicut apud nos irati punire conſueverunt, unde ipſa punitio eſt ſignum iræ, & propter hoc ipſa punitio nomine iræ ſignificatur, cum Deo attribuitur. Similiter id quod ſolet eſſe in nobis ſignum voluntatis, quandoq; Metaphorice in Deo voluntas dicitur, ſicut cum aliquis præcipit aliquid, ſignum eſt, quod velit illud fieri; unde præceptum divinum quandoq; Metaphorice voluntas Dei dicitur, ſecundum illud *Matthæi* 6. Fiat voluntas tua, ſicut in cœlo & in terra; ſed hoc diſtat inter voluntatem & iram, quia ira de Deo nunquam proprie dicitur, cum in ſuo principali intellectu includat paſſionem, voluntas autem proprie de Deo dicitur, & ideo in Deo diſtinguitur voluntas proprie, & Metaphorice dicta, voluntas enim proprie dicta vocatur voluntas beneplaciti; voluntas autem Metaphorice dicta eſt voluntas ſigni, eo quod ipſum ſignum voluntatis voluntas dicitur. *Aquin. part.* 1. *Sum. Qu.* 19. *art.* 11.

Communiter dicitur quod diſtinctio voluntatis divinæ in voluntatem beneplaciti, & in voluntatem ſigni, eſt diſtinctio voluntatis in voluntatem proprie dictam, & Metaphorice, nam voluntas beneplaciti eſt voluntas proprie dicta, vel actus ſuus volendi, quo aliquid ſibi placet, ſed voluntas ſigni dicitur Metaphorice voluntas Dei, eo modo quo ſignum nominatur Metaphorice nomine rei, cujus eſt ſignum, ut imago *Herculis* vocatur *Hercules*

Et hoc poteſt eſſe dupliciter, uno modo ratione ſimilitudinis inter ſignum & ſignatum ut in exemplo jam poſito; alio modo ratione proportionis quaſi arguendo, Quod ſicut ſe habent ſignum & ſignatum in uno, ſic ſe habeant in alio; & ſic eſt in propoſito noſtro: Quia enim in nobis ille qui præcipit, vel conſulit aliquid fieri, videtur illud velle: ſimiliter qui prohibet aliquid fieri, videtur velle illud non fieri; qui autem aliquid facit, vult illud fieri, qui vero permittit aliquid fieri cum poſſit impedire, videtur illud velle; ideo in Deo idem ponitur ſcilicet quod præceptum, conſilium, prohibitio, operatio, & permiſſio ſunt, vel dicuntur voluntas divina propter dictam ſimilitudinem vel magis proportionem. *Durand. lib.* 1. *diſt.* 45. *Q.* 3.

Hæc diviſio divinæ voluntatis in voluntatem beneplaciti, & voluntatem ſigni, non eſt univoci in univocata, ſed analogi in analogata. Nam de ſigno divinæ voluntatis non dicitur voluntatis nomen niſi Metaphorice, & analogice, propter habitudinem illius ad voluntatem divinam proprie dictam. Quam rem aliis verbis *Cajetanus* expreſſit in hac quæſtione. *Art.* 11. Cum dixit non dividi hic rem aliquam, ſed vocem ipſum, ſeu nomen divinæ voluntatis *Gregor de Valentia. Tom.* 1. *Diſp.* 1. *Q.* 19. *punct.* 2.

Some of them profeſſe in *terminis*, that the will of ſigne or ſignification, is called the will of God only improperly, and metaphorically by way of ſimilitude or proportion, and therefore the diſtribution of Gods will into a will of ſigne and will of purpoſe or good pleaſure is not reall, but only verball, *diviſio vocis*; from whom they doe not diſſent, who ſay that 'tis *diviſio Analogi in analogata*. For as *Scheibler* a Lutheran, and of your opinion for the maine in theſe controverſies, obſerveth, that they are to be underſtood of ſuch an analogy which is by *extrinſecall reference*

and denomination. Intelligunt enim eam analogiam, quæ eſt per extrinſecam habitudinem & denominationem. Voluntas enim ſigni vocatúr voluntas extrinſeca denominatione, in quantum ſcilicet ſignificat beneplacitum divinum, quod abſolute eſt voluntas Dei, ad eum modum quo multa dicuntur ſana, per habitudinem ad ſanitatem animalis, quæ primo talis eſt: Metaph. lib. 2. cap. 3. tit. 15. art. 4. punct. 2. n. 535.

For the *will of ſigne* is called *will* by *extrinſecall denomination*, as it ſignifieth Gods good pleaſure or decree (which abſolutely is the will of God) after the ſame manner that many things are ſaid to be healthy or wholſome, in regard of reference unto the health of a ſenſitive creature, unto whom health is in the firſt place properly and intrinſecally attributed.

Unto theſe ſuffrages of the Schoolemen, I ſhall adde reaſons drawn from three attributes of Gods will properly ſo called; It is internall, eternall, irreſiſtible, and Gods precept or injunction is externall, temporary, and reſiſtible.

1. Gods will properly ſo called is internall in God, really undiſtinguiſhed from his Eſſence, whereas Gods precepts or injunctions, are externall without him, really diſtinguiſhed from him.

2. The proper will of God was from eternall, the commands of God are given in time.

From the Eternity of Gods will, I ſhall alſo draw this following Argument.

The will of God properly ſo called is uncapable of interruption, reiteration, and multiplication, for in eternity there is a moſt abſolute and perfect unity and indiviſibility without any ſucceſſion of parts, but now the Commands of God may be very often reiterated and multiplied, precept upon precept, precept upon precept, line upon line, line upon line. *Eſay* 28. 10. *Oh Jeruſalem, Jeruſalem, how often would I have gathered thy children together. Math.* 23. 37.

3. The will of God properly ſo called is irreſiſtible, *Who hath reſiſted his will. Rom.* 9. 19. *Whatſoever the Lord pleaſed that did he in heaven and in earth, in the Sea and all deepe places. Pſal.* 135. 6. *The Counſell of the Lord muſt ſtand and cannot be withſtood. By all the powers of the World and darkneſſe my counſell (ſaith the Lord) ſhall ſtand, and I will doe all my pleaſure Eſay* 46. 10. But now Gods precepts and prohibitions are every day violated, broken and reſiſted by wicked men.

Unto theſe reaſons I might adde your own confeſſion, *I confeſſe* (ſay you) *that no ſignification whatſoever, whether of what a man willeth or decreeth to be done, or of what is the duty of another to doe, can properly be ſaid to be the will of the ſignifier.*

Prælatus enim religioſus quandoq; præcipit ſubdito aliquid grave, volens eum per præceptum ligare, & tamen nec vult, nec intendit, quod res quam præcipit fiat; unde cum ſubditus parat ſe ad exequendum præceptum, Prælatus revocat; ita quod Præceptum eſt directe ſignum voluntatis præcipientis quod velit obligari ſubditum ad exequendum præceptum, ſed non eſt directe ſignum quod velit rem præceptam impleri; talia enim præcepta ſunt vel ad ſumendum experimentum de obedientia ſubditi, vel ad oſtendendum pluribus obedientiam unius quaſi pro exemplo.

But now I ſubjoyne, Gods precept or injunction is only a ſigne of his will, and therefore however it be uſually termed in Scripture the will of God *Mat.* 6. 10. *Mat.* 7. 21. *Rom.* 12. 2. 1 *Theſſ.* 4. 3. It is to be underſtood only *improperly* and *Tropically*; and that firſt *Metaphorically*, 2. *Metonymically.*

Firſt *Metaphorically*, and by an *Anthropopatky*, when God commands a thing, he carryeth himſelfe as men doe, when they purpoſe, will, deſire, and

and determine that ſuch a thing ſhould come to paſſe; for amongſt men uſually their commands are manifeſtations and declarations of their purpoſes and deſires; I ſay uſually, becauſe ſometimes ſuperiors injoyne ſome things to inferiors only for tryall, and, upon their readineſſe to obey, recall and revoke ſuch commands. How Gods commandements and other ſignes of his will, are the will of God *Metaphorically*, *Aquinas* illuſtrates in the place but now quoted; ſeeing paſſions are aſcribed unto God only *Metaphorically*, hence the ſignes of ſuch paſſions in us, when aſcribed unto God, are called by the names of the paſſions themſelves. Puniſhment is with us a ſigne of Anger, and therefore Gods puniſhments are termed his wrath or anger; ſo our commands are ſignes uſually of our wills, of our deſires, and intentions, and therefore the commands of God are termed in Scripture the will of God.

But I think with D. *Ames*, that the commandements of God are termed the will of God, not only *Metaphorically*, but alſo *Metonymically*, becauſe they are ſignes of a proper will of God. *Media illa* (ſaith *Ames*) *per quæ voluntas iſta revelatur, recte vocantur voluntas ſigni, non tantum Metaphorice, quia ſolent inter homines indicare quid velint: ſed etiam Metonymice, quia ſunt vel effecta, vel adjuncta, propriam Dei voluntatem ex parte indicantia. Medul. lib.* 1. *c.* 7. 53. And this alſo is obſerved by D. *Twiſſe*, in his conſideration of the *Doctrine of the Synod of Dort and Arles reduced to the practice*, *p.* 54. Now we ſay, even Gods commandement notes the will of God alſo in proper ſpeech, to wit, what ſhall be our duty to doe; for undoubtedly whatſoever God commands us, it is his will in proper ſpeech, that it ſhall be our duty to doe it. However then, it is the ſence of D. *Twiſſe*, that the commandement of God cannot properly be ſaid to be his will, yet he doth not deny that it ſignifieth or betokeneth the will of God properly ſo called, in which regard it is termed the revealed will of God, becauſe it revealeth Gods will: all the Queſtion is, what will of God it revealeth or ſignifieth. D. *Twiſſe* (you ſee) roundly expreſſeth himſelfe, that it ſignifieth, or revealeth Gods will of obligation, what he will oblige and bind men unto; what he will have to be their duty: but it doth not at all ſignify the will of Gods purpoſe concerning what ſhall come to paſſe actually; it doth not ſignify Gods will of operation or permiſſion, *i. e.* it doth not reveale what good God hath decreed to worke, what evill he hath decreed to ſuffer or permit in all thoſe to whom his commands are given; briefly, it ſignifieth or revealeth mans duty, and Gods will of obliging unto it. *Mic.* 6. 8. *He hath ſhewed thee O man what is good, and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to doe juſtly, and to love mercy, and to walke humbly with thy God. Obad.* 12. 13. 14. It doth not reveale the event or iſſue of things what ſhall actually be, by Gods working or permitting providence; This you have aſſerted by *Durand* an ancient Schooleman, *Præceptum* (ſaith he) *non ſemper indicat voluntatem præcipientis, qua præcipiens velit rem præceptam fieri, ſed illam qua præcipiens vult obligare illum, cui præcipit, ad faciendum quod præcipitur, & hoc & ſemper.* And a little before in the ſame place, *Præceptum non eſt directè & ſemper ſignum quod præcipiens velit rem præceptam fieri, ſed ſolum quod velit ſubditum obligare ad faciendum illud quod præcipitur, & hoc clarum eſt in præceptis divinis, per quæ Deus vult ſimpliciter nos obligare, ſed non vult ſimpliciter rem præceptam fieri, alioquin ſemper fieret. Lib.* 1. *diſt.* 47. *Qu.* 3. Gods command unto *Pharaoh*, that he ſhould let Iſrael goe, ſignified only his duty, that he was bound to let Iſrael goe, not the event, that he ſhould actually conſent unto their departure. Gods command

of

of *Cain*, *Judas*, *&c.* to believe, and repent, did not ſignify that God did will the actuall exiſtence of their faith and repentance, but only that it was his purpoſe to bind them to faith and repentance as a duty. And thus you have a confirmation and cleere explication of D. *Twiſſe* his meaning, againſt which your diſcourſe in this Section, if it were reduced unto Syllogiſmes, would not conclude with the leaſt ſhew of probability.

MR GOODWIN.

BVt yet that will wherewith, or out of which God willeth or commandeth us to doe that which is our duty to doe, is as properly his will, as that whereby he willeth or decreeth things to be done.

IEANES.

FIrſt, here you make *to will* and *to command* termes equivalent or *Synonimons* (as you doe afterwards *to will* and *to injoyne*) which is very unreaſonable, for 'tis the very thing in queſtion, and D. *Twiſſe* affirmeth, that to *command* is to will only *improperly*, and therefore *equivocally*. For you then to uſe *to Will and Command*, as words of the ſame import and ſignification, before you have proved them to be ſo, ſerves for nothing but to breed confuſion, diſtract the Reader, and diſturbe the courſe of Diſputation.

Secondly, I confeſſe that the will wherewith, or out of which God commandeth us to doe that which is our duty to doe, is as properly his will, as that, whereby he willeth or decreeth things to be done; for they are one and the ſame will really, diſtinguiſhed only *ratione ratiocinata*, by their objects, in regard of our manner of conceiving. And if any one in imitation of your ſubtilty in the following part of this Section, ſhould object, *that acts are differenced, and diſtinguiſhed by their objects*, therefore if the object of that will, wherewith, or out of which God commandeth us to doe that which is our duty to doe, be really diſtinguiſhed from the object of that will, whereby he decreeth things to be done, unpoſſible it is, but that theſe two wills of his, ſhould be alſo really diſtinguiſhed, I ſhall for anſwer referre them unto *Ferrarienſis upon Aquinas contra gentes lib.* 1. *c.*77. *Adverte quod ex iſta probatione* (viz.) (that *actus ſecundum objecta diſtinguntur*) *vult habere, S. Tho. quod diſtinguibile proportionatum objecto eſt actus; & ideo ſi plura objecta faciant aliquam pluralitatem, illa erit actuum pluralitas: Non autem intendit, quod per quæcunque plura objecta plurificentur actus. Unde ſenſus illius propoſitionis eſt, quod actus eſt id quod proprie & primo plurificatur, quando pluralitas objectorum aliquam pluralitatem inducit.* The ſence of this propoſition, *Acts are differenced and diſtinguiſhed by their objects*, is, that if many, or different objects doe inferre any plurality or diſtinction, 'tis only of acts; not that every plurality, or diſtinction of objects doth alwaies argue a plurality or diſtinction of acts.

3. But thirdly, this conceſſion will not in the leaſt degree advantage you; for the inference that you make afterwards, That if the precept of God

God be not properly his will, neither can any other will of his be properly ſuch; for no rationall and Scholaſticall Divine will deny Gods decree, of things to be done, to be properly his will; and I have made it good, that Gods commandement is not properly his will, and you bring nothing like an argument to prove the contrary: but in the next place, you illuſtrate this by a compariſon from the acts of willing, proceeding from the principle, or faculty within man of willing, let us heare what you ſay.

Mr GOODWIN.

MY will or deſire that my Child ſhould obey me, or that he ſhould proſper in the World, is as properly my will, as that, whereby I will or purpoſe to ſhew the reſpects of a Father unto him in providing for him: being as proper, naturall, and direct an act of that principle or faculty of willing within me, whereby I will the latter, as that act it ſelfe of this faculty, wherein I will the latter, is. For the principle or faculty within me of willing, how numerous or different ſoever the acts of willing, which I exert by vertue of this faculty, may be, is but one and the ſame. And this faculty being naturall, there can be no ſuch difference between the acts proceeding from it, which ſhould make ſome to be more proper and others leſſe, though ſome may be better, and others worſe, but this difference can have no place in the acts of the will of God.

IEANES.

FOr anſwer, I ſhall diſtinguiſh betwixt the *Elicite* acts of the will, which proceed from the will, as their only and immediate principle, and ſuch acts of the will as are only *imperate*, that is, performed at the beck and command of the will, but proceeding immediately from other faculties *v. g.* the underſtanding, loco-motive faculty, the parts and members of the body, &c. as walking, ſpeaking, writing, and the like. Now I confeſſe there can be no ſuch difference between the *elicite* acts of mens wills, which ſhould make ſome to be more proper, and others leſſe: But yet notwithſtanding this I affirme, that the *imperate* acts of mens wills, ſuch as their injunctions, and precepts, whether by tongue, penne, or otherwiſe (to give an inſtance pertinent to the buſineſſe in hand) are not called properly acts of their wills; and this I ſhall not dictate, but confirme by theſe three following arguments.

First, every act of the will properly ſo called, is voluntary, *intrinſecally*, and *of it ſelfe*, but now theſe *imperate* acts of the will are voluntary only *extrinſecally*, by denomination from an act of the will moveing, ſtirring up, and applying the power or faculty from which they proceed unto operation.

2. Thoſe acts which proceed from other faculties, diſtinguiſhed really from the will, are not properly acts of the *will*, or *acts of willing* (as you phraſe it) but theſe *imperate* acts of the will proceed from other faculties really diſtinguiſhed from the will, and therefore cannot properly be ſaid to be acts of the will, and of theſe faculties too.

3. The acts of the will, are not properly objects of acts of the will. The act of willing is not properly a thing willed, a decree is not decreed. *Actus* (ſaith *Suarez*) *qui per ſeipſum eſt intrinſece voluntarius, non comparatur ut proprium objectum, vel effectus ad illum actum, quo eſt voluntarius, quia eſt voluntarius ſeipſo, & non eſt proprie objectum vel effectus ſui ipſius: habet ergo aliud objectum in quod directe tendat, & eſt effectus potentiæ, a qua elicitur, & ſolum per quandam virtualem reflectionem, quam in ſe includit, eſt voluntarius: unde dici ſolet volitus per modum actus, non per modum objecti. Met. Diſp.* 19. *Sect.* 5. *n.* 17. But theſe *imperate* actions of the will are properly objects of the will, and things willed, and therefore cannot in ſtrictneſſe and propriety of ſpeech be ſaid to be acts of the will.

M. GOODWIN.

THerefore if the precept or preceptive will of God be not properly his will, neither can any other will of his, or any other act of his will be properly ſuch.

IEANES.

I Have ſearched for the premiſes out of which you inferre this concluſion, and I muſt needs profeſſe unto you, that I can find none: it is poſſible the fault may be in the dulneſſe of my underſtanding, and you ſhall find me willing and ready to confeſſe as much, if you will put your argument into Moode and Figure for me, and conclude this propoſition out of any thing you have delivered in the former part of this Section.

Mr GOODWIN.

IF ſo, then that will of God, or act of will in God, whereby he willeth or injoyneth faith and repentance, and conſequently ſalvation unto all men, is as properly his will, as that whereby he willeth the ſalvation of any man.

IEANES.

FIrſt, untill you can find a Major and Minor unto your former concluſion, this which is inferr'd therehence is preſumed and not proved.

2. You here make *Willeth* and *Injoyneth* all one, concerning the unreaſonableneſſe of which, I have ſpoken already.

3. I wonder what you meane in talking of an act of will in God, whereby he injoyneth faith and repentance, The injunction or precept of faith and repentance, is an act *without God*, not *in him*, and belongs unto his will, not *formally*, but *effectively*.

4. Your

4. Your mentioning of an act of will in God, hath occaſioned mee to thinke of ſome thing, which for clearing of mine own meaning, and avoyding of miſtakes, I ſhall communicate unto the Reader: And it is carefully to put a diſtinction betwixt theſe two expreſſions, *To be properly the will of God*, and *To be properly an act of the will of God.*

That Gods decrees are *properly* the will of God, may be demonſtrated out of moſt Schoolemen; that they are properly acts of Gods will I deny, and that for two reaſons.

1. If Gods decrees were properly acts of his will, then his will were properly a power, But his will is not properly a power, for will is aſcribed unto God, not as a power diſtinct from the act, but as an act not *elicite* but *ſubſiſting:* And here I ſhall give you the words and reaſons of *Suarez*, then whom there are few Moderne Schoolemen more rationall. He having proved that the will is not in God *per modum potentiæ ſecundum rem, ſed per modum actus ultimi & puri*, he propounds the doubt *ſecundum rationem, & modum concipiendi noſtrum*, wherein heare his reſolution. *In hoc eodem modo loquendum eſt, quo de intellectu & ſcientia locuti ſumus, quod ſcilicet ex parte rei conceptæ, non poteſt concipi potentia volendi in Deo, quia non poteſt concipi potentia agendi vel recipiendi ad intra. Nec fingi poteſt quod ſit potentia ad agendum & recipiendum, non ſecundum rem, ſed ſecundum rationem; quia loquendo ex parte rei conceptæ involvitur repugnantia in his terminis; nam agere ſecundum rationem, non eſt agere, ſed fingere actionem. Ex parte autem modi concipiendi noſtri, concipimus in Deo aliquid ad eum modum, quo in creaturis concipimus potentiam volendi, ſcilicet virtutem amandi ſe, ut ſic, quam præſcindimus ab actuali amore, ſicut de actu primo & ſecundo in ſcientia diximus.*

But here I deſire to be underſtood, as *Franciſcus Amicus* explicates himſelfe touching this particular *Curſ. Theol. Tom.* 1. *Diſp.* 14. *Sect.* 1. *Dupliciter conſiderari poteſt potentia vitalis; uno modo, ut dicit diſtinctionem ab actu; ſecundo, ut importat poſitivam perfectionem percipiendi aut tendendi ad objectum; primo modo involvit imperfectionem Deo repugnantem; ſecundo modo perfectionem Deo convenientem. Quare concedo in Deo eſſe voluntatem, ſecundum poſitivum conceptum potentiæ; Nego autem eſſe potentiam, ſecundum imperfectionem diſtinctionis ab actu ſecundo, quam potentia ut ſic per ſe importat.* The power of willing may be conſidered two manner of waies; Firſt, as it implyeth diſtinction from its act; and ſo it involveth imperfection repugnant unto God, Secondly, as it importeth a poſitive perfection of tendency towards its object or thing willed, and ſo it may be attributed unto God.

2. If Gods decrees were properly acts of Gods will, then they ſhould be properly *Elicite* acts, but they are not properly *elicite* acts, but *ſubſiſting. Enunciantur fateor* (ſaith our Author) *tanquam actus a Deo eliciti, & ſic dici poſſunt per anthropopathiam, quemadmodum & paſſiones humanæ attribuuntur Deo. At eruditi probe norunt omnia decreta Dei eſſe unicum duntaxat actum volendi in Deo, qui quidem actus volendi non differt realiter ab ipſa voluntate Dei, quæ quidem voluntas Dei non differt realiter ab ipſo Deo, qui eſt actus ſimpliciſſimus. Vind. lib.* 2. *p.* 2. *p.* 101. But I returne from this digreſſion unto M. *Goodwin.*

M. GOODWIN.

THerefore if there be any ſecret, or revealed will of God, whereby he willeth the deſtruction of any man, at the ſame time when he willeth the ſalvation of all men, (be it with what kind of will ſoever) theſe two wills muſt needs enterfeere and contradict one the other.

IEANES.

THis you gather from what you have not at all proved, but only pretended to have proved, *viz.* that the precept or injunction of faith and repentance, is properly the will of God. And for the contrary I have brought undeniable proofes, and therefore though there be any ſecret or unrevealed will in God, whereby he willeth the deſtruction of any man, at the ſame time, when he willeth or enjoyneth his faith and repentance, thoſe two wills doe not as you ſay *enterfeere* or *contradict* one the other. *For unto contradiction it is required, that all the termes muſt be taken in the ſame ſenſe and ſignification,* now this condition is not here obſerved: For that he willeth the deſtruction of any man, is with a *will in proper ſpeech*, that he willeth the faith and repentance of all men, unto whom the Goſpell is preached, is with a will *improperly ſo called, viz.* his commandement.

Mr GOODWIN.

NOr will that diſtinction of the late mentioned Author, ſalve a conſiſtency between them, wherein he diſtinguiſheth betwixt the decree of God, and the thing decreed by him; affirming, that the thing which God decreeth may be repugnant to, or inconſiſtent with the thing that he commandeth, though the decree it ſelfe cannot be repugnant to the command. [a]

[a] Rem a Deo decretam cum re a Deo mandata pugnare poſſe dicimus, decretum vero Dei cum mandato pugnare poſſe non dicimus. *Twiſſe ubi ſup.*

IEANES.

THis is not barely affirmed, but ſtrongly proved by D. *Twiſſe*, and of his proofes you take no notice, but only object againſt what he ſaith: This if it be a laudable, is a very eaſy, and compendious way of handling a controverſy, for it would ſave a man the labour of that, which hath ſtill been accounted the moſt difficult taske in Polemicall Writers, to wit, ſolution of Arguments; but I ſhall acquaint the Reader with what you conceale, and I doe not doubt, but upon repreſentation thereof, he will acquit the Doctor, and his diſtinction, from that vanity which you lay to his charge. *Rem a Deo decretam cum re a*

Deo

Deo mandata, pugnare poſſe dicimus; interea decretum Dei cum mandato pugnare poſſe non dicimus; utrumque demonſtramus. Rem a Deo decretam cum re a Deo mandata pugnare poſſe, ſic oſtendimus; ſacrificatio Iſaaci & non-ſacrificatio Iſaici pugnant inter ſe, ſunt enim termini contradicentes. At harum altera fuit a Deo mandata Abrahamo, uti docet Scriptura, ſimulque eodem tempore non-ſacrificatio fuit à Deo decreta, ut colligitur ex eventu. Nam Deus eam efficaciter impedivit, ne fieret. Quare res a Deo mandata, pugnare poteſt cum re a Deo decreta. Rurſus, dimiſſio populi Iſraelitici ex Ægypto, & non-dimiſſio pugnant inter ſe, ſunt enim ſibi invicem contradicentes: at altera, nempe dimiſſio, fuit a Deo mandata Pharaoni; altera, puta non-dimiſſio, fuit a Deo eodem tempore decreta. Nam & mandavit Pharaoni per Moſem & Aaronem ut populum dimitteret; ſimul etiam ſignificavit, ſe obduraturum cor Pharaonis, ut non dimitteret; ergo res a Deo mandata, pugnare poteſt cum re à Deo decreta.

That things commanded and decreed by God, may be contradictory, the Doctor proveth by undenyable inſtances. The ſacrificing of *Iſaack*, and the not ſacrificing of *Iſaack*, are *termes contradictory*; but the ſacrificing of *Iſaack* was the object of Gods command to *Abraham*. *Gen.*22. 2. The not ſacrificing of *Iſaack* was the object of Gods decree, as appears by the event. *v.*11.12. Therefore the object of Gods commandement, and the object of his decree, may be *contradictory*. Againe, the letting of Iſraell goe out of Ægypt, and the not letting of Iſraell goe out of Ægypt are *termes contradictory*; but the letting of Iſraell goe was commanded unto *Pharaoh*, his not letting of Iſraell goe was decreed and determined by God. *Exod.*7. 2,3. and 10. 1,2. God told *Moſes* that he would harden *Pharaohs* heart, that he ſhould not let Iſraell goe. Therefore a thing commanded by God, and a thing decreed by God, may be *contradictory*. Concerning the firſt of theſe inſtances, you ſay ſomething pag. 451, 452. But there is nothing argumentative in what you ſay, but may receive an anſwer from your own rule of interpreting Scripture. pag. 92. 99. 108. 109. In the next place the Doctor proves, that the commandements and the decrees of God are not repugnant. *Nec tamen decretum pugnare cum mandato, ſic probamus. Mandato ſignificat Deus quid ſit noſtri officii, ut a nobis fieri debeat; decretum vero divinum nihil aliud eſt, quam propoſitum divinum de aliquo, ut vel fiat, vel impediatur ne fiat, idque efficaciter. Mandatum docet quid ipſe probaturus ſit, ſi modo ab homine fiat, quid improbaturus ſi non fiat: decretum ſtatuit quid ipſe facturus ſit, aut impediturus, ne ſit. Iſta autem non pugnant; tui eſt officii ut hoc facias, ſed non eſt mei propoſiti per gratiam efficere ut facias. Pari ratione poteſt Deus mandare alicui fidem, & reſipiſcentiam, & interea apud ſe ſtatuere, quod non credat, aut reſipiſcat, negando ſcilicet gratiam efficacem, qua ſola fieri poteſt ut credat aut reſipiſcat.*

God by his command ſignifieth, and ſheweth what is our duty, what ought to be done, or left undone by us; Gods decree is nothing elſe, but his purpoſe that things ſhall come to paſſe, or not come to paſſe; the command teacheth, what God will approve or diſapprove; his decree determineth, what he himſelfe will doe or hinder, &c. Now theſe are no waies repugnant. It is thy duty to doe this, but it is not Gods purpoſe to give thee grace for the doing of it: Thou art bound or obliged to doe this, but yet thou ſhalt never actually doe it: faith and repentance are thy duty, and yet thy faith and thy repentance ſhall never actually exiſt, or come to paſſe. By this that the Doctor hath ſaid it is plaine, that there is no oppoſition between Gods command to all that heare the Goſpell,

believe, and repent, and his purpoſe of denying faith and repentance unto many, nay moſt of them. And thus you ſee what the Doctor hath to ſay for himſelfe, let us next heare what you can ſay againſt him.

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THe vanity of this diſtinction cleerely appeareth upon this common ground, viz. *that acts are differenced and diſtinguiſhed by their objects, therefore if the object of Gods decreeing will, or the thing decreed by him, be contrary unto the thing preceptively willed or commanded by him, impoſſible it is, but that the two acts of his will, by the one of which he is ſuppoſed to will the one, and by the other the other, ſhould digladiate and one fight againſt the other.*

IEANES.

FIrſt, here againe you perplexe the diſputation with talking of two acts of Gods will, but ſuppoſing that by one of them you meane *Gods decree which is in him*, and by the other his *commandement which is without him*, performed uſually by the Miniſtry of the creature, and therefore not his will properly ſo called, I utterly deny the conſequence of your argument, and how juſt and reaſonable this my denyall thereof is, will appeare, if you pleaſe to reduce your *Enthymeme* into a *Categoricall Syllogiſme*, for then you will find the proofe of its conſequence to depend on this, That whatſoever acts are differenced and diſtinguiſhed by their objects, doe digladiate and one fight againſt the other; and this is a propoſition ſo groſſely falſe, as that I am very confident you cannot back it with ſo much as one, either teſtimony or reaſon. *That acts are differenced and diſtinguiſhed by their objects*, is a common and received rule; but that *all acts are oppoſite, whoſe objects are repugnant*, is an aſſertion that as yet I never ſo much as read or heard of in any either Philoſopher or Divine; and 'tis this alone will ſerve your turne to conclude a digladiation or repugnancy between the *Decree* and the *Command* of God from the oppoſition that D. *Twiſſe* admitteth to be between the things *Decreed* and the things *Commanded*.

2. If we take oppoſition and repugnancy as the Ramiſts, who divide it into *diſparation* and *contrariety*, we may ſafely ſay, that Gods decree and his commandement are things *oppoſite*, for they are *diſparate*; but this will no wiſe prejudice D. *Twiſſe*, who ſpeakes in the language of the followers of *Ariſtotle*, neither will it any waies advantage you, for the *oppoſition or repugnancy* that is between things *diſparate* is only as touching an *eſſentiall predication one of another*, we cannot ſay that Grammar is Logick, or that temperance in a man is fortitude, and ſo we cannot ſay that Gods decree is his commandement, or his commandement is his decree: not of a *denominative or concretive predication of the ſame ſubject*: the ſame man may be valiant, and temperate, a Grammarian and a Logician. See *Scheibler Top. cap.* 14. *n.* 7. & *cap.* 15. *n.* 19.

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IT is impoſſible that I ſhould inwardly and ſeriouſly will or deſire the death of my Child, and yet at the ſame time ſeriouſly alſo will and injoyne the Phyſitian to doe his beſt to recover him.

IEANES.

IF you would hereby inſinuate, that we affirme, that God doth inwardly and ſeriouſly will or deſire the death or damnation of his Children, and yet at the ſame time alſo ſeriouſly injoyne his Miniſters, who are ſpirituall Phyſitians, to doe their beſt to recover them out of the ſnare of the Divell, you doe wonderfully miſconceive and misreport our opinion; for we ſay, that unto none hath he given power, right, or priviledge to be his Sonnes, but unto ſuch as believe on his name; and all thoſe who believe, he hath ordained unto eternall life, and will keepe by his power unto ſalvation; but of this ſee our Author, *In the firſt Book of this Treatiſe. p.* 133.134.137.

What hath been ſaid is ſufficient to convince him, that will not wilfully and obſtinately ſhut his eyes againſt the light, that the command of all who heare the Goſpell to believe and repent, and the purpoſe of God to deny faith and repentance unto many, are not contradictory. I ſhall, before I diſcharge my ſelfe of this Section, evince as much briefly concerning this latter purpoſe, and that purpoſe or decree out of which the command proceedeth, and which is ſignified thereby.

Here we muſt premiſe, that the commandement of God doth ſignify a *decree or decreeing* will of God, though not ſuch a decree or will as the Arminians uſually ſhape for themſelves. 1. It ſignifieth the decree of God concerning the commandement it ſelfe, 2. Concerning the thing commanded.

Firſt then, the command of God ſignifieth Gods will or decree of the commandement it ſelfe, of the *externall tranſient act of commanding. Eph.* 1.11. *God worketh all things after the Counſell of his own will.* Gods commanding then of things in time, is a ſigne that from everlaſting he did decree to command them. But ſecondly, It ſignifieth a will or decree of God alſo concerning the thing commanded, *viz.*, as *touching the obligation to it*, not as *touching the exiſtence or non-exiſtence of it*, it ſignifieth, that God from everlaſting did decree, that the thing commanded ſhould be mans duty, ſhould be a thing *Morally* good, but it doth not ſignify or reveale, that the thing commanded ſhould actually exiſt, and be performed by every one unto whom the command is propounded. Indeed the obedience of the elect, for whoſe ſalvation only the commands of God are given, was both commanded and decreed, or determined by God *Ezek.*36. 26,27. And hence we may inferre, that the command of faith, repentance, obedience, &c. all which God hath determined to be neceſſary unto ſalvation, doe imply, and reveale in a generall, and indefinite way, that God from eternity did purpoſe to worke faith, repentance, and obedience in thoſe, whom he had deſigned to ſalvation. But this conceſſion will not ſatisfy Arminians, who will be contented with nothing

thing, unleſſe we will grant them, that God willeth and deſireth the faith, repentance, obedience, and ſalvation of Reprobates; which we cannot doe, but withall we muſt renounce and diſclaime Gods omnipotency, and immutability.

Theſe things thus briefely premiſed, That Gods purpoſe or decree of commanding faith, and repentance unto all that heare the Goſpel, and his purpoſe or decree to deny faith and repentance unto many, are not contradictory, is manifeſt: becauſe Gods purpoſe or decree of commanding faith and repentance, referres unto the thing commanded, faith and repentance, only as concerning the *obligation to them, not as touching the exiſtence of them*; now to decree and purpoſe, to bind and oblige all to faith and repentance, and to decree and purpoſe, that ſome yet ſhall never actually believe and repent, cannot be proved by any rules of Logick to be contradictory.

Before I proceed unto the conſideration of your next and laſt paſſage againſt D. *Twiſſe*, I ſhall only repreſent unto you, that our Author, whom you take to be one of the greateſt patrons of that cauſe, which you account adverſe, doth diſlike the accommodation of that diſtinction of *voluntas ſigni* and *beneplaciti*, or a ſecret and revealed will, unto 1 *Tim.* 2.4. (the place which you have under debate,) as well as you, though, I confeſſe, upon different grounds. In his Booke againſt *Jackson* pag. 534. he informeth us, that neither *Calvin* embraceth it, nor *Beza*, nor *Piſcator*, but all concurre upon that interpretation which *Auſtin* gave many hundred years agoe. *Peter Martyr* propoſeth it (ſaith he) amongſt diverſe others, but embraceth it not, neither doe I know any Divine of ours that embraceth it. *Cajetan* indeed embraceth it, and *Cornelius de Lapide*, and *Aquinas* amongſt other interpretations; If you take (ſaith he ſpeaking to D. *Jackson*) a liberty to put upon us the opinions, and accommodations of diſtinctions uſed by Papiſts, you may in the next place make doubt, whether we have not ſubſcribed to the Councell of *Trent*. And againe in the next page 535. Neither doe I like (ſaith he) *Cajetans* interpretation after this manner, when he ſaith, *Eſt ſermo de voluntate ſigni, qua Deus proponit omnibus hominibus præcepta ſalutis, doctrinamq; Evangelii*; and that for two reaſons: Firſt, becauſe God doth not propoſe his Goſpell to all: Secondly, if God ſhould propoſe the Goſpell to all, and bid all men to believe, this is no certaine ſigne that God will have them to believe; like as it is no certain ſigne that God will give them grace to believe, without which they cannot believe; For it is manifeſt that God doth not give the grace of faith and repentance unto all that heare the Goſpell, nor to a major part of them: but it is a ſigne I confeſſe that God will have it our duty to believe, by commanding us to believe.

The interpretation of this place, which D. *Twiſſe* ſticks to, is that of *Auſtin*, that God will have ſome of all ſorts or conditions to be ſaved, and he makes it good from the coherence, as here, ſo in his conſiderati. on of the doctrine of the Synod of *Arles* and *Dort* &c. p. 61. and p. 62, 63, 64. he gives a full and ſatisfactory anſwer unto that which you call more then a *Topicke argument* againſt this expoſition, unto which why you doe not reply, I cannot but wonder, but perhaps you never read it; And yet againe 'tis very ſtrange, that you, who have ſearched ſo narrowly and throughly into theſe controverſies, as you profeſſe, ſhould be unread in all the workes of him, whom you confeſſe to be one of the greateſt Patrons of the Adverſe cauſe (as you call it) I will lay downe that which you call more then a Topicke argument, and compare it with

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the objection of *Tilenus*, and then put downe D. *Twiſſe* his anſwer unto *Tilenus*, and referre it unto the Reader, whether it doe not fully ſatisfy, that which you ſuppoſe to be a demonſtration.

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pag. 104.

IF it may be ſaid that God will have all men to be ſaved, becauſe he will have ſome of all ſorts to be ſaved, it may more properly & truly be ſaid of him, that he will have all men to be deſtroyed (at leaſt in their ſenſe, who hold an irreverſible reprobation of perſons perſonally conſidered from eternity) becauſe not ſimply ſome, but a very great part of all ſorts of men now extant in the world, will in time periſh, and that according to the decree or will of God, the tenour whereof is, that all perſons dying in impenitency, and unbeleife ſhall periſh: yet the Scriptures doe no where ſay upon any ſuch account as this, either in terminis, or in ſubſtance, that God will have all men to periſh, and not to come to the knowledge of the truth which is ſomewhat more than a Topicke argument, that God is not therefore ſaid to will that all men ſhould be ſaved and come to the knowledge of the truth, only becauſe he will have ſome, ſome few of all ſorts of men to be ſaved, and to come to this knowledge, but ſimply becauſe his will is to have all men with out exception (viz. as they are men, and whilſt they are yet capable of Repentance) to be ſaved, and in order therennto to come to the knowledge of the ſaving truth. (i.e.) *The Goſpell.*

TILENVS.

NOW if this New Evangeliſt doe tell the Infidell that the paſſages of Scripture, which ſay that God would have all men to be ſaved, are to be underſtood of ſome of every Nation, and condition, the Infidell will reply that then the Scripture ought with much more reaſon to ſay, that God would have all men to be damned; becauſe that in every Nation there are farre more of theſe than of them, and how that in all reaſon the denomination ſhould be taken from the greateſt number.

Dr TWISSE upon the Synod of *Arles &c.* Pag. 62, 63, 64.

I Deny that the Scripture ought with much more reaſon, or with any reaſon to ſay, that God would have all men to be damned, although put the caſe that in every Nation & condition there be more of theſe, than of them; and his reaſon drawne from the denomination to be taken from the major part is nothing to the preſent purpoſe. For the queſtion here about the interpretation of Saint *Pauls* phraſe is only this, whether the word *All* be to be interpreted of all ſorts, or of all and every one; ſo that the rule of denomination taken from the major part is nothing pertinent to this, The queſtion being only, whether *genera ſingulorum*, or *ſingula generum* be here meant, not whether ſome of all ſorts, or all and every one of all ſorts. Which being reſolved, and that hereby is meant, *genera ſingulorum*, it may be farther queſtioned, whether *genera ſingulorum* doe imply every particular of theſe kinds, or only ſome of them? For it is well known, that the phraſe is indifferent to the one as well as the other, and that *genera ſingulorum*, are equally preſerved entire in ſome particulars, as in many, or moſt, or all. Like as the Species of the Sunne is maintained exactly as well in that one Sunne, which ſhines by day in the firmament, as if there were twenty Sunnes.

Secondly, though the reaſon here given from the denomination to be taken from the greater part, were pertinent, yet were it nothing pertinent to the Apoſtles purpoſe in this place, to ſay, that God would have all men to be damned; For this were no agreeable reaſon to move them to pray for all, for Kings, and all that are in authority. As if the Apoſtle ſhould ſay thus, I will have you to pray for all, for God will have all to be damned; for ſaith *Auſtin*, if Gods Church knew who were predeſtinated to be ſent into eternall fire with the Divell and his Angells, they would no more pray for ſuch, than they would pray for the Divell himſelfe.

So that this Author doth miſerably overlaſh in this his ſubtilty, and betraies more nakedneſſe than any ſober and wiſe Infidell were like to doe.

Then againe, the inſtances of Scripture are clearely againſt him. For when every foure-footed beaſt (as the Scripture ſpeakes) was ſeen by *Peter* in a viſion; in all likelyhood they were not the moſt part of every kind, but the ſmalleſt rather of every kind: and accordingly this Author might conclude, that conſidering denominations are taken from the major part, therefore it is rather to be ſaid, that every foure-footed beaſt was not ſeen by *Peter*, for certainly the major part of every kind was not; yet in this ſenſe to ſpeake of it, in that caſe was nothing pertinent, but rather contrariant to that which followeth: Riſe *Peter*, kill and eate.

In like ſort ſeeing in all likelihood more people ſtaid at home both in Jeruſalem, and in Judea, then were they who went out to *John*, and according to this Authors rule, it were more fit to ſay, All Jeruſalem and all Judea ſtaid at home, when *John* the Baptiſt Preached: yet was it nothing congruous, but contrariant rather to the Evangeliſts ſcope to write ſo; His purpoſe being to ſet downe of what eſtimation was the authority of *Iohn* by the confluence of all people from all parts unto him & there-

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fore when he writes that all Judea, and all Jeruſalem went forth unto him, the meaning can be no more than this, namely, that from all parts of Judea and of Jeruſalem ſome flocked unto him.

IEANES.

I come unto the third and laſt exception in your Book againſt Doctor *Twiſſe*. pag. 245.

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HAnging upon the Croſſe he prayed for his enemies, and thoſe that crucified him, that they might be forgiven. May it not as well be inferred from hence, that therefore all his enemies, and all ſuch, who (in any ſenſe) crucify him, ſhall be forgiven by God; as it is argued from his praying for Peter, that his faith might not faile, that the faith of no true believer ſhall faile. Doctor Twiſſes notion upon the caſe is not ſo authentique; and though admitted, will not heale the difficulty: Chriſt (ſaith he) prayed for his enemies, ex officio hominis privati, i. e. according to the duty of a private man, but for his elect, as Mediator. This is ſaid but not proved, nor indeed probable. For very unlikely it is, that Chriſt being now in a full inveſtiture of his great office of Mediator, ſhould wave his intereſt in Heaven, by meanes hereof in his addreſſements unto God for men, and pray only in the capacity, and according to the intereſt and duty of a private man; This would argue, that he prayed not for them with his whole heart, nor with an effectualneſſe of deſire to obtaine what he prayed for. But let it be granted, yet ſtill it followes, that whatſoever Chriſt prayed for, was not ſimply, or abſolutely granted or done; and if whatſoever Chriſt prayed for, was abſolutely granted, it is not materiall, as to matter of impetration, whether he prayed as Mediator, or as a private man. But the intent of Chriſts Prayer for thoſe that crucified him, was not that all their ſinnes ſhould be forgiven them, much leſſe that ſimply and abſolutely (i. e. without any intervening of faith and repentance) they ſhould be forgiven (which had been to pray for that which is expreſſely contrary unto the revealed will of God) but that that particular ſinne of their crucifying him ſhould be forgivem them i.e. ſhould not be imputed unto them, by way of barre unto their repentance, either by any ſuddaine or ſpeedy deſtruction; or by delivering them up to ſuch a ſpirit of obſtinacy or obduration, under which men ſeldome or never repent.

IEANES.

THis expoſition of D. *Twiſſe* proceeds upon ſuppoſition, (not grant) that Chriſt prayed for all that had a hand in his crucifying; and taking this ſuppoſition to be true, this following argument, for the proofe of this expoſition, may eaſily be gathered out of D. *Twiſſe*. If Chriſt prayed for all that crucifyed him, then either according to the duty of a private perſon, or by vertue of his office, as he was Mediator; but he prayed not for all his perſecutors by vertue of his office, as he was a Mediatour: therefore if he prayed for them, it was only in anſwer of his duty, as he was made under the Law, and a private perſon. The Minor which is only likely to be queſtioned, is thus confirmed; ſome that were guilty of his crucifying, were in all likelihood Reprobates, as is not only confeſſed, but proved by *Arminius*. *Oravit* (ſaith he) *pro iis qui crucifixerunt eum, pro inimicis ſuis, inter quos & non-electi fuerunt: Principes enim ſæculi crucifixerunt illum; at plurimis illorum ſapientia Dei, & virtus quæ eſt Chriſtus, non eſt revelata.* The *Princes of the World crucified the Lord of Glory.* 1 *Cor.* 2. 8. And unto moſt of them the wiſdome and power of God, which is Chriſt, is not revealed. Now in *Ioh.* 17. 9. where we have the modell, rule, or Epitome of Chriſts interceſſion, that is, of his praying as Mediator, he diſclaimes all prayer, and conſequently mediation for Reprobates. *I pray not for the World, but for them which thou haſt given me.* Where *World* is taken *pro turbâ Reproborum &c.* (ſaith D. *Twiſſe*) for the rout or rabble of Reprobates: and he proves it thus; *In his, Mundus opponitur iis qui dantur Chriſto a Patre; at dari a patre, ſignificat ſtatum electionis. Ioh.* 6. 39. *Significat enim ſtatum bonum præcedaneum vocationi efficaci; omne quod dat mihi pater, veniet ad me. Venire autem ad Chriſtum, eſt credere in Chriſtum per vocationem efficacem. Vind. l.* 1. *p.* 2. *pag.* 181. The *World* in theſe words is oppoſed, unto them which are given unto Chriſt by the Father; but to be given unto Chriſt by the Father, ſignifieth the ſtate of election, for it ſignifieth a good and happy eſtate or condition, precedaneous unto effectuall vocation. *Ioh.* 6. 37. *All that the Father giveth me ſhall come unto me*; but to come unto Chriſt, is to believe in Chriſt, by an effectuall vocation. Thus you ſee, that notwithſtanding your pleaſure to ſay otherwiſe, it is not barely ſaid but proved by him, that Chriſt prayed not for all his Crucifyers by vertue of his office as he was Mediator.

In the next place, that Chriſt according to the duty of a private man, might pray for all that crucified him, even for thoſe of them that were not elect, is rendred probable by two arguments in D. *Twiſſe*.

The firſt is, Chriſts ſubjection unto the Law. *Gal.* 4. 4. *He was made under the Law:* and therefore *bound to fulfill all righteouſneſſe. Math.* 3. 15. And one branch of the Law, as is evident, by Chriſt his own gloſſe upon it, *Math.* 5. is to *love our enemies*, to forgive private & perſonall wrongs, to *pray for them which deſpitefully uſe us, and perſecute us.* this was a poynt that he preſſed much upon his Diſciples in his life time, and it being a duty (though of frequent uſe) yet difficult and harſh unto fleſh and bloud, it is not unlikely but that he might exemplify it by his own practice at his death.

A ſecond Argument in D. *Twiſſe* to prove that it is not improbable that Chriſt as a private man, *affectu humano*, prayed on his Croſſe for all his

his Crucifyers, even ſuch of them as he knew, not to belong unto the election of grace, is drawn from compariſon of ſuch a prayer, with the like prayer, that Chriſt made in his agony in the Garden, *O my Father, if it be poſſible, let this cup paſſe from me. Math.* 26.39. Father, if thou *be willing*, remove this cup from me. *Luk.* 22.42. This bitter cup of his death and Paſſion, he knew full well that he was to drinke up, as a Mediator for his elect, both by his Fathers decree, call, command, as alſo by his own voluntary undertaking; for to this end and purpoſe he came into the World, and ſanctified himſelfe. *Ioh.* 17.19. and therefore though theſe words were part of a moſt ſolemne addreſſement unto God, yet were they not put up by him in the capacity, and according to the duty and intereſt of a Mediator for his elect. *Twiſſe Vindic. l.* 1. *p.* 2. *pag.* 188. And this is enough to ſatisfy you, that you are out in paſſing your cenſure upon D. *Twiſſe* his notion on this place, *that it is ſaid not proved*, which I am perſwaded you would have forborne, if you had ſo throughly peruſed him, as it was fit you ſhould, before you had in publike thus cenſured him.

Let us ſee in the next place, with what ſtrength of Argument you oppoſe his expoſition.

M. GOODWIN.

NOr indeed is this probable, for very unlikely it is, that Chriſt being now in a full inveſtiture of his great office of Mediator, ſhould wave his intereſt in heaven, by meanes hereof, in his addreſſements unto God for men, and pray only in the capacity, and according to the intereſt, and duty of a private man, this would argue that he prayed not for them with his whole heart, nor with an effectuallneſſe of deſire to obtaine what he prayed for.

IEANES.

FIrſt, you cannot deny but that in theſe words of Chriſt, *Father if it be poſſible*, or *if it be thy will, let this cup paſſe from me*, Chriſt prayed not as a Mediator for his elect, for ſo he was ingaged to drinke off this Cup; but as a man naturally declining, and abhorring death, and the ignominy of the Croſſe, as they are in themſelves evill: and yet all your arguments, *mutatis mutandis*, with due change may be applied unto this interpretation, as well as unto D. *Twiſſe his notion* (as you call it) upon *Luke* 23.34.

Secondly, in anſwer unto your objections, we may make uſe of a diſtinction of prayer, brought by *Suarez* in *tertiam partem Sum. Aquin. q.* 21. *Art.* 4. *Prayer is nothing elſe but an unfolding of the will unto God.* Now in Chriſts manhood there was a twofold will, one *abſolute* and *effectuall*, another *conditionall* and *uneffectuall*, which may otherwiſe be termed, a *velleity*, a will of ſimple *complacency*, a will of a thing only *ſecundum quid*, in ſome particular reſpect, according to ſome particular conſideration: of ſuch a will of his we read. *Mar.* 7.24. *He entred into an houſe, and would have no man know it, but he could not be hid.* Anſwerable unto theſe

two acts of the will in Christ, there may be attributed unto Christ two sorts or *kinds* of *prayer*; one proceeding from an *absolute* and *effectuall will*, and this was alwaies heard: the other from a *conditionall and uneffectuall* will, and this was not alwaies heard; such was his prayer in his agony, *let this cup passe from me*: and of this sort or kind of prayer, is that passage, *Psal.*22.2. In reference unto Christ, understood, *O my God, I cry in the day time, but thou heareſt not, and in the night season and am not silent.*

Now to apply this distinction, Christ could not pray as a private man for those of his persecutors, for whom he did not pray as a Mediator, if we speake of that kind of Prayer, which cometh from an absolute and effectuall will, which is styled by *Gregory de Valentia*, *Voluntas rationis undequaque deliberatæ*, because it proceedeth upon regard had to all circumstances: And the reason is, because with this kind of Prayer, he never prayed for any thing, but what he knew would be granted; for he never absolutely and effectually willed any thing, but what was agreeable unto Gods absolute will, the will of his decree or good pleasure, and this is all that your arguments can prove. But yet notwithstanding this, he might pray (taking prayer for a representation of a conditionall or uneffectuall will) for the pardon of even those of his persecutors, who he knew should be condemned, and for whom therefore he prayed not as Mediator: or more plainly, he might expresse a velleity, a gracious, mercifull, and charitable desire, to have all his crucifyers pardoned, so as it were not contrary unto Gods decree, unto which he did submit, and in which he did acquiesce, as he did in his prayer for the removall of his Passion, *not my will but thy will be done.*

An answer very like unto, if not coincident with this, may be easily gathered out of D. *Twisse*; and it is, that Christ, as a private man, prayed for the pardon of all his persecutors, taking prayer for an expression of Christs antecedent will, not as prayer is a representation of his consequent will.

An Antecedent will, as *Alvarez* explaines it, is the willing of a thing considered absolutely, as it is in it selfe, abstracting from all other considerations of it: A consequent will, is the willing of a thing considered with all circumstances wherewith it is clothed. Thus a Merchant willeth the preservation of his wares with an antecedent will, as the preservation of his wares is considered in it selfe; but he doth not will it with a consequent will, as it is considered with this circumstance, as 'tis accompanied with hazard, and danger of his life. Thus also a judge with an antecedent will, willes the life of a Prisoner, because his life is in it selfe, a thing good and desireable: but he doth not will it with a consequent will, as he is guilty of Murther, incest, or any the like capitall crime.

Now D. *Twisse*, though he reject the application of this distinction to God, with whose simplicity and infinite knowledge severall successive considerations of one and the same thing are utterly incompetible, yet he denyeth not, but it may have place in the manhood of Christ. *Ratione diversarum considerationum non nego* (saith he) *distinctionem istam competere posse in hominem; quippe cui variæ considerationes occurrere possunt invicem succedentes: sic Christus naturali sui conservandi desiderio ferebatur, cum a patre peteret, ut calix transiret; at consideratâ voluntate & decreto patris de Calice isto ad bibendum ipsi propinato, eidem se submittere consultum duxit.* This distinction in regard of diverse considerations of one and the same thing, may be ascribed unto man, in whom are found

severall

ſeverall conſiderations of the ſame thing ſucceeding one another: So Chriſt as man, out of a naturall deſire of ſelfe-preſervation, prayed that the cup of his paſſion might paſſe from him; but the will or decree, the command of his Father, his owne office, and mans ſalvation being conſidered, he ſubmitted himſelfe to the drinking up of this cup, even to the very dreggs; *neverthelesse not my will but thy will be done.* Luk. 22. 42. *If this cup may not passe away from me except I drinke it, thy will be done.* Mat. 26.42. He did not will his paſſion with an *Antecedent* will, but he willed it (you ſee) with a *Conſequent will. Joh.* 4. 34. And ſo he prayed againſt it, as a prayer is a propoſall of an Antecedent, not conſequent will.

Now that Doctor *Twiſſe* reſembles this prayer of Chriſt, for the forgiveneſſe of all his crucifyers, unto Chriſts deprecation of his death and paſſion, and makes it to be as that, an expreſſion only of an antecedent will, a deſire of their pardon, conſidered abſolutely in it ſelfe, abſtracting from Gods decree unto the contrary, I ſhall evidence by giving you D. *Twiſſe* his own words. *Vind. lib.*1.*p.* 2. *pag.* 188. *Non dicit Molinæus iſtam voluntatem Chriſti hominis, ſecundum quam oravit pro crucifigentibus ipſum, contrariam fuiſſe voluntati divinæ; potuit enim fieri cum ſubmiſſione voluntati Dei tacite factâ, licet non expreſsâ, ad formulam precationis illius: pater tranſeat a me calix iſte; Sed non mea voluntas fiat, ſed tua.* And againe afterwards in the ſame page. *Annon homini ſanctiſſimo convenit, privatam offenſam remittere, & palam proteſtari, ſe (niſi Deus aliter ſtatuiſſet) percupere ut ipſis ignoſceret; de quibus tamen Deus aliter forſitan conſtituerit, quod & ipſi forſitan innoteſcit? Annon petiit ſalvator, & ardenter obſecravit, ut ſi poſſibile eſſet, calix tranſiret, cum tamen Deum aliter conſtituiſſe, ne ſcilicet eum tranſiret calix, ipſi ſatis conſtaret? &c. Denique, Chriſtum illis bene voluiſſe, ut homo erat, quos antecedaneo decreto ab omnis boni ſpe ac poſſeſſione abſolute excluſit Deus; hoc enim addendum fuit (licet illud fraudulenter nimium diſſimulet Corvinus) etiam hæc ſententia quid horrendi, quæſo te inculcat? Præſertim cum non ſic voluiſſe dicamus, conſideratâ iſtâ, de eorum a ſalute excluſione, voluntate divinâ; ſed duntaxat, ſi per voluntatem Dei aliter conſtitutum non fuiſſet, & ſi penes ipſum eſſet, ut eligeret, utrum in perſecutores ipſius vindictam exerceret, aut ſuſpenderet; pro eâ quam ut homo in omnes (etiam in injuriis remittendis) charitatem exercere debuit, vindictam ſuſpenſam mallet quam exercitam.*

And this in generall unto all your Arguments, I ſhall ſay ſomething to each of them apart.

Mr GOODWIN.

For very unlikely it is, that Chriſt being now in a full inveſtiture of his great office of Mediator, ſhould wave his intereſt in Heaven, by means hereof in his addreſſements unto God for men, and pray only in the capacity and according to the intereſt and duty of a private man.

IEANES.

VNleſſe variation of Phraſes be argumentative, here is nothing but a begging of the queſtion, only it is in ſtate and good language.

M. GOODWIN.

MR GOODWIN

This would argue that he prayed not for them with his whole heart.

IEANES.

IF we understand Prayer in the sense but now mentioned, what absurdity is it to say, that Christ, as a private man, prayed for the forgiveness of all his persecutors with his whole heart, that is, as intensely, earnestly, vehemently, and zealously as he could, in the utmost degree possible to an humane nature. In *Luk.* 22. 44. 'tis said, that Christ prayed ἐκτενέστερον *more earnestly*, and his Sweat was as it were great drops of bloud falling downe to the ground. That this prayer was with the whole heart of Christ, you will not deny, and yet the former part of this prayer (*if thou be willing remove this cup from me*) was not the prayer of Christ as Mediator, but only an expression of an antecedent or conditionall will and desire, like unto this his prayer upon the Crosse for the justification of all his persecutors.

There is nothing considerable which can be objected against this, but that hereupon it would follow, that seeing prayer is a representation of the will before God, that therefore in Christ there are two contrary wills, if he prayed for the pardon of all his persecutors as a private man, and did not pray for it, but rather against it, as a Mediator.

But this receives a very easy solution. To will or not to will, or nill one and the same object, are not contrary, unlesse it be in respect of the same circumstances or considerations. For Christ as a private man, out of humane pitty to wish and desire the justification of all his crucifiers, as a thing good and desireable, if God had not decreed otherwise; and not to will, but rather nill the justification of some of them; upon consideration that they are not given unto him by the Father, but excluded from salvation by the will of his decree or purpose; these indeed are *diverse*, but not *repugnant* acts of the will, because they proceed upon generall considerations, and therefore though the object be one *materially*, yet 'tis *formally diversified:* Thus between Christs desire of declining his death, and his willing acceptance thereof, there was a *diversity*, but no *contrariety*, because they were not in respect of the same circumstances; he desired to decline it, as it was in it selfe evill, and contrary to nature; but as the meanes of mans salvation, he joyfully embraced it.

To cleare this farther, I shall propound a distinction of contraries out of *Rada. Part.* 3. *Controv.* 10. *Art.* 2. *Contraria sunt in duplici differentiâ, alia absoluta, quæ a quibuscunq; causis causentur contraria sunt; ut calor & frigus, quæ non dicunt essentialem ordinem, & dependentiam ad aliquid extrinsecum, exceptâ dependentiâ ad causam: Alia sunt contraria, quæ & dicunt ordinem, & dependentiam essentialem, non solum ad suas causas, sed ad alia extrinseca, & objecta; cujusmodi sunt scientia & ignorantia, velle & nolle, gaudium & tristitia; quocirca non erunt contraria nisi ad idem formale objectum comparentur.*

M. GOODWIN.

Mr GOODWIN.

THis would argue that he did not pray for them with an effectualneſſe of deſire to obtaine what he prayed for.

IEANES.

THis only prooves, what will eaſily be granted, that Chriſt prayed not for all his perſecutors, with a prayer proceeding from an abſolute and effectuall will. But there is one thing which I ſhall not diſſemble, but freely acquaint the Reader with; And it is, that many great Scholers both Papiſts and Proteſtants doe deny, that the propoſall, expreſſion, or repreſentation of a conditionll and uneffectuall will or deſire, is properly a prayer: I ſhall alleadge but two; the firſt ſhall be a Papiſt, to wit, *Becanus Sum. Theol. Tom.* 5. *cap.* 17. *q.* 3. *Licet in Chriſto* (ſaith he) *diſtingui debeat duplex voluntas; una efficax, altera inefficax: non tamen diſtingui debet duplex oratio, una procedens ex efficaci voluntate, altera ex inefficaci. Nam oratio ſi vere oratio eſt, ſemper procedit ex abſoluta & efficaci voluntate orantis, nunquam ex inefficaci. Qui enim petit aliquid fieri, efficaciter illud deſiderat, & ideo adhibet orationem, tanquam medium quoddam ad obtinendum id, quod petit; hinc ſolet dici, orationem natura ſua utilem eſſe ad impetrandum. Unde ſic concludo: qui vult aliquid voluntate inefficaci nullum medium adhibet ad illud obtinendum; quia ſi adhiberet aliquod medium, jam vellet illud voluntate efficaci: at qui orat, adhibet aliquod medium ad obtinendum, nempe ipſam orationem: ergo qui orat, non vult voluntate inefficaci, ſed tantum efficaci.* Although in Chriſt there ought to be diſtinguiſhed a two-fold will, one effectuall, another uneffectuall; yet notwithſtanding, prayer ought not in the like manner to be diſtinguiſhed: for there are not two ſorts or kinds of Prayer, one proceeding from an effectuall, the other from an uneffectuall will; for prayer, if it be truly prayer, alwaies proceedeth from an abſolute and effectuall, and never from an uneffectuall will of the party praying: For he that petitioneth for the doing of any thing, doth effectually deſire it, and therefore uſeth Prayer, as a meanes for the obtaining of that which he requeſts: Hence it is wont to be ſaid, that Prayer is in its own nature uſefull or profitable for obtaining or procuring. Whence I conclude thus; He who willeth any thing with an uneffectuall will, applyeth or uſeth no meanes for the procurement thereof; becauſe if he ſhould make uſe of any meanes to procure it, he ſhould will it with an effectuall will: but he who prayeth, makes uſe of a meanes for the obtaining of what he Praye's for, to wit, Prayer it ſelfe: therefore he who Prayeth, willeth that he prayes for, only with an effectuall, and not with an uneffectuall will. He goes on in the confirmation of this opinion. *Hæc ſententia eſt probabilior: pro quâ nota, aliud eſſe orare; aliud, ſimplex ſeu inefficax deſiderium proponere: quod facile in nobis oſtendi & explicari poteſt. Nam noſtra oratio debet eſſe conjuncta cum certâ ſpe ſeu fiduciâ conſequendi*

quendi id quod petimus. Iacobi 1. 6. *poſtulet autem in fide, nihil hæſitans. Et Math.* 21. 22. *Omnia quæcunque petieritis in oratione credentes, accipietis. Quando autem proponimus ſeu manifeſtamus alteri ſimplex ſeu ineffi-cax deſiderium noſtrum, non facimus id cum certâ ſpe, ſeu fiducia conſequendi illud, ſed potius cum contrario affectu: ut ſi dicam,*

O mihi præteritos referat ſi Jupiter annos.

This opinion is the more probable, for the opening of which we muſt marke, that it is one thing to pray, another thing to propound a ſimple or uneffectuall deſire; which may eaſily be ſhewen and explained in our ſelves; for our Prayer ought to be conjoyned with a certain hope or aſſurance of obtaining that which wee pray for. *Iam.* 1.6. Let him aske in faith nothing wavering or doubting. *Math.* 21.22. And all things whatſoever ye ſhall aske in prayer believing, ye ſhall receive. But when we propound or manifeſt a bare, ſimple, uneffectuall deſire, we doe not doe it with a certain confidence of obtaining what is ſo deſired, but rather with aſſurance of the contrary.

A ſeond teſtimony ſhall be taken out of Doctor *Ames*, an acute and learned Proteſtant. *Coron. art.* 5. *c.* 5. *Juxta ſententiam Armimii &c. nulla propria eſt oratio, quæ non ſit abſoluta: quæ etiam ſententia non eſt temerè damnanda, cum inniti videatur rationibus non contemnendis; præſertim illâ, quæ deducitur ab orationis natura: Oratio enim eſt ſubmiſſa repræſentatio voluntatis noſtræ apud Deum ut ab ipſo perficiatur. Explicatio velleitatis, quâ quid vellemus, ſi aliud non obſiſteret, non eſt oratio proprie dicta. jam vero nihil volumus proprie, quod non abſolute volumus; atque adeo nil petimus quod non abſolute petimus, Quamvis in diſpoſitione precantium conditionis ratio virtualiter ſæpe contineatur. Petimus quidem nonnunquam, ut unum fiat ſi alterum contingat; cujus quidem conſequentis rei futuritio ut conditionata ſit rogamus: Sed ipſa tamen petitio eſt abſoluta, quoniam abſolute petimus, ut poſito uno, ponatur & alterum.*

According to the opinion of *Arminius*, there is no proper prayer, but what is abſolute; which opinion is not raſhly to be condemned; ſeeing it ſeems to be grounded upon conſiderable reaſons, eſpecially that which is drawn from the nature of prayer: for prayer is a ſubmiſſe and lowly repreſentation of our wills before God, to the end, it may be performed by him. The unfolding of a velleity, whereby we would will a thing if ſomething did not hinder, is not prayer properly ſo called: But now we will nothing properly, which we doe not abſolutely will; and therefore we pray for nothing properly, which we doe not abſolutely petition for, although the nature of a condition be often virtually contained in the diſpoſition of the parties praying, who may be ready to ſubmit their wills unto Gods. Indeed we ſometimes pray that one thing may be done, if another thing come to paſſe; and here we pray, that the futurition of the following thing be conditionall, but the prayer it ſelfe is abſolute, becauſe we pray abſolutely that one thing doe exiſt upon the poſiture or exiſtence of another. If this which theſe men ſay be true, then Chriſt praved for the juſtification of all his crucifiers, as a private man, only *improperly*, and not in the *proper and ſtrict acception* of Prayer; for which improper notion of the word, we have warrant from Scripture, when Chriſt ſaid, *Father, if it be poſſible, let this cup paſſe from me, Non oravit* (ſaith *Becanus*) *ſed ſimplex naturæ deſiderium propoſuit*: He did not pray but propound the ſimple, bare, and naked

deſire

desire of his nature: but though this his expression of his naturall desire and love of life, be not a prayer in regard of either a *criticall or Philosophicall* use of the Word, yet you see, tis agreeable enough unto the language of the holy Ghost in scripture, to inlarge the signification of the Word so farre, as to apply it thereunto: for *Mathew* saies expresly that he prayed. *Math.* 26. 39, 42.

But here for mine owne part, I must freely professe that I better like *Aquinas* his interpretation of the place; that Christ prayed not for all his Crucifyers, but only for those of them, that were predestinate unto the obtaining of eternall life, by and through him.

And of this prayer what a fruitfull and plentifull Harvest he reaped, you may read in the 2, 3, and 4. Chapters of the History of the *Acts of the Apostles.* There you shall read, that the Lord daily added to the Church such as should be saved; at one time three Thousand, and another time five thousand; of whom a great and considerable number denyed the Holy one and the just, and desired a murtherer to be granted to them, and crucified and killed the Prince of life. *Acts* 2.36. *Acts* 3.14, 15. *Rivet* on *Psal.* 2. quotes a testimony of *Austin* favouring this glosse: *videbat quosdam suos, inter multos alienos: illis jam petebat veniam, a quibus accipiebat injuriam.*

In making good this to be the sense and meaning of the place, I shall proceed by degrees: proving first, that it cannot be gathered out of the Text, that Christ prayed universally for all that crucified him.

Secondly, That the contrary may be cleared from the Text, both considered in it selfe, and compared with other places of Scripture, as also by reason.

Thirdly, That those of his persecutors for whom he prayed were such as belonged unto the election of grace.

First, All the Logick in the World, though racked never so much, cannot inferre out of the Text, that Christ prayed universally for the pardon of all his Crucifyers: for out of an indefinite terme, a universall cannot be concluded, saith our Author, in defence of *Moulin* his denyall that Christ prayed for all without exception. *Vindic. l.* 1. *part.* 2. *Digres.* 7. *p.* 136.

Secondly, That Christ prayed not for all his Crucifiers without exception, may be cleared from the Text, both considered in it selfe, and compared with other places of Scripture, as also by reason.

First, From the Text considered in it selfe; *Father forgive them, for they know not what they doe*: Here *Moulin*, from the reason adjoyned to the Petition, concludes, That he prayed not for all that had a hand in Crucifying him, but only for those who did it out of ignorance; and in all probability some of them, especially some of the rulers, did it out of pure malice. And whereas *Corvinus* objecteth out of *Acts* 3.17. against *Moulin*; That even the Rulers did it through ignorance: Doctor *Twisse* upbraideth him with his unskilfullnesse in framing consequences, and making an indefinite proposition equivalent unto an universall. It doth not follow, (saith he) The Rulers did this through ignorance, therefore all the Rulers did it through ignorance. That some did, is certain from that place; and so it is,

that ſome of them were converted, and obedient to the Faith. *Act.* 6. 7.

Beſides he addes, that the Rulers, in all likelyhood, did it out of affected ignorance, reſiſting the evidence of the holy Ghoſt, ſpeaking in, and by Chriſt, and bearing witneſſe to the divine Authority of his Doctrine by miracles: Whereas 'tis poſſible that Chriſt might pray for the executioners, that aſſiſted and acted in his crucifying, perhaps not out of malice, but meerely in the ſimplicity of their hearts, in obedience to their Superiours, not knowing any thing. *Tum vero ad ignorantiam iſtam quod attinet, quam populo Iudaico, & primoribus populi vitio vertit Apoſtolus; quid obſtat, quo minus affectata fuerit in multis, (reſiſtendo ſcilicet evidentiæ Spiritus ſancti per Chriſtum loquentis, & per miracula doctrinæ ipſius teſtimonium ferentis) præſertim in primoribus. Qui vero ipſum in crucem egerunt, (pro quibus etiam oravit) erant illi miniſtri, & ſuperiorum mandatis ex officio inſerviebant: poterat ergo Chriſtus oraſſe pro iis, qui non malitia pulſi, Sed cordis ſimplicitate in Superiorum obſequium ducti Chriſtum in crucem ſuſtulerunt.* He alſo addeth, that he prayed only for them that were preſent at his Death; and 'tis probable that the Rulers, at leaſt ſuch of them as were not afterwards converted, were not preſent at his Death. *Eſto vero, non fuerint converſi, ſed & nihilo minus probabile eſt, primores iſtos non adſtitiſſe preſentes Chriſto, qui crucifixionem ipſius promoverent, pro quibus tamen & ſolis oravit Chriſtus in cruce.*

Secondly, that Chriſt prayed not for all and every one of his crucifyers, D. *Ames* confirmeth, from compariſon of this text with other places of Scripture. *Coron. Art.* 2. *c.* 9. *Art.* 5. *c.* 5. Amongſt theſe his enemies there might be ſome that had committed that great and unpardonable ſinne againſt the holy Ghoſt *Math.* 12. 24, 31, 32. There were ſome, by the confeſsion of *Arminius* himſelfe, that were finally impenitent; and finall impenitency in generall, and the ſinne againſt the holy Ghoſt, which formally includes finall impenitency, are ſinnes unto death, for the pardon of which, if knowne, prayer is not lawfull. 1 *Iohn* 5. 16. And therefore (ſaith *Auſtin*) if Gods Church knew, who were predeſtinated to be ſent into eternall fire, with the Divell, and his Angells, they would no more pray for ſuch then they would pray for the Divell himſelfe. Now Chriſt knew who had committed the ſinne againſt the holy Ghoſt, and who would be finally impenitent; for he himſelfe knew full well what was in man. *Ioh.* 2. 28. Yea he knew from the begining who they were that believed not. *Ioh.* 6. 64. See the Learned and reverend M. *Owen* in his Treatiſe of *Univerſall Redemption.* p. 44. 45.

Thirdly, that Chriſt prayed not for all his crucifyers, may be confirmed by an argument ſhaped in imitation of that, which Doctor *Twiſſe* urgeth againſt a common and generall interceſsion, which *Corvinus* aſcribeth unto Chriſt. If Chriſt prayed, that all who crucified him ſhould be forgiven, then it was either that they ſhould be forgiven abſolutely or conditionally; not abſolutely, for then all of them were pardoned; if conditionally upon condition, then this condition was either on Gods part, or elſe to be performed on his crucifyers part: it could not be on Gods part, *modo ſcilicet ipſi viſum fuerit*, for then all of them ſhould be pardoned according to your opinion; for you hold, that God truly and unfainedly deſires the ſalvation, and juſtification of all and every one of the Sonnes of Men: If you ſay that 'tis a condition on the part of his crucifyers, why this condition can be nothing elſe but faith and repen-

tance

tance; and then I demand, whether he prayed for their faith and repentance or no? If you anſwer, that he did not pray for the Faith and Repentance of all and every one of them, then ſay I, neither did he pray for their pardon; for he that truly and ſincerely prayeth for any thing, prayeth alſo by juſt & undeniable conſequence for all the neceſſary antecedents and conſequents, cauſes and meanes, fruits and effects thereof: If you hold, that he prayed for the faith and repentance of all and every one of his crucifyers, then the argument may be renewed as in the begining; for I aſke you againe, whether he prayed for their faith and repentance abſolutely or conditionally; if abſolutely, then all and every one of them did believe and repent, which the Remonſtrants themſelves deny: if conditionally, then this condition is either on Gods part, or elſe on the part of the crucifyers of Chriſt; if upon condition on the part of God, it can be nothing but this, if he will or pleaſe, and then all of them ſhould believe and repent, for (as Arminians gloſſe that text 1 *Tim.* 2. 4) God will have not only all ſorts and kinds of men, but alſo all and every individuall man to be ſaved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth: if it be a condition on the part of thoſe who crucified him, then pray doe you aſſigne that condition, and either I ſhall drive you upon the ſame rock of abſurdity, upon which Doctor *Twiſſe* forceth *Corvinus*, to wit, that Chriſt prayed for his Crucifiers, that they ſhould believe and repent, upon condition that they doe believe and repent; or elſe I ſhall renew the argument, ſo as that a progreſſe from one condition to another, and that without end, ſhall be unavoydable.

Laſtly, that he prayed only for thoſe of his crucifiers, who belonged to the election of grace, is evident from what hath been already ſaid out of D. *Twiſſe* upon *Ioh.* 17. 9. For thence I have inferr'd, that he prayed only for his elect as Mediator, that Chapter being the platforme of Chriſts interceſsion, as mediator for his Church: and you affirme it to be improbable, that Chriſt prayed under the notion and capacity of a private man, for any for whom he did not pray as Mediator.

But now in the laſt place, let us heare how you expound this prayer of Chriſt.

Mr GOODWIN.

BVT the intent of Chriſts prayer for thoſe that crucifyed him, was not that all their ſinnes ſhould be forgiven them, much leſſe, that ſimply and abſolutely, that is, without any intervening of faith and repentance, they ſhould be forgiven; (which had been to pray for that which is expreſly contrary to the revealed will of God) but that that particular ſinne of their crucifying him ſhould be forgiven them, i. e. *ſhould not be imputed unto them by way of barre unto their repentance, either by any ſuddaine or ſpeedy deſtruction, or by delivering them up to ſuch a ſpirit of obſtinacy or obduration, under which men ſeldome or never repent.*

IEANES.

FIrſt, I ſay of this your comment, as you did of D. *Twiſſe* his notion upon the place, this is ſaid but not proved,

Nor indeed probable, becauſe

Firſt, Scripture is a ſtranger to this acception of remiſſion.

Secondly, 'tis very irrationall to take remiſſion in this ſenſe, which by your Doctrine may be conſiſtent with its contrary: to wit condemnation. Though this particular ſinne of their crucifying him, were not imputed to them by way of barre unto their repentance, either by any ſudden or ſpeedy deſtruction, or by delivering them up to ſuch a ſpirit of obſtinacy or obduration, under which men ſeldome or never repent. yet according unto what you teach of grace, and aſcribe unto the power of mans will, they might notwithſtanding all this not believe and repent, but reſiſt the grace of God, and dye in finall unbeliefe and impenitency, even for this ſinne, and ſo conſequently be condemned for it. Chriſts prayer might be granted, this particular ſinne of their crucifying Chriſt might be forgiven unto them, and yet they might be everlaſtingly damned for it, and their other ſinnes. How you can reconcile theſe things paſſeth my underſtanding, but I ſhall not be unwilling to learne.

Laſtly, you ſeem to intimate, that ſome ſinnes are ſo foule, as that they are of themſelves a bar to repentance, for the deſert of which God doth ſometimes deny men either time for, or the grace of repentance.

And hereby you entrench upon the freeneſſe of Gods grace in mans effectuall vocation, which is the free gift of God, and therefore diſpenced, not according to mens preceding carriages good or bad, but meerely according to the good pleaſure of his will: but this argument I ſhall ſpare farther to proſecute, and referre you to our Doctor, who hath abundantly laboured herein, as in other places, ſo eſpecially in his examination of Mr *Cotton* his Treatiſe of Predeſtination, *a pag.* 190. *uſque ad* 204. and againe, p. 234, 235. &c. *uſque ad* 246.

As for that which followeth, as alſo that which is in the beginning of this Section, the examination of it is beſide my preſent deſigne, which is to vindicate Doctor *Twiſſe* from what you object againſt him.

Yet if the Reader deſire ſatisfaction thereabouts, he may meet with it in Doctor *Ames* his *Coronis ad Coll. Hag. Art.* 5. *c.* 5. Whither I ſhall in this haſt referre him.

And thus have I done with the defence of Doctor *Twiſſe* againſt your oppoſition of him: when I conſider your fluent Wit, and ready Penne, I may expect from you a very ſpeedy reply, Which may be, as ſharpe, ſo ſpecious and Rhetoricall enough. I ſhall deſire this favour of the judicious Reader, that he would ſuſpend his cenſure untill he hath my rejoynder, which I ſhall not deferre long, if God grant me his aſſiſtance.

FINIS.

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God does not predestinate
none unto sin 111 bk 2
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36/7 p. 417 Summa opinion

Difference between "quoad res volitas" and
"quoad actum volentis". Rab. bk 1 pag
and bk 2 p 12